Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

A social-cognitive approach to understanding gender differences in

negotiator ethics: The role of moral identity
Jessica A. Kennedy a,⇑, Laura J. Kray b, Gillian Ku c
a
Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, 401 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203, United States
b
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, 2220 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94720, United States
c
London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: To date, gender differences in ethics have received little theoretical attention. We utilize a social-
Received 19 June 2015 cognitive framework to explain why these differences emerge and when women engage in less unethical
Revised 28 September 2016 negotiating behavior than do men. We propose that, relative to men’s, women’s stronger moral identities
Accepted 23 November 2016
suppress unethical negotiating behavior. Study 1 establishes a gender difference in moral identity
Available online 10 December 2016
strength through a meta-analysis of over 19,000 people. Study 2 observes gender differences in two
aspects of negotiator ethics – moral disengagement and opportunism. Study 3 establishes moral identity
Keywords:
strength as an antecedent to negotiator ethics. Finally, Studies 4 and 5 explore financial incentives as a
Gender
Negotiation
situational moderator. Because financial incentives temporarily decrease the salience of moral identity,
Ethics they could mitigate gender differences in negotiator ethics, leading women to act more like men.
Moral disengagement Across both studies, financial incentives impacted women’s (but not men’s) unethical negotiating behav-
Moral identity ior. Our findings help to explain why and when gender differences in ethics emerge.
Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction women (Kray et al., 2001), and poor performance relative to

Since Gilligan (1982) proposed that women and men reason dif-
ferently about morality, scholars have found persistent evidence of
gender differences in ethics both generally (for meta-analyses, see
Borkowski & Ugras, 1998; Franke, Crown, & Spake, 1997; Whitley,
Nelson, & Jones, 1999) and in negotiations specifically (Haselhuhn
& Wong, 2012; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012; Robinson, Lewicki, &
Donahue, 2000; Westbrook, Arendall, & Padelford, 2011).
Differences in men’s and women’s ethicality in negotiations
have received relatively little theoretical attention to date, despite
the importance of understanding negotiation processes and out-
comes, as well as gender differences within negotiations. Negotia-
tions are a critical organizational context to understand. Beyond
being a fundamental mechanism by which resources are divided,
women face numerous hurdles in negotiations (Amanatullah &
Morris, 2010; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Kray, Kennedy,
& Van Zant, 2014; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Kray, Thompson, &
Galinsky, 2001; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & Amanatullah,
2009). Additionally, negotiations are a masculine context (Bowles
& Kray, 2013), in which men are expected to perform better than
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jessica.kennedy@owen.vanderbilt.edu (J.A. Kennedy), kray@
haas.berkeley.edu (L.J. Kray), gku@london.edu (G. Ku).
women can threaten men’s sense of masculinity (Kray &
Haselhuhn, 2012; Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015). To
the extent that unethical tactics are perceived to provide an advan-
tage over competitors, men may therefore be especially likely to
use them when negotiating, whereas women may be less inclined
to rely on unethical tactics. Practically, because unethical tactics
can help negotiators to claim value (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997;
Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005), gender differences in nego-
tiator ethics may provide a novel explanation for why women have
worse negotiation outcomes than men under some conditions
(Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Alternatively,
to the extent that women negotiators have ethical strengths,
women may have a negotiating advantage over men under certain
conditions, such as when relational capital and subjective value are
important (Kennedy & Kray, 2015).
The current research builds on contemporary social-cognitive
accounts for ethical behavior to understand why and when gender
differences in negotiator ethics emerge. We go beyond existing
research on gender differences in ethics in two ways. In consider-
ing why women negotiate more ethically than men do, we propose
that women internalize moral traits in their self-definitions more
strongly than men do—that is, women have stronger moral identi-
ties. We expect moral identity to have a number of downstream
consequences in negotiations, including moral disengagement

