CASE #1

Doctrine: Lex Rei Sitae. It is universal principle that real or immovable

property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located.
Case Title: ORION SAVINGS BANK, PETITIONER, VS. SHIGEKANE
SUZUKI, RESPONDENT [ G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014 ]
Facts: First week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki),
a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about
a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong
City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. After the meeting and brief
negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price from 3 million to
P2,800,000.00. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against Kang and Orion to protect his interest/ property rights
based on the following grounds:
●That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No.
536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
●That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly executed by Kang, with
Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently
cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
●That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated in CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118;
●That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the
documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15,
2003;
●That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never
mortgaged to Orion; and
●That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain
possession of the titles.
RTC Branch 213 ruled in favor of Suzuki. CA partially granted Orion’s
appeal but denied its motion for reconsideration. Orion then filed petition for
review on certiorari at the SC.
Issue/s: Orion's petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:
 The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void.
Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made
with the consent of both spouses;
 Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner's
duplicate copies of the CCTs;
 Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which
prohibits any conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment,
defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
 Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
Held: It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located
(lex loci rei sitae). However, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses. Thus, matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
Hence, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach
or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as Philippine Law. Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung
Sam Kang 'married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name
alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
Therefore, we are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate
the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang's conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CASE #2
Doctrine: Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Case Title: NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.
vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES – PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE G.R NO 187587 JUNE
5,2013
Facts: By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia
reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque,
Province of Rizal and Pasay City for military reservation. Later on, Former
President Marcos issued a proclamation amending such publication, which
excludes certain area of the reserved land. Again, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476 that further amended the proclamation that
excluded the barangays of Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village and a handwritten addendum which includes Western Bicutan for
the disposition of the area. The proclamation was published in the Official
Gazette without the handwritten addendum. Demolition of illegal structures
existed to prevent the area from the increasing number of informal settlers.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying
as is already alienable and disposable. COSLAP ruled that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not published thus the areas occupied
by the petitioners are in question alienable and disposable. NMSMI and
WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s: Did the handwritten addendum of President Marcos have the
force and effect of law though it was not included in the publication?
Held: NO, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have
the force and effect law since it was not included in the publication. We
agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. In relation
thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication. Under the above provision, the
requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless
the law itself has otherwise provided.
SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

CASE #3
Doctrine: By analogy, the same principles apply to foreigners such that
they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties.
Case Title: NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM G.r. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Del Socorro and respondent Van Wilsem got married in
Holland sometime 1990 and were blessed with a son. Five years after they
were separated by a divorce decree issued by the Court of Holland.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. Petitioner
alleged that since their arrival, respondent failed to fulfil his promise to give
monthly support for their son. Thereafter, respondent came to the
Philippines, remarried and established a business with his new wife in
Cebu City. On August 28, 2009, petitioner demanded for the above
mentioned promise to support through a letter but the respondent refused
to receive the same. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of
Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, a Resolution was issued
recommending the filing of an information at RTC-Cebu for the crime
charged.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Held: To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
15[35] of the New Civil Code stresses the... principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens.
By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their... national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not,
however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.[40] In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by... such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.[41] While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands
in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
which... enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be
made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing
or failing to give support to petitioner's son, to wit:... n addition, considering
that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner's claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that:"[p]enal... laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of... respondent in
refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is... likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over
the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza,*and Reyes, JJ., concur.

CASE #4
Doctrine: Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum
court) is called upon to respect the parties’ choice of governing law, such
respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the
contract central to the controversy.
Case Title: SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J.
BETIA, Petitioners, – versus – MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO,
MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND
LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 198587,
SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Facts: Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation
established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were
recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the
accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
Respondents continued their employment until they are separated from
service on various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the
termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the
termination was made solely because they were pregnant. They allege that
they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone
through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves.
Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later informed respondents that
its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity
leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and
demand for their resignation on its “Unified Employment Contract for
Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract,
the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered
void. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all
the determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that
the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

Issue/s: Whether forum non conveniens is applicable.

