Mind Association

The Picture Theory of Meaning

Author(s): Edna Daitz
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 62, No. 246 (Apr., 1953), pp. 184-201
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251383 .
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 III.-THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING
BY EDNA DAITZ

ISAIAH BERLIN has recentlydiscoursedon the pronenessof

philosophersto adopt as a paradigmone type of sentence-fact
relation,and then Deflate othersentencesto sentencesof the
chosensort,or, alternatively,Inflateotherfactsto.facts of the
chosen sort. In his view, one of the causes of this persistent
propensityis the CorrespondenceTheory of Language, 'the
assumptionthat words are names and that it is not truth,
so muchas meaning,that is a formof correspondence between
symbolsand things.' (P.A.S. 1949-50,p. 180). One formwhich
the Correspondence viewofmeaningtakesis the PictureTheory.
I shall explore the logic of ' picture', and of related notions
*like'map,' 'reflection'in the hope of showingwhatthe Picture
Theoryis and why it mustbe a misdescription of 'hot words
mean'. Some philosophershold the Picture Theoryoutright.
Others,althoughtheydo not say explicitlythat namesof things
are like picturesof things,or that sentencespicturefacts,yet
describelanguagein termsthat properlydescribenot language
but pictures. I shall mostlydrawexamplesfromthreesources:
Russell, Wittgenstein'sTractatus,and Wisdom's articles on
'Logical Constructions'. For ease of statementand with no
commitment to any use beyondthat introduced, pictures,maps,
sentences,etc., will be said to be signsthatsignify. A signwill
be composed of elements. What the picture etc., depicts,
the signified,willalso be said to be composedof elements.
A picture,forexample,mighthave as its elementssplodges
of paint; if what it signifies is a landscape,the signifiedmight
have as elementsstones,leaves,trees. It is possibleto set up a
correspondence betweenelementsofthe signand elementsofthe
signified: the brownstrokescorrespondto the treetrunks,the
greendots to leaves. However,a pictureis not,a jumble of
variegatedpaint patches. To showtreesin a forestthe browns
and greensmustbe disposedon thecanvasin a particulararrange-
ment,an arrangement similarto thearrangement oftheleavesand
the treetrunkstheyrepresent.
This elicits three characteristics of the relationwhichholds
between picture and pictured. The elements of a picture
representelementsin the pictured. The arrangementof the
elementsin the pictureshowsthe arrrangement of the elements
184
 EDNA DAITZ: THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 185
in thepictured. To each elementin thepicturetherecorresponds
an element in the pictured. There are furtherfeaturesof
'picture ' whichinfluenceelucidationsof 'word' or 'sentence'
in pictureterms.
offunctionamongthe elementsof a
Thereis no diflerentiation
picture. One patch of paintdoes not do this,and another- that.
All elementsofa picturebearthesame relationto theelementsof
the pictured: that of 'representing'. Further,the terms
betweenwhichtherelationofpicturing holds,the pictureand the
pictured,are bothentitiesin the sensethat,unlikedreamsor the
meaningsof words,theyare amongthe furniture of the world.
When a picturestandsin a relationto somethingwhichis not a
thing,we no longerspeak ofit as picturing thatthing. It illus-
tratesa story; The Old Wives'Tale is not a thingand it is that
whichis illustrated; or it is a graphofa temperature;a record
of nervousimpulsesin the brain; a spatial interpretation of a
symphony. Not onlymustbothpictureand picturedbe entities,
but theymustalso be entitiesin what-for wantofa betterword
-I call the same genre. A pictureis a visual patternand can
pictureonly what is visuallyaccessible. A still-lifeof a duck
cannot show the taste of the bird as it may showits markings.
The sense in whicha pictureshowsa tasty birdis the sense in
whichI see a tasty bird,that is, I see a birdwhichlooks as ifit
would be succulentto the taste. I cannot see the taste of a
bird any more than a picturecan show it. As Wittgenstein
says: '2.171 The picture can representevery reality whose
formit has. The spatialpicture,everything spatial,the coloured
everything coloured,etc.' Ofcourse,pictureand picturedcannot
be in theidenticalgenre. If theywere,theonewouldbe a replica,
a duplicate,or a modelofthe otherand not a pictureofit. To
be a picturesomethingmustbe omitted,but what remainscan
show only featuresof the scene in the same genreas itself,i.e.
certainlyspatial and possiblycolouredfeatures.
It is now possible.to summarisefeatureswe may expect in
a descriptionof language whichuses the pictureas a model.
Elementsof the sign will stand for,and be in one to one cor-
respondence with,elementsin the signified. The arrangement of
elementsin the sign will showthe arrangement of the elements
in the signified. There will be no diversityof role among
the elementsof the sign. Sign and signifiedwill be entitiesin
the same genre.
Look now at a description oflanguagein pictureterms. Witt-
gensteinsays: '4.01 The propositionis a pictureof reality.
4.0312 The possibilityofpropositions is based upon theprinciple
186 EDNA DAITZ:

of the representationof objects by signs. 3.21 To the con-

figurationofthesimplesignsin thepropositional signcorresponds
the configuration ofthe objectsin the state of aflairs.' As in a
picture,so in a proposition' 4.0311 One name stands for one
thing,and anotherfor anotherthing,and they are connected
together. And so the whole, like a living picture,presents
the.atomicfact.'
The Tractatusalso satisfiesthe model's demand that sign
and signified be in the same genre. It achievesthisby equating
the sign (the proposition)to the signified(the fact). '2.1 We
maketo ourselvespicturesoffacts. 2.141 The pictureis a fact.'
Russell,in Our Knowledgeof theExternalWorld,is constrained
'to preservethe parallelismin language as regardsfacts and
propositions ' (p. 63) and to talk oftheone as he talksofthe other
forthe same reason. In additionpropositionsand facts must
become entities. ' 3.1431 The essential nature of the pro-
positionalsignbecomesveryclearwhenwe imagineit made up of
Apatialobjects (such as tables, chairs,books) insteadof written
signs.' Here Wittgensteinthinks of propositionsand-since
propositions.coincidewithfacts-of factsas a complexofobjects.
So does Wisdom: 'It is truethatthe factexpressedby ' This is
red 'is notmerelytwothingsthisand red. It is thesetwo stuck
togetherand stuck togetherin a certainway.' (MIND, 1931,
p. 197). Again, Wisdom writes-note the italics and initial
capitalsubstituted forthesignificantly omitted' that '-' suppose
I say" Some dogsare sleepy" and speaktruly. Thentherewill
be one ortwofactsout in thebigworldofthissort: This is a dog
and thisis sleepy,That is a dogand thatis sleepy,Thetis a dog
and etc.' (MIND, 1931, p. 473). That on thismodelfactsare,
thingsis here even plainer.
Different philosophersmay make different use of the picture
model. Theymay pickon different featuresor stop shortwhere
another.mightgo on. Wittgensteinasserts a correspondence
betweenelementsof the signand elementsof the signified(' 3.2
In propositions thoughtscan be so expressedthat to the objects
of the thoughtscorrespondthe elementsof the propositional
sign.') but does not go on to assertthat this correspondence is
one to one. There are elementsin the sign e.g. the logical
constantswhich do not represent,that is, do not stand for
objects. Nor, in consequence,does he assignthe same role to
all elementsin the proposition. Wisdom,on the otherhand,
adopts these two featuresof the picturemodel. There must
be an isomorphism of elementsin the-proposition and the fact
-this is whathe meansby 'identityofform'; and all element
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 187
in the propositionstand forelementsin the fact. Widom says
they are all DemonstrativeSymbols in Stebbing'ssense- (' A
demonstrative phraseis like a bodilygesture,it,pointsat some-
thingforconsideration.' A ModernIntroduction toLogic,p. 15)-
thatis, theyall perform the samefunction.
At once, forviews like these thereare difficulties.Consider
firstthosecreatedby the notionthat elementsofthe signstand
for elementsin the signified. Take the phrase ' The river'
in 'The riveris long'. For what could it stand? The river?
But then,sinceall wordsin the sentencestand foran object,for
what does 'long' stand ? The rivertoo ? But this is absurd.
Shall we say thenthat 'The river' standsforthe riverwithout
itslength,and 'long'standsforitslength?Thisis to taketheroad
that will end at the bare particular.Or shall we say that 'The
river ' stands forthe riverwith all its propertiesand 'long '
standsforits length,i.e. one of its properties? This makes all
relationsinternal. Clearly,a 'stand for'account ofthefunction
of the wordsin a sentencewill notdo. Equally clearly,theories
ofmeaningwhichsay: The namemeans the object,evenifthey
do not acknowledgeit, use ' mean ' withthe logicof 'stand for'.
And how can it apply at all to conditionalsentencesor negative
sentences? Does ' not ' name an elementin the world? If it
-does,how odd an element; ifit doesn't,how do we describethe
difference between' This is red ' and ' This is notred'? 'This'
confessesWisdom (MTND, 1932, p. 461) 'is the sleeping dog
negationand we hurrypast. . ..
Again,howcantheviewthatthearrangement ofelementsinthe
signshowsthe arrangement of elementsin the signified account
forstatements, which,thoughtheyhave a different arrangement
ofelementsyetexpressthesame fact? Maynot' Thisis redand
round' and ' This is red and thisis round' statethe same fact?
Eitherit mustbe claimedthatno two sentencescan everexpress
thesamefact-whichis to denya use to ' same fact'-or it must
be admittedthatthearrangement of elementsin thesentencedoes
not always showthe arrangement of elementsin the fact,that
somesentencesarebetterat doingthisthanothers,e.g.that' This
is red and this is round' morenearlyshowsthe arrangement of
elementsin the factthanthemisleadingly telescoped' This is red
and round'. And then the suspicionarises that no ordinary
sentenceintimatesreallywellthe structure ofthe fact,thatonly
some as yet undisclosedsenteneescould do this, perhaps,or
is it thatno sentencecan be used to do thisat all ?
Considernext difficulties created by the transformation of
factsinto things. There is a modicumof plausibilityin 'The
 188 EDNA DAITZ:

factSophia hitmeis in theworld.'; thereis no semblanceof it in

'The factSomething hitmeis in theworld'. Whilethe firstfact
is composedof Sophia and me in a certainrelation,what would
be the elementsof the secondfact? Something and me ? But
what sort of thingis something? Sentenceslike 'Everything
whichis roundis red', 'The thingwhichis roundis red ' pose
the same problemas willany sentencenot composedofnamesof
objects and simple verbs. Clearly,a philosophercommitted
to treatingfacts as thingsmust discardembarrassing elements
like something, everything,
the thingwhich,etc. Consider,for
instancethe devicesWisdotaresortedto. His firststrategemis
to introducethe new relation of 'referring'. He separates
the factexpressed by theseembarrassing sentencesfromthefacts
to whichthey refer. The facts referredto are always of the
satisfactoryconcretesort. 'Suppose I say "Some dogs are
sleepy" and speak-truly. Then therewill be one or two facts
out in thebig worldof,thissort: This is a dogand thisis sleepy.
That is a dogand thatis sleepy. Thetis a dogand etc. What I
refer-to by my sentencesare these facts. What I expressby
my sentenceis thefactthatthereare such factsas these.'
This is unsatisfactory: the fact expressedstill containsde-
plorableelements.Wisdom'ssecondexpedientis to jettisonboth
therelationof ' expressing' and his self-devised'referring '. He
inventsa newone-'locating'. Sentencesnowsimplylocatefacts.
The difference between'Sophia hitme' and 'Somethinghitme '
is now describableas a difference in completenessof location.
'Sophia hit me ' preciselylocates the fact Sophia hit me.
'Somethinghitme 'partiallylocatesthefactsSophiahitme,Amos
hit me, Martha. . . . The facts are all composedof tangible
elementswithno difficult somethings, or everythingsoccurringin
them. Thuswe findold factsdiscarded,likethefactthatsomeone
hit me, and new facts invoked,like Sophia hit me, Amos hit
me,Martha. . . . We findthattheintimatelinkbetweensentence
and facthas been broken,and in its place a looseunionbetween
a sentenceand countlessotherfacts. Wouldonenothave thought
that ' Someonehit me', if relatedto any fact,would be related
to thefactthatsomeonehit me, and not to Sophia hitme,Amos
hit me,Martha . . .
Finally, considerone of the consequencesof the assimilation
of sentencesto facts. ' 3.1432 We mustnot say " The complex
sign' aRb 'says ' a standsin,relationR to b ' "; but we mustsay,
" that ' a ' standsin a certainrelationto ' b ' says that aRb ".'
Normallywe should say that it was a fact about the sign
'aRb ' that ' a ' standsin a certainrelationto ' b', not that the
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 189
sign ' aRb ' is that fact. This way of converting sentencesinto
factscreatesa difficulty:in conversion,an n-termedsentence
becomesan n + 1-termed fact. Consider' Sophia hates Amos'.
This becomesthe fact ' Hates ' is between ' Sophia ' and 'Amos',
whichhas the consequencethat it is impossibleto gearthe form
of a sentenceto the formof the fact. The sentence' Sophia
hates Amos' is not identicalin formwith,i.e. has not the same
numberof elementsas, the fact Sophia hatesAmos. For the
sentenceis thefact' Hates ' is between ' Sophia ' and ' Amos', i.e.
it has fourelementswhile Sophia hatesAmos has only three.
This view brings with it the consequence that all ordinary
sentenceshave, forfact-stating purposes,one wordtoo many!
All thesedifficultiesstrengthenthe suspicionthatpicturesare,
as a model for sentences,unfortunate.In some cases, e.g.
negativesentences, thereis no fit; in othercases,e.g. sentences
containingwords like 'something' contrivingis needed to
achievea fit,and in eventhebestcasesthe fitis uncomfortable-
it is timeto examinecloselypicturesand sentences. To bring
out theirlogic I proposealso to examinereflections and maps.
Reflections, pictures,and maps sharea featureoffundamental
importance. They are icons.' An icon is a sign whichhas at
leastoneoftheproperties ofthatforwhichit is a sign,and signifies
in virtueofsucha property. In a drawingofa cat withhersmall
kitten,moreof the picturewill be occupiedby the cat than the
kitten; the relativedimensionsof the cat and the kittenare
repeatedin the pictureof the cat and the kitten. Reflections,
pictures,and maps duplicatethespatialpropertiesofthat which
they reflect,pictureor map.2 Sentences,on the otherhand,
are not icons. In the sentence ' The cat is biggerthan the
kitten', 'cat ' is in the same type as 'kitten '. To conveyour
meaningwe have no need to write'THE CAT is biggerthanthe
kitten'.
The next difference to notice between icons and sentences
is important. Icons show, sentences state. A reflectionin
watershowsthe treeson its bank,a pictureshowsa girlholding
a cat, a map shows the course of a river. A sentencestates
thatthe treeis on the riverbank,that the girlholds a cat, that
theriverflowsfromnorthto south.
Beforecontinuingit may be worthwhileto examine briefly
a sense of ' show' whichin this contextis confusing. It is a
1 J adapt this term fromC. S. Peirce.
2 This is inaccurate. It fails to take account of the effectsof, e.g.
perspective or projection. So to take account would complicate but not,
I think,alter the description.
190 EDNA DAITZ:

sense different fromthe sense in which,e.g.a pictureof a girl

holdinga cat has been said to show a girl holdinga cat. In
the new sense of ' show' a pictureof a girlholdinga cat may
show somethingother-than a girl holdinga cat; it may, in
thissense,showthe i:nfluence of a schoolof paintingor that the
artist's technique has improved. This se:nse of 'show'- is
applicable to sentencestoo. A sentence may show care in
constructionor that its writerspells poorly. It seems to me
clear that 'show' in this sense of 'reveals' is not of directin-
terestto us. Fromnow on I ignoreit to discuss 'show' only
in thesensein whichan icon,but not a sentence,may show.
To continue,then,withthecompa.rison ofshowingand stating.
Both relationsare resoluble into two components. Showing
consistsin representing and arranging,statingin referring and
describing. Here the similarityends. It is possible to point
at a reflectionin a riversaying'Look at the treein the water'.
Similarly,of a picturewe may say 'This '-pointing at a line
in a drawing-.'is the treetrunk', or of a map 'Here's Oxford
and there'sWoodstock'-indicating two dots with the finger.
But we cannotsay as we indicateone of the wordsin a sentence
'This is a tree'. The fact that icons are like what theysignify
is acknowledgedby our willingness to say that the icon is what
it signifies.
Thereis no locutionalternativeto ' is ' fortherelationbetween
the elementsof a reflection and the elementsof whatit reflects.
Its elementsare trees, clouds, leaves. We do not say that a
reflectionrepresentsor stands for or denotes or refersto the
sceneit reflects. Perhapsthisis so because it is a causal pheno-
menonand theserelationsall implyan agentwho uses the sign
to represent,stand for,denote,or referto the signified. The
imageon a televisionor cinemascreenis spokenabout in a similar
way. 'Look, there's Philip Harben ' and not ' Look, that
represents, or stands for,etc. PhilipHarben.' Of a picture,on
the otherhand,in additionto sayingthat a curvedstrokeis the
treetrunk,we may say that it representsthe treetrunk. Simi-
larly,ofa map,the dot whichis Oxfordmay also be said to stand
forOxford. Instead of writing: The elementsof an icon stand
for,represent,or are, elementsin the signified, let us use the
and
singlerelationof representing say: The elements of an icon
representelementsin the signified. Now, showingis notmerely
representing.The elementsof an icon must be in a certain
arrangement.The lines which representthe trunk and the
speckleswhichrepresentthe leaves will not make a pictureof
a tree unless (roughly)the lines and specklesare arrangedso
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 191
thatthe specklesare on top ofthe lines. Thus the arrangement
of the elementsin the icon mustbe similarto the arra,ngement
oftheelementsin whatit signifies.
Nowcontrastshowing, whichwehaveresolvedintorepresenting
and arranging,with stating. The elementsof a sentence,viz.
its words,neitherare, nordo theystand for,or representwhat
theysignify. 'Tree 'is not a.treein theway thata drawingofa
treeis a tree,and nor does 'tree ' representa tree in the way
that a drawingdoes. Wordshave meaning-unlikestrokesand
lines-and are used (thisis two of manychosenbecause we are
concernedwith sentencesin theirfact-stating use) to referto
a,ndcharacterisethings. 'The treeis bare ' bothrefersto a tree
and describesit as bare. In ' The tree is bare ', ' The tree'
refersto an object and 'is bare ' describesthat object. So to
apportionthe functionof ' The tree' an'is bare ' is not, of
course,quite correctas Strawsonpointedou On Referring
(MIND, 1950). 'The tree' is descriptiveas well as referential,
as we see ifwe contrastit with'It ' in ' It is bare '.
Althoughstating,like showing,resolvesintotwo components,
the relations between stating,referring, and describingare
different fromthe relationsbetweenshowing,representing, and
arranging. To beginwith,referring and describingare not the
counterpartsof representingand arranging. Rather do both
referring and describingcorrespondto the one relationof repre-
senting. Some elementsofa sentencerefer,somedescribe,some
do both; all theelementsof an iconrepresent. Arranging is an
orderingof elementsall of whichrepresent,but describingis
not an orderingof elementsall of whichrefer. Describingis on
a par withreferring in the way in whicharrangingis not with
representing.
Next, showingbears a relationto representing from
different
the relationthat statingbears to describingand referring.A
sen:tence states,but its elementscannotstate. An icon shows-
and so do its elements. Comparethe sentence'My cat sits on
its cushion' witha pictureof a cat on a cushion. If fromthe
drawingI erase the cushionI leave a pictureof a cat. The
removalof 'sits on his cushion' fromthe sentenceleaves, not a
sentence,buta phrase. In otherwords,elementswhichrepresent
also show; butelementswhichreferor describedo notalso state.
Not onlydo all the elementsof an icon signifyin the same way,
but the iconsignifies theway all its elementsdo. In contrast,a
sentencestates,but does not as its elementsdo, referor describe.
Finallywe mustnoticethatshowingis notfirstrepresenting and
then arranging. Representingis simultaneouswith arranging.
 192 EDNA DAITZ:

Stating,on the other hand, is firstreferringand then de-

scribing,or perhaps firstdescribingand then referring.The
orderin a sentencemay contributeto fixingits mea,ning, but
difference in meaningmay be achieved by means other-than
difference in wordorderby, e.g. case inflexion. The orderfound
in a spatialicon,however, mfistcQntribute to fixing
itssignific'ance.
The order of words in a sentenceis a conventionalorder of
presentation;the spatialorderingofthe elementsin a reflection,
picture,or map, is an iconicorderofrepresentation.
By now it is clea,rthat it is a mistaketo thinkthat showing
is composed of representationand arrangementin the way
that statingis reference and description. We now see that not
only is showingunlike stating,but also that representing and
arrangingare relatedto showingin a way unlike the way in
whichreferring and describingare relatedto stating.
There are furtherdifferences between icons and sentences.
If all the elementsin the signrepresentelementsin the signified,
it is possibleto set up a correspondence betweenthe elements
ofeach. In the case ofa reflection the correspondence is clearly
one to one. As Wisdom put it: 'When a mirrormirrorsa
scene then foreach colouredpatch in the reflection, thereis a
colouredpatch in the scene and vice versa. . . . A reflection
may be blurredas in rippledwater,or distortedas in a concave
mirror;theseare respectively a defectofclarityand a peculiarity
in projection. It cannot, however, omit detail. To each
elementin the scene theremust correspondan elementin the
reflection.This does not hold good of pictures. Though
'it is stillthe case that a correspondence can be set up between
the elementsof a pictureand the elementsof the pictured,the
correspondence need not be one to one. A portraitmay be
faithful to thelast detail,but it maynot. It maybe a sketch,or
an outlinedrawing,or even a compositiondesign,showingonly
broad massesand omittingdetail completely. Similarly,a map
may omitdetail,and in so faras it does, it ceases to be in one
to one correspondence with that of which it is a map. For
example, a map of England may show every English river,
or it may show instead merelythe main rivers. Reflections,
pictures,maps, forma series of decreasingiconicity,i.e. they
differ in the numberoffeaturestheymusthave in commonwith
what they signify. Language,thoughits mode of signification
is conventionaland not i'onic, containsa few iconic devices
like 'creak', 'buzz', 'tinkle . These are similar in sound
to the soundstheymay be used to referto. Even thoughit is
only the elementsof a reflection, and not of a pictureor map,
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 193
whichmust be isomorphicwiththe elementsof the scene,it is
still in generaltrue that the elementsof an icon can be set in
correspondence-though notalwaysin one to one correspondence
with the elementsof that of whichit is an icon. This is so
becauseall theelementsofan iconrepresent. We saw.abovethat
the elementsof a sentencehave no functionanalogous to re-
presenting. At best,referring is itsanalogue-and not all words
refer. Sincetheelementsofa sentencedo notrepresent elements
in the signified,a fortiori,the elementsof a sentencedo not
correspondto elementsin the signified.
The elementsof icons and sentencesdiffer in anotherrespect.
The elementsofa sentenceare partofa vocabulary,the elements
of an icon are not. Whetherwe take as elementsof an icon
lines, dots, and patches, or meaningfulcombinationsof such
lines,dots, and patches,the point still holds. If the lines etc.
are themselvesto be taken as elements,then,as theyhave no
constantsignificance, they cannot constitutea vocabulary,as
the itemsin a vocabularymustbe usable withthe samemeaning
on different occasions. A 2 cm. line could be used to represent
the side of a fan, a mouth,etc. If meaningfulcombinations
of lines,dots,etc., i.e. such -combinations as representa recog-
nisable object, are taken as elements, the elements of an
icon still cannotforma vocabularyas they cannot be used in
many situations: being themselvesicons, they representa
specificobject. A sketchof a face,forexample,has.a specific
shape and a specificarrangementof features; it represents
thatface and no other. As iconicitydecreasesso the possibility
of a vocabularyincreases.
Maps, whichare less iconicthan picturesand reflections have
the beginningsof a vocabulary. Dots stand fortowns,crosses
forchurches,etc., and the dots and crossesare used withthe
same significance in differentinstances. Since the signs may
standforotherthingsin anothermap the vocabularyis relative
to each map. Each map needs therefore a legendto interpret
its signs. It wouldbe possibleto have a standardset ofsymbols
formap-making,so that no key-for this purpose-was neces-
sary. In practicesome cartographicsymbolsare standardand
othersvaryfrommap to map. Theystillconstitutea vocabulary
whethertheyhave a constantsignificance merelyfora particular
map, or 'whetherthey are generalcartographicconventions.
However,not all the elementsin a map are itemsin a rudi-
mentaryvocabulary. Lines standingfor riversand sea-fronts
are not so forthe reasonsthat the elementsof a pictureare not.
A map stands midwaybetweena pictureand a language. Its
13
194 EDNA DAITZ:

moreiconicelementsare likepictureelements; itsless iconicand

therefore moreconventionalelementsare likelanguageelements.
The factthatmaps and languageshave a vocabularyis connected
withanotherdifference.A conventionalsign does not, like an
icon,show whatit signifies. Thereis nothingin the sign 'cat'
to showthat it signifies a cat, as thereis in a drawingof a cat.
We have to learnthemeaningof' cat 'in a waywe do nothaveto
lea'rnthe meaningof a drawing. We learnto read (significant
idiom)a map becauseit is to someextentconventional.
Consider now 'the question of entities. That sentences,
unlike icons, do not signifyqua entitycan be broughtout by
comparinga sentencewithan icon. Take a pictureofa cushion
betweena cat and a mouse,and thesentence' Thisadjoinstlhat'.
To speak of the sentenceas the factthat 'Adjoins' is between
'this ' and ' that ' (3.1432 . . . That ' a ' stands in a certain
relationto ' b ' says that aRb) is to regardit as threemarksin
ink in the way that a pictureof a cushionbetweena cat and a
mouse is threemarksin ink. Butta sentencedoes not signify
because it is a pattern of'marks-its physical appearance is
irrelevantin the sense that' there is no correlationbetween
appearance and function,e.g. homonymslook alike but have
different meanings,a sentencelooks no different fromits com-
ponent words,yet signifiesdifferently, and so on. It is just
because the sentence,unlikethe picture,does not signifyqua
collectionofinkmarks,thatwe do nottalkaboutit as thesentence
'Adjoins ' is between'this' and 'that' (cf.the pictureof the
cushionbetweenthe cat and the mouse). Nor is whatis stated,
a fact, on a par with the scene reflected,person picturedor
countrymapped. Facts are notthings. Anyonewhoholdsthat
theyare mustdo violenceto the conceptoffact. By thisI mean
thattheymustmisusetheterm'fact ', forI take the questionof
whethera factis a thing,oran eventora truestatement, to be the
question of whetherthe idioms appropriateto the onie are
appropriateto the other. Though the fact and thing idiom
merge,e.g. De Gama discoveredthe Canaries,Poirotdiscovered
the facts,facts and thingsmay be overlooked,concealed,un-
earthed,etc.,themergingis minutecomparedto the vast terrain
of:each which remainsseparate. Facts cannot be brokenor
identified,they neitherexist nor do they not exist. Yet they
seem so brute,so inescapable,surelythey are out therein the
world just likethetable?x But thetable is nota fact,noris the
table is brown,nor the table being brown. That the table is
brownis (or rathermay be) a fact-and there are no 'thats '
in the world.
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 195
We mustnow considerone last difference of greatimportance
between icons and sentences. As icons signifyby being like
what they signify,theirrange of signification is limited. The
special restriction to what is in spatial proximity
of a reflection
to it is unconnected withits iconicity,and due solelyto the fact
that it is a causal phenomenon. Both reflections and pictures,
however, can show only spatial and coloured relations,i.e.
they can show only -whatis in (what I earlier called) the
same genre as themselves. A song or.a taste can be neither
reflectednor pictured. Maps, being less iconic and more con-
ventional,mayshowthe spatialrelationships ofa greatervariety
of thingsthan reflections or pictures,e.g. althoughwe cannot
picturethe equator,we can markit on a map. A map's range
of signification expands in other directionstoo. As -well as
geographicalmaps, there are political maps, rainfall maps,
ethnologicalmaps. This increasein scope dependsupon and is
accompaniedby an increasein conventionality.Since language
is whollyconventionalit has an unlimitedrange. It is restricted
to no genrespatialorotherwise. To showyouhowsomeonelooks
I can painta picture; to showyou how she soundsI mustsing,
not paint; in wordsI can tell you both how she looks and how
she sings. It is the strengthof the icon that it signifieswith
greatspecificity.It is its weaknessthat it can signifyonlywhat
is likeitself.Languagecan describeanythingbar the ineflable-
and even thisit characterisesas such.
It seemsto me that this reviewof reflections, pictures,maps
and sentences,reveals two vastly differentmodes of signi-
fication: theicoic. and theconventional.Earlierwe summarised
the demandsof the picturemodel. We can now see them as
demands which can only be fulfilledby a misdescription of
language. They demand,in effect,that languagesignifyiconi-
cally. But sincelanguagedoes not signify in virtueofproperties
it has in commonwith what is signified-itis not an icon-
any descriptionof it.whichdescribesit as iconicmisdescribes it.
It is clearthatsentencesdo notshow,butstate,thatarrangement,
whichis an essentialfactorin iconicsignification, need not occur.
in conventionalsignification, that the elementsof a sentence
do not standforobjectsbut (maybe used to) referto or describe
objects. And since the words in a sentence-do not stand for
objects,they cannotbe in correspondence, let alone one to one
correspondence,. with objects. Nor can a language fulfilthe
demandthat the signbe in the same genreas the signified since.
it does not signifyin virtueof beingitselflike what is signified
and nor,in the case of langguage, can the signand the signified
196 EDNA DAITZ:

be treatedas things. A sentenceand a picturediffer in the very

respectsin which-if the one is to be a model forthe other-
they would have to resembleone another. '
It now becomescleartoo why,on the picturemodel,sentences
alwayshave a wordtoo many. An iconneedsno markforwhat
it showsby likeness. A drawingof one thingadjoininganother
needsa markforone thingand a markfortheother,but no mark
fortherelationofadjoining. Thisit showsbythespatialplacing
of the marks for the two things. A sentenceneeds a mark
wherea picturedoes not: it cannotshowthat thisadjoins that,
but must say so. (Wittgenstein was wrongin saying: ' 4.1212
What can be showncannotbe said '.) Say we dropthe markfor
adjoins and write'This that ' in place of 'This adjoins that '.
How wouldwe indicatethatthisadjoinsas opposedto surpasses
or dividesinto that? Again, wordslike ' a ', 'the', 'which',
'all', 'some', 'three ', do a job which,as opposedto iconic,is
characteristicallylinguistic. Since a languagehas a vocabulary,
i.e. is composedofsignswhichmaybe used on different occasions
'to talk about different things,some device is needed to show
whichthingis being talked about on any given occasion. To
say m.erely' Cats on cushions' would not tell whetherit is the
cats (myneighbour'sand myown),all cats,somecats,or no cats,
that are on cushions. The functionof 'the', 'all', ' some',
'no', is not to destroythe non-existentcorrespondence which
holds betweena sentenceand a factbut to help identifywhich
cats are beingspokenabout. Indeed, any censureof a wordon
the groundthat its occurrencein a sentencewrecksthe iso-
morphismbetweenlanguage and realitymust be mistaken-
languagedoes not tryso to correspond, and nothing,therefore,
can cause it to failto do so.
Why are negative statements,conditionalst,atements, dis-
junctive statements,etc., not describable in picture terms?
The reasonis that theyare the verystatementswhichhave no
pictorialcounterparts. I can say that a cat is black and I
can picturea black cat. But whereasI can also tell you that
it is not black, I cannotpicturethis. To say that a cat is not
black is not to say of what colourit is; but if I paint I must
painta cat of somecolour. And how could we showin a picture
thatall cats are black,thatthecat (as opposedto a cat) is black?
The sentenceswhichdo not yieldto the picturemodel are just
thosewhichcovera regionno picturecould picture. Variations
in tense-we can picturea black cat but how could we picture
a cat that was or will be black ?-is anotherexample. And
werea picturetheoryto succeedin the fact-stating sphere,some
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 197
other account would still be needed for.commands,questions,
prayers,promises,hopes,wishes,fears. If we considerhowsmall
a proportionof actual discourseis composedof simplesentences
ofthe cat-on-the-mat type,we see whata smallpartoflanguage
this modelcould even purportto elucidate.
Of course, iconic and conventionalsigns are not wholly,
diverse. At the least they share the grammarof 'sign'. For
instanceboth sortssignifywell or ill. A portraitcan be' faith-
ful,trueto the original,or showa faceas otherthanit is ;. a map
can be accurate or inaccurate; a sentence,when used infor-
matively,true or false. All are furtheralike in that'theycan
signifyin various ' projections'. A concave mirrorwill in a
regularmannerdistortwhatit reflects; a picturemay be cubist
or pointillistin its formof representation; ;maps can be in
different projections,e.g. Mercator's; and a tale can be told
in the firstpersonsingular,or in an impersonalreporter'sidiom,
.in Freudian terms, etc. As well as variation in projection
thereis variationin style. By this I mean that theremay be
differencesnotdue to any regulartransformation.Idiosyncratic
omissions,high-lighting of one detail ratherthan another,occur
in stoties,and also in pictures,e.g. a caricature,and in ma.ps,
e.g. a diagram. Again,pictures,maps, sentences,are all alike
in this: to know if they are faithful,adequate, true,whether
they distortor not, somethingotherthan themselvesmust be
examined,that whichthey-purportto reflect,picture,map or
describe. It is also true that iconic signification slides into
linguistic. Historicallya large number of our conventional
signs have come ultimatelyfrompictographs. The prejudice
thatwhathas a commonsourcehas commonproperties maylead
us to thinkicons and linguisticsignsmorealike that they are.
Thus Wittgenstein couldsay: '4.016 In orderto understandthe
essenceof the proposition,considerhieroglyphic writing,which
picturesthe factsit describes. And fromit came the alphabet
withoutthe essence of the representation being lost.' Picture
languages embodythe transitionfromiconic to conventional,
having signs at once both (hieroglyphsfor instance). Such
signs may be representational to a larger or smaller extent.
The human figurewith protrudingribs that representsfamine
or the weepingeye that standsforsorroware stylisedpictures,
ideographs,representing simpleabstractideas. If a drawingof
an eye comesto represent" not onlyideas suggestedby eyes but
also all homonymsof 'eye ', thena signofpurelyphoneticvalue
has emerged,and the picturehas becomeconventionalised. All
thisfillsinthefissurebetweeniconicand conventional signification.
198 EDNA DAITZ:

