Journal of Contemporary Asia

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Kerala's experience of development and change

Govindan Parayil & T.T. Sreekumar

To cite this article: Govindan Parayil & T.T. Sreekumar (2003) Kerala's experience of development
and change, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 33:4, 465-492, DOI: 10.1080/00472330380000291

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330380000291

Published online: 14 May 2007.

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 465

Kerala's Experience
of Development and Change

Govindan ParayiI* and T. T. Sreekumar**

[Abstract: Scholars have variously described the development experience of the Indian state
of Kerala as a "model" or a "paradox" or an "enigma" and posited different meanings and
significance to its developmental trajectory. Rather than following the usual one-dimensional
accounting of Kerala's achievements and shortcomings, we present a historically informed
social and political analysis to reveal the meaning and significance of the "Kerala model" of
development. This article, thus, critically appraises Kerala's development experience since
decolonization to show how the discourse on development and the discursive practices of the
dominant actors involved in governance of Kerala diverge in recent years, especially after the
second round of economic liberalizations at the national level in 1991; which coincidently
corresponds to the beginning of the newest phase of economic giobalization. Old lessons are
reviewed based on the notion of replicability oftbe "Kerala model" and new lessons ate analyzed
within the contexts of sustainability and economic globalization.]

This article analyses the unique development experience of the Indian state of Kerala in
order to present a coherent narrative to situate the lessons the experience offers to the
field of development and social change. Rather than following the usual one-dimen-
sional accounting of Kerala's achievements and shortcomings, we present a historically
informed social and political analysis to reveal the meaning and significance of the
"Kerala model" of development. We will then show how the discourse on development
and the discursive practices of the dominant actors involved in governance of Kerala
diverge in recent years, especially after the second round of economic liberalizations at
the national level in 1991, which coincidently corresponds to the beginning of the new-
est phase of economic globalization. We will revisit the debates concerning the topical
issues of replicability and sustainability of Kerala's development experience. Finally,
we will look at Kerala's current and future development prospects.
Kerala in a Contextual Excursus
India's social and economic transformation since decolonization is marked by diverse
regional experiences. At the time of independence, India was an amalgam of nearly
autonomous political entities with diverging economic and social development; some

*Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore

**Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Journal t~]'Contemporary Asia, Vol. 33 No. 4 (2003)
466 JCA 33:4

provinces ~ were industrially advanced, some had relatively advanced commercial agri-
culture and some had a history of capitalist plantation enclaves, but most of India was
feudal or semi-feudal. Rampant poverty and deprivation prevailed among Indian peas-
ants and workers largely due to technological stasis and consequent low factor produc-
tivity and colonial economic policies, but most importantly due to distributional inequi-
ties of entrenched socio-economic systems. Though at the national level there were
attempts to consolidate a monolithic development strategy through Five Year Plans
modelled after the Soviet experiment, the states could not be contained entirely within
that framework due to antecedent social and political factors as well as constitutional
provisions, whereby states were deemed semi-autonomous entities in matters pertain-
ing to development and social change. National development in the post-colonial con-
text could not have meant anything more than the development experiences of these
diverse regional specificities, despite Jawaharlal Nehru's dream of reconstructing post-
colonial India as an industrialized nation state through his "temples of modern India. ''2
What were the available development options at this critical juncture? These were
serious questions not only for India and its constituent states, but also for other develop-
ing states undergoing decolonization. Essentially, we could delineate them under the
rubric of two meta-models---capitalism and statism--and variations and combinations
thereof to choose from because of the deeply entrenched international political and
economic situation prevailing at the time. India adopted what came to be known as a
"mixed" path. 3 It was in this broader framework that various Indian states formulated
their development policies and strategies. In the absence of a coherent and clearly ar-
ticulated national strategy, diverging economic policies of the states, largely, shaped
regional development outcomes.
The state of Kerala in southern India forged a somewhat singular development path
that, however, was circumscribed by the national fervour of planned development. Through
concerted popular mobilizations and public actions, Kerala achieved significant success
in reducing poverty and social inequalities. As a noted Kerala scholar observes, Kerala's
development experience is not just a case of a state that has traversed on a unique trajec-
tory of development commonly classified as high social development with low per capita
income, but as a state that has "demonstrated that poverty alleviation can be achieved
along with a reduction in spatial and gender gaps, the two important gaps that are promi-
nent in the development experience''4 (Kannan, 2000: 41). It is also important to note that
Kerala's success in enhancing basic human capabilities, and thereby reducing poverty
through educational attainments, improved health services, meaningful land reforms, and
so on, has a long historical foundation dating back to the nineteenth century.
Given a history of class and caste based mobilizations that began in the nineteenth
century, post-colonial Kerala inherited a social structure that was polarized along these
lines. The communist movement that was banned and persecuted by the colonial gov-
ernment found a favourable environment to grow and consolidate in post-independent
Kerala? The anti-caste movement in colonial Kerala, while organizing rural masses for
gaining social equality, regarded the struggle for civic rights and political participation
as integral to its project. This agenda was actively pursued, particularly, in the southern
 Kerala ~" Experience 467

and central parts of Kerala where tributary monarchies under British rule enjoyed rela-
tive political autonomy. The anti-caste movements in these regions aligned with the
Christian and Muslim minorities to gain demographic representation in the state legis-
latures. The movement in Thiruvitamcore, the southern princely state, transformed it-
self into a broad platform for struggle for democratic rights and social and economic
equality. Further, the nationalist movement actively participated in the anti-caste agita-
tion and attracted the leaders of the anti-caste movement into anti-imperialist struggles.
The nationalist movement also provided support and leadership for progressive politi-
cal mobilization in the state, which further weakened the ruling monarchy and its aligned
feudal class's power and legitimacy. An important anti-caste movement in Kerala that
emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was led by a charismatic
Hindu reformer, Sree Narayana Guru (1854-1928). The Sree Narayana movement mo-
bilized the numerically large a v a r n a ~ caste of Ezhavas to fight discrimination by upper
caste Hindus through peaceful means (Casinader, 2000 and 1995). The anti-caste move-
ment led by Sree Narayana Guru had played an important role in mobilizing lower
caste Hindus like the Ezhavas into the nascent communist movement during the 1930s
and onwards (Kannan, 1988). Similarly in southern Kerala, the Pulayas (former agre~tial
slaves who now identify themselves as Dalits) emerged as a united force under the
leadership of Ayyankali, an able social reformer.7
It is instructive to contrast this experience with the anti-caste agitations in other
states of India such as the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu and the Phule movement
in Maharashtra. s The Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu took interesting turns after
independence. While its core is anti-Brahmanism and an abandonment of ritualized
Hinduism, it took a strong Tamil nationalist turn during the 1960s and 1970s. The de-
velopmental trajectory took an entirely different track in Tamil Nadu compared to its
sma~er counterpart on its western border. While it eschewed mobilization and public
actiot9 for distributive justice unlike Kerala, Tamil Nadu opted for enhancing economic
growth through rapid industrialization as the core of its development strategy.
In terms of a comparable experience, it is with Sri Lanka, its southern neighbour
that Kerala shares much in common than other states in India. However, Sri Lanka's
religious reformation movement was in contrast to Kerala's lower-caste mobilization.
The Buddhist revivalist movement in Sri Lanka in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century led by Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) was "a response to the hegemonic
position of Westernization and the Westernized elite" in Sri Lankan social hierarchy
(Casinader, 2000: 208-9). An important element of the revivalist movement was the
presence of the native intelligentsia that had nurtured anti-imperialist sentiment among
the Sri Lankan population. The birth of radical political parties such as the Lanka Sama
Smaja Party during the 1930s is very much related to the radicalization of a large segment
of Sri Lankan intelligentsia and working class (Casinader, 2000: 209). According to
Casinader (2000: 209), the Kerala-Sri Lanka similarity in development can be traced to
the "[R]adicalization of politics, trade unionization, together with electoral and
parliamentary politics" in these two neighbouring states during the colonial period.
The early integration of the anti-caste struggle with the nationalist agitation provided
468 JCA 33:4

a more secular and enduring character to the social movements in Kerala. In the case of
social upheavals in other parts of India, the agenda of struggle often remained faithful
to an initial inspiration - anti-Brahmanism. The communist movement in Kerala had a
richer legacy of political and democratic struggles, most of its leaders emerging from
the social movements as well as from the movement for national independence and
democracy.
During the first democratic elections, held in 1957 immediately after the formation
of the state by uniting all Malayalam speaking regions of British India, the Communist
Party of India was brought to power in Kerala. Although short-lived, during its two years
in power this government tried to bring sot ~al and economic changes through reforming
the educational and land tenure systems? The high expectations raised by this government
forced all the subsequent governments, Communist-led as well as Congress-led, to pursue
redistributive development policies of one form or another, un61 the 1980s) °
Kerala is one of the twenty-eight constituent states of the Indian union. It occupies
1.18% of the total landmass of the country with a population of 31.8 million according
to the 2001 census, which is 3.10% of the Indian population) ~ The population growth
rate in Kerala during the 1950s was one of the highest in India, but by the 1970s it had
begun to fall and, subsequently, became the lowest among all the Indian states. Decadal
population growth rate of Kerala dropped from 14.32% during 1981-91 to 9.42% during
1991-2001, while the corresponding figures for India are 23.86% and 21.34%.12 Kerala's
birth rate in 1997 was 17.9% and for India it was 27.2%. 13 Kerala's adult literacy rate in
2001 was 90.92%, while India's rate was 65.38%. In terms of female literacy, Kerala
again stands out among all the Indian states. Female literacy in Kerala in 2001 was
87.86%, while all-India rate was 54.28% (Census of India 2001). Furthermore, almost
100% of children of school age and youths of Kerala are literate (Kannan, 2000). Kerala
is the only state in India with a female-to-male ratio favourable to women. Its female-
to-male ratio is 1.058:1, in contrast to India's ratio of 0.933:1 (Census of India 2001).
Kerala's ratio is similar to those in North America and Western Europe. In addition to
being the only state in India with a gender ratio favourable to women, Kerala has the
best gender development record among all the Indian states. According to Amartya
Sen, "[T]he distinction of Kerala is particularly striking in the field of gender equality"
(Sen, 1997:13). William Alexander (2000) argues that it is Kerala that is "normal" and
India "abnormal," to counter the perception that Kerala's high gender development
indicators have to be explained away as an anomaly. While Kerala's infant mortality
rate (IMR) was 12 per 1,000 live births in 1997, India's IMR was 7114, and survey data
among certain groups in Kerala have shown an infant mortality rate of 6 to 7 pcr 1,000
(Ramachandran, 2000). Again, Kerala's IMR figure compares favourably x:ith many
so-called developed states, notwithstanding its very low per-capita income.
Kerala has a history of trade and cultural links with the outside world since antiquity, ta
Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese navigator, arrived at the famous Kerala seaport city of
Calicut (now known as Kozhikode) in 1498 with the help of Arab and Gujarati pilots
and traders. 16 Da Gama's arrival and assault of Calicut laid the foundation for western
colonialism in the Indian subcontinent. While Kerala became linked to western capitalist
 Kerala's Experience 469

system in the sixteenth century as the Portuguese established trade monopoly, it became
fully integrated into the world system in the nineteenth century with the arrival of British
capital, which was mainly invested in the plantation sector, thus reinforcing the export
dependent character of Kerala economy (Sreekumar, 1993).
Kerala in Development Focus
The development experience of Kerala began to receive attention more than a quarter
century ago with the publication of a United Nations study on poverty, unemployment
and development policy in Kerala as a response to some macro-level disaggregate studies
on poverty in India which showed very low level of per capita income and high level of
poverty in Kerala ostensibly ignoring some seemingly contradictory developments on
the social front (CDS, 1975). t7 It brought into focus Kerala's developmental trajectory,
which was marked by low per capita income and high unemployment characteristically
shared by many poor regions in the Third World and surprisingly high levels of literacy
and life expectancy and low levels of fertility, infant and adult mortality that are usually
associated with highly industrialized regions of the North. Low per capita income and
high unemployment were easily cognizable from the fact that the state had a weak
industrial base (dominated by low productivity traditional industries) and a stagnating
agricultural sector with a relatively low labour absorption rate. In 1980-81, Kerala was
ranked eighth in terms of per capita income (PCI) among Indian states, and its rank
declined by one point in the next decade. While the PCI for Kerala was relatively higher
than the large and poor north-central states known by the acronym 'BIMORU' is (Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh), in terms of PCI growth rate Kerala
ranked 14th, below these "sick" states. 19 Even the process of land reforms, for which the
state has a credible record among Indian states, was successfully completed only in the
mid-1970s, while the achievements in social indicators mentioned earlier had a longer
precursor. Macro-level poverty estimations, which put Kerala at the bottom, were also
re-examined to show that certain staples unique to the food basket of the region had not
been included in the calculations of calorie intake used in those studies pointing to possible
underestimation on this count and consequent over-estimation of poverty ratios. 2°
Initial scholarly response to this situation was of admiration and bewilderment. It was
understood and instantly portrayed as a "model," particularly for other Third World regions
where any improvement of their very low physical quality of life was considered
unattainable without first going through rapid capitalist development or socialist
revolution.2~The case of Kerala emerged as singular example of how an economically
poor region could, in fact, achieve living standards comparable to the levels of advanced
industrialized regions. It provided an instant illustration of a possible "model" because it
had overcome maladies of underdevelopment like hunger, malnutrition high fertility and
educational backwardness without traversing the arduous path of either militant social
revolution or rapid industrialization with its mythical promises of "trickled down" benefits.
It appeared that all concerned had their own lessons to draw from the experience. Not
surprisingly, both the World Bank and the radical left had hailed the state as a "model,"
and not without reason. Those who were voicing the need for an alternative path of
470 JCA 33:4

sustainable development also pointed out certain specific features of the state's development
trajectory that warranted a closer look at resource use patterns underlying the model. 22
Earlier optimistic assessments of the "Kerala model," then, have to be understood
in the historical conjecture where a stalemate on future path of development in Third
World countries became the central theme of development debate. The achievements of
a small region had lessons to offer to those struggling to attain better living conditions
in the poor regions of the world. At the same time it was believed to highlight the falsity
of the assumption that in order to improve living conditions, rapid industrialization
(usually affecting the ecological balance and sustainability of natural resource base)
was a necessary evil. In Kerala's case it was evident that neither planned socialist
transformation nor rapid capitalist industrialization had been the determinant factor in
shaping its development contours. Given this context, it was only natural on the part of
mainstream scholars to think of the possibility for replicating an experience that
minimized negative externalities of hyper-modern social engineering (of communism)
and high-growth industrial social restructuring{of capitalism), while delivering desirable
outcomes of better living conditions and sustainability under social democracy.
Conceptualization of the Kerala experience as a "model" worthy of emulation soon
raised questions of immediacy with regard to understanding its agency, structures and
processes. This was important since disentangling the model was crucial for addressing
the problematic of replicability in its entirety. In other words, interpreting the "Kerala
model," understanding sources of its successes, and charting its genesis and transformation
became central to the discourses on Kerala's development experience. Even though some
early literature on the subject had described the situation as "enigmatic" or "paradoxical"
in order to explain it away as an anomaly, focus of concerned development scholars soon
turned to unravelling causative chains and providing rational explanations. 23Another
important factor that pointed to the immediacy of such comparative analytics was the
striking similarity of post-colonial Sri Lankan development experience with the Kerala
patterns. As mentioned earlier, Casinader (1995 and 2000) pointed out striking similarities
between the social and political histories of Kerala and Sri Lanka during the colonial
period. While Sri Lanka's economic growth performance has been consistently better
than Kerala's, Kerala's social development performance has been slightly better than Sri
Lanka's. Sri Lanka's social indicators were moving faster to close the gap with Kerala
and by mid-1990s its Human Development Index of 0.716 was approaching Kerala's 0.
775. 24It has become increasingly difficult to treat Kerala as a development aberration
with no parallels to compare and contrast.
One of the early attempts to situate the development experience of the state and
interpret its evolution in a comparative framework was initiated by Jean Dr~ze and
Amartya Sen (1989). 25Within the larger context of understanding the role of public
action in alleviating poverty and preventing famines in the Third World, they offered a
close look at the development experiences of certain regions that have made
commendable strides in containing the problem of hunger or preventing its more
catastrophic avatar of famines. In the chapter on China and India, Dr~ze and Sen (1989)
provide a comparison of China, India and the Indian state of Kerala. A comparison
 Kerala ~" Experience 471

