WHO WE ARE

Woven Teaching is the human rights education practice of the Bylo Chacon Foundation.
Through a combination of original programming and grantmaking, Woven Teaching advanc-
es the foundation’s focus on long-term change towards a widespread acceptance of basic
human rights for all.

Our programmatic work is dedicated to supporting classroom teachers with practical help for ethical
and effective instruction. We believe that by weaving human rights education into the curriculum, we
can help educators create socially responsible global citizens.

Woven Teaching envisions a world in which every student’s education includes:

• A sense of historical perspective;
• The development of critical thinking skills;
• A feeling of global citizenship;
• The ability to identify bigotry – understanding its negative effects on both individuals and
society – and the analytical tools to combat it.

CONTACT
woventeaching.org

info@woventeaching.org

1600 Bush Street, Ste 300, San Francisco, CA 94109

Do you have feedback on this lesson or want to share how you implemented it in
your classroom? We’d love to hear from you!

Please take our short evaluation at bit.ly/WT-eval or scan the QR code to the left.

Cover photo: UNHCR/Roger Arnold

Table of Contents
Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................3
Focus on Human Rights......................................................................................................................................3
Considerations for Teaching Ethically and Effectively...................................................................................4
Activity 1: Whose Responsibility?.....................................................................................................................5
Activity 2: Responsibility to Protect..................................................................................................................6
Activity 3: What Can We Do?.............................................................................................................................9
Activity 4: R2P in the Real World....................................................................................................................10
Activity 5: What Do You Think?......................................................................................................................12
Extension Activity..............................................................................................................................................12
Appendix
Case Study: Rwanda.....................................................................................................................................14
Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica)..................................................................................26
Case Study: Kosovo......................................................................................................................................38
Case Study: Libya..........................................................................................................................................52
Case Study: Myanmar..................................................................................................................................65
R2P Key Terms...............................................................................................................................................79
R2P Timeline..................................................................................................................................................80
Graphic Organizer.........................................................................................................................................82
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ..................................................................................................83
Resources........................................................................................................................................................84

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 1

 CONTENT GUIDING QUESTIONS
LEVEL
Grades 11-12
• What responsibility does the international community
have for preventing atrocities?

• What is the relationship between sovereign states?

TIME
3-4 Class Periods
• What measures are available to prevent or intervene when
mass atrocities occur?

LEARNING OBJECTIVES
At the end of this lesson, students will be able to:
• Define the Responsibility to Protect principle
• Understand possible challenges related to intervention under R2P
• Assess action (or inaction) of the international community related to R2P

MATERIALS
• Computers with internet access for
students
• Projector or screen share capability
• Films:
» “Sovereignty Explained” (4:40)
» “What is the UN Security Coun-
cil?” (1:04)
» “Military Humanitarian Interven-
tion Explained” (3:54)
» “Sanctions Explained” (4:27)
» “Negotiations in Foreign Policy”
(4:57)
» “What is UN Peacekeeping?” (2:25)
• Student Handouts:
» R2P Graphic Organizer
» R2P Key Terms
• Case Studies:
• Rwanda [PDF/Online]
• Bosnia [PDF/Online]
• Kosovo [PDF/Online]
• Libya [PDF/Online]
• Myanmar [PDF/Online]

COMMON CORE STANDARDS

Speaking & Listening Literacy in History/Social Studies
• CCSS.ELA-LITERACY.SL.11-12.1 • CCSS.ELA-LITERACY.RH.11-12.3
• CCSS.ELA-LITERACT.SL.11-12.4 • CCSS.ELA-LITERACY.RH.11-12.9

2 Woven Teaching
Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is global political commitment stating that countries have a respon-
sibility to protect not only their own populations, but all populations at risk of genocide and other mass
atrocities. In this lesson, students will consider where responsibility lies for preventing or stopping
violence and the potential challenges faced by international actors when making decisions about
intervention.

This lesson provides opportunities to both look at historical events and to make connections to current
events and global politics. Students will learn about the various actions that nations may take against
other countries when there is evidence of mass atrocities and/or genocide. Students will work with a
case study to analyze historical events and the many considerations at play. The lesson also includes
testimony from survivors and witnesses, addresses from U.S. presidents, and other primary source
documents to provide a fuller picture of these historical events.

With current events in Ukraine and the crises that are unfolding, the U.S. government weighs its
options to take actions against Russia. These decisions are critical and complicated. Sanctions, military
humanitarian interventions, or negotiations are all options that the U.S. and other countries must
consider. Students will learn about all of these interventions and their consequences in order to better
understand Responsibility to Protect.

Focus on Human Rights

Woven Teaching believes that human rights education is essential for students to understand and
assert their own rights and to protect the rights of others. As a result, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) lies at the core of Woven Teaching’s materials. The document’s 30 articles
outline fundamental human rights: basic rights and freedoms which every human being is entitled to,
regardless of the person’s race, religion, birthplace, gender, sexual orientation, or other characteristic.
Although its articles are not legally binding, the UDHR serves as the moral compass for the internation-
al community.

The activities in Are We Responsible? connect directly to several UDHR articles, including:

• Article 3: Right to Life, Freedom, and Safety

• Article 5: Freedom from Torture or Cruel, Degrading, or Inhuman Treatment
• Article 7: Right to Equality Before the Law
• Article 20: Freedom of Assembly and Association
• Article 29: Our Duty to Each Other

Free & Equal: Human Rights Around the World 3

Considerations for Teaching
Ethically and Effectively
These principles draw upon guidelines from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. They have been synthesized and expanded into guide-
lines for teaching about difficult topics related to genocide and mass atrocities.

• Center learning on students.

• Integrate human rights and history.
• Avoid comparisons of pain; there is no hierarchy of suffering and each instance of atrocity is
unique and tragic.
• Acknowledge the sensitive nature of the topic. Plan for a variety of emotional responses from
your students.
• Complicate thinking and avoid oversimplification by avoiding stereotypes and asking students
to be precise with their language.
• Avoid simulation or role play activities which encourage students to imagine that they were
directly involved in genocide or atrocity.
• Genocide and atrocity are processes that can be stopped; they are not inescapable. Mass atrocities
occur because of the decisions and actions of individuals and institutions.
• Emphasize personal agency. Encourage students to consider both the actions taken and not taken
by people before, during, and after mass atrocities.
• Promote student activism and action.
• Allow time to process the material. Provide space for reflection.
• Graphic text or images can trigger trauma and may be degrading to victims, so be sure to
question whether the educational outcomes are served by using certain materials. Preview all
materials before sharing with students.
• Support students to work critically with source material, particularly on the internet. Recom-
mend authoritative sources with factual, archival content.
• Support your students in making connections between historical events and contemporary
issues.

4 Woven Teaching
Activity 1: Whose Responsibility?
In this activity, students will develop and share opinions about state sovereignty and intervention.

Procedure (30 Minutes):

1. Begin the lesson by asking students to move to the center of the room.

2. Explain to your students that they will be asked to silently respond to a series of statements.
They will indicate their answers by moving to either the left or the right of the room. Left means
agreement with the statement and right means disagreement. Explain to students that there are no
correct answers and that they should make their decisions quickly, off the top of their heads. Even
if students feel ambivalent about their answers, they should pick a side. Ask students to move
silently until every person has taken their place either on the left or right side of the room.

3. After each statement and student movement, debrief by asking for a couple students on each side to
explain their position. Respectful debate between sides should be encouraged. Students are encour-
aged to switch sides during the discussion if they have a change of opinion.

4. After you have read all statements, debrief as a class. Is there consensus? Where is there disagree-
ment and why?

Statements:
• Governments should be able to do whatever they want within the borders of their own
country.
• There is no reason why one country should intervene in the affairs of another country.
• Governments have a responsibility to protect their country’s residents from harm.
• Countries should make sure the needs of their own people are met before intervening to
protect people in other countries.
• If people are being harmed by their government, it is the responsibility of other countries to
intervene.
• If people in one country are being harmed by non-government actors (e.g. terrorist organiza-
tions, rebel groups, etc.), it is the responsibility of other countries to intervene.
• Military intervention in another country is never the right thing to do.

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 5

Activity 2: Responsibility to Protect
In this activity, students will learn about the global Responsibility to Protect and consider its usefulness
as a tool to maintain international peace and security.

Procedure (40 Minutes):

1. Before beginning, it may be helpful to review World
101’s “Sovereignty Explained” (4:40) if your students are
not familiar with the concept of sovereignty.
2. Provide students with an overview of the Responsibility
to Protect (see “R2P Explained”).
3. Give students 10 minutes to review the R2P Timeline
(see Appendix or WovenTeaching.org).
Teaching Tip
If students have no prior knowledge
of the United Nations, you may
wish to assign “The United Nations,
Formed for World Peace” on Newse-
la.

4. After reviewing “R2P Explained” and the R2P Timeline, ask students to find a partner. Working in
pairs, students should discuss the following questions and take notes:
a. What events influenced the creation of R2P? How?
b. Many critics argue that R2P restricts state sovereignty, the idea that states should be able to
control all of the people and property within their borders without outside interference. Do
you agree that the international community has a responsibility to protect populations from
harm, even if it violates sovereignty? Why or why not?
c. Are there crimes or situations not covered by R2P that you think should also be included?
d. Do you think R2P seems like a useful tool for maintaining peace?

5. After 10 minutes, bring the class together for a short debrief. Ask for volunteers to share one of their
answers. As you review the questions, discuss the different viewpoints. Lastly, ask the following
questions:
a. Did anything about the timeline surprise you? Was it helpful in understanding the R2P?
b. What are some of the reasons that a country might intervene to prevent a mass atrocity or
genocide? What are some of the reasons that they might not intervene?
c. Do you think that R2P is a useful principle? In what ways? In what ways might it not be
useful?

6 Woven Teaching
 R2P Explained
The concept of sovereignty–that each country can do whatever it wants within its borders and
cannot interfere in what happens elsewhere–is a pillar of international law. But what happens when
a country is harming or allowing harm to happen to its population? Is a country’s sovereignty
more important than human life? Under what circumstances should the international community
intervene?

At the United Nations’ 2005 World Summit, representatives from 170 countries came together and
discussed these questions. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) came out of this summit. At its core,
R2P is about protecting people from the worst crimes; it is a global political commitment that says
countries have a responsibility to protect their populations from large-scale, systemic violence
against civilians (mass atrocities).

This principle arose in the aftermath of genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda during the 1990s. During
these crises, governments around the world failed to intervene to stop the violence. This caused
many people to wonder whether or not the United Nations was effective at preventing harm.

When Responsibility to Protect was adopted in 2005, world leaders agreed to the following three
principles:

1. The first layer of protection comes at the state level. Because of its sovereignty and the legal
obligations of the State, every country has the responsibility to protect its populations. Under
R2P, States must protect their populations from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing,
genocide, and war crimes.

Crimes Against Humanity: Acts committed as part of a widespread attack against civilians.
Crimes against humanity include (but are not limited to):
• Murder
• Deportation
• Torture
• Sexual assault
• Apartheid

Ethnic Cleansing: making an area “ethnically homogeneous” by using force or intimidation to

remove people from a given area. Practices of ethnic cleansing include:
• Murder
• Torture
• Arbitrary arrest and detention
• Sexual assault
• Forced removal and deportation
• Destruction of property

Genocide: Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, including:
• Killing members of the group;
• Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
• Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
• Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 7

 • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

War Crimes: actions that take place during armed conflict which violate the international rules
of war. Among other things, war crimes include:
• Torture or killing of civilians or prisoners of war
• Destruction of property beyond military necessity
• Intentionally targeting civilians
• Use of poison or poison weapons

2. The international community has the responsibility to help individual states meet the responsi-
bility to protect.

3. If a country is failing to protect its population, the international community must be prepared
to take collective action–in accordance with the UN Charter–in order to protect human safety
and security.

This collective action comes in many forms: economic sanctions, attempts at diplomacy, or military
intervention, for example. The UN Charter states that only the Security Council may authorize the
use of force; individual States are not allowed to make this decision on their own. Because the UN
Security Council has five permanent members–the United States, Russia, France, China, and the
United Kingdom–that all have the power to veto a decision, collective action is rare (especially the
use of force).

Since 2005, there have been many criticisms of Responsibility to Protect. Some critics argue that
countries are unwilling to intervene unless intervention is beneficial for them in some way. Others
believe that R2P infringes on sovereignty and can be used as an excuse for countries to involve
themselves in the affairs of other states.

What do you think?

8 Woven Teaching
Activity 3: What Can We Do?
In this activity, students will learn about the mechanisms of Responsibility to Protect and weigh the
pros and cons of each.

Procedure (45 Minutes):

1. As a class, watch “What is the UN Security Council?” (1:04), explaining that the UN Security
Council plays a critical role in the global Responsibility to Protect, as it is the body responsible for
approving any engagement related to R2P; States are not supposed to make these decisions on their
own.

2. Distribute the R2P Graphic Organizer (see Appendix). Instruct students to watch the following vid-
eos (either on their own or as a class) and complete the handout, explaining how each instrument
works and the pros and cons of each.
• “Military Humanitarian Intervention Explained” (3:54)
• “Sanctions Explained” (4:27)
• “Negotiations in Foreign Policy” (4:57)
• “What is UN Peacekeeping?” (2:25)
Note: The original version of this video includes references to sexual assaults perpetrated by UN peace-
keepers. Although this is an important issue, it may be confusing for students who do not otherwise
know what peacekeeping is or how it works. For ease of understanding, Woven Teaching has edited this
part of the video out. Should you wish to share the full video with students, you can do so at youtu.be/
Ns37jHVUilE.

3. After 25 minutes, ask each student to find a partner

and share what they wrote on their graphic organizers,
helping each other to fill in any gaps.
Teaching Tip
4. After 10 minutes, bring the class together for a short
debrief. Review the graphic organizer as a class, asking
volunteers to share their answers. Use the following To ensure all students understand
question to guide discussion: the process, complete the first section
• Which of these tactics seems the most effective? of the graphic organizer together
• What are the downsides to each tactic for the after watching the first video.
countries implementing them?
• How might ordinary people in the target country
be affected by these tactics?

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 9

Activity 4: R2P in the Real World
In this activity, students will work together to analyze one case study, based on actual events. They will
look at the alleged crimes of a country and the international response to these crimes, including the
decision-making process about whether or not to intervene.

Procedure (2 class Periods):

1. Preparation before class: Choose one case study to examine as a class:
• Rwanda, 1994
• Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 1995
• Kosovo, 1999
• Libya, 2011
• Myanmar, 2017

Sources for each case study can be found in the Appendix or digitally on WovenTeaching.org.

2. Begin by explaining that the class will now examine one global event in which the international
community had to make a decision about whether to intervene. Tell students that the case study is
based on real events and both the crimes and the international responses are factual. Working in
small groups, students will learn about one aspect of the case study and present a short summary to
the class.

3. Individually or as a class, read the case study summary so that students have background informa-
tion and context for the rest of the activity.

4. Before breaking into small groups, explain to students that they will first listen to and/or watch
testimony from people who experienced the atrocities, noting that examining the human toll of
these events is essential to understanding the full picture. Putting faces and names to the victims
offers an opportunity for students to understand the effects on real people living in impossibly dire
situations. A list of testimonies related can be found on the following page.

Remind students to listen closely and to take notes. Ask students to write down key words or
phrases that they hear.

After watching, ask students to write down any questions that they have about the testimony.
When they are finished, debrief with the following questions:
a. Briefly, summarize what you heard.
b. What are your initial responses and thoughts about what you heard?
c. What questions do you have?
d. What were some of the important points in the testimony?
e. Why do you think the speaker(s) wanted to share their testimony? Why was this important to
them?
f. Why is testimony so important to understanding historical events?

4. Divide the class into five groups of roughly equal size. Assign each group one of five roles and
provide them with the associated source material.

Note: Impact Researchers will not receive primary or secondary source material. Their role is to conduct
research on the aftermath of the event.

10 Woven Teaching
 • Historian: What events may have foreshadowed later atrocities?
• U.S. Specialist: What role did the U.S. play? What actions did the U.S. take (or not take)?
• United Nations Monitor: What actions did the UN take (or not take)?
• International Specialist: How did the government/perpetrator of the other country react to
foreign interference? What did other members of the international community say/do?
• Impact Researcher: What was the outcome? How did events play out?

5. Instruct students to analyze their source individually, taking notes about anything they find import-
ant, interesting or have questions about.

6. After students have reviewed their source individually, they should bring any notes and questions
back to their group. Working as a team, groups will put together a short presentation (5-8 minutes)
on their source. They should use the following questions to guide their discussion/planning:
• What was the source you analyzed?
• Whose point of view is being expressed in this source? Is that important? If yes, in what ways?
• What questions do you have?
• What does this teach us about Responsibility to Protect?

7. When students have completed their summaries, each group will present to the class. Allow for
time after each presentation for Q&A. When all groups have given their presentations, debrief as a
class with the following questions:
• Did anything surprise you during your research?
• Did this activity change your previous answer to the question, “What responsibility does the
international comunity have when a country is perpetrating mass atrocities or genocide?”
• How did the testimony(ies) of survivors influence your understanding of the events?
• Is there anything else that you would like to know about this period of history?
• How can examining this case study help us understand the challenges today?

Witnesses to Atrocity: First-Hand Accounts

Rwanda
• Monique Mujawamariya, who escaped from Rwanda one week after the genocide began
(Video, 1:59)
• Norah Bagarinka, who survived the genocide in hiding (Video, 1:47)

Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
• Suad Mujić, who speaks about his twin brother, who was killed during the massacre (Video,
2:50)
• Amra Begić, who speaks about her father. She was only 13 the last time she saw him alive
(Video, 2:53)

Kosovo
• B., S., and E., Albanian victims of Serbian ethnic cleansing and atrocities (Text, 2,032 words)

Libya
• Hutaf Shanna, who survived Qaddafi’s crackdown in Libya (Audio, 7:56)

Myanmar
• Sumida, Rabiya, and Harsa, three Rohingya women who survived the attacks of August
2017 (Text, 1,456 words)
• Tasmina, a Rohingya teenager who was forced to flee to Bangladesh (Text, 701 words)

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 11

Activity 5: What Do You Think?
To conclude this lesson, ask students to reflect on what they have learned and make connections to
current events. Students will respond to a writing prompt and then work in pairs to discuss their
responses. Finally, students will participate in a group discussion about Responsibility to Protect.

Procedure (20 Minutes):

1. Provide students with the following prompt:

Should the international community have a responsibility to prevent harm? Be as specific as

possible and draw upon the case study to provide evidence to support your argument.

2. Ask students to spend 5 minutes writing down their responses. When they have finished, ask
students to find a partner to share their writing and discuss their answers.

3. After 5 minutes, bring the class back together and lead a whole group discussion using the
following questions:
a. Did you and your partner agree on your answers? Where were their agreements?
Disagreements?
b. Did anything that your partner shared make you change your mind? Why or why not?
c. We began the lesson reflecting on the premise of Responsibility to Protect. Has your opinion
changed since we began? If so, why? Why not?
d. Conflicts are exploding around the globe; what is our responsibility as a nation? As
individuals? Are there ways that you can voice your opinion? Are there ways that you can
take action? What support or resources might you need?

Extension Activity
Procedure:
1. Working in pairs, ask students to choose one active UN peacekeeping mission (list available at
peacekeeping.un.org) and create an infographic describing the situation there.

2. Infographics should contain:

• An overview of the situation – What is happening there? Who are the parties involved?
• Current role of UN peacekeepers – How large is the peacekeeping force? What is their man-
date?
• An argument for why the international community should pay attention to this situation –
Why should we care? What can we do to bring awareness?

3. Upon completion, students will share their infographics on the class blog or website.

12 Woven Teaching
Appendix
Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda is a small country located in East Africa.
According to the United Nations, approximately
800,000 people (out of a population of seven mil-
lion) were killed over a period of three months
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The geno-
cide was perpetrated by Hutu extremists against
the Tutsi population. It was carried out by militia
groups and everyday Rwandans.
Hutus and Tutsis make up nearly the entire
Rwandan population, comprising about 99 per-
cent. Before the genocide, Hutus were a majority
of the population. Both groups shared the same
language, traditions, and culture. Prior to coloni-
zation, “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were social categories RwandA
East Africa
that distinguished peasant farmers (Hutu) from
aristocratic cattle herders (Tutsi). People could
move between Hutu and Tutsi categories as their
social conditions changed. When Europeans colo-
nized Rwanda, they turned these social labels into
rigid ethnic categories that were based on alleged
“racial traits.” Radio broadcasts referred to Tutsis as traitors,
cockroaches, and snakes. This dehumanization
Germany was the first country to colonize Rwan- of Tutsis helped to create the conditions for mass
da in the 1890s and ruled indirectly for nearly 20 violence and genocide.
years. Belgians took control of the colony during
World War I. The colonizers believed that the Tutsi The Rwandan government and the RPF reached a
were racially superior to the Hutu because they peace agreement in August 1993, three years after
tended to be taller, thinner, and lighter-skinned. the war began. This treaty, the Arusha Accords,
As a result, the Belgians favored the Tutsi and gave was intended to set up a power-sharing system
them preferential treatment. Additionally, the col- between Hutu and Tutsi. In October 1993, the
onizers created a system of ethnic identity cards United Nations established the United Nations
categorizing people as “Hutu” or “Tutsi.” These Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Its
identity cards maintained the ethnic hierarchy in purpose was to ensure the Arusha Accords were
Rwanda that later contributed to the genocide. implemented. The UN sent 2,500 peacekeepers to
Rwanda for this purpose.
In 1962, Rwanda won its independence from Bel-
gium and Hutus gained formal political control Less than a year later on April 6, 1994, the Hutu
of the country. In the decades that followed, more president of Rwanda was assassinated when his
than 450,000 Tutsi fled the country to escape vio- plane was shot down. Both Hutu extremists and
lence. Most went to Uganda and other neighbor- the RPF blamed each other for the attack. The
ing countries. Many of these refugees later tried to actual identity of the perpetrator(s) of the attack
return to Rwanda, but were turned away. is still disputed. The assassination was the spark
that started the genocide against the Tutsi.
In 1990, a group of armed Tutsi refugees called the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda The day of the crash, members of the Hutu Intera-
from Uganda and began a civil war. Hutu ex- hamwe militia put up roadblocks all over the coun-
tremists began the preparation for genocide. They try to begin targeting their enemies. Anyone who
stockpiled weapons and trained militias. Hutus showed a Tutsi identity card was harmed or killed.
also began producing and spreading propaganda That same day, the prime minister and other mod-
that incited hate and violence against the Tutsi. erate Hutu leaders–those Hutus who did not want
to harm Tutsis–were assassinated. Hutu extremists

14 WovenTeaching.org

also killed ten Belgian peacekeepers. This caused
Belgium to withdraw the rest of its peacekeeping
forces. On April 21, two weeks after the start of
the genocide, the United Nations removed nearly
90 percent of UNAMIR troops–leaving only 270
peacekeepers in the country.
The genocide lasted nearly 100 days. During that
time, groups of Hutus searched homes, churches,
and villages looking for Tutsis. The media contin-
ued to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda. Perpetrators
killed men, women, and children, mostly with ma-
chetes and clubs. In many cases Tutsis were killed
by people they knew: their neighbors, colleagues,
and other close relations. Some Hutus attempted
to help Tutsis by hiding them or helping them
escape, but the majority participated or remained
indifferent. Approximately 70 percent of Rwan-
da’s Tutsi population was murdered during the
genocide. Genocide experts estimate that at least
175,000 Hutus participated in the violence.
Key Terms
• apocalypse: an event involving destruction
or damage on a catastrophic scale
• Arusha Accords: a 1993 peace agreement
between the Rwandan government and the
Rwandan Patriotic Front
• autocratic: relating to a ruler who has abso-
lute power
• feudal: any of various political or social sys-
tems similar to medieval feudalism (in which
peasants were forced to work on nobles’ land)
• Habyarimana, Juvénal: Hutu president of
Rwanda (1973-1994). His plane was shot
down on April 6, 1994, sparking the genocide
in Rwanda.
• Interahamwe: Hutu paramilitary group that
participated in the 1994 genocide. In Kinyar-
wanda, the language of Rwanda, Interahamwe
means “those who work together.”
• Kigali: the capital city of Rwanda
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Rwanda
The genocide ended when the RPF defeated the
government and won the civil war in July 1994.
Rwanda was nearly destroyed by the genocide
and Rwandans still face many difficulties and
hardships today. A generation of children lost
their parents; people lost their spouses and their
children; many women and their children were
raped and infected with HIV; and many survivors
now live in poverty, as Hutu extremists destroyed
their homes and land during the violence. Geno-
cide denial is illegal in Rwanda, but outside of
the country, perpetrators and their supporters
still claim that the Tutsi deaths were not part of a
genocidal campaign.
Since 1994, the country has made remarkable
social and economic progress. The government,
civil society, and everyday Rwandans continue to
work together to build peace, accountability, and
reconciliation.
• MRND (Mouvement républicain national
pour la démocratie et le développement): Na-
tional Republican Movement for Democracy
and Development, the ruling party of Rwan-
da from 1975-1994
• NSC: National Security Council, the US Pres-
ident’s foreign policy advisors
• RGF: Rwandese Government Forces, the
armed forces of Rwanda
• RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front. The current
ruling party of Rwanda (since 1994). Prior
to and during the genocide, the RPF was
the armed group–mostly Tutsi–opposing the
government’s forces.
• UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping mis-
sion tasked with implementing the Arusha
Accords
• yoke: joined or linked together
15
 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – Roles
Historian A timeline outlining select events that occurred in Rwanda before the genocide
began in April 1994.

