G.R. No.

L-38352 August 19, 1982

ADELA J. CAÑOS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. E.L. PERALTA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur and ROLANDO
APAS, respondents.

Hermenegildo Cabreras for petitioner.

Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for respondents.

&

ESCOLIN, J.: 1äwphï1.ñ ët

Petition to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge E.L. Peralta, presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, ordering the consolidation and joint trial of Criminal Case
No. 326 and Civil Case No. 558.

The facts pertinent to this case are as follows: On December 23, 1971, petitioner Adela C. Caños
was charged in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur with violation of Section 3[a] of Rep. Act
No. 602, as amended, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, for alleged non-payment of the
minimum wage to her employee, respondent Rolando Apas. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 326.

On August 4, 1972, respondent Apas instituted an action against petitioner for collection of
differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 558 of the
same court. The complaint averred that respondent Apas had been employed by petitioner as
cashier in her gasoline station since August 1965 up until he was illegally dismissed on January 15,
1971; that during his employment, he was not paid the minimum wage or the overtime pay
prescribed by law, neither was he given termination pay after his dismissal. Respondent, however,
did not pray for reinstatement.

After joinder of issues, the provincial fiscal of Davao del Sur and respondent Apas filed a "motion for
consolidated trial" of the criminal and civil cases, alleging in support thereof – 1äwphï1.ñët

That the defendant in. each of the two cases is one and the same person; that the
complaining witness in the criminal case is also the plaintiff in the civil case; that the
nature of the issues, at least, the factual issues, in both cases are almost Identical;
and that the evidence in both cases would virtually be the same, so that a conso-
lidated trial of both cases would be conducive to the early termination of the two
cases and would greatly enhance the convenience of the parties and the speedy
administration of justice. 1

Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the challenged order, directing the joint trial of the
two cases, in this wise: 1äwphï1.ñët

Since Rolando Apas, complainant, is not insisting on the trial of this case ahead of
his civil case against the accused, for practical purpose, that is, to save time and
effort of the parties and the court, the court is of the view that this case and the civil
case be jointly tried. We shall be shooting two birds with a single shot.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that after the institution of Criminal Case No. 326, the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 558 should be suspended until final judgment in the criminal action has been rendered.
Petitioner relies on Section 3, pars. [a] and [b], Rule III of the Rules of Court, which we quote: 1äw phï1.ñët

[a] Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

[b] After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been rendered;

The argument, fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code. Civil Case No. 558 is a
separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326. The former is based upon a contract of
services entered into by the parties, not upon the civil liability arising from the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the minimum wage, punishable under Section 3 (a) of
Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation to Section 15 (a) of the same Act. 2 Being essentially an action
for enforcement of an obligation ex-contractu the civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in
accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code: 1äw phï1.ñët

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the consolidation and joint trial of the
criminal and civil cases? A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together
where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and
depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over
the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. 3 Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized
under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court: 1äw phï1.ñët

Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or

fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression
and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in
short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. 4

Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action in consolidating
will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the instant case, respondent judge
did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that such joint
trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's
jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against petitioner. The lower court is
directed to proceed with the joint trial of the two cases without unnecessary delay.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75357 November 27, 1987

RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION and/or RUFO MAURICIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J :

Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the 5th Judicial Region, Branch II,
Legaspi City with homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence, in an information
which reads-

That on or about the 20th day of September, 1979, in the city of Legaspi, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the driver of an Izusu dump truck, bearing Plate No. WD-224 T Philippines "79,
belonging to and owned by RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, operate and manage the said vehicle
in a reckless and imprudent manner without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent and/or avoid accident to persons and/or damage to property, and without
regard to traffic rules and regulations, causing as a result of his carelessness and
imprudence the said vehicle that he was driving to sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant
with Plate No. AC -206 S Pilipinas "79, driven and owned by the late JUDGE
ARSENIO SOLIDUM, thereby inflicting injuries upon the said Judge Arsenio Solidum
which directly caused his untimely death, and further causing damage to the said
Colt Gallant in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency to the damage and prejudice of the late Judge Arsenio Solidum and/or his
family, and likewise causing damage to the house owned by PABLO NAVARRA, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Pablo Navarro.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)

After arraignment and trial on the merits, Cabiliza was convicted of the crime charged in a Decision
dated October 12, 1983, the dispositive portion of which reads —

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Illustre Cabiliza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide and damage to property thru reckless imprudence and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months, as minimum to six (6) years, as maximum of prision correccional to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Judge Arsenio G. Solidum, the sum of
P115,723.05 as actual and compensatory damages, Pl,447,200.00 for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 75)

The aforesaid judgment was promulgated on November 9, 1983. On November 11, 1983, Cabiliza
filed a Notice of Appeal. But he did not live to pursue his appeal as he died on January 5, 1984. A
notice of death dated February 4, 1984 was filed by his counsel Atty. Eustaquio S. Beltran. In the
same notice of death, Atty. Beltran manifested the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer of
Cabiliza to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is subsidiarily
liable.
On March 5, 1984, the lower court issued an Order requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to
substitute him as appellant with respect to the civil aspect of the case.

