Weak State, Strong Presidents Situating The Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Time

Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte
Presidency in Philippine Political Time

Julio C. Teehankee
College of Liberal Arts, De La Salle University
AbSTrAcT
The Philippine presidency is the first and most durable in Asia. As a political
institution, it has been rendered enough constitutional power to have a formal
semblance of a “strong presidency” but apparently not enough to totally control
strategic interests in Philippine society. Applying the concept of “political time,”
this article will discuss the rise of the 16th president Rodrigo Duterte within the
cycle of presidential regimes in the Philippines. Furthermore, it will analyze the
nature of presidential power in the Philippines by identifying the strategic
moments that lie between structural regimes and agential choices. Lastly, it will
delineate the emergence of regime narratives as “governing scripts” that bind
together a coalition of interests within a particular institutional context.
Keywords: Presidents, presidential leadership, Philippine politics, regimes,

political time
Introduction
The unexpected election of Rodrigo “Rody” Duterte as the 16th presi-

dent of the Philippines on May 9, 2016 signifies a major rupture in
the liberal democratic regime reestablished 30 years earlier with the
ouster of the dictatorship of Ferdinand E. Marcos. 1 The rise of Duterte
can potentially usher in a regime of neoauthoritarianism in the
Philippines. Neoauthoritarianism is a recent phenomenon in countries
that underwent democratic transition in the 1980s and 1990s but failed
to consolidate their democratic gains. It is a lite form of strongman rule
that legitimizes itself by competing in elections, sparing use or threat of
violence, and generating mass support by exploiting popular issues and
aspirations (oftentimes) through demagoguery.
Duterte rose to national prominence by turning Davao in the
southern island of Mindanao—once a hotbed for crime and the
communist insurgency—into a disciplined and developed city that
has attracted a
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2 Journal of Developing Societies 32, 3 (2016): 1–29
significant amount of investments. But this transformation came with

a heavy price, as the mayor has earned the reputation (seldom denied)
of using heavy-handed tactics and (even) extrajudicial killings to fight
criminality, especially narcotics and drug trafficking. After some
initial indecisiveness, Duterte plunged into the presidential race with
one basic campaign narrative: He will restore peace and order in the
Philippines through any means possible including extrajudicial killing
and declaring martial law.2 When Duterte was first elected as a mayor
in 1988, the citizens of Davao “entered into a Hobbesian social
contract with Duterte, which allowed him to rule with an iron-fist in
exchange for social peace and personal security” (Isaac & Aceron,
2016). Now elected as the president with less than 40 percent of the
total votes cast, it remains to be seen whether the entire Filipino nation
will be doing the same with him. This article aims to situate the
incoming Duterte presidency in the Philippines within the context of
political time. Inspired by Stephen Skowronek’s structural analysis
of American presidents, this article explores the leadership
challenges faced by the Philippine presidency from the perspective
of political time. It is an attempt to evaluate the performance of
Philippine presidents, not just in terms of personal and persuasive
qualities but also based on the sequencing of a presidency within a
political regime. Moreover, it will analyze the cycle of presidential
challenges within the context of strategic moments that lie between
structural regimes and agential choices.
Weak State, Strong Presidents
The Philippine presidency is the most durable in the Asian region. There
have been 16 presidents since the first Philippine Republic was
inaugu- rated in 1899. Until the declaration of martial law in 1972 by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the presidential form of government
had been firmly instituted in Philippine political life since it was first
introduced by the American colonial regime in 1935. After 14 years of
authoritarian dictatorship, presidentialism was reintroduced as part of
the democratic restoration after the ouster of Marcos through a people
power uprising in 1986.
While the Philippine presidency is patterned after the American
template, it is rooted in Latin American practices. 3 The Philippine
presidency has traditionally been accorded more coercive powers and
fiscal prerogatives than its American counterpart. Although the 1935

Teehankee: Weak State, Strong Presidents 3
Constitution adapted the American model of dividing governmental

powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, it has
established an extraordinarily “strong presidency” by establishing presi-
dential control over the decisions on the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, assumption of emergency powers, national finance, and
budgetary appropriations; and the amendment of the constitution
(Hedman & Sidel, 2000, pp. 16–17). The tradition of a strong
presidency can be traced to Manuel L. Quezon—the first president of
the Philippine Commonwealth under the 1935 Constitution.
According to McCoy (1989, pp. 117–118):
Quezon’s Commonwealth (1934–41) appeared to have many of the attributes

of President Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law regime (1972–81). Through
manipulation of the constitution and bureaucracy both men sought, above
all else, to perpetuate their power, Quezon rather dexterously and Marcos
more crudely. Their relentless accumulation of power at the center
spawned a regime characterized by corruption and cronyism—allies won
government largesse and paid both lavish gifts to their presidents,
opponents faced a punitive bureaucracy.
On the other hand, Sidel (1999, p. 19) portrayed Marcos as a

“national boss” who ruled over a protracted national-level boss rule
unlike the small-town, district-level, and provincial bosses that
dominated local politics.
The eminent Filipino political scientist Remigio Agpalo referred to
the “pangulo regime”4 as distinguishable from the English parliamentary
and American presidential regimes since it “operates on the principle
of the supremacy of the executive and it puts premium on the value of
pagdamay (sharing with and caring for fellow persons)” (Agpalo, 1999,
pp. 45–60). In his view, the “pangulo” serves as an appropriate metaphor
for the body politic such that “ang sakit ng kalinkingan ay damdam
ng buong katawan” (The pain suffered by the little finger is suffered
by the whole body). He traced the roots of his “pangulo regime”
model to Philippine political history, particularly in the writings of
anticolonial leaders Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and Emilio Jacinto.
Agpalo believed that his “pangulo regime” was institutionalized in
Emilio Aguinaldo’s first Philippine Republic where Aguinaldo played
the role of “pinakaulo” (one who serves as the head). Moreover,
Agpalo also insisted that only three Filipino presidents successfully
established his concept of “pangulo
Journal of Developing Societies 32, 3 (2016): 1–29

regime” in the Philippines after Aguinaldo—Manuel L. Quezon, Jose

P. Laurel, and Ferdinand E. Marcos. The fact that these three
presidents exercised authoritarian powers at critical junctures of
Philippine history only serves to reinforce the suspicions that Agpalo
sought to provide a legitimizing framework for the Marcos
dictatorship.
regime Structure in Political Time
Under a presidential system of government, a president normally ascends