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.11.003
0749-5978/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
and unethical behavior. To our knowledge, we are the first to pro-
vide an empirical test of why gender differences emerge in ethics
generally or in unethical negotiating behavior specifically. In ask-
ing when gender differences in negotiator ethics are likely to
emerge, we expect that certain situational factors (e.g., financial
incentives) will suppress chronic gender differences in ethical
behavior, leading women to act similarly to men.
1.1. Gender differences in ethical attitudes and behavior
Philosophers (e.g., Kant) and early psychologists (e.g., Freud,
Kohlberg) originally proposed that men were morally superior to
women (for a summary, see Walker, 2006). Since these controver-
sial propositions, research has examined gender differences in eth-
ical attitudes and behavior, both generally and in negotiations
specifically.
1.1.1. Outside the negotiation context
Many studies have explored the extent to which women and
men view unethical behaviors as such. Generally, men are more
accepting of unethical behavior than women. Meta-analyses have
found that women report more ethical attitudes (Borkowski &
Ugras, 1998), hold business practices to higher ethical standards
(Franke et al., 1997), and report less favorable attitudes toward
cheating (Whitley et al., 1999) than do men. When men do view
a behavior as unethical, they still report greater willingness to
engage in the behavior than do women (Doty, Tomkiewicz, &
Bass, 2005). When women are asked to sacrifice ethical values
(e.g., honesty or loyalty) for money or social status at work, they
lose interest in the job, whereas men do not (Kennedy & Kray,
2013). Gender differences in ethical attitudes emerge not only in
student samples, but also in samples of working adults
(Valentine & Rittenburg, 2007).
Other studies have examined ethical behavior. For instance,
Dreber and Johannesson (2008) explored deceptive behavior via
an economic game (the ‘‘Deception Game”) and found that only
38% of women lied to secure a monetary benefit, relative to 55%
of men. In a meta-analysis, Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Trevino
(2010) found gender differences to emerge not only for ethical
intentions, but also for ethical behavior.
1.1.2. Within the negotiation context
Gender differences in ethical attitudes and behavior have also
been documented in negotiations. Kray and Haselhuhn (2012)
found that men exhibited more lenient and egocentric attitudes
about negotiating ethics than did women. Similarly, Robinson
et al. (2000) found that women were less accepting of a wide array
of unethical negotiating strategies than were men. Examining
negotiators’ behavior, Haselhuhn and Wong (2012) coded decep-
tion from email transcripts of a negotiation: Whereas only 11% of
women were deceptive, 25% of men used deception to secure a
deal that harmed their counterpart’s interests. Although less
research has focused on gender differences in the realm of negoti-
ation, these findings suggest that women negotiators exhibit rela-
tively high ethical standards and engage in less unethical
negotiating behavior than do men.
Why might these gender differences in negotiator ethics
emerge? Is there an underlying psychological factor that can
account for gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior?
To date, these questions have received little theoretical attention.
For instance, Franke et al. (1997, p. 920) noted that ‘‘the ethics lit-
erature has taken on a debate-like quality where the focus appears
to center on whether gender differences exist, rather than exploring
why such differences might occur.” Because the literature has
focused on documenting the existence of gender differences in
negotiator ethics rather than providing an explanation for these
29
differences, we focus on exploring the critical question of why gen-
der differences in negotiator ethics exist.
1.2. Explaining why gender differences emerge in negotiator ethics
1.2.1. Historical approaches
One explanation for these gender differences focuses on
women’s and men’s distinct styles of ethical reasoning. Building
on cognitive developmental models of morality that assume people
progress into increasingly sophisticated modes of processing and
resolving moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1971; Piaget, 1932),
Gilligan (1982) proposed that men and women utilize qualitatively
different moral approaches. By this account, women exhibit an
ethic of care, whereas men exhibit an ethic of justice, meaning that
women resolve ethical dilemmas by considering others’ needs
whereas men resolve them by considering individuals’ rights. Gil-
ligan’s proposition inspired much research spanning several dec-
ades (e.g., Ford & Lowery, 1986; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, &
Sampson, 1982; Skoe, Cumberland, Eisenberg, Hansen, & Perry,
2002; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Jaffee and Hyde’s (2000) meta-
analysis found that women do rely more on care-based reasoning
and less on justice-based reasoning than men, but concluded that
the gender differences were too small to justify treating women
and men as different types. Moreover, because more recent
research has found evidence that moral intuitions, not moral rea-
soning, drive ethical behavior for most people (Haidt, 2001) gender
differences in moral reasoning are unlikely to explain why men
and women differ in unethical negotiating behavior. Finally, previ-
ous attempts to explain gender differences in ethical behavior in
terms of distinct reasoning processes cannot explain when and
why moderators exist. These limitations suggest that a more
nuanced approach is needed to explain gender differences in ethi-
cal behavior.
1.2.2. A social-cognitive approach
With this goal in mind, we adopted a social-cognitive perspec-
tive (Bandura, 1991), which emphasizes self-regulatory processes
in explaining gender (Bussey & Bandura, 1999) and ethical behav-
ior (Aquino & Reed, 2002). According to this perspective, degree of
cognitive sophistication in moral reasoning is less important in
predicting behavior than is a consideration of whether being a
moral person is an essential aspect of the self-concept because
how individuals define themselves motivates behavior that is con-
sistent with the self-definition (Blasi, 1980, 1993, 2004). As noted
by Bandura (2001, pp. 8–9), ‘‘A complete theory of moral agency
must link moral knowledge and reasoning to moral conduct [be-
cause] moral reasoning is translated into actions through self-
regulatory mechanisms.” Another advantage of this approach is
that it allows for situational variation in ethical behavior, depend-
ing on the momentary salience of an individual’s moral identity.
Although identity is a relatively stable construct in the sense that
some traits are more chronically and readily accessible than others
in an individual’s self-concept (Boegershausen, Aquino, & Reed,
2015), situational cues can temporarily activate or de-activate
moral identities within people’s working self-concepts (Aquino &
Reed, 2002), allowing scope for understanding how context can
affect men and women’s ethicality. Thus, by considering moral
identity, the current research focuses not on individual differences
in the type of moral content that appeals to women and men, but
on how gender differences in moral identity interact with the
social context of competitive negotiations to predict ethical cogni-
tions and behavior.
1.2.2.1. Moral identity. To start then, we draw from prior research
that has linked identity to ethicality. Moral identity is defined as
conceiving of the self in terms of moral traits that indicate respon-
30 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
siveness to others’ needs and interests (e.g., caring, compassionate,
fair, and kind) (Aquino & Reed, 2002). We expect that women and
men define themselves differently—specifically, that women inter-
nalize moral traits in their identities more strongly than do men.
Throughout the paper, we use the term ‘‘moral identity strength”
to indicate the degree to which people internalize moral traits in
their identities. We expected gender differences in moral identity
strength to underlie gender differences in unethical negotiating
behavior. Notably, we focus on the extent to which men and
women internalize moral traits in their identities (i.e., strength of
moral identity internalization) rather than on their desire to
appear moral in public settings (i.e., strength of moral identity
symbolization). We focus on internalization for two reasons. First,
we seek to explain gender differences in ethical behavior across
private and public contexts. Gender differences in symbolization
would only explain why women and men act differently in public,
not private, contexts. Second, internalization consistently predicts
moral cognition and behavior, whereas results for symbolization
are mixed (see Boegershausen et al., 2015 for a review). For
instance, only moral identity internalization (not symbolization)
predicted actual donations (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Because gender
differences in ethical behavior (not only ethical intentions) do
emerge (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), the internalization construct
is more theoretically relevant than is the symbolization construct.
Gender differences in strength of moral identity could emerge
from the differing self-construals that men and women hold, with
relationships being more central to women’s identities than to
men’s identities (Cross & Madson, 1997). Women often define
themselves as fundamentally interdependent and connected to
others, whereas men typically define themselves as independent
from others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Cross & Madson,
1997). As a result, women tend to describe themselves in more
relational terms, experience more relationship-linked emotions,
and are more attuned to the relationships and emotions of others
(Cross & Madson, 1997). Because being moral helps individuals
to build and maintain relationships (Haidt, 2007; Schwartz,
2007), women are likely to adopt goals and values that promote
the welfare of others. Over time, these goals and values may trans-
late into identifying strongly as a moral person. Overall then, we
expect women to have a stronger moral identity than men do.
Hypothesis 1. Women more strongly internalize moral traits in
their identities than do men.
1.2.2.2. Moral disengagement. In addition to examining moral iden-
tity, we also considered moral disengagement because prior
research has found that moral identity and moral disengagement
‘‘jointly drive” ethical judgments (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman,
2007). Moral disengagement involves an inter-related set of cogni-
tive rationalizations (e.g., blaming the victim or minimizing the con-
sequences of unethical conduct) that allow people to violate their
ethical standards without feeling guilty or critical of themselves
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Prior research
has documented less moral disengagement among girls and women,
relative to boys (Bandura et al., 1996) and men (Chugh, Kern, Zhu, &
Lee, 2014; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008). This gender difference
is robust to context, emerging with respect to behavior at work
(Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012), in sports (Boardley
& Kavussanu, 2007), at school (Bandura et al., 1996), in the military
(McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006), and civically (Caprara, Fida,
Vecchione, Tramontano, & Barbaranelli, 2009).
Moral disengagement enables unethical behavior by cognitively
