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International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx – xxx
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Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and

relationships with success
Ralf Müller a,⁎, Li Zhai b , Anyu Wang b
a
BI Norwegian Business School, Dpt of Leadership & Organizational Behavior, Nydalsveien 37, 0442 Oslo, Norway
b
Fudan University, School of Management, Department of Management Science, 670 Guoshun Rd, Shanghai, China

Received 15 August 2016; received in revised form 21 December 2016; accepted 12 January 2017
Available online xxxx

Abstract

This study investigates the role of governance and governmentality in project and organizational success. Results from 121 responses to a
worldwide survey provided for profiling of different governance and governmentality approaches at different levels of success, and quantitative
investigation of the relationships between them. Results support the model of governmentality being positively related with both project level and
organizational level success. Governance as structural context variable moderates this relationship. Moderation takes place at the project level
through the governance mechanisms (trust and control) influencing the strength of the relationship, and at the organizational level through
governance complexity, measured as the number of governance institutions involved in projects, influencing the form of the relationship.
Contingency theory serves as a theoretical lens to interpret and discuss the findings, as well as theoretical and managerial implications.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Project governance; Governance of projects; Governmentality; Success; Projectification

1. Introduction mentalities, rationalities, and ways of interaction, chosen by the

The relationship between governance and governmentality of
projects with their success has recently caught the attention of
researchers. Governance in the realm of projects is often defined as
the value system, structures, processes and policies that allow
projects to achieve organizational objectives (Müller, 2016).
Governance differs by organizational levels (Turner, 1999), and
recent work distinguishes between project governance as the
governance of a single project, and governance of projects as the
governance of groups of projects, such as programs or portfolios
(e.g. Biesenthal and Wilden, 2014). Foucault (1991) explains how
these levels of governance are linked through the concept of
governmentality, which is defined in the realm of projects as the
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ralf.muller@bi.no (R. Müller), lizhai@fudan.edu.cn
(L. Zhai), aywang@fudan.edu.cn (A. Wang).
governance roles to implement, maintain, and change the
governance structure (Müller, 2016, p20). Governmentality
expresses itself in the ways governing institutions interact with
those that are governed (Barthes, 2013). OECD (2004) and project
management researchers claim inseparability of the two concepts,
and suggest that governance should not be discussed without
governmentality as its integrating mechanism (e.g. Müller et al.,
2014).
1.1. Approaches to governance and governmentality
Earlier research investigated the particularities of governance
approaches for projects of different types, sizes, etc., which
showed large variety in governance approaches in and for projects
(e.g. Miller and Hobbs, 2005). This patchwork of studies
uncovered issues like a) no common framework to capture,
outline and compare the different governance approaches, because
b) most studies invented their own governance dimensions,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
0263-7863/00/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
2 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
instead of using already established concepts from existing
studies, and c) often ignored the relation of governance with
project and organizational success.
The aim of the present study is to address these issues by using
a conceptual framework for governance and governmentality
for projects recently developed and published by Müller et al.
(2016b). Their profiling tool provides dimensions for qualitatively
measuring governance and governmentality. The profiles derived
from their study are not generalizable, as they are based on eight
case studies and collected with the intent to identify the largest
variety in possible measures in order to develop measurement
dimensions and scales.
The present paper tests and applies this tool by quantita-
tively operationalizing the formerly qualitative scales, validate
them through a worldwide survey, derive patterns of gover-
nance approaches, and assess the impact of governance and
governmentality on success at project and organizational level.
Through this, we measure, quantify and profile different
governance and governmentality approaches and identify those
dimensions that correlate with success at both the project and
the organizational level, using compounds of soft and hard
measures of success. To address the issues outlined above we
pose the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the patterns of approaches to governance
and governmentality in organizations?
RQ2: How do the dimensions of these patterns relate to
project success and organizational success?
The Unit of Analysis is the project-based part of an organi-
zation. The study takes a Critical Realism perspective, which
implies that the study results provide for some often found, but not
automatically generalizable findings (Bhaskar, 2016).
The data was collected through a worldwide, web-based
questionnaire. Subsequent data analysis controlled for influences
by demographic parameters, project specifics, and the level of
projectification of the organization (in the sense of Midler, 1995).
The questionnaire was newly developed, based on the tool by
Müller et al. (2016b).
We chose a contingency theory perspective (Donaldson,
2001), and used existing studies to define governance as structural
context (i.e. contingency variable), which may influence the
relationship between governmentality and success.
We developed scales for existing governance and govern-
mentality concepts, based on general management literature and
earlier studies. This extends the predominantly normative results of
earlier studies into a relativistic perspective, which provides
academics with new avenues for theory development. Practitioners
benefit from the identification of potential success factors and the
identification of profiles of governance and governmentality at
different levels of project and organizational success.
The paper is structured the following way: the next section
reviews the most relevant literature, which is followed by the
study's methodology, data analysis, and discussion. The paper
finishes with conclusions and answers to the research questions,
and the Appendix A provides the questionnaire.
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
2. Literature review
We found only one existing framework that integrates and
assesses governance and governmentality for projects and uses
a majority of dimensions that relate to the corporate governance
and governmentality literature. Hence, a framework that allows
to connect project governance level theory development to
governance theories of the project's parent organization. This
framework, developed by Müller et al. (2016b) is based on
eight qualitative case studies in Europe and Asia, and structured
into three main categories: Governmentality, governance, and
projectification. Governmentality is assessed along the dimen-
sions of approach and precept. Approach refers to authoritative,
liberal or neo-liberal governmentality (as described by Dean,
2010). Precept was a newly identified dimension that reflects
the dominant theme in the interaction between governors (such
as steering committees) and their project managers. It measures
the preference of governors for their managers to either “follow
the process”, maximize the project's wellbeing (in terms of both
short and long term results), or the adherence to corporate
values. Governance includes the dimensions for sovereignty
of projects, the preferred governance mechanisms and the
number of governance institutions. A control variable in form
of projectification indicates possible differences in approaches
based on the level project management thinking that pervades
the organization (in the sense of Midler, 1995).
2.1. Governmentality
Governmentality (the combination of the words governance
and mentality) was invented by the French semiologist Roland
Barthes (2013) in 1957, by conceptualizing the way governing
organizations (such as governments) present themselves to the
public. This presentation reveals the rational and attitudes of
governors and sets the ‘tone’ between the members in a society,
as well as between governors and governed individuals (Dean,
2010). The concept became popular twenty years later through
the French philosopher Michel Foucault, who used the concept
in a narrower sense in his studies on power. We apply the term
in its original (i.e. Barthes') scope, of which power is only one
of many different contexts for related investigations.
Nowadays the literature distinguishes between authoritarian,
liberal and neoliberal rationalities or approaches in govern-
mentality (e.g. Dean, 2010).
Authoritarian approaches assume reconcilability of the various
governance principles (Burchell, 1991), expressed through
centralized decision making, clearness of directions, and signif-
icant power distance, which “seek[s] to operate through obedient
rather than free subjects, or, at a minimum, endeavor to neutralize
any opposition to authority” (Dean, 2010, p155). In projects, this
is typical for major public investment projects where process
compliance is enforced within rigid governance structures (Miller
and Hobbs, 2005).
Liberal approaches emphasize the heterogeneity and incom-
patibility of different governance approaches (Burchell, 1991),
and are expressed, for example, through use of economic
principles and market awareness to drive rationalistic decision
 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
making (Dean, 2010). In projects, this is expressed in
governors emphasizing outcome control, with clearly defined,
but when needed flexible governance structures, typical for
customer delivery projects (Dinsmore and Rocha, 2012). Both
authoritarian and liberal approaches operate through interac-
tion of governors (e.g. steering committees) with individuals
(e.g. project managers), thus are direct person-to-person ap-
proaches to governmentality.
Neoliberal governmentality differs from that by influencing the
societal context of individuals in order to steer their behaviors
(Lemke, 2001). By addressing people's collective interests and
their willingness to consent, it indirectly steers people by setting the
criteria for their decision-making through their societal context.
Through people's collective interest and their voluntary obeying to
these contextual frameworks, their behavior is shaped, but not
necessarily determined (Clegg et al., 2002). It is typical for projects
that foster self-control within rudimentary governance structures,
such as community-governed open source development projects
(Franck and Jungwirth, 2003). Neoliberal governmentality works
indirectly between governor and governed.
Governmentality precept – this reflects the preference that
governors have toward the way a project should be managed.
Precepts are:
• Organizational values: governors prioritize organizational
values in their governmentality and subordinate processes or
results to it. Examples include project owners prioritizing the
accomplishment of core organizational values - like continu-
ous learning, individual wellbeing, or individual's engage-
ment - over short term profit objectives or process compliance.
• Process: governors prioritize process compliance, such as
following the project management methodology. This is
typical for projects in high-risk industries, such as for airline
pilots or firefighters.
• Project wellbeing: governors prioritize the project in terms of
its viability, success of its deliverables, and the importance of
the deliverables for the organization or its stakeholders. Process
compliance and organizational values are subordinated to short
and long-term project results.
Any precept can appear in any governance approach, thus they
are independent of governance approaches. However, one of them
typically dominates the other two in the governors understanding
of how the project manager is supposed to execute tasks.
These above listed dimensions for governmentality are used
in this study.
2.2. Governance
Müller et al. (2016b) followed Biesenthal and Wilden (2014)
and used corporate and country level governance concepts that
reach through to the project level. Following Dean (2010) they
used:
Sovereignty – which refers to supreme power or authority. It is
one of the most basic principles in governance and addresses
the rights for autonomy, mutual recognition and control
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
3
(Krasner, 2001). In the realm of projects it refers to the right
for autonomy of standalone projects, and mutual recognition
of projects within the organization, as well as mutual control,
for example through resource sharing (Müller et al., 2016b).
This applies similarly to program and portfolio governance.
Sovereignty overlaps partly with the concept of project
autonomy (e.g. Gemünden et al., 2005). However, including
mutual recognition and external control makes it wider in
scope.
Governance mechanisms – addresses the use of control and
trust as mechanisms to execute governance. Influential work,
like the Cadbury report (1992) or textbooks, (e.g. Larcker and
Tayan, 2011) emphasize the importance of formal control
mechanisms to reduce the risk of hazards (Williamson, 1991).
Others emphasize the importance of trust and relationships to
govern organizations (Davis et al., 1997; Poppo and Zenger,
2002). The relationship between trust and control is complex
and non-linear (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). The OECD
(2004) definition of governance implies an irreducibility of
governance mechanisms to neither trust nor control alone.
Following this, we assume that both control and trust are
present at any stages of a project, but one of them dominates as
a governance mechanism, as shown in Poppo and Zenger's
(2002) model of control and trust as the endpoints of a
continuum, where governance prioritizes one of the two
alternatives.
Institutions – refers to the number of governance institutions
like steering groups, project management offices (PMOs),
quality committees, program and portfolio management.
Each of them fulfills its particular role in governance.
However, every additional governance institution increases
the complexity in overall governance due to the difficulties
in reconciling and coordinating the different governance
approaches of these institutions, hence poses a further
agency problem to the project, because of the need to agree
and maintain performance in line with the terms of reference
under which each of those institutions engages (Dixit, 2009).
This becomes evident in organizations that establish many
PMOs (Aubry et al., 2012) or are in industries that are
strongly controlled, such as the pharmaceutical or healthcare
industry with their various governance bodies. The number
of governance institutions for a project is used to assess the
complexity of governance.
These governance dimensions are also used in the present
study.
2.3. Projectification
In line with the underlying model we use the level of
projectification as a control variable during the analysis.
Projectification is the extent to which an organization uses
projects and their management as an underlying principle
to conduct their work. Midler (1995) and Lundin et al. (2015)
describe it as an organizational transition process from process
to project orientation. Literature on the measurement of
4 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
projectification is rare and we adopt the dimensions described
in the methodology section.
The literature indicates a gap in the knowledge about the
context contingency of the dimensions for governmentality,
governance and projectification. This study will address this
gap.
2.4. The relationship between governmentality and success
Governmentality is a relatively new concept in project
management and very little research investigates its impact on
project success. Clegg et al. (2002) brought governmentality into
the realm of projects by describing the particular approach used at
the Sydney Olympics as a successful project. Recently Simard and
Aubry (2016) found qualitatively traces of a relationship between
governmentality and success, but did not specify it further. A
global quantitative study by Müller et al. (2016a) showed a
significant correlation between governmentality as an enabler for
project governance and a) the acceptance of governance structures
by project managers, and b) organizational success. The present
study differs from that by not measuring governmentality as a
timely antecedent for the development of governance structures.
Instead, we concentrate on the governmentality during project
execution, thus we measure authoritarian, neoliberal and precept,
which differs from the measures in the Müller, Shao and Pemsel
study. However, we adapt the notion of a direct relationship and
hypothesize:
Hypothesis H1. There is a positive relationship between
governmentality and project success.
The link between organizational success and governmentality
in the public sector was shown, for example, by Renou (2015)
who emphasized the importance of governmentality for
successful water utilities in France, and Collier (2007) who
identified governmentality, sovereignty and discipline as the
three critical success factors for performance in the police.
This was complemented through studies in the private sector
with organizations like IBM and consulting firms showing
the importance of governmentality for global supply chains
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). We transcend these results from
studies in functional/permanent organizations, to the realm of
projects.
Hypothesis H2. There is a positive relationship between
governmentality and organizational success.
2.5. The relationship between governance and success
Corporate governance studies on the relationship between
good governance and performance or success show mixed results.
The OECD describes it as exceedingly difficult to establish
empirical evidence of such a relation (Clarke, 2007).
Related studies at the project level are somewhat clearer.
Qualitative studies, support the notion of this relationship,
whereby Bekker and Steyn's (2008) Delphi study with an expert
group supports the importance of governance of projects for
success, and Joslin and Müller's (2016a) study the importance of
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
project governance through project methodologies, for project
success.
Quantitative studies are more nuanced. Project governance
(i.e. project methodologies) accounts for 22% of project
success, and the shareholder versus stakeholder orientation
of the organization (i.e. a governance of projects dimension)
explains about 6% of project success (Joslin and Müller,
2016b). Other quantitative studies focused on the phenomenon
in particular project types, like enterprise resource planning
(ERP) projects. Here Badewi and Shehab (2016) showed that
institutional routines and benefits management support project
success, thus effectively shifting large proportions of the
responsibility for project results away from project manage-
ment and into the governance structure. Wang and Chen (2006)
showed how the balance of four governance elements (explicit
contracts, implicit contracts, reputation, and trust) mediates the
relationship between project hazards and project success. Many
corporate level studies perceive governance as contextual
structures and therefore define it as a moderator variable (e.g.
Narayanan and Narasimhan, 2014). These studies frequently
show a moderating effect of governance on the relationship
between different measures of organizational performance and,
for example, flexibility and human capital (Narayanan and
Narasimhan, 2014), environmental performance (Kock and
Santaló, 2005), or market turbulence (Pan et al., 2015). We
address research question 2 by hypothesizing a similar moder-
ating role of governance between the governance of projects
dimensions and project success, using the earlier identified
dimensions of sovereignty, governance mechanism, and number
of governance institutions:
Hypothesis H3. Governance of projects moderates the relation-
ship between governmentality and project success.
Little research is done on the relationship between governance
of projects and organizational success. The traditional view is that
project success leads to organizational success (Kaplan and
Norton, 1995). Empirical studies for that include those by Pollack
and Adler (2015) who found that profitability of small to medium
enterprises is significantly driven by projects and their results.
Based on that we hypothesize that the moderating effect
hypothesized in H3 for each project, will be accumulated at the
organizational level for the totality of projects.
Hypothesis H4. Governance of projects moderates the rela-
tionship between governmentality and organizational success
2.6. Contingency theory as theoretical perspective
Contingency theory claims that organizational performance
results from fitting characteristics of the organization to contin-
gencies that reflect the situation of the organization (Donaldson,
2001). This makes it an appropriate lens for this study. The
governmentality approach chosen is hereby seen as a character-
istic and the governance structure as a contingency variable.
Early version of contingency theory proposed that context shapes
organizational characteristics, (Donaldson, 1985). More recent
 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
versions emphasize reflexivity through interaction between context
and organizational characteristics, which allows readjustment of
organizational characteristics to changes in context, for the benefit
of organizational performance (Donaldson, 2001). In studying
organizational phenomena from the latter perspective, researchers
“implicitly treat organizations as loosely coupled aggregates whose
separate components may be adjusted or fine-tuned incrementally
once weak constraints have been overcome” (Meyer, Tsui, &
Hinings, 1993, p1177). The interaction between these components
(in this study: governmentality, governance and success) is
typically investigated using moderator models and related analysis
techniques (Drazin and van de Ven, 1985), such as hierarchical
regression analysis.
3. Methodology
Our research design followed the design process suggested by
Saunders et al. (2007). We chose critical realism as underlying
philosophy, which assumes the existence of a mind-independent
reality, in which the empirically observable part of a phenomenon
is investigated for its causal events and the mechanisms that
underlie the emergence of these events (Bhaskar, 2016). Hence,
we assume that similar empirical phenomena can be caused by
different underlying events and mechanisms, which allows
identification of trends, but not automatically generalization of
results.
A deductive approach was chosen, testing hypotheses with data
collected through a worldwide, web-based questionnaire. This
was distributed in a snowball sampling approach to professional
organizations for project managers (such as Project Management
Institute, International Project Management Association) and to
the researchers existing networks with practitioners known from
earlier studies.
3.1. Measurement constructs
The Appendix A lists the assessed constructs, the measures,
and the related questionnaire items.
Governmentality was operationalized along the findings from
the underlying study. Authoritarian to liberal approaches were
measured through two sets of questions, which were combined in
the subsequent factor analysis. Precepts was measured through
three questions on the relative importance of values, process and
projects. All these constructs were measured on five point Likert
scales from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
Following Müller et al. (2016b) sovereignty was operational-
ized as the totality of the role that the project manager is granted
by the governance system. We distinguished between project
manager roles of employee, manager or entrepreneur. As
employee the governance system expects the project manager to
fulfill tasks in a merely prescribed manner (e.g. process
compliance), like in some public investment projects (Klakegg
and Haavaldsen, 2011). As manager the system grants some
level of decision-making authority to the project manager, in
expectation of a merely risk averse behavior (Amihud and Lev,
1981). This implies professional and predictable decisions
making heuristics (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). An entrepreneur
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
5
is granted a wider scope of tolerated behavior, including risk
taking behavior and rugged individuals (McGrath et al., 1992). It
assumes that the project manager is responsible for the project in
its entirety as a business and free to decide on behalf of the project
as long as it stays within the limitations set by the governing
bodies. In summary, we assess the project manager's represen-
tativeness of the project in relation to its context, including the
related internal control and external autonomy granted to this role
by the governance system, as a proxy to measure sovereignty.
These dimensions were measured on a five point Likert scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
Governance mechanisms were measured using an existing five
dimensional construct from Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014), which
uses five point semantic differential scales (a form of Likert
scales). Lower levels are indicative of a preference for control, and
higher levels of a preference for trust as a governance mechanism.
We measured institutions in project governance from low
(0 or 1 institutions, such as a steering group), medium (2 or 3
institutions) and high (more than 3 institutions). Projectification
is a broad concept. We operationalized the dimensions from
Müller et al. (2016b), which were based on Midler (1995), on five
point Likert scale from very low to very high.
Success was measured separately for project level and
organizational level. To balance the hard (objective) and soft
(subjective) measurement dimensions we used the construct
developed by Blomquist and Müller (2006) for their governance
studies, using 5 point Likert scales from Not at All to Very much. It
assesses on the project level achievement of the triple constraints,
business objectives and customer satisfaction. At the organiza-
tional level, it assesses the accomplishment of last year's annual
plan, customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction.
Demographics included questions on the respondent's country,
experience, sector, employees in organization, and budget of the
project. Respondents were asked to answer the question in respect
of their last finished project.
The survey yielded 125 responses, of which four were empty
submission, leading to 121 usable responses. Table 1 shows the
demographics. ANOVA tests showed no differences in answers
between project managers and other roles. Therefore, all answers
were used for analysis.
3.2. Validity and reliability
Validity of the data was ensured by using constructs that were
either used and tested before, or developed from the most often
cited publications in the subject area. A pilot test with 10
respondents from academia and industry was done to test
face-validity. Minor misspellings were corrected after the pilot,
which allowed using the pilot data in the final sample.
Quantitative tests for validity included item-to-item and item-to-
total correlations. Reliability was tested using Cronbach Alpha
tests (Cronbach, 1951).
Data for both independent and dependent variables were
collected from the same informants, thus we took precautions to
avoid the risk of Common Methods Bias (CMB). These followed
Podsakoff and Organ (1986) and included reminders on
anonymity of the data, that there are no right or wrong answers,
6 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx

Table 1 4. Analysis
Sample demographics and their categories.
Fequency Percent Category We tested the data for missing values, eligibility for the
Country analysis techniques, used factor analysis to validate the constructs
The Netherlands 34 28.1 outlined above, and hierarchical regression analysis (HRA) to test
Other countries 20 16.5 the moderator model. The results of the HRA were interpreted
Sweden 15 12.4
following Sharma et al. (1981). The interpretation of significance
USA 11 9.1
Canada 8 6.6 values followed Aguinis et al. (2010) with 0.10 being “marginally
Australia/NZ 7 5.8 significant”, 0.05 “significant”, and 0.01 “highly significant”.
China 5 4.1 Missing values were not of concern (below the 15% mark) and
Germany 5 4.1 skewness and kurtosis ± 2 indicated normality (Hair et al., 2010).
Norway/Finland 5 4.1
Scales sizes were harmonized by using categories for measures
Global workers 4 3.3
Middle/South America 3 2.5 of number of employees, budget size and years of experience
Total 117 96.7 (Table 1). Dummy variables were created for each industry
Missing 4 3.3 category, for use as control variables in subsequent regressions.
Sample total 121 100.0 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the constructs. ANOVA
Experience tests by demographic variables showed no significant differences
Up to 5 years 14 11.6 1 by demographics.
6 to 10 years 20 16.5 2
11 to 20 years 48 39.7 3 4.1. Factor analysis
More than 20 years 35 28.9 4
Total 118 97.5
Missing 4 3.2 Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation resulted
Sample total 121 100.0 in eight factors (KMO 0.749, p = 0.000) and explained 68% of
the variance. Six factors had acceptable reliability (i.e. Cronbach
Project budget
Up to M€ 0.5 31 25.6 1 Alpha ≥ 0.6), and were used to replace the original questionnaire
M€ 0.5–5.0 37 30.6 2 items in further analyses. Item-to-total and item-to-item correla-
M€ 5–50 28 23.1 3 tions generally met or exceeded the respective validity threshold
More than M€ 50 12 9.9 4 of 0.5 and 0.3. The question on “Steering Committee acts
Total 108 89.3
authoritarian” compromised the thresholds slightly. However,
Missing 13 10.7
Sample total 121 100.0 deleting the question would have compromised reliability. We
prioritized reliability over the minor deviation from threshold and
Industry/Sector found it important from a logical perspective to keep the item in
IT/Telecom 31 25.6 1
Engineering 16 13.2 2
the analysis. The factor loadings and Cronbach measures are
Other 22 18.2 3 shown in Table 3, the related question items are shown in the
Oil and gas 13 10.7 4 Appendix A.
Finance 8 6.6 5 The questionnaire items for project success and organiza-
Utility 8 6.6 6 tional success all loaded highly on their respective factor (KMO
Consulting 7 5.8 7
Healthcare 7 5.8 8
0.757, p = 0.000), thus confirmed the construct. Success was
Total 112 92.6 measured as the mean of the related question items.
Missing 9 7.4 The factor solution mirrors the theoretically derived
Sample total 121 100.0 concepts from the underlying study. Minor deviations were
Employees in org. expected when moving from qualitatively developed scales to
Up to 50 10 8.3 1 quantitative measures of dimensions. One difference found was
51–250 5 4.1 2 in the questions on liberal governmentality. Of the three
251–1000 16 13.2 3 questions, one loaded on the factor for authoritarian, one on the
1000–10,000 44 36.4 4
factor for neoliberalism, and the third did not load sufficiently
10,001–50,000 15 12.4 5
50,001–100,000 5 4.1 6 high on any factor. As the factors are orthogonal, it indicates
More than 100,000 20 16.5 7 a clear distinction between direct governmentality of people
Total 115 95.0 (i.e. the authoritarian factor) and indirect governmentality
Missing 6 5.0 through neoliberal approaches to set the context for people's
Sample total 121 100.0
self-governance. It indicates a dominance of the difference
between direct (i.e. authoritarian) and indirect (i.e. neoliberal)
that answers should be related to the last finished project. Related governmentality quantitatively over other differences, such as
post-hoc tests included the Harman test, which showed 12 liberal and authoritarian governmentality. This is an important
factors, with the first one accounting for 21% of the variance, finding, which does not compromise the concept of the underlying
followed by 13%, 7%, 6%, 5% and smaller. No single factor tool, but refines it in terms of the importance of direct versus
dominated the test, thus no indication of CMB. indirect governmentality.

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx 7

Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. error Statistic Std. error
Experience 117 1.000 4.000 2.889 0.972 − 0.576 0.224 − 0.595 0.444
Company size 115 1.000 7.000 4.252 1.711 0.026 0.226 − 0.406 0.447
Project budget 108 1.000 4.000 2.194 0.981 0.325 0.233 − 0.923 0.461
Projectification 109 − 2.272 2.103 0.000 1.000 − 0.202 0.231 − 0.679 0.459
IT_Telecom 118 0.000 1.000 0.263 0.442 1.092 0.223 − 0.821 0.442
Engineering 121 0.000 1.000 0.132 0.340 2.199 0.220 2.882 0.437
Other 121 0.000 1.000 0.182 0.387 1.671 0.220 0.804 0.437
Oil_Gas 121 0.000 1.000 0.107 0.311 2.567 0.220 4.668 0.437
Finance 121 0.000 1.000 0.066 0.250 3.536 0.220 10.681 0.437
Utility 121 0.000 1.000 0.066 0.250 3.536 0.220 10.681 0.437
Consulting 121 0.000 1.000 0.058 0.234 3.835 0.220 12.924 0.437
Healthcare 121 0.000 1.000 0.058 0.234 3.835 0.220 12.924 0.437
Authoritarian gvty 109 − 2.824 2.302 0.000 1.000 − 0.043 0.231 − 0.258 0.459
Neoliberal gvty 109 − 2.490 2.321 0.000 1.000 − 0.214 0.231 − 0.256 0.459
Gvty precept 109 − 2.743 2.746 0.000 1.000 0.236 0.231 − 0.191 0.459
Sovereignty 109 − 2.846 1.758 0.000 1.000 − 0.630 0.231 − 0.090 0.459
Gov mechanism 109 − 2.448 2.801 0.000 1.000 − 0.175 0.231 − 0.334 0.459
# of institutions 98 1.000 6.000 2.735 1.248 0.715 0.244 0.348 0.483
Project success 115 1.667 5.000 4.214 0.834 − 0.972 0.226 0.198 0.447
Organizational success 114 1.000 5.000 3.662 0.965 − 0.657 0.226 − 0.120 0.449
Valid N (listwise) 73

A few questionnaire items did not clearly load on one individual
factor. However, all expected constructs were clearly represented
through the factor analysis.
The correlations are shown in Table 4. It indicates significant
correlations, such as the increase of authoritarian and decrease of
neoliberal governmentality with increasing company size, which
reflects earlier findings, like those by Miller and Hobbs (2005) or
Klakegg and Haavaldsen (2011). In respect of research question
RQ2 it shows the correlation of project success and the level of
authoritarian and neoliberal governmentality, as well as the
relationship between organizational success and authoritarian
governmentality. This is further elaborated in later sections. Even

Table 3
Rotated factor and reliability analysis.
Component
Gov mechanisms Projectification Sovereignty Neoliberal gvty Authoritarian gvty Precept Not valid Not valid
Cronbach Alpha .824 .837 .718 .619 .813 .642 N/A N/A
Q20 .759
Q18 .719
Q19 .716
Q21 .700
Q22 .697
Q27 .894
Q26 .853
Q24 .825
Q25 .641
Q17 .724
Q16 .683
Q13 .649
Q15 .612
Q9 .715
Q8 .591
Q3 -.546
Q7 .502
Q1 .856
Q2 .686
Q10 .727
Q12 .570
Q4 .539
Q11 .865
Q5 .756

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8 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx

.531 ⁎⁎
mechanisms institutions success
Project
though it is not within the scope of the present study, Table 4
shows that project level success and organizational success are
significantly correlated. Assuming a causality from project level to

−.027
−.001
organizational level success, it indicates that 28% of organiza-
# of

tional success can be traced back to project success.

−.292 ⁎⁎

−.050
4.2. Hierarchical regression analyses

.053
Sovereignty Gov

Two separate path models were tested. The first model tested
the correlation of the independent variables governmentality with

.000
.035
.157
.147
dependent variable project success and its moderation through
governance (Table 5, left side). The second model tested the same
precept

−.036
Finance Utility Consulting Healthcare Authoritarian Neoliberal Gvty

.000
.000
.000
.156
independent and moderator variables in relation to organizational
success (Table 5, right side). The factors for authoritarian,
.275 ⁎⁎
neoliberal, and precept were entered as the dimensions for the
−.077
.000
.000
.000

.162
gvty

governmentality variable, and sovereignty, mechanisms, and

institutions as those of governance. To avoid nuisance effects we
controlled for the level of projectification, and demographics like
.328 ⁎⁎
.315 ⁎⁎
.000
.000
.000
.000
.014
gvty

the respondent's years of experience, size of the company, budget

of the project. To control for effects by industry, we created
dummy variables for each industry. Multicollinearity was not
−.074
−.069

−.172

−.022
.052

.021

.091

.153

assumed to be an issue, as all VIF measures in all regressions

were below the threshold of 5. Missing values were replaced by
means.
−.061
−.006

−.088
.078

.097
.096
.044
.065
.105

The regression analysis followed Sharma et al.'s (1981)

process:
−.066
−.066
−.139

−.051
−.031

−.154
.098

.093
.089
.039

i. Test for significant interaction between moderator and

−.071
−.066
−.066
−.148
−.031
−.087

−.165
−.081
−.029
−.177
.046

independent variable (step 4). If significant proceed to ii,

otherwise to iii.
−.092
−.092
−.086
−.086

−.013
−.055

−.146

−.065
Oil &

.071

.048

.030

.050
Gas

ii. If the moderator is related to the independent variable it is a

“quasi moderator” (i.e. a mix of antecedent and moderator
−.164
−.125
−.125
−.117
−.117

−.047

−.080
Experience Company Project Projectification IT_Telecom Engineering Other

.078

.079
.082
.040
.047
.007

variable), if not, it is a “pure moderator”, which influences

the form of the relationship between independent and
dependent variable.
−.184 ⁎
−.135
−.104
−.104
−.097
−.097
−.086
−.043

−.065
−.055
−.020
−.003
−.016
.057

iii. If the moderator correlates significantly with the independent

or dependent variable it is not a moderator, but a possible
antecedent variable. If not, it is a potential homologizer,
−.236 ⁎⁎
−.286 ⁎⁎
−.210 ⁎
−.161
−.161
−.150
−.150

−.046

−.183

which is tested in iv
.107
.091
.134

.173

.108
.180

iv. The sample is split on the basis of the hypothesized

moderator, using its median. The sub groups are tested
−.409 ⁎⁎

for significant differences in predictive validity. If the

⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
⁎⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
.254 ⁎⁎

.514 ⁎⁎
.215 ⁎
−.176
−.089

R-square values of the subgroups differ significantly it is a

.185

.073

.082
.153
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.019

homologizer, which influences the strength of the relation-

budget

−.069

−.049

−.040

−.090

−.002

−.034
−.148
−.165

ship between independent and dependent variable. Other-

.001

.013

.016
.159
.025

.032

.002
.003
.100

wise it is not a moderator.

−.251 ⁎⁎

−.216 ⁎
.308 ⁎⁎
−.058

−.096

−.040
−.061
−.059

−.006
.153
.060
.058

.028

.090
.190

.128
.006

.036
size

Two types of robustness tests were done at step 3. First we

repeated the analyses leading up to step 3 five times, each times
using a random sub-sample of a size that ensured 15 observations
−.241 ⁎
−.001

−.131
−.009

−.039
−.039

−.008

−.072
−.127

−.063

−.029
.032

.033
.012

.103

.037

.058

.013
.106

per (in)dependent variable. The mean values of these five rounds of

resampling are shown in the column robustness test in Table 5. The
Organizational success

results confirm those of the full sample, except for Sovereignty,

Authoritarian gvty

Gov mechanisms

which tended to be close to, but not always meeting significance.

# of institutions
Correlations.

Neoliberal gvty

Project success
Projectification
Project budget
Company size

Gvty precept
IT_Telecom
Engineering

Sovereignty
Consulting
Healthcare

Second, we performed the regressions separately for governance

Oil & Gas
Table 4

Finance
Utility

and governmentality. Both test confirmed the results of the original

Other

regression.

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dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx 9

Table 5
Hierarchical regression models.
Variables entered Dependent variable: Project success Dependent variable: Organizational success
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Robustness Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Robustness
test test
Control variables
Experience (years in managing projects) 0.100 0.111 0.105 0.091 0.073 − 0.067 − 0.080 − 0.095 − 0.102 − 0.077
Size of company (in employees) − 0.026 − 0.053 − 0.047 − 0.090 − 0.072 − 0.045 − 0.058 − 0.074 − 0.033 − 0.096
Size of project (budget) − 0.129 − 0.141 − 0.145 () − 0.148 − 0.138 − 0.120 − 0.134 () − 0.134 () − 0.139 () − 0.150
Projectification 0.236 ⁎ 0.257 ⁎⁎ 0.251 ⁎⁎ 0.247 ⁎ 0.238 ⁎ 0.506 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.519 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.519 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.541 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.493 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
Industry dummy variables:
IT-Telecom 0.325 0.190 0.161 0.120 0.243 0.174 0.110 0.081 0.079 0.112
Engineering & construction 0.149 0.113 0.102 0.104 0.144 − 0.035 − 0.037 − 0.064 − 0.079 − 0.027
Other industries 0.310 0.224 0.190 0.116 0.223 0.195 0.159 0.116 0.090 0.158
Oil & gas 0.111 0.045 0.026 0.007 0.065 0.091 0.047 0.003 ⁎ 0.013 0.014
Finance 0.166 0.194 0.181 0.156 0.207 − 0.019 0.002 − 0.040 − 0.020 − 0.008
Utility 0.224 0.213 () 0.197 () 0.182 0.219 () − 0.027 − 0.024 − 0.037 − 0.024 − 0.025
Consulting 0.168 0.122 0.094 0.079 0.125 0.116 0.087 0.061 0.047 0.079
Healthcare 0.082 0.049 0.039 0.035 0.085 0.132 0.105 0.070 0.051 0.065

Independent variables
Governmentality:
Authoritarian governmentality 0.353 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.354 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.367 (),⁎ 0.359 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.287 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.291 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.419 ⁎ 0.342 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
Neoliberal governmentality 0.239 ⁎⁎ 0.243 ⁎⁎ 0.390 () 0.259 ⁎⁎ 0.138 () 0.130 () 0.489 ⁎ 0.171
Governmentality precept 0.166 ⁎ 0.166 ⁎ − 0.006 0.150 − 0.046 − 0.048 − 0.168 − 0.085

Moderator variables
Governance:
Sovereignty 0.132 0.178 ⁎ 0.165 () 0.134() 0.171 ⁎ 0.122
Governance mechanisms 0.048 0.014 0.070 − 0.078 − 0.085 − 0.061
Number of governance institutions 0.006 0.023 0.030 − 0.011 − 0.004 − 0.001

Interaction terms
Authoritarian × Sovereignty − 0.086 0.018
Authoritarian × Mechanisms 0.121 − 0.028
Authoritarian × Institutions 0.027 − 0.093
Neoliberal × Sovereignty − 0.083 0.019
Neoliberal × Mechanisms − 0.059 − 0.025
Neoliberal × Institutions − 0.221 − 0.393 ⁎
Precept × Sovereignty 0.018 0.043
Precept × Mechanisms − 0.063 − 0.101
Precept × Institutions 0.203 0.092
F for regression 1.200 3.166 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 2.795 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 2.112 ⁎⁎⁎ 2.560 ⁎⁎⁎ 4.343 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 5.138 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 4.539 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 3.355 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
F for change 1.200 9.849 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.959 0.830 4.545 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 4.343 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 5.936 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 1.314 0.992 0.005 ⁎⁎⁎
R-square 0.118 0.311 0.330 0.380 0.326 0.423 0.445 0.493
Adj. R-square 0.020 0.213 0.212 0.200 0.226 0.251 0.341 0.347 0.346 0.368
N = 121.
Main Table standard coefficients beta.
()
p ≤ 0.1.
(),*
= 0.055.
⁎ p ≤ 0.05.
⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.005.
⁎⁎⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.001.

4.3. Moderation model for project success
Table 5, left side, shows the results for project success. Step 1
shows the results after entering the control variables, step 2 after
adding the independent variables, step three after adding the
moderator variables, and step 4 after adding the interaction terms
of independent and moderator variables. The model is significant
with an Adjusted R-square of 21% (p = 0.000). Step 2 shows a
significant main effect, which is the correlation between all three
dimensions of governmentality and project success. This
supports Hypothesis H1. The relative weight of each dimension
(i.e. the standardized Beta coefficient) indicates authoritarian
governmentality as strongest correlated with project success,
followed by neoliberal governmentality and precept.
The insignificant results for moderators (step 3) and
interaction terms (step 4) indicate possible homologizer variables.
The results of the homologizer test are shown in Table 6. Only
the R-square values of the subgroups for different levels of

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10 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx

Table 6 Insignificant correlations for moderators (step 3) and those for

Homologizer test. interaction variables (step 4) indicate possible homologizer
Potential Independent Project success Organizational success effects. Related tests (Table 6) did not support this. The marginal
moderator variable significance of neoliberal governmentality (step 3) and its
Moderator Moderator
group group significant interaction term with Number of Institutions (step 4),
Low High Low High indicates a pure moderator. The number of institutions influences
r r Z r r Z the form of the relationship between governmentality and
organizational success. Hypothesis H4 is partly supported: The
Sovereignty - Authoritative 0.699 0.542 1.180 0.720 0.731 −0.110
Sovereignty - Neoliberal 0.682 0.534 1.090 0.701 0.727 −0.240
relationship between neoliberal governmentality and organiza-
Sovereignty - Precept 0.664 0.531 0.960 0.698 0.699 − 0.010 tional success is moderated by the number of governance
n= 46 44 45 45 institutions. The relationship is shown in Fig. 3.
Mechanism - Authoritative 0.538 0.796 −2.220 ⁎ 0.640 0.764 − 1.130
Mechanism - Neoliberal 0.605 0.744 −1.180 0.642 0.756 − 1.030
Mechanism - Precept 0.548 0.680 − 0.980 0.617 0.734 −0.990
n= 47 43 48 42
4.5. Profiling of governance and governmentality
Institutions - Authoritative 0.750 0.699 0.440 0.732 0.762 −0.270
Institutions - Neoliberal 0.655 0.712 − 0.440 0.683 0.764 − 0.700 Mean values were calculated for each dimension at three
Institutions - Precept 0.634 0.706 − 0.540 0.686 0.746 − 0.510 levels of success. These were: the lowest third (low), the next
n= 36 38 35 39 higher third (medium), and the highest third (high) for both
⁎ p ≤ 0.05. project and organizational success. The profiles for project
success are shown in Fig. 1 and for organizational success in
Fig. 2, where the profiles of the lowest third in success are
governance mechanism vary significantly. Hence, governance shown as dotted line, those of the middle third as dashed line,
mechanism is a homologizer, which strengthens the relationship and the top third as solid line.
between authoritarian governmentality and project success when Fig. 1 shows that successful projects tend to be governed
trust is the dominant governance mechanism. This partly supports using measures on the right side and center of the tool, whereas
Hypothesis H3. those with low to medium levels of success tend to be governed
predominantly along the measures on the left side of the profiling
tool.
4.4. The moderation model for organizational success Projects with low to medium levels of success show ambiguity
in governmentality approaches, as both authoritarian and neoliberal
The right side of Table 5 shows he results with organiza- approaches are low. It indicates a lack of clarity in the ways the
tional success as dependent variable. The model is significant governors (e.g. the steering committee) want the project to be
(p = 0.000) with an Adjusted R-square of 35%. The main effect managed (i.e. it is neither communicated through directives
shows significant correlations of authoritarian and neoliberal nor through neoliberal “culture setting”). Approaches to
governmentality with organizational success (p = 0.000 and 0.10 governance vary considerably between low and high levels of
resp.), and no significant correlation with the precept variable. sovereignty, paired with a tendency to prioritize control as a
This partly supports Hypothesis H2. There is a positive governance mechanism. Projectification is low to medium in
relationship between governmentality and organizational success. these organizations.

Fig. 1. Governance profile of organizations at three levels of project success.

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
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 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
Fig. 2. Governance profile of organizations at three levels of organizational success.
Projects with high levels of success show clear governmentality
approaches, with both approaches, the direct (authoritative) and the
indirect (neoliberal) being highly expressed. The precept is in
average the project. The governance of successful projects sets
medium levels of sovereignty for projects, together with high
levels of trust as the related governance mechanism. The average
number of governance institutions does not vary by project
success. It is typically the steering committee, the owner/customer
of the project, and a PMO. Successful projects are found most
often in the context of highly projectified organizations.
Fig. 2 shows the average profile of organizations with low,
medium and high levels of success with their project-based part
of the organization. Similar to Fig. 1, it shows that organizations
with low to medium levels of success apply more ambiguous
approaches to governmentality, indicted through low to medium
levels of clarity in authoritarian and neoliberal governmentality.
Governance approaches vary considerably in these organizations
and are in part contradictory, for example by giving projects high
levels of sovereignty and then employing control as a governance
mechanism. As before, these organizations show low to medium
levels of projectification.
Highly successful organizations tend to apply governance
and governmentality approaches found on the right side of the
profiling tool. Clarity in governmentality is achieved with both
authoritarian and neoliberal approaches used in parallel, and a
precept of organizational values. The governance approaches of
these organizations include high levels of sovereignty, paired with
a balance between trust and control as governance mechanism and
two or three governance institutions. These organizations tend to
be highly projectized.
5. Discussion
This study is the first to model the relationship between
governance, governmentality, and success at project and organi-
zational level. Results show all governmentality dimensions being
correlated with project success, and authoritarian and neoliberal
governmentality with organizational success. Governance is the
structural context, within which governmentality is executed and
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
11
moderates governmentality's impact on success. This moderation
differs by level of success.
5.1. Moderator effects
Authoritarian governmentality's relationship with project
success is moderated by the governance mechanism, where
higher trust strengthens the relationship between authoritarian
governmentality and project success. The profiles in Fig. 1
confirm this by showing highest levels of both trust as
governance mechanism and authoritarian governmentality in
the most successful projects. Dyer and Chu (2003) study
supports this in the context of general management and Müller
et al. (2013) in project management. Both studies showed that
increasing trust associates with decreasing control efforts and
improved task/project efficiency. Contingency theory suggests
that a “fit” between context and organizational characteristics
leads to higher performance. For this study, it translates into
trust and authoritarian (direct and clear) governmentality
influencing each other to find their “fit” in form of an
equilibrium in relation to the success of the project. Earlier
studies support that by showing that successful projects are
characterized by clearness in interaction between project
sponsor and manager (Turner and Müller, 2004), which
associates with higher levels of authoritarian governmentality,
and as well as trustful project environments fostering mutual
respect and openness in interaction between governance
institutions and projects (Müller et al., 2013).
Neoliberal governmentality's relationship with organizational
success is moderated by the number of governance institutions,
where the latter influences the form of the relationship. This effect
is shown in Fig. 3. In the context of few governance institutions (0
to 2) neoliberal governmentality and organizational success are in
a positive linear relationship. In case of three or more institutions
(labeled high), organizations start at a higher level of success, but
the increase of organizational success along with increases in
neoliberal governmentality is marginal. This is further discussed
under theoretical implications.
12 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx
Fig. 3. Interaction effect of neoliberal governmentality by governance complexity on
organizational success.
5.2. Profiles
The study provides profiles for governance and governmentality
practices at different levels of project and organizational success.
Successful projects and organizations show clear governmentality
approaches, with both approaches, the direct (authoritative) and
the indirect (neoliberal) being highly expressed. Intuitively this
may seem contradictory, as neoliberal contexts do not fit at first
sight to an authoritarian presence of governors. However, it
becomes clearer when seen from the perspective of clarity in
governmentality. Setting clear context criteria through neoliberal
approaches and complementing them with clear messages about
the expected ways projects should be managed reduces ambiguity
in governmentality. Studies that support these findings include
Turner and Müller (2004) finding that clarity in approach and
level of engagement of project sponsors are indicative of more
successful projects.
Moreover, the distinction between direct and indirect ap-
proaches allows for adjustment of governmentality to the particular
needs of projects, thus, flexibility in governance approaches. Just
as the adjustment of leadership styles to the particular leadership
situation marks a significant improvement in leadership success
(Müller and Turner, 2010), it is reasonable to assume that the
adjustment of governmentality approaches to governance situa-
tions will have a greater impact on governance success.
A comparison of Figs. 1 and 2 shows that successful practices
differ at project and organizational level. Highly successful projects
are governed using medium levels of sovereignty, which give a
certain level, but not complete freedom to the project and its
manager to act independent from the rest of the organization, plus
high levels of trust. Highly successful organizations allow for
high levels of sovereignty, while balancing trust and control.
Hence, governance of projects should provide for high levels of
sovereignty for groups of projects, such as programs or portfolios,
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
whereas project governance reduces the level of sovereignty within
these groups and increases trust instead.
6. Conclusion
This study tested two research models, which hypothesized
a relationship between governmentality and project success and
organizational success respectively, and a possible moderation
by governance. Moreover, the study developed profiles of
governance and governmentality approaches across different
levels of the two types of success.
Research question RQ1 asked for patterns in approaches.
Successful projects and project-based parts of organizations
tend to use homogeneous combinations of governance of
projects approaches, which are those found predominantly on
the right side and the center of Figs. 1 and 2. They show clarity
in governmentality approaches, both direct (authoritarian) as
well as indirect (neoliberal). Successful projects are character-
ized by a project precept, whereas successful organizations
prefer a values precept. In terms of governance the former
prefer medium level of sovereignty and institutions and high
levels of trust. The latter are characterized by high levels of
trust and medium level of institutions and a balance of control
and trust as governance mechanism.
Research question RQ2 asked for the relationship of the
dimensions of these patterns with success. Four hypotheses
were tested. All three governmentality dimensions correlate
with project success (H1 supported). Governance moderates
this relationship, with stronger relationships in cases of trust as
governance mechanism (partly support of H3). Authoritarian
and neoliberal governmentality correlate with organizational
success (partly support of H2). This relationship is moderated
by the number of governance institution (partly support of H4).
6.1. Theoretical implications
It is important to mention that the above study does not imply
causality in the sense that a particular governance or govern-
mentality approach will lead to better project and organizational
results. It is likely that governance and governmentality
approaches are adopted to the status of projects. Because of
that, the study focuses on correlation, not causation.
Implications from a contingency theory perspective are in the
support of the model that places governance as the structural
context for human interaction (through governmentality) with its
direct relationship with success. Governance and governmentality
interact, showing different interactions at different levels (high,
medium, low) and types of success (project or organizational). The
interaction is influenced by the governance mechanism applied,
where control weakens and trust strengthens the correlation be-
tween direct governmentality and project success, whereas the
number of governance institutions, which was used as a proxy to
measure governance complexity, influences the form of the rela-
tionship between neoliberal governmentality and organizational
success. Complex governance structures provide for stable
organizational success over different levels of neoliberal govern-
mentality, hence substitute potential influences from steering
 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx 13

committees on success. Simple governance structures allow for
stronger influence through the level of neoliberal governmentality
by the steering committee. In cases of very high levels of neoliberal
governmentality, simple structures (i.e. few governance institu-
tions) are associated with higher success levels than complex
structures.
The results support the appropriateness of contingency theory to
explain the relationship between governance, governmentality and
successful.
of causality (or other form of interaction) between success
and governmentally/governance, and b) the moderation effects
as they emerge in practice, thus, the situational context within
which the interaction between governance and governmentality
takes place. Jointly these studies lead the way for future
quantitative investigations that allow for generalization and
theory building.
6.4. Strengths and weaknesses

6.2. Managerial implications
The profiling tool serves practitioners in assessing their
organization's particular profile of governance and govern-
mentality and experiment with the dimensions and their scales
to find their own “best practice”. Practitioners in management
and governance roles will benefit from having the study's
results included in training and education programs to grow
awareness of the importance of governmentality as a potential
success factor in projects. This includes the importance of
establishing both direct and indirect governmentality simulta-
neously and in non-ambiguous ways.
6.3. Future research
The study's strength lies in the use of proven constructs
and dimensions from studies in general and project manage-
ment. The strong evidence found for the role of govern-
mentality further supports the validity of the findings. It is in
line with the ongoing discussion about the importance of soft
factors over hard factors in project management. Weaknesses
are in the relatively small sample size and the exploratory
nature of the study, which extends in several new areas, thus
needs further studies to validate and support the present
findings.
The study's contribution to knowledge lies in modeling,
theorizing, and clarifying the relationship between governance,
governmentality and success for a better understanding of
organizational practices and their consequences.

The study supports Clarke's (2007) notion that the relationship Conflict of interest
between governance and success is complex. Building on the
present results, qualitative studies can assess a) the direction The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A: Questionnaire

Concept Items
Governmentality In my project, the project governance institution…
Approach Gives clear directions. Q1
• Authoritarian Enforces their decisions. Q2
Is authoritative in style. Q3
• Liberal Emphasizes achievement of project objectives. Q4
Uses rational means to convince project managers. Q5
Flexibly adjusts organization structures to project needs. Q6
• Neoliberal Communicates values and fosters a culture that allows project manager/team to control themselves. Q7
Expects project manager and team to decide for themselves, based on the collective interest of the stakeholders in Q8
the project.
Rarely steers the project through directive orders. Q9
Precept Emphasizes achievement of organizational values, and to a lesser extent on project processes or time/cost/ Q10
• Organizational values quality results.
• Processes Emphasizes the need to follow the project process or methodology, and to a lesser extend organizational values or Q11
time/cost/quality results.
• Project well-being Emphasizes the viability and success of the project and the product/service it delivers, and to a lesser extend Q12
processes or time/cost/quality results.

Governance In my project, the project manager is…

Sovereignty …not allowed to negotiate with other projects, departments, or suppliers for the needed resources. Q13
• Low …expected to fulfill his or her role in a prescribed manner, for example, by mainly following a given processes. Q14
• Medium …expected to assume a certain level of decision making, such as for types of processes or resources to employ Q15
• High …expected to act entrepreneurial and apply a wide variety of risk taking behavior if it is for the benefit of the Q16
project.
…allowed to lend out resources to other projects when it is in the best interest of the wider organization. Q17
(continued on next page)

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, et al., 2017. Governance and governmentality in projects: Profiles and relationships with success, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
14 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management xx (2017) xxx–xxx

Table 7 (continued)
Appendix A (continued)
Concept
Governance mechanisms
• Balance between trust and control …a strong emphasis on always getting personnel to follow the formally laid down procedures … versus …a
Governance institutions
Projectification
Items
The governance philosophy in my project favors…
Q18
strong emphasis on getting things done even if it means disregarding formal procedures
…tight formal control of most operations by means of sophisticated control and information systems … versus Q19
…loose, informal control; heavy dependence on informal relationships and the norm of cooperation for getting
things done
…a strong emphasis on getting personnel to adhere closely to formal job descriptions … versus …a strong Q20
emphasis to let the requirements of the situation and the individual's personality define proper on-job behavior
… support institutions (like a PMO) emphasize tactical aspects, such as compliance with the organization's Q21
project management methodology … versus …support institutions (like a PMO) emphasize strategic aspects,
such as skills and knowledge development
…prioritization of methodology compliance over people's own experiences in doing their work … versus … Q22
prioritization of people's own experiences in doing their work over methodology compliance
Please list the institutions that are involved in the governance of your project. Q23
In my wider organization (such as the whole company)….
…the perceived importance of project management for achieving organizational objectives Q24
…in total, how well developed is the career system for project managers in terms of training and certification Q25
programs, career ladder, support for membership in professional organizations etc.
…to what extent is working-in-projects a business principle in your organization Q26
…to what extent prevails a project mindset and culture the organization Q27
What is the approximate percentage of revenue through projects Q28

Success My last project…

• Project level …was successful in terms of meeting overall time, cost and quality objectives Q29
…was successful in terms of outcomes achieving the intended (business) objectives Q30
…was successful in terms of customer satisfaction Q31
• Organizational level In my company, the project-based part of the organization …
…achieved last year's annual plan Q32
…achieved customer satisfaction objectives Q33
…achieved its employee satisfaction objectives Q34
Demographics Country, experience, sector, employees in organization, budget of the project in question Q35 to Q39

Acknowledgments
The authors thank the BI-Fudan Research Fund for their
financial support without which this study would not have been
possible.
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