U.S. Specialist US Department of State. Cable number 099440, to US Mission to the United
Nations, New York. “Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal.” National Secu-
rity Archive. 15 April 1994. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/
rw041594.pdf.

A cable, written about a week after the start of the genocide, outlining the reasons
why the US State Department believes that the United Nations should withdraw
all UNAMIR forces from Rwanda.

United Nations Dallaire, Romeo (Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwan-
Monitor da). “Genocide Fax.” National Security Archive. 11 January 1994. https://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/document/27352-document-section-genocide-fax.

A message sent to UN headquarters by Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UNAMIR,

in January 1994. The message describes an informant’s reports of preparations for
genocide being made by powerful Hutus. At the time of its receipt, the UN chose
not to change its course of action.

International United Nations, Security Council. S/PV.3377 (16 May 1994). https://digitallibrary.
Specialist un.org/record/188689?ln=en.

Minutes from a May 1994 UN Security Council meeting. Rwandan Foreign Min-
ister Jerome Bicamumpaka addresses the Council, denying that perpetrators in
Rwanda are acting with genocidal intent.

Impact Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath
Researcher of genocide in Rwanda. They may use the following questions to guide their
research:
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Rwanda? In what ways?
• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?
• How was the nation of Rwanda impacted as a whole?
• What does the government look like today?

16 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – historian
This timeline outlines select events that occurred in Rwanda before the genocide began in April 1994.

Guiding Questions:
• Did the international community have evidence that genocide in Rwanda might happen? If yes,
what was the evidence?
• Do you think the international community could have intervened in Rwanda to prevent the
genocide? If so, when?

1990 October: The RPF invades Rwanda. Local and military officials arrest civilians and hold them
without cause shortly after the invasion. Authorities deny that the arrests are focused on Tutsi;
however, according to Human Rights Watch, approximately 75 percent of those arrested are Tutsi. By
mid-November, 4,500 Tutsis have been arrested.

Pro-Hutu political parties establish the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias. These militias
will be responsible for most of the killing that occurs during the genocide.

1991 January-February: Local officials encourage attacks against Tutsis in northwest Rwanda. 300 Tutsis
are killed and many others are injured. The international community learns of these attacks in 1992.

November: Local officials in central Rwanda incite Hutus to attack Tutsi and members of
opposition political parties. One person is killed and hundreds are forced to flee from the area.
20,000 Rwandans protest in Kigali, demanding an end to government attacks against civilians.
In January 1992, an estimated 50,000-100,000 attend a demonstration with similar demands.

1992 The Rwandan government begins distributing firearms to militia members and other government
supporters. This continues through the beginning of 1994.

1993 July: Radio Tèlèvision Libre des Milles Collines, a Hutu-run radio station, begins airing anti-Tutsi propa-
ganda. In radio broadcasts, Tutsis are often referred to as “enemies,” “traitors,” and “cockroaches.”

August: A peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords formally ends the war between the
Hutu-dominated Rwandan government at the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 2,500 UN peacekeep-
ers are sent to Rwanda.

1994 January: UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire sends message to UN headquarters warning of a
plan for genocide. UNAMIR learns of a secret delivery of weapons at the airport in Kigali. UN forces
intervene and confiscate the weapons.

February: UNAMIR intercepts three more secret deliveries of weapons and ammunition to the
government of Rwanda.

April 6: President Habyarimana’s plane is shot down. The following day, Interahamwe set
up roadblocks and begin to kill Tutsis. UNAMIR forces do not intervene, as their mandate
only allows them to monitor the situation.

WovenTeaching.org 17
 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – U.S. Specialist
This message was written about a week after the start of the genocide (April 15, 1994). It outlines the
reasons why the US State Department believed that the United Nations should withdraw all UNAMIR
forces from Rwanda. The US was hesitant to support foreign intervention; the year before, a failed US
mission in Somalia resulted in the death of 18 American soldiers.

Guiding Questions:
• Why did the U.S. State Department want to withdraw all UNAMIR forces from Rwanda?
• Do you agree that peacekeepers should be withdrawn from a location if there is risk to their
lives? Why or why not?

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON UNAMIR
WITHDRAWAL [...]
1. CONFIDENTIAL – ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE - SEE BELOW.
sonnel. We also believe that UNAMIR should take
steps to ensure the safety of Rwandan civilians un-
der its protection, consistent with its mandate and
provided that the safety of UNAMIR personnel is
not jeopardized.

3. Department has given careful consideration to Action Requested

the draft resolution (Ref A) and the views of other
Security Council (UNSC) members regarding the
status and future of the current UN peacekeeping
force in Rwanda.
The political and humanitarian reasons put forth
for retention of UNAMIR elements in Rwanda
have been taken into account fully in our determi-
nation of the appropriate international response to
developments in Rwanda since passage of UNSC
Resolution 909 on April 5.
4. Department has considered the prospect of
additional widescale conflict and violence in
Rwanda, and the threat that the relative immunity
afforded to remaining foreign civilian and military
personnel will end on April 15.
Taking these factors into account department
believes that there is insufficient justification to
retain a UN peacekeeping presence in Rwanda
and that the international community must give
highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all
UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.
5. Cognizant that full withdrawal may not be able
to be implemented prior to the end of the current
deadline set by the RPF, we believe that UN ne-
gotiators should focus their efforts on ensuring
that the withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel is not
impeded and that the warring Rwandan parties
refrain from attacking or threatening these per-
6. Drawing on the foregoing, [U.S.Mission to the
UN] is instructed to inform [National Security
Council] colleagues that the United States believes
that the first priority of the Security Council is to
instruct the Secretary General to implement an or-
derly withdrawal of all/all UNAMIR forces from
Rwanda, taking the necessary steps to ensure that
the warring parties in Rwanda respect the safety
of UNAMIR and other foreign civilian and mili-
tary personnel until such time as their evacuation
has been completed. Mission is also instructed
to make clear to other UNSC members that the
United States does not believe that a Security
Council resolution is necessary to implement this
withdrawal (the [Secretary-General] has authority
to order this withdrawal under the circumstances)
and that we will oppose any effort at this time to
preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda.
7. Mission they drawn the following points in pre-
senting the U.S.position:
– The United States shares the shock and outrage
of the international community over the events in
Rwanda in recent days.
– We condemn unequivocally the renewed fight-
ing and widespread violence, and the attacks on
international peacekeepers, foreign civilians, and
innocent Rwandan citizens.

18 WovenTeaching.org

– The Rwandan armed parties must bear full re-
sponsibility for the tragic situation, and continued
violence and instability, and their country.
– In the current environment in Rwanda, there is
no role for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force.
– Those nations that contributed troops to UN-
AMIR have acted responsibly and to their utmost
ability, and have exerted commendable efforts to
provide humanitarian protection to foreign, as
well as Rwandan, civilians.
– Those forces that participated in UNAMIR are
to be commended for their efforts in a hostile and
threatening environment.
– We endorse the decision of UNAMIR contrib-
utors to withdraw their forces from Rwanda for
their safety, hoping that such withdrawal will be
carried out in an orderly manner and that mea-
sures will be taken to obtain commitments from
the Rwandan parties to respect the safety of Rwan-
dan and foreign citizens after the UN personnel
have withdrawn.
– We do not believe that the warring parties in
Rwanda are likely to respect UNAMIR’s mandate
nor, in the present environment, are they capable
of adequately ensuring the safety of UN peace-
keeping personnel in Rwanda.
– There may be a role for the UN to play in fa-
cilitating negotiations among the warring parties
but that is a role for a representative of the Sec-
retary General, not for UNAMIR. We are willing
to support and encourage a political initiative by
the Secretary General to promote reconciliation
among the parties.
– Experience suggests that any serious negoti-
ations among the parties will take place outside
Source
US Department of State. Cable number 099440, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York.
“Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal.” National Security Archive. 15 April 1994. https://nsar-
chive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041594.pdf.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda; therefore, UN security forces will not be
required.
– Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence
in Rwanda is firm. It is based on our conviction
that the Security Council has an obligation to en-
sure the peacekeeping operations are viable, but
they are capable of fulfilling their mandates, and
that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or
retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.
– United States hopes that the parties in Rwanda,
with the assistance of mediators from the inter-
national community as appropriate, we’ll be able
to end the violence in their country, move toward
reconciliation, and begin a process that will lead to
a durable peace.
– When the parties demonstrate that they are will-
ing and able to work in the interests of the Rwan-
dan people toward a lasting resolution of their
conflict, we will be willing to reconsider whether
a renewed role for UNAMIR when peacekeeping
can facilitate and build a lasting peace in their
country.
– Until that time, however, priority must be
given to ensuring the safe withdrawal of UN
peacekeepers and other international personnel
and civilians in danger in Rwanda. To attempt to
sustain a peacekeeping operation in the present
environment would only undermine the Security
Council’s responsibilities for international peace-
keeping. [...]
CONFIDENTIAL
<<END OF DOCUMENT>>
19
 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – United Nations Monitor
Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, sent this message to UN
headquarters in January 1994. In the note, Dallaire describes an informant’s reports that Hutu leaders
were preparing for genocide against the Tutsi. At the time of its receipt, the UN chose not to change its
course of action.

Guiding Questions:
• What specific information did Dallaire provide to the UN headquarters?
• Do you think the UN should have acted on the information that Dallaire provided? Why or why
not?

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994 [...]
1. Force commander put in contact with informant
by very very important government politician.
Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of In-
terhamwe armed militia of MRND.
2. He informed us he was in charge of last Satur-
day’s demonstrations which aims were to target
deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremo-
nies and Belgian soldiers. They hoped to provoke
the RPF [Battalion] to engage (being fired upon)
the demonstrators and provoke a civil war. Dep-
uties were to be assassinated upon entry or exit
from Parliament. Belgian troops were to be pro-
voked and if Belgians soldiers resorted to force a
number of them were to be killed and thus guar-
antee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. [...]
5. Interhamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF
military camps outside the capital. The 1700 are
scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since
UNAMIR deployed he has trained 300 personnel
in three week training sessions at RGF camps.
Training focus was discipline, weapons, explo-
sives, close combat and tactics.
6. Principal aim of Interhamwe in the past was to
protect Kigali from RPF. Since UNAMIR mandate
he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali.
He suspects it is for their extermination. Example
he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could
kill up to 1000 Tutsis.
7. Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi
extermination. He supports opposition to RPF,
but cannot support killing of innocent persons.
He also stated that he believes the president does
not have full control over all elements of his old
party/faction.
8. Informant is prepared to provide location of
major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons.
He already has distributed 110 weapons including
35 with ammunition and can give us details of
their location. Type of weapons are G3 and AK47
provided by RGF. He was ready to go to the arms
cache tonight—if we gave him the following guar-
antee. He requests that he and his family (his wife
and four children) be placed under our protection.
9. It is our intention to take action within the next
36 hours with a possible [start time] of Wednesday
at dawn (local). Informant states that hostilities
may commence again if political deadlock ends.
Violence could take place day of the ceremonies
or the day after. Therefore, Wednesday will give
greatest chance of success and also be most timely
to provide significant input to ongoing political
negotiations.
10. It is recommended the informant be granted
protection and evacuated out of Rwanda. This
[headquarters] does not have previous UN ex-
perience in such matters and urgently requests
guidance. No contact has as yet been made to any
embassy in order to inquire if they are prepared to
protect him for a period of time by granting diplo-
matic immunity in their embassy in Kigali before
moving him and his family out of the country.
11. Force Commander will be meeting with the
very very important political person tomorrow
morning in order to ensure that this individual
is conscious of all parameters of his involvement.
Force Commander does have certain reservations

20 WovenTeaching.org

on the suddenness of the change of heart of the
informant to come clean with this information.
[Search] of armed cache and detailed planning of
raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a trap
not fully excluded, as this may be a set-up against
the very very important political person. Force
Case Study: Rwanda
Commander to inform [Special Representative of
the Secretary-General] first thing in morning to
ensure his support.
13. Peux ce que veux. Allons-y. [French: Where there’s
a will, there’s a way. Let’s go.]

Source
Dallaire, Romeo (Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda). “Genocide
Fax.” National Security Archive. 11 January 1994. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27352-docu-
ment-section-genocide-fax.

WovenTeaching.org 21
 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – International Specialist
These notes come from a May 1994 meeting of the UN Security Council. During the meeting, Rwandan
Foreign Minister Jerome Bicamumpaka addresses the Council, denying that perpetrators in Rwanda
are acting with genocidal intent. His comments are intentionally misleading and false. During the
genocide, Hutu militants killed Tutsis. Bicamumpaka twists the facts and speaks of the Tutsis as though
they are the perpetrators of the violence in Rwanda. Afterwards, members of the Security Council make
statements in response to Bicamumpaka’s address and the Secretary-General’s suggestion that more
troops are brought in to support UNAMIR.

Guiding Questions:
• How did members of the UN Security Council respond to Bicamumpaka’s speech?
• Three days before this meeting, the Secretary-General suggested increasing the number of
peacekeepers in Rwanda. What did the members of the Security Council say about this?

The President: The Security Council will now be-
gin its consideration of the item on the agenda. [...]
Mr. Bicamumpaka [VEE-cha-moo-MAW-kuh]
(Rwanda): [...] I speak to you in order to invite
you to look more deeply into the tragic events
that are currently besetting my country, Rwan-
da. Many people learned of these events as they
happened, unaware of their historical background
and origin, or of the motives behind them. How-
ever, many have asked why there was so much
hatred and cruelty. Some would answer naively
that it was the fault of the Rwandese army or of
the Rwandese Government. Yet the actual reality
is different, more complex, less easy to grasp from
the outside. It is deeply rooted in the subconscious
of every Rwandese and in the collective memory
of an entire people.
The Rwandese tragedy derives from the age-old
history of the nation of Rwanda. The hatred that
is erupting now was forged over four centuries of
cruel and ruthless domination of the Hutu majori-
ty by the haughty and domineering Tutsi minority.
[...] But too much hatred and too much contempt,
too much enslavement, inevitably bring rebellion.
[...]
Several years of tranquility passed. Some said that
ethnic hatred had died down, that national rec-
onciliation had been achieved. Deep friendships
developed between the Hutu and Tutsi peasants
and among the elites on both sides, and mixed
marriages were celebrated, many modest but
some with great ceremony.
22
The illusion was perfect, but it was still only an
illusion, for then came the invasion of 1 October
1990, [...] The wound that we thought had healed
was reopened.
Many lost their lives simply because they were
Hutu. The invaders, the Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF), had [...] destroyed everything that could
symbolize republican power - roads, bridges, clin-
ics, hospitals, schools and so on.
And yet, they claim to have taken up arms in
order to restore democracy and the prosperity
of Rwanda. What kind of democracy accepts the
systematic killing of its people? What democracy
can tolerate the forced displacement of more than
a million people?
Fortunately, the army and the Rwandese people
together were able to stop the revenge-seeking
invaders, [...]
I should like to thank all the observers at the nego-
tiations, who spared no effort to get the two par-
ties to sign the Arusha Peace Accords. The people
of Rwanda, and particularly those displaced in
the fighting, had legitimate hopes for those agree-
ments. Everybody came together in saying: long
live peace in Rwanda.
But alas, how disappointed we were when the
moment came to implement the Accords, which
had been negotiated with such difficulty. The
Rwandese Patriotic Front, the political organ of
the invaders, showed its true colours. It wanted
power during the transitional period, and at any
WovenTeaching.org

price. [...]
The assassination of the Head of State of Rwanda
on 6 April 1994 and the simultaneous resumption
of war were not mere coincidence. These events
were part of a carefully prepared plan to seize
power in Kigali. [...] The resumption of hostili-
ties by the RPF, along with large-scale massacres
of Hutu civilians, was the straw that broke the
camel’s back, unleashing repressed hatreds and a
festering desire for revenge.
The apocalypse came in the form of an inter-eth-
nic war of unbelievable cruelty. Long-repressed
hatred and bottled-up feelings resulting from con-
stant provocation erupted. [...]
The Government of Rwanda has condemned
every massacre, no matter who the perpetrators
were. Those perpetrators must be identified and
punished. But this applies to the entire duration of
the war, that is, since 1 October 1990.
The RPF, strongly supported by Uganda, has
taken responsibility for killing the Head of State
of Rwanda - high treason in any civilized coun-
try - and has resumed the war, a war more savage
than the one that began on 1 October 1990. It has
carried out systematic, selective massacres of civil-
ians. The RPF shamelessly accepted responsibility
for its heinous crimes because it was certain that it
could continue to mislead the world and convince
the world it was innocent. But can we believe
in its innocence? Can we agree that all of these
crimes should simply be disregarded because of
an unprecedented media campaign to absolve the
assassins and assign them the hero’s role? [...]
The solution is not to let the Tutsi minority - 10 per
cent of the population - seize power. The problem
of Rwanda has to be understood so that it can
be destroyed at its roots. The people of Rwanda
carried out a social revolution in 1959 against the
autocratic power of the Tutsi minority and the sti-
fling feudal yoke. No people, however docile, can
agree to be slaves once again. [...]
The Rwandese Government is convinced that the
cease-fire will not be respected nor the Rwandese
conflict resolved until Uganda ends its aggression
against Rwanda and stops supplying war matériel
and troops to the RPF. The Security Council should
ensure that this occurs. [...]
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Rwanda
Mr. Olhaye (Djibouti): If there is a positive de-
velopment in the relentless Rwandan tragedy, it is
the apparently universal recognition that in some
significant way the international community must
now become directly involved. [...]
Although, as is clear, my delegation would like
to see a stronger mandate for UNAMIR, time is
crucial at the moment. It is critical that we take im-
mediate steps to halt the progression of fighting,
aid those innocent civilians displaced by the war
and control vital geographic assets in Rwanda [...]
Mr. Vorontsov (Russian Federation): [...] Russia
strongly condemns efforts to resolve the conflict
in Rwanda by force, and advocates an immedi-
ate end to the violence and the fighting in that
country. We are willing closely to coordinate our
activities in the Security Council and our bilateral
activities with the efforts of all members of the
world community, the Organization of African
Unity and African States, with a view to dealing
with this grave crisis in Rwanda. We intend to do
everything possible to ensure that peace and con-
cord will reign there once more.
Mr. Keating (New Zealand): I need to begin, I
regret, by saying that in the view of my delegation
the first speaker in our debate should not have
spoken. I say this for two reasons. First, in the view
of my delegation he does not represent a State. He
has no legitimacy and is merely the mouthpiece
of a faction. He should not have been seated in a
privileged position at this table. Secondly, he has,
in the view of my delegation, given us a shameful
distortion of the truth.
My delegation voted in favour of resolution 918
(1994), but I cannot conceal its disappointment
that the resolution only approves a very modest
first phase of the expanded United Nations pres-
ence which we believe is essential in Rwanda. [...]
Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): I would
like to say that my delegation, too, regrets the
tone and the content of the first statement that
was made to the Council this evening in the name
of the Government of Rwanda. We would have
wished to see a condemnation of the atrocities that
have taken place, [...]
Mr. Yañez Barnuevo (Spain): Like other members
of the Council, we also regret that we have had to
hear today, in the Council, reasoning which comes
23

too close to an attempt to justify acts that we con-
sider to be altogether unjustifiable. [...]
It is our hope that the Rwandese parties, heed-
ing the appeals of the international community,
will cooperate in good faith with those efforts by
concluding a cease-fire and resuming the Arusha
peace process. If they do not do so, they will be
assuming enormous responsibility vis-à-vis their
people and the entire international community.
Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): Now, as is well
known, a civil war has been raging in Rwanda as
well since 1990. But even a civil war, however aw-
ful by itself, is no excuse - never mind justification
- for genocide. And, civil war or not, the hundreds
of thousands of civilians who have fallen victim to
the butchers were not at the front lines but far in
the hinterland, with no visible connection to the
RPF except for their ethnic background. Hence the
real innocence of those whom we all too automat-
ically describe as “innocent civilians”.
The President: I shall now make a statement in
my capacity as representative of Nigeria. [...]
Source
UN Security Council. The situation concerning Rwanda: Report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/565).
S/PV.3377. 16 May 1994. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/188689?ln=en.
24
Case Study: Rwanda
We urge Member States to respond promptly to the
Secretary-General’s request for logistical support
capability for the rapid deployment of UNAMIR’s
expanded force level and its support in the field.
One final word: although Nigeria voted in favour
of this resolution, we have reservations on two
aspects. First, we are not entirely satisfied with the
manner in which African issues that come before
the Council tend generally to be treated. [...] Our
own expectation is that the second phase of UN-
AMIR’s deployment will achieve the force level
of 5,500 troops, or as close to that as possible and
necessary, as called for by the Secretary-General
in his report. In this regard, Nigeria has already
indicated its intention to contribute troops to an
expanded UNAMIR. We therefore call on Member
States to respond urgently and favourably to the
Secretary-General’s request.
We call on the international community not to
abandon the innocent civilians in Rwanda, be-
cause to let them down would be to let ourselves
down. After all, we are part of the same common
humanity. [...]
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 Case Study: Rwanda
Rwanda – Impact Researcher
Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of genocide in
Rwanda.

Guiding Questions
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Rwanda? In what ways?

• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?

• How was the nation of Rwanda impacted as a whole?

• What does the government look like today?

