Cariage v. People, G.R. No.

180010, July 30, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Cenita M. Cariaga is a municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela whose

been charged with three separate cases before the Regional Trial Court of Isabela,
all for malversation of public funds. Cariaga was convicted for the said cases.
Hence, an appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals. 

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding
that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon.
Petitioner, admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel,
implores the Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully
ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit
the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial
justice.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT OR BE ENDORSED
AND TRANSMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL
SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.

HELD:

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being
deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Courts
dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the
Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of

justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in
technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.

In Ulep v. People, the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it
found that

x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was
inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part.
Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be
dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in
the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the
case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC
judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong
court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees
with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The
judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of
procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and
when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have
conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases such
as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent
ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial
measures to question her conviction.[11]

While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made
exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence
of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the
interests of justice so require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the case of
petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.

Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the
prosecution and defense as well as a proper application of the imposable
penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage
petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

People v. Dapitan, G.R. No. 90625, May 23, 1991

Facts:
Benedicto Dapitan and Fred de Guzman conspired and confederated together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, armed with deadly weapon and by means of
force and violence, robbed or stole and carried away two pieces of men’s watches worth P1,
188.00 and one pair of long pants worth P250.00 and cash money in the amount of P75.00
belonging to Orendia Amil and stabbed to death on the neck and hitting Rolando Amil (eight
year old child) several times on the head with a piece of wood to prevent him from making an
outcry which directly caused his death.

Accused-appellant, Benedicto Dapitan was found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
by the Regional Trial Court and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the victim Rolando Amil in the amount of P30, 000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency while his co-accused, Fred de Guzman,
remained at large.

          The accused-appellant then filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting that he was appealing
the decision of the RTC. He asserts that the trial court erred in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law that favors the accused-appellant. Additionally, in support of the assigned error,
the accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty by the trial court is
“tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution” and he submits that “the
righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate
sentence” with “all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the
accused-appellant . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian
reasons.”

He prays that he be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua as maximum.

Issue:

          Whether or not there is a denial of due process and whether the trial court erred in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law that favors the accused-appellant.

Held:

          No. There was no denial of due process. Due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing.
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further
disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to
reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted
the court to cancel the hearing of 10 February 1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented
against him and to present his own evidence.

If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the trial
court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Yet,
he found it futile to go any farther.

Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is
to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any other
provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses.
The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has
survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973
Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution.

All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may
be imposed in appropriate cases. As a matter of fact, the same paragraph of the section of Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua.

As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, since robbery with homicide under paragraph
1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is now punishable by the single and indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule
prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply.
Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. No. 131652, 131728, 9 March 1998 –

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn

Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The case was brought before the
Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of
venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an
affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was
done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial
Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of
Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his
right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were
raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case
due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right.
The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver
of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano
has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The
case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

People v. Sola, G.R. Nos. 56158-64, 17 March 1981 –

Facts: Following search and seizure of bodies from hacienda of Pablo Sola, 7 separate
complaints of murder were filed against the accused. After due preliminary examination of
the complainant’s witnesses and other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause
against the accused and issued an order for their arrest. However, without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the
court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo
Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and were
released from detention. The witnesses informed the prosecution of their fears that if the
trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan their safety could be
jeopardized.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the plea for a change of venue for trial is justified.

b) Whether or not the cancellation of bail bonds is justified.

Decision:        
a) Petition accepted; hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a         
justification for transfer of venue.

b) Petition accepted; there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the
prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to
bail being granted.

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal
case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground.

Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 133289, 23 December 1999 –

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayan  without claiming
that one of the accused is a public officer who took advantage of his position.  The information was amended to effectively describe
the offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took
advantage of his position. Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of
arrest issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence,
this petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that
the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.  However, we hold that the petitioners are
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for
the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and
person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial
jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it
was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25 March 2014 –

FACTS
An information was filed against Henry Go for alleged violation of
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government and for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile.
Henry Go filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him
on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent,
citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that,
independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is
not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as
a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019

ISSUE
WON  the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private person
who was alleged to have conspired with a public official whose
salary grade is 27 and that public official has died prior to the filing
of the information.

RULING
The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed
by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public
officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then
Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly
by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its
jurisdiction over the person of its jurisdiction over the

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134307, 21 December 1998 –

Facts: Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination
of his cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Further, he prays for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent
Sandiganbayan (First Division) from further enforcing and/or implementing its order dated February 20,
1995 which bans petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court. The
petitioner and the Office of the Special Prosecutor both argue that the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void for lack of sufficient basis upon which it could have
personally determined the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against him. They
contend that there was a violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequent to the nullity of
the warrant of arrest, petitioner further argues that the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over
him and is without power to exercise the same.
Issue:
(1) whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be
lifted if initially valid;
(2) whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan could still exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner and
proceed with the trial of the case.
Ruling: The rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in
a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order
to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. xxxxxxxxx Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no
probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to
the same by appearing and giving bond. By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from
the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to
continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim
has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of
various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.

In said complaint, the respondents were charged "for having conspired and confederated together and
taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence,
connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using
PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of
the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.2

Alva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157331, 12 April 2006

FACTS:

Arnold Alva was accused of defrauding YUMI VERANGA HERVERA by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of
other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to
give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on
the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same
were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession
with intent to defraud, he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the said YUMI VERANGA HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa.

ISSUE:

Having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, has the accused lost his right to appeal his
conviction?

RULING:

Yes. Under Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court: Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own motion
and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.

The act of jumping bail will result in the outright dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. As pointed out
by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao, the reason for said rule is that: “once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed
to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.”

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final
and executory.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his
chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has
waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc, the court enunciated that:”There
are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right
of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.”