shielding the self from moral consequences. The current research
considers whether gender differences in moral disengagement oper-
ate in tandem with expected moral identity differences to predict
ethical behavior. Early research linked moral disengagement to less
prosocial behavior and greater aggression among children (Bandura
et al., 1996), with more recent research linking it to unethical
decision-making (Detert et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012), vindictive-
ness (Aquino et al., 2007), social undermining (Duffy, Scott, Shaw,
Tepper, & Aquino, 2012), and unethical work behavior as perceived
by others (Moore et al., 2012). Overall then and consistent with prior
research, we expected that, by helping negotiators to ignore their
ethical standards, gender differences in moral disengagement
would result in gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior.
Hypothesis 2. Moral disengagement mediates the direct effect of
gender on unethical negotiating behavior.
1.2.2.3. Moral identity, moral disengagement, and unethical behav-
ior. Because moral identity serves as a self-regulatory mechanism
to promote moral action (Aquino & Reed, 2002), those who place
higher self-importance on their moral identities morally disengage
less than do those for whom being moral is a less strongly internal-
ized aspect of the self-concept (Aquino et al., 2007; Detert et al.,
2008; McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010). For instance, exploring
reactions to war, Aquino et al. (2007) found that moral disengage-
ment translated into unethical behavior and reduced moral emo-
tion only for those who placed low self-importance on their
moral identities. In a similar vein, we expect gender differences
in moral identity to drive gender differences in moral disengage-
ment, which concomitantly explain gender differences in unethical
negotiating behavior. Overall then, by identifying more strongly
with moral traits, women morally disengage less than men do, thus
suppressing unethical behavior.
Hypothesis 3. Moral identity and moral disengagement sequen-
tially mediate the effect of gender on unethical negotiating
behavior.
1.3. Explaining when gender differences in negotiator ethics emerge
Previous investigations of the role of moral identity on ethical
behavior support a person by situation perspective. Whereas stron-
ger moral identities predict less unethical behavior than weaker
moral identities, the presence of situational cues can mitigate this
effect, with those having stronger moral identities reacting more to
situational cues because the recency and presumed continual rein-
forcement of the situational cue ‘‘overrides” the moral identity
(e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). Building on this
prior work, we examined a situational moderator by testing whether
financial incentives, which increase the desire for money (Hur &
Nordgren, 2016), would mitigate the gender difference in negotiator
ethics.
People hold multiple identities and the salience of a given iden-
tity depends on both individual differences and situational cues
(Aquino et al., 2009; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins & Brendl,
1995; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Skitka, 2003). Because moral goals
and values conflict with goals related to self-interest and self-
advancement (Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1992), situational
cues that highlight self-interest can supplant moral identity and
increase unethical behavior. Thus, merely contemplating money
(Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006) or making salient material objects
common to business (e.g., a briefcase) (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, &
Ross, 2004) can lead people to be more self-interested and less help-
ful towards others. Within negotiations, relationship-promoting
and self-promoting outcomes are often inversely correlated
(Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008). Further sup-
porting these ideas, Aquino et al. (2009) showed that providing a
performance-based financial incentive increased the use of decep-
tion in a negotiation for those with strong (but not weak) moral iden-
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
tities by temporarily decreasing the salience of moral identity rela-
tive to other identities.
We similarly focused on the situational cue of financial incen-
tives. Following Aquino et al.’s (2009) logic, we predicted that finan-
cial incentives may suppress gender differences in moral identity
and unethical negotiating behavior by making goals related to
self-interest salient to women. Thus, even though we expect women
to generally have stronger moral identities than men (and to there-
fore behave less unethically), we expected financial incentives to
have a larger effect on women than on men because the recency
and salience of the incentives will override women’s (but not men’s)
moral identities. Overall then, to the extent that women have stron-
ger moral identities than men, we would expect women’s unethical
negotiating behavior to be affected by financial incentives, whereas
men’s would not because men already maintain a relatively weak
moral identity and thus introducing financial incentives would not
significantly alter their behavior.
Hypothesis 4. Financial incentives moderate the direct effect of
gender on unethical negotiating behavior by increasing women’s
(but not men’s) unethical negotiating behavior.
2. Overview of studies
We carried out five studies to examine why and when women
behave more ethically than men in negotiations. Study 1 involved
a meta-analysis of over 19,000 respondents to first examine gender
differences in moral identity strength (Hypothesis 1), our funda-
mental theoretical mechanism for gender differences in negotiator
ethics. After finding that women internalize moral traits in their
identities more strongly than do men, Study 2 shifted to examining
gender differences in moral disengagement and unethical negotiat-
ing behavior (Hypothesis 2). Through mediation, Study 3 tested the
full theoretical model whereby gender differences in unethical
negotiating behavior are sequentially explained by moral identity
and moral disengagement (Hypothesis 3). Finally, whereas Studies
1–3 focus on explaining why gender differences in negotiator
ethics exist, Studies 4 and 5 tested for a situational moderator –
financial incentives – that would mitigate these differences. We
hypothesized that women’s (but not men’s) unethical negotiating
behavior would increase in response to financial incentives, lead-
ing the gender difference in unethical negotiating behavior to dis-
appear when female negotiators are sufficiently incentivized to
deceive (Hypothesis 4).
3. Study 1
Because we expected individual differences in how strongly
moral traits are internalized to underlie ethical cognition and
behavior, Study 1 began by investigating gender differences in
moral identity strength using a meta-analytic approach. Drawing
from 14 years of research across multiple contexts and samples,
our analysis provides a robust test (cf. Cumming, 2014) of whether
women more strongly internalize moral traits than do men
(Hypothesis 1).
3.1. Method
For this study and others, data, syntax, and study materials are
available from the authors upon request, and all measured
variables are disclosed.1
1
This statement refers to original data collected by the authors (i.e., not Study 4
which involved re-analyzing data from Aquino et al., 2009; for those data, please
contact Aquino et al.).
31
To identify relevant studies, we searched for ‘‘moral identity” in
the Social Sciences Citation Index (i.e., Web of Science), which is
currently the most comprehensive database for the social sciences.
It retrieves articles from a wide array of journals, including all the
top empirical journals in organizational behavior and psychology.
Notably, we did not use gender in the search term as this could
have led to selective sampling of papers that found significant gen-
der differences. We also reached out to researchers via email and
professional listservs for unpublished manuscripts to mitigate
the ‘‘file drawer problem”, i.e., the possibility that non-significant
studies are less likely to be published. Nevertheless, the ‘‘file
drawer problem” is unlikely to be a significant concern in this par-
ticular context because none of the identified papers focused on
gender as a key predictor. Instead, the relationship between moral
identity internalization and gender was typically disclosed in cor-
relation matrices. Therefore, we had no reason to believe that the
sample of published effects would include only papers that found
a significant relationship between gender and moral identity
internalization.
The initial database search returned 387 results. Studies were
included in the analysis if they used Aquino and Reed’s (2002)
scale of moral identity internalization (please see Study 3’s meth-
ods for further information about scale items) and disclosed the
statistics necessary to calculate the effect size for gender. Of the
102 studies that used the moral identity internalization scale, 27
reported the necessary statistics, resulting in data from 15,511
individuals from published papers (see Fig. 1 for a summary of
the studies included in the meta-analysis). Through emails and
professional listservs, we obtained data from an additional six
studies with 4,286 respondents. Our total sample therefore
included 19,797 individuals.
We used Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) and Hunter and Schmidt’s
(2004) methods to conduct the meta-analysis. Specifically, for each
study, we recorded a zero-order correlation between gender and
strength of moral identity internalization. Across studies, we
ensured that female gender was coded with a larger number than
male gender (e.g., female = 2 and male = 1, or female = 1 and
male = 0); if not, we reversed the sign of the correlation to be con-
sistent. We then adjusted the correlations for reliability in the
strength of moral identity internalization scale. Using the sample
size, we calculated standard errors and inverse variance weights
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Finally, we used SPSS and syntax from
Wilson (2015) to conduct mean effect size analyses.
3.2. Results and discussion
Effect sizes ranged from r =
0.09 to 0.46 (SDweighted = 0.08). We
first examined the data for outliers, and a histogram revealed none.
We then conducted a fixed effect analysis of the mean effect size,
which assumes the existence of one true population correlation
and is an approach widely used in management research (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010). Overall, consistent with our theorizing and
Hypothesis 1, women exhibited stronger moral identities than
men (r = 0.21, z = 29.84, p < .001). A fixed effect analysis generated
a 95% confidence interval for the effect size that ranged from
r = 0.19 to 0.22. Overall, this effect size was moderate (a correlation
of 0.21 corresponds to a d of approximately 0.43). Results using a
random effects model were similar (r = 0.20, CI = 0.17–0.24,
z = 11.47, p < .001). There was evidence of significant heterogeneity
in the effect sizes, Q (32) = 127.62, p < .001, indicating the potential
presence of moderators. We revisit the issue of moderating factors
in Studies 4 and 5.
Study 1 documented a significant gender difference in moral
identity strength. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, across 33 studies
and over 19,000 individuals, women more strongly internalized
moral traits in their self-definitions than did men. In common lan-
32 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44

Public. Scale
Study Authors Journa l Ye a r N Re lia bility Corre la ti on
1 Barc lay , W hites ide, Aquino - St udy 1 Journal of Bus ines s Ethic s 2014 127 . 80 . 20
2 Barc lay , W hites ide, Aquino - St udy 2 Journal of Bus ines s Ethic s 2014 200 . 85 . 19
3 Barc lay , W hites ide, Aquino - St udy 3 Journal of Bus ines s Ethic s 2014 179 . 74 -. 08
4 Birt c h & Chiang Journal of Bus ines s Et hic s 2014 318 . 93 . 04
5 Joos t en, Dijk e, Hiel, Cremer Journal of Bus ines s Ethic s 2014 94 . 77 .29
6 Rupp, Shao, Thornt on & Sk arlic k i - Study 1 Pers onnel Ps y c hology 2013 81 .73 .02
7 Rupp, Shao, Thornt on & Sk arlic k i - Study 2 Pers onnel Ps y c hology 2013 245 .76 -. 02
8 W int eric h Aquino Mitt al Swart z - St udy 1 Journal of Applied Ps y c hology 2013 293 . 78 .17
9 W int eric h Aquino Mitt al Swart z - St udy 2 Journal of Applied Ps y c hology 2013 231 . 87 .19
10 Hardy, Francis, Zamboanga, Kim, Anderson, & Forthun Journal of Clinical Ps y c hology 2013 9500 . 82 . 19
11 DeCelles , DeRue, Margolis , & Ceranic Journal of Applied Ps y c hology 2012 173 . 77 . 22
12 Aquino, Mc Ferran, & Laven - St udy 1 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2011 436 .85 .26
13 Aquino, Mc Ferran, & Laven - St udy 2 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2011 443 .86 .26
14 Aquino, Mc Ferran, & Laven - St udy 4 Journal of Pers onality and Soc ial Psychology 2011 129 .82 .29
15 O'Fallon & But terfield Journal of Bus ines s Et hic s 2011 655 . 85 . 26
16 Cot e, DeCelles , Mc Cart hy , Van Kleef, & Hideg Ps y c hologic al Sc ienc e 2011 131 . 84 . 15
17 Sage & Kavus s anu Psychology of Sport and Exercise 2010 365 .71 .05
18 Mc Ferran, Aquino, & Duffy Bus ines s Et hic s Quart erly 2010 145 . 81 . 37
19 W interic h, Mit t al, & Ros s - St udy 1 Journal of Cons umer Res earc h 2009 143 . 85 . 42
20 W int eric h, Mit t al, & Ros s - St udy 2 Journal of Cons umer Res earc h 2009 258 . 83 . 21
21 W int eric h, Mit t al, & Ros s - St udy 3 Journal of Cons umer Res earc h 2009 233 . 79 .09
22 Sk arlic k i, van Jaars veld, & W alk er Journal of Applied Ps y c hology 2008 358 . 82 . 24
23 Reed & Aquino - St udy 2 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2003 79 .87 .37
24 Reed & Aquino - St udy 3 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2003 96 .90 .36
25 Reed & Aquino - St udy 4 Journal of Pers onality and Soc ial Psychology 2003 106 .85 .10
26 Reed & Aquino - St udy 5 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2002 333 .70 -.02
27 Reed & Aquino - St udy 6 Journal of Pers onalit y and Soc ial Psychology 2002 160 .78 .29
28 Trapnell Unpublis hed manus c ript NA 1084 . 80 .20
29 Cohen, Pant er, Turan & Kim Journal of Pers onality and Soc ial Psychology 2014 1514 .83 .22
30 Cohen, Pant er, Turan & Kim Journal of Pers onality and Soc ial Psychology 2014 548 .85 .06
31 W ard & King Unpublis hed manus c ript NA 346 .84 . 20
32 W ard & King Unpublis hed manus c ript NA 194 .78 . 10
33 W ard & King Unpublis hed manus c ript NA 600 .81 . 25

Fig. 1. Summary of studies included in Study 1’s meta-analysis of gender and strength of moral identity internalization.

guage terms (McGraw & Wong, 1992), there is roughly a 66% prob-
ability that a randomly chosen woman will have a stronger moral
identity than a randomly chosen man. As a medium effect size,
gender differences in moral identity are likely ‘‘visible to the naked
eye” (Cohen, 1977, p. 26). However, it is worth noting that the dis-
tributions of moral identity for women and men show approxi-
mately 73% overlap.
4. Study 2
Having established gender differences in moral identity
strength, Study 2 shifted the focus to demonstrate that, consistent
with prior research (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996; Detert et al., 2008;
Moore et al., 2012), women morally disengage less than men in
negotiations and therefore engage in unethical negotiating behav-
ior to a lesser extent (Hypothesis 2). We examined gender differ-
ences in intentions to engage in opportunistic behavior by
distorting information and reneging on implicit and explicit com-
mitments (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Malhotra & Gino, 2011) within
the context of a distributive negotiation involving the sale of a used
car with a known defect. We chose this context because we
expected it to be both common and high-stakes and because
deception abounds within it (Akerlof, 1970).
4.1. Pretest
21% were 35–54, and 6% were 55–64. Using a scale from 1 (no expe-
rience at all) to 9 (great deal of experience), participants first rated
their experience with nine negotiation domains (order counterbal-
anced): negotiating for cars, real estate, employment, furniture,
merchandise, division of household labor, with friends and family,
with landlords/tenants, and with a romantic partner. Participants
then rated the stakes in the nine negotiation domains from 1
(extremely low stakes) to 9 (extremely high stakes).
Participants reported ‘‘some experience” with car negotiations
(M = 4.29, SD = 2.34), which they perceived as ‘‘high-stakes”
(M = 6.32, SD = 1.52). Car negotiations were higher stakes than
six of the eight other domains (ps < .001). Only real estate
(M = 7.18, SD = 1.88, t [106] =
5.62, p < .001) and employment
negotiations (M = 6.69, SD = 1.67, t [107] =
2.64, p = 0.009) were
rated as higher stakes. Thus, used car negotiations are both com-
mon and high-stakes, making them an important context to
examine.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants and procedure
Participants (N = 217; 42% female; Mage = 28.72, SDage = 9.77)
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website received $1.50 for com-
pleting the study. Our sample size was pre-determined and no data
were excluded. Gender varied naturally between participants.2