to power within an existing regime, which largely influences his or
her style of leadership. Presidents either identify with the existing regime
or are opposed to it. Nevertheless, every president is given the same
institu- tionally defined “raw material” of politics to work with, such as
Congress, political parties, the bureaucracy, interest groups, and the
public. Thus, all presidents basically encounter the same challenges,
opportunities, or moments of choice that are structured and constrained
by the configura- tions of regime narrative, strategic interests, and state
institutions. These regime orientations provide structured contexts for
presidential leadership that are repeated within political time
(Lieberman, 2000).
According to Skowronek (2011, p. 18), political time “is the medium
through which presidents encounter received commitments of
ideology and interest and claim authority to intervene in their
development.” Thus, presidential leadership is defined by a president’s
place in political time rather than his or her personal style or character
in facing down a series of challenges. Presidents find themselves
confronting different obstacles to leadership based on their relation to
existing “regimes” that may be the same or different from their
predecessors or successors. Moreover, “political time” can be
distinguished from “secular time.” Secular time refers to the regular,
historical, and sequential ordering of presidential administrations.
Political time, on the other hand, is the cycle of presidents within a
pattern of regime continuity and change. While political time is the
historical medium through which authority structure have recurred,
secular time is the historical medium in which power structures have
evolved (Skowronek, 1997, p. 30).
From the perspective of secular time, the Philippine presidency can
be divided into four distinct regimes namely proto-regimes, the neo-
colonial regime, the authoritarian regime, and the reformist regime
(see Table 1). It has spanned five republics that have produced three
short-lived regimes (revolutionary, late-colonial, and occupation) and
three long-term regimes (neocolonial, authoritarian, and reformist).5

Table 1.
Philippine Presidents in Secular Time
regime republic President Date

Proto-regimes First Philippine Republic Emilio Aguinaldo January 23, 1899–April 1, 1901
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Philippine Commonwealth Manuel L. November 15, 1935–August 1, 1944

Quezon Sergio August 1, 1944–May 28, 1946
Second Philippine Republic Osmeña October 14, 1943–August 19, 1945
Jose P. Laurel
Neocolonial regime Third Philippine Republic Manuel Roxas May 28, 1946–April 15, 1948
Elpido Quirino April 17, 1948–December 30, 1953
Ramon Magsaysay December 30, 1953–March 17, 1957
Carlos P. Garcia March 18, 1957–December 30, 1961
Diosdado Macapagal December 30, 1961–December 30, 1965
Ferdinand E. Marcos December 30, 1965–September 21, 1972
Authoritarian regime Fourth Philippine Republic Ferdinand E. Marcos September 21, 1972–February 25, 1986
Reformist regime Fifth Philippine Republic Corazon C. Aquino February 25, 1986–June 30, 1992
Fidel V. Ramos June 30, 1992–June 30, 1998
Joseph E. Estrada June 30, 1998–January 21, 2001
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo January 21, 2001–June 30, 2010
Benigno S. Aquino June 30, 2010–June 30, 2016
III Rodrigo R. June 30, 2016
Duterte
Source: Author’s own.
The First Philippine Republic (1899–1901) refers to the short-lived

revolutionary government established by President Emilio Aguinaldo
after the Filipino declaration of independence from Spanish colonial rule.
However, the Filipino march to national independence was
interrupted by American colonial rule (1898–1943, 1945–1946). The
institutional foundations of the modern Filipino nation-state were
largely shaped by the American colonial experience. American
political tutelage also resulted in the rise of two Commonwealth
presidents: Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. During World War
II, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines ushered in the Second
Republic (1943–1945) which saw the selection of Jose P. Laurel as the
president of the Japanese-sponsored government.
While the first three short-lived regimes can be considered as “proto-
regimes,” the Third Philippine Republic can be considered as the “foun-
dational regime” in the development of the Filipino nation-state. The
Third Philippine Republic (1946–1972) can be characterized as an
elite democracy or “a constitutional democracy dominated by an
oligarchy that was buttressed by patronage, coupled with continued
dependence on the former colonial power” (Wurfel, 1988, p. 325).
Moreover, the landed families that formed the national oligarchy
dominated electoral com- petitions and maximized their linkage with
the state apparatus in order to access the lucrative US markets. Thus,
oligarchic rent-seeking and control of government has thwarted the
state’s capacity to pursue national development goals and social equity
(Velasco, 1997, pp. 77–112). Five postwar Philippine presidents:
Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos P. Garcia,
and Diosdado Macapagal committed themselves to a national
economic development plan premised on close ties with the United
States. All faced the challenge of local insurgencies fuelled by
agrarian unrest in the countryside. All promised to institute the
agrarian reform but failed to dismantle the powerful landed elites
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p. 167).
Elite democracy has sustained the long-running revolutionary chal-
lenge from below. The intensification of intra-elite competition for
wealth and power further added strain to the postwar regime.
Demands for change were echoed by an emerging middle class—
composed of students, professionals, and small entrepreneurs who
were exposed to the rise of radicalism around the world in the 1960s
and 1970s. Inspired by the writings of Filipino nationalists, mass
protests were launched by students and workers’ group against the
corrupt, elitist, and US-dependent government. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
who was first elected as president in

1965 and was reelected in 1969, seized the opportunity amidst the social
unrest to declare martial law in 1972 and dismantled the formal
institutions of democracy. Marcos justified the imposition of an
authoritarian regime as a “revolution from the center” against the
forces of the extreme right represented by the oligarchs and the
extreme left represented by the radicals and communists (Velasco,
1997, p. 84).
The Marcos authoritarian regime (1972–1986) repudiated the institu-
tion, ideas, and interests of the previous postwar democratic regime.
Marcos replaced the ancien régime with a new order he labeled as the
“New Society.” Operating under the Orwellian rubric of “constitutional
authoritarianism,” Marcos used his martial law powers under the
1935 Constitution and manipulated the passage of the 1973
Constitution to provide himself extraordinary powers. He then
assembled a coalition of interests that were formerly marginalized in
the previous regime—the technocrats, his cronies, and the military.
These sectors became the three pillars of the authoritarian regime. 6
Through his control of the military and the coercive apparatus of the
state, Marcos consolidated his regime and adopted an export-led
growth policy managed by the technocrats. He attempted to dismantle
the economic and political base of the traditional agricultural elite and
established his own stranglehold on the export of sugar and coconut
through his cronies. He also centralized the distribution of political
patronage to local political clans through the state-based political
machinery (i.e., the Ministry of Local Governments) and the centrally
directed and monolithic party machinery (i.e., the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan, KBL).7 Ultimately, the Marcos regime can be classified in
Weberian terms as “sultanistic” since he “pursued not ideological but
personal goals, and his regime was organized around family and
friends, not strong state institutions” (Thompson, 1996, pp. 4–5). Soon
after, the Marcos regime collapsed under the weight of its own corruption
and was overthrown in the first people power uprising in Asia in
1986.
The peaceful military-backed people power uprising at the historic
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) ushered the birth of the Fifth
Philippine Republic (1986 to present). Corazon Aquino, who was
installed as the president after the ouster of Marcos, presided over the
initial phase of the democratic transition to a “reformist regime,” 8 which
was devoted to the dismantling of the centralized authoritarian power
structure and restorating of premartial law democratic institutions.
This was a tall order given the fact that “by the time that Marcos was
overthrown in 1986, he had been president for 20 years, or half of the 40
years since the Philippines had regained independence in 1986”
(Abueva, 1997, p. 8).