between India and China was justified on the basis of both economic and political reasons.
Both countries became empowered to choose autonomous development paths following
India's independence in 1947 and the communist revolution in China in 1949. Dr~ze
and Sen note that while traversing drastically diverging political and economic systems,
China and India had both maintained the essential features of a support-led development
strategy to modernize their economies. However, Dr~ze and Sen are quick to point out
the asymmetric development performance of these large Asian neighbours. China had
made rapid.strides in eradicating poverty and reducing illiteracy compared to India.
China's achievements in demographic transition were also remarkable. Nonetheless,
Dr~ze and Sen wanted to draw our attention to the fact that China's progress was
punctuated by a huge famine during 1958-61 that had caused excess mortality of over
30 million people. On the other hand, India was able to prevent famines despite "several
alarming dips in food output and availability" (Dr~ze and Sen, 1989:21 t). The authors
attribute this difference to the nature and degree of adversarial journalism and oppositional
political practice permissible in these countries. In India, free expression and oppositional
political practices embedded in its burgeoning civil society succeeded in transmitting
independent signals of social and economic conditions in the country, which forced the
government to take effective steps before a situation worsened to the verge of famine.
Dr~ze and Sen further illustrate this point by providing an admittedly uncanny comparison
of China and India with the experience of a region in India, Kerala state.
The characteristic features of China's political system are the ubiquitous presence of
coercion, censorship and top-down implementation of policies typical of single party
dictatorships. The achievements and pitfalls in China's progress have to be evaluated against
this backdrop. In the case of India, a liberal democratic polity, it could not in general
deliver as much as China did, but averted catastrophic famines through responding to
social signals transmitted by an independent press as well as adversarial political formations.
The state of Kerata, which is an integral part of India, nonetheless achieved better levels of
physical quality of life than all-India and China, while never being gripped by famines or
widespread hunger and malnutrition. Given the chequered history of Indian and Chinese
experiences, the trajectory of Kerala's development appeared refreshingly stimulating.
Contrasting Kerala with both China and India led Drrze and Sen to provide a set of
non-deterministic but provisional explanations for the uniqueness of Kerala's development
experience. 26 In tune with the general tenor of the book, they highlighted the role of
support-led security and public action in Kerala supplemented by popular demand for
social provisions articulated by a literate and politically alert population. This analysis
begs the question of causality, literacy as both cause and consequence of development
choices needed explanation. Hence it was underscored that the twin processes of public
action and popular articulation are mutually reinforcing with a longer history than could
normally be assumed, harking back to the nineteenth century. Most other interpretations
of the "model" have also stressed the continuities in public policies and popular
mobilization as contributing to phenomenal advances made by Kerala in the social sectors?7
While the strong presence of different denominations of left ideology in Kerala
underscores the quality of political articulation in the state, the role of other political
472 JCA 33:4

formations in reinforcing an historical experience during the post-colonial period is

more complex than is normally imagined. In the post-colonial period, Kerala witnessed
a consensus politics on the developmental project, despite deep polarizations, internal
dissentions and conflicts among major political parties and coalitions. In the next section
we will discuss the process of the emergence of a developmental project practiced and
legitimized by the major actors and agents in Kerala's policy arena at a time when
factionalism and mutual mistrust amongst them have been degenerating to a politics of
cynicism,z8
Articulation of the "Kerala Model"
The historical backdrop of Kerala's achievements and problems was briefly touched
upon earlier and well documented elsewhere.29In the nineteenth century, deepening
commercialization of the agricultural sector resulted in the rise of a variety of
contradictory formations in the indigenous mode of agrarian organization (Sreekumar,
1991). While the commercialization of agriculture (in terms of growth of plantation
enclaves) and the development of port towns, more or less, followed the colonial pattern
in Kerala, except for certain geographical specificities such as dispersed settlements,
west flowing rivers, and chain of estuaries determining the nature of the urban system
without a primate city, the consequences of the process were drastically different for the
local economy and polity. On the immediate economic and social fronts it resembled
the larger colonial pattern; this reinforced commercialization (which had its beginnings
in the early modern period when commercial influences greatly affected the sub-
continent) unleashed the productive forces, albeit, temporarily, as a result of which the
legal and political structures that gave coherence to the indigenous society began to
disintegrate. The small peasantry was to a certain extent liberated, land and produce
markets expanded, and the incidence of land holding increased to a considerable extent.
However, the upper castes more or less abstained from claiming a role in the new division
of labor and many deprived sections of society were able to make use of the new
opportunities to their economic advantage, thereby creating a niche in the economic
sphere. However, the caste system, although weakened in several respects, was still
prominent, mediating and over-determining social roles and ranks. Even after gaining
economic power, demographically significant but socially underprivileged communities
like Christians, Ezhavas and Muslims were not able to influence social s:ructures and
hierarchies in any significant manner (Sreekumar, 1995). The power of high caste Hindus
was firmly rooted in traditional social organization, through positions in the ritual and
religious spheres as well as in the revenue administrative system.
The new economic order strengthened the economic position of many deprived
communities, but did not result in the enhancement of their social and political positions.
Social power continued to be the prerogative of caste Hindus. Consequently, the first
half of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented upheaval, spearheaded by the
newly emerging leadership of depressed communities, to attain civil rights and equality
of opportunities in economic and political spheres. They demanded right to participation
in the administrative and legislative processes. In the 1930s, political movements in the
 Kerala ~ Experience 4"]3

state, which coincided with struggles for independence, both Congress Socialists and
Communists adopted the caste question into their political agenda. Thus, at the beginning
of the process of decolonization a radical politics had assimilated anti-caste and anti-
imperialist sentiments into their ideological frameworks.
This situation continued to exist till the mid-1970s when a profusion of ideological,
political, and economic developments effected drastic changes in the post-colonial state
formation and consolidation. The period 1947 - 1975 had been crucial in many respects.
Abandoning its professed path of gaining power through revolution closely following on
the heels of the Calcutta thesis debacle, the Communist Party of India (CPI) decided to
join the electoral mainstream. In the first elections of 1957, held after the unification of
Kerala state in 1956, it came to power with a narrow majority. Political polarization
following the election of the Communist Party into power ted to the consolidation of
liberal democratic parties and forces, which formed a political alliance against communists
in Kerala. Opposition to communist rule in Kerala was gradually built up, culminating in
the eventual dismissal of the democratically elected government by the Congress-led
central government using article 356 of the Indian Constitution. 3° Anti-communist protest,
which went under the self-styled name of "Liberation Struggle," rallied disaffected
students, farmers, workers and caste-religious formations loyal to (conservative) liberal
politics. While this movement was undemocratic because it demanded toppling of a
democratically elected government, its underlying rationale, according to the movement
leaders, was fear of communist consolidation leading to one-party dictatorship. Proto
forms of the two prominent political camps in contemporary Kerala, the Left Democratic
Front (LDF) and the United Democratic Front (UDF), was formed during this period) ~
Fairly successful implementation of the land reforms was the major development
milestone during this period in Kerala. Dismantling land-lordism as a feudal social
structure by abolishing absentee landlords, intermediaries, and tenancy were the positive
features of the land reforms (Herring, 1983; Raj and Tharakan, 1983; Oommen, 1994).
The abolition of tenancy led to conferring ownership rights to the erstwhile tenants thus
improving their economic and political power. The landlords, on the other hand, were
given nominal monetary compensation and they were subsequently eliminated as a
class through the reform. But certain drawbacks of the reform package became evident,
subsequently. The plantation sector was excluded from land ceiling stipulations and the
actual tillers of the land, agricultural labourers, did not receive a fair share of the
reforms? The enactment of land reforms can be shown as an example of the politics of
consensus that was gradually developing among contending actors. The Communist
Party of India (CPI) and the Indian National Congress (INC) were ruling the state when
the law was finally enacted. The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M or CPM as
also called), which was in the opposition at the time of the enactment, had organized a
series of struggles for its implementation. 33With no real opposition to land reforms,
except a fairly weakened class of landlords whose relative position in the class structure
had become precarious, implementation of land reforms was comparatively smooth. It
may be noted that other states in India, including West Bengal where a communist-led
government has been in power for the past quarter century, have not been able i to
474 JCA 33:4

implement land reforms primarily due to the class power wielded by the landlords. 34
The reigning development ideology had been progress through modernization, which
was commonly shared by all political formations. Rapid industrialization was a declared
objective of all political groups. That Kerala did not industrialize is no reason to assume
that it was not on the development agenda. Each political entity criticized the other as
being unable to industrialize the state. Even the first communist government had tried
to woo pan Indian capital to the state, and acceded to industrialists' demand for cheap
raw materials as a sop to invest in the state. The case of Mavoor Gwalior Rayons, a
factory owned and operated by a monopoly Indian industrial house (the Birlas), is
illustrative in this regard. The 1957 Communist Government agreed to supply bamboo
for this paper and synthetic fiber factory at a minute fraction of its actual market value) 5
Later in the 1960s, there were attempts to bring foreign investment from Japan and the
USA while the national government was following an import substitution strategy.36At
the same time none of the successive governments could pursue a state-led
industrialization strategy mainly due to paucity of investment capital from public or
private sources. In fact the share of economic services (infrastructure development,
most notably) in capital formation recorded a steady decline from nearly 80% to 40%
during the 1970s and 1980s, while the share of social and community services such as
education and health increased from around 15% to 40% during the same period (George,
1993: 87). The idea of rapid industrialization was never out of the agenda, but the state's
expenditure pattern could not be reversed and it was evident to policy makers that only
through increased private investment that industrialization could be set in motion.
These attempts point to the fact that while professing diverging ideological positions
all political formations of Kerala were moving toward the same constellation of
development goals, which led to certain achievements in the area of land reforms,
education, health care and public distribution of food grains. Thus, the celebrated United
Nations publication in 1975 highlighting these achievements (CDS, 1975) was a timely
pointer to the emerging consensus on the developmental project. But it may be noted
here that these achievements were not based on any considerable expansion of the
productive base. Industrial retardation and agricultural stagnation began to set in, showing
visible manifestations of an impending crisis in Kerala's development. However, arguably
the precipitation of the crisis may have been averted by the large-scale emigration of
mainly unemployed youths to Arabian Gulf countries and their remittances, beginning
in the mid-1970s. One scholar points out that from mid-1970s the factor that had a
visible effect on Kerala economy (particularly on labour market, consumption, savings,
investment, poverty, income distribution and economic growth) had been the migration
of skilled and unskilled labour to Persian Gulf countries and their remittances 37(Prakash,
1999: 147; Kannan and Hari, 2002).
Although the impact of the migration of large number of skilled and semi-skilled
workers to the Arabian Gulf countries may have cushioned the impact of a possible crisis,
it certainly did affect the consumption patterns and attitudes of the general public. Having
made no visible impact on investment and employment creation in Kerala, the large
amounts of remittance may have caused more damage to the long-term development of
 Kerala's Experience 475

Kerala by creating a consumer society without a productive base. Because of the absence
of a congenial investment climate in the state transforming remittances into industrial
capital appeared impossible. It could not even stimulate investment to cater to the growing
"domestic demand." A comprehensive account of the social, economic, cultural and
political factors behind the failure of an entrepreneurial culture to germinate in the state
has yet to be presented by Kerala scholars, although Tharamangalam (1998) proposed a
sociological account of over-politicization of Kerala society as a possible reason for
Kerala's failure to grow economically. In Kerala, by the mid-1970s the middle class had
gradually acquired the trappings of a consumer society thanks to the developmental project
and the Gulf migrant remittance) 8 The benefits of the Kerala model began to get
concentrated around this new middle class. Organized groups, through intermediation of
the state and the political society, were able tO grab a sizable share of the new riches. But
groups and communities that were marginalized from the mainstream such as Adivasies,
fish workers and a section of Dalits became the conspicuous "outliers" of the developmental
process) 9 Parallel to these developments, the post-Emergency politics4°had led to a further
realignment of coalition politics in Kerala. CPI and CPI (M) joined together to form the
LDF and the INC led regional parties formed the UDF. These political constellations
remain, more or less, the same until now. The political content and social impact of the
developmental projects conceived by both camps are strikingly similar.
Discordant notes on the very meaning and relevance of the Kerala model began to
appear in the 1990s. Some scholars have begun to see a disturbing picture in the layers of
information gleaned from various facets of Kerala's recent economic and social conditions.
Mathew (1997) analyzes the severe unemployment situation in the state in the context of
Kerala's worsening economic and fiscal problems. 41George (1993) points to an early
warning on the possible unravelling of the Kerala model due to the serious fiscal situation
prevailing in the state. 42Some apparent development dilemmas emerging from the political
propensities manifested in post-colonial Kerala, particularly after the consolidation of
left ideologies, have received scholarly attention (Kannan, 1998). Kannan argues that
hostility toward labour saving technical change as a trade union strategy earned a wage
gain in the short run, but resulted in eventual industrial and agricultural stagnation and
long-run job lOSS. 43 Further, the successive governments failed to facilitate the inflow of
new investment and rehabilitate local capital in the changing context of improved labour
relations. Joseph Tharamangalam (1998) points out that a new pattern of state intervention
and societal formation had undermined the autonomy and rationality of civil society
institutions in Kerata. He claims that this led to over-politicization and bureaucratic state
intervention in development projects and policies. Such maladies as high rates of suicide,
mounting political violence, corruption and lack of accountability also figure prominently
in the list of Kerala's recent woes?4 A possible downward shift in women's status in
Kerala and consequent worsening of gender bias has also caught the attention of observers
(Rajan, et al., 2000). Even though these authors do not predict the possibility of Kerala
sliding down steeply to join the rest of India in female demographic disadvantage, they
draw our attention to declining women's status to caution against any "complacency on
this score" (ibid: 1091). An attempt to understand the lessons of the Kerala experience
476 JCA 33:4

cannot overlook some of these major recent developments.

Most recently, there have been attempts to understand the problems of Kerala on
the basis of the "Dutch disease" model (Balakrishnan, 1999; Harilal and Joseph, 2000).
This all too familiar model in development literature hypothesizes that an income windfall
in the export of a primary commodity (usually oil or mineral) would necessarily induce
labour and capital resources to drain into this sector resulting in a subsequent contraction
of the secondary sector. As a corollary, it also argues that exports will inevitably influence
the exchange rates since the nominal exchange rate would remain constant as the ratio
of foreign to domestic price decline leading to the appreciation of the local currency.
Consequently, the ensuing fall in competitiveness leads to a decline in exports of
manufactured goods. Moreover, a spending effect is also postulated. This leads to a
boost in demand for non-traded commodities and services (education, health, welfare,
construction, and so on). In a conventional market situation, rise in demand creates
price rise in the context of supply constraints. This would make local production of
traded goods less profitable, culminating in the relative contraction of this sector?5
While the Dutch syndrome has been an important analytical artifact in explaining
de-industrialization in some primary commodity exporting economies, one would expect
that the adoption of the model in the context of Kerala would be to explain the
backwardness of the secondary sector in terms of the economy's historical dependence
on primary commodity exports. However, some scholars have used the model's analytics
to Gulf remittances that have become a prominent feature of the local economy since
the mid-1970s. While it is evident that the stagnation in agriculture and industry began
to deepen in the mid-1970s, as the political economy of dependent development would
instantly illuminate, the stagnation had a much longer history because of the emergence
of the region as a primary commodity export specializing unit in the international
economic order that was structured by the exigencies of imperialism during the previous
phases of economic globalization of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. ~ Symptoms
of spending effect of export boom on services and the resource movement to plantation
enclaves during the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century had been
visible to economic historians of Kerala for a long time. The Gulf remittances have
merely reinforced an already existing historical pattern. Arguably, to claim that the
modem economy of Kerala had a congenital Dutch syndrome seems to be the logical
conclusion to follow from similar reasoning. This, however, is to miss the point on the
exploitative logic of colonial economic expansion and its impact on Kerala. The Dutch
syndrome explanation may be tautological and ahistorical in the case of Kerala.
Two separate initiatives came up in the 1990s in a bid to break the impasse on the
development front. Following the 73 m and 74 t~ amendment to the Indian Constitution
by the central government to devolve administrative powers to local bodies (Panchayats),
the UDF government enacted legislation to devolve power to local bodies. 47 They
conducted fresh elections for local bodies and delegated a set of administrative functions
to a three-tier system of local administration (Village, Block and District Panchayats).
When it was voted back to power in 1996, the LDF government launched an innovative
programme of micro-level decentralized development planning based on the newpolitical
 Kerala's Experience 477

system of local administration (Ttrnquist, 2000; Franke and Chasin, 2000; Vtron, 2001).
The "People's Plan," as this new initiative was called, made use of the experiences
from the "Total Literacy Campaign" and "People's Resource Mapping Programme"
initiated at the behest of the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP), ~ Kerala's largest
NGO, during the 1980s (Franke and Chasin, 2000). The LDF government allocated 35-
40% of the state plan budget for projects to be formulated and implemented by local
bodies. The campaign aimed at formulating systematic micro-level planning with the
assistance and participation of local communities. The three-tier local administrative bodies
were identified as the nodal agency for carrying out this objective:9This necessitated
transfer of more resources to the local bodies which emerged as a new locus of political
and economic power. While some projects were implemented, "the people's campaign
has experienced numerous difficulties, delays and disappointments" (Franke and Chasin,
2000: 37). The new experiment in decentralized development has been received with
mixed reviews. While some scholars describe it as "best hope for the future" (Franke and
Chasin, 2000), "unique and bold" (T~Srnquist,2000), "democratic decentralization" (Isaac,
2000), "small voice of socialism" (Prashad, 2001), "a new Kerala model" (Vtron, 2001),
others see it as "seriously flawed" (Kannan, 2000), "a floundering experiment" (Das,
2000) and, "same wine in new bottle" (Indukumar, 2000). It is noteworthy that the new
endeavour has made a qualitative improvement in political development pertaining to
development policy in that it brought development discourse to grassroots. It also
intensified partisan political polarization. However, it failed to induce dynamism in the
regional economy in terms of productivity growth, income generation and employment.
At the end of the Five Year "people's campaign for decentralized development planning,"
the state may have compounded its already precarious financial situation because the 35-
40% outlay of the state's development funds to local bodies did not result in economic
growth or increase in tax revenue for the state. The divergence with the political processes
of the campaign with its actual achievements could be highlighted by the irony of Vithura
Panchayat. This Panchayat was selected as one of the outstanding performers in
implementing the people's plan. However, shortly after its elevation, a case of starvation
death was reported from Vithura (Indukumar, 2000), followed by similar reports from
other parts of the state. This is an unprecedented development in the recent history of
Kerala. Although, these serious social problems could not be directly linked to the
inadequacies of micro-level planning, the very occurrence of death by hunger points to
serious developmental maladies in the state. Moreover, the whole project of people's
plan has come under severe criticism from a section within CPM itself who argue that the
whole exercise had been an imperialist strategy to derail the state's development process
and reverse its achievements in the social spheres: °
The newly elected UDF government did not continue with the "peoples plan
campaign" initiated by the previous LDF government: ~The new government has already
dissolved all the expert committees set up by the former left-front government, the new
Chief Minister has indicated that decentralized development project would continue,
albeit with a different mandate and process of implementation. His rationale is that it
was another former Congress former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, who had introduced
478 JCA 33:4