A pretest (N = 109; 48% female) examined whether used car 2

We manipulated the gender of the negotiating counterpart (‘‘the buyer”) to
negotiations are perceived as common and high-stakes. Thirty- ensure this factor could not explain the results. Because it did not produce any main
nine percent of participants were ages 26–34, 33% were 18–25, or interaction effects, we do not discuss it further.
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
Participants first read a negotiation scenario (see Appendix A
for the full scenario), which provided the possibility for negotiating
opportunistically. Specifically, participants were selling their used
car, which had a minor (missing fuel cap) and a larger (intermittent
transmission) problem. Participants were given examples of how
some deception was not uncommon in car negotiations (to ensure
they did not feel pressure to act ethically) and needed to decide
whether they would reveal the car problems to a potential Craigs-
list buyer.
4.2.2. Dependent variables
After reading the scenario, we measured participants’ moral
disengagement and opportunism.
To measure moral disengagement in negotiations, we adapted
Bandura et al.’s (1996) moral disengagement scale to the negotia-
tion context (see Appendix A for the 32 items; a = 0.97). Using a
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants
indicated how much they agreed with items like, ‘‘It’s ok to omit
information if the buyer doesn’t ask the right questions” and
‘‘Bending the truth is no big deal when you consider that others
are engaging in outright fraud.”
Next, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), we measured
opportunism using a 3-item scale (a = 0.66) from Malhotra and
Gino (2011). Questions included, ‘‘When negotiating with
Michael/Patricia, how committed are you to negotiating openly
and in good faith?” (reverse-scored), ‘‘When negotiating with
Michael/Patricia, to what extent are you going to be opportunis-
tic?”, and ‘‘How obligated do you feel to act in a completely trust-
worthy and honest manner in your dealings with Michael/
Patricia?”.3
4.3. Results and discussion
Our first analyses helped to validate our moral disengagement
in negotiations scale. We submitted the 32 items to a principal
components analysis with varimax rotation. Four factors with
eigenvalues greater than one emerged, but all items loaded most
heavily on the first factor, at 0.59 or higher. Consistent with prior
research (Bandura et al., 1996; Detert et al., 2008; Shu, Gino, &
Bazerman, 2011), we therefore analyzed moral disengagement as
one scale.
We next examined whether relative to men, women would
morally disengage less and negotiate less opportunistically. Con-
sistent with prior research, a main effect of participant gender
emerged, t (215) =
2.82, p = 0.005, d = 0.39, with women
(M = 3.03, SD = 1.10) morally disengaging less than men
(M = 3.49, SD = 1.25). The same pattern emerged for opportunism:
women (M = 2.93, SD = 1.07) exhibited less opportunism than did
men (M = 3.40, SD = 1.42), t (209) =
2.74, p = 0.009, d = 0.37.
Finally, we tested whether women’s lower moral disengage-
ment could explain their lower opportunism. In a linear regression
predicting opportunism, participant gender (b⁄ =
0.17, t [208]
=
2.54, p = 0.01) became non-significant (t [207] =
1.53,
p = 0.13) when accounting for moral disengagement, b⁄ = 0.44, t
(207) = 7.18, p < .001. A bootstrapping analysis with 10,000 sam-
ples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) yielded a confidence interval of
[
0.05,
0.39] for the indirect effect, providing evidence of signif-
icant mediation and supporting Hypothesis 2.
Consistent with prior research on moral disengagement and
ethical behavior, women in Study 2 were less likely to morally dis-
engage and less likely to behave opportunistically when selling a
3
We also measured stereotypes about and feelings toward the buyer (e.g., anxiety,
warmth, competence), as well as individual differences (e.g., social dominance
orientation, sexism). Because these measures are not central to our research question,
we do not discuss them further.
33
used car to a stranger. Although the mediational analyses should
be interpreted with caution as the data are correlational and the
effects appear to be bi-directional (i.e., opportunism predicted
moral disengagement), women were less inclined than men to
act unethically and to rationalize unethical behavior within a dis-
tributive negotiation. Given that holding a stronger moral identity
prevents moral disengagement (Aquino et al., 2007; Detert et al.,
2008; McFerran et al., 2010), we turned to whether women nego-
tiator’s stronger moral identities can explain why women morally
disengage less and behave less unethically than men when they
negotiate.
5. Study 3
The previous studies established both that women have stron-
ger moral identities than men (Study 1) as well as report less moral
disengagement and opportunism in negotiations (Study 2). Study 3
linked these ideas to explore the fundamental role of moral iden-
tity in creating gender differences in negotiator ethics. We
expected moral identity to precipitate gender differences in moral
disengagement and unethical negotiating behavior (Hypothesis 3).
In Study 3, men and women were introduced to Study 2’s negoti-
ation scenario, after which we measured their moral identity
strength, moral disengagement, and endorsement of unethical
negotiating tactics. Studies 2 and 3 examined moral disengage-
ment within the context of a specific scenario, demonstrating that
in an identical situation, women rationalize deception less than
men do. Study 3 also measured endorsement of unethical negotiat-
ing tactics as a more general measure of intentions to engage in
unethical behavior, which is broadly applicable across negotiating
contexts.
5.1. Method
Participants (N = 324; 44% female; Mage = 20.55, SDage = 1.99)
were undergraduates at two universities: one private in the South-
eastern U.S. and one public in the Western U.S. Participants
received course credit for completing the study. Our sample size
was determined by the number of students who opted to partici-
pate in the study at each university (we collected as much data
as possible within a fixed number of lab sessions). No data were
excluded. Gender varied naturally between participants.
5.1.1. Moral identity strength
We first measured how strongly participants internalized moral
traits in their identities. Participants read characteristics associated
with a moral identity (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, gener-
ous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind) and wrote about how
a person with these characteristics would think, feel, and act on a
typical day (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2007). In designing
this measure, Aquino and Reed (2002) noted that these traits do
not comprehensively capture every characteristic of a moral per-
son, but they invoke associations that make salient a person’s
moral identity. These terms were mentioned by at least 30% of
respondents when asked about the traits of a moral person. After
imagining this type of person, participants reported how important
it was for them to have these characteristics by responding to the
five-item internalization subscale (a = 0.79) from Aquino and Reed
(2002). Specifically, using a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7
(extremely important), they responded to items like, ‘‘It would make
me feel good to be a person with these characteristics”, ‘‘Being
someone who has these characteristics is an important part of
who I am” and ‘‘I would be ashamed to be a person who had these
characteristics (reverse-scored)”.
34 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
5.1.2. Moral disengagement
Participants then read the used car negotiation scenario and
completed the 32-item moral disengagement scale from Study 2
(a = 0.97).
5.1.3. Endorsement of unethical negotiating tactics
Finally, using the self-reported inappropriate negotiating strate-
gies (SINS) scale (Robinson et al., 2000) and a scale from 1 (not at all
appropriate) to 7 (very appropriate), participants reported their
endorsement of 16 general unethical negotiating tactics that were
not specific to the scenario (e.g., attempt to get your opponent fired
from his/her position so that a new person will take his/her place).
The items formed a reliable scale (a = 0.91).4
5.2. Results and discussion
Table 1 presents correlations among the variables. We first con-
ducted analyses including the institution where the study was con-
ducted as a factor. No interactions between gender and the
institution emerged (ps > .22), so we collapsed across the samples
in analyses reported below.
We replicated the gender differences from Studies 1 and 2. Once
again, women (M = 6.22, SD = 0.88) more strongly internalized
moral traits than did men (M = 5.93, SD = 0.88), t (320) = 2.98,
p = 0.003, d = 0.33. Additionally, women negotiators (M = 2.79,
SD = 1.07) morally disengaged less than did men negotiators
(M = 3.17 SD = 0.98), t (320) =
3.26, p = 0.001, d = 0.37. Finally,
also as expected, women (M = 2.71, SD = 0.90) endorsed general
unethical negotiating tactics to a lesser degree than did men
(M = 3.31, SD = 1.01), t (320) =
5.56, p < .001, d = 0.63. Notably,
the effect size for this last gender difference was medium-to-
large (Cohen, 1992), and it is larger than has been observed outside
negotiations (e.g., Jaffee & Hyde, 2000).
5.2.1. Sequential mediation analysis
Using Preacher and Hayes (2008) method, we then explored
whether the gender difference in moral identity strength could
explain gender differences in moral disengagement and unethical
negotiating behavior (Hypothesis 3). Specifically, we tested a
model involving gender ? moral identity strength ? moral disen-
gagement ? endorsement of unethical negotiating tactics. In PRO-
CESS, Model 6 (Hayes, 2013), we entered gender as the explanatory
variable, moral identity strength and moral disengagement as
sequential mediators, and endorsement of unethical negotiating
4
On an exploratory basis, we also measured guilt and examined its role. Prior
theorizing suggests that guilt is an important moral emotion that could follow moral
identity (Cohen & Morse, 2014). Using a scale from 1 (disagree entirely) to 7 (agree
entirely), participants imagined that they had disclosed the small defect but not the
large defect in the car negotiation and indicated their agreement with eight items
measuring their guilt (adapted from Grant & Wrzesniewski, 2010) (e.g., I would feel I
had not lived up to the buyer’s standards, I would feel I had not lived up to my
standards, I would feel guilty), a = 0.95. Women (M = 5.61, SD = 1.00) anticipated
stronger feelings of guilt than did men (M = 5.00, SD = 1.27) after imagining that they
acted unethically, t (320) = 4.77, p < .001, d = 0.54. To test guilt’s mediating role, we
used PROCESS, Model 6 (Hayes, 2013). When guilt was entered into the model
between moral identity strength and moral disengagement, the 95% confidence
interval excluded zero (
0.04,
0.01). The results suggest that gender differences in
moral identity strength may precipitate gender differences in moral emotions, such as
guilt. Other exploratory models confirmed that moral identity strength precipitates
subsequent gender differences in ethical emotion and behavior, not vice versa.
Although interesting, we interpret these findings with caution because two prior
studies produced contradictory findings for guilt. One study manipulated guilt and
found neither a main effect of guilt nor a gender  guilt interaction on moral
disengagement. A second study using a panel of men and women recruited through
Qualtrics failed to replicate the mediating role of guilt observed above. Overall,
further empirical exploration is needed to properly understand the role of guilt in
predicting gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior. Further details are
available from the authors.
tactics as the outcome variable. The bootstrap analysis with
10,000 resamples yielded a 95% confidence interval that excluded
zero for the four-variable model (
0.08,
0.01). Fig. 2 illustrates
these results. This analysis provides evidence that gender differ-
ences in moral identity strength help to explain why women
morally disengage less and endorse unethical negotiating tactics
to a lesser degree than men.
Notably, a number of models did not receive empirical support.
Moral disengagement alone did not explain the gender difference
in endorsement of unethical negotiating tactics (
0.12, 0.04), and
neither did moral identity strength by itself (
0.08, 0.01). The
results indicate that moral identity strength and moral disengage-
ment each help to explain why gender differences in unethical
negotiating behavior emerge, consistent with prior research adopt-
ing the social-cognitive approach (Aquino et al., 2007).
Study 3 replicated and extended the effects found in our prior
studies. Women reported stronger moral identities, lower moral
disengagement, and lesser endorsement of unethical behavior than
did men. We tested and confirmed a sequential model, whereby
the degree to which the self was conceptualized in moral terms
precipitated gender differences in moral disengagement, which in
turn predicted gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior
(Hypothesis 3).
6. Study 4
Our studies up to this point have focused on establishing that
gender differences in the strength of moral identity predict ethical
cognition, which underlies gender differences in ethical behavior.
In Study 4, we shifted towards identifying a situational moderator
that might mitigate gender differences in unethical negotiating
behavior, increasing women’s use of deception in negotiations to
a level comparable to that of men.
More specifically, Study 4 explored whether financial incentives
eliminate gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior. By
testing financial incentives as a moderator, the study could provide
further support for moral identity as an underlying mechanism
(Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Aquino et al. (2009, Studies 2
and 3) found that financial incentives suppress moral identity,
affecting those with stronger (but not weaker) moral identities. If
financial incentives affect women (but not men), it would suggest
that moral identity underlies gender differences in unethical nego-
tiating behavior. Consistent with Aquino et al. (2009), we opera-
tionalized financial incentives in two ways – the presence of
performance-based incentives and incentive size. Following their
logic, we expected financial incentives (performance-based incen-
tives or large financial incentives) to affect women’s but not men’s
unethical negotiating behavior. Specifically, Hypothesis 4 pre-
dicted that women (who generally have stronger moral identities,
Studies 1 and 3) would behave unethically in the presence but not
absence of financial incentives. In contrast, men (who generally
have weaker moral identities, Studies 1 and 3) would behave
unethically regardless of the presence or absence of financial
incentives.
Finally, to show the robustness of our effects, Study 4 used a
behavioral dependent variable to explore gender differences in
unethical negotiating tactics. Because our earlier studies used
scales to measure unethical behavioral intentions, we sought to
replicate our effect using a behavioral measure of lying in a face-
to-face negotiation.
6.1. Method
To test our hypothesis that gender differences in unethical
negotiation behavior would be moderated by financial incentives,
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44 35