In effect, the reformist regime was premised on two complementary

objec- tives: demarcosification and democratization (Velasco, 1997, p.
91). The institutional foundations for the reformist regime were laid out
in the 1987 Constitution that was drafted to replace the 1973 Marcos
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution effectively restored the premartial
law structures of a presidential system based on the principles of the
separation of powers and checks and balance among the three coequal
branches of government. In addition, civil and political liberties, along
with media freedom, were restored. The constitution also provided for
the holding of free and open elections and the development of a
multiparty system.
Filipino Presidents in Political Time
In the Philippines, a presidency can be a prequel or a sequel to an

ongo- ing regime narrative. Comparing presidents in different historical
periods according to the parallel moments of political time would
yield more similarities in leadership challenges than by comparing
them according to the regular sequential period of secular time
(Skowronek, 2011, p. 18). Stephen Skowronek situates the presidency
not according to personal traits and attributes, but rather on “the
structural pattern of regime change and the cycle of presidents within
regimes—a pattern of ‘political time’” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 274).
In his two books The Politics Presidents Make (1997) and Presidential
Leadership in Political Time (2011), Skowronek traces the recurring
regime pattern in the American presidency. He places presidents
within the context of regimes or “the commitment of ideology and
interest embodied in preexisting institutional arrangements”
(Skowronek, 1997,
p. 34). Except for rare opportunities in which the regime becomes
ripe for reconstruction, a president ascends to power within a
prevailing regime that largely shapes the nature of the
administration9. The political identity of an incumbent president is
either affiliated or opposed to the prevailing regime. Moreover, the
political opportunity available to the incumbent president (i.e.,
success or failure of presidential leadership) hinges on whether the
prevailing regime is resilient or vulnerable. Skowronek cross-
tabulates these general considerations of political identity and
opportunity to yield a typology of four structures of political
authority namely (a) politics of reconstruction—when the president
emerges from the opposition at a time when the prevailing regime is ripe
for repudiation, (b) politics of disjunction—when a president is affiliated
with a regime that has been put into question as failed or irrelevant to

Table 2.
Philippine Presidents in Political Time
Affiliated Opposed
Vulnerable Disjunctive Leaders Great repudiators
Quirino, late Marcos, Macapagal, Roxas, early Marcos, Cory
Macapagal Arroyo, Aquino III Aquino, Duterte
Resilient Orthodox Innovators Preemptive Leaders
Magsaysay, Ramos Garcia, Estrada
Source: Typology adapted from Skowronek, 1997.
the problems of the day, (c) politics of articulation—when a president is

affiliated with a resilient regime, and (d) politics of preemption—when
an opposed president ascends to power within a resilient regime
(Skowronek, 1997, pp. 34–44).
From the perspective of political time, the Filipino presidents can
be categorized into great repudiators, preemptive leaders, orthodox
innovators, and disjunctive leaders (see Table 2). Skowronek
observes: “Presidents bid for authority by reckoning with the work of
their predecessors, locating their rise to power within the recent
course of political events, and addressing the political expectations
that attend their inter- vention in these affairs” (Skowronek, 2011, p.
18).
roxas, early Marcos, c. Aquino, and Duterte: repudiation

and reconstruction
Adapting Skowronek’s categories, the great repudiators refer to those

who rise to power by challenging the previous regimes and building new
regimes. Manuel Roxas can be considered as the first presidential regime
founder in Philippine history. In repudiating the four-decade-old brand of
conservative nationalism of the Nacionalista Party’s Old Guards, Roxas
embraced the Cold War alliance with the US and laid down the
foundation for a regime of neocolonial elite democracy of the Third
Republic. Ferdinand Marcos justified the establishment of his
authoritarian “New Society” by challenging the oligarchs that
dominated the Third Republic and replacing them with technocrats, his
cronies, and the military. Former housewife Corazon “Cory” Aquino,
in turn, rallied the forces of “people power” to oust the Marcos
dictatorship and pave the way for the restoration of elite democracy
under the reformist regime of the Fifth Republic. Ironically, the
election of the foulmouthed, maverick mayor Rodrigo Duterte to the
presidency is largely seen as a repudiation not only

of the incompetence of the administration of Corazon’s son and the

15th president Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III but also of the entire
reformist regime she founded and the elite democracy it
reestablished.
Except for Cory Aquino, both Roxas and Marcos each repudiated
the respective regimes that spawned them. Duterte is poised to
repudiate the reformist regime in which he was elected to power.
Manuel Roxas, who established his political career first in the American
colonial government then later in the Commonwealth government,
was a stalwart of conservative nationalism together with Quezon and
Osmeña. He had served as municipal councilor, provincial governor,
legislator, and house speaker before he was elected to the Senate in 1941.
After the war, he was elected as the president of the reconstituted
Senate. Supported by General Douglas MacArthur, Roxas galvanized
the support of provincial elites who consolidated power during the
American period and the emergent “local strongmen” who rose to
prominence as guerrilla leaders during the Japanese occupation.
Together they challenged Osmeña and the old guards of the
Nacionalista Party as its “Liberal” wing. During the 1946
presidential election, the Nacionalistas projected itself as the party
of Quezon, while the Liberals as the party of the new republic. In
addition,
Nacionalistas who served with Quezon or in the Second Republic knew

the value of a strong executive and the power of nationalism to motivate
service to the common good. Claro M. Recto, Laurel, and Osmeña were
still committed to centralizing the capacities of the state to strengthen the
nation. The Liberals, in contrast, had little use for nationalism once the
Philippines was independent. (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p. 170)
Roxas was elected as the third and last president of the

Commonwealth and the first president of the Third Republic.
Consequently, Roxas quickly dismantled the proto-regime established by
Quezon and the conservative nationalists. He began to reconstruct a
new regime. Together with the landowning political elite, he eschewed
nationalism in favor of neocolonial “modernization” under the ambit
of the anticommunist Cold War alliance and “American-style”
democracy.
Faced with the victory of communism in China, the expansion of
nationalist–communist revolution in Indochina, domestic communist-
led peasant unrest, on top of the massive financial resources required
to rehabilitate the war-ravaged economy; the neocolonial economic
and security arrangements with the US dictating the regime logic of
the

Third Republic. In the view of nationalist historian Renato

Constantino (1978, p. 193),
[The United States turned the Philippines] from a colony to a neo-colony.

This meant continued domination of the economy, its retention as a
market for American goods, a source of raw materials, and an open field of
American investments…the United States wanted to have military and
naval bases on Philippine soil but existing outside Philippine sovereignty.
To hasten the process of economic rehabilitation, Roxas extensively

used the treaty-making power of the presidency to enter into unequal
agreements with the United States (Brillantes, 1988, p. 119). Despite his
sudden death by heart attack in only his second year in office, Roxas
managed to lay down the institutional and ideological foundations for
the postwar neocolonial regime.
Ferdinand Marcos rose to political prominence in the postwar neoco-
lonial regime established by Manuel Roxas. He already gained a
degree of notoriety during the Commonwealth period as a young and
brilliant law student at the University of the Philippines who was
accused of assassinating his father’s political rival. As American
journalist Sandra Burton (1989, p. 37) noted:
Marcos was the most brilliant politician produced by a young republic that
thrilled to stirring rhetoric and tales of political intrigue…It was a central
fact of Marcos’s political legend that his career had begun, as it would
end, with a murder.
The young bar topnotcher dramatically won an acquittal from the

Supreme Court. He became a guerrilla fighter during the Japanese
occupation and leveraged his real and manufactured war exploits for
his initial foray into politics. In 1949, he was first elected to the
House of Representatives under the Liberal Party, together with a
new breed of “local strongmen” who “were without the landed wealth
of the older generation; their power derived from education and
professional talent, black market speculation, or arms and networks they
acquired as guerrilla leaders during the war” (Abinales & Amoroso,
2005, p. 168).
Marcos rose the ranks of neocolonial regime politics from three terms
in the House of Representatives to being elected to the Senate and
serving as its president. Throughout his political career, Marcos had
been a stalwart of the Liberal Party and a defender of Roxas’ Cold War
regime,

until the political expediency forced him to switch parties and seek
the presidential nomination of the Nacionalista Party. Marcos won his
first term as president in 1965 and an unprecedented second term in
1969. He secured his reelection amidst the charges of excessive
election spend- ing, vote-buying, intimidation, and fraud. Armed with
a fresh mandate but faced with a worsening intra-elite conflict, a
faltering economy, the mass mobilization of workers, farmers, and
students, and a resurgent communist insurgency, Marcos proceeded
to lay the foundation for his authoritarian regime. On September 21,
1972, Marcos declared martial law in order to “save the Republic” and
“build a New Society” (De Dios, 1988; Martinez, 1984).
As early as his first term, Marcos was already planning the declaration
of martial law in the country. Alex Brillantes Jr identified five major
factors that influenced Marcos to declare martial law. First, after winning
his second and last four-year term in one of the dirtiest elections in
postwar history, Marcos wanted to perpetuate himself in power. Second,
foreign pressures to preserve (mostly) the American security and
economic interests in the Philippines. Third, intensification of rivalry
for political and economic dominance among the factions of the ruling
class. Fourth, efforts by the ruling elite to quell the mobilization of the
basic sectors of society that threatens their political and economic
dominance (Brillantes, 1987, pp. 128–130). Ambition for power only
partly explains Marcos’ imposition of an authoritarian regime since
the dictatorship also represent the social project of the dominant sections
of the Philippine ruling elite to break the dead end it faced in the early
1970s. Only towards the start of the late 1970s would the elite realize the
Frankenstein monster it had helped create which threatened to eat them up
one by one and to drive the entire nation into an economic and political
[disaster]. (Tiglao, 1988, p. 27)
In jettisoning the neocolonial regime that Roxas built, Marcos

rejected the “U.S.-style” democratic process that were “unresponsive to
the needs of Philippine society” (Tiglao, 1988, p. 27). But Marcos did
not totally repudiate the Cold War aspect of Roxas’ regime. Although
the United States previously supported Diosdado Macapagal’s
successful bid for the presidency in 1961, they were not particularly
satisfied with his first term in office. Thus, the Americans actively
sought the commitment of the newly elected Marcos for support for the
US escalating war in Vietnam. In line with the American foreign policy
of supporting right-wing dictators

in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Marcos

proved to be one of their staunchest cold warriors in Southeast Asia
(Bonner, 1987, pp. 42–44).
While Corazon “Cory” Aquino was the inexperienced and reluctant
candidate who eventually replaced the discredited Marcos
dictatorship, she was organically linked to the previous regimes in
Philippine history. Her maternal grandfather Juan Sumulong was an
active Commonwealth politician who was a staunch opposition
leader (first of the Partido Nacional Progresista, then later the Partido
Democrata Nacional) against Manuel Quezon and the Nacionalista
Party. In the 1950s, her father acquired Hacienda Luisita—the
largest sugar plantation in Central Luzon. She was married to
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr—son of another Commonwealth politician
Benigno Aquino Sr who served as Speaker of the National Assembly
of the Japanese-sponsored Second Republic. Ninoy Aquino was a
rising star in postwar Philippine politics having been elected successively
as mayor, governor, and senator. Ninoy was poised to run for the
presidency until Marcos declared martial law (Joaquin, 1986). Given her
links to premartial law politics, it was not surprising that Cory
reconstructed the elite democracy that she was more familiar and
comfortable with. Hence,
[The] kind of democracy which Cory Aquino championed in 1986 cannot

survive in the Philippines without greater social justice And, despite
certain frictions, the trend toward closer cooperation with the United
States on both economic and military matters showed signs of again
coalescing nationalist sentiments against the regime. (Wurfel, 1988, p.
324)
During a brief period of rule under a revolutionary government, Cory

moved to dismantle the political and economic base of Marcos’ authori-
tarian regime. In turn, she restored the premartial law institutions of
democracy that included Congress, free press, and human rights. She
sought to enshrine the gains of the people power revolution by
drafting the 1987 Constitution which reflected a number of reformist and
innova- tive provisions (i.e., decentralization, sectoral representation, and
so on). However, she left a lot of the more crucial equity issues to be
resolved by the elite-dominated Congress (i.e., land reform, political
dynasties, foreign debt, and so on) (Velasco, 1997, pp. 91–101). The
failure of the Aquino presidency to promote social equity in the new
reformist regime would plant the seed for legitimation crises in later
presidencies.

The election of Rodrigo Duterte came on the heels of six years of

high growth and political stability under the administration of President
Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III. Duterte’s phenomenal victory, however,
should be understood within the context of what the second Aquino
administration has failed to do. Despite his personal popularity due to
his clean image and lack of political scandals, Aquino failed to
institu- tionalize his “straight path” reformism. If he makes true his
campaign narrative, he is poised to repudiate the postauthoritarian
reformist regime founded by Cory Aquino in 1986.
As the first mayor from a major city outside Manila to launch a major
presidential bid,10 Duterte’s calls for a federal system draws on “anti-
Imperial Manila” sentiments, particularly in his birthplace, Southern
Mindanao. Besides this strong regional base (which extends into parts
of the Visayas islands in the middle of the country), he strongly
appeals to voters within Manila itself where his calls for a brutal and
immediate implementation of a “law and order” have resonated
particularly well.
The rapid rise of voter support for Duterte, despite his late entry
into the race, highlights the pent-up anger among the middle class at the
dete- rioration of public order and concerns about growing drug
abuse. They were supposed to be the beneficiaries of the daang
matuwid (straight path)—the name the administration of Benigno
“Noynoy” S. Aquino III gives its own efforts at promoting good
governance. Duterte’s rise in the polls has to do with frustration and
anger with the limits of the reformist agenda of the Aquino
administration, but more generally with the good governance reformist
regimes stretching back to Fidel Ramos and Corazon Aquino. But this
dissatisfaction is different from the kind Joseph Estrada tapped into in
1998 (after the “successful” Ramos presidency). Its not the
dispossessed, the losers of “exclusive” growth, rather its the anxieties
about criminality, rampant smuggling, incompetence, and government
corruption of those now marginally better off after a couple of decades
of solid growth (Teehankee & Thompson, 2016).
Garcia and Estrada: The Great Preemptors
Preemptive leaders oppose a prevailing regime but opt for a hybrid alter-
native. Carlos P. Garcia was the paragon of a resurgent nationalism with
his “Filipino First Policy” amidst a neocolonial regime. Joseph Estrada—
the man of the masses—mobilized his tremendous popularity with the
poor to challenge the ruling elites in their own game in the reformist
regime. A running theme among the preemptive Philippine presidents

is their use of nationalist aspirations to rally the common people against

colonial or neocolonial domination. Both Garcia and Estrada,
however, fell amidst the allegations of massive corruption under their
presidencies. Carlos P. Garcia, the eighth president of the Philippines,
offered an alternative development vision to the neocolonial regime
of Roxas. He revived the nationalist narrative and utilized it to
frame his alternative development vision known as the “Filipino
First” policy. The policy promoted increased Filipino control of the
economy through protection- ism and gave preference to Filipino-
controlled enterprises in the alloca- tion of foreign exchange. In his
campaign for reelection in 1958, Garcia declared, “It is…the
imperative of this epoch in our national life that the Filipinos acquire
a major and dominant participation in the national economy”
(Doronila, 1992, p. 74). His strong nationalist advocacy was aimed to
counter the backlash within the Nacionalista Party over his
predecessor President Ramon Magsaysay’s uncritical support of the
Cold War policies of the United States, thereby tarnishing the nationalist
credentials of the party (Doronila, 1992, pp. 74–75).
In a regime characterized by elite democracy, Joseph Estrada espoused
the populist cause to win the votes of the downtrodden, amidst the failure
of previous leaders to institute social reforms and to consolidate
democracy. Populism (from the Latin word populis) refers to “a
movement, a regime, a leader, or even a state which claims close
affinity with the people” (De Castro, 2007, p. 930). It is often reviled
since “it gives expres- sion to the crudest hopes and fears of the masses
and by leaving no scope for deliberation and rational analysis”
(Heywood, 2000, p. 178). Populists usually make class appeals and claim
to champion the poor (Thompson, 2010). Latin American-style populism
fully emerged in the Philippines in the wake of the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis with the election of Joseph Estrada as the 13th
president. The postcrisis regional environment saw the electoral
victories of populist politicians not only in the Philippines but in
Thailand as well (De Castro, 2007, p. 930).
Initially, Estrada provided hope for the poor majority that he will
pursue the much-needed social reforms to dismantle the inequitable
system of control by the traditional oligarchy. In his inaugural address
in 1998, he promised, “The light is fading, the day is almost over, and yet
this late afternoon is the morning of a new day. The day of the
Filipino masses. One of their own is finally leading them” (Official
Gazette, 1998). The popular action movie star-turned-politician, won
by a landslide in the 1998 presidential election on the strength of his
close affinity with the poor, encased in his campaign slogan “Erap
para sa mahirap” (Erap is

for the poor). “Erap” is a rewording of the colloquial term “pare”

which means pal or friend. Estrada was first elected as mayor in
1967, then as senator in 1987, and vice president in 1992. He parlayed
his celluloid image as a “Robin Hood”-type action star with a strong
anticolonial nationalist posturing that propelled his meteoric rise to the
presidency. But despite having been elected with the widest electoral
margin in the post-1986 period, Estrada was plagued by allegations of
abuse of power, a lavish lifestyle, and corruption. This led to his
impeachment and subsequent ouster in a second people power uprising
in 2001. His failure and downfall has pushed back the cause of social
justice reforms that the nation badly needs11 (Doronila, 2001; Laquian
& Laquian, 1998, 2002).
Duterte’s political back story runs parallel with that of Estrada.
Both come from middle-class families with minor political
connections who found affinity with the poor at an early age. Both
were expelled from Jesuit-run schools, and both started their careers
as successful mayors: Erap during the Marcos era and Rody during
the post-Marcos era. Both projected a “siga” (tough guy) image with
Erap magnifying this persona in the movies and in the Metro Manila
town (later city) of San Juan, and Rody crafting this image in the
communist infiltrated and crime infested city of Davao.
Estrada, however, managed to rise earlier from local to national
politics, having been elected as mayor of San Juan in the late 1960s
shortly before martial law and then to the senate in 1987, as vice
president in 1992, and as president in 1998. Rody, on the other hand,
spent most of his political career in Davao (except for a short stint in
Congress from 2001 to 2004). While Erap was viewed suspiciously by
elites but enjoyed tremendous popularity among the poor voters,
Duterte’s electoral appeal was more among the upper- and middle-
class voters. The angry middle class constitute an emerging counter-
elite, who feel left out by the ruling oligarchy. Duterte’s emerging
neoauthoritarian constituency was initially concentrated among some
elites and the middle class, and has only recently gained electoral
support from the poor.
Magsaysay and ramos: Orthodox Innovators
Meanwhile, the orthodox innovators are presidents who willfully identify

with an existing regime and are fully committed to pushing it
forward. The Cold War warrior, Ramon Magsaysay, switched
political affilia- tion and allied himself with the old guards of the
Nacionalista Party to defeat Quirino and prevented the collapse of
the neocolonial regime.

The economic reforms pursued by Fidel V. Ramos served to enhance the

political reforms introduced by Corazon Aquino and the reformist
regime. Ramon Magsaysay rose to power amidst the legitimation
crises triggered by charges of corruption and electoral fraud against the
presidency of Elpidio Quirino. In reaction to the string of corruption
scandals under the Quirino administration, a “reformist” candidate in
the person of Ramon Magsaysay emerged to challenge Quirino’s
reelection bid in 1953. A charismatic guerrilla leader during World
War II who was elected to Congress in 1949, Magsaysay capitalized on
the success of his pacification campaign against the communist Huk
insurgents as Quirino’s Secretary of National Defense to bolster his
national appeal to the general public. Closely identified with Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Edward Lansdale, he enjoyed
covert American support through financial contributions and media
coverage. Using American political marketing techniques, Lansdale
successfully packaged him as a “man of the people.” Magsaysay
eventually resigned his cabinet position and declared his candidacy
for president against Quirino. Despite the silent protest of old school
nationalists within the Nationalist Party (NP), the “Cold War warrior”
became the party’s standard bearer in the 1953 presidential election.
As such, “Magsaysay’s candidacy was backed by professional military
officers, the CIA, the Catholic Church, professional associations, and
anti-communist labor and peasant associations, which formed the
Magsaysay-for-President Movement, a well-oiled propaganda machine
that promoted his image as a non-traditional politician.” He combined a
potent mix of reformist and populist narrative. Magsaysay
overwhelmingly won the election but died in a plane crash in 1957
before he could
finish his term of office (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p. 179).
Until his election into the presidency, Fidel V. Ramos had always
preferred to operate in the background and keep his cards close to
his chest. The West Point-educated career soldier headed the defunct
Philippine Constabulary under the authoritarian regime of his cousin,
Ferdinand Marcos. In fact, Ramos was one of the so-called “Rolex
12”—close associates of Marcos who plotted the declaration of
martial law. His decision at the last minute to support the failed coup
attempt of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the members of
the reform, the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), helped turn the tide
in favor of the people power uprising at EDSA. Later, his decision to
defend the fledgling government of President Cory Aquino against the
coup attempts launched by Enrile and RAM was a turning point in the
defense and consolidation

of democracy in the period of transition. When he lost the presidential

nomination of the pro-Aquino party Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), he suddenly decided to push through with his
candidacy and formed his own party—Lakas ng EDSA—which merged
with the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD). Ramos’
candidacy was endorsed by Aquino, and with the support of
government machinery, he won the presidency with a plurality of
votes in a field of seven candidates. He wrapped himself with the
mantle of the EDSA Revolution and posi- tioned himself as the
rightful successor to Cory Aquino (Cortes, 1999, pp. 284–293).
Under the reformist regime, Fidel V. Ramos was the first to offer a
comprehensive development plan after the democratic transition from
the Marcos authoritarian regime. He vigorously pursued the policies
of liberalization, privatization, and decentralization under his
development vision of “Philippines 2000.” Given his middle-class
military background, Ramos had no links to the old oligarchy and was
in a strategic position to dismantle the monopolies and cartels in
key industries controlled by family conglomerates (Velasco, 1997, pp.
161–163). Among the post- Marcos presidents, Ramos was the most
successful in pushing for economic reforms. Unfortunately, he ran
out of time as his six-year term of office ended before he could
pursue the next set of social reforms. Moreover, the 1997 Asian
financial crisis eroded the economic gains achieved under his
administration.
Quirino, Macapagal, later Marcos, Arroyo, and Aquino III:

Disjunctive Leaders
Lastly, disjunctive leaders are those who are identified with an

existing regime that is ripe for repudiation. These presidents have the
misfortune of ascending to power at the time when the regime they are
affiliated with is most vulnerable. In the Philippines, they also include
presidents who were affiliated with a still sturdy regime but went off-
script due to their actions seen as not in conformity with the regime
narrative.
Elpidio Quirino was the logical successor to the pro-American Roxas.
He was saddled by allegations of electoral fraud and corruption that
nearly ended the neocolonial regime. The latter part of Ferdinand
Marcos’ long reign of power paled in comparison to the vigor and
promise of his early years. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ascended to the
presidency on the crest of a second people power revolution at EDSA
(against the perceived corruption of the Estrada administration) but she
herself was accused of

corruption and electoral fraud that also triggered a crisis of

legitimation during her administration.
Aquino overwhelmingly won the 2010 presidential elections with his
good governance and reformist narrative of “Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap” (no corruption, no poverty). However, the inability
to rein in the twin problems of institutionalized corruption and political
clientelism has limited his ability to put a dent in the bigger problem of
poverty in the country. What is worse is that his perceived moblization
of clientelistic tactics, such as pork barrel politics to push for his
anticorruption agenda, has exposed the limits of his good governance
rhetoric.
Macapagal ascended to the presidency at the time when the
postwar neocolonial regime he was affiliated with was most
vulnerable and ripe for repudiation. Quirino, the later Marcos, and
Arroyo were entangled in legitimation crises that made their
respective regimes vulnerable. By the time Marcos proclaimed the
triump of his Fourth Republic in 1981, his authoritarian regime was
ripe for repudiation, and by 1986, he was ousted from power.
In 1949, Quirino won his own mandate in a fraud-ridden election
against nationalist Jose P. Laurel. The intense intra-elite competition
boiled to a near revolutionary situation in the immediate aftermath of
the 1949 presidential election as the followers of Laurel threatened to
revolt against the government. By the 1950s, the legitimacy of the
neocolonial regime under the presidency of Quirino continued to
erode as his administration faced both a growing communist-led
insurgency in the countryside and allegations of widespread
corruption involving the
imposition of exchange controls and involvement in corruption scandals

(especially regarding the implementation of such controls and the manage-
ment of government-owned corporations)…Such charges of corruption, as
well as opposition to expanding government controls and credits in the
first place, were identified with the powerful sugar bloc and its politicking to
secure continued access to the US market and to the Philippine presidency.
(Hedman & Sidel, 2000, p. 21)
The election of Diosdado Macapagal to the presidency marked the

return of the Liberal Party to power after two terms of Nacionalista
dominance under Magsaysay and Garcia. The self-styled “Poor Boy
from Lubao” capitalized on his impoverished roots to project a
populist “man of the masses” image. Together with Ferdinand Marcos,
he belonged to the “batch of 1949,” former guerrilla fighters-turned-
politicians who were

recruited by Manuel Roxas to run for Congress. Both Macapagal and

Marcos became stalwarts of the Liberal Party and defenders of
Roxas’ Cold War regime. Marcos begrudgingly gave way to
Macapagal for the opportunity to challenge Carlos P. Garcia in the
1961 presidential elections, on the promise that he will only serve for
one term. When Macapagal turned back on his promise and
proceeded with his reelection bid, Marcos switched to the Nacionalista
Party and won its presidential nomination. The break between these
two Roxas protégé signaled the further erosion of the Cold War
regime (Liang, 1970).
Macapagal struggled to be an “orthodox innovator” in reviving the
Roxas regime and began to dismantle the economic protectionsim of
Garcia’s “Filipino First Policy” and promoted foreign exchange
decontrol which effectively devalued the Philippine peso. But in the
end, he was more of a “disjunctive” president “known more for the
corruption per- meating his administration than for his attempt to
coordinate economic development” (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p.
186).
Despite the promise of destroying the “oligarchs” and building a “New
Society,” Ferdinand Marcos only succeeded to consolidate his
political and economic power around his wife Imelda, his business
cronies, and key officers in the military. He failed to deliver on his
promise of economic development, one of the linchpins of regime
legitimation. Despite widespread repressions and human rights
violation, he failed to suppress the growing communist insurgency and
secessionism in Muslim Mindanao. By the mid-1970s, key institutions
like the influential Catholic Church had begun to be critical of some of
the most repugnant authoritarian policies. The twilight of his
authoritarian regime began with the total dissipation of the middle-
class support in the wake of the assassination of opposition leader,
former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr on August 21, 1983. Upon the
prodding from the United States, Marcos called for a “snap election”
in 1985. He was challenged by Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the widow
of the slain opposition leader. His attempt at stealing the election led
to a major legitimation crises that finally concluded in regime
breakdown. The military-backed “people power” uprising ended the
Marcos authoritarian regime and propelled Cory Aquino into the
presidency of a new regime (Martinez, 1984; Thompson, 1996;
Velasco, 1997).
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is the daughter of Diosdado Macapagal and
chosen heir of Corazon Aquino to continue the mantle of the reform-
ist regime after the second people power uprising at EDSA. However,
her first term in office was punctuated by serious challenges in the