Useful Websites
• Human Rights Watch – www.hrw.org

• Rwandan Stories – www.rwandanstories.org

• United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – www.ushmm.org

WovenTeaching.org 25
Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is a country in
southeastern Europe. In July 1995, Bosnian Serb
forces killed nearly 8,000 Bosnian Muslim (Bos-
niak) men and boys near Srebrenica, a town in
Bosnia. It was the largest massacre in Europe since
the Holocaust.
Background
The nation of Yugoslavia was established in 1918
following the end of World War I. It was composed
of six republics: Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Yugoslavia was eth-
nically and religiously diverse. Major population
groups included Bosniaks (Muslim), Serbs (Chris-
tian), and Croats (Catholic).
From 1953 until his death in 1980, Josip Tito served
as president of Yugoslavia. After his death, ethnic
nationalism increased in Yugoslavia. Most of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Southeastern Europe
republics wanted independence, while Serbia
wanted to strengthen its control over all of Yu-
goslavia. Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic en- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Srebren-
couraged Serbian nationalism, especially in Serb ica bridged two disconnected regions of Repub-
communities inside of Bosnia and Croatia. lika Srpska, so Bosnian Serbs wanted to control
the area. Because it was controlled by Bosniaks,
By the early 1990s, the majority of Bosnia’s pop- refugees from the surrounding area flooded into
ulation was one of three ethnic groups: Bosnian Srebrenica beginning in 1992.
Muslims (Bosniaks, 44%), Bosnian Serbs (31%),
and Croat (17%). In 1992, Bosnia moved toward In April 1993, the United Nations declared Sre-
independence; however, the creation of an inde- brenica a “safe area,” ordering “all parties and
pendent Bosnia would mean that the new country others concerned [to] treat Srebrenica and its
would have a Bosniak majority. Bosnian Serbs surroundings as a safe area which should be free
opposed this. from any armed attack or any hostile act.” Soon
after, the UN called for a ceasefire and deployed
When Bosnia declared its independence on April peacekeepers to Srebrenica (UNPROFOR). Both
5, 1992, Bosnian Serbs immediately established sides violated this agreement: the Bosnian forces
Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) with- did not give up their weapons and the Bosnian
in the borders of Bosnia. With the backing of the Serbs did not withdraw their troops from the area.
primarily Serb Yugoslav Army, the Bosnian Serb
Army (VRS) quickly launched attacks in an effort By the spring of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces con-
to win territory and expel non-Serbs from the area. trolled the territory surrounding Srebrenica,
Their tactics included murder, rape, torture, and making it nearly impossible for food, fuel, and
forced displacement–a process known as “ethnic medicine to make it into the enclave. Bosniaks in
cleansing.” Over the course of the war that fol- Srebrenica began to die of starvation. Even the UN
lowed (1992-1995), approximately 100,000 people peacekeepers could not access the supply road.
(mostly Bosniaks) were killed. In March 1995, Radovan Karadzic, President of
Srebrenica Republika Srpska, issued Directive 7, ordering
the VRS to “create an unbearable situation of total
In the beginning of the war, Bosnian Serbs began insecurity with no hope of further survival or life
targeting the town of Srebrenica. The town and the for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.”
surrounding area were controlled by the Army of

26 WovenTeaching.org

On July 6, 1995, the VRS, commanded by General
Ratko Mladic, advanced toward the Srebrenica en-
clave. Troops burned homes and caused thousands
of Bosniaks to flee to Srebrenica and Potocari, a
nearby town where UNPROFOR was headquar-
tered. Approximately 200 UN peacekeepers from
the Netherlands were stationed in Potocari, but
none of them fired on Bosnian Serb forces or tried
to stop the advance. VRS troops captured several
UNPROFOR observation posts in the following
days.
On July 11, 1995, the VRS entered the town of Sre-
brenica. Up to 30,000 Bosniaks fled and sought pro-
tection at UNPROFOR headquarters. Thousands
squeezed inside, but the rest were left outside of
the compound. More than 10,000 Bosniak men
and boys attempted to flee the area. Thousands
were caught or surrendered to the VRS based on
false promises of safety.
Key Terms
• Bosniak: Bosnian Muslim
• enclave: a portion of territory within or sur-
rounded by a larger territory whose inhabi-
tants are culturally or ethnically distinct
• International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): a court created
by the United Nations to prosecute individ-
uals for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and ethnic cleansing in the former
Yugoslavia
• Karadžić, Radovan (Kah-rah-jitch): Pres-
ident of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb
Republic), 1992-1996. In 2016, Karadzic
was convicted of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
• Milošević, Slobodan (Mee-low-SHEH-
vitch): president of Serbia from 1989-2000.
Milosevic was eventually tried for war crimes
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, but died before a verdict
was reached.
• Mladić, Ratko (Muh-LAH-ditch): Colo-
nel-General of the Army of Republika Srpska
who oversaw the atrocities of Srebrenica. In
2017, Mladic was convicted of genocide and
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Bosnia
The next day, Bosnian Serb forces took control of
Potocari. Women, children, and the elderly board-
ed buses that would take them to Bosniak-held
territory. Approximately 30,000 people were forc-
ibly removed from the area in this manner. As the
buses were being loaded, VRS troops begin sepa-
rating Muslim men and boys of military age from
the crowd.
Over the next several days, approximately 8,000
Bosniak men and boys were murdered by Bos-
nian Serb forces. Their bodies were put into mass
graves. As of 2021, more than 1,000 victims of the
Srebrenica genocide have not been identified.
In 2004, the government of Republika Srpska–now
an official entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina–
issued an apology for the massacre at Srebrenica.
Karadzin, Milosevic, and Mladic were all tried at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
crimes against humanity by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
• paramilitary: a group that is organized like
a military force, but is not officially part of a
country’s armed forces
• Potočari (Poh-toh-char-ee): village near Sre-
brenica; base of UN peacekeeping operations
• Republika Srpska (Reh-POO-blee-kuh
Serp-skuh): Bosnian Serb Republic, a self-pro-
claimed sovereign state inside the borders of
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-1995. It was
not recognized by Bosnia, the United Nations,
or any other state. It is now a constituent of
Bosnia.
• Srebrenica (Sreh-breh-neetz-uh): a town lo-
cated in the eastern part of Republika Srpska
in Bosnia-Herzegovina
• UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection
Force, the UN peacekeeping mission to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995
• Yugoslavia: a country in southeastern Europe
that existed from 1918-1992. Present-day
countries that were once part of Yugoslavia
are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Koso-
vo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia,
and Slovenia.
27
 Case Study: Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica) – Roles
Historian A timeline outlining select events that occurred in Srebrenica before the genocide
began in July 1995.

U.S. Specialist Katherine Q. Seelye. “Many in Congress Reluctant To Widen U.S. Role in Bosnia.”
The New York Times, 2 June 1995. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/02/world/con-
flict-balkans-capitol-hill-many-congress-reluctant-widen-us-role-bosnia.html.

A New York Times article published one month before the Srebrenica massacre. It
details U.S. politicians’ lack of support regarding the possibility of sending Ameri-
can troops to Bosnia.

United Nations UN Security Council. Resolution 1004 (1995). S/RES/1004 (1995). 12 July 1995.
Monitor https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1004(1995).

UN Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council [on “Bosnia
and Herzegovina”]. S/PRST/1995/32. 14 July 1995. https://undocs.org/en/S/
PRST/1995/32.

A UN Security Council resolution and statement by the president of the Security

Council regarding the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica.

International “Interviews with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (1995).” Woven Teaching.
Specialist YouTube. Video, 11:52. 15 April 2022. https://youtu.be/iy7OqhZEwLs.

This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original videos:
• Interview with Radovan Karadzic. 12 July 1995. http://srebrenica.sensecen-
tar.org/en/.
• “Meeting Mladic: Alex Thomson’s 1995 encounter.” Channel 4 News. 26
May 2011. https://www.channel4.com/news/alex-thomson-meets-gener-
al-mladic-in-1995.

1995 news broadcasts featuring interviews with then-president of Republika

Srpska Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Commander Ratko Mladic. Both men
were later found guilty of genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. Transcript included in handouts.

Impact Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath
Researcher of genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They may use the following questions to guide
their research:
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In
what ways?
• How was the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina impacted as a whole?
• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?

28 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica) – historian
This timeline outlines select events that occurred in Srebrenica before the genocide began in July 1995.

Guiding Questions:
• Did the international community have evidence that genocide in Bosnia might happen? If yes,
what was the evidence?
• Do you think the international community could have intervened in Bosnia to prevent the
genocide?

1992 February/March: Serb paramilitaries arrive in Srebrenica. With support of the Yugoslav army, they
distribute weapons to the Bosnian Serb population and provide paramilitary training.

March: Bosnia and Herzegovina officially declares its independence from Yugoslavia. One
month later, the European Union formally recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next day,
Republika Srpska secedes from Bosnia.

Summer: Bosnian Serb forces cut off most supply routes into Srebrenica. By winter, a
shortage of food causes widespread starvation in Srebrenica.

Winter: Military campaigns force tens of thousands of Bosniaks out of Republika

Srpska. Most flee to the majority-Muslim areas of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.

1993 Spring: Approximately 40,000 Muslim refugees from other parts of Bosnia reside in Srebrenica.

April: UN Security Council passes Resolution 819, creating a “safe area” in Srebrenica.

1994 April 10: UNPROFOR calls for NATO airstrikes to protect the Gorazde safe area. U.S. planes bomb a
Bosnian Serb military outpost.

Spring: Robert Frasure, a member of U.S. President Clinton’s negotiation team, tells the
National Security Council that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic would not agree to any
peace agreement unless it gave Serbs control of the UN-established “safe areas.”

1995 March 8: Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic issues Directive 7, expressing his desire “By
planned and well-thought-out combat operations, [to] create an unbearable situation of total insecu-
rity, with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa”

Spring: Ratko Mladic, leader of the Army of Republika Srpska, tells the Bosnian Serb Assembly
that, “My concern is to have them vanish completely,” referring to the Bosniak population.

May 28: Leaders of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agree to suspend
NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces. They do not notify the government of the
Netherlands, who has the largest peacekeeping force in Bosnia. The Dutch peacekeepers
request NATO air support at least nine times.

July 6-11: Bosnian Serb offensive against Srebrenica begins. Commander of the Dutch
battalion of UN peacekeepers sends a message to his superiors stating that Srebrenica
will likely fall into Bosnian Serb hands in the coming days. By July 11, 20,000 civilians
flee to the UN peacekeeping base at Potocari.

WovenTeaching.org 29

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica) – U.S. Specialist
This New York Times article, published one month before the Srebrenica massacre, details U.S.
politicians’ opinions regarding the possibility of sending American troops to Bosnia.
Guiding Questions:
• According to this article, did congresspeople support the U.S. supporting Bosnia militarily?
• What reasons did the congresspeople give for supporting or not supporting military
engagement?
Sentiment in Congress today was decidedly
against sending American ground troops to fight
in Bosnia, although members of both parties said
they might support allowing United States forces
to help withdraw United Nations peacekeepers.
Even Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Re-
publican who is chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee and a pointed critic of President Clin-
ton, said he would not object if the United States
helped evacuate United Nations troops. But of the
involvement of American forces for any other pur-
pose, such as helping to move the peacekeepers
to more defensible positions, Mr. Helms declared,
“Not on my watch.”
President Clinton said on Wednesday that he
might send troops to Bosnia not only to help
with withdrawal but for “a reconfiguration and
a strengthening” of United Nations forces. But he
said that so far, he had not had any requests for
such deployment and had made no decisions.
For 200 years, Congress and Presidents have wres-
tled over who has the final authority to send troops
where battles threaten, and the political back and
forth today certainly did not resolve this issue.
But among the voices of caution was that of Repre-
sentative Newt Gingrich, Republican of Georgia,
the Speaker of the House.
“We should wait to see what’s happening,” he told
reporters in Georgia. He said it was unlikely that
“we would say to our allies of a half-century the
U.S. won’t do anything, but at the same time we
don’t want to go and get involved.” He added,
“It’s very important for us to be very cautious.”
He said he had been reassured by Gen. John Sha-
likashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
30
Case Study: Bosnia
that “there were no circumstances where we
would come under U.N. command.”
With the Administration’s intentions undefined,
Republican leaders in the Senate planned hear-
ings on Bosnia next week, while Democrats were
muted in offering their whole-hearted support.
Republicans and Democrats alike renewed their
calls for lifting the arms embargo to allow the
Bosnian Government to defend itself and urged
the President to make the case to Congress -- and
the nation -- for how involvement in Bosnia would
serve American interests.
Despite the predictable criticisms of President
Clinton’s handling of Bosnia -- Senator Bob Dole,
the Republican leader, branded it an abject failure
-- there were some surprising voices of sympathy
for the President in what many view as an intrac-
table situation.
“Nobody’s gotten it right yet, not Bush, not Clin-
ton,” said Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican
of Kentucky, chairman of the foreign operations
subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee
and a leader on foreign affairs in the Senate.
“It’s easy to jump on the President,” he added.
“I’ve done that on a variety of issues. But frankly,
I don’t have any clearer idea of how to proceed
from here than I believe he does.”
But by and large, Republicans and Democrats
alike expressed little enthusiasm for American
involvement in the Balkans.
“I hear from people about tax policy and pesti-
cides and affirmative action, not about Bosnia,”
said Representative Henry Hyde, the Illinois Re-
publican who, like most other members of the va-
cationing Congress, is back in his district talking
WovenTeaching.org

with voters. “But I don’t see that the U.S. has to
be at the eye of every storm over the globe. This is
a European matter, and there ought to be enough
resources in Europe 50 years after World War II to
deal with it.”
Representative J. D. Hayworth, a freshman Re-
publican from Arizona, said, “My constituents,
who are among the most conservative, are not
neo-isolationists but practical, and their question
is, ‘Where is our national interest?’ “
The lack of a specific proposal from the President
has made for some confusion on Capitol Hill. Sen-
ator Paul Coverdell, Republican of Georgia, said:
“I think they were on reasonable, I underline rea-
sonable, grounds, when they talked about evacua-
tion assistance. But who in the hell can understand
where reordering deployment goes?”
Mr. Coverdell faulted the President for not con-
sulting in advance with Senator Dole, who has
said the Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees would hold hearings next week.
“I think that when we’re back on deck Monday,
there will be a very, very intense scrutiny that will
mount very quickly,” Mr. Coverdell said.
Many Democrats appear as reluctant as Republi-
cans to send troops, at least to fight as combatants.
“I am not in favor of using U.S. ground troops
in Bosnia,” Representative Richard A. Gephardt,
Democrat of Missouri, the minority leader, said
in a statement. Like others, he said he would “re-
serve judgment” on providing limited troops for
other purposes until he saw a specific proposal
from NATO.
“The President is treading on very dangerous
ground,” said Representative Billy Tauzin, a con-
servative Democrat from Louisiana. “We should
not get dragged into this war.”
Representative Steny Hoyer, a Maryland Demo-
crat, said he would go “further than the President
Source
Seelye, Katherine Q. “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: CAPITOL HILL; Many in Congress Re-
luctant to Widen U.S. Role in Bosnia.” The New York Times. 2 June 1995. https://www.nytimes.
com/1995/06/02/world/conflict-balkans-capitol-hill-many-congress-reluctant-widen-us-role-bos-
nia.html.
From The New York Times. © 1995 The New York Times Company. All rights reserved. Used under license.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Bosnia
in terms of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.”
But Representative Howard L. Berman, a liberal
Democrat of California, a member of the Inter-
national Relations Committee, and one who is
somewhat sympathetic to the President, cautioned
against such a move. “The existence of NATO is at
stake here,” he said.
As for using United States forces to fight, Mr. Ber-
man said: “You don’t want to fight without a mas-
sive deployment of personnel. You can’t do it with
5,000, 10,000 or 20,000 troops, and not enough has
been done yet to lay the foundation for a massive
American invasion.”
One of the few Democrats to issue a ringing en-
dorsement of President Clinton was Represen-
tative John P. Murtha of Pennsylvania, ranking
member of the Appropriations subcommittee on
National Security. “I absolutely agree with Pres-
ident Clinton’s position on Bosnia as laid out in
his speech at the Air Force Academy,” Mr. Murtha
said. “The national security interest of the United
States is to protect against a wider war in the re-
gion.”
Administration officials gave a classified briefing
on the Bosnia situation to some members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week
before the NATO air strikes. Senator Richard G.
Lugar, Republican of Indiana and a member of the
committee, said the officials outlined a scenario
involving “a very large NATO force with about a
one-third complement of Americans that would
in fact be of sufficiently large size and military
impressiveness and robust enough to extricate
whoever is there.”
Mr. Lugar said such a force should then remain
in Bosnia, secure major ports, airports and other
strategic positions, and make it clear that it would
stay until a diplomatic accord is achieved. He also
sees this force as the solution to the hostage crisis.
31
 Case Study: Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica) – United Nations Monitor
The following documents include a UN Security Council resolution and a statement by the president of
the Security Council. Both documents refer to the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica, a town in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.

Guiding Questions:
• How did the UN Security Council respond to the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica?
• What do you think the international response to the genocide at Srebrenica should have been?
• Do you think the United Nations should have the sole responsibility to authorize intervention?
Why or why not?

S/RES/1004 (1995) flict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by

The Security Council,
Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Gravely concerned at the deterioration in the sit-
uation in and around the safe area of Srebrenica,
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the
plight of the civilian population there,
Gravely concerned also at the very serious situa-
tion which confronts personnel of the United Na-
tions Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and a great
number of displaced persons within the safe area
at Potocari, especially the lack of essential food
supplies and medical care,
Paying tribute to the personnel of UNPROFOR
deployed in the safe area of Srebrenica,
Condemning the offensive by the Bosnian Serb
forces against the safe area of Srebrenica, and in
particular the detention by the Bosnian Serb forces
of UNPROFOR personnel, Condemning also all
attacks on UNPROFOR personnel,
Recalling the Agreement for the demilitarization
of Srebrenica of 18 April 1993 (S/25700, annex)
by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party, and re-
gretting that it has not been implemented in full
by either party,
Stressing the importance of renewed efforts to
achieve an overall peaceful settlement, and the
unacceptability of any attempt to resolve the con-
military means,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease
their offensive and withdraw from the safe area of
Srebrenica immediately;
2. Demands also that the parties respect fully the
status of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance
with the Agreement of 18 April 1993;
3. Demands further that the parties respect fully
the safety of UNPROFOR personnel and ensure
their complete freedom of movement, including
resupply;
4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces immedi-
ately and unconditionally release unharmed all
detained UNPROFOR personnel;
5. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded ac-
cess for the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and other international humanitarian
agencies to the safe area of Srebrenica in order to
alleviate the plight of the civilian population, and
in particular that they cooperate on the restoration
of utilities;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to use all re-
sources available to him to restore the status as
defined by the Agreement of 18 April 1993 of the
safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the
mandate of UNPROFOR, and calls on the parties
to cooperate to that end;
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

32 WovenTeaching.org

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL
At the 3554th meeting of the Security Council, held
on 14 July 1995, in connection with the Council’s
consideration of the item entitled “The situation
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the
President of the Security Council made the follow-
ing statement on behalf of the Council:
“The Security Council recalls its resolution 1004
(1995). The Council is deeply concerned about the
ongoing forced relocation of tens of thousands of
civilians from the Srebrenica safe area to the Tuzla
region by the Bosnian Serb party. Such a forced re-
location is a clear violation of the human rights of
the civilian population. It is especially concerned
about reports of grave mistreatment and killing of
innocent civilians. It is equally concerned about
reports that up to 4,000 men and boys have been
forcibly removed by the Bosnian Serb party from
the Srebrenica safe area. It demands that in con-
formity with internationally recognized standards
of conduct and international law the Bosnian Serb
party release them immediately, respect fully the
rights of the civilian population of the Srebrenica
safe area and other persons protected under inter-
national humanitarian law, and permit access by
the International Committee of the Red Cross.
“The Security Council again condemns the un-
acceptable practice of ’ethnic cleansing’ and re-
affirms that those who have committed or have
ordered the commission of such acts will be held
individually responsible in respect of such acts.
“The Security Council demands that the Bosnian
Serb party immediately allow unimpeded access
Sources
UN Security Council. Resolution 1004 (1995). S/RES/1004 (1995). 12 July 1995. https://undocs.org/
en/S/RES/1004(1995).
UN Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council [on “Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na”]. S/PRST/1995/32. 14 July 1995. https://undocs.org/en/S/PRST/1995/32.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Bosnia
to the civilian population of the Srebrenica safe
area by international humanitarian organizations
and cooperate with any procedure established by
those organizations to determine which civilians
wish to depart the area of Srebrenica. It further
demands that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully
the rights of those civilians who wish to remain in
the safe area and cooperate with efforts to ensure
that civilians who wish to depart are allowed to
do so with their families in an orderly, safe way in
conformity with international law.
“The Security Council demands that both sides
allow the unhindered movement of humanitarian
relief and cooperate with efforts by international
organizations and agencies and concerned Gov-
ernments to provide food, medicine, facilities, and
housing to the displaced.
“The Security Council reiterates its demand that
the Bosnian Serb forces immediately and uncondi-
tionally release unharmed all detained personnel
of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRO-
FOR), and that the parties respect fully the safety
of all UNPROFOR personnel and ensure their
complete freedom of movement.
“The Security Council pays tribute to all the per-
sonnel of UNPROFOR, and of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, especially those
deployed in the area of Srebrenica. It notes that
the presence and bravery of the troops has un-
doubtedly saved the lives of many civilians in the
Srebrenica area.”
33
 Case Study: Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica) – International Specialist
This video contains clips from two 1995 news broadcasts. The first clip is an interview with then-presi-
dent of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadzic at the start of the genocide in Srebrenica. The second clip
is an interview with General Ratko Mladic two months after the genocide at Srebrenica. Both men were
later found guilty of genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Guiding Questions:
• How do Karadzic and Mladic feel about the United Nations?
• From the perspective of Karadzic and Mladic, what was the purpose of these interviews? Who
was the intended audience? What specific details were included and why? Who did they claim
was to blame for the problems?