Table 1
Correlations among variables in Study 3.

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
a
1. Gender – – –
2. Moral identity strength 6.06 0.89 0.16** –
3. Moral disengagement 3.00 1.04
0.18**
0.26*** –
4. Endorsement of unethical negotiating tactics 3.04 1.01
0.30***
0.24*** 0.51*** –
a
Female = 1, male = 0.
***
p < .001.
**
p < .01.
*
p < .05.

Moral Identity -.24***

Moral
Strength Disengagement

.16** .45***
-.14* -.09NS

-.30*** / -.20*** Endorsement of

Gender Unethical
Indirect effect Negotiating
95% CI [-.08, -.01] Tactics

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Note. Diagram shows standardized regression coefficients. CIs obtained using Hayes (2012) PROCESS approach.

Fig. 2. Test of theoretical model in Study 3.

we re-analyzed data from Aquino et al.’s (2009) Study 3, which was
provided to us by the study’s authors. Participants (N = 224, 130
women) were undergraduate business students. The study used a
2 (Incentive type: Random, Performance)  2 (Incentive size:
Small, Large) between-participants design. Full details are pro-
vided in Aquino et al. (2009, pp. 132–133), but we repeat key infor-
mation here.
The role-play simulated a negotiation between a manager and a
job candidate. Managers sought to secure the candidate at the low-
est possible salary. Candidates valued job security and were
instructed not to agree to any salary without a guarantee of hold-
ing the position for at least 2 years. However, managers could not
agree to this term because the job would be eliminated in six
months due to a restructuring (unbeknownst to the candidate).
Participants in the manager role therefore had an opportunity to
lie to the candidate about job stability. The negotiation lasted
15 min. Consistent with Aquino et al. (2009), we included only
those who held the role of manager (n = 112, 66 women) in our
analyses in order to explore their deceptive behavior.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimen-
tal conditions. Reward size was either $50 (small incentive) or $150
(large incentive). Participants were told that the reward would be
given to either the manager who negotiated the lowest salary (per-
formance incentive) or to a randomly selected manager (random
incentive).
6.1.1. Moral identity strength
At least two days prior to the study, participants’ strength of
moral identity (a = 0.82) was measured using the five internaliza-
tion items from Aquino and Reed (2002) on a 5-point scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The items were similar to
those in our Study 3, except they were phrased as statements (‘‘It
would make me feel good to be a person who has these character-
istics”) rather than questions (e.g., ‘‘How good would it make you
feel to be a person who has these characteristics?”). We explored
moral identity strength first as a continuous variable, and then as
a median split. Following Aquino et al. (2009), those below the
median of 4.60 were coded as having weak moral identities
(n = 55, M = 3.97, SD = 0.43) and those at or above the median were
coded as having strong moral identities (n = 57, M = 4.86,
SD = 0.17).
6.1.2. Unethical negotiating behavior
Aquino et al. (2009) had two independent raters (ICC = 0.89)
code the degree of deception from videotapes of the negotiation.
The deception variable had four levels: truth telling (e.g., ‘‘The
job will be restructured after six months”), refusing to answer
(e.g., ‘‘I can’t tell you that”), concealing (e.g., ‘‘It’s possible you
may be on the job for at least two years”), and lying (e.g., ‘‘I can
guarantee that you will be at the same job for at least two years”).
Following Aquino et al. (2009), we first analyzed deception as a 4-
level variable from 1 (told truth) to 4 (lied), and then as a binary
variable (1 = lied, 0 = other response).
6.2. Results and discussion
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among
variables.
We first tested for gender differences in moral identity strength.
Consistent with Studies 1 and 3, women (M = 4.57, SD = 0.48) had
stronger moral identities than men did (M = 4.22, SD = 0.59), t
(110) = 3.41, p = 0.002, d = 0.64. Overall, using Aquino et al.’s
(2009) median split, 64% of women were categorized as having
strong moral identities compared to 33% of men, X2 (1) = 10.44,
p = 0.001. Because moral identity strength was measured two days
before the key manipulations, we were not able to further analyze
its potential role in explaining the effects of the manipulation on
unethical behavior (deception). We thus examined deception by
participant gender and incentive condition.
We explored whether both incentive type and incentive size
moderated the gender difference in unethical negotiating behavior.
To do so, we first used multinomial logistic regression with
36 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44

Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations in Study 4.

Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
a
1. Gender 0.59 0.49 –
2. Incentive sizeb 0.52 0.50 0.07 –
3. Incentive typec 0.49 0.50 0.02
0.02 –
4. Moral identity strength (cont.) 4.43 0.55 0.31** 0.13
0.04 –
5. Moral identity strength (split)d 0.51 0.50 0.31** 0.05
0.11 0.81*** –
6. Deception (4-level) 2.40 1.08
0.09 0.03 0.12
0.28**
0.15 –
7. Deception (binary) 0.22 0.42
0.12 0.09 0.16
0.31**
0.16y 0.80***
a
Female = 1, male = 0.
b
1 = large incentive ($150), 0 = small incentive ($50).
c
1 = performance incentive, 0 = random incentive.
d
1 = high moral identity, 0 = low moral identity.
***
p < .001.
**
p < .01.
*
p < .05.
y
p < .10.