Held: Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis
pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of
parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a
single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address
parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal’s desistance in exercising
jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to
the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure that prevents the
former’s having to interfere in affairs which are better and more
competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails
a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on
and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better
positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest
Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign
law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the
stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of
the laws of Saudi Arabia. Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to
the choice of governing law. That forum non conveniens may ultimately
result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its
application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is
not the primarily pivotal consideration in this case.
Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law
provisions. Where such provisions exist, Philippine tribunals, acting as the
forum court, generally defer to the parties’ articulated choice. This is
consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts.
Article 1306 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “[t]he contracting
parties may establish ‘such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient.” Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal
(acting as the forum court) is called upon to respect the parties’ choice of
governing law, such respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight of
considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
that underlie the contract central to the controversy.
We emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating
the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to
women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the
basis of no other consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated
with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of inequity
to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it must
entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear to us that any
individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the
performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy
could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but
the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a
living.
Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality before the
law of men and women, it is settled that contracts relating to labor and
employment are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 of the Civil
Code provides that “[t]he relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts
must yield to the common good.”
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the
illegal termination of respondents’ employment, this case is immutably a
matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear
pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find
application in and govern this case. ‘Moreover, as this premise for Saudia’s
insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it
follows that Philippine tribunals may properly assume jurisdiction over the
present controversy.
SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,*Del Castillo,
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

CASE #5
Doctrine: Effect of Divorce Decree
Case Title: GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO v.
REDERICK A. RECIO (G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001, Third Division)
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by
a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.
Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy — respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage
to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couples’ wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending — respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
Issue/s: Whether or not Philippine Courts take cognizance of the divorce
decree
Held:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original
of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts;
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
SO ORDERED. Melo, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
CASE #6
Doctrine: The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is
declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total
nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed.
Case Title: Millarosa vs. Carmel Development Inc. GR No. 194538;
November 27, 2013
Facts:
Mirralosa, et.al filed Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision and
Order of the Regional Trial Court RTC, Caloocan City. The RTC had
reversed the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court MeTC), Branch 52,
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114, ordering petitioner to vacate the
subject property in this case for ejectment. Respondent Carmel
Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known
as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The lot
that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by
the titles above-mentioned. On September 1973, President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D. 293), which invalidated
the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the
members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the
MHAI, then occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On
January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and
Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of
Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer14
(Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in
all its parts. Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of
an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan. On 14 January 2003,
respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC.
METC ruled in favour of the respondent; RTC reversed the decision of
MeTC, and in CA, the decision was in favour of the respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;
2. Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being
a party to the case; and
3. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.
Held: Petitioner argued that 1. Respondent has no cause of action
against him, because under the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine
of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt, 2. And she
should not be prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should not affect the rights of other persons
not party to the case.
HOWEVER, in declaring a law null and void, the real issue is whether the
nullity should have prospective, not retroactive, application.
The Court held the ruling that Republic v. Court of Appeals is instructive on
the matter:
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared
unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity,
and it is deemed as if had never existed.
A law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and
confers no right on any person. It matters not whether the person is a party
to the original case, because "not only the parties but all persons are bound
by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
Thus, petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae
nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt (meaning: Matters which are adjudged as
between certain persons effect no prejudice as to others) cannot be
countenanced. We have categorically stated that the doctrine does not
apply when the party concerned is a "successor in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or
proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is binding against him.
Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative fact doctrine, which
recognizes the interim effects of a law prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it
must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional
law produces no effects.
COURT held that petitioner anchored his right over the property to an
Affidavit allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA,
authorizing petitioner to occupy the same. However, this Affidavit was
executed only sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the
Tuason case was promulgated. The Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