On motion of the heirs of the victim, the lower court in its order dated August 23, 1984 ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution and accordingly on the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a
writ.

The writ of execution was however returned unsatisfied per Sheriff's return of service dated
September 3, 1984, because Cabiliza was found insolvent. A certificate of insolvency was issued by
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan and by the Municipal Assessor of Claveria
Cagayan where Cabiliza appears to be a permanent resident.

On September 3, 1984, the victim's widow, Mrs. Aurora Solidum, filed a motion for the issuance of a
subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or
Rufo Mauricio Construction Co., which was granted by the court in its order dated September 6,
1984. A subsidiary writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court also on September 6, 1984.

On September 12, 1984, Rufo Mauricio thru his counsel Atty. Beltran filed a motion to quash the
subsidiary writ of execution. Resolution of this motion was held in abeyance.

Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio, as the employer of Cabiliza pursued the latter's appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. No. 01829). He interposed the following assignment of errors
—

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS

GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND IMPRUDENT IN TRYING TO OVERTAKE ANOTHER
TRUCK WHEN THERE WAS AN ON COMING CAR FROM THE OPPOSITE
DIRECTION;

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE PROXIMATE

CAUSE OF THE COLLISION RESULTING IN DEATH OF JUDGE ARSENIO
SOLIDUM AND DAMAGE TO HIS CAR, WAS DUE TO THE LATTER'S GROSS
NEGLIGENCE AND IMPRUDENCE IN INVADING THE PROPER LANE OF THE
ISUZU DUMP TRUCK OWNED BY RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION;

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE TOTAL OF P 1,782,923.05

DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE COMPLAIN ANTS;

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST

THE ACCUSED UPON PROOF OF HIS DEATH AND IN NOT RELEASING THE
EMPLOYER RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO
FROM LIABILITY;
 V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING APPELLANT RUFO MAURICIO

AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION A DAY IN COURT TO RESIST THE
DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM.

On April 8, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its now assailed Decision, 1 the
pertinent portion of which reads —

We find that the proper amount of damages for loss of earnings based on Life
expectancy of the deceased is Pl,082,223.84. In this respect, the trial court's findings
is modified. The Judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other aspects.

WHEREFORE, with the afore-mentioned modifications, the appealed Judgment is

AFFIRMED. (Rollo, p. 86)

Rufo Mauricio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution
of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 18, 1986.

The said Decision and Resolution are the subject of the present petition. Petitioner contends that —

1. The dismissal of the criminal case against the accused employee wipes out not
only the employee's primary civil liability, but also his employer's subsidiary liability
for such criminal negligence, because:

a. The criminal case is based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal

Code wherein criminal liability and the exemption of criminal liability
implies exemption from civil liability arising from crime.

b. The civil liability of the employer petitioner is based, if any, on

quasi-delict, since the accused was exempted from criminal liability.

2. Exemplary damages cannot be imposed upon an employer who at the time of the
alleged incident was not present nor inside the vehicle involved in the accident.

3. The petitioner employer cannot be condemned (to pay) an exhorbitant amount of

damages to the tune of P1,417,946.89, without giving him opportunity to cross
examine the witness supporting such claim and affording him opportunity to adduce
evidence to resist the claim, because that would be deprivation of property without
due process of law, repugnant to the Freedom Constitution.

4. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court misapplied the facts contrary to the
physical evidence and relied on conjectures and surmises that depicted a different
picture of the accident when the evidence shows that it was the victim who was
negligent at the time of the accident. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

The first contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-employee wipes out not only the
employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability is without merit. The death
of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction (rendered
against him by the lower court) became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability
meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but
not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was
committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as
innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case. The liability
of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can
prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection
and supervision of his driver). (See 8th par. of Art. 2180, Art. 2194, Civil Code; also People vs.
Navoa, 132 SCRA 412; People vs. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs. Sandaydiego 82 SCRA 120).

Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him
his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on
the driver's alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are
entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense,
the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for
the purpose adverted to hereinabove.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and
this case is REMANDED to the trial court for the hearing adverted to in the next preceding
paragraph.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The
facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits
"1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27,
1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a
clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria
Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo.
As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she
worked as a teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for
it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent
Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.
During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact
of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said
marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors
of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A"
and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of
his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the
nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th
edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H.
466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10]
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted
But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of
penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in
the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and
had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab
initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that
effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of
strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting
this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.