Interview with Radovan Karadzic, 12 July 1995
Journalist in the studio: The guest of the news is
the President of Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan
Karadzic. The Serb side guarantees full safety to all
of those who are located in the Potocari reception
camp, as well as to the members of the Muslim
armed formations on condition that they surren-
der their weapons and themselves. Mr. President,
what is the latest situation in Srebrenica?
Radovan Karadzic: You are right in saying that
Srebrenica is top news but it should be. And as
such, it’s a complete example of the superiority
of both the Serb weapons and the Serb Army, and
at the same time an example of Serb generosity.
Namely, UNPROFOR is present there all the time
and we are giving it the possibility, if it deems
necessary, to protect those civilians, to have the
complete introduction… insight into what’s going
on. Not one civilian has been hurt, since the com-
bat activities ceased. There is absolute peace and
order.
Our army is enabling the establishing of our civil
authorities there because the Serbs were exiled
from Srebrenica at the beginning of the war. Those
Serbs are coming back now, from the neighbouring
villages. There are already existing organs there,
elected organs of the Municipal Assembly, the Serb
organs. And there is now, as affairs settle down, an
activity of the refugees who want to leave. In fact,
the majority, the vast majority of these refugees
declared that they wished to go to Tuzla.
It is probable that some of them would declare
that they want to go to Abdic. And we are com-
pletely willing to satisfy their wish, as we have
signed an agreement which states that each citizen
has the right to freely choose their place of resi-
dence, although we think that they do not need
to go and they should not go. But one thing is
certain: that place will never again be a terrorist
stronghold of, as you said yourself before. Not a
single armed man can ever be there again, except
for the police. If they want to accept the authorities
of Republika Srpska, and become its citizens, then
they don’t have to go. However, it turns out that
the overwhelming majority wishes to go and they
are mainly going to Tuzla.
Journalist: Now I suggest that we watch the foot-
age brought to us by the Serb Television crew from
Srebrenica.
Reporter: After great provocations and strong
Muslim attacks here from Srebrenica, the members
of the VRS (Republika Srpska Army) were forced
to free this town. A crowd of civilians here are sur-
rendering to the VRS, but the Muslim soldiers are
in a panicked flight in the surrounding hills. So,
that the operation of the liberation of Srebrenica is
still ongoing.
Journalist: On the other hand, the world media
is manipulating with the difficult humanitarian
situation in Srebrenica. Mr. President, what infor-
mation do you have on the humanitarian situation
in this town?
Karadzic: First of all, it was never difficult because
they would always present sixty thousand inhab-
itants. They would inflate the figures two to three
times and in return receive great quantities of
food, which they gave to their army, while it was
fighting against us. This was a source of frequent

34 WovenTeaching.org

tension between our army, UNPROFOR and UN-
HCR because we knew that this food was being
misused.
Secondly, our commissariat [military department
for the supply of food and equipment] for refu-
gees, as you can see, rushed in to help. Everyone
can see that these people look well fed and that
there are no problems, at all. If you compared
what happened in Western Slavonia, where the
Croatians were allegedly liberating, with what
has happened in Srebrenica, where the Serbs are
doing the liberating, there is such a difference that
it is impossible to talk about war at all. Here, the
inhabitants are being simply taken care of and,
of course, if they want to stay they may. The hu-
manitarian situation is being kept under control
by our authorities, and we will certainly not allow
the civilians there to suffer or bear any hardship,
because we will share what we have with them.
Because they are the people. They could have de-
cided to be our citizens and, to put it simply, Mus-
lim civilians were never our enemy and adversary.
We were not fighting against them. And the same
will happen this time.
Journalist: Muslim officials Izetbegovic and Sila-
jdzic seemed confused today. They are blaming
the United Nations and Yasushi Akashi as the per-
sonification of the United Nations’ indecisiveness,
requesting that the United Nations and NATO
return to Srebrenica the status of safe haven. [...]
Karadzic: Well, only we can return to Srebrenica
the status of safe haven. It will only now be a safe
haven because all those remaining in Srebrenica,
as well as those who return – the Serbs, that is -
will be safe. Up to now, no one was safe. Accord-
ing to the international law of war, a safe haven
is an area on which two armies, two conflicting
sides, come to an agreement, draw its borders and
sign pledges that there will be no soldiers or arms
there, that there will be civilians there who will en-
joy the protection of both parties. That was not the
case. None of the safe havens was demilitarised.
[Former Secretary-General] Mr. Ghali himself has
said that the safe havens were military strongholds
for supporting operations against the Serb territo-
ries and the Serb people and this had to stop. This
must stop in Bihac and in Tuzla, in Srebrenica and
Zepa, in Gorazde and Sarajevo. All six zones have
to stop acting as buffers for attacks on Serb terri-
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Bosnia
tories, the burning of Serb village and killing of
Serb civilians. No one can force us into returning
to Srebrenica the kind of status it had while it was
a stronghold of the Muslim Army. This is out of
the question.
This is a war and we are one of the parties to the
war. The United Nations must not under any cir-
cumstances become one of the parties to the con-
flict. If they did become a party to the conflict, that
would be an open act of war against the Serbs and
we would have to defend ourselves. I would also
like to remind the entire international community
of a particular hypocrisy: whenever, Muslim forces
from these safe havens advance through the Serb
territory, from Bihac, Tuzla, Sarajevo, and even
from Gorazde, the whole world applauds, but
when the Serbs undertake counter-offensives and
neutralise their opponents, then the world starts
to wail and mourn over the losses. You can see that
the Muslim civilians haven’t lost anything, but the
Muslim Army has.
The message I would pass on to the International
Community is to hurry up with the conference
because the longer the war continues, the less
flexible the Serbs will be. We were most flexible at
the Lisbon Conference prior to the war. Every new
day of war makes it harder for us to return any
of the territory, and the factual state of affairs will
indeed play a crucial role here.
Accordingly, it would be better if they hurried up
with the conference, removed the sanctions on
Yugoslavia and brought us to the negotiating table
under identical conditions and resolved the crisis,
instead of becoming actively involved against the
Serb Army and the Serb people and Republika
Srpska in political games. They exclusively helped
the Muslims. And the Muslims are ungrateful. If
it hadn’t been for UNPROFOR, they would have
been defeated a long time ago. Even though it may
sound paradoxical, UNPROFOR’s presence pro-
longed the war. If UNPROFOR was not present
here, the Serbs would have brought this war to an
end. And I am afraid that this war will only end
with a complete Serb victory, although we want-
ed to separate from them, rather than defeat and
incorporate them in our state. In the final analysis,
Bosnia once belonged to the Serbs and it may hap-
pen that it will return, in its entirety, to Yugoslavia.
35

Interview with Ratko Mladic, September 1995
Thomson (voiceover): Inside, General Ratko
Mladic, wanted for war crimes outside Bosnian
Serbia, lionized [given public attention and ap-
proval] as its military savior within it. So was he
surprised by the scale of NATO’s unprecedented
attacks?
Ratko Mladic: I am surprised by the brutality of
the NATO forces and the Rapid Reaction force
because the crime they have committed against
Serbian people in the four day attack on different
targets in the Republika Srpska had never been
equaled, even during the Second World War.
Hitler bombarded Belgrade on 6th April 1941. But
on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, he paused. He did not
bombard again so the people could be pulled out
of demolished houses, the wounded tended and
the dead buried according to Christian tradition.
Thomson (voiceover): And yet, when I asked if
that meant he’d pull back all his heavy weapons
from Sarajevo as the UN demands, General Mlad-
ic said it was unfair and unrealistic.
Mladic: It’s not logical to leave our people, about
120,000 Serbs, unprotected in Sarajevo. In and
around Sarajevo, there are 55,000 armed Muslims
and Croats.
Thomson (voiceover): General Mladic said the
Serbs were not responsible for the mortar attacks
that led to the series of NATO airstrikes in recent
days. He said NATO action after this massacre
was out of all proportion and not simply directed
at military targets.
Mladic: We have proof that the shell was not fired
from our side. In my talks with [Head of UNPRO-
FOR] General Janvier, I told him that they have
been bombarding some targets in heavily popu-
lated areas. In Republika Srpska, some were hit
by air strikes with 1,000, 1,500 or even 2,000 kilos
of high explosive. One of those bombs was even
Source
“Interviews with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (1995).” Woven Teaching. YouTube. Video,
11:51. https://youtu.be/iy7OqhZEwLs.
This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original videos via Sense Centar and Channel
4 News.
36
Case Study: Bosnia
directed at a densely populated area in the region
of Rogatica and it killed 10 people. A bomb of that
size is one to two thousand times more destructive
that the 120mm shell that was fired on Sarajevo.
Thomson (voiceover): But NATO action is far
from the only pressure on the general. After his
forces took the Srebrenica enclave, causing an-
other exodus of mainly Muslim refugees, Mladic
himself was sought by the international court for
war crimes.
Thomson (during interview): After Srebrenica,
you have been indicted for war crimes by the
international community. What really went on
there?
Mladic: Everything about Srebrenica happened
in front of the eyes of the international audience
and the international community. During all that
time, a UN commander was present, a Dutch col-
onel whose name I can’t remember. In the camp at
Potocari, there were also members of international
organizations. As far as I can remember, MSF–Me-
decins Sans Fronteres [Doctors Without Borders]
and I think, the Red Cross–were there too. They
can blame me as much as they like. That’s their
right. But what the world is supposed to accept is
the truth.
I am a man of my people and I, together with my
people, fight for our ancient homeland–to defend
them not only from the Muslim-Croat Federation,
but in this case also from NATO-backed Rapid
Reaction Force, and unfortunately from some
individual members of UNPROFOR. They are
supposed to be here as forces of peace and not of
war as they have become. [...]
Thomson (voiceover): As he left, he told me that
NATO and the Americans can bomb all they like.
But he said, “We’re like the Vietnamese. If any UN
or NATO infantry arrive,” he said, “we’ll send
them back in body bags.”
WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Bosnia
Bosnia and HErzegovina (Srebrenica) – Impact Researcher
Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of genocide in
Srebrenica.

Guiding Questions
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In what ways?

• How was the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina impacted as a whole?

• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?

Useful Websites
• Human Rights Watch – www.hrw.org

• Sense Centar – www.sensecentar.org

• United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – www.ushmm.org

WovenTeaching.org 37
Case Study: Kosovo
The Kosovo War (1998-1999) took place in south-
eastern Europe between ethnic Albanians and
ethnic Serbs. For many decades following World
War II, Kosovo was an autonomous province
within Yugoslavia. By the late 1980s, however, the
Yugoslav government was tightening its grip on
Kosovo. At the same time, a separatist movement
inside of Kosovo was growing. In 1998, these
tensions erupted into the Kosovo War. By March
1999, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization),
a military alliance led by western States such as
the United States and the United Kingdom, inter-
vened to stop the violence.
Background
Yugoslavia was established in 1918 following the
end of World War I. Yugoslavia was ethnically and
religiously diverse. It was composed of six repub- Kosovo
lics: Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Ser- Southeastern Europe
bia, and Slovenia. In 1974, two provinces in Serbia
gained autonomy: Kosovo and Vojvodina.
escalated substantially. Milosevic sent troops from
The autonomous province of Kosovo was pri- the Yugoslav Army to Kosovo.
marily composed of two major ethnic groups:
In September 1998, the UN Security Council
Albanians (77%) and Serbs (13%). From the estab-
demanded a ceasefire in Kosovo. By December,
lishment of Yugoslavia, there was tension between
the fighting had resumed. Three months later,
ethnic Albanians and the Yugoslav government.
the international community came together and
When Kosovo gained some autonomy in the
prepared the Rambouillet Accords, which would
1970s, its leadership and institutions shifted from
give Kosovo autonomy again and would deploy
being dominated by Serbs to being dominated
peacekeepers from NATO. The KLA signed the
by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian population felt
agreement, but the Yugoslav government did not.
marginalized.
On March 24, 1999, NATO began a bombing cam-
By the 1980s, Kosovar Albanians were pushing for
paign in Yugoslavia in an attempt to get Milosevic
independence from Serbia. They wanted Kosovo
to withdraw his troops. NATO stated that the
to become an independent republic within Yugo-
campaign was a humanitarian intervention, and
slavia. Violence between Albanians and Serbs was
that the Yugoslav government’s refusal to sign the
common.
Rambouillet Accords justified the action. The UN
Violence in Kosovo Charter prohibits the use of force, with two excep-
tions: if the Security Council approves the decision
When Slobodan Milosevic became president
or as self-defense against an armed attack. NATO
of Serbia in 1989, he tried to weaken Kosovo by
did not have approval of the UN Security Council,
reducing Kosovo’s autonomous status. Soon af-
nor had its members been attacked.
ter, Kosovar Albanian separatists announced the
creation of an independent Republic of Kosovo At a meeting of the UN Security Council that same
(although no country in the world, besides Alba- day, representatives from around the world ex-
nia, recognized the state). In the early 1990s, the pressed their disagreement with NATO’s actions,
separatists created the Kosovo Liberation Army including: Russia, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia,
(KLA), a paramilitary guerrilla group. By 1998, Gabon, and China. Those expressing support
fighting between the KLA and ethnic Serbs had for the military intervention were all members

38 WovenTeaching.org

of NATO, including the United States, Canada,
Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom.
During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Pres-
ident Milosevic proceeded with the campaign to
destroy the Albanian population of Kosovo. Over
the 78 days of the bombing campaign, Yugoslav
troops forced more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians
out of Kosovo, with hundreds of thousands dis-
placed internally. According to Human Rights
Watch, an international human rights organiza-
tion, 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians were forced
from their homes in the four months between
March and June 1999.
The expulsions were very orderly, suggesting
that the ethnic cleansing campaign was planned
in advance. In addition to forcing Albanians out
of Kosovo, there were reports of Yugoslav forces
destroying Albanians’ identity documents so that
they would not be able to return. Murder and
sexual violence were also widespread during the
campaign.
Key Terms
• Albright, Madeleine: U.S. Secretary of State
(1997-2001)
• Balkans: a geographic area in southeastern
Europe
• Belgrade: the capital of Yugoslavia (pres-
ent-day capital of Serbia)
• Chapter VII of the UN Charter: outlines the
UN Security Council’s role in establishing and
maintaining peace. It states that the Security
Council alone can authorize military or non-
military intervention to restore international
peace.
• Contact Group: a group of countries who
worked to maintain peace in Yugoslavia. The
group included the United States, France,
Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United King-
dom.
• Milošević, Slobodan (Mee-low-SHEH-
vitch): president of Serbia from 1989-2000.
Milosevic was eventually tried for war crimes
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, but died before a verdict
was reached.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Kosovo
Despite pleas from the international community
to end the campaign, the bombing continued for
78 days. Approximately 500 civilians in Serbia,
Kosovo, and Montenegro were killed during NA-
TO’s bombing.
On June 10, 1999, the Yugoslav Army signed an
agreement with NATO, ending the Kosovo War.
More than 13,000 people were killed during
the war and close to 6,000 people went missing.
NATO’s bombing campaign killed hundreds of
civilians.
After the war, the UN placed Kosovo under UN
administration temporarily; it remained an auton-
omous province within Serbia. Kosovo declared
independence in February 2008. As of 2022, Koso-
vo is recognized by 97 of the UN’s 193 Member
States. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as a sov-
ereign state.
• OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-op-
eration in Europe, the world’s largest security
organization. As of 2022, OSCE includes 57
countries in Europe, Asia, and North Ameri-
ca. Its verification mission was sent to Kosovo
to ensure that Serbian/Yugoslav forces were
abiding by agreements to end atrocities in
Kosovo.
• Rambouillet: a city in France, as well as the
name of a proposed peace agreement between
Yugoslavia and a delegation of Kosovar Al-
banians (named after the location where it
was negotiated). Yugoslavia did not sign the
agreement.
• UNHCR: United Nations High Commission-
er for Refugees, the UN’s agency that deals
with issues related to refugees
• Yugoslavia: a country in southeastern Europe
that existed from 1918-1992. Present-day
countries that were once part of Yugoslavia
are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Koso-
vo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia,
and Slovenia.
39
 Case Study: Kosovo
Kosovo – Roles
Historian A timeline outlining select events that occurred in Kosovo from the late 1980s until
the beginning of NATO’s bombing campaign in March 1999.

U.S. Specialist “President Clinton’s Remarks on Kosovo – March 24, 1999.” Woven Teaching.
YouTube. Video, 9:24. https://youtu.be/SknLDA_YT6E.

This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video: “President
Clinton’s Address to the Nation on Kosovo (1999).” William J. Clinton Presidential
Library. YouTube. 13:08. https://youtu.be/rLzPVYTf2oc.

A televised address by U.S. President Clinton to inform the American public about
NATO’s bombing of Serbian forces. In this address, President Clinton describes
U.S. interests related to peace in the Balkans. Transcript included in handouts.

United Nations United Nations, Security Council. S/RES/1160 (1998). 31 March 1998. https://digi-
Monitor tallibrary.un.org/record/252117?ln=en.

United Nations, Security Council. S/RES/1199 (1998). 23 September 1998. https://

digitallibrary.un.org/record/260416?ln=en.

United Nations, Security Council. S/RES/1203 (1998). 24 October 1998. https://

digitallibrary.un.org/record/262334?ln=en.

A series of UN Security Council resolutions related to Kosovo in the year prior to

the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

International United Nations, Security Council. S/PV.3988 (24 March 1999). https://digitalli-
Specialist brary.un.org/record/1491671?ln=en.

Minutes from a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on March 24,
1999–the day that NATO bombing of Yugoslavia began.

Impact Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath
Researcher of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. They may use the following questions to guide their
research:
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Kosovo? In what ways?
• How was the nation of Kosovo impacted as a whole?
• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?
• Looking back, what is the legacy of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia?

40 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Kosovo
Kosovo – historian
This timeline outlines select events that occurred in Kosovo from the late 1980s until the beginning of
NATO’s bombing campaign in March 1999.

Guiding Questions:
• Did the international community have evidence that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo might happen?
If yes, what was the evidence?
• Do you think the international community could have intervened in Kosovo to prevent the
ethnic cleansing?

1987 Slobodan Milosevic, not yet president of Serbia, addresses Kosovar Serbs, stating: “You should stay
here. This is your land. These are your houses. [...] You shouldn’t abandon your land just because
it’s difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. [...] But I don’t suggest
that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you’re not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should
change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia.”

1989 Upon becoming president, Milosevic strips Kosovo of its autonomy. Protests erupt in Kosovo.

1991 September: Kosovar Albanians overwhelmingly vote for independence from Yugoslavia. Serbia
refuses to recognize the results of the vote and dissolves Kosovo’s government. Albania is the only
country that recognizes Kosovo as an independent state.

October: All Albanian teachers in Kosovo are fired. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians
are fired from other government positions. Kosovar Albanians secretly create a parallel educa-
tion system in private homes.

1996 February: The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) begins coordinated attacks against the Serbian police;
Serbia responds with widespread force.

1998 February 27: Serbian forces launch a major assault on the central Drenica valley, where the KLA
holds power. According to witnesses, Serbs fire indiscriminately at men, women, and children.
March 5: Serbian police massacre nearly 60 ethnic Albanians in Prekaz (central Kosovo). Three
days later, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says, “We are not going to stand by and
watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in
Bosnia.”

September 23: UN Security Council issues Resolution 1199, calling for a ceasefire in
Kosovo and demanding that Yugoslav forces end “repressive actions against the peaceful
population.”
September 28: In retaliation for the recent killing of 14 Serbian police by the KLA, Serb
forces massacre 21 members of the same family in Gornje Obrinje, including children.

1999 January: Increasingly large numbers of Serb security forces enter Kosovo. Additionally, Serb militias
begin arming ethnic Serb civilians.

March 24: NATO bombing of Yugoslavia begins. Serbian forces intensify attacks on Albanian
civilians. In the following months, more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians are forced from Kosovo.

WovenTeaching.org 41
 Case Study: Kosovo
KOSOVO – U.S. Specialist
On March 24, 1999, U.S. President Clinton gave a televised address to inform the American public
about NATO’s bombing of Serbian forces. In this address, President Clinton describes U.S. interests
related to peace in southeastern Europe.

Guiding Questions:
• What reasons did President Clinton give for NATO’s campaign in Yugoslavia?
• The United States/NATO acted without the approval of the UN Security Council, which violates
the UN Charter. Do you think this action was justified? Why or why not?

My fellow Americans: today, our Armed Forces
joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian
forces, responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. [...]
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive; we act
to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at
the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before
in this century, with catastrophic results; and we act
to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting
now, we are upholding our values, protecting our
interests, and advancing the cause of peace. To-
night, I want to speak with you about the tragedy
in Kosovo and why it matters to America that we
work with our allies to end it.
First, let me explain what it is we are responding
to. Kosovo is a province of Serbia in the middle of
southeastern Europe, about 160 miles east of Italy.
That’s less than the distance between Washington
and New York. And only about 70 miles north of
Greece. Its people are mostly ethnic Albanian and
mostly Muslim. In 1989 Serbia’s leader Slobodan
Milosevic, [...] stripped Kosovo of the constitu-
tional autonomy its people enjoyed. Thus denying
them their right to speak their language, run their
schools, shape their daily lives. For years, Kosovars
struggled peacefully to get their rights back.
When President Milosevic sent his troops and po-
lice to crush them, the struggle grew violent. Last
fall, our diplomacy, backed by the threat of force
from our NATO alliance, stopped the fighting for a
while and rescued tens of thousands of people from
freezing and starvation in the hills where they had
fled to save their lives. And last month, with our
allies and Russia, we proposed a peace agreement
to end the fighting for good. The Kosovar leaders
signed that agreement last week, even though it
does not give them all they want, even though their
people were still being savaged, they saw that a just
peace is better than a long and unwinnable war.
The Serbian leaders on the other hand refused even
to discuss key elements of the peace agreement.
As the Kosovars are saying yes to peace, Serbia
stationed 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in
preparation for a major offensive and in clear vi-
olation of the commitments they had made. Now
they started moving from village to village, shell-
ing civilians and torching their houses. We’ve seen
innocent people taken from their homes, forced to
kneel in the dirt and sprayed with bullets, Kosovar
men dragged from their families. Fathers and sons
together lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not
war in the traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks
and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose
leaders already have agreed to peace. Ending this
tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important
to America’s national interest. [...]
Kosovo is a small place but it sits on a major fault line
between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, at the
meeting place of Islam, and both the Western, and
Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are
our allies, Greece and Turkey. To the north, our new
democratic allies in central Europe. And all-around
Kosovo, there are other small countries struggling
with their own economic and political challenges;
countries that can be overwhelmed by a large, new
wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the ingredients
for a major war are there. [...]
We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just
a few years ago. The world did not act early enough
to stop that war either and let’s not forget what hap-
pened. Innocent people herded in the concentration
camps, children gunned down by snipers on the
way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into

42 WovenTeaching.org

cemeteries. A quarter of a million people killed, not
because of anything they had done, but because of
who they were. Two million Bosnians became refu-
gees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe, [...]
At the time, many people believed nothing could
be done to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. They said,
“Well, that’s just the way those people in the Bal-
kans are.” But when we and our allies joined with
courageous Bosnians to stand up to the aggressors,
we helped to end the war. We learned that in the
Balkans inaction in the face of brutality simply in-
vites more brutality. But firmness can stop armies
and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo
before what happened in Bosnia happens there too.
Over the last few months, we have done everything
we possibly could to solve this problem peacefully.
Secretary Albright has worked tirelessly for a ne-
gotiated agreement. Mr. Milosevic has refused. On
Sunday, I sent Ambassador Dick Holbrook to Serbia
to make clear to him again, on behalf of the United
States, and our NATO allies, that he must honor his
own commitments and stop his repression or face
military action. Again, he refused.
Today, we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do
what we said we would do, what we must do, to
restore the peace. Our mission is clear: to demon-
strate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose, so that
the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of
reversing course. [...] In short, if President Milose-
vic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to
make war.
Now, I want to be clear with you. There are risks in
this military action–risk to our pilots and the peo-
ple on the ground. Serbia’s air defenses are strong.
It could decide to intensify its assault on Kosovo
or to seek to harm us or our allies elsewhere. If it
does, we will deliver a forceful response. Hopeful-
ly, Mr. Milosevic will realize his present course is
self-destructive and unsustainable. If he decides to
accept the peace agreement and demilitarize Koso-
vo, NATO has agreed to help to implement it with
a peacekeeping force. If NATO’s invited to do so,
our troops should take part in that mission to keep
Source
“President Clinton’s Remarks on Kosovo – March 24, 1999.” Woven Teaching. YouTube. Video, 9:24.
https://youtu.be/SknLDA_YT6E.
This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video via William J. Clinton Presiden-
tal Library.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Kosovo
the peace, but I do not intend to put our troops in
Kosovo to fight a war.
Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to
our armed forces? I thought long and hard about
that question. I am convinced that the dangers of
acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not
acting: Dangerous to defenseless people and to our
national interests. If we and our allies were to allow
this war to continue with no response, President
Milosevic would read our hesitation as a license to
kill. There would be many more massacres, tens of
thousands more refugees, more victims crying out
for revenge. Right now, our firmness is the only
hope that people of Kosovo have to be able to live
in their own country without having to fear for
their own lives.[...]
Imagine what would happen if we and our allies
instead decided just to look the other way as these
people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That
would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which
our security has rested for 50 years now. We must
also remember that this is a conflict with no natural
national boundaries. [...] Let a fire burn here in this
area and the flames will spread. Eventually key
U.S. allies could be drawn into a wider conflict, a
war we would be forced to confront later, only at
far greater risk and greater cost. I have a respon-
sibility as President to deal with problems such as
this before they do permanent harm to our national
interest. America has a responsibility to stand with
our allies when they are trying to save innocent
lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in
Europe. That is what we are doing in Kosovo. [...]
That is why we have acted now, because we care
about saving innocent lives, because we have an in-
terest in avoiding an even crueler and costlier war.
Because our children need and deserve a peaceful,
stable, free Europe. Our thoughts and prayers
tonight must be with the men and women of our
armed forces who are undertaking this mission for
the sake of our values, and our children’s future.
May God bless them and may God bless America.
43

Kosovo – United Nations Monitor
The following is series of UN Security Council resolutions related to Kosovo in the year prior to the
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.
Guiding Questions:
• How did the UN Security Council respond to the violence in Kosovo?
• What do you think the international response to the violence in Kosovo should have been?
Resolution 1160 (1998)
31 March 1998
The Security Council,
[...] Condemning the use of excessive force by
Serbian police forces against civilians and peace-
ful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of
terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any
other group or individual and all external support
for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance,
arms and training, [...]
Noting also the clear commitment of senior repre-
sentatives of the Kosovar Albanian community to
non-violence,
Noting that there has been some progress in imple-
menting the actions indicated in the Contact Group
statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further
progress is required,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, [...]
Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
immediately to take the further necessary steps to
achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo
through dialogue and to implement the actions
indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and
25 March 1998;
Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to
condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that
all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community
should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;
Underlines that the way to defeat violence and ter-
rorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade
to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genu-
ine political process;
Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the lead-
ership of the Kosovar Albanian community urgent-
ly to enter without preconditions into a meaningful
44
Case Study: Kosovo
dialogue on political status issues, and notes the
readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a
dialogue; [...]
Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of
fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, prevent the
sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
including Kosovo, [...] of arms and related matériel
of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, mil-
itary vehicles and equipment and spare parts for
the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and
training for terrorist activities there; [...]
Resolution 1199 (1998)
23 September 1998
The Security Council,
[...] Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting
in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and in-
discriminate use of force by Serbian security forces
and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in
numerous civilian casualties and, according to the
estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement
of over 230,000 persons from their homes,
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into
northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and oth-
er European countries as a result of the use of force
in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing numbers of
displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000
of whom the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and
other basic necessities,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced
persons to return to their homes in safety, and un-
derlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which
allow them to do so,
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as
WovenTeaching.org

well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any
group or individual, and all external support for
such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of
arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo
and expressing concern at the reports of continuing
violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolu-
tion 1160 (1998),
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in
the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo,
alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastro-
phe as described in the report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from
happening,
Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing
violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to
ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo
are respected,
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998),
in which the Council expressed support for a peace-
ful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would
include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substan-
tially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful
self-administration,
Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member
States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Affirming that
the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace
and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals
immediately cease hostilities and maintain a cease-
fire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
which would enhance the prospects for a meaning-
ful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian
leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian
catastrophe;
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian
leadership take immediate steps to improve the
humanitarian situation and to avert the impending
humanitarian catastrophe;
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership
to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue
without preconditions and with international
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Kosovo
involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to
an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political
solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the
current efforts aimed at facilitating such a dialogue;
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia, in addition to the measures called for un-
der resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately
the following concrete measures towards achieving
a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as
contained in the Contact Group statement of 12
June 1998:
(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting
the civilian population and order the withdrawal
of security units used for civilian repression;
(b) enable effective and continuous international
monitoring in Kosovo by the European Commu-
nity Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions
accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
including access and complete freedom of move-
ment of such monitors to, from and within Koso-
vo unimpeded by government authorities, and
expeditious issuance of appropriate travel docu-
ments to international personnel contributing to
the monitoring;
(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and
the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced
persons to their homes and allow free and unim-
peded access for humanitarian organizations and
supplies to Kosovo;
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in
the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the
Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolu-
tion 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confi-
dence-building measures and finding a political
solution to the problems of Kosovo;
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in
his joint statement with the President of the Russian
Federation of 16 June 1998:
(a) to resolve existing problems by political means
on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic
communities in Kosovo;
(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against
the peaceful population;
(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and
ensure that there will be no restrictions on rep-
resentatives of foreign States and international
institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of
45

Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;
(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for
humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the
UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;
(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees
and displaced persons under programmes agreed
with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State
aid for the reconstruction of destroyed homes,
and calls for the full implementation of these
commitments;
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership
condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that
all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community
should pursue their goals by peaceful means
only; [...]
Resolution 1203 (1998)
24 October 1998
The Security Council,
[...] Recalling the objectives of resolution 1160
(1998), in which the Council expressed support for
a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which
would include an enhanced status for Kosovo,
a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and
meaningful self-administration,
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as
well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any
group or individual, and all external support for
such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of
arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo,
and expressing concern at the reports of continuing
violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolu-
tion 1160 (1998),
Deeply concerned at the recent closure by the au-
thorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of
independent media outlets in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and emphasizing the need for these
Sources
UN Security Council. Resolution 1160 (1998). S/RES/1160 (1998). 31 March 1998. https://digitalli-
brary.un.org/record/252117?ln=en.
UN Security Council. Resolution 1199 (1998). S/RES/1199 (1998). 23 September 1998. https://digi-
tallibrary.un.org/record/260416?ln=en.
UN Security Council. Resolution 1203 (1998). S/RES/1203 (1998). 24 October 1998. https://digitalli-
brary.un.org/record/262334?ln=en.
46
Case Study: Kosovo
to be allowed freely to resume their operations, [...]
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, [...]
3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160
(1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with
the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and the
NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo [...]
4. Demands also that the Kosovo Albanian leader-
ship and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian
community comply fully and swiftly with resolu-
tions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate ful-
ly with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo;
5. Stresses the urgent need for the authorities in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Koso-
vo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into
a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and
with international involvement, and to a clear time-
table, leading to an end of the crisis and to a nego-
tiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo; [...]
11. Demands immediate action from the authori-
ties of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Kosovo Albanian leadership to cooperate with
international efforts to improve the humanitarian
situation and to avert the impending humanitarian
catastrophe;
12. Reaffirms the right of all refugees and displaced
persons to return to their homes in safety, and un-
derlines the responsibility of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which
allow them to do so;
13. Urges Member States and others concerned to
provide adequate resources for humanitarian assis-
tance in the region and to respond promptly and
generously to the United Nations Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance
Related to the Kosovo crisis; [...]
WovenTeaching.org

Kosovo – International Specialist
These notes come from a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on March 24, 1999–the day
that NATO bombing of Yugoslavia began. NATO’s campaign had not been approved by the Security
Council.
Guiding Questions:
• Russia and other countries disagreed with NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. Do you think
NATO’s campaign was justified? Why or why not?
• Do you think the United Nations should have the sole responsibility to authorize intervention?
Why or why not?
Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation): The Russian
Federation is profoundly outraged at the use by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
of military force against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. [...]
Attempts to justify the NATO strikes with argu-
ments about preventing a humanitarian catastro-
phe in Kosovo are completely untenable [not able
to be maintained or defended against attack or
objection]. Not only are these attempts in no way
based on the Charter or other generally recognized
rules of international law, but the unilateral use of
force will lead precisely to a situation with truly
devastating humanitarian consequences. [...]
NATO’s decision to use military force is particu-
larly unacceptable from any point of view because
the potential of political and diplomatic methods
to yield a settlement in Kosovo has certainly not
been exhausted. [...]
The Russian Federation vehemently demands the
immediate cessation of this illegal military action
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [...]
Mr. Burleigh (United States of America): The cur-
rent situation in Kosovo is of grave concern to all
of us. We and our allies have begun military action
only with the greatest reluctance. But we believe
that such action is necessary to respond to Bel-
grade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians,
violations of international law, excessive and in-
discriminate use of force, refusal to negotiate to
resolve the issue peacefully and recent military
build-up in Kosovo — all of which foreshadow
a humanitarian catastrophe of immense propor-
tions.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Kosovo
For months, Serb actions have led to escalating
explosions of violence. It is imperative that the
international community take quick measures to
avoid humanitarian suffering and widespread
destruction [...]
Our preference has been to achieve our objectives
in the Balkans through peaceful means. [...] These
efforts led to talks in Rambouillet and Paris, which
produced a fair, just and balanced agreement. The
Kosovar Albanians signed that agreement, but
Belgrade rejected all efforts to achieve a peaceful
resolution. [...]
Mr. Fowler (Canada): The international commu-
nity is facing a situation in which a Government
at the heart of Europe is flouting the most funda-
mental rights of its citizens. [...]
Unfortunately, the intensive and exhaustive dip-
lomatic efforts of the international community did
not succeed. The looming humanitarian disaster
caused by President Milosevic’s refusal to accept
any peaceful compromise leaves the international
community with very few options. Every day, the
situation worsens and it is the civilian population
— principally women and children — that suffers.
[...] The continuing oppression in Kosovo by the
Government in Belgrade, [...] have left NATO with
no choice but to take action. [...]
Mr. Türk (Slovenia): [...] Slovenia regrets that the
developments in Kosovo have brought the inter-
national community to the point at which all dip-
lomatic means have been exhausted and military
action in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has
become inevitable. The constant endeavours of the
international community to achieve a diplomatic
47

solution to the crisis and to prevent a humanitari-
an catastrophe of even greater extent have yielded
no results. In view of this tragic moment for the
peoples in that part of Europe, we would like to
emphasize that the tragedy is the result and con-
sequence of the erroneous policy of the Belgrade
Government alone.
The current situation was not inevitable. A diplo-
matic solution was not impossible. [...]
Unfortunately, the efforts of the international com-
munity were in vain, since the Belgrade Govern-
ment was not ready to agree to a political solution
of the crisis. [...]
Mr. Buallay (Bahrain): Our delegation regrets the
recent developments in Kosovo, which have final-
ly led to the use of military force against the forces
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have
long called for a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo
crisis through serious and constructive dialogue
between the parties to the conflict. [...]
The policy of “ethnic cleansing” and the denial of
the fundamental rights of the Kosovar Albanians
can bring only destruction and instability to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [...]
Mr. Jagne (Gambia): The situation in Kosovo, in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is a cause of
great concern to my delegation. [...]
As far as my delegation is concerned, we cannot
remain indifferent to the plight of the murdered
people of Kosovo.[...]
It is the responsibility of any Government to
protect its citizens. We speak with great regret of
the fact that the international community had to
take the action it took today. Of course, regional
arrangements have responsibility for the main-
tenance of peace and security in their areas. The
Security Council, however, has the primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, as clearly stated in the Charter
of the United Nations.
It must be noted, though, that at times the exi-
gencies [an urgent need or demand] of a situation
demand, and warrant, decisive and immediate
action. We find that the present situation in Koso-
vo deserves such a treatment. The action started
today by the international community could have
48
Case Study: Kosovo
been avoided, for the action could still be pre-
vented. We therefore call on those with whom the
responsibility lies to take the necessary action to
prevent a continuation of this action before it is too
late.
Mr. van Walsum (Netherlands): We have partici-
pated in and assumed responsibility for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision
because there was no other solution. As for the
Netherlands, this decision was not taken lightly; it
was taken with conviction. Responsibility for the
NATO action lies squarely with President Milose-
vic. [...]
Mr. Enio Cordeiro (Brazil): [...] In conformity
with its unflinching commitment to the pacific
settlement of disputes, the Brazilian Government
regrets that the escalation of tensions has resulted
in recourse to military action.
Mr. Dejammet (France): [...] In recent weeks we
have witnessed, together with the inflexibility of
the Belgrade authorities in negotiating a peace
agreement, an increase in tension and confron-
tation, with the massing of a powerful offensive
capacity by the Yugoslav army, inspiring fears
that there will be a new upsurge of massacres in a
community of 2 million people. We cannot aban-
don that community to violent repression. What
is at stake today is peace, peace in Europe — but
human rights are also at stake. [...]
Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia): [...] One thing should be
clear: combating the so-called acts of terrorism in
Kosovo does not in any way justify gross human
rights violations or the failure to respect interna-
tional norms and international humanitarian law.
[...]
As a matter of principle, my delegation is not in
favour of the use or threat of use of force to re-
solve any conflict situation, regardless of where
it occurs. If the use of force is at all necessary, it
should be a recourse of last resort, to be sanctioned
by the Security Council, which has been vested
with primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security. [...]
We are seriously concerned about the current situ-
ation on the ground when, with the withdrawal of
international observers and the onset of military
actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Yugoslav authorities are likely to
WovenTeaching.org

unleash their preponderant military might upon
the poorly armed Albanians in retaliation. If this
happens, the humanitarian impact on the Kosovar
civilian population will be enormous and tragic
indeed. [....]
Mr. Andjaba (Namibia): [...] My delegation wish-
es to underscore that military action against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may not be the
solution. Furthermore, the implications of this
action may go beyond the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia, thereby posing a serious threat to peace
and security in the region.
Therefore, my delegation appeals for the immedi-
ate cessation of the ongoing military action and for
the exhausting of all possible avenues for a peace-
ful resolution of the conflict. [...]
Mr. Dangue Réwaka (Gabon): [...] My Govern-
ment is in principle opposed to the use of force to
settle local or international disputes.
Mr. Petrella (Argentina): The attacks by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Serb
targets, which are taking place at this moment, are
a source of great concern for Argentina. [...]
Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): Presi-
dent Milosevic has been engaged in repression of
the Kosovo Albanians since he revoked Kosovo’s
extensive autonomy almost 10 years ago. During
all this time he has declined seriously to pursue a
political solution to the problem of Kosovo, a prob-
lem that everyone knew would lead to increased
tension and that he, as leader of his nation, held
the responsibility for remedying. Instead, he has
chosen to use brute aggression against a peaceful
population. Where is the outrage at that? [...]
In a series of resolutions, [...] the Security Council
has called on Belgrade to end actions against the
civilian population and withdraw security forces
responsible for repression, to cooperate with or-
ganizations engaged in humanitarian relief and
to pursue a negotiated settlement. But Belgrade
has rejected all of the Security Council’s demands,
and continues to act in defiance of the expressed
will of the Council. In these circumstances, when
diplomacy has failed, do we react just with further
words? [...]
We have taken this action with regret, in order to
save lives. [...]
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Kosovo
The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an
exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe. [...]
Every means short of force has been tried to avert
this situation. In these circumstances, and as an
exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity, military intervention is
legally justifiable. The force now proposed is di-
rected exclusively to averting a humanitarian ca-
tastrophe, and is the minimum judged necessary
for that purpose. [...]
The President: I shall now make a statement in
my capacity as the representative of China.
Today, 24 March, the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), with the United States in the
lead, mobilized its airborne military forces and
launched military strikes against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, seriously exacerbating the
situation in the Balkan region. This act amounts to
a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter
and of the accepted norms of international law.
The Chinese Government strongly opposes this
act. [...]
It has always been our position that under the
Charter it is the Security Council that bears
primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. And it is only
the Security Council that can determine whether
a given situation threatens international peace
and security and can take appropriate action. We
are firmly opposed to any act that violates this
principle and that challenges the authority of the
Security Council.
The Chinese Government vigorously calls for an
immediate cessation of the military attacks by
NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
[...]
Mr. Jovanovic [Serbian diplomat]: Today, the
armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) committed a unilateral act of the
most brutal and unprovoked aggression against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a sovereign
and independent State and a founding Member of
the United Nations. [...]
The decision to attack an independent country has
been taken outside the Security Council, the sole
body responsible, under the Charter of the United
49

Nations, for maintaining international peace and
security. This blatant aggression is a flagrant vio-
lation of the basic principles of the Charter of the
United Nations [...]
The United States of America and NATO must
assume full responsibility for all consequences
of their act of open aggression, both foreseeable
and unforeseeable. By committing the aggression
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO
has trampled upon international law and the fun-
damental principles of international relations by
endangering peace and security in the world in
the most irresponsible and criminal way. [...]
Case Study: Kosovo
I call on the members of the Security Council to act
swiftly and in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations to condemn this act of aggression
and to take appropriate measures to stop it imme-
diately and unambiguously so that all problems
may be resolved by political means. [...] If the
aggression is not stopped, the precedent of such
unpunished aggression will, sooner or later, lead
to aggression against a number of other, smaller
and medium-sized countries. The real question is:
Which country is next?

Source
UN Security Council. Letter dated 24 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Feder-
ation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/320). S/PV.3988. 24
March 1999. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1491671?ln=en.

50 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Kosovo
Kosovo – Impact Researcher
Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo.

Guiding Questions
• In the long term, who was impacted by the events in Kosovo? In what ways?

• How was the nation of Kosovo impacted as a whole?

• What were some of the consequences for the perpetrators?

• Looking back, what is the legacy of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia?

Useful Websites
• Amnesty International – www.amnesty.org

• Human Rights Watch – www.hrw.or

• Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – www.osce.org

WovenTeaching.org 51
Case Study: Libya
Libya is a country in North Africa with a popu-
lation of approximately seven million people.
Following a military coup in 1969, Colonel Mua-
mmar Qaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years. Although
Qaddafi claimed that the people of Libya had
decision-making power, he held the country with
an increasingly tight grip. Under Qaddafi’s rule,
freedom of expression was limited and dissidents
were murdered.

At the end of 2010, pro-democracy uprisings began

to occur throughout the Middle East and North
Africa. These uprisings were known as the Arab
Spring. Beginning in Tunisia in December 2010,
protests soon spread to neighboring Egypt and
LibyA
North Africa
Libya. In the case of Libya, these protests quickly
turned into a civil war and an international mili-
tary intervention that ended Qaddafi’s long reign.

The first protests in Libya took place in Benghazi,

the second largest Libyan city. One of the pro-
testors’ demands was the release of Fethi Tarbel,
a human rights lawyer who had recently been
arrested. Two days later, thousands of Libyans
took to the street on the “Day of Rage.” Protesters
demanded the release of political prisoners, an
end to restrictions on political freedoms, and for
Qaddafi to step down. This was the official start of
the Libyan Revolution.
As the protests grew larger and spread beyond
Benghazi, Qaddafi’s administration ordered secu-
rity forces to fire into the crowd. Protesters were
also fired on from tanks and helicopters. More
than ten people were killed in the first days. In an
attempt to stop the demonstrations from growing,
the regime restricted communication. It cut tele-
phone lines and blocked people from accessing
the internet and social media. After only three
days, protesters had taken over Benghazi.
As a result of Qaddafi’s violent response to the
demonstrations, several government officials re-
signed in protest. Demonstrators soon acquired
weapons and joined forces with military units that
had defected. This marked the shift from an upris-
ing to a civil war. Internationally, leaders around
the world were calling for Qaddafi to step down,
including U.S. President Barack Obama.
In late February and early March, Qaddafi made
a series of televised speeches in which he claimed
the protesters were using drugs and were being
controlled by al-Qaeda. In one speech, he also
threatened to “show no mercy,” stating that his
forces would go “alley by alley, house by house”
in Benghazi to find and punish protesters.
On February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council
passed a resolution 15-0 urging Libya to respect
the safety and security of its people. The resolu-
tion also:
• Introduced an arms embargo, blocking the
sale and supply of weapons to Libya;
• Banned travel for specific Libyan officials;
• Directed Member States to freeze the assets
of specific Libyan officials; and
• Referred the case to the International
Criminal Court, the body responsible for
investigating and trying people accused of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.
In early March, rebel groups created the Nation-
al Transitional Council (NTC) to guide Libya’s
democratic transition. By this time, the rebels also
controlled eastern Libya and parts of the west. The

52 WovenTeaching.org

European Union unanimously called for Qaddafi
to step down, but he refused to do so. The inter-
national community remained divided on military
intervention.
By mid-March, the UN Security Council had made
up its mind. On March 17, it voted to authorize “all
necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya.
This included use of force. The Qaddafi regime
announced a ceasefire within 24 hours. Despite
the announcement, fighting between rebels and
pro-Qaddafi forces continues.
As a result of this decision, the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom began air strikes
on Libya on March 19. Other Member States of
NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
began strikes in the days following. The interven-
tion was initially under the command of the United
States military. On March 31, the U.S. transferred
Key Terms
• Al-Qaeda: a Sunni Islamic extremist organi-
zation
• Arab League: an organization composed of
Arabic-speaking African and Asian countries.
It was formed in Cairo, Egypt in 1945 and has
22 Member States (as of 2022).
• Arab Spring: a series of anti-government pro-
tests and rebellions across the Arab world in
the early 2010s
• Benghazi: a major city and seaport in Libya.
It is Libya’s second-most populous city.
• Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: the official name of
Libya from 1977-2011
• National Transitional Council: the transi-
tional government of Libya after the fall of
Muammar Qaddafi. The NTC governed for
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Libya
command of the operation to NATO.
For the next several months, both the rebels and
pro-Qaddafi forces gained and lost control of areas
throughout Libya. In April, Qaddafi’s youngest
son and three of his grandchildren were killed in a
NATO airstrike. Although their forces were disor-
ganized, by early September, the rebels took con-
trol of Tripoli, the capital of Libya. On September
15, the UN recognized the National Transitional
Council as the official government of Libya.
On October 20, Muammar Qaddafi was found
hiding in his hometown of Sirte. He was killed by
rebel forces. Three days later, the NTC declared
victory in Libya. On March 31, 2011, NATO ended
its campaign and withdrew its forces.
ten months, transferring power to the Gener-
al National Congress in August 2012.
• NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a
military alliance established in the aftermath
of World War II. As of 2022, NATO includes
28 European countries and 2 North American
countries, including the United States.
• no-fly zone: a section of airspace in which
certain aircrafts are not allowed to fly. No-fly
zones are usually overseen by a military pow-
er and are intended to prevent enemy aircraft
from operating in certain areas.
• Qaddafi, Muammar: leader of Libya, 1969-
2011
• Tripoli: the capital and largest city of Libya
53
 Case Study: Libya
Libya – Roles
Historian A timeline outlining select events that occurred in Libya from the early 1970s until
the beginning of NATO’s bombing campaign in March 2011.

U.S. Specialist “President Obama’s Remarks on Libya – March 28, 2011.” Woven Teaching. You-
Tube. Video, 13:57. https://youtu.be/MdAb-XAd0wk.

This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video: “President
Obama’s Speech on Libya.” The Obama White House. YouTube. Video, 26:32.
https://youtu.be/cVW6jBbD5Q8.

In this televised address on March 28, 2011, U.S. President Obama informed the
American public about the situation in Libya. At the time of this speech, the United
States was moving back into a support role as NATO took command of the opera-
tion. Transcript included in the handouts.