legislation for Panchayati Raj in the national parliament for devolving power to lower
administrative units by amending the National Constitution.
Globalization and the Kerala Economy
As we have mentioned earlier, Kerala became well integrated into the world capitalist
system by the turn of the twentieth century. Kerala's role in the international division of
labour was essentially mapped on by the nature of colonial capital that was invested in
plantations and spices trade for which the region came to specialize due to historical
factors that pre-date colonialism. Kerala emerged as a region specializing in the export
of primary commodities as evident from the commodity composition of Kerala's export
basket (Nair, 1999). Price fluctuations in the international primary commodity markets
have both benefited and disadvantaged Kerala. Kerala's vulnerability to the impacts of
the new wave of globalization should be a cause of concern since it makes the region
increasingly sensitive to external shocks in a more direct and straightforward manner.
Kerala is affected more seriously than other states in India by the new phase of
economic globalization: 2 The rapid integration of Indian economy into the international
economic system dictated by globalization has made Kerala's position in the chain highly
vulnerable. Because of the financial crisis that the state has been faced with since the
1990s and the external pressures (both direct and indirect) from national and supranational
powers acting on the state to withdraw from social support functions, the state may see a
steady erosion of its commanding advantages in social development. Structural changes
in the global economic and financial architecture need not necessarily be of benefit to
Kerala, because of its specialization in the export of primary commodities and skilled and
semi-skilled labour. In both cases the uncertainties in the international market, in terms of
demand and price fluctuations, have become particularly serious problems for the local
economy. Being a minor player in the global commodity markets and the local economy
being disproportionately dependent on the export of primary commodities and semi-skilled
labour power, Kerala economy can only be influenced by forces from without rather than
within. The ongoing global economic recession and subsequent economic problems of
Arabian Gulf countries have caused the retrenchment of skilled and semi-skilled overseas
workers in these countries, a large number of the retrenched workers being from Kerala
who had migrated there during the 1980s and 1990s. Another serious crisis facing Kerala
workers who had migrated to the region earlier was their inability to compete with
expatriate workers from South and Southeast Asian countries who are willing to work for
lower wages and benefits (Zachariah, et al., 2001). The recession had its impact on the
employment of skilled labour in the IT sector in Kerala as well: 3 However, retrenchment
in domestic firms was not as massive and immediate as in the case of IT companies in
Bangalore and other major IT hubs. It is likely that the lay off and wage cuts in major
software companies in Bangalore might have affected Kerala also since a large number
of skilled workers from Kerala are employed there: 4
Market vulnerability enveloping the export scenario of its traditional commodities
of Kerala has already attracted scholarly attention. As one researcher notes:
With the economicreformsand commitmentstO the WTO and the consequentopeningup/
 Kerala ~ Experience 479

globalizationof the Indianeconomy,Keralahas been hit hard. Kerala'straditionalexportsare

now subjected to wild volatility of global markets. The compliance to the WTO regime,
pressures fromthe US Food and DrugAdministrationand applicationof non-economicissues
such as social clauses and labor standards are going to weaken most of Kerala'sexports and
their productionbase (Nair, 1999: 372).
Nair mentions three important indicators for the worsening economic situation in
Kerala (Nair, 1999: 373): (i) an unprecedented crash in the prices of spices, real estate,
gold, stocks and shares: 5 (ii) fall in export earnings from marine products on account
of extreme regulatory policies of European Community as welt-as the United States on
hygiene and health grounds, and (iii) a sharp decline in out migration of manpower and
increase in the number of returnees from Arabian Gulf countries. Ostensibly, the
increasing exposure of Kerala economy to economic globalization is one of the important
reasons for the worsening situation of the state. It is ironic because Kerala had benefited
earlier from its exposure to external market forces.
A fresh look at the Kerala experience cannot ignore the strong negative impacts of
the new markets, actors and rules that are central to the new phase of globalization on
an increasingly weakening economic base of the region. Kerala is threatened by the
erosion of even the meager benefits it had enjoyed as being part of the global order in
the past in terms of the exports of primary commodity and labour power. More
importantly, these new forces are capable of imposing limits on its further expansion.
Recent reports suggest that Kerala farmers are being pauperized by the onslaught of
market competition for primary commodities. It is estimated that the loss to Kerala
farmers in 2000-01 due to fall in the price of primary goods in the international market
amounts to about US$1.5 billion, and approximately 5.5 million farmers are affected
by the decline in prices due to trade liberalization consequent on globalization. 56
Compensatory mechanisms for income stabilization to offset the volatility in prices
or decline in production due to adverse weather conditions are either absent or inadequate
in Kerala. Similarly, instruments for price stabilization, such as price risk management
are also fraught with deficiencies and are also underdeveloped.There are visible trends
in favour of government withdrawal from monopoly procurement and marketing, which
would eventually lead to disintegration of the feeble support mechanisms covering primary
commodity producers in the state. This will enhance the income risks of the farmers and
expose them even more acutely to the vagaries of national and global market forces.
While globalization has been disastrous to primary commodity export from Kerala
and India at large, the period following adoption of liberalization package in India has
restructured the growth dynamism in the regional economy. A revival of Kerala
economy: 7 albeit weak, is discernable in the decade following liberalization compared
with previous phases (Harilal and Joseph, 2000; Subrahmanian and Azeez, 2000).
However, it is argued that liberalization has not led to any significant structural change
in Kerala's industrial sector (Subrahmanian and Azeez, 2000). In the agricultural sector,
fall in prices often has the effect of increasing production, which is conceived as a
strategy of resistance on the part of the farmers to offset the income decline due to such
fall, a tendency that merely exacerbates the vicious circle. Moreover, weak revival does
not significantly alter the situation given a fragile production base.
480 JCA 33:4

Nevertheless, being a highly literate state with a reserve army of educated human
resources (human capital) Kerala has great potential for opportunities in the information
and communication technologies (ICTs) sector. The benefits to social development and
its potential for economic growth due to easy access to telephones to the poor of Kerala
has been well established (Krishnaswamy, 1998). The rapid diffusion of ICTs in the
state should be seen as a positive development. However, the state is still lagging behind
neighboring states vis-a-vis infrastructure development in the IT sector. The high cost
of maintaining a bloated bureaucracy and increased burden on the state for maintaining
social development projects have left very little funds for infrastructure development.
The perception of being a problem state due to high unionization has also affected
private investment across all industrial sectors. Nevertheless, relevant public policy
instruments could lead to the exploitation of ICTs for job, income creation, and the
development of a "weightless economy." However, no clear policy guidelines seem to
be forthcoming from the state government on this score to invigourate the regional
economy?s We may also caution against a euphoric appeal to ICT's potential, considering
the expanding digital divide (or more precisely a technology divide) consequent on
intensification of international competition and the unbridgeable gap in technological
change between centers of technological innovation and peripheral regions like Kerala
that is outside the ambit of the emerging national and global systems of innovation
centered on IT and biotechnology, a topic beyond the scope of this article.
Lessons Old and New
It is natural that a development experience premised on a preconceived notion of
"sustainability" soon raised promises of replicability. Appreciation of Kerala's
achievements was initially focussed on the surprising outcome of relatively advanced
living standard in a poor region. It was then widely believed that it bestowed upon a
struggling humanity an alternative path of development. These beliefs and perceptions
had three important implications.
The first implication pertains to the replicability of Kerala's development experience
in other parts of the world, especially in developing countries. It could not have missed
the attention of concerned scholars that the historical antecedents of the experience
were quite difficult to be mapped on entirely in another terrain. However, it clearly
transmitted the signal that a low industrial base was not necessarily a constraint to
enhancing the living conditions of ordinary people. Thus, the policies and programmes
of the post-colonial governments in Kerala as well as the struggles carried out by different
sections of the working class, farmers, and youths of Kerala pointed to the need for
focussing on the concepts of structure and agency in moulding desirable social outcomes.
The second implication is hinged on" the political significance of the experience.
During the Cold War, there prevailed a view that a political strategy of pluralism and
democracy was irrelevant to the grounded realities of Third World societies that came
out of harsh foreign subjugation for centuries. Many waxed eloquent that multi-party
democracy and pluralism was too unwieldy and expensive for the Third World to afford
to bring about rapid social and economic changes. Varieties of militarism or statism
 Kerala's Experience 481

