Hard problem of

consciousness

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how humans have
qualia[note 1] or phenomenal experiences.[2] This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of
explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate,
integrate information, and so forth. These problems are seen as relatively easy because all that
is required for their solution is to specify the mechanisms that perform such functions.[3][4]
Philosopher David Chalmers writes that even once we have solved all such problems about the
brain and experience, the hard problem will still persist.[3]

The existence of a "hard problem" is controversial. It has been accepted by philosophers of mind
such as Joseph Levine,[5] Colin McGinn,[6] and Ned Block[7] and cognitive neuroscientists such
as Francisco Varela,[8] Giulio Tononi,[9][10] and Christof Koch.[9][10] However, its existence is
disputed by philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett,[11] Massimo Pigliucci,[12] Thomas
Metzinger, Patricia Churchland,[13] and Keith Frankish,[14] and cognitive neuroscientists such as
Stanislas Dehaene,[15] Bernard Baars,[16] Anil Seth,[17] and Antonio Damasio.[18]

Overview

Philosophical responses
Relationship to scientific frameworks

The meta-problem

In popular culture

See also

Notes

References

External links

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Last edited 19 days ago by Гармонический Мир