United Nations United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973. 17 March
Monitor 2011. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1973-%282011%29.

An excerpt from a March 2011 Security Council Resolution establishing a no-fly

zone in Libya, strengthening an arms embargo and assets freeze, and authorizing
Member States to protect civilians in Libya.

International United Nations, Security Council. Minutes from meeting on Peace and Security
Specialist in Africa, S/PV6490. 11 February 2011. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N11/243/88/PDF/N1124388.pdf?OpenElement.

In this transcript from a February 2011 meeting of the UN Security Council, Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon speaks on the need to implement R2P in Libya. Libya’s
representative to the UN also provides a statement.

Impact Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath
Researcher of atrocity and intervention in Libya. They may use the following questions to
guide their research:
• In the long term, who has been impacted by the events in Libya? In what
ways?
• How was the nation of Libya impacted as a whole?
• What consequences have the perpetrators faced, if any?
• Looking back, what is the legacy of NATO’s intervention in Libya?

54 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Libya
Libya – historian
This timeline outlines select events that occurred in Libya from the early 1970s until the beginning of
NATO’s bombing campaign in March 2011.

Guiding Questions:
• Did the international community have evidence that Qaddafi’s regime would act violently
towards protestors?
• Do you think the international community could have intervened in Libya earlier to prevent the
violence?

1972 Law No. 71 bans all political activity which is not connected to the ruling party (Arab Socialist
Union). Violators may face the death penalty.

1973 Libyan security forces arrest hundreds of people who oppose (or are thought to oppose) the political
system.

1974 Qaddafi announces that anyone found guilty of forming a political party will receive the death
penalty.

1977 Qaddafi establishes “revolutionary committees” to govern locally. These committees are tasked with
suppressing those who oppose Qaddafi’s policies. By the 1990s, an estimated 10-20% of Libyans
operate as informants for the revolutionary committees.

1996 In response to an uprising over poor conditions at Abu Salim prison, security forces kill approxi-
mately 1,200 incarcerated Libyans.

1997 The Libyan General People’s Congress announces the Law of Collective Punishment. This law
allows the state to punish entire families, communities, and villages for the crimes of an individual.

2011 February 15: Anti-government rallies are held in Benghazi, the second-largest city in Libya. Demon-
strators demand the release of Fethi Tarbel, a human rights lawyer who has recently been arrested.

February 17: Libyan police fire into crowds of protesters during the “Day of Rage” demonstra-
tions. At least 100 people are killed over the next three days.

February 21: Muammar Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, appears on television. In a speech, he
says that “We will fight to the last minute, until the last bullet.” The regime bombs Tripoli
using airplanes and helicopters.

February 22: Muammar Qaddafi gives a televised speech referring to the protesters as
“traitors” and signals that he will use violence to remain in power.

February 24: Qaddafi’s forces shoot at civilians leaving mosques. Approximately

100 people are killed.

March 19: NATO’s bombing of Libya begins. Qaddafi is captured and killed
by Libyan rebel forces on October 20, 2011. NATO’s intervention ends shortly
thereafter on October 31, 2011.

WovenTeaching.org 55
 Case Study: Libya
LIBYA – U.S. SPECIALIST
In this televised address on March 28, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama informed the American
public about the situation in Libya. At the time of this speech, the United States was moving back into a
support role as NATO took command of the operation.

Guiding Questions:
• What reasons did President Obama give for NATO’s campaign in Libya?
• President Obama stated that, “To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and–more
profoundly–our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would
have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in
other countries. The United States of America is different.” Do you agree or disagree with this
statement? Why?

Tonight, I’d like to update the American people on
the international effort that we have led in Libya–
what we’ve done, what we plan to do, and why
this matters to us. [...]
For generations, the United States of America
has played a unique role as an anchor of global
security and as an advocate for human freedom.
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action,
we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the
world’s many challenges. But when our interests
and values are at stake, we have a responsibility
to act. That’s what happened in Libya over the
course of these last six weeks. [...]
Last month, Qaddafi’s grip of fear appeared to give
way to the promise of freedom. In cities and towns
across the country, Libyans took to the streets to
claim their basic human rights. As one Libyan
said, “For the first time we finally have hope that
our nightmare of 40 years will soon be over.”
Faced with this opposition, Qaddafi began at-
tacking his people. As President, my immediate
concern was the safety of our citizens, so we evac-
uated our embassy and all Americans who sought
our assistance. Then we took a series of swift steps
in a matter of days to answer Qaddafi’s aggres-
sion. We froze more than $33 billion of Qaddafi’s
regime’s assets. Joining with other nations at the
United Nations Security Council, we broadened
our sanctions, imposed an arms embargo, and
enabled Qaddafi and those around him to be held
accountable for their crimes. I made it clear that
Qaddafi had lost the confidence of his people and
the legitimacy to lead, and I said that he needed to
step down from power.
In the face of the world’s condemnation, Qaddafi
chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military
campaign against the Libyan people. Innocent
people were targeted for killing. [...]
Confronted by this brutal repression and a loom-
ing humanitarian crisis, I ordered warships into
the Mediterranean. European allies declared their
willingness to commit resources to stop the kill-
ing. The Libyan opposition and the Arab League
appealed to the world to save lives in Libya. And
so at my direction, America led an effort with our
allies at the United Nations Security Council to
pass a historic resolution that authorized a no-fly
zone to stop the regime’s attacks from the air, and
further authorized all necessary measures to pro-
tect the Libyan people.
Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence
without using force, the international community
offered Qaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign
of killing, or face the consequences. Rather than
stand down, his forces continued their advance,
bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to
nearly 700,000 men, women and children who
sought their freedom from fear.
At this point, the United States and the world
faced a choice. Qaddafi declared he would show
“no mercy” to his own people. He compared them
to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict
punishment. In the past, we have seen him hang
civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand
people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces

56 WovenTeaching.org

on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we
wanted–if we waited one more day, Benghazi,
a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a
massacre that would have reverberated across the
region and stained the conscience of the world.
It was not in our national interest to let that hap-
pen. I refused to let that happen. And so nine days
ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of
Congress, I authorized military action to stop the
killing and enforce UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973.
We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi
to save that city and the people within it. We hit
Qaddafi’s troops in neighboring Ajdabiya, allow-
ing the opposition to drive them out. We hit Qadd-
afi’s air defenses, which paved the way for a no-fly
zone. We targeted tanks and military assets that
had been choking off towns and cities, and we cut
off much of their source of supply. And tonight, I
can report that we have stopped Qaddafi’s deadly
advance.
In this effort, the United States has not acted alone.
Instead, we have been joined by a strong and
growing coalition. This includes our closest allies
– nations like the United Kingdom, France, Can-
ada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece, and
Turkey – all of whom have fought by our sides for
decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen
to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan
people.
To summarize, then: In just one month, the
United States has worked with our international
partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secure an
international mandate to protect civilians, stop an
advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish
a no-fly zone with our allies and partners. To lend
some perspective on how rapidly this military and
diplomatic response came together, when people
were being brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it
took the international community more than a
year to intervene with air power to protect civil-
ians. It took us 31 days.
Moreover, we’ve accomplished these objectives
consistent with the pledge that I made to the
American people at the outset of our military oper-
ations. I said that America’s role would be limited;
that we would not put ground troops into Libya;
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Libya
that we would focus our unique capabilities on
the front end of the operation and that we would
transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.
Tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge.
Our most effective alliance, NATO, has taken com-
mand of the enforcement of the arms embargo and
the no-fly zone. [...]
So for those who doubted our capacity to carry out
this operation, I want to be clear: The United States
of America has done what we said we would do.
[...]
Now, despite the success of our efforts over the
past week, I know that some Americans contin-
ue to have questions about our efforts in Libya.
Qaddafi has not yet stepped down from power,
and until he does, Libya will remain dangerous.
Moreover, even after Qaddafi does leave power,
40 years of tyranny has left Libya fractured and
without strong civil institutions. The transition to
a legitimate government that is responsive to the
Libyan people will be a difficult task. And while
the United States will do our part to help, it will be
a task for the international community and–more
importantly–a task for the Libyan people them-
selves.
In fact, much of the debate in Washington has put
forward a false choice when it comes to Libya.
On the one hand, some question why America
should intervene at all–even in limited ways–in
this distant land. They argue that there are many
places in the world where innocent civilians face
brutal violence at the hands of their government,
and America should not be expected to police the
world, particularly when we have so many press-
ing needs here at home.
It’s true that America cannot use our military
wherever repression occurs. And given the costs
and risks of intervention, we must always mea-
sure our interests against the need for action. But
that cannot be an argument for never acting on
behalf of what’s right. In this particular country–
Libya–at this particular moment, we were faced
with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale.
We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an
international mandate for action, a broad coalition
prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries,
and a plea for help from the Libyan people them-
selves. We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s
57

forces in their tracks without putting American
troops on the ground.
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader
and–more profoundly–our responsibilities to our
fellow human beings under such circumstances
would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some
nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities
in other countries. The United States of America is
different. And as President, I refused to wait for
the images of slaughter and mass graves before
taking action.
Moreover, America has an important strategic
interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning
those who oppose him. A massacre would have
driven thousands of additional refugees across
Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the
peaceful–yet fragile–transitions in Egypt and Tu-
nisia. [...] The writ of the United Nations Security
Council would have been shown to be little more
than empty words, crippling that institution’s
future credibility to uphold global peace and se-
curity. So while I will never minimize the costs
involved in military action, I am convinced that
a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far
greater price for America. [...]
There will be times, though, when our safety is
not directly threatened, but our interests and our
values are. Sometimes, the course of history poses
challenges that threaten our common humanity
and our common security–responding to natural
disasters, for example; or preventing genocide and
keeping the peace; ensuring regional security, and
maintaining the flow of commerce. These may not
Source
“President Obama’s Remarks on Libya – March 28, 2011.” Woven Teaching. YouTube. Video, 13:57.
https://youtu.be/MdAb-XAd0wk.
This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video via The Obama White House.
58
Case Study: Libya
be America’s problems alone, but they are import-
ant to us. They’re problems worth solving. And
in these circumstances, we know that the United
States, as the world’s most powerful nation, will
often be called upon to help.
In such cases, we should not be afraid to act–but
the burden of action should not be America’s alone.
As we have in Libya, our task is instead to mobilize
the international community for collective action.
Because contrary to the claims of some, American
leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone
and bearing all of the burden ourselves. Real lead-
ership creates the conditions and coalitions for
others to step up as well; to work with allies and
partners so that they bear their share of the burden
and pay their share of the costs; and to see that the
principles of justice and human dignity are upheld
by all. [...]
Yes, this change will make the world more com-
plicated for a time. Progress will be uneven, and
change will come differently to different countries.
There are places, like Egypt, where this change
will inspire us and raise our hopes. And then there
will be places, like Iran, where change is fiercely
suppressed. The dark forces of civil conflict and
sectarian war will have to be averted, and difficult
political and economic concerns will have to be
addressed.
The United States will not be able to dictate the
pace and scope of this change. Only the people of
the region can do that. But we can make a differ-
ence. [...]
WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Libya
Libya – United Nations Monitor
In March 2011, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution establishing a no-fly zone in
Libya, strengthening an arms embargo and assets freeze, and authorizing Member States to protect
civilians in Libya. The text below includes excerpts from this resolution.

Guiding Questions:
• How did the UN Security Council respond to the violence in Libya?
• The Security Council called for an arms embargo and an assets freeze. How useful do you think
these tools could be in preventing harm?

The Security Council, 2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February
2011,
Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to
comply with resolution 1970 (2011),
Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating sit-
uation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy
civilian casualties,
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan au-
thorities to protect the Libyan population and
reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to
ensure the protection of civilians,
Condemning the gross and systematic violation
of human rights, including arbitrary detentions,
enforced disappearances, torture and summary
executions,
Further condemning acts of violence and intimida-
tion committed by the Libyan authorities against
journalists, media professionals and associated
personnel and urging these authorities to comply
with their obligations under international human-
itarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),
Considering that the widespread and systematic
attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya against the civilian population may
amount to crimes against humanity, [...]
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1. Demands the immediate establishment of a
cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all
attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;
solution to the crisis which responds to the legiti-
mate demands of the Libyan people [...]
3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply
with their obligations under international law,
including international humanitarian law, human
rights and refugee law and take all measures to
protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and
to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian assistance;
Protection of civilians
4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the
Secretary-General, acting nationally or through re-
gional organizations or arrangements, and acting
in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take
all necessary measures, [...] to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi,
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any
form on any part of Libyan territory, [...]
No Fly Zone
6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the
airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to
help protect civilians; [...]
8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the
Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, to take all
necessary measures to enforce compliance with
the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above,
as necessary, and requests the States concerned
in cooperation with the League of Arab States to
coordinate closely with the Secretary General on
the measures they are taking to implement this
ban [...]

WovenTeaching.org 59

Enforcement of the arms embargo
13. [...] Calls upon all Member States, in particular
States of the region, acting nationally or through
regional organisations or arrangements, in or-
der to ensure strict implementation of the arms
embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of
resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory,
including seaports and airports, and on the high
seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has
information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe that the cargo contains items the supply,
sale, transfer or export of [weapons] including the
provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls
upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to
cooperate with such inspections and authorises
Member States to use all measures commensurate
to the specific circumstances to carry out such in-
spections”; [...]
Ban on flights
17. Decides that all States shall deny permission
to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals
or companies to take off from, land in or overfly
their territory unless the particular flight has been
Source
UN Security Council. Resolution 1973 (2011). S/RES/1973 (2011). 17 March 2011. https://www.
undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011).
60
Case Study: Libya
approved in advance by the Committee, or in the
case of an emergency landing; [...]
Asset freeze
19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by para-
graph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011)
shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories,
which are owned or controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by
the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting
on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities
owned or controlled by them, as designated by
the Committee, and decides further that all States
shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or eco-
nomic resources are prevented from being made
available by their nationals or by any individuals
or entities within their territories, to or for the
benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by
the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on
their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned
or controlled by them, as designated by the Com-
mittee, [...]
WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Libya
Libya – International Specialist
In this transcript from a February 2011 meeting of the UN Security Council, Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon speaks on the need to implement R2P in Libya. Libya’s representative to the UN also provides a
statement. Note: This document uses an alternate spelling of Qaddafi (Al-Qadhafi).

Guiding Questions:
• What reasons does Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon give for intervention in Libya?
• What evidence does the Libyan representative provide when calling for international support
against Qaddafi?

[...] The Secretary-General: I wish to thank the
Council for the opportunity to brief it this after-
noon. On our agenda is the issue of peace and
security in Africa. [...]
We meet at a critical moment — potentially a de-
fining moment — for the Arab world. Fundamen-
tal issues of peace and stability are at stake, most
immediately at this moment in Libya.
Since my Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, briefed the Council earlier
this week (see S/PV.6486), there have been con-
tinuing reports of violence and the indiscriminate
use of force. Estimates indicate that more than
1,000 people have been killed. The eastern part of
the country is reported to be under the control of
opposition elements, who have taken over arms
and ammunition from weapon depots. There are
daily clashes in at least three cities near Tripoli. The
streets of the capital are largely deserted. People
cannot leave their houses for fear of being shot by
Government forces or militias. Colonel Al-Qadha-
fi’s supporters are reportedly conducting house-
by-house searches and arrests. According to some
reports, they have even gone into hospitals to kill
wounded opponents.
Today, clashes broke out again, with high casual-
ties reported. In their public statements, Colonel
Al-Qadhafi and members of his family have con-
tinued to threaten citizens with a civil war and the
possibility of mass killing if the protests continue.
There are other allegations of the killing of soldiers
who refused to fire upon their countrymen.
Let us speak frankly: these accounts from the press,
human rights groups and civilians on the ground
raise grave concerns about the nature and scale
of the conflict. They include allegations of indis-
criminate killings, arbitrary arrests, the shooting
of peaceful demonstrators and the detention and
torture of the opposition and the use of foreign
mercenaries. We are also hearing reports of wom-
en and children being among the victims, as well
as reports of indiscriminate attacks on foreigners
believed to be mercenaries. We know from the Red
Crescent and the International Committee of the
Red Cross that there are dangerous impediments
to medical treatment and access for humanitarian
workers. We do not have conclusive proof, but the
reports appear to be credible and consistent.
I strongly believe that the first obligation of the in-
ternational community is to do everything possi-
ble to ensure the immediate protection of civilians
at demonstrable risk. Indeed, if further proof is
required, it should be sought simultaneously with
measures to afford protection. [...]
In that regard, I would like to underscore the
statement of Ms. Pillay, High Commissioner for
Human Rights, to the Human Rights Council. She
reminded member States that, when a State man-
ifestly fails to protect its population from serious
international crimes, the international community
has the responsibility to step in and take protective
action in a collective, timely and decisive manner.
[...]
We have seen strong statements from many inter-
national leaders and international organizations,
among them the League of Arab States, the Eu-
ropean Union and the African Union. They have
called for an immediate end to the violence and
condemned what appeared to be gross violations
of human rights. In my conversations with the
leaders of the region and the world, and in my

WovenTeaching.org 61

public and private statements, I have spoken out
bluntly and repeatedly. The violence must stop.
Those responsible for so brutally shedding the
blood of innocents must be punished. Fundamen-
tal human rights must be respected.
My Special Advisers on the Prevention of Geno-
cide and the Responsibility to Protect have re-
minded the national authorities in Libya, as well
as in other countries facing large-scale popular
protests, that the heads of State and Government
at the 2005 World Summit pledged to protect
populations by preventing genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as
well as their incitement. The challenge for us now
is how to provide real protection and do all we can
to halt the ongoing violence.
As the Council looks to its next steps, I urge it to
consider a wide range of options for action. Some
of the proposals being considered by the Council
include the imposition of trade and financial sanc-
tions, including targeted measures against the
leadership, such as a ban on travel and the freez-
ing of financial assets. Some Member States call
for a comprehensive arms embargo. Others draw
our attention to the clear and egregious violations
of human rights taking place in Libya and urge the
Security Council to take effective action to ensure
real accountability.
It is time for the Security Council to consider con-
crete action. The hours and days ahead will be de-
cisive for Libyans and their country, with equally
important implications for the wider region. The
statements and actions of the Security Council
are eagerly awaited and will be closely followed
throughout the region. Whatever its course, let us
be mindful of the urgency of the moment. In these
circumstances the loss of time means more loss of
lives. [...]
The President: I thank the Secretary-General for
his briefing.
I now give the floor to the representative of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
Mr. Shalgham (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya): Allow
me, at the outset, to express our gratitude to you,
Madame President, for calling this meeting on the
situation in my country and the events unfolding
there. I would also like to commend the Secre-
tary-General for his concern about the situation in
62
Case Study: Libya
my country.
Pol Pot, head of the Khmer Rouge in Cambo-
dia, was asked why he executed one third of his
people. He said he did it because of the people.
Before invading the Soviet Union, Hitler recalled
Rommel from Libya and told him, “General, I
intend to invade the Soviet Union”. Rommel told
him, “Operation Barbarossa will cost us 2 million
lives”. Hitler responded, “What does it matter if 2
million Germans die in service to the glory of the
Führer?”
What is taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiri-
ya is indeed very dangerous. On 15 February, a
group of peaceful civilians protested, calling for
the release of a lawyer named Tarbel who was rep-
resenting the families of 2,000 prisoners who were
killed in the Abu Salim prison in 1996. This group
faced gunfire aimed at their heads and chests, as
if the soldiers who opened fire did not know that
human beings have heads, hearts and legs, or that
there are other parts than can be shot at, that there
are such things as tear gas bombs or roadblocks
that can contain demonstrations.
Libyans are asking for democracy; they are ask-
ing for progress; they are asking for freedom; and
they are asking for their rights. They demonstrat-
ed peacefully. They did not throw a single stone.
They were killed. What did Brother Muammar
Al-Qadhafi say? He said that these people were
using hallucinogens. These tens of thousands of
people would need mountains of such pills to lose
their minds in such a way. One million turned out
in Benghazi yesterday. A pile of pills the size of the
Akhdar Mountains would not be enough for that
many people.
Muammar Al-Qadhafi and his sons are telling Lib-
yans: “Either I rule you or I kill you”. That much
is clear this evening after dozens of our brothers
were killed in Tajura and in eastern Tripoli. He
gave a speech to a crowd of children who were
brought in from asylums and soldiers dressed in
civilian clothes. He told them “I will burn Libya;
I will distribute arms to the tribes. Libya will run
red with blood”. Is this for glory, or is it for the
people? Muammar Al-Qadhafi cannot give a sin-
gle weapon to any person in Libya, because they
will not be used for him, they will be used against
him.
WovenTeaching.org

I regret being in this position. The first time I
heard Muammar Al-Qadhafi, he was addressing
a secondary school, in the south, in 1959. He was
talking about how he wanted freedom for the
Congo. In 1960, I listened to him denounce the
French nuclear tests in Algeria. In 1961, I listened
to him speak out against the separation of Syria
and Egypt. Today, I listened to him telling his peo-
ple “Either I rule over you or I destroy you.”
Fear not, Libya is united. Libya will remain unit-
ed. Libya will be a progressive State. But I say to
my brother Al-Qadhafi, leave the Libyans alone.
However many of these steadfast people you kill
[...] they will not surrender. Libyans will not sur-
Source
UN Security Council. Peace and Security in Africa. S/PV6490. 25 February 2011. https://digitallibrary.
un.org/record/698592?ln=en.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Libya
render. Omar Mukhtar said it best: “We will not
surrender. Either we achieve victory or we die.”
We will not surrender. Victory, or death.
When I was a member of the Security Council,
representing my country, I talked openly about the
murders we saw in Gaza. Muammar Al-Qadhafi
said they were followers of Bin Laden. I ask my
brother, “Is a six-month-old child who was killed a
follower of Bin Laden?” Libya was established by
a resolution of the United Nations. Please, United
Nations, save Libya. No to bloodshed. No to the
killing of innocents. We want a swift, decisive and
courageous resolution. [...]
63
 Case Study: Libya
Libya – Impact Researcher
Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of atrocity and
intervention in Libya.

Guiding Questions
• In the long term, who has been impacted by the events in Libya? In what ways?

• How was the nation of Libya impacted as a whole?

• What consequences have the perpetrators faced, if any?

• Looking back, what is the legacy of NATO’s intervention in Libya?

Useful Websites
• Al Jazeera – www.aljazeera.com

• Human Rights Watch – www.hrw.org

• United States Institute of Peace – www.usip.org

64 WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a Southeast
Asian nation that has a population of more than
50 million people, most of whom identify as Bud-
dhist. The country is also home to many ethnic
and religious minorities. One of these groups is
the Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim group.
The Rohingya have faced systematic discrimina-
tion for decades. Despite having lived in Myan-
mar’s Rakhine State for generations, government
officials and social leaders often describe them as
“illegal immigrants” and “Bengalis,” a term that
implies they are foreigners from Bangladesh. The
government stripped Rohingya of citizenship in
1982 and still does not recognize them as one of
the country’s 135 official ethnic groups. As a result,
the Rohingya have few rights and are considered
stateless.
MyanmAr
Since the end of British colonial rule in the 1940s, Southeast Asia
Myanmar has been run by the military. Beginning
in 2010, the country experienced a period of de-
mocratization. This led to the election of “pro-de- lage, including burning entire Rohingya villages
mocracy” Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San to the ground.
Suu Kyi. In 2015, she was appointed to the office
While the Burmese military claims that the ARSA
of State Counsellor (a role equivalent to prime
attacks were the reason for its violent actions
minister).
against the Rohingya, evidence indicates that
In August 2017, a genocide occurred in Myanmar, preparation began at least a year earlier. According
largely perpetrated by the military. This campaign to Fortify Rights, an organization investigating the
against the Rohingya people included widespread genocide, prior to the campaign the Tatmadaw:
violence, sexual assault, and imprisonment. Hun-
• Disarmed Rohingya civilians, including con-
dreds of thousands Rohingya refugees fled to
fiscating kitchen tools that could be used for
neighboring countries to avoid being murdered.
self-defense;
On August 25, 2017, a Rohingya militant group
• Forced humanitarian organizations to with-
known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
draw from Rakhine State;
(ARSA) attacked police outposts in Rakhine State.
According to official government accounts, twelve • Provided military-style training to non-Ro-
police officers were killed in the attacks. The mil- hingya civilians; and
itary of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, and security
forces retaliated against entire Rohingya villages • Tore down fences and other structures that
in what they called “clearance operations.” These would provide cover for Rohingya during
were part of a systematic campaign that the former an attack.
United Nations human rights top official called a
As a result of the violence in Rakhine State, more
“textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”
than 730,000 Rohingya fled from Myanmar. Most
Although its stated target was ARSA, the army ended up in refugee camps across the border in
murdered men, women, and children. Soldiers– neighboring Bangladesh, but many thousands
with voluntary support from civilians–also con- died trying to escape.
ducted a widespread campaign of rape and pil-

WovenTeaching.org 65

Following the violence in August 2017, the UN
Security Council called on Myanmar to ensure
the safety and security of all people in its territo-
ry, including minority groups like the Rohingya.
Member States pushed for increased humanitar-
ian access to Rakhine State as well as a plan for
the safe return of refugees from Bangladesh. In a
meeting of the Security Council in September 2017,
a representative from Myanmar stated that, “there
is no ethnic cleansing or genocide in Myanmar.
Ethnic cleansing and genocide are serious charges
that should not be made lightly.” In the months
following the atrocities, few countries labeled the
events as “genocide.”
In 2017–even before the last large-scale genocid-
al campaign–the United Nations Human Rights
Council established a fact-finding mission for
Myanmar to investigate what was happening in
Rakhine State. In September 2018, the fact-find-
Key Terms
• ARSA: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a
Rohingya insurgent group
• Bengali: a person from Bangladesh
• clearance operations: term used by Burmese
state to describe its violent August 2017 cam-
paign
• Cox’s Bazar: area of Bangladesh and site of
Kutupalong refugee camp, the largest refugee
camp in the world
• extrajudicial: without our outside of a legal
process
• National Verification Process: process in
Myanmar through which Rohingya would
receive new identification cards. In order to
receive a new card, however, Rohingyas must
state that they are foreigners from Bangladesh
66
Case Study: Myanmar
ing mission released its report. The report stated
that there was evidence of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity in Myanmar. The
fact-finding mission recommended that senior
generals of the Tatmadaw be prosecuted for these
crimes at an international criminal tribunal.
As of January 2022, there are more than 920,000
Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. Some
genocide survivors would like to return to Myan-
mar, but without assurance that they will be grant-
ed safety and full citizenship, they choose to stay
in Bangladesh. Nearly all of the refugees who fled
Myanmar remain in refugee camps. To complicate
the situation further, the military once again took
control of Myanmar in February 2021, deposing
the country’s democratically-elected leadership.
The new regime arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and
sentenced her to several years in prison.
• Rakhine State: a state on the western coast
of Myanmar. Rakhine State was home to the
majority of Myanmar’s Rohingya population.
• repatriation: the return of someone to their
country
• Rohingya (Row-hing-guh): a stateless ethnic
group, most of which are Muslim, that live in
Myanmar
• Suu Kyi, Aung San (Ow sahn soo chee): a
Burmese politician and 1991 recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize. She served as State Coun-
sellor of Myanmar from 2016-2011. She was
arrested during the 2021 military coup in
Myanmar.
• Tatmadaw: the armed forces of Myanmar
WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar – Roles
Historian A timeline outlining select events that occurred in Myanmar from the mid-1970s
until the beginning of the genocide in August 2017.

U.S. Specialist “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Meeting on the Rohingya Crisis (August
2020).” Woven Teaching. YouTube. Video, 13:24. 27 April 2022. https://youtu.be/
iYfSCrGlEo4.

The video above has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video: “An
Update on the Rohingya Crisis.” House Foreign Affairs Committee. YouTube. Video,
1:53:11. 3 August 2020. https://youtu.be/VpdsF97qP2w.

A virtual meeting of a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Committee

on Foreign Affairs nearly three years after the start of the genocide in Myanmar.
During this meeting, U.S. lawmakers and experts in the field debate whether or
not to officially label the violence in Myanmar as “genocide.” U.S. representatives
include Ami Bera (D-California), Ted Yoho (R-Florida), and Mark Green (R-Ten-
nessee). Experts include representatives of Refugees International, Women’s Peace
Network, and the Heritage Foundation.

United Nations United Nations, Department of Public Information. Amid ‘Humanitarian and Human
Monitor Rights Nightmare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return
of Displaced Rohingya, End to Military Operations. SC/13012, 28 September 2017,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13012.doc.htm.

This September 2017 press release from the UN includes summaries of statements
made by various members of the Security Counci. It also includes a statement from
the National Security Adviser of Myanmar, who denies that genocide or ethnic
cleansing took place in Rakhine State.

International “Aung San Suu Kyi’s First Comments on the Rohingya Crisis.” Woven Teaching.
Specialist YouTube. Video, 13:03. https://youtu.be/DEs2Hl3umtI.

This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video: “Aung San
Suu Kyi’s speech in full: ‘We condemn all human rights violations’” Al Jazeera.
YouTube. Video, 29:24. https://youtu.be/NJkg2_72uUo.

In September 2017, Myanmar’s then-leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, gave her first
public statement on the situation in Rakhine State. In this speech, Suu Kyi did not
denounce the violence against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Transcript included
in handouts.

Impact Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of
Researcher genocide in Myanmar. They may use the following questions to guide their research:
• In the long term, who has been impacted by the events in Myanmar? In what
ways?
• How was the nation of Myanmar impacted as a whole?
• What consequences have the perpetrators faced, if any?
• How has the international community addressed (or not addressed) the Rohing-
ya refugee crisis since 2018?
WovenTeaching.org 67
 Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar – historian
This timeline outlines select events that occurred in Myanmar from the mid-1970s through 2016.

Guiding Questions:
• Did the international community have evidence that genocide in Myanmar might happen? If yes,
what was the evidence?
• Do you think the international community could have intervened in Myanmar to prevent the
genocide?

1974 The Burmese Parliament passes the Emergency Immigration Act, which requires all people to carry
identification cards known as National Registration Certificates. Officials confiscate Rohingyas’
registration certificates and give them Foreign Registration Cards–a type of identification meant for
foreigners and not for Burmese citizens.

1978 In “Operation Dragon King,” Tatmadaw (the Burmese military) and immigration officials engage
in a series of mass roundups of Rohingya in Rakhine State. Approximately 250,000 Rohingya flee
to Bangladesh to escape the violence. The military leadership views this movement as “proof” that
Rohingya are foreigners from Bangladesh.

1982 Parliament passes the Citizenship Act, which bases citizenship on ethnicity. The law states that all
people who have citizenship will not lose it; however, many Rohingyas no longer have proof of
citizenship because their National Registration Certificates were confiscated in the 1970s.

1991 The Burmese government requires all people to apply for new identification cards. Most people
receive “Pink Cards” while Rohingya and other minoritized groups receive temporary registration
cards, or “White Cards.” White Cards give the holder certain rights, but are not considered proof of
citizenship.
In “Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation,” the Tatmadaw again conducts mass roundups
in an attempt to expel the Rohingya from Myanmar. Approximately 250,000 Rohingya flee to
Bangladesh.

1992 The Burmese government establishes NaSaKa, an immigration force, in Rakhine State. NaSaKa en-
acts travel restrictions, marriage restrictions, and other discriminatory polices against the Rohingya.

2012 Three Rohingya men are accused of raping and killing a Buddhist woman in Rakhine State. Violence
breaks out between Rohingya and non-Muslim residents of Rakhine; more than 1,000 Rohingya are
arrested and 115,000 people are internally displaced.

2015 The government invalidates all temporary ID cards (“White Cards”) and issues National Verifi-
cation Cards (NVC). Rohingya must declare themselves foreigners in order to get an NVC. Many
Rohingyas who turn in their White Cards are given a receipt, but are not given new identification
documents.

2016 October: A Rohingya militant group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks
several police outposts. In response, the Burmese military burns more than 1,000 Rohingya villages
and initiates a widespread campaign of rape and and mass killing.

68 WovenTeaching.org
 Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar – U.S. SPECIALIST
A virtual meeting of a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs
nearly three years after the start of the genocide in Myanmar. During this meeting, U.S. lawmakers and
experts in the field debate whether or not to officially label the violence in Myanmar as “genocide.” U.S.
representatives include Ami Bera (D-California), Ted Yoho (R-Florida), and Mark Green (R-Tennessee).
Experts include representatives of Refugees International, Women’s Peace Network, and the Heritage
Foundation.

Guiding Questions:
• Why might it be important for a country like the United States to refer to something as “genocide”?
• Why might governments be hesitant to use such a label?

Mr. Bera: [...] Later this month will mark 3 years
since the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, began
what they called clearance operations against the
Rohingya in the Rakhine State. In reality, what we
witnessed was ethnic cleansing and what should
be considered a genocide. According to the UN
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar, what took place was actually the killing
of thousands of Rohingya civilians, as well as forced
disappearances, mass gang rapes, and the burning
of villages in the hundreds.
We decided to hold this hearing because although
our Nation and the world is grappling with a pan-
demic and massive economic recession, we have
to continue to remain vigilant and watch what is
happening around the world. [...]
What the hearing will look at is–you know, it’s clear
that three years later, Burma is still not respecting
the basic human rights of the Rohingya. Three years
later, the victims in Burma and Bangladesh and the
international community are still dealing with the
consequences. That is what this hearing will exam-
ine. What is the current status of those who have
fled to Bangladesh and were placed in Cox’s Bazar?
[...] And how have Burma’s neighbors welcomed or
not welcomed the Rohingya refugees.
This hearing will also examine the role of the United
States and the international community. What ad-
ditional steps should the U.S. Government and the
international community take to help the Rohingya
people and assist Bangladesh in caring for them?
How should we ensure justice and accountability
for the victims of this brutal campaign against the
Rohingya
perpetrated by the Burmese military? And, finally,
this hearing will examine prospects for peace and
the return of the Rohingya State–or of the Rohingya
to the Rakhine State. [...]
Mr. Yoho: [...] During my time in Congress, my
colleagues and I have repeatedly striven to hold
the government of Myanmar accountable for its
ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. I was proud to
be a cosponsor of the BURMA Act of 2019, which
passed the House late last year and have led multi-
ple efforts to usual the Treasury Department to hold
Myanmar accountable through sanctions, which
has led to the Trump Administration imposing visa
and economic sanctions on nine Tatmadaw military
officers and two military units for their involvement
in extrajudicial killings in the Rakhine State.
While some actions have been taken, it has clearly
not been enough to stop the violence. Despite many
condemnations and sanctions from the United
States and the international community, the Ro-
hingya [continue] to face discrimination, violence,
murder, rape, torture, and death from their own
government.The approach our country and the
international community has taken to resolve this
crisis has failed.
Part of solving the crisis of this magnitude rests in
definition, which some have been too cautious to act
on. Let’s be clear: what is happening in Myanmar
toward the Rohingya is State-sponsored genocide,
period. It has been our commitment since the Holo-
caust to resolve and to say “never again.” [...]
Mr. Schwartz: [...] I’ll now turn to the question of
genocide and the requests of a broad coalition that

WovenTeaching.org 69

the State Department declare Burma responsible for
genocide. [...]
A declaration would recognize the crime for what it
is and promote accountability. It would bring global
attention that could help prevent further atrocities.
It could rally international pressure. It would signal
solidarity with both the Rohingya and with Bangla-
desh and other countries that are hosting Rohingya.
[...]
Ms. Nu: [...] Dear distinguished members, all of this
was preventable. This was the failure to address root
causes of persecutions against Rohingya. Similar
tactics used against ethnic minorities in Myanmar
for decades continue today as military inflict abuses
on civilian in Rakhine, Shan, and Koran States while
the peace process has been stalled. So far, impunity
has reigned for most atrocities in Myanmar. [...]
I want to thank the U.S. for imposing sanctions
on Myanmar military officials and ask that you
also impose financial sanctions on military owned
businesses since the income generated from these
businesses enable the military to continue its brutal
acts. [...]
The U.S. Government should call the crimes what
they are: genocide. Refusing to do so helps the
Myanmar government in its aim to deny our identi-
ty and existence as Rohingya people. [...]
Ms. Enos: [...] There are five reasons to put into the
record for why the U.S. Government should issue an
atrocity determination. I will cover three now. No. 1,
a designation counters the narrative, that the U.S.
does not care about human rights. Atrocities com-
mitted against Rohingya are among the most signif-
icant human rights violations committed during the
Trump Presidency. A strong U.S. response would
telegraph to other countries that the U.S. continues
to support freedom and human rights. Failure to
do so has the potential to embolden bad actors who
will believe that there are little to no negative con-
sequences for engaging in human rights violations
while maintaining a diplomatic relationship with
the U.S.
No. 2, a designation demonstrates a U.S. commit-
ment to preventing atrocity. Atrocity determinations
transcend administrations and ensure that survivors
receive the help that they need. [...]
Should the Trump Administration issue a determi-
70
Case Study: Myanmar
nation of its own on the Rohingya, it would demon-
strate moral and political leadership, and serve as
an opportunity for the Administration to highlight
its burgeoning atrocity prevention efforts. [...]
An atrocity determination now may serve as a cata-
lyst for other countries to provide aid. I recommend
that Congress and the executive branch pursue the
following: first, make an official public legal deter-
mination on crimes committed against Rohingya;
second, evaluate relevant financial tools to craft an
overarching sanctions policy toward Burma, one
that targets Burmese military owned enterprises [...]
An atrocity determination can be issued at any
point in time. Secretary Pompeo has the authority
and discretion to issue such a determination at
whim. But should he choose not to, Congress also
has the option to press the Administration to do as
it did in the case of ISIS genocide, which I am happy
to address more during Q&A. Perhaps this method
could be successful again. Issuing a genocide deter-
mination now would be win for the Administration.
The administration should do so now before it is too
late. [...]
Mr. Yoho: [...] we see this over and over again. We
see it in China in the Xinjiang Province. We see it
elsewhere in the world. And we’ve said “never
again,”’ but yet it happens over and over again. And
without having a direct conflict, the best thing I think
we can do as a Nation is economic pressure. I would
assume that China is their largest trading partner.
But what other nations are coming to the table out-
side of the U.S.? What other developed nations? Are
we seeing the EU? Are we seeing Japan? Are we see-
ing any other country? And then, particularly, since
the majority of the Rohingya are Muslims and they
practice their Muslim faith or they try to, what Mus-
lim countries are coming to the table to be actively
engaged, or is this the U.S. alone? Because if we can
get these other countries engaged, we can put that
economic pressure on there and squeeze them there,
in addition to the sanctions that we are doing? Does
anybody want to comment on that? [...]
Mr. Schwartz: Sure. I would be happy to. I think
key interlocutors, economic interlocutors for Burma
include not only China but India, Japan, Indonesia,
the E.U. And the challenge is to marshal an inter-
national effort and there really has been an absence
of leadership in that effort to marshal, you know, a
truly international effort. The Muslim world has–
WovenTeaching.org

governments with Muslim majority populations
have been regularly supportive of declarations
against what the Burmese military have done, but
that has not really translated into genuine political
and economic pressure.
Mr. Yoho: Okay. Let me bring this up then: We know
in January 2020 the U.N. reported genocide going
on and called their commander in chief and five
generals to face charges of crimes, but yet the U.N.
Security Council has yet to issue such a designation.
This is just something I am going to say is that we
as a Nation need to invoke these other nations. And
we need to have this at the U.N. to where they bring
this up and then, from that, move that coalition to
put that economic pressure on anybody that is trad-
ing with them. And, again, what we see is China
is the bad actor. China could come to the table and
help us resolve so many issues around the world,
yet they are on the opposite end, fuming and work-
ing against us. Until we get agreement in countries
working in the same direction, this will not end. [...]
Mr. Green: [...] I believe that foreign policy and
foreign affairs right now are probably the most chal-
lenging ever in the United States’ history, far more
complex than ever before [...]
And Myanmar is an excellent example of that,
where we face an Asian nation undergoing this hu-
manitarian, human rights crisis. But as in the past,
when Americans fight for other nations and peo-
ple’s human rights, we bring security to our own
world and, thus, ourselves.
When we have to stand with these people who
are–this is an atrocity, as it has been called already
in the committee meeting, “genocide,” in some
ways. However, we also have to consider–and I
think it was Representative Titus who mentioned
this–China continues to grow its malign influence
throughout the world. Relationships in that region
are clearly have to be considered and how it em-
powers their actions. [...]
Ms. Enos: [...] But the U.S. decision not to call it geno-
Source
“House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Meeting on the Rohingya Crisis (August 2020).” Woven Teach-
ing. YouTube. Video, 13:24. 27 April 2022. https://youtu.be/iYfSCrGlEo4.
The video above has been edited from the original for use in the classroom. Original video via House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Myanmar
cide, not to call it crimes against humanity, I think,
has really hampered international aid efforts, and I
think if you were to have such a determination, you
have the potential to really galvanize much needed
aid and assistanceduring a time when needs are
ever increasing with COVID-19.
And I would just add, very briefly, that any sort of
atrocity determination that is issued does not re-
quire any sort of new case before the ICJ or the ICC.
It actually does not have any sort of legal require-
ments to pursue international justice, but I do think
that the Administration would be wise to pursue
alternative legal and judicial mechanisms for hold-
ing the Burmese military accountable in addition to
targeting and levying the much needed sanctions,
you know, and continuing that sanctions pressure
against the Burmese military, especially against Bur-
mese, military-owned enterprises.
Mr. Yoho: [...] I have got to make a few comments
here because I saw this administration being at-
tacked and not doing enough, dropping the ball on
this. But we have had two witnesses talk about, you
know, under President Obama, the sanctions got
released. Hillary Clinton, as Secretary of State, was
bragging about the democracy she helped form in
Burma when it was a shell game, we find out now.
And these atrocities were going on way before this,
and they continued all the way through this, but
the work that happened in the State Department al-
lowed for the sanctions to be released. And so these
attacks are tawdry. I mean, they are just cheap shots
that aren’t going to solve any problems, and I really
don’t appreciate this. [...]
So, if you want to focus on politics, that is great. This
is not the place to do it. We need to come together
with policies that we can pass in a bipartisan man-
ner that we can get and work through the Senate, so
that we can get these policies enacted so that we can
bring this genocide, which is ultimately what this
hearing is about, to an end, and we can only do that
if we are working bipartisanly together. [...]
71
 Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar – United Nations Monitor
This September 2017 press release from the UN includes summaries of statements made by various
members of the Security Council. It also includes a statement from the National Security Adviser of
Myanmar, who denies that genocide or ethnic cleansing took place in Rakhine State.

Guiding Questions:
• How did the UN Security Council respond to the violence in Myanmar?
• What do you think the international response to the violence in Myanmar should have been?

António Guterres, United Nations Secre-
tary-General, said that the escalation of the cri-
sis in northern Rakhine state demanded action.
[...] “The situation has spiralled into the world’s
fastest-developing refugee emergency and a hu-
manitarian and human rights nightmare,” he said,
calling on the Myanmar authorities to take imme-
diate steps to end the military operations, allow
unfettered access for humanitarian support, and
ensure the safe, voluntary, and sustainable return
of the refugees to their homes. [...]
from Myanmar of suffering that no one should be
forced to endure. [...] The international commu-
nity could not be afraid to call the actions of the
Myanmar authorities exactly what they were — a
brutal, sustained campaign to cleanse the country
of an ethnic minority. Such a brutal assault did
not advance justice, but rather put it further from
reach. [...]
What was most frustrating about the conflict was
“how we should have seen it coming”, she said.

The Myanmar authorities must fulfil their funda-
mental obligation of ensuring the safety and se-
curity of all communities and upholding the rule
of law without discrimination, he stressed. United
Nations agencies and non-governmental partners
must be granted immediate and safe access to all
affected communities, he said, expressing concern
about the current climate of antagonism towards
the United Nations. [...]
Jonathan Guy Allen (United Kingdom) said that
the world had watched in horror at the violence
that had erupted over the last month. By now, all
had seen reports of the extrajudicial killings, burn-
ings of villages and the placement of landmines.
Most of the victims were Rohingya Muslims, al-
though others were also being affected. [...] It was
becoming increasingly clear that world opinion
was aligning on the issue, and it now fell to Myan-
mar, and its military to respond. The military bore
the primary responsibility for resolving the crisis,
he said, adding: “There is a way out.” [...]
If the leaders did not take the necessary steps, they
would find themselves on the wrong side of histo-
ry and the Council must be ready to act.
Nikki Haley (United States) said that for the
last four weeks, the world had witnessed images
Fodé Seck (Senegal) [...] strongly condemned the
violence and urged Myanmar to put an end to the
human tragedy. The involvement of Bangladesh
and Myanmar in today’s meeting was a testament
to the transparency of discussions. “We now know
much more about the deep-seeded causes of the
conflict,” he continued. [...]
Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Egypt) said that hun-
dreds of thousands of innocent souls had been
killed or persecuted and regional security dan-
gerous[ly] threatened, creating a heavy burden on
neighboring countries. The issue was humanitar-
ian at heart, based on the principle of acceptance
of others and coexistence with people of different
beliefs and religions. Hate speech, violence or
threat of use of violence could not be accepted and
must be rejected, whether perpetrated by a party
or Government institutions. [...] Egypt’s position
that the Rohingya had a right to life did not mean
that it supported violence of any related groups.
“But it is important to ask: What choice are we
leaving to these people, other than taking up arms
to defend themselves?” [...]
François Delattre (France) said that ethnic cleaning
was currently underway in the west of Myanmar
and that 500,000 Rohingya, mostly women and
children, had fled to Bangladesh in the last month.

