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International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx – xxx
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Operationalizing governance categories of projects

Ralf Müller a,⁎, Laurence Lecoeuvre b
a
Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, Nydalsveien 37, 0484 Oslo, Norway
b
Department Project Management, SKEMA Business School, LSMRC, Lille Nord de France, Avenue Willy Brandt, 59777 Euralille, France

Received 14 October 2013; received in revised form 3 March 2014; accepted 8 April 2014

Abstract

This study operationalizes an existing concept for the categorization of governance approaches for projects. For that the concept's four
governance paradigms, based on the overlay of the shareholder–stakeholder orientation with the behavior–outcome control of a project's parent
organization are measured. The measurement dimensions were derived from the intersection of governance and organization theory with project
management theory, thereby addressing those areas of corporate governance and organizational control that extend into projects. The application of
the measurement construct, its validity and reliability are tested through a world-wide questionnaire with 478 responses. Analysis of the responses
shows the differences in governance structures for projects by country, project size, and project type. The results are important for managers
developing governance structures and academics developing governance theories.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Governance of projects; Modeling; Categorization

1. Introduction GoP theory include limitations in the comparison of specific

Governance defines project objectives, the ways the required
resources are obtained, and how progress is monitored. Thus,
governance makes a project viable and steers it along its life
cycle. (Müller, 2009; Turner, 2009).
Researchers have addressed Governance of Projects (GoP)
from different perspectives and found a variety of governance
approaches. However, little has been done to categorize
governance approaches. Studies modeling GoP are mainly
conceptual or case-based and relatively little has been done
quantitatively to develop related theories. This is in line with the
development of researchers' understanding of relatively new
management phenomena, which typically develops from nascent
to mature theories synchronous with the development from more
qualitative to more quantitative studies (Edmondson &
McManus, 2007). Examples for the relative immature stage of
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ralf.muller@bi.no (R. Müller),
laurence.lecoeuvre@skema.edu (L. Lecoeuvre).
governance structures, which are not possible on a larger scale
because of the qualitative and/or conceptual nature of the current
studies. The present study aims to overcome this limitation
through the development of a quantitative assessment for GoP
categories within organizations. Existing models of GoP do not a)
take into account corporate governance factors, such as
stakeholder and shareholder orientation, and their extension into
projects, and b) allow for categorization of GoP structures based
on quantitative assessments. The present paper addresses this gap
by operationalizing the established GoP model by Müller (2009)
which is based on point a) above and categorizes GoP approaches
along four different categories, named paradigms. The four
paradigms are based on an organization's governance orientation
being merely shareholder or stakeholder oriented and their
organizational control structures being merely behavior or
outcome oriented. This results in four discrete paradigms, as
shown in Table 1. The model has been used in several qualitative
studies before (e.g. Aubry et al., 2011, 2012; Joslin & Müller,
(under review); Müller et al., 2013). The present paper aims for a
quantitative operationalization of the model allowing for

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.04.005
0263-7863/00/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
2 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx
Table 1
Four governance paradigms.
Governance orientation
Stakeholder orientation Shareholder orientation
Outcome Flexible economist Versatile artist
Control focus
Behavior Conformist Agile pragmatist
comparisons, inferential quantitative assessments, and generaliz-
ability of results to wider populations in future studies.
The study is driven by the question: How can the four
paradigms model by Müller (2009) be operationalized for the
quantitative assessment and categorization of GoP approaches?
The Unit-of-Analysis is the structural dimension of gover-
nance at the organizational level. Underlying assumption is that
there is a variety of different project types that are executed
simultaneously in different parts of an organization, which may
or may not be governed differently. For that the study takes an
organizational perspective toward the operationalization.
The study uses existing literature to define and quantitative-
ly operationalize the dimensions for the assessment of the four
paradigms. Subsequently it validates the measurement tool and
shows its applicability through a world-wide survey, illustrat-
ing the differences in governance approaches by country,
industry and project size. These themes were selected because
of their popularity in GoP literature to investigate the most
rudimentary differences in the GoP.
The study is of value for both practitioners and academics by
providing a measurement model for categorizing GoP at the
organizational level. Through application of the model
practitioners can identify their particular governance paradigm
and, for example, apply the research results of earlier studies,
such as preparing for paradigm specific ethical issues and their
mitigation strategies (Müller et al., 2013), select the governance
structures of their Project Management Office (PMO) and
networks of PMOs (Aubry et al., 2011), or adjust the GoP
structure to increase the likelihood of project success (Joslin &
Müller, under review). For academics the study provides a basis
for assessing the link between corporate governance, GoP, and
projects to develop new theories which are generalizable to
wider populations.
The next section describes the governance in the realm of
projects, the GoP paradigm model and the development of the
measurement dimensions for the quantitative assessment. This
is followed by the methodological approach for the validation
study and its analysis and results. The paper finishes with a
discussion and conclusions from the findings. The appendix
provides the questionnaire for the construct.
2. Literature review
2.1. Governance in the realm of projects
Governance in the realm of projects takes place at different
levels, which are the individual project and groups of projects. The
governance of individual projects is often called project gover-
nance, which is “The use of systems, structures of authority and
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
processes to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in
a project.” (Pinto, 2014, p. 8). The collective governance of a
program or portfolio of projects, or the collective governance of all
projects in an organization from the corporate or board level
perspective is often referred to as GoP. This takes a broader view
than the individual project. Its locus is the corporate governance
framework (which steers all activity in an organization, including
projects) and “comprises the value system, responsibilities,
processes and policies that allow projects to achieve organizational
objectives and foster implementation that is in the best interest of
all the stakeholders, internal and external, and the corporation
itself” (Müller, 2009, p. 4). This is also the focus of the present
paper. Too and Weaver (2014) conceptualize governance in the
realm of projects as a set of nested governance and management
functions. At its center are the governance approaches for
individual projects and their deliverables, which is nested within
GoP, which, in turn, forms the interface to the Board of Directors
level of project related governance. They distinguish governance
from management:
“The governance system defines the structures used by the
organization, allocates rights and responsibilities within those
structures and requires assurance that management is operating
effectively and properly within the defined structures. The role of
management is to manage the organization within the framework
defined by the governance system; this applies particularly to the
governance and management of projects.” (p. 4)
Models of GoP differ by their theoretical and epistemolog-
ical perspectives and emphasize different aspects of gover-
nance. Turner's (2009) model identifies four roles (sponsor,
steward, project manager, owner or business change manager)
and the related processes to govern projects in organizations.
The model comprises of three concentric circles. The
governance of project management (define objectives, define
means, monitoring progress) is at the center. This is governed
by a process at the next outer circle, which defines and controls
for client needs, desired outcome, desired output, required
process, delivered output, and delivered outcome. This layer, in
turn, is governed by the next outer circle of governance roles
which are the client manager, sponsor, steward, project
manager, and owner, the typical members of a Steering
Group. The model lays the foundation for high levels of
transparency and clearness of goals through start-to-end control
and communication of the management and governance
institutions. However, the model is neutral to corporate
governance in terms of variance by shareholder or stakeholder
orientation of the company.
A different approach is taken by Walker et al. (2008) in their
model of governance elements. They distinguish between the
hard and soft aspects in governance. The former relates to
structural and regulatory elements, such as organizational design,
policies and legal requirements. These are the way responsibil-
ities are discharged to deliver approved and signed-off project
objectives and enshrine systematic accountability. The soft
aspects are the ways people interact with the governance
structure, given the responsibilities and accountabilities granted
to them by the governance structure. This includes the
interpretation and enforcement of regulatory frameworks, and
 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx
the impact of relationships on the behaviors of individuals. At the
heart of the model is the determination of governance efforts and
structures that lead to an equilibrium of trust and control as the
mechanism to balance the hard and soft elements for governance.
This model is to some extent neutral to corporate governance
orientation, as it addresses the impact of corporate governance on
GoP only indirectly through trust or organizational structures.
The model by Müller (2009) explains GoP through four
governance paradigms. For that it addresses corporate governance
orientation and control orientation at the level of the organiza-
tional unit that governs a project. The corporate governance
dimension builds on Clarke (1998) and Hernandez (2012)
models. Both claim that a corporation's governance orientation
can be found on a continuum from shareholder to stakeholder
orientation (or a pendulum that swings between shareholder and
stakeholder orientation). The GoP model aims for identification
of the dominant orientation. In other words: Is the unit governing
a project more shareholder or more stakeholder oriented? The
second dimension addresses the type of control exercised by the
governing institution over the project and its manager. This
follows Brown & Eisenhardt (1997), Ouchi and Price (1978) and
Ouchi (1980) by distinguishing between organizational control