maximum-likelihood estimation, in line with Aquino et al. (2009).
We predicted the 4-level deception variable with incentive type,
incentive size, manager gender, and the three two-way interaction
terms (gender  incentive type, gender  incentive size, and incen-
tive type  incentive size). Two significant effects emerged. A main
effect for participant gender emerged, X2 (3) = 12.70, p = 0.005, and
this effect was qualified by an interaction with incentive size, X2
(3) = 7.68, p = 0.05. No other effects reached significance,
X2s < 6.00, ps > .11. When the 3-way interaction (gender  incen-
tive type  incentive size) was entered, it was non-significant, X2
(3) = 2.34, p = 0.50.5 For women, incentive type (X [3] = 9.88,
p = 0.02) and incentive size (X [3] = 8.96, p = 0.03) influenced decep-
tion, with women acting more deceptively in the presence (rather
than absence) of incentives and when incentives were large (rather
than small). For men, no effects of incentive type (X [3] = 1.49,
p = 0.69) or incentive size (X [3] = 1.94, p = 0.59) emerged. These
findings supported Hypothesis 4: women’s (but not men’s) ethicality
was suppressed in the presence of large incentives. Figs. 3a and 3b
depict the results.
We next investigated deception with the binary measure also
reported by Aquino et al. (2009). Using logistic regression, we once
again predicted deception with incentive type, incentive size, par-
ticipant gender, and the three two-way interaction terms. As
before, the main effect of gender (OR = 0.02, Wald = 6.38, p = 0.01)
was subsumed by a gender  incentive size interaction,
OR = 22.17, Wald = 6.33, p = 0.01. No other effects were significant
(Walds < 2.11, ps > .14). For women, the odds of lying were 6.06
times higher under performance than random incentives,
Wald = 5.37, p = 0.02. Additionally, the odds of lying were 8.41
times higher when incentives were large than small, Wald = 5.98,
p = 0.01. For men, no effect emerged for incentive type (OR = 1.62,
Wald = 0.50, p = 0.48) or size (OR = 0.53, Wald = 0.86, p = 0.35).
Fig. 4 illustrates the effect.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, these results confirm that women
(but not men) respond to strong situational cues such as financial
incentives: women (who generally have stronger moral identities)
behaved unethically in the presence of large incentives. In contrast,
men (who generally have weaker moral identities) were unaffected
by incentive size. These findings also provide further theoretical
support for the role of situational factors that promote self-
interest by suppressing and supplanting moral identity, in line
with a social-cognitive perspective on moral behavior.
Because Aquino et al. (2009) showed that people with stronger
moral identities (but not those with weaker moral identities) were
5
Results were similar using linear regression analysis. Only a main effect of gender
(b⁄ =
0.34, t [105] =
2.11, p = 0.04) and the gender  incentive size interaction
⁄
(b = 0.39, t [105] = 2.14, p = 0.04) were significant.
influenced by the presence of performance-based (relative to ran-
dom) financial incentives, we also expected incentive type to sim-
ilarly moderate gender differences in unethical negotiating
behavior, something which we did not find. One possible explana-
tion for the null effect could be that some participants in Aquino
et al.’s (2009) study interpreted the mere presence of a financial
incentive in the random incentive condition as performance-
based. In their study, no manipulation check was reported that
specifically asked whether participants perceived the incentive to
depend on their performance. Study 5 remedies this problem.
7. Study 5
We conducted Study 5 to further explore whether it is the pres-
ence of performance-based financial incentives specifically rather
than any financial incentives (i.e., random financial incentives) that
moderate gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior. To
the extent that unethical behavior is triggered by lucrative envi-
ronments broadly (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013),
any type of financial incentive (including one randomly awarded)
could impact unethical negotiating behavior. Alternatively, to the
extent that unethical behavior is more narrowly triggered by finan-
cial goals relevant to performance, performance-based financial
incentives could be especially impactful. Performance-based finan-
cial incentives could encourage goal-setting more strongly than do
randomly-awarded financial incentives, thereby increasing uneth-
ical behavior (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004). Overall, we
expected women (but not men) to be influenced by the presence
(versus absence) of performance-based financial incentives
(Hypothesis 4).
We used the procedure from Aquino et al.’s (2009) Study 2,
which is similar to our Study 4 with the following exceptions. First,
we did not vary incentive size, but held it constant at $100. By
holding constant the incentive size at a moderate level (the mid-
point of the low and high incentive amounts from the prior study),
we aimed to isolate the hypothesized moderating effect of
performance-based financial incentives on unethical negotiating
behavior for women relative to men. Second, we included a manip-
ulation check to ensure that participants in the performance-based
financial incentive condition perceived their performance as more
relevant to their payout than participants in the randomly-
awarded financial incentive condition. Third, participants did not
actually complete the negotiation. After reviewing their role
instructions, participants completed a survey with measures of
moral identity strength and intention to lie, embedded among filler
items. Measuring moral identity strength after role instructions
and manipulations were introduced allowed us to test whether
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44 37

60%
50%
50%

Frequency among Women

40%
33%

30% 28%
23% 22%
20%
20% 17%

10% 7%

0%
Truth Refuse Conceal Lie
Small Incenve Large Incenve

Fig. 3a. Frequency of unethical negotiating behavior by incentive size for women in Study 4.

60%

50%
Frequency among Men

40%
32% 33%
29%
30% 27%
23%
21%
17% 18%
20%

10%

0%
Truth Refuse Conceal Lie
Small Incenve Large Incenve

Fig. 3b. Frequency of unethical negotiating behavior by incentive size for men in Study 4.

35% 33%

30% 28%
Proporon Who Lied

25% 23%

20%

15%

10%
7%
5%

0%
Men W om e n
Small Incenve Large Incenve

Fig. 4. Gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior (binary measure) by incentive size in Study 4.
38 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
moral identity strength mediated the effect of gender and financial
incentive type on intention to lie.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants and design
Participants (N = 194, 100 women, Mage = 19.77, SDage = 1.07)
were undergraduates at a private Southern university. They
received course credit for participating. Our sample size was deter-
mined by the number of students who opted to participate in the
study (we collected as much data as possible within a fixed num-
ber of lab sessions). No data were excluded. The study had a 2-
condition (Financial incentive type: Random, Performance)
between-participants design, with gender varying naturally.
7.1.2. Procedure
Participants were given the role of a manager in a negotiation
role-play, which was very similar to the one used in Study 4
(adapted from the Job Offer Negotiation in Lewicki, Barry, &
Saunders, 2015). As manager, participants were tasked with secur-
ing a job candidate at the lowest possible salary. Participants knew
that the job candidate would agree to a lower salary in exchange
for a verbal commitment of job stability, but in fact, the job would
be eliminated in 6 months due to a restructuring (unbeknownst to
the candidate). Once again, the critical question was whether par-
ticipants would lie to the candidate about job stability in order to
secure a better negotiation outcome for themselves.
Following Aquino et al. (2009), participants in the performance
incentive condition were told:
Negotiating a low salary can benefit you personally in this experi-
ment because the person in the manager’s role who negotiates the
lowest salary at the end of this study will earn a $100 cash prize.
Participants in the random incentive condition were told:
For participating in today’s experiment, you may win a $100 cash
prize. The winner of the prize will be randomly selected from
among all of the persons who played the role of manager during
the experiment.
In both conditions and consistent with instructions from
Aquino et al. (2009), participants were informed that doing better
for themselves could harm the other party:
In addition, by doing better for yourself, you will decrease your
negotiating counterpart’s chances of earning $100 because the can-
didate’s prize is dependent on his or her starting salary.
7.1.3. Moral identity strength
After reading their role materials, we measured participants’
moral identity strength with the five items from Study 4,
a = 0.81. Participants reported how important displaying the moral
traits would be to them in the context of the negotiation with the
job candidate using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree).
7.1.4. Intention to lie
We measured intention to lie with two items from Aquino et al.
(2009). In the context of planning their negotiation strategy, partic-
ipants reported how likely they were to tell the job candidate that
the position was certain to be eliminated in six months if they
were specifically asked about job security during the negotiation
using percentages (0–100%) and a scale from 1 (extremely unlikely)
to 9 (extremely likely). We reverse-scored the items so that higher
numbers indicated greater intent to lie and then standardized
and averaged the items, a = 0.94.
7.1.5. Manipulation check
At the end of the study, participants were asked, ‘‘To what
extent does your chance of winning the $100 incentive depend
on how low of a salary you negotiate?” They responded using a
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
7.2. Results and discussion
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among
variables. We analyzed results using ANOVA with incentive type
and participant gender as between-participant factors, unless
otherwise noted.
7.2.1. Manipulation check
Participants in the performance incentive condition (M = 6.06,
SD = 1.72) thought that their negotiation performance more greatly
affected their chances of winning the incentive than those in the
random incentive condition (M = 3.14, SD = 2.22), F (1, 190)
= 104.03, p < .001, g2p = 0.35. Neither gender nor the interaction
term reached significance (Fs < .93, ps > .33).
7.2.2. Moral identity strength
Only a main effect for gender emerged for moral identity
strength, F (1, 190) = 16.21, p < .001, g2p = 0.08. Women (M = 6.20,
SD = 0.81) had stronger moral identities than men did (M = 5.67,
SD = 0.99). Incentive type (F [1, 190] = 0.00, p = 0.98, g2p < .001)
and the gender  incentive type interaction (F [1, 190] = 0.17,
p = 0.68, g2p = 0.001) were non-significant.
7.2.3. Intention to lie
We then examined whether women and men reacted differ-
ently to the presence of performance incentives. For intention to
lie, only the predicted gender  incentive type interaction
emerged, F (1, 190) = 4.45, p = 0.036, g2p = 0.02. The main effects
of incentive type (F [1, 190] = 0.28, p = 0.60, g2p = 0.001) and gender
(F [1, 190] = 0.02, p = 0.89, g2p < .001) were not significant.
As hypothesized, the interaction reflected responsiveness to
financial incentives on the part of women but not men. Women
reported greater intention to lie under the performance incentive
(M = 0.14, SD = 0.81) than under the random incentive
(M =
0.22, SD = 0.96), t (98) = 2.03, p = 0.045, d = 0.41. In contrast,
men’s intentions to lie did not vary by type of incentive, t (92)
=
1.03, p = 0.30, d = 0.22. Fig. 5 illustrates the result.
7.2.4. Conditional mediation analysis
Using Hayes (2013) PROCESS models, we then tested whether
moral identity strength explains why incentive type affected
women’s intentions to lie, but not men’s. Gender (0 = male,
1 = female) was entered as the independent variable, incentive
type (0 = random, 1 = performance) was entered as the moderator,
moral identity strength was the mediator, and intention to lie was
the dependent variable. All analyses used 10,000 resamples.
We first tested Model 15, expecting performance incentives to
moderate both the direct effect of gender and the indirect effect
of women’s stronger moral identities on intentions to lie (i.e., a
second-stage moderated mediation; see Fig. 6a for an illustration).
Model 15 did not receive support. The 95% confidence interval
bridged zero for the incentive type  moral identity interaction
[
0.42, 0.16] and for the indirect effect of moral identity overall
[
0.26, 0.08]. This finding was surprising because Aquino et al.
(2009) found evidence for the mediating role of moral identity
between financial incentives and unethical behavior. However,
the lack of evidence for this second-stage moderated mediation
model could potentially be explained by our having measured
moral identity strength rather than moral identity accessibility.
Moral identity strength increases a person’s perceived obligation
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44 39

Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlations in Study 5.

Variables M SD 1 2 3
a
1. Gender 0.52 0.50 –
2. Incentive typeb 0.50 0.50 0.12y –
3. Moral identity strength 5.95 0.94 0.28*** 0.03 –
4. Intention to lie
0.36 0.95 0.01 0.04
0.17*
a
Female = 1, male = 0.
b
1 = performance incentive, 0 = random incentive.
***
p < .001.
**
p < .01.
*
p < .05.
y
p < .10.

0.20

0.15 0.14

0.10
0.05
0.05

0.00
Men Women
-0.05

-0.10

-0.15

-0.20 -0.17

-0.25 -0.22

Random Incentive Performance Incentive

Fig. 5. Gender differences in intention to lie by incentive type in Study 5.

Incentive Moral Identity

Type Strength

95% CI [-.42, .16]

Intention
Gender Indirect effect to Lie
95% CI [-.26, .08]

Note. CIs obtained using Hayes (2012) PROCESS macro.

Fig. 6a. Mediation analysis (PROCESS MODEL 15) in Study 5.

to act morally—that is, it increases the ‘‘activation potential” of
moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009, p. 125)—but accessibility
reflects ‘‘actual activation” in a given situation.
We then proceeded to test Model 5, whereby incentive type mod-
erated only the direct effect of gender on intentions to lie (see
Fig. 6b). Model 5 was supported. A bootstrapping analysis produced
a 95% confidence interval of [
0.22,
0.03] for the indirect effect of
moral identity strength, overall. This result suggests that gender dif-
ferences in moral identity strength help to explain why incentive
type impacted unethical negotiating behavior for women but not
men.
Study 5’s results were consistent with those from Study 4, sug-
gesting that women’s unethical negotiating behavior is more
affected by the presence of financial incentives than is men’s.
Aquino et al. (2009) found evidence that self-interest-promoting
situational factors like financial incentives most strongly influence
the behavior of people with stronger moral identities. Across Stud-
ies 4 and 5, we found evidence to support this notion. Women
(who have generally stronger moral identities) negotiated more
ethically than men (who have generally weaker moral identities)
only when incentives were small (not large), and their behavior
varied based on type of incentive more than men’s did. This sug-
gests that women require more financial incentives than men do
to engage in unethical bargaining behavior.
Prior research (Aquino et al., 2009, Study 2) established that
performance-based financial incentives decrease the salience of
40 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
Incentive
Type
Gender
95% CI [-.22, -.03]
Note. CIs obtained using Hayes (2012) PROCESS macro.
Fig. 6b. Mediation analysis (PROCESS MODEL 5) in Study 5.
moral identity. Other identities such as ‘‘clever person” and ‘‘prag-
matic person” become relatively more salient when such incen-
tives are present. Our two mediation analyses suggest that moral
identity remains stronger for women than men even when
performance-based financial incentives are present. However, con-
sistent with Aquino et al.’s (2009) theorizing, the fact that
performance-based financial incentives moderated the gender dif-
ference on lying intentions suggests that women’s moral identity
became less accessible in the presence of performance incentives,
thereby providing indirect evidence for the importance of moral
identity in explaining gender differences in negotiator ethics.
8. General discussion
In a series of five studies, we draw attention to important gender
differences in negotiator ethics and provide a novel theoretical
explanation for them: Women’s stronger moral identities relative
to men’s provide a buffer against the temptation to rationalize, plan,
and engage in unethical behavior in competitive negotiations.
Although women are disadvantaged in negotiations by negative
stereotypes (Kray et al., 2001) and in terms of economic perfor-
mance under some conditions (Mazei et al., 2015), the current work
suggests that at times, women have an ethical advantage at the bar-
gaining table relative to their male counterparts. Additionally, we
find that women’s stronger moral identities only translate into more
ethical behavior when financial incentives do not promote the use of
deception, suggesting chronic gender differences in moral identity
interact with contextual cues to predict bargaining behavior.
The magnitude of our findings for gender are consistent with
Eagly’s (1995, p. 151) assertion that sex differences are often compa-
rable in size to other types of findings, when judged in relation to
reasonable benchmarks. Our results place gender alongside other
well-accepted predictors of ethical behavior, such as idealistic and
relativistic moral philosophy, and Machiavellianism, which respec-
tively showed correlations of
0.21, 0.20, and 0.27 with unethical
choices in Kish-Gephart et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis. With regard
to endorsing unethical negotiating tactics on Robinson et al.’s
(2000) measure specifically, gender’s effect size in our studies was
comparable to that of being in a loss (versus gain) frame (Kern &
Chugh, 2009) and was larger than that of envy (Moran &
Schweitzer, 2008). With respect to moral identity, gender related
to it at levels comparable to parents’ autonomy-granting behavior
(Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, & Aquino, 2010), one of the few known
predictors. Below, we further discuss theoretical and practical impli-
cations of our findings.
8.1. Theoretical contributions
Fundamentally, our research draws attention to and explains a
number of under-theorized gender differences in the literature: in
Moral Identity
Strength
Intention
Indirect effect to Lie
moral disengagement, endorsement of unethical tactics, and
deception. Despite emerging consistently in prior research, these
effects have received little theoretical attention. We attempt to
take one step toward eliminating the treatment of gender as a
‘‘black box.” Studying demographic variables as black boxes (with-
out insight into their underlying psychological constructs) allows
for prediction, but it eliminates explanation, obscuring clear think-
ing (Lawrence, 1997). Our findings suggest that gender is a proxy
for moral identity, which predicts unethical behavior under certain
circumstances.
Our approach is distinguished from prior accounts that have
emphasized the importance of moral reasoning, where moderators
have played a limited role (e.g., Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). By
focusing on moral identity as the driving mechanism underlying
gender differences in negotiator ethics, our research supports a
social-cognitive account. The social-cognitive model argues that
moral behavior is determined by the interplay of internal stan-
dards (e.g., moral identity) and situational circumstances (Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 1996). Consistent
with this model, our research shows the importance of how nego-
tiators conceptualize themselves for their bargaining behavior.
When negotiators prioritize moral traits in their self-concept, it
has important consequences for whether they behave ethically in
negotiations. When moral traits are less strongly internalized,
negotiators are more likely to rationalize the use of ethically ques-
tionable tactics and to deceive their counterparts. Additionally, we
show that when situational pressures such as financial incentives
disrupt self-regulatory processes, then unethical negotiating
behavior increases for those who are a priori more restrained.
Similarly, our research reflects a desire to shift the study of gen-
der differences in ethics toward explanation and away from gender
determinism, whereby gender is thought to be a fixed cause of
individual traits (Tinsley, Howell, & Amanatullah, 2015). Gender-
deterministic perspectives are too often used to justify the segrega-
tion of women and men into distinct roles (Baumeister, 1988;
Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Eagly, 1995; Tinsley et al.,
2015). Instead, we seek to begin addressing ‘‘the more demanding
question of why the sexes sometimes differ considerably and at
other times differ moderately or minimally or do not differ at all”
(Eagly, 1995). In so doing, we examine gender differences in con-
cert with the situational context, and thereby avoid both exagger-
ating differences (alpha bias) and minimizing them (beta bias)
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988).
8.2. Potential practical implications
Moving from theory to practice, Eagly (1995, p. 152) concluded
that ‘‘the evaluation of the. . .importance of sex-related differences
should not end with the translation of them into metrics that are
 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
easily understood. In practical terms, the importance of a differ-
ence depends on the consequences of the behavior in natural set-
tings.” We expect our moderate gender differences in negotiator
ethics to matter in practical terms because simulations suggest
that even small differences have important practical consequences.
In one simulation, Martell, Lane, and Emrich (1996) explored the
effects of bias in work performance ratings on women’s represen-
tation in leadership positions. When gender bias comprised only
1% of the variance in performance ratings, only 35% of top-
ranking positions in an organizational hierarchy were filled by
women. Likewise, in negotiations, small differences in economic
outcomes can compound over time: Babcock and Laschever
(2007) found that small salary differences between men and
women at early stages in their careers can result in substantial
wealth differences as they near retirement, even if men and
women receive identical raises in the intervening years. Similarly
then, gender differences in unethical negotiating behavior can cre-
ate gender differences in economic outcomes that compound
rapidly. If women negotiators deceive others less than men, they
may gain less from their counterparts. Gender differences in ethical
standards may thus contribute to ‘‘supply side” explanations for
gender differences in pay (for a summary of this and other expla-
nations, see England, 2005). Alternatively, women’s approach to
negotiating could build relational capital and subjective value
(Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu,
2006). It is an empirical question whether such outcomes would
translate into economic gains over time, by attracting cooperative
counterparts or repeat business.
Although our research recognizes a potential and largely unap-
preciated (Kennedy & Kray, 2015) ethical advantage possessed by
women negotiators, we have ironically risked providing data-
driven justifications for antiquated gender roles. Too often, favor-
able female stereotypes have been used to exclude women from
high-status roles that are associated with toughness or aggressive-
ness (Eagly, 1995) and to lend scientific prestige to politically
charged differences between women and men (Baumeister,
1988). Our findings should not be used to justify gender disparities
in hiring or role assignments for at least two reasons. First, the gen-
der differences seem to be contextual rather than constant, and as
such, are not evidence that gender dictates individual characteris-
tics. Second, when women’s ethical advantage does manifest, it
could be valuable for organizations in maintaining their reputation
and relationships with key constituencies. That is, women’s ethics
could justify greater (not lesser) negotiation responsibilities.
8.3. Avenues for future research
Our research leaves open some unanswered questions that
nonetheless present interesting avenues for future research. First,
we focused on understanding the role of moral identity in driving
negotiator ethics. One possibility for future work is to explore the
role of moral emotions (relative to moral identity) in driving gen-
der differences in negotiator ethics. Moral identity has been theo-
rized to elevate guilt following transgressions (Cohen & Morse,
2014), and consistent with this notion, women report more chronic
guilt than men (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Although we found mixed results for guilt on nego-
tiator ethics (as reported in Footnote 4), one possibility is that
moderators may be needed to predict whether and when guilt
proneness leads to gender differences in ethical behavior. Alterna-
tively, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of moral
emotions to explain gender differences in ethicality, including
sympathy, anger, contempt, or gratitude, to name a few (Haidt,
2003).
Our research has focused on how women prioritize morality in
their identities, leaving open the question of what men prioritize in
41
their identities. Prescriptive gender stereotypes require that men
demonstrate good business sense (Prentice & Carranza, 2002)
and it may well be that male negotiators’ identities are comprised
of traits that fulfill this requirement, including being competitive,
ruthless, and strategic. Drawing from circumplex models of values
(e.g., Schwartz, 1992), Aquino et al. (2009) made a convincing
argument that moral identity and self-interest are at odds. Accord-
ingly, men may conceive of themselves in terms of values related
to self-interest (e.g., power, achievement) rather than morality
(e.g., universalism and benevolence). In fact, some research sup-
ports this proposition (Adams & Funk, 2012). However, similar to
the dual concern model (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), it is also possi-
ble that morality and self-interest are orthogonal. Future research
could explore whether moral identity and self-interest are at odds,
and if measuring the self-interested component of identity predicts
men’s bargaining behavior across contexts. Additionally, if finan-
cial incentives have their greatest impact on those with strong
moral identities, it is worth considering whether there are situa-
tional moderators that have a relatively large impact on those with
strong self-interest identities, such as relational incentives. In
negotiations where a goal is in place to maintain long-term rela-
tionships, men may shy away from unethical bargaining behavior,
becoming more like women. Alternatively, a promising factor
could be cues that highlight identity implications of acting uneth-
ically. Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) found that participants
cheated less frequently when they were told, ‘‘Please don’t be a
cheater,” rather than, ‘‘Please don’t cheat.” By embedding interven-
tions for men to behave more ethically in their identities, research-
ers may be more successful in reducing men’s vulnerability to
ethical lapses at the bargaining table.
Another avenue is to explore the construct of moral identity rel-
ative to communal identity. Moral identity could simply reflect the
communal orientation of women (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). Many
of the terms used in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure of moral
identity are communal in nature (e.g., caring, friendly, generous,
helpful, kind). On one hand, these items were mentioned by over
30% of those authors’ respondents when asked what traits com-
prise a moral person, meaning that communal roles prescribe
morality to a greater extent than agentic roles. If so, it raises the
question of whether the communal-agentic distinction offers a
more parsimonious explanation for gender differences in negotia-
tor ethics than moral identity. On the other hand, recent work
has begun to distinguish warmth and sociability from morality
(Goodwin, 2015), suggesting the answer is not so straightforward.
Future research should explore the overlap between moral and
communal identities.
Finally, although we examined the impact of financial incen-
tives (in terms of type and size) on gender differences in negotiator
ethics, there may also be situational moderators unrelated to self-
interest. For instance, performance-based financial incentives may
be part of a broader class of contextual cues that provide plausible
cover stories to allow women to maintain a stronger moral identity
while acting unethically. In one study, women acting as an agents
were no more ethical than men (Kouchaki & Kray, 2016) because
advancing the client’s interests licensed women to act unethically,
possibly insulating their moral identity from threat. Similarly,
ambiguity may be critical (Bowles et al., 2005; Kray & Gelfand,
2009). Perhaps gender differences are mitigated when norms for
how to treat another party are clear and stronger when such norms
are ambiguous.
9. Conclusion
The current research opens up what has heretofore been a the-
oretical black box with respect to gender differences in negotiator
42 J.A. Kennedy et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 138 (2017) 28–44
ethics. Drawing from social-cognitive explanations of ethical
behavior, we find that, relative to men, women more strongly
internalize moral traits in their self-concepts under baseline condi-
tions. Whether this gender difference in moral identity produces a
gender difference in unethical behavior depends on whether situ-
ational forces are in place to suppress the self-regulatory benefits
of moral identity. In so doing, we address both why and when
men and women approach competitive negotiations with different
ethical playbooks.
Acknowledgements
We thank Karl Aquino, Dan Freeman, Americus Reed, Vivien
Lim, and Will Felps for so generously sharing their existing data
set with us. We also thank Ryan Corser for managing the Owen
Behavioral Lab and Jacqueline Chirdo and Sarena Martinez for their
assistance with this research.
Appendix A. Moral disengagement in negotiations scale
Imagine you are selling your used car. It’s generally been a good
car, but you recently lost your job so it’s more expensive than you
can currently afford.
Because you really need the money, you have set your sights on
getting the best price possible. To begin, you read a book on how to
negotiate the best deal for a used car. The book said that people
obtain the best price for their used car when they disclose a small
defect – for instance, the need for new windshield wipers. This
helps because people know when they’re buying a used car that
it probably has some problems (but because potential buyers know
this, it is up to them to ask about bigger problems). The book pro-
vided many tips on how to selectively disclose information to
potential buyers.
Your used car is missing the cap for the gas tank. It rolled off one
day and you haven’t made it to the store to buy a new one. More
importantly, the car has a transmission problem that flares up
now and then. You have taken the car to the shop twice, but no
one has been able to find the problem or fix it. Lately, the car has
been working with no issues, though. In considering whether to
reveal these issues, you remember back to when you bought the
car 3 years ago. Its previous owner lied to you outright by saying
all 4 tires were new; you later found out that only 2 of the tires
had been replaced. This experience taught you that at least some
sellers tell ‘‘whoppers”, or outright lies.
After posting an ad on Craigslist, you were contacted by an
interested buyer.
Below are a series of statements of how you might think or act
in this negotiation. Please rate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with each of the statements below, using the provided
scale.
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Agree
Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree
1 2 3 4
1. It is alright to bend the truth to protect your assets.
2. It’s ok to keep secrets in order to take care of your financial
needs.
3. It’s ok to omit information if the buyer doesn’t ask the right
questions.
4. It is alright to keep quiet in order to get a good price.
5. Omitting some information is just a way of getting a fair
deal.
6. Keeping some information secret is just self-defense.
7. Not disclosing the car’s transmission problem is just ‘‘play-
ing the game” in negotiations.
8. It is not bad to withhold information about the car in this
situation.
9. Bending the truth is no big deal when you consider that
others are engaging in outright fraud.
10. Omitting a relevant fact is not too serious compared to those
who tell outright lies.
11. Providing only the information the buyer asks for is really no
big deal when you consider that other people are probably
explicitly deceiving buyers in situations like this.
12. Compared to other deceptive things people do in negotia-
tions, not disclosing the car’s entire maintenance history is
not very serious.
13. Since you are under pressure to get a good deal, you cannot
be blamed for concealing the transmission problem.
14. If the buyer doesn’t catch a lie, you aren’t responsible for that.
15. Because you are being pressured into driving a hard bargain
by your financial situation, you shouldn’t be blamed for
doing whatever you have to do to get a good deal.
16. You cannot be blamed for omitting information to get a good
price since it’s a dog-eat-dog world in competitive
negotiations.
17. You should not be blamed for using negotiation tactics other
people invented.
18. If you only copy the tactics advocated by the experts, you
should not be blamed for using them.
19. If negotiators commonly act deceptively, it is unfair to blame
you for being deceptive.
20. As an individual seller, you can’t be blamed for misleading
someone because you play only a small part in setting com-
mon practices for used-car negotiations.
21. It is ok to tell a small lie because it wouldn’t really do any harm.
22. People don’t mind being misled in used-car negotiations
because it’s part of the game.
23. Omitting information doesn’t really violate anyone’s rights.
24. Letting buyers fend for themselves isn’t really wrong.
25. If people buy a ‘‘lemon,” it’s their own fault.
26. If someone is deceived when buying a car, it’s their own fault
for believing whatever they were told.
27. Negotiators who are deceived usually deserve it.
28. Negotiators who need the money are not at fault for bending
the truth.
29. Some negotiators deserve to be treated like dumb animals.
30. If the buyer is as ignorant as a rock, it is ok to let them suffer
the consequences.
31. Naïve idiots do not deserve to be treated honestly.
32. Some people have to be deceived so they learn to use their
brain.
Slightly Moderately Strongly Agree
Agree Agree
5 6 7
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