Philosophy Case Digest

PIO DURAN vs. ABAD SANTOS, Judge of the People

GR No. L-99

Fact:

Pio Duran filed a petition to set aside decision denying his petition to be released on bail. The decision
was executed on October 12, 1945. His Motion for Reconsideration on October 15, 1945 was also denied.

Duran a political prisoner asserted that he has no knowledge on any charges filed against him. He claims
that Abad Santos the respondent judge, exercised abuse on handling his case and has deprived him of his
liberty without due process of law.

As Duran stated, “That the denial of said petition is a flagrant violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines and of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, and that the respondent has committed a
great abuse of discretion for which petitioner has no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.”

Respondent judge has answered to the petition and has denied the allegations and claimed to have
explained the reasons for the denial. Abad Santos claims that petitioner was charged with treason, the
highest of all crimes, and the latter admitted during the court hearings that he failed to rebut all the
allegations against him for treason. Abad Santos considered the presented pieces of evidence strong
enough to deny the bail petition of Duran, even with the recommendation of the Solicitor General to
allow the petitioner to post bail pending trial at the amount of P35, 000.00.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent has erred in his decision to disallow the bail of the petitioner and has
exercise great abuse on this case in accordance to section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682

2. Whether or not the petitioner is deprived of liberty without due process

Held:

1. NO. Duran was charged with treason, which is "the highest of all crimes" and according to section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682...political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after
due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail, even prior to the
presentation of the corresponding information, unless the Court finds that there is strong evidence
of the commission of a capital offense.”

2. Petition was dismissed due to lack of merit. Duran was not deprived of liberty without due process
because he was given opportunity to be heard and his petition for bail was set for hearing.
STA. MARIA vs. LOPEZ
GR No. L-30773

Fact:

Sta. Maria, a professor of English and Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP College in Baguio),
was elected Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967, by the Board of Regents, on nomination of
the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five-year term, "effective May 16, 1967, until
May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and
obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

The graduate and undergraduate students at the UP College of Education presented to President
Salvador P. Lopez several demands having a bearing on the general academic program and the physical
plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee
composed of eight graduate students.

But the students were not to be appeased. For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did not act on some
of their demands. Respondents herein have stressed that in the meetings of the education graduate
committee, Dean Sta. Maria neither included in the agenda nor consulted the faculty about some of the
students' demands…

On July 17, the Education Graduate Student Organization boycotted their classes just the same. The
President met the striking students’ representatives and the faculty members of the College of Education.
The boycott fever infected other colleges. On July 22, 1969, the newly installed members of the UP-
Student Council voted to support the education students’ strike. The next day, July 23, the main avenues
leading to the university gates were barricaded, buses denied entrance, and students cajoled into joining
the strike. It was thus on that day that all academic activity in the university came to a complete standstill.
UP President called a meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of
confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, on the same day, July 23, 1969, President
Lopez issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. That order, addressed to
Dean Sta. Maria and simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean
of the College of Education, without additional compensation.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria’s transfer was a removal

2. Whether or not Sta. Maria was actually demoted and not merely transferred
3. Whether or not the lack of formal hearing violated her rights to due process
Held:

1. NO. There are transfers which do not amount to removal. Some such transfers can be affected without
the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the
employee. The clue to such transfers may be found in the “nature of the appointment.” Where the
appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided
the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary.

2. YES. The transfer of petitioner from his post of Dean, college of Education, to the office of respondent
UP President as Special Assistant in charge of public information and relations was a demotion. The
position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and
responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff position.

3. YES. Transfer could be but a ploy to cover dismissal, and dismissal cannot be justified on grounds of
expediency. As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that “if the employee believes that there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case . . . and pending his appeal and decision thereon, his
transfer shall be held in abeyance.”

Demonstrations and boycotts which are manifestations of such activism are constitutionally protected.
But there are limits, it should not impair the rights of others. Emergency could not justify disregard of
constitutional rights.

Vargas v Rilloza
GR No. L-1612

Facts:

A motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of the People's Court Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 682), which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance,
Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a
regular Supreme Court Justice.

upon the following grounds:

(a) It provides for qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section 6,
Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.

(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.

(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm
or reject appointments to the Supreme Court…

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his opposition
submits that the Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 and section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional qualification for
members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the
Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

Held:

No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other
than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the
infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court, in this case
replaced by judges of first instance.

Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be
appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, “Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as
determined by the Constitution.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. POMAR

GR No. L-22008

Fact:

Julio Pomar the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La
Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in said city,
and having, during the year 1923, in his employ and service as cigar-maker in said factory, a woman by
the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos
(P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days
before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement, despite and over the demands made by her.
In accordance with the provision of Act. 3071which states that.

“Section 13
Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant
to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required
to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.”

The judge found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense. From that sentence, the defendant appealed
contending that his act did not constitute any offense because such provision of the Act No. 3071 is
unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act No.3071 is unconstitutional

Held:

YES. The Court ruled that Section 13 of the Act is unconstitutional and void, in that it violates a person’s
liberty to contract. Although this liberty must yield to the common good, the law creates a term in every
such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to
contract. The right to liberty includes the right to enter contracts and to terminate contracts.

Section 13 of Act No. 3071 was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed police power,
with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers. however, Section 13 creates a
term or condition in every contract made by every person, firm, or corporation with any woman who
may, during her employment, become pregnant. Failure to include in said contract the terms fixed by the
law, makes the employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and imprisonment. Therefore, the law has
deprived, every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a place of labor of his right to enter
contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice

GR No. 203335

Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a
person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among
other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study,
amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.

Issue:

Whether or not certain provisions of the cybercrime prevention act are unconstitutional

Held:

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this
standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is
on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used
to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act –
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating him from the coverage of
Section 4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.

Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid under the Overbreadth
Doctrine.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or
the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill
such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional
rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set
of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not
being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing
there exists a well-known billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for
cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name
and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that,
considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his real name or use
it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law
is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the
same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

The right to privacy

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of
the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court
acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving of constitutional protection.

Zones of Privacy

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
“constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these
zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
process of the law.

Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is NOT unconstitutional
The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover identical
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system.

The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one
can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational
basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating

freedom of expression
The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam.”
The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats
the same sentence or comment was said to be making a “spam.” The term referred to a Monty Python’s
Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying “Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading
options from a menu.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which
is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.

Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article is NOT
unconstitutional
Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with
knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard
standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such element is required to
establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is
available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a
barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation).
Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the
Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a
defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted to apply to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerate as cybercrimes. It
suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part
of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as
the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the
absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code if
committed through information and communication technologies, is NOT unconstitutional.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As
the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through
the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means.
In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more
victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.

Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal Code, is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber child pornography is concerned.
There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted
online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses,
one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A.
10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG
itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under
Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s
scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means.” Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They
appear appropriate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is
not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an
element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department.

Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO SWEEPING AND LACKS
RESTRAINT
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may
require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such
requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there is compelling State interest
behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. In assessing regulations affecting privacy
rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to
monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or
even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and totalitarian society.” The Court must ensure that laws
seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 on preservation of computer data and Section 17 on destruction of computer data do not
constitute undue deprivation of right to property
The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and
are to be considered private communications. The data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The
process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

It is unclear that the user has demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the
data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved
them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service
provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate privacy of communications and
correspondence
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of subpoena. Executive agencies
have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. Besides, what Section 14
envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands
of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for
disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data does not supersede existing search and
seizure rules
On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure
the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue
of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties does not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.

Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that
contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of
property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service
provider’s systems.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires
that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law.
Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision.
It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law enforcement agencies under Chapter
IV, is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that mere failure to
comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would
be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829, Section 20 necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, there must still be judicial
determination of guilt, during which, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus,
Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26, which provides the creation and powers of the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordination Center, are VALID
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to “prevent and
combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation.” This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as
sufficient standard.

CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE

G.R. No. 187226

Facts:
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic
educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got
pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order. The
question that must be resolved is whether the petitioner's conduct constitutes a ground for her dismissal.
The petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a
resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she
would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.
Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for
engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to
serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.
The basis was the "Support Staff Handbook," SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS
cites "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for
termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does not
amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she is unaware
of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and,
thus, a ground for dismissal.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner’s conduct constitutes a ground for dismissal

Held:
NO. Pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each
other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view
of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality.
Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS,
which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.

The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, was declared guilty of illegal dismissal and was
ordered to pay the petitioner.