72 WovenTeaching.org

The incitement to hatred and violence against
the Rohingya existed in Myanmar today, he said,
warning that public discourse and other stigma
could lead to even worse atrocities. The Security
Council had the responsibility of standing united
and acting to break the negative spiral. Immediate
efforts must concentrate on putting an end to the
violence. The security forces in Myanmar must en-
sure protection for all, without discrimination. [...]
Wu Haitao (China) said that order must prevail
as soon as possible and that unity among different
people must be restored. Antagonism had been
building for a long time, he said, noting that a
series of steps had been taken to ease the situation
in Rakhine state. The international community
must view the difficulties and challenges facing
the Myanmar Government through an objective
lens. The international community must support
dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar so
that they could properly address the mass exodus
of the Muslim population. As a friendly neighbour
to both countries, China had provided necessary
assistance for accommodating the displaced. The
situation on the ground was moving towards sta-
bility, he added.
Vassily A. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) said
that the situation was far from being resolved.
According to reports, the Arakan Rohingya Sal-
vation Army was guilty of killing civilians and
the extremists had forced members of the Hindu
communities to leave their homes and migrate
with Muslims to Bangladesh. He noted the efforts
of the Government of Myanmar to resolve the
situation in Rakhine state and repatriate refugees
from Bangladesh. He commended the efforts of
Bangladesh and expressed hope that the interna-
tional community would provide sizeable support
to resolve the humanitarian crisis. The situation
could only be resolved through dialogue among
people of all nationalities and faiths. The inter-
national community must be very careful before
labelling something genocide and ethnic cleans-
ing, he continued, calling for violence and violent
rhetoric from any sides to end.
Sebastiano Cardi (Italy) expressed concern about
the appalling increase in the number of refugees
over the past month. It was the Security Council’s
responsibility to urgently address the situation
and send a strong, unified and constructive mes-
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Myanmar
sage in line with the priorities outlined by the Sec-
retary-General. The violence must end immediate-
ly, and in that context, he called on the authorities
to stop the attacks against civilians and stressed
the need for the security response to fully respect
international humanitarian and international
human rights law. Attacks against the Rohingya
were a matter of grave concern and could not be
tolerated. [...]
Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine) said that any
targeting of civilians was totally unacceptable and
impunity for perpetrators could not be tolerated.
His delegation was particularly concerned about
allegations of human rights violations having
taken place during recent military operations in
the province. [...] Given the dire nature of the sit-
uation, the least the Government could do would
be to halt all military operations in Rakhine. [...]
Concrete steps were urgently needed, as what was
doable and within reach today may not be avail-
able tomorrow. It was not too late to deliver, al-
though it was imperative that the Council be more
proactive to ensure the violence was stopped.
“Nobody around this table wants to see the worst-
case scenario,” he said. [...]
Mr. Zambrana (Bolivia) condemned all action
that exacerbated tensions and incited violence
and said all such acts must be duly investigated.
The Rohingya were victims but others, including
Hindus, were as well. While upholding the United
Nations Charter and international law, it was also
important to stand by the principle of non-inter-
vention in the internal affairs of States. Dialogue,
consultation, mediation and negotiation were es-
sential to resolve the crisis. [...]
Tekeda Alemu (Ethiopia), Council President
for September, said the situation in Myanmar
was deeply worrying as it could have serious
regional implications if not handled quickly and
carefully. [...] Any acts of extreme violence were
unjustifiable. The Government of Bangladesh was
“already telling us” that the humanitarian situa-
tion had become grave, he continued, urging the
end of military operations. He stressed the need
to ensure an acceptable level of mutual trust be-
tween the Myanmar Government and the United
Nations. The role of diplomacy must never be
overlooked. [...]
U Thaung Tun, National Security Adviser of
73

Myanmar, said that assertions in the media that a
campaign of terror had been unleashed in north-
ern Rakhine and that unspeakable crimes had
been committed against innocent people only
served to heighten the concern of the international
community. “While such assertions may appear
reasonable at first glance to a lay observer, experts
with knowledge of the history of Myanmar and
exposure to the propaganda tactics of terrorists
will see such comments for what they were —
malicious and unsubstantiated chatter.” Never-
theless, his Government understood the concern
of the international community and took serious
note of it.
The Government recognized there was a serious
problem that needed to be addressed, he said. The
recent violence was triggered by the attacks carried
out by the so-called Arakan Rohingya Salvation
Army terrorist group. His country was committed
to a sustainable solution that would lead to peace,
stability, development and the return of displaced
communities to their homes. The Government had
strongly condemned the acts of terror committed
by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in north-
ern Rakhine and would work to ensure that the
fight against terrorism would not distract from the
commitment to bring peace, harmony and devel-
opment to Rakhine. [...]
He stressed that there was no ethnic cleansing
and genocide in Myanmar. “It would be a sad
commentary of our times if we allowed emotions
to cloud our view and assert that what is happen-
ing in Rakhine is ethnic cleansing without first
undertaking a legal review and making a judicial
Source
United Nations, Department of Public Information. Amid ‘Humanitarian and Human Rights Night-
mare’ in Myanmar, Secretary-General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return of Displaced Rohingya, End to
Military Operations. SC/13012. 28 September 2017. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13012.doc.
htm.
74
Case Study: Myanmar
determination,” he underscored. The leaders of
Myanmar, who had been struggling for so long for
freedom and human rights, would never espouse
a policy of genocide or ethnic cleansing, and the
Government would do everything to prevent it.
[...]
Masud Bin Momen (Bangladesh) said that since
25 August, nearly 500,000 people had entered
Bangladesh, fleeing violence in northern Rakhine
state. Despite serious constraints, Bangladesh had
given shelter to those distressed Rohingyas, most
of whom were women and children. [...] With
the influx of arrivals, Bangladesh was currently
hosting more than 900,000 forcibly displaced Ro-
hingyas, he said, warning: “This is an untenable
situation, to say the least.”
Despite claims to the contrary, violence had not
ceased in northern Rakhine state, nor had the ex-
odus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh, he said. A day
ago, an additional 20,000 entered into Bangladesh.
The new arrivals described the use of rape as a
weapon to scare families into leaving. The indis-
criminate killing and torture by the Myanmar
security forces, aided by vigilante groups with
religious and ethnic affiliation, had already been
cited as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”
by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. The remaining Rohingya civilians
in northern Rakhine state must be guaranteed
unconditional protection through the creation of
a United Nations-administered “safe zone” inside
Myanmar. Humanitarian assistance must reach
affected communities. [...]
WovenTeaching.org

Myanmar – International Specialist
In September 2017, Myanmar’s then-leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, gave her first public statement on the
situation in Rakhine State. In this speech, Suu Kyi did not denounce the violence against Rohingya
Muslims in Myanmar.
Guiding Questions:
• What reason does Aung San Suu Kyi give for the exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar?
• What is Suu Kyi asking the international community to do? Why?
[...] Burma is a complex nation, as all of you know.
And its complexities are compounded by the fact
that people expect us to overcome all these chal-
lenges in as short a time as possible. I think it is
only fitting that I should remind you today that
our government has not yet been in power for
even 18 months. [...] 18 months is a very short time
in which to expect us to meet and overcome all
the challenges that we have been expected to do.
This does not mean that we are not ready to go on
with our task of overcoming these challenges. Be-
cause I believe in the community of nations, I am
prepared to share, with all our friends who wish
us well and who understand our problems and
sympathise with us, what we have been doing to
achieve democratic transition, peace and stability,
and development.
I am aware of the fact that the world’s attention is
focused on the situation in Rakhine State. And, as
I said at the [UN] General Assembly last year, as a
responsible member of the community of nations,
Myanmar does not fear international scrutiny and
we are committed to a sustainable solution that
would lead to peace, stability, and development
for all communities within that State. [...]
Unhappily, on 9 October [2016], eighteen days af-
ter the delivery of my address at the [UN] General
Assembly, three police outposts were attacked by
armed Muslim groups. There were further attacks
on 11 October and 12 November and these clashes
resulted in loss of lives, injuries, burning of villag-
es, and the displacement of peoples in the affected
areas. Many Muslims fled to Bangladesh.
Since then, the government has been making every
effort to restore peace and stability and to promote
harmony between the Muslim and Rakhine com-
munities. Even before these outbreaks took place,
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Myanmar
we had established a Central Committee for rule of
law and development in the Rakhine and invited
[former Secretary-General of the United Nations]
Dr. Kofi Annan to lead a Commission that would
help us to resolve the longstanding problems of
that State. But, in spite of all these efforts, we were
not able to prevent the conflicts from taking place.
[...]
After several months of seemingly quiet and
peace, on 25 of August, thirty police outposts, as
well as the Regimental Headquarters in Taungth-
azar village, were attacked by armed groups.
Consequent to these attacks, the government de-
clared the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and
its supporters responsible for acts of terrorism, as
a terrorist group [...]
There has been much concern around the world
with regard to the situation in Rakhine. It is not
the intention of the Myanmar government to ap-
portion blame or to abnegate responsibility. We
condemn all human rights violations and unlaw-
ful violence. We are committed to the restoration
of peace, stability, and rule of law, throughout the
State. The security forces have been instructed to
adhere strictly to the code of conduct in carrying
out security operations, to exercise all due re-
straint, and to take full measures to avoid collater-
al damage and the harming of innocent civilians.
Human rights violations and all other acts that
impair stability and harmony and undermine the
rule of law will be addressed in accordance with
strict norms of justice.
We feel deeply for the suffering of all the people
who have been caught up in the conflict. Those
who have had to flee their homes are many–not
just Muslims and Rakhines, but also small mi-
nority groups, such as the Daing-net, Mro, Thet,
75

Mramagyi and Hindus of whose presence most of
the world is totally unaware. [...]
Nevertheless, we are concerned to hear that num-
bers of Muslims are fleeing across the border to
Bangladesh. We want to find out why this exodus
is happening. We would like to talk to those who
have fled as well as to those who have stayed. I
think it is very little known that the great majority
of Muslims in the Rakhine State have not joined
the exodus. More than 50 per cent of the villages
of Muslims are intact. They are as they were before
the attacks took place. We would like to know why.
This is what I think we have to work towards. Not
just looking at the problems, but also looking at
the areas where there are no problems. Why have
we been able to avoid these problems in certain
areas? For this reason, we would like to invite the
members of our diplomatic community to join us
in our endeavor to learn more from the Muslims
who have integrated successfully into the Rakh-
ine State. If you are interested in joining us in our
endeavors, please let us know. We can arrange
for you to visit these areas, and to ask them for
yourself, why they have not fled, why they have
chosen to remain in their villages, even at a time
when everything around them seems to be in a
state of turmoil. [...]
With regard to citizenship, a strategy with specific
timelines has been developed to move forward the
National Verification Process. But this is a process
which needs cooperation from all communities.
In some Muslim communities, their leaders have
decided that they are not to join in the verification
process. [...]
There has been a call for the repatriation of refu-
gees who have fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh.
We are prepared to start the verification process
at any time. [...] Those who have been verified as
refugees from this country will be accepted with-
out any problems and with full assurance of their
security and their access to humanitarian aid.
I understand that many of our friends throughout
the world are concerned by reports of villages be-
ing burnt and of hordes of refugees fleeing. As I
said earlier, there have been no conflicts since the
5th of September and no clearance operations. We
too are concerned. We want to find out what the
real problems are. There have been allegations
76
Case Study: Myanmar
and counter-allegations and we have to listen to
all of them. And we have to make sure that these
allegations are based on solid evidence before we
take action.
Action will be taken against all peoples, regardless
of their religion, race, or political position who go
against the laws of the land and who violate hu-
man rights as accepted by our international com-
munity. We have never been soft on human rights
in this country. Our government has emerged as a
body committed to the defence of human rights.
Not of any particular community’s rights, but of
the rights of all human beings, within the borders
of our country. [...]
And as we go forward in our efforts to redress the
ills of this nation, I would like to ask our friends
who understand and sympathise with, both our
aspirations and our problems, to join us. We would
like you to join us in a positive and constructive
way to find new paths towards peace and stability
and towards harmony.
We would like you to think of our country as a
whole. Not just as little afflicted areas. It is as a
whole only that we can make progress. [...]
It is sad that in meeting our diplomatic commu-
nity, I am obliged to focus just on a very few of
our problems, when there are so many which I
think we could resolve together. That is why I am
opening the door to all of you who wish to join us
in our endeavors. We invite you to join us, to talk
to us, to discuss with us, to go with us to the trou-
bled areas, where we can guarantee security for
you, because we don’t want the added problems
of anything happening to any of you, so we would
like you to join us, then to see for yourself what is
happening and think for yourself, what can we do
to remove these problems? And also, I want you to
take special care to study the peaceful areas–how
have they managed to keep the peace? How have
they managed to preserve harmony? Why are they
not at each other’s throats in these particular ar-
eas? This is the answer that we need. It is not just
a matter of removing ills, but also of promoting
what is positive. We have to remove the negative
and increase the positive, and we would like to do
that together with all of you. [...]
We don’t want Myanmar to be a nation divided by
religious beliefs, or ethnicity or political ideology.
WovenTeaching.org

We all have the right to our diverse identities and
we all have the right to strive to fulfil our lives in
the ways in which we believe are right. But we
also have to work together because we belong to
one nation. And as we belong to one nation, we
also belong to this world.
It is for this reason that we place great importance
on the role of the United Nations as an assembly of
nations which was created to promote peace and
harmony, to ensure that our world should not ever
again, in future, fall into the suffering that we all
experienced during the Second World War. [...]
It is by cooperating only, that our world can go for-
ward. By attacking each other, either with words,
Source
“Aung San Suu Kyi’s First Comments on the Rohingya Crisis.” Woven Teaching. YouTube. Video,
13:03. https://youtu.be/DEs2Hl3umtI.
This video has been edited for use in the classroom. Original video via Al Jazeera.
WovenTeaching.org
Case Study: Myanmar
or with weapons, or even with emotions, will not
help us. Hate and fear are the main scourges of our
world. All conflict arises either out of hate or out
of fear. It is only by removing the sources of hate
and fear that we shall be able to remove conflict
from our country and from our world.
As you know, there are many allegations and
counter-allegations. I have not gone into any of
them because it is not my purpose to promote and
encourage conflict, whether of ideas, or of arms,
but to try to promote harmony and understand-
ing. I hope that you will understand us and join us
in our endeavors. [...]
77
 Case Study: Myanmar
Myanmar – Impact Researcher
Impact Researchers will conduct research on the internet related to the aftermath of genocide in
Myanmar.

Guiding Questions
• In the long term, who has been impacted by the events in Myanmar? In what ways?

• How was the nation of Myanmar impacted as a whole?

• What consequences have the perpetrators faced, if any?

• How has the international community addressed (or not addressed) the Rohingya refugee crisis
since 2018?

Useful Websites
• Fortify Rights – www.fortifyrights.org

• Human Rights Watch – www.hrw.org

• United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – www.ushmm.org

78 WovenTeaching.org
R2P Key Terms
• apartheid: racial segregation, specifically: a
former policy of segregation and political, so-
cial, and economic discrimination against the
nonwhite majority in the Republic of South
Africa
• atrocity: a shockingly bad or atrocious act, ob-
ject, or situation
• colonialism: domination of a people or area by
a foreign state or nation
• crimes against humanity: acts committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against any civilian population.
• ethnic cleansing: the forced removal, by mass
expulsion or killing, of a group from a given
territory (with the purpose of making it ethni-
cally homogenous).
• genocide: According to the United Nations,
genocide is any of the following acts commit-
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflict-
ing on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another
group.
• humanitarian: concerned with promoting
human welfare and helping those who are
suffering
• International Court of Justice (ICJ): one of the
six principal bodies of the United Nations. The
ICJ settles legal disputes between States.
• International Criminal Court (ICC): the first
permanent, treaty-based, international court
established to try crimes of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ICC
tries individuals, not states, for these crimes.
• mass atrocities: large-scale and deliberate at-
tacks on civilians
Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
a military alliance established in the aftermath
of World War II. As of 2022, NATO includes
28 European countries and 2 North American
countries, including the United States.
• peacekeeping: a project of the United Nations
whereby troops are sent to a country to moni-
tor its transition from conflict to peace.
• perpetrator: a person who commits an illegal
or harmful act. In the context of mass atrocities,
a perpetrator is someone who orders, assists,
or engages in the act of killing.
• Responsibility to Protect (R2P): an interna-
tional commitment to prevent genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity
• sanctions: economic restrictions that countries
impose on another state, group, or individual
• Secretary-General: the Chief Administrative
Officer of the United Nations. The Secre-
tary-General is appointed by the General As-
sembly and oversees the operations of the UN.
• sovereignty: the authority of a state to govern
its affairs without external interference
• United Nations (UN): an intergovernmental
organization established in 1945. Its purpose
is to maintain peace and security around the
world and to develop international coopera-
tion among countries.
• UN Security Council: one of the six principal
bodies of the United Nations. The Security
Council is the leadership body of the UN, re-
sponsible for maintaining peace and security.
It has 15 members, 5 of whom are permanent
members with veto power–the United States,
China, the United Kingdom, France, and Rus-
sia.
• war crimes: acts that take place during war
that violate the rules of war. For example, tor-
ture, killing of civilians, and the use of poison
weapons, are war crimes.
79
R2P Timeline

UN is established 1945
At the end of World War II, the international community came together to establish the United
Nations. The UN is dedicated to maintaining peace and security around the world. As of 2022,
there are currently 193 Member States of the United Nations.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948

In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This document outlines the 30 human rights that every individual is entitled to,
regardless of race, sex, social class, religion, or any other characteristic.

First UN peacekeeping mission (West Asia)

The first UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in May 1948. It included a small number of
military observers who were sent to West Asia (Middle East) to monitor the Armistice Agree-
ment between the newly-established state of Israel and its Arab neighbors.

First large-scale UN peacekeeping mission 1960

In 1960, the UN sent 20,000 peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission ended
in 1964.

UN Peacekeeping wins Nobel Peace Prize 1988

While presenting the award, the President of the Nobel Committee stated, “It becomes clearer and
clearer that what has to be done to secure the future for new generations has to be done together.
Our determination has to be channeled into the United Nations. This is the best hope for the future
of the world – indeed its only hope!”

Somalia 1993
UN peacekeepers were deployed to Somalia to monitor a ceasefire and provide humanitarian aid.
They were regularly attacked by warring factions. The UN authorized U.S. troops to capture militia
leaders in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. During the operation, two U.S. military helicopters were
shot down and 18 American soldiers, 1 Malayasian soldier, and hundreds of Somalis died. In the
aftermath of the battle, dead American soldiers were dragged through the streets by Somalis,
which was shown on American television—to public outcry. The events in Somalia made the
international community hesitant to intervene militarily in the years after.

Rwanda 1994
Before the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda, the head of the UN’s peacekeeping mission to Rwanda
warned of impending violence. The United Nations ignored the warning. When widespread
violence erupted following the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, the
international community did little to stop the killings.

80 Woven Teaching
2022 Ukraine
On February 24, Russian leader, Vladimir Putin sent military forces into Ukraine (a former Soviet
Republic). The strategic aims seem to be reclaiming Ukraine as part of Russia and destabilizing
NATO. The global response has been swift–the largest mobilization of forces in Europe since World
War II. Additionally, Russia and Putin himself are facing sanctions. This conflict has unleashed a
devastating humanitarian toll and claimed thousands of lives. As of April 2022, more than three
million people have been forced to flee Ukraine, spurring what the United Nations has called the
fastest-growing refugee crisis since WWII.

2017 Myanmar
In August 2017, a genocide occurred in Myanmar, largely perpetrated by the military. This South-
east Asian nation led a campaign against the Rohingya people that included widespread violence,
sexual assault, and imprisonment. Nearly one million Rohingya refugees fled to neighboring
countries to avoid being killed. The international community did not intervene to stop the vio-
lence. Nearly all of the refugees who fled Myanmar have not yet returned.

2011 Libya
At the end of 2010, pro-democracy uprisings started to occur throughout the Middle East and
North Africa. Beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, protests soon spread to neighboring Egypt
and Libya. In the case of Libya, these protests quickly turned into a civil war, with rebel groups
fighting to end the 42-year reign of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. A month after the start of the war,
the UN Security Council authorized military intervention in Libya. This was the first time that the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine had been invoked since it was created in 2005.

2005 Responsibility to Protect

At the UN’s 2005 World Summit, representatives from 170 countries assembled and created
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). At its core, R2P is about protecting people from the worst crimes.
It is a global political commitment that says countries have a responsibility to protect their popula-
tions from large-scale, systemic violence against civilans (mass atrocities), namely: genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. If countries are unable and unwilling to
protect their populations, the international community has a responsibility to intervene to stop the
violence.

1999 Kosovo
The Kosovo War (1998-1999) took place in southeastern Europe between ethnic Albanians and
ethnic Serbs. For many decades following World War II, Kosovo was an autonomous province
within Yugoslavia. By the late 1980s, however, the Yugoslav government was tightening its grip
on Kosovo. At the same time, a separatist movement inside of Kosovo was growing. In 1998, these
tensions erupted into the Kosovo War. By March 1999, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization),
a military alliance led by western States such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
intervened to stop the killing and displacement of Kosovar Albanians by Yugoslav forces.

1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica)

During the 1990s, Bosnian Serbs engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide against
Bosnian Muslims and other ethnic groups in the newly-independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
July 1995, Bosnian Serbs killed nearly 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys from the enclave of
Srebrenica, while forcibly removing women and children from the area.

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 81

82
What is military intervention? How does it work?

military
intervention Pros Cons

What are sanctions? How do they work?

Graphic Organizer

Sanctions
Pros Cons

What are negotiations? How do they work?

Name:

Negotiations Pros Cons

What is peacekeeping? How does it work?

Peacekeeping Pros Cons

Woven Teaching
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
student version

1 2 3
All human beings These rights belong
are born equal in to everyone. You
dignity and in rights. should never be
discriminated against.
You have the right
to life, liberty, and
safety.

4 5 6
No one can torture Everyone has
No one can hold you or treat you in a
rights, no matter
you in slavery. cruel or degrading
where they are.
way.

7 8 9
Laws should be You have the right
applied the same to seek legal help
if your rights are
way for everyone.
not respected.
You cannot be
imprisoned or thrown
out of a country
without a good reason.

10 11 12
You have the You should You have a right to
be presumed privacy. No one can
right to a public innocent until
enter your home, read
your mail, or bother you
trial. proven guilty. without good reason.

13 14 15
You have the right
You have the right to You have the right
seek protection from to be a citizen of
to move and travel another country (asylum)
within your country if your country treats you
a country (have a
and internationally. poorly. nationality).

16 17 18
Every adult has the You have the You have the
right to get married right to own right to practice
and have a family.
property. any religion.

19 20 21
You have the You have the right You have the right
to gather with to participate in the
right to express
others and protest government of your
your opinion. publicly. country (e.g. vote).

22 23 24
You have the right You have the right to
to have your basic work, to receive equal
You have the
needs met (e.g. pay for equal work, right to rest
through social and to join a union. from work.
security programs).

25 26 27
You have the right to an You have the No one can stop you
adequate standard of
right to an from participating
living, including housing, in your community’s
food, and medical care. education. cultural life.

28 29 30
Everyone must respect Everyone must No one can take any
the social order that of the rights in this
allows these rights to respect the declaration away
exist. rights of others. from you.

Are We Responsible?: Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Atrocity 83

Resources
resources
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
globalr2p.org
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect was created in 2008. It engages in advocacy,
conducts research to promote R2P, recommends strategies to help states build capacity, and works
closely with nongovernmental organizations, governments and regional bodies.

UN Charter
United Nations
un.org/en/about-us/un-charter
The UN Charter is the founding document of the United Nations. Chapter VII outlines the respon-
sibility of the Security Council in maintaining peace and security (including the authorization of
intervention).

UN Security Council
Dag Hammarskjöld Library
research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings
An archive of UN Security Council meeting minutes, resolutions, and vetoes from 1946 to the pres-
ent

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

United Nations
un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
This webpage contains the full text version of the UDHR, an illustrated version, and links to pages
about the history and drafters of the declaration.

World 101 – Building Blocks

Council on Foreign Relations
world101.cfr.org/how-world-works-and-sometimes-doesnt/building-blocks
A series of modules and instructor resources about sovereignty, nationalism, and the Responsibility
to Protect

84 Woven Teaching