legitimacy of her government, characterized by the revolt of disgruntled

and impoverished supporters of ousted president Joseph Estrada in 2001,
and a failed mutiny of junior military officers in 2003. In seeking her
own electoral mandate in 2004, she used the entire government
machinery to win a victory against her populist challenger and movie
icon Fernando Poe Jr. When illegally wiretapped conversations with a
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) official was leaked, she
mobilized government resources (i.e., pork barrel funds to
congressmen and local government officials) to prevent impeachment
and stay in power. She concentrated her efforts into regime survival
at the tail end of her presidency that all reform efforts were halted and
government malfeasance was encouraged (Fabros, 2010).
Despite her near loss of legitimacy to govern, she managed to end
her term and turn over the presidency to her successor and former
student Benigno Aquino III. She ran and won a seat in the House of
Representatives but was arrested in 2011 on charges of “election
sabo- tage.” Ultimately, “[m]uch have been said of President Arroyo,
but few will deny her enduring skill in the power game and her steely
nerves in fighting within the arena. She has repelled impeachment
attempts as well as coup attempts” (Velasco & Saludo, 2010, p. xi).
She began her presidency like Cory Aquino but ended it like
Ferdinand Marcos—a discredited leader.
Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III was the reluctant candidate who
was thrust into the presidency upon the outpouring of national grief
over the death of his mother, Cory Aquino. This was not the first time
that death propelled an Aquino into the presidency. Cory ascended
into the presidency after the brutal assassination of Noynoy’s father,
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Noynoy’s presidency is a testament of
the potency of the Aquino narrative, a particular variant of the
reformist storyline that harks back to the presidency of Ramon
Magsaysay. For the true believers, the deaths of Ninoy and Cory
turned around the destiny of our nation, reviving the popular clamor for
honesty and decency in public service… The people saw in their son the per-
sonification of his parents’ example in the 2010 elections…believing that he
will carry the torch of moral leadership that will finally free Philippine society
from misery and corruption. They wagered on him their dreams and their
hopes that change is indeed possible. (Villacorta, 2011, p. 3)

A more sober profile of Noynoy is that he is
[l]aidback and easygoing, he felt no pressure to other than what he truly

was
. . . He could be stubborn when he wanted to, had a long memory, and was
quick to pick up and remember the minutest of details. To his close friends, he
was known to have a predilection for combat shooting, to love a good smoke,
cola, burgers, Chinese and Japanese food, and even a good laugh. He was
an audiophile as well. (Hofileña & Go, 2011, p. 3)
Beyond the power of the narrative is the resilience of the regime that
his mother founded. The governing coalition that Noynoy assembled
resembled that of his mother—“an explosive mix of traditional oligarchs,
big business, military rebels, middle-class professionals, human rights
activists, and old and new politicians” (Velasco, 1997, p. 100). Like
his mother, “Noynoy” came into power with high popular
expectations of rapid reforms toward good governance, which he failed
to deliver. While he ended his administration with the highest
popularity rating among the post-Marcos presidents, his
administration served to accentuate the vulnerabilities and
contradictions of the postauthoritarian reformist regime. These
include the lack of interest in pursuing serious institutional reforms
relying instead on “good leadership,” the intensification of intra-elite
competition, and the overall attitude of “business-as-usual” among the
well-entrenched political and socioeconomic elites with the lack of
concern or care for the daily plight of the poor and the middle class
(Thompson 2014).
During the first half of his administration, it was hoped that Noynoy
Aquino would be a successful “orthodox innovator” like Fidel Ramos
and would reinvigorate the regime that his mother founded. Instead,
the second half of his administration signaled the death knell for the
postauthoritarian reformist regime and the good governance narrative
it advocated.
Instead of institutionalizing much-delayed political reforms (such the
Freedom of Information Act, the Political Party Development Act,
and the Anti-Political Dynasty Act) or cracking down on smuggling
(which has worsened under his administration), he spent most of his
political capital in symbolic acts such as putting his predecessor
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo under house arrest on corruption
charges and blam- ing her for every setbacks his administration faced.
He lobbied to have Congress impeach and remove the Supreme Court
Chief Justice Renato Corona on dubious charges. At the height of a
major pork barrel scandal

that hit Congress in 2011, only Aquino’s political enemies were arrested
and prosecuted, giving rise to suspicions that his good governance
crusade was one-sided and politically motivated. A botched
antiterrorist opera- tion supervised by suspended police chief and
close Aquino ally Allan Purisima resulted in the death of 44 Special
Action Force (SAF) person- nel. Moreover, crime was widely seen to
have risen under the watch of Aquino’s anointed presidential candidate
Manuel “Mar” Roxas II, who, as the Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, was in charge of the National Police Commission.
Roxas was also widely faulted for missteps in managing relief
operations after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, and for repeated
breakdowns in public transportation when he previously served as
Secretary of Transportation and Communication.
The electoral victory of Duterte was a repudiation of the failures of
the second Aquino administration. Many of those who supported
Duterte were from the elite and middle-class supporters of Aquino
who were frustrated and angered by his failure to complete the reform
process and realize inclusive growth. The anger found form in a
movement that gravitated around the antiestablishment and
unorthodox mayor from the South who promised the coming of “Tunay
na pagbabago” (real change). It can also be argued that the rise of
Duterte occurred at the exact moment when the postauthoritarian
reformist regime was most vulnerable. Its core narrative of good
governance was eroded with the extraconstitutional ouster of
populist President Joseph Estrada in 2001, the contested presidential
election of 2004, and the massive display of incompetence during the
latter half of the second Aquino administration. It remains to be seen
whether Duterte will make true his neoauthoritarian campaign
narrative and institute a regime change (like Roxas, Marcos, and Cory
Aquino) or end up as a preemptor (like Garcia or Estrada). For sure,
he will initiate some systemic changes. He has vowed to pursue
federalism which is an important step in decentralizing power that has
long been concentrated in the capital city. He is also expected to
finally make peace with the communist insurgents and the Muslim
secessionists in the south. While claiming to be a left-wing socialist, his
economic agenda does not veer much away from the neoliberal
orthodoxy of his predecessors. Yet, he is bold enough to offer four
cabinet positions to communists as a confidence-building measure to
jumpstart the peace negotiations. He has spoken about raising the
Philippines’ low agricultural produc- tivity and reemphasizing
industrialization which had been neglected during the Aquino years.
Duterte is also open to conducting bilateral