that merely focuses on goal accomplishment by controling
outcomes (e.g. reaching of set objectives), versus merely on
compliance in employees behavior (e.g. following a process, such
as a project management methodology). Overlaying the corporate
governance orientation with the control orientation yields four
distinct paradigms for governing the projects in an organizational
unit. Table 1 visualizes the model and its four paradigms. More
details can be found in Müller (2009).
A shareholder oriented organization with an outcome
control focus applies a ‘flexible economist paradigm’. The
aim is achieving the highest possible return on investment for
the organization's shareholders by flexibly applying the most
effective project management methods, tools and techniques
and management approaches for the project. PMOs can provide
relevant training and support of project managers in using tools
and techniques.
A shareholder oriented organization with a behavior control
focus is termed a ‘conformist paradigm’. This paradigm
emphasizes conformance and compliance with existing meth-
odologies and processes. Assumption is that efficiency is
reached by following the process. This paradigm is especially
interesting for organizations with non-complex projects and a
homogenous set of project types.
Organizations with a stakeholder orientation using outcome
as their control mechanism are described as using a ‘versatile
artist’ paradigm. These organizations exercise versatility by
balancing a diverse set of often conflicting requirements,
stemming from the variety of stakeholders. Most likely these
organizations employ the most senior and experienced project
managers and have them guided by a strategic PMO, which
defines the organization's portfolio of project management
practices and trainings.
A stakeholder oriented organization with behavioral control
focus produces the ‘agile pragmatist paradigm’. This paradigm
is highly process focused, in line with the current stream of
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
3
agile methods in project management. This paradigm allows for
flexibility and frequently changing requirements from project
stakeholders.
The four paradigms are not mutually exclusive. Depending
on the particular contribution of individual organizational units
to the corporate strategy different paradigms may be exercised
in different parts of the organization. Examples include a
dominance of stakeholder orientation in R&D departments and
a shareholder orientation in maintenance departments. This
model bridges between corporate governance and GoP as
described in the introduction section and will be operational-
ized and subsequently tested in this paper.
3. Operationalization of the model
The aim of the paper is to develop a categorization system, not
a fine-grained measurement system for the four governance
paradigms. Objective is to detect the dominance of either
shareholder or stakeholder attitude and either behavior or
outcome control attitude in the organization governing projects,
to categorize them in accordance with the paradigm model.
Notwithstanding other dimensions of corporate governance the
focus in the operationalization is on the two dimensions of the
four paradigm model. This was driven by the question: Which
sub-dimension of corporate governance orientation (sharehold-
er–stakeholder) and organizational control (behavior–outcome)
extend into the governance of projects. This was addressed
through a literature review for the identification of themes
extending from corporate governance and organizational control
into GoP. Ten dimensions were found, which are described
below.
3.1. Operationalizing shareholder versus stakeholder orientation
The dominance of a shareholder orientation is indicative of an
underlying value of maximizing shareholder wealth relative to
the requirements of other stakeholders, whereas the dominance of
stakeholder orientation indicates a wider spectrum of stake-
holders to serve, of which shareholders are one (Clarke, 1998;
Davis et al., 1997)
Five subject areas were recognized as overlapping in the
corporate governance and GoP literature: decision making,
remuneration, legitimacy, financial objectives, and long-term
objectives. Table 2 shows examples of related literature for
each area and its related measurement item. The questions are
in line with popular dimensions of governance definitions, such
as those developed by Nordberg (2011), Larcker and Tayan
(2011), Monks and Minow (1995) and Müller (2009), and
shown as the top five questions in the Appendix A.
3.1.1. Decision making
A classic theme in governance is the question whether
managers' decisions should be governed by the desire to
maximize value for shareholders (i.e. shareholder orientation of
the firm), or balance the requirements of a diverse set of
stakeholders (stakeholder orientation of the firm). A prominent
proponent of the former is Michael Jensen, who, for example,
4 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx
argues that value creation must be focused in order to avoid
confusion among managers (Jensen, 2010). This is counter-
balanced by proponents of stakeholder approaches, who
understand stakeholders as “those groups without whose
support the organization would cease to exists” (Stanford
Research Institute, quoted in Donaldson & Preston, 1995), and
therefore try to satisfy the requirements of a variety of
stakeholders, albeit at varying priories (Donaldson & Preston,
1995). This subject has been addressed in GoP, for example by
writers on stakeholder satisfaction frameworks and scales, such
as Atkinson (1999) or Turner and Zolin (2012).
3.1.2. Remuneration
Another classic theme in governance is the question whether
managers' remuneration should be tight to corporate perfor-
mance or not. Proponents of the former showed that this is
dominant practice in many parts of the World (e.g. Benito &
Conyon, 1999), and an important mechanism for governance
from a shareholder perspective. The stakeholder perspective
counterbalances this by assuming that too much focus on the
contract between managers and the firm (and its performance)
causes inefficient contracting with other stakeholders, which
impacts adversely on performance (Jones, 1995). Fabi and
Pettersen (1992) address this topic in the context of projects and
suggest, among others, remuneration based on production and
quality of performance.
3.1.3. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper,
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.
574) Shareholder theory legitimates the primacy of maximizing
shareholder wealth as a governance principle in organizations
(Jensen, 2010; Merino et al., 2010), whereas stakeholder theory
acknowledges the diversity of stakeholder interests as a moral
requirement of the management function and the legitimacy of
their actions (Charreaux & Desbrières, 2001; Donaldson &
Preston, 1995). The legitimacy of actions is also a theme in
GoP. Governance institutions, such as Steering Groups have to
ensure the legitimacy of their projects and their outcomes,
PMOs have to ensure the legitimacy of approaches to managing
projects etc. (Müller, 2009).
Table 2
Corporate governance dimensions extending into project governance and their assessment.
Dimension Shareholder oriented Stakeholder oriented
corporate governance corporate governance
Decision making Jensen (2010) Donaldson and Preston, (1995)
Remuneration Benito and Conyon (1999) Jones (1995)
Legitimacy Jensen (2010); Merino Charreaux and Desbrières (2001);
et al. (2010) Donaldson and Preston (1995)
Financial objectives Friedman (1970) Berman et al. (1999)
Long term Friedman (1970) Freeman et al. (2004)
objectives
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
3.1.4. Financial objectives
In a now classic article Milton Friedman (1970) takes a
shareholder theory perspective when outlining the importance
of financial objectives, such as company profits, over social
responsibilities of a firm. Contrarily, stakeholder theory based