became increasingly attractive for this nihilistic political perspective. Kerala, in contrast,
was offering a refreshingly golden mean where pluralist political practice within a social
democratic framework and of low economic base could deliver policies that resulted in
improved living conditions. Thus the position of Dr~ze and Sen (1989) is reiterated by
Kannan (2000: 41) when he argues that, "[W]hat the Kerala record shows, is the feasibility
of poverty alleviation without- denying the freedom of political choice to the people."
Looking at the comparative history of poverty alleviation through enhancing human
capabilities in Kerala with five Asian countries (Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and China) and India at large, Kannan shows that despite the fact that most of these
countries had performed well in reducing poverty and deprivation, none can "claim the
kind of freedom of political choice that is present in Kerala and India at large" (Kannan,
2000: 41).
The third implication has to do with the concept of a resource use pattern that was
believed to be the basis of Kerala's asymmetric development experience. The low
economic base of the state was seen as a vindication of ecological politics, particularly
after the Rio conclave of 1992. Kerala's development path became particularly attractive
to environment and development scholars and activists in the West because it showed
that development does not necessarily need over-exploitation of natural resources and
obsession with economic growth. 59 Kerala seemed to have achieved good results without
comparable throughputs that industrialized rich states churn out to maintain their high
living standards (Alexander, 1994). If Kerala's achievements in the social sphere were
comparable to the western equivalents, it looked too obvious that the West has been
running an unsustainable deficit on its natural capital budget.
While these lessons from Kerala's development experience had political and strategic
relevance in the context of understanding and articulating alternative practices, the fact
that Kerala has plunged into serious socio-political and economic crises in recent times
beckons for having a "long run" view of the development trajectory. There are indeed
new lessons that a long run view could offer. The new lessons primarily emerge from a
closer reading of the experience with a concern for its sustainability. Most of the old
lessons were premised on a belief that forces undermining the sustainability of the
paradigm were either absent or negligible. We have seen that the developmental project
underlying the Kerala experience may not be entirely "sustainable." The resource use
pattern has shown strong proclivities of over-exploitation and consumerist tendencies
of recent decades have aggravated the ecological-economic tensions that lurked beneath.
Kerala emerged as a serious contender of a new path of socio-economic change
around the time the enterprise of development was awash with pessimistic studies. It
emerged while scholars were challenging the development project itself, how the field
has gone awry or failed to deliver.~° Over 1,300 million people around the world subsist
on less than one US dollar a day (UNDP, 2000). A large majority of this humanity lives
in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty, deprivation, social conflict and
environmental problems in states of the South have not really abated since the
development project began after decolonization half a century ago. What Kerala has
achieved with very low per capita income and economic growth is noteworthy. Hence,
482 JCA 33:4

other developing states may have a great more to learn from Kerala than from
development experiences of rich countries. As Amartya Sen (1997) has pointed out,
India does not need to look elsewhere for development pointers; yet there is much that
India can learn from Kerala's development experience.
At the same time, there are a number of caveats that requires attention. First, despite
the developmental project being moulded within the modernization paradigm (structural
transformation from a traditional agrarian socio-economic system to a modern industrial
society), its success in terms of economic development was not necessarily impressive,
as Sen himself reiterated many times. But the very same failure to achieve economic
growth now stands in the way of the state being able to consolidate and sustain its
remarkable social achievements to date. Here again, we must realize that Kerala's decision
to follow a redistributive development path emphasizing social development was not
intended to sacrifice economic growth at the expense of the former. Second, the
international context of Kerala's experience needs to be properly accounted for. Kerala
emerged in the international economic order as a weak link specializing in the export of
semi-skilled labour and primary commodities. In a rapidly globalizing international
economy Kerala's excessive dependence on export market for primary goods and labour
would make its position extremely precarious. The rules of the new game are not
favourable to Kerala as is the case for other developing economies.
Third and most important new lesson that we learn from Kerala's experience relates
to its portrayal as an alternative path of development. Did Kerala blaze an alternative
path? The answer is yes, but is it sui generis? Comparable lessons can be gleaned from
the development experience of neighbouring Sri Lanka or a little closer China, or far
away Cuba or Costa Rica (Dr~ze and Sen, 1997; Ghai, 1997). While it is true that
industrial modernization did not take place in any significant way in Kerala while social
development took off, this fact alone may not necessarily make it sui generis. It remains
an important aspect of Kerala's political and economic history during the post-colonial
period that successive governments attempted to achieve rapid industrial growth although
the policies faltered due to a variety of reasons. It is now well known that Kerala's
achievements in the social sector were made possible within the context of a set of
geographical, historical and political factors. Kerala is now thrown into the nebulous
vortex of insurmountable pressures and tensions caused by factors both internal and
external, particularly the new wave of globalization. That it does not have a strong
support base to withstand this aggression is an occasion for serious rethinking on the
nature and future course of Kerala's development trajectory. Given the greatest lesson
that Kerala has brought to the fore of development theory and practice is the dialectics
of structure and agency and the role public action and popular mobilization play in
articulating development as if people mattered, the present development dilemma that
Kerala is experiencing is indeed perplexing, but eminently explicable.
Notes
1. Manyof these provinceslater becamestates or reorganized into states after the language-basedStates
Reorganisation Act of 1956. For example, the state of Kerala was formedby uniting the Malayalam
 Kerala ~ Experience 483

speaking former princely States of Thiruvitamcore and Kochi with the Malabar district of the former
British colonial province of Madras.
2. India's first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru described dams and factories as the "Temples of
Modern India," ironically, juxtaposing India's modernization on its civilizational and religious predi-
lections. For a reflective analysis of the varying regional dimensions of Indian development, see Dr~ze
and Sen (1997) and Kohli (1987). Bhalla (1995) provides an analytical comparison of uneven develop-
ment in China and India. Bhalla discusses aspects of regional inequalities in incomes and output, tech-
nical change, and access to education and health in his book. For an analysis of diverging trends in
human development among Indian states in recent years, see Shariff (1999). Perspectives on class and
caste in Indian development are discussed in Berberoghi (1992).
3. Indian planning process has been the focus of many intense debates in India and elsewhere. Recent
anthologies on the topic include Byres (1997) and Chathopadhyay, et al. (1996). A critical appraisal of
India's developmental trajectory is provided in Joshi and Little (1994). For a close scrutiny of India's
experiments with planning, see Chakravarthy (1987).
4. For a discussion on spatial changes see, Sreekumar (1993). The changes in gender position are dis-
cussed in Saradamoni (1999) and Jeffrey (1992).
5. The communist movement was unbanned by the British colonial government for a short period during
the Second World War because of communists' support for the Allies.
6. In India the upper castes are known as "savarnas' and lower castes "avarnas.'" Ironically, the former
means good coloured, but indicating whitish complexion.
7. See George, A. (1990) for a detailed discussion of the movement led by Ayyankali.
8. See Gall Omvedt, "Jotirao Phule: Sbetkayaca Asud: Translation," and "The Dravidian Movement," at
htto:llwww.ambedkar.ore]~aill. Retrieved on March 1, 2002.
9. During his tenure as Chief Minister of Thiru- Kochi state (which was the southern half of Kerala after
unification), C. Kesavan had initiated an aborted attempt at land reforms in the early 1950s. He was also
a prominent leader of the democratic movement in the late 1930s. For a detailed discussion of the
struggle for democracy during the inter-war period, see Ouwerkerk (1994). See also the autobiographical
sketch of Accamma Cheriyan, the prominent women leader of the movement (Cheriyan 1990).
10. The key test of this expectation was the strong anti-incumbency sentiment on the part of Kerala electorate.
When the left claims credit for innovative development initiatives while in power, no coalition of major
left parties had been returned to power. For a recent example, despite having introduced a micro-level
planning campaign ambitiously called "People's campaign for decentralized development," the Left
Democratic Front (LDF) was voted out during the state legislative eloctions held in May 2001 and the
opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) was returned to power with a two-thirds majority. More on
"People's Planning" to follow.
11. Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India, Census of India 2001 at www.censusindia.net,
retrieved on February 26, 2002.
12. Ibid.
13. Source: Sample Registration System Bulletin, October 1998. Reported in Census of India 2001 at
www.censusindia.net, retrieved on February 26, 2002.
14. Ibid.
15. Chinese, Arab, Greek and Roman traders called on Kerala ports to collect or buy various spices for
which Kerala had and continues to maintain an international reputation. Balakrishnan (1987) presents a
detailed discussion of trade between Kerala and the external world during ancient and early-modern
periods, and characterizes it as one of unequal scope and consequence. As be has painstakingly explained,
corroborative evidence to suggest sophisticated market exchange between people from the Kerala coast
and foreigners is not available for the early period. It is suggestive that Karl Polanyi (1957/1944) used
the extensive anthropological accounts 0f Robert Thurnwald (1932) to argue against the modern tendency
to project backwards the existence of market society in all human cultures. According to Polanyi,
''Thurnwald established the fact that the earliest forms of trade simply consisted in procuring and carrying
objects from a distance" (Polanyi 1957: 275).
16. Da Gama sailed from Western Europe by first rounding the African continent and then from the Arabian
Peninsula he crossed the Arabian Sea to reach Calicut. For an excellent reconstruction of da Gama's
484 JCA 33:4

journey and how he accomplished the feat with the help of Arab and Indian navigators, see Subrahmanyam
(1997). Subrahmanyam systematically deconstructs the myth of da Gama's "discovery" of India and re-
examines his role in the structuration of colonial disposition in the sub-continent.
17. Cf. Dandekar and Rath ( 1971). Critical research on poverty in India has produced a voluminous literature.
Representative studies include Bagchi, et al. (1989), Ahluwalia (1978), Bhattacharya, et al. (1995),
Datta (1989), Dec, et al. (1991), Minhas, et al. (1991), and Planning Commission (1993). Most of these
studies show high incidence of poverty in Kerala compared to other states. But most of these studies
used conventional measures of income per capita as the basis of welfare. Few years after the United
Nations Study (CDS, 1975), Morris's (1979) innovative study of measuring the condition of the world's
poor through his physical quality of life index (PQLI) highlighted Kerala's achievements. According to
Morris (1979: 74), "it is provocative to discover that the state of Kerala (with a lower per capita income
than India as a whole) has a PQLI of 68, while the all-lndia PQLI (including Kerala) is 43." Morris
clubs Sri Lanka with Kerala as another state "that has been able to achieve remarkable life-quality
results at startlingly low levels of income' (Morris, 1979: 104). Morris's pioneering study of poverty
measures by means other than PCI as the sole basis of development led to the creation of human
development index (HDI) by UNDP under the leadership of the late Mahbnbul Haq. See Parayil ( 1996,
note 17) for details on how PQLI and HDI are computed.
18. The acronym "BIMORU" sounds similar to the word for sickness in Hindi.
19. Kerala's PCI was lower than the national average and its share in the India's NDP was also steadily
declining (Cf. the figures quoted in Ramanathaiyer and MacPherson, 2000: 39-42).
20. Kerala has a long history of being a rice deficit region. In order to supplement shortage of rice, people
used to eat a variety of tubers (cassava, yam, etc.), nuts, fruits, leafy vegetables, fish and shellfish that
were available from private gardens or open access land, forests, rivers and ponds. Some of these food
items were not included in standardized nutrition and food intake surveys. However, these items are
being gradually replaced with fried and processed food items, meat, egg, dairy products, sweets, and
polished rice due to rampant consumerism on the one hand and loss of biological diversity on the other.
Consequently, repeat surveys conducted by the National Nutrition Monitory Bureau shows that the
intake of cereals, millets, leafy vegetables, pulses, milk and Vitamin A is below the recommended levels
(Ramanathaiyer and MacPherson, 2000). For a recent study on levels and trends of poverty in Kerala,
s e e Mohandas (1999).
21. Samir Amin, with reference to Kerala, later summarized this attitude this way. "It is incorrect to think
that nothing can be done until revolution, and that until then 'the worst is the best'" (Amin, 1991: 28).
This statement could be interpreted in two ways, either as vindication of the politics of social democracy
or as supporting parliamentary democracy and sharing of state power as an interim strategy before
revolution.
22. Kerala is still an example of an economy with a low technological profile which when compared with
its achievements in the social sectors appears paradoxical. See for example Alexander (2000) and Parayil
( ! 996).
23. Nevertheless, the vestiges of this belief are still echoed in McKibben's characterization of Kerala as
"proving development experts wrong" and Wallich's claim that "Kerala has been one of economist's
favorite anomalies." See McKibben (1996) and Wallich (1995). For a discussion see Parayil (2000).
24. Kerala's HDI measure is taken from EPW Research Foundation (1994:1307) computed broadly following
UNDP's methodology.
25. This is a theme that Sen has revisited in several of his subsequent engagements with development
theory and practice, making him one of the pioneers in drawing international attention to Kerala. Cf.
Sen (1992, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999).
26. It must he emphasized here that Amartya Sen never used or endorsed the term "Kerala Model." He,
however, preferred "Kerala's experience of development' as the appropriate characterization (see Parayil,
2000: 12, for an exchange on this score with Amartya Sen).
27. See Kannan (1988) and Franke and Chasin (1989). One of the strongest interpretations of Kerala's
achievements is its characterization as a model of "social justice" (Ratcliffe 1978). On a related point,
there is a controversy on the role of Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPM in the articulation of
the model. While Ramachandran (2000) and Prashad (2001) highlight the role of CPM in the success of
 Kerala ~ Experience 485

the "Kerala model," Kannan (1998) points out that the strategies and struggles of communists and their
trade unions have cost Kerala a "generation's time" for modernization. Attributing Kerala's achievements
solely to communist initiatives or attempting to obliterate the role of either CPM or other denominations
of communists in Kerala would be to miss the obvious--pluralistic ambience that envelops democratic
experimentation in the state. The contrast here with West Bengal, a state continuously ruled by CPM for
more than a quarter century has a very low HD1 compared to Kerala. As we have noted earlier, in the
mid- 1990s, Kerala's HDI was 0.775 where as the same for West Bengal was only 0.418 (EPW Research
Foundation, 1994: 1307).
28. A detailed discussion of the developmental project and its relation to the emergence of new social
movements in Kerala is presented in Sreekumar (1999).
29. Representative studies on the history of education are Tharakan (1984) and Mathew (1999). For studies
on health sector, see Panikkar and Soman (1984) and Kabir and Krishnan (1996). Tharakan (1996)
gives an overview of historical developments in social sectors. For a comprehensive recent account of
Kerala's development experience, see Parayil (2000).
30. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution is a highly controversial statute. It gives unprecedented power to
the Central Government to dismiss democratically elected State Governments and impose "President's
rule," which means direct rule by the Central Government through its executive arm. The statute was
originally intended to preserve the federal structure of the nation by dismissing elected stale governments
that are incapable of maintaining law and order or condone secession. The statute is often misused by
the Central government in states where the opposition is in power by claiming that the "law and order"
is under threat although the actual condition may not be severe enough to dismiss the state governments,
as happened in Kerala in 1957. Article 356 has been used by the central government more than hundred
times. For Centre-State political relationship with particular reference to Kerala, see Sathyamurthy
(1985). For a personal account of the saga leading to the dismissal of the state government, see
Namboodiripad (1994) who was the Chief Minister at the time.
3 I. But, eventually, beth groups saw innumerable inner tensions and a range of dissensions and contradictions
leading to splits in the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1964 and the Indian National Congress (INC)
in 1965 and 1969. The split in Communist Party led to the formation of Communist Party of India
(Marxist) or CPI (M), also known as CPM, the largest single political formation in Kerala. A subsequent
split in CP1 (M) during 1967-69 led to the emergence of anti-feudal radicalism in the form of Communist
Party of India (Marxist Leninist) or CPI (ML). The 1965 split in the Congress Party created a regional
party representing the middle and rich peasants called Kerala Congress. The 1969 split caused the
surfacing of the Syndicate Congress, which in the post-emergency period of 1977 joined hands with
like-minded right-wing parties, socialists, and the Hindu fundamentalist party called Janasangh
(predecessor of the present Bharathiya Janata Party or BJP) and formed the Janatha party. The Janatha
party won a majority in parliamentary elections held in 1977, defeating lndira Gandhi who had imposed
emergency rule from 1975-77. CPM had supported the Janatha party government because they were
both in the forefront of anti-emergency insurgency in India. Except for the 1965 split in the INC in
Kerala that created the Kerala Congress, all other dissensions were part of national level polarizations.
However, the impacts of these splits had their unique imprints in Kerala. One is the realignment of
political forces. Splinter groups in both camps shifted their loyalties. While the CP! eventually formed
a coalition with the INC, the rightist elements of the breakaway Congress group moved to the CP1 (M)
camp. This is in brief the political scenario in Kerala at the beginning of the 1970s (Sreekumar, 1999).
32. For an early critical appraisal of land reforms in Kerala, see Mencher (1980). She argued that those landlords
who had evicted tenants in the 1950s and 1960s did not face any adverse impact of the reforms while others
became instantly land poor in many cases. She also noted that the benefit for agricultural labourers was
permanent rights to a tiny piece of land that was their hutment. She wondered whether this waan't what the
Dalits in other parts of Southern India had been enjoying for a long time, the cheri (loosely translated as
hutments on the outskirts of the village) in which they had been living for eons, and of which they had
common law ownership. Also see Jayaraman and Lanjouw (1999: 8) for additional details.
33. A splinter faction from CPM, called CPI (ML) (which followed the Maoist theory of peasant insurgency
as the true road to revolution, and hailed by the then Peking Radio as the "Thunder of spring over the
Indian horizon") had declared their political agenda as the "physical annihilation' of landlords. A few
486 JCA 33:4