Nonetheless,although'aniconand the elementsin it represent,

neither the propositionnor its parts represent. A picture
has parts whichare little pictures,that is, an icon stands for
somethingjust as its elementsdo. But with a sentencethe.
case is different.Partsofa sentencearenotthemselves sentences
and thoughits elementsmay referto or describesomething- the
sentenceitselfcannot. Put in this way, it is clear that it is a
possibledescriptionofthe searchfora correlateof a sentenceto
parallelthe correlatesofthe wordsin a sentence,to say thatit is
an assimilationof-stating to showing. This is, among other
things,to imaginethat just as the icon, like its elements,rep-
resents something,so the sentence,like its elements,refers
to something. We see too whythe picturecan be a modelfor
wordsas well as sentences. Since the elementsof a picture.are
themselvespicturesone could think that words are pictures,
as well as thata sentenceis a picture.' Thus we mightsay that
'the namelikethepictureis an imitationofthe thing' (Cractylus
430) or that 'TThepropositionis a pictureof reality' (Tractatus
4.12).
Considerthe 'picture' elucidationof names. This may be
put as 'The name meansthe object,the object is its meaning'.
To say this is to use ' means' withthe logic of ' stand for' or
'represent', i.e. to constiue words on the iconic-model. The
attendant'puzzle: 'If the wordmeans thisobject,perhapsthe
one by whichit is ostensively defined,howcan it meanany other.
object ? ' comes from tryingto fit an essentiallylinguistic
-attribute into an iconic description. If an icon representsthis
'object,it can represent no other. A paintingof a redroseshows
a rose of a determinateshade and a particularshape and the
picturecannotpicturea rose of any othercolouror shape. Ana
iconmustalwaysbe specific. A languageon the otherhand has
signs that can be used with the same meaning on different
occasions. Thus to ask: 'How if the wordmeans this object
can it mean another?' is firstto assimilate words to icons
and then to demand that an icon signifylinguistically. This
is to ask of a sign that it at once ' mean' the object (signify
specifically)and have meaning(signifyso that thereare general
directionsfor its use). The complaintthat words are too in-
'determinatein their signification-whichoften accompanies
the thesisthat the name meansthe object-can be viewedas a
complaintthat wordsare not iconic'enoughin theirsig.nifi.cation.
The ideal name wouldpicture,say, a particular.
Althoughthe PictureTheorybringswithit puzzlesthat even
itsholdersrecogniseas insoluble,it nevertheless seemsto havethe
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 199
virtue of dealing adequately with two questions,which may,
as a resultofcertainphilosophicalviews,becomeproblems: How
is it that we immediatelyunderstanda sentencewe have never
heard before? How can a false sentencehave meaning.?
We understanda newcombination of.wordsforthesamereason,
we mightsay, that we comprehenda pictureon seeingit forthe
firsttime. No explanationis necessaryineithercase; thepicture
'speaks 'for itself,it showswhatit pictures; thesentencespeaks
for itself,it 'shows ' its sense. The parallel is most clearly
stated by Wittgenstein'4.01 The propositionis a pictureof
reality. 4.02 This we see fromthe factthat we understandthe
sense of the propositionalsign,withouthavinghad it explained
to us. -4.021The propositionis a pictureof realityforI know
thestateofaffairs presentedbyit,ifI understandtheproposition.
And I understandthe propositionwithoutits sensehavingbeen
explained to me. 4.022 The proposition shows its sense.
4.027 It is essentialto propositionsthat theycan communicate a
new sense to us.'. This seemsto explainhow it is that we can
understanda newsentence,but does it really? A sentencedoes
not showits meaning-considerthe impenetrability ofa sentence
in an unmasteredlanguage. To understanda statementwe must
firsthave learntthe language in whichit is made-but in the
sense in whichthereare foreignlanguagesthereare no foreign
pictures. Only if learningwas unnecessaryfor languagestoo
would Wittgenstein be rightin saying' 4.03 A propositionmust
communicatea new sense with old words. The proposition
communicatesto us a state of affairs,thereforeit must be
essentiallyconnectedwith the state of affairs.' We do not
understanda sentenceon firsthearingit because it is essentially
connectedwith reality; a sentenceis conventionally connected
withreality. ' 4.012 It is obviousthat we perceivea proposition
of the formaRb as a picture. Here the sign is obviouslya
likenessof the signified.' But a sentence,unlike a picture,is
not a likenessof the signified, so that this mustfail to explain
how we finda new sense in old words. Indeed, the picture
-viewitselfcreatesthe need for-an 'explanation'. This is the
puzzle, this time withsentencesinsteadof names,of how if the
sign means this,can it ever mean anythingelse? As before,
the puzzle pivots on sayingthat the sign is an iconic sign and
thenwishingthat it wouldfunctionas a linguistic -sign.
The Picture Theorysappears also to explain how a false
sentencecan have mea-ning.We can cometo be perplexedabout
the meaningof false sentencesas a result of a vieWsuch as
Russell's that 'the componentsof the fact which makes a
 200 EDNA DAITZ:

proposition,trueor false . . . are the meaningsof the symbols

we must understandin order to understandthe proposition'
(PhilosophyofLogicalAtomism). This viewapparen,tly accounts
forthe meaningfulness of true propositions, forin this case the
fact 'correspondsin a way that makes the propositiontrue'.
Supposeit is a factthatthisis redand I say: ' Thisis red ', then
' this ' means this and ' red ' means red. But what if I sa,y:
'This is blue' whenin factthis is red ? 'This' means thisbut
whatnow does 'blue' mean ? What componentin the factthat
this is red can bhiLemean ? Either we must say that since
blueis not a componentofthefact-viz. thisis red-which makes
' This is blue ' false,'blue ' has no meaning,or we mustsay that
' blue ' means red-in 'the false way'. Neitherpleases. lt
seems betterto press the modelfurtherand say that just as a
pictureshowswhatit pictureseven whenit does not pictureany
actual thingso a sentenceshowswhatit meanseven whenit does
not mean any actuaalfact. '4.061 If one does not observethat
propositions have a senseindependentofthe facts,one can easily
believethat true and false are two relationsbetweensignsand
thingssignifiedwithequal rights. 2.22 The picturerepresents
whatit represents independently ofitstruthorfalsehood,through
the formof representation.2.221 What the picturerepresents
is its sense. 4.022 The propositionshowsits sense.' Since, as
was pointed out earlier,a propositioncan show only what is
otherthan its sense 'thisaccount of the meaningfulness of false
sentencesis not correct. Nevertheless,by making meaning
independentof truth or falsityit does come nearer a right
description.1
Fin'ally,let us notice it is not for nothingthat philosophers
thought'there willalways be a certainfundamentalidentityof
structurebetweenthefactand the symbolforit '. The truthin
this.is that a sentence' S ' cannotbe used to state in any way
inadequatelythe factthat S. 'S' may defaultin the statement
of a fact F only if ' S' is otherthan 'F'. ' S ', forexample,
may state approximatelythe fact that F, where ' S ' is an
approximationto ' F ', e.g. ' There are two thousandmen on
strike' says in round figuresor is a less precisestatementof
'There are 1763 men on strike'. Take another case. 'S'
may statewithoutdetailthe factthat F, where' S ' is a sentence
givingless information than ' F ', e.g. ' She walkedup the hill'
states a bare, a plain, an ungvarnished fact comparedwith 'She
walked slowlyup the hill singingall the way'. A hesitation
can of courseappear whether' S ' statesthe factthat F in a less
1 See Strawson: " On Referring
", MIND, JUly1950.
 THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING 201
detailedway than ' F ', or whether'S ' and 'YF' state different
facts. Does ' She walkedup the hillwithRoderick' add a detail
to the fact that she walked up the hill or state a furtherfact
about her? There seemsto be a tendencyto give the answer
that 'S' adds a detail-to'F' if 'S' and 'F' are linguistically
similar,and to givethe oppositeanswer,to say ' F ' states.4new
fact,if ' S ' and ' F ' are linguisticallydifferent.'She walked
up thehillwithRoderick' adds a detailto thefac.tthatshewalked
up the hill. ' Roderickwas herescort' suppliesa factadditional
to the fact that she walkedup the hill.
The importantpointforus is that the questionwhether'S'
states the fact that F loosely or approximately,in less or in
great detail, cannot arise unless 'S' is differentfrom'F'. It
makes no sense to ask whether'The cat is on the mat' is an
approximate,a plain, a full,or an adequate statementof the
fact that the cat is on the mat. If ' S ' is identicalwith ' F '
i.e. when 'S' states the fact that S, then 'S' states altogether
adequatelythefactthatS, is,ifyoulike,in perfectcorrespondence
withthefactit states. But if,in sucha case, we put it thisway,
we must mean by correspondence no morethan that it makes
no semseto questionthe fitnessof ' S ' to state the factthat S.
Sentencesand facts cannot correspondin any way that suits
the needs of a Correspondence Theoryof Language.
University ofLondon