talks with China after the outcome of the Philippines’ arbitral case on
the South China Sea. He is also expected to take a more nuanced attitude
regarding the Philippines’ relation with the United States.
Nonetheless, his close ties to the military and police in Davao and
his previous threats to set aside the democratic institutions and legal
due process are a cause for concern, given the immense powers of the
Philippine presidency. It is also possible that the presidency will provide
an institutional check to his unorthodox positions. In the words of
Noynoy Aquino, “reality will tame Duterte” (Moss, 2016).
context and conduct in Presidential Leadership
Presidents shape regimes as much as regimes shape presidents. An

agential view of presidential leadership tends to privilege their
personal qualities such as reputation, prestige, perception, and
judgment to per- suade others to follow their lead. This view also
highlights the importance of psychological disposition in shaping the
presidential character. On the other hand, a structural view shifts the
focus from personal traits and attributes to the structural
configuration of institutions, interests, and ideas—a change of view
from presidential style to presidential regimes. A president ascends to
power either affiliated or opposed to an existing regime. An incumbent
president’s regime orientation largely determines the nature of
presidential administration. The recurrence of these regime
orientations provides a structured context for presidential leadership
in the pattern of political time, which can be differentiated from
secular time. Secular time is the chronological and historical sequencing
of presidencies, while political time refers to the recurring pattern of
presidential
regimes.
As the previous presidential sketches have demonstrated,
presidents make their own presidencies, but they do not make them
anyway they please. Presidents are the products of the very same
regimes they attempt to mold or shape. They have the option to
innovate or preempt the dominant narrative, governing coalition, or
institutional base of an existing regime. In rare instances, they also
have the opportunity to repudiate and reconstruct it.
The Philippines does not exactly exhibit the same historical continuity
that Skowronek was able to draw upon when searching for patterns in
the US presidentialism. Nonetheless, this article delineated the presi-
dential regimes in the Philippines. In this historical survey, the article
observed the prevalence of dialectical path dependency. The
literature

on historical institutionalism says that early choices matter—the

timing and sequencing of institutional formation. While largely
accepting this view, this article departed from a unilinear understanding
of path dependency. The article instead presented that the path
dependency occurs within a regime framework which means that
institutions are “bundled” in a particular way over a substantial period of
time. A “regime change” involves a rearrangement of institutional
interactions, with the nature of the past regime dialectically influencing
the formation of the new one. It is within this context that Duterte’s
campaign narrative of “real change is coming” can best be appreciated.
NOTES
1. The 2016 election was only the fifth time, the Filipino people directly
elected their president and vice president since the restoration of democracy
in 1986. Presidents are elected for a single six-year term. Except for the
contested election of 2004, the presidential elections of 1992, 1998, and
2010 have resulted in a smooth democratic transfer of power.
2. Duterte has been quoted several times in the press that he will emulate
Ferdinand Marcos’s authoritarian style of governance and will use the
military and the police to address criminality. Duterte’s father served in the
Marcos cabinet as Secretary of General Services (Tejada, 2016).
3. Latin American presidentialism has long been characterized by regime insta-
bility and a cycle of democratic breakdowns that have ushered a parade
of military regimes in the past. For a detailed account of presidential
breakdown in Latin America, see Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Mainwaring
and Shugart (1997), and Llanos and Marsteintredet (2010).
4. “Pangulo” is the Tagalog word for president. Etymologically, it comes from
the root word “ulo” which means head. Thus, the “pangulo” or president is
referred to as the head of the body-politic.
5. For a detailed account of the first 100 years of the Philippine presidency,
see Cortes (1999).
6. The technocrats were drawn from the academe and corporate sector to
enhance the regime’s administrative efficiency. The cronies were a small
circle of business associates and relatives of Marcos who amassed enormous
fortunes by creating monopolies and oligopolies through state support
and patronage. The formerly nonpartisan and professional military was
heavily politicized under Marcos, as it played a critical role in the
maintenance and survival of the authoritarian regime (see Velasco, 1997,
pp. 85–87).

7. The Marcos ruling family succeeded in dominating all political institu-

tions in the country, including the ruling party. Personalities who were
closely associated with the Marcos–Romualdez clan, whose fortunes
were derived from the major agricultural exports (sugar, coconuts, and
bananas), were all Central Committee members of the Marcos political
party—KBL (see Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 276; Wurfel, 1979, pp.
233–245).
8. Thompson (2010, p. 7) argues that Philippine reformism, like urban
reformers in the United States in the early twentieth century, claim to act
on the interest of the nation, disregarding class differences. They focus
on the importance of education in uplifting the poor. They make moral
appeals based on “good governance”. Reformists promise to govern
honestly and stop corruption that impedes government efficiency and
undermines economic development.
9. Skowronek’s presidential regime approach (developed from the United
States political experience) needs to be modified in order to be
applicable to the context of a developing country like the Philippines.
See Thompson, 2014, pp. 444–445.
10. Duterte, who served a total of seven terms for 22 years as the mayor of
Davao, was one of the longest serving local chief executive in the
country. He also briefly served as congressman and vice mayor of his
city.
11. Other national personalities have attempted to pick up and carry on the
populist banner, such as Estrada’s best friend and fellow actor Fernando
Poe Jr. in 2004 and self-made billionaire Senator Manuel Villar in 2010.
Both ran for the presidency, evoking strong populist narratives, but failed to
replicate Estrada’s phenomenal victory in 1998. Estrada himself
contested the 2010 presidential election and landed second to Benigno
Aquino III. Estrada’s running mate in 2010, Jejomar Binay embraced the
populist mantle and won the vice presidency. Binay, a long-time mayor
of the commercial city of Makati, pulled an electoral upset and narrowly
defeated the front running candidate Senator Manuel Roxas II. However, he
lost miserably to Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, placing fourth in a field of five
candidates.
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Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Abueva, J. (1997). Philippine democratization and the consolidation of
democracy since the 1986 revolution: An overview of the main issues, trends
and prospects. In F. B. Miranda (Ed.), Democratization: Philippine
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E-mail id: julio.teehankee@dlsu.edu.ph

Weak State, Strong Presidents Situating The Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Time

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Weak State, Strong Presidents Situating The Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Time

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Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte

Presidency in Philippine Political Time

Keywords: Presidents, presidential leadership, Philippine politics, regimes,

The unexpected election of Rodrigo “Rody” Duterte as the 16th presi-

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significant amount of investments. But this transformation came with