operations were carried out in rural Kerala in which landlords identified by the group as "'people's
enemies" were killed by armed revolutionaries. In Kerala the splinter movement included many prominent
leaders of CPM including their elected representatives in the state legislature. The strong presence of
CP! (ML) as a major political force led to massive repression of the movement in the 1970s.
34. Soon after independence the central government had put forward a land reform package aimed at
eliminating large landlords and redistributing land to the tillers. This provided the broad framework for
land reform legislation in various states, including Kerala. Nevertheless, Omvedt (1992: 89) argues
"The Zamindari Abolition and Tenancy Acts passed in various states in the 1950s did not give land to
the landless or the land poor, they were not intended to. They allowed landlords to retain huge amounts
of land (usually the best) and paid generously for what was taken away. The Acts resulted as often in
poor tenants being expelled from land as in richer tenants getting control of land."
35. The original agreement between Government of Kemla and the industrial house was signed during the
period of the first communist government. Through this accord the monopoly house ensured a steady
supply of bamboos and reeds at the incredibly low rate of one rupee per tone (0.02 cent at the current
exchange rate). The factory, in addition to its overexploitation of natural resources, has become one of
the most polluting industrial units in the state. Successive governments belonging to both political
camps have been supporting and defending the monopoly
36. The predominant development strategy that most developing states, including India, had followed in the
1960s and 1970s was import substitution to protect local industries by restricting imports and subsidizing
infant industries and restricting foreign direct investment. For an excellent discussion of the different
strategies of development followed in the Third World since decolonization, see Debraj Ray (1998)
37. For a more recent assessment of the various dimensions of Gulf migration, see Zacharia et. at (2002).
38. An exact measure of the remittance is yet to be established. While some Kerala analysts put the figure
at about 10% of the state domestic product, (Cf., Zachariah, et al, 2000), others like Krishnan (1991)
and Prakash (1999) consider it to be up to 25 to 30% of SDP.
39. Kurien (2000, 178) states: "For this community [marine fishing] the indicators of the quality of life
poses no paradox of the kind noticed when considering Kerala state as a whole." For example, several
surveys conducted among the fishers in Kerala during the period 1971-1998 have shown unfavourable
female-male ratio in fisher households, which is a glaring difference from the macro picture of female
advantage (Pushpangadan and Murugan, 2000: 9). For analysis of the fish workers struggle see Kannan
and Sreekumar (1998). For a close look at the living conditions of Adivasis, see Antony (1995). Bijoy
(1999) provides a passionate account of Adivasi agitation for land rights in Kemla. The political economy
of Adivasi movement in Kerala is analyzed in Sreekumar and Parayil (2002b).
40. Faced with growing internal resistance to her rule, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared an
internal emergency and suspended constitutional rule for 19 months, from 25 June1975. She lost the
elections held under the Emergency rule, a pointer to the enduring features of liberal democratic politics
in India.
41. See also Rajeev (1983) for an early analysis of the unemployment situation made in the context of
understanding the development dilemmas of the state.
42. Kurian (1999) discusses the relative performance of Indian states in government finances in which also
Kerala's position appears rather weak.
43. As a corollary to this, social development resulting in the creation of a huge reserve of labour that is
reasonably educated, young and politically aware, culminated in a phenomenon of mismatch between
labour supply and labour demand. Cf. Kannan (1998).
44. Cf. Halliburten (1998).
45. For a discussion of these and other aspects of the "Dutch disease," see Jazayeri (1986), Struthers (1990),
Fardmanesh (1991) and Heeks (1998).
46. For a recent historical enquiry into the choice of crops among small farmers in nineteenth century Kerala,
see Tharakan (1998). It may be noted that the export commodity sector in Kerala has witnessed repeated
cycles of boom and bust ever since the region was integrated into the world capitalist system as a price
vulnerable spices exporting unit. Chefian (1991 ) examines the instability in India's primary commodity
export earnings focussing on pepper and cardamom, two important spices exported from Kerala.
47. 73 '~ and 74 'h amendment to the Indian Constitution was adopted in 1992 by the Congress government at
 Kerala's Experience 487

the Centre, which required states delegate 29 general administrative functions to lower-level bodies
called village and district Panchayats. It was implemented in Kerala in 1994 again by the Congress-led
UDF coalition government. The LDF government that came to power in 1996 followed up the legislation
with a micro-level planning campaign called the "'People's Campaign."
48. For a critical history of the KSSP, see Zachariah and Sooryamoorthy (1994).
49. For sympathetic accounts of"People's Planning," see Isaac and Franke (2000), Vtron (2000 and 2001 ),
Franke and Chasin (2000), and T6mquist (2000).
50. Two recent articles published in a Malayalam language journal called Paldam edited by a well known
Marxist intellectual M. N Vijayan, who is incidentally the editor of the CPM weekly Deshabhimani
also, has accused People's Plan as a foreign capitalist plot to ruin Kerala's economy through the
involvement of the CIA. See Vijayan (2003) and Sudheesh (2003).
51. The LDF government lost badly in the state assembly election held in May 2001. The opposition UDF
won two-thirds majority in the state assembly.
52. The new phase of gtobalization is in certain definite ways different from its previous forms of the
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries (UNDP, 1999). The new era of globalization is marked by: (i) the
emergence of new markets which link foreign exchange and capital markets on a global scale operating
in real time or selected time, thus eliminating spatial differentials, (ii) strengthening of new and old
actors like WTO, IMF and other supra-national entities that exercise authority over national governments
of Third World countries, (iii) the rise of MNCs which enjoy greater economic and political power over
economically weaker governments where they operate plants but often disregard environmental and
labour norms that would often be deemed violations in their home bases, (iv) enactment of new rules
such as multilateral agreements on trade, services and intellectual property backed by strong enforcement
mechanisms, (v) proliferation of new technological tools, such as information and communication
technologies (ICTs) and biotechnologies that co-ordinate market operations, (vi) the rise of a network
society marked by structural changes in social morphology of regions connected by the new tools and
markets, (vii) the rise of resistance movements, such as NGOs through better articulation of civil society
norms, and, (viii) the exclusion of large areas of the world from the benefits of trade and technological
innovation. More detailed exposition of these characteristics of contemporary globalization can be found
in UNDP (1999), Castells (1996), and Held, et al. (1999).
53. Reply given by the Minister of Industry, Government of Kerala in the State Legislative Assembly to a
member's question. At http:llwww.deshabhimani.comldllkeralam.htm.
54. See for a Report, Dhanakaryam, 2001 April 23 (Malayalam). The new government attempted to create
an investment climate in the state in order to attract industrial capital, particularly in the IT sector
through a Global Investor's Meet (GIM) in January 2003. The GIM was partially successful in terms of
agreements signed for major investments. However, it faced severe opposition from the radical left for
the participation of MNCs.
55. While a drop in the price of spices, rubber, coconut, coffee, tea and other commercial crops of Kerala and
their impact on its economy may be apparent, the crash in the prices of non-agricultural factors need
explanation. A large portion of savings of Kerala people is tied up in real estate, gold, and lately in stocks
and shares. Per capita consumption of gold (in the form of ornaments) in Kerala is the highest in India.
56. The calculations have been made by the State Agricultural Prices Board and reported in Mathrubhumi
at "http:llwww.mathrubhumi.comlarchiveldate-91index.htm'" httr~:llwww.mathrubhumi.comlarchivel
date-9/index.htm retrieved on 14 April 2001.
57. Other southern states like Karnataka, Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have benefited far greater from the
regional dynamism of Indian growth pattern due to liberalization and globalization. However, the growth
in these states is clustered around cities like Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai (formerly Madras).
58. The state initiatives in this sector lack momentum. Kerala is often seen as a low performer in comparison
with the neighbouring states that have surged ahead in developing IT industries. The defeat of the LDF
government and the return of the UDF to power in 2001 have seen some changes the industrial policy of
the state. The new government claims that it would revitalize the IT sector in Kerala by emulating its
neighbour Karnataka state for IT development. The Congress Chief Minister of Karnataka had
campaigned for the UDF (the main party of the UDF is Congress and the new Kerala Chief Minister is
from this party) in Kerala and claimed that if the UDF came to power, he would help them foster IT
488 JCA 33:4

would be declared in one hundred days of his government's assumption of office. He alluded that the
policy would be geared towards encouraging private sector participation in IT development in the state.
For details see Deepika at http://ww.deepika.com retrieved on July 8, 2001. Investment in the IT sector
received a boost during the Global Investors' Meet, as major Indian IT MN.Cs like Infosys and Wipro
promised to invest in the state.
59. Bill McKibben's (1995) enthusiastic endorsement of Kerala as soft on its ecological footprint ("living
lightly on the earth") attests to this sort of post-Rio ecological politics.
60. For normative critiques of the failure of the development project to deliver, see Seers (1979), Hirschman
(1981), Hi11.(1986), Edwards (1989), and Parayil (1990). The recently released UNDP's Human
Development. Report 2003 also takes a closer look at the failures of official development actions to
alleviate extreme poverty and hunger in the word, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South
Asia. The Report, however, lauds Kerala's achievements, particularly, its initiatives to decentralize
development planning discussed earlier.
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