studies show that the relationship managers have with the
stakeholders of their firms have significant direct and indirect
impact on the firms results (Berman et al., 1999). The subject is
also addressed in GoP. For example by Ibbs and Kwak (1997)
for maximizing project sponsor returns, or Müller and Turner
(2007) for balancing shareholder and sponsor returns in
different geographies.
3.1.5. Long-term objectives
Another classic theme is that of the long-term objectives.
Friedman (1970) argues for profitability as a focused long-term
objective from a shareholder theory perspective, whereas
Freeman et al. (2004) point to the importance of long-term
survival and its diversity of objectives from a stakeholder
theory perspective. In the GoP literature Newcombe (2003),
among others, argues that the concept of stakeholder extends
well beyond the shareholder concept and is more appropriate
for contemporary management of projects.
Table 2 summarizes the dimensions and associated mea-
surement items. The related questions are shown in the
Appendix A.
3.2. Operationalizing behavior versus outcome control orientation
The questions on control orientation are along the concepts
by Ouchi (1980), Ouchi and Price (1978), and Brown and
Eisenhardt (1997), and enhanced by a dimension on GoP
institutions (PMOs) and process compliance, as identified by
Aubry et al. (2012) and Müller (2009). These are the lower five
questions in the Appendix A.
The literature review showed five areas of overlap between
organizational control theories and GoP control structures: rule
orientation, level of control, adherence to job descriptions, role
of support institutions, compliance expectations, Table 3.
3.2.1. Process versus outcome orientation
Ouchi (1980) describes how organizations either control
people's behavior by fostering process compliance, or control
by assessing peoples work against predetermined outcome
Project governance Measurement item
Atkinson (1999); Müller, Turner, Andersen, Miles et al. (2000)
Shao, and Kvalnes (2014); Turner and Zolin (2012))
Fabi and Pettersen (1992) Miles et al. (2000)
Müller (2009) Miles et al. (2000)
Ibbs and Kwak (1997); Müller and Miles et al. (2000)
Turner (2007)
Newcombe (2003) Miles et al. (2000)
 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx
expectations. Henderson and Lee (1992) were among the first
to take this concept in the realm of projects by showing that
behavior control of managers correlates with higher project
success. The concept later developed into contemporary
methodologies, such as Agile/SCRUM project management
(Schwaber, 2004), which are based on an underlying assump-
tion of process compliance, thus behavior control.
3.2.2. Level of control
Many writers have addressed the issue of level of control,
from tight control using sophisticated systems, to lose control
using informal relationships (e.g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997;
Mintzberg, 1985; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). Turner and Keegan
1999 addressed this question for GoP and argued for
idiosyncratic control structures, contingent on the nature of
the project, its client, input, process and output.
3.2.3. Adherence to job description
Job descriptions are a method to control the behavior of
employees. However, not all roles qualify for behavior control.
Eisenhardt (1985) showed how the nature of the job role
determines the appropriateness of behavior control (through
strict adherence to job description) or outcome control. Tsui
(1987) argued, among other factors, for clarity of job
descriptions, a perspective which was taken into GoP by
Belout (1998) who emphasized its importance for project
success.
3.2.4. Role of support institutions
Institutionalization of new practices is a classic theme in
organization research. An example is Total Quality Manage-
ment (TQM) as shown by Westphal et al. (1997). Scott (2014)
traces institutionalization back to support institutions which
carry the practices into the organization and establish practices
through habitualization. This is shown to exist in GoP in form
of PMOs as support institutions and their role in establishing
organization-wide project management practices (Hobbs &
Aubry, 2007).
3.2.5. Compliance expectations
The final dimension addresses process compliance versus
self leadership to execute tasks. Organizational theorists like
Manz (1986) linked the need for self-leadership to tasks'
intrinsic motivational values and the extent employees aspire to
higher level external (or experience based) standards. Writers
on GoP addressed this dimension from several perspectives,
such as Jaafari (2003) who argued that process compliance or
Table 3
Organizational control dimensions extending into project governance and their assessment.
Dimension Organization theory
Process of outcome orientation Ouchi (1980)
Level of control Brown and Eisenhardt (1997); Mintzberg (1985);
Ouchi and Maguire (1975)
Adherence to job descriptions Eisenhardt (1985)
Role of support institutions Scott (2014); Westphal et al. (1997)
Compliance expectations Manz (1986)
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
5
self-leadership on a project is a question of project type. He
distinguished between four project types and argued for process
compliance in bureaucratic and normative projects, and
self-leadership in ad-hoc and creative–reflective projects.
Crawford et al. (2006) approached the question from the
perspective of the reflective practitioner. By outlining the
changes in requirements for project managers and project
teams, stemming from changing ways of doing work in
organizations, they showed the mismatch between practices
outlined in existing professional standards and actual require-
ments in organizations, which require more reflectiveness and
self-leadership on the side of project managers.
Table 3 summarizes the dimensions and associated mea-
surement items. The related questions are shown in the
Appendix A as the lower five.
The majority of question items for the above dimensions
were taken from constructs developed by Miles et al. (2000),
which are based on Khandwalla (1977), which were used
successfully in other GoP related studies before (e.g. Turner &
Müller, 2004). Two items were modified to include GoP
specific topics, such as the use of project management
methodologies and PMOs. All questions were asked using
seven point Likert semantic difference scales (see Appendix A).
The themes chosen for testing the construct were the most
popular distinctions in GoP research. The majority of published
studies address the governance of particular project types, such
as Olympics projects (Clegg et al., 2002), NASA projects
(Shenhar et al., 2005), and construction projects (Pryke, 2005).
Another popular theme is governance differences by project
size, for example governance of small versus large projects
(Turner & Keegan, 2001), large projects (Miller & Hobbs,
2005), or the differences by national cultures (Klakegg et al.,
2008).
The test was done through a worldwide survey.
4. Methodology of the survey study
A post-positivist perspective was taken, which assumes
ontological objectivity and “being” as the ideal. However, this
ideal is compromised by epistemological subjectivity stemming
from data which are collected from human beings through
questionnaires (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Thus, for this study we
assume “that the world is mainly driven by generalizable
(natural) laws, but their application and results are often
situational dependent” (Biedenbach & Müller, 2011, p.87).
The study takes a deductive and cross-sectional, questionnaire
based approach to test the operationalized model, including its
Project governance Measurement item
Henderson and Lee (1992); Schwaber (2004) Miles et al. (2000)
Turner & Keegan (1999) Miles et al. (2000)
Belout (1998) Miles et al. (2000)
Hobbs and Aubry (2007) Self-developed
Crawford et al. (2006); Jaafari (2003) Self-developed
6 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx

validity and reliability. The questionnaire was first distributed on Table 4

paper among students of executive MBA and PhD programs in Sample demographics.
Europe with considerable industry experience (N 2 years) and Country Responses Job role Responses
subsequently distributed as a web-based survey in a snowball Norway 143 Project manager 215
approach through professional project management organiza- Other 63 Project team member 54
tions, such as Project Management Institute (PMI), or the USA 34 Other manager 45
France 33 Consultant 29
International Project Management Association (IPMA). NL 27 Sales/marketing 15
In addition to the questions in the Appendix A respondents Germany 24 Subproject manager 11
were asked for the monetary value of their project, the type of China 23 Engineer 7
project (engineering or construction, information or telecom- Canada 23 Academic 6
munication, organizational or business), as well as demograph- Lithuania 22 PMO 4
Sweden 13 Other role 71
ic information such as the respondents title, years of work Panama 9 Total 457
experience, years of project management experience, national- India 8 Missing 21
ity, and country the project was executed. UK 7 Total 478
The questionnaire was piloted using 14 participants in a Spain 5
Project Management Institute (PMI®) Chapter meeting. No Jordan 4 Project type Responses
New Zealand 4 Engineering & construction 175
changes were made after the pilot. Pakistan 4 Information & telecommunication 163
Denmark 4 Organizational & business 108
4.1. The sample United Arab 4 Total 446
Emirates
The combined sample of the paper and web-based responses Australia 4 Missing 32
Total 458 Total 478
amounted to 478 responses. Average work experience of the Missing 20
participants was 12.7 years (sd = 8.0 years, range from less Total 478 Project size Responses
than 1 to 35 years) and average project management experience b .5 M€ 93
was 4.6 years (sd = 4.2 years, range from less than 1 to .5–1 M€ 121
30 years). Sample demographics are shown in Table 4. No 1–5 M€ 102
N 5 M€ 132
significant differences were found by job role. Total 448
Validity and reliability of the data were tested in several Missing 30
ways. Content validity is given through the literature-based Total 478
development of the measurement dimensions; face validity was
tested during the pilot. After data collection was completed
validity was tested through unrotated factor analysis for each of
the two dimensions, which also served as the Haman test to • ANOVA to identify statistically significant differences
exclude Common Method Bias related issues (Podsakoff & among the mean values
Organ, 1986). Results showed that each sub-dimension • Pearson correlation to assess correlations between the two
(governance orientation, control orientation) loaded on one dimensions of the model and project size.
single factor, which indicates convergent and divergent
validity. Testing Item-to-Item and Item-to-Total correlations 5. Analysis
showed that the required threshold values of .3 and .5
(respectively) were reached. Furthermore, Cronbach Alpha The descriptive analyses of the data are shown in Table 5.
reliability tests on the two dimensions, showed .824 for the
corporate governance dimension and .822 for the organization- 5.1. Unrotated factor analysis
al control dimension. These tests indicate validity and
reliability of the data (Hair et al., 2006). Unrotated factor analysis of the corporate governance
For the analysis of the data we followed the Ockham's razor orientation dimensions showed that all items load on a single
principle and chose the simpler of the possible approaches that factor and explain 58.8% of the variance (KMO 0.844, p
lead to the same results (supported by (Hair, 2000)). We aim for 0.000). A similar unrotated factor analysis was performed on
an easy to use categorization system which neither measures the organizational control dimension. All sub-dimensions load
latent variables nor causalities and therefore does not need a on a single factor which explains 58.2% of the variance (KMO
highly granulated measurement scale for the GoP dimensions. 0.810, p b 0.000).
Hence, using advanced techniques like Structural Equation A rotated factor analysis using the variables from both
Modeling would be an exaggeration. We used: dimensions (corporate governance and organizational control)
showed the distinct nature of each of the two dimensions at the
• Factor analysis to identify the coherence of the sub-dimensions usual cut-off level of .5 for factor loadings (KMO 0.834,
per construct p b 0.000). Each dimension loaded on a separate factor and
• Mean values to map averages by country, project size, and with the theoretically derived sub-dimensions, thus showing
project type into the paradigms validity.

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx 7

5.2. Countries relative position in GoP
The countries' mean values in terms of the two governance
paradigm dimensions (scale 1 to 7) were calculated to derive
averages per country. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics
per country and paradigm dimension.
These mean values were then “centered” by subtracting the
mean for each dimension of the paradigms to set them relative
to the mean values of all countries together (Country average in
Fig. 1) in order to identify each country's relative position to all
others, see Fig. 1.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to identify
differences between countries. The results indicate significant
differences (p .000 for both dimensions), but a post-hoc Scheffe
test only showed a significant difference between Norway and
the group of “other” countries, with the former being
significantly more stakeholder oriented (p = .012).
5.3. Project size and governance paradigm
The average governance paradigm by project size was
calculated similar to that by country. The descriptive statistics
in Table 6 shows the mean values and standard deviations as
measured on the seven point Likert scale.
The relative position of project size by governance paradigm
is shown in Fig. 2. The visualization and the correlation
analysis show a significant negative correlation between project
size and outcome control (p b 0.000, r = − .245), as well as a
negative correlation between project size and stakeholder
orientation (p b 0.000, r = − .150). The larger the project the
more governance tends to apply behavior control and
shareholder orientation. Despite their significance, the effect
size is rather low.
ANOVA analysis showed that smaller projects (b .5 M €)
are governed significantly more using
• Stakeholder orientation (p for significance of difference
between projects b .5 M€: 0.017, 0.009, 0.001 for sizes .5–
1 M€, 1–5 M€, and N 5 M€ respectively)
• Outcome control (p b 0.000 for all project sizes)
Thus, the governance of small projects is significantly
different than for larger projects.
5.4. Governance paradigms by project type
The descriptive statistics for the average governance
paradigm by project type (engineering & construction,
Information Technology (IT) & Telecom, organizational
change & business projects) is shown in Table 6.
Fig. 3 shows the relative governance paradigm by project
type. IT and Telecom projects are more governed from a
behavior control and shareholder orientation, engineering and
construction projects more shareholder oriented combined with
outcome control, and organizational change and business
projects more stakeholder oriented and outcome controlled.
ANOVA showed significant differences by project types in
both paradigm dimensions (p for Corporate Governance .001,
organizational control 0.033). Post hoc Scheffe tests showed
that organizational change and business projects are governed
significantly more from a stakeholder perspective (p of
difference 0.016 for engineering & construction projects and
0.002 for IT & Telecom projects). At the same time are IT and
Telecom projects nominally more behavior controlled than
engineering and construction projects (p 0.072) and organiza-
tional change and business projects (0.095). The latter two
differences are above the study's level of significance (0.05),
but would be significant if the level were raised to 0.1.
6. Discussion
6.1. Differences in governance paradigms by country
Shareholder oriented governance structures with behavior
control orientation dominate the sample with the Anglo-Saxon
countries like UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand, but also India,
Spain, United Arab Emirates and Sweden. These countries
favor a Conformist paradigm in the governance of their
projects. However, very few countries seem to favor

Table 5
Descriptive analysis of governance paradigm measures.
Descriptive statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. error Statistic Std error
Decisions 476 1 7 3.17 1.644 .548 .112 −.698 .223
Remuneration 461 1 7 3.34 1.562 .599 .114 −.248 .227
Legitimacy 471 1 7 3.34 1.658 .454 .113 −.696 .225
Financials 468 1 7 3.50 1.443 .197 .113 −.458 .225
Longtermobj 475 1 7 3.04 1.822 .697 .112 −.547 .224
Procedures 465 1 7 3.36 1.560 .269 .113 −.744 .226
Control 465 1 7 3.49 1.612 .365 .113 −.720 .226
Behavior 464 1 7 3.65 1.521 .230 .113 −.771 .226
Support 441 1 7 3.40 1.377 .201 .116 −.330 .232
Compliance 463 1 7 3.74 1.463 .060 .113 −.675 .226
Valid N (listwise) 421

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j.ijproman.2014.04.005
8 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx

Table 6
Descriptive statistics of paradigm dimensions by country, project size, and project type.
Corporate governance paradigm Organizational control paradigm
N Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum N Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
Norway 142 3.90 1.41 1.0 7.0 143 3.84 1.21 1.6 6.8
Other 63 2.78 0.90 1.4 5.4 63 3.19 0.95 1.4 5.5
USA 34 2.83 0.96 1.0 4.6 34 3.09 0.94 1.0 4.6
France 33 3.24 1.29 1.0 5.8 33 3.49 1.21 1.4 6.2
Netherlands 27 3.44 1.41 1.2 6.0 27 3.92 1.35 1.8 6.4
Germany 24 3.22 1.06 1.2 4.8 24 3.21 1.20 1.2 5.0
China 23 3.16 1.23 1.4 5.0 23 3.39 1.09 2.2 5.8
Canada 23 2.96 1.02 1.2 5.0 23 3.34 0.92 1.8 5.0
Lithuania 22 3.72 1.12 2.0 6.0 22 4.45 1.51 1.6 7.0
Sweden 13 2.34 0.89 1.0 4.2 13 3.23 0.88 2.0 5.0
Panama 9 2.60 0.70 1.0 3.2 9 3.07 0.92 1.8 4.2
India 8 2.88 0.68 1.8 4.0 8 3.10 0.87 2.0 4.2
UK 7 2.83 0.88 2.0 4.0 7 3.31 0.50 2.4 3.8
Spain 5 2.37 0.52 2.0 3.3 5 3.24 0.52 2.8 3.8
Jordan 4 3.20 0.54 2.8 4.0 4 2.90 0.50 2.2 3.4
New Zealand 4 2.70 1.47 1.0 4.2 4 3.00 0.82 1.8 3.6
Pakistan 4 3.70 0.74 3.2 4.8 4 3.70 0.70 3.0 4.4
Denmark 4 3.36 1.44 1.8 4.8 4 2.85 0.85 1.6 3.4
United Arab Emirates 4 2.70 0.74 2.0 3.6 4 3.55 0.66 2.8 4.4
Australia 4 2.50 1.09 1.6 3.8 3 3.67 0.81 3.2 4.6
Total 457 3.30 1.26 1.0 7.0 457 3.53 1.16 1.0 7.0

Project size
b.5 M € 93 3.762 1.2840 1.0 7.0 93 4.275 1.3804 1.2 7.0
.5–1 M€ 121 3.217 1.2580 1.0 6.8 120 3.407 1.0481 1.4 6.0
1–5 M€ 102 3.158 1.0548 1.0 5.8 102 3.331 1.0983 1.4 6.0
N5 M€ 132 3.098 1.3021 1.0 6.8 132 3.339 .9446 1.0 5.6
Total 448 3.282 1.2550 1.0 7.0 447 3.550 1.1664 1.0 7.0

Project type
Engineering & construction 108 3.118 1.1228 1.2 6.4 108 3.664 1.0922 1.6 6.0
IT & telecom 163 3.081 1.2158 1.0 7.0 163 3.331 1.1346 1.2 6.8
Organizational change & 175 3.548 1.2731 1.0 6.2 174 3.628 1.2106 1.0 7.0
business projects
Total 446 3.273 1.2346 1.0 7.0 445 3.528 1.1623 1.0 7.0

shareholder orientation with outcome control. Among the
observed countries only Australia was classified under this
approach, which is the Flexible Economist paradigm.
Outcome control seems to be favored among the stakeholder
oriented governance structures within countries like Norway,
France, Netherlands Lithuania and China. The Versatile Artist
paradigm seems to dominate GoP in these countries. The Agile
Pragmatist paradigm, with stakeholder orientation and behavior
control is indicated to be popular in countries like Germany,
Denmark and Jordan.
GoP in Norway is shown as the most stakeholder oriented.
Their level of stakeholder orientation is significantly higher
than in the group of “other” countries, which were a collection
of the answers of those countries with less than 4 responses.
This is supported by studies in cultural differences, such as
those by Hofstede, who identified Norway as the second most
feminine culture in World, thus cultural aspect such as leveling
with others, consensus, “independent” cooperation are valued,
at the same time as Norway scores low on power distance, high
on individuality and uses a pragmatic working style (Hofstede,
2013). This particular combination appears to foster high levels
of mutual respect and consensus driven governance styles as a
basis for balancing the often conflicting requirements (stem-
ming from the variety of requirements) different stakeholder
groups pose on their projects.
6.2. Differences in governance paradigms by project size
The perspective of project size poses a very different view
on the results. The majority of projects are classified as
shareholder and behavior control oriented, thus fall under the
Conformist paradigm. The governance of small projects (under
€ 0.5 million) appears to be significantly more outcome and
stakeholder oriented. This strong difference in governance
approaches and the relative nature of the scale (projects are
classified relatively to the sum of all projects) may explain the
grouping of the majority of projects under one paradigm. Thus
there is a small relative differences in the governance
approaches to projects of half a million Euro and bigger.
6.3. Differences in governance paradigms by project type
Governance of organizational change and business projects
differs from that of other project types. Their governance is

Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx
Fig. 1. Governance paradigm mean per country.
significantly more stakeholder oriented. A phenomenon which
may be linked back to the non-physical outcome of these
projects, which require more human interaction, process
orientation and consensus finding than product related projects
which often deliver against clearly defined specifications. The
results are also supported by leadership studies which showed
that successful project managers in these types of projects are
more interactive and possess higher social and emotional
competences than others (Turner & Müller, 2006).
IT and Telecom projects are governed more from a behavior
control (i.e. process compliance) perspective when compared to
engineering and construction projects which are more con-
trolled by their outcome, even though both are governed more
shareholder oriented than organizational change and business
projects. The relative difference in behavior and outcome
control can be linked to the popularity of very process oriented
project management methodologies, such as Agile/SCRUM,
which are especially appropriate for these types of projects.
Taken together, the results from the three different analysis
perspectives are supported by earlier studies in neighborhood
areas of investigation.
7. Conclusions
This study developed a categorization system for GoP
approaches. It joins previous attempts in the development of
measurement constructs for populations, such as those by
Hofstede (1980) or House et al. (2004) for cultural differences
in human populations, or World Banks' studies on measuring
governance of populations of countries (Kaufann et al., 2008).
An existing model of paradigms for GoP was used and its
dimensions operationalized through a partly modified set of
questions of an existing measurement construct. The
Please cite this article as: R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre, 2014. Operationalizing governance categories of projects, Int. J. Proj. Manag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.ijproman.2014.04.005
9
literature-based approach together with the results shows
validity and reliability of the measurement construct.
Ten GoP measurement sub-dimensions were extracted from
the literature and subsequently empirically tested. These are:
decision making, remuneration, legitimacy, financial objec-
tives, and long-term objectives for the shareholder–stakeholder
dimensions and rule orientation, level of control, adherence to
job descriptions, role of support institutions, and compliance
expectations for the behavior–outcome control dimensions. A
test through a worldwide questionnaire with 478 responses
indicates stability and validity of the measurement construct.
The managerial implications are in the practicality of the
tool for the assessment of GoP in organizations and the
development of related actions for changing or improving
governance structures. Organizations aiming for changing their
governance approaches because they are assessed as being too
self centered and shareholder oriented can use Hernandez'
(2012) recommendation for moving organizations from a
shareholder to a stakeholder orientation. Other managerial
implications include those mentioned in the introduction plus
the use of the model for training of managers developing
governance structures for projects, such as members of Steering
Committees or PMOs, to identify the particularities they can
expect for the governance paradigm they impose on their
projects (references see introduction section). Alternatively
project managers can use the tool to better understand and make
sense of the existing governance structures in their
organization.
Theoretical implications include the contribution to a
middle-level theory of governance, which interfaces project
level governance with corporate governance, an area that has
rarely been researched and lacks quantitatively grounded
theory. This includes the development of project management
10 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx

Fig. 2. Governance paradigms mean by project size.

approaches that are sensitive to different governance structures
and vice versa. The results in this paper support findings
showing significant differences by the four paradigms in terms
of trust, ethical issues, and project managers behavior (Müller
et al., 2013), governance of PMOs (Tsaturyan & Müller, 2011),
PMO networks and governance of project management (Aubry
et al., 2011, 2012), as well as the moderating role of governance
paradigms in the relationship between methodology use and
success in projects (Joslin & Müller, under review). This
indicates the need for further investigation.
The strengths of the study are in its grounding in existing
theories, the use of existing and proven models and measure-
ment constructs, and the large sample size. There are, of course,
also weaknesses, which include the limited number of

Fig. 3. Governance paradigm mean by project type.

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 R. Müller, L. Lecoeuvre / International Journal of Project Management xx (2014) xxx–xxx 11

Table 7 (continued)
dimensions given by the underlying model, and small sample
…tight formal control of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …loose, informal control;
sizes for some countries. It is recommended to interpret Figs. 1
most operations by heavy dependence on
to 3 only in conjunction with Table 4. Further research is means of sophisticated informal relationships and
suggested to a) test the tool developed here for its stability control and information the norm of cooperation
across studies, and b) its expansion with additional dimensions systems for getting things done
to increase the granularity of the understanding of GoP, and c) …a strong emphasis on 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …a strong emphasis to let
getting personnel to the requirements of the
quantify the overall impact of corporate governance structures
adhere closely to formal situation and the
on projects with GoP as a mediating variable. Future research job descriptions individual's personality
should use the tool developed herein for large sample studies define proper on-job
which allow for generalizations to larger populations. behavior
The study's contribution to knowledge is in the quantitative …support institutions (like 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …support institutions (like a
a PMO) should ensure PMO) should collect
categorization of GoP. Three perspectives of analysis were used
compliance with the performance data in order
to show its application. Each of the three perspectives (country, organization's project to identify skills and
project size, project type) provides a different view toward the management knowledge gaps
phenomenon in terms of relative difference in governance methodology
structures. The results may trigger more studies to reach a …prioritization of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …prioritization of people's
methodology own experiences in doing
holistic picture of governance structures for projects.
compliance over their work over
people's own methodology compliance
experiences in
Appendix A. Questionnaire doing their work

Table 7
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