CASE #7
Doctrine: In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment. We also have a right to assume that officials
have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary.
Case Title: Ramonito O. Acaac vs. Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. GR No.
187378, September 30, 2013
Facts: The petitioner, Ramonito O. Acaac, was the founder of the NGO
called PETAL. PETAL built cottages on Capayas Island, which it rented out
to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna,
Jr. and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL, ordering it to stop all illegal activities on
the island due to the absence of a building permit. There was a third and
final notice sent on July 8, 2002 but the same remained unheeded.
On the same date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted a
subject ordinance, which prohibited the entry of any entity and the
construction of any structures in the area of Capayas Island which Mayor
Azcuna, Jr, adopted on July 12, 2002. On August 23, 2002, a Notice of
Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built since it was a violation of the subject ordinance.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action against the respondents
before the RTC alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island, while also assailing the validity of the subject
ordinance on the grounds that it was adopted without public consultation, it
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation, and it was not
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On November 26, 2004, the RTC declared the subject ordinance as
invalid/void on the same grounds that the petitioners laid down.
On the contrary, according to the CA, the subject ordinance was deemed
approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days.
It also gave credence to the respondent that the subject ordinance was
posted and published and that public consultations were conducted before
the subject ordinance was passed.
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 9,
2009. Thus, the instant petition.
Issue/s: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable
against petitioners.
Held: Yes. Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has been
taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent
with law and therefore valid.” In this case, petitioners maintain the subject
ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time.
It, however,
bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time
the subject ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for
review by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved
and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the Local Government Code.
While Sec. 59 of Republic Act No. 7160 or “The Local Government Code”
required the main features of ordinances duly enacted or adopted be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, Petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication of the subject ordinance
was made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. All told, the
Court finds on reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the
validity of the subject ordinance.
SO ORDERED. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CASE #8
Doctrine: The rule in legal separation is that the spouse at fault shall have
no right to any share of the net profits earned by the couple’s common
property during the marriage. His or her share of the net profits is forfeited
in favor of the children or the innocent spouse.
Case Title: QUIAO vs. QUIAO, et. al. G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012 due
process, Family Code, vested right
Facts: Respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision granting the same and custody of the minor children were
awarded to Rita. Their property as enumerated was to be divided among
the spouses equally subject to the respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children.He was further ordered to reimburse the sum of
[P]19,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P 5,000.00.
Petitioner posits that he has a vested right over his shares of the property
in the conjugal partnership which was violated by the Court’s order of the
forfeiture of the same to his children.

Issue/s: What is “vested right” from the perspective of the due process
clause? Was petitioner’s “vested right” over half of the common properties
of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in
favor of his children pursuant to Article 63 (2) and 129 of the Family Code?
Held: No. In the en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for
ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,it was held that:
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. From
the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested
right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.
First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that
all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
Second, when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
“net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CASE #9
Doctrine: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Case Title: SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
GR No. 171914, 2014-07-23
Facts: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the
First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same... date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the... condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his
own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,
[9] holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the
latter's death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by
ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior
marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]
Issue/s: The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).
Held: Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time
of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at
the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted
the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to... follow the nationality rule,
to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the...
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty.
Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10,
1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not
been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed,
the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the
void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such...
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,... was void; properties
acquired during their marriage... were governed by the rules on co-
ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to
Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,[22] on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but... n the Philippines, marriages that are
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code
clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as... determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or

subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed... by the rules on co-ownership.
(n)
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her
own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and
the law books subject matter in contention in this case proof that was
required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article.
148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were
acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but
not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144
of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would... govern. But this
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at
first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated
or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there... still exists a prior conjugal partnership
or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of... money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for
this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such... valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CASE #10
Doctrine: The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law
Case Title: Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Minuro Nikamura, GR. No. 149177;
November 23, 2007
Facts: Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) in Japan with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a
Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Nippon then
assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines On 2000, petitioner
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International
Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on
March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA’s expiry. Threatened with
impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a
negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term. As
he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners,
respondent consequently initiated an action for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners contended that the ICA
had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They
asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s ICA
could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following
the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. The RTC, denied
the motion to dismiss. Petitioners on certiorari invoked the defense of forum
non conveniens. On petition for review before this Court, petitioners
dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens
defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is
the [state of the] most significant relationship rule.
Issue/s: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts
in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts
executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the
principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the “state of the most
significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
Held: No. To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,
three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction

considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law.
To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or
tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it
the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that
the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and
is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or
the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.”
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and
hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by
petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and
appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
So, Ordered. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice