RMvaon 1
M 1 I1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.133
LOOSE-PART DETECTION PROGRAM 1 FOR THE PRIMARY
SYSTEM OF LIGHT-WATER-COOLED REACTORS
A. INTRODUCTION
Criterion 1, "Quality Standards and Records," of Appen
dix A, "General Design Critiera for Nuclear Power Plants,"
to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities," requires that structures, systems, and
components important to safety be designed, fabricated,
erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with
the importance of the safety functions to be performed and
that a quality assurance program be established and imple
mented in order to provide adequate assurance that these
structures, systems, and components will satisfactorily
perform their safety functions.
Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control," requires,
in part, that instrumentation be provided to monitor
variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for
normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences,
and for accident conditions to ensure adequate safety,
"-• including those variables and systems that can affect the
fision process, the integrity of the core, and the reactor
coolant pressure boundary.
Section 50.36, "Technic Specifications," of 10 CFR
Part 50 requires an applicant. )r a facility operating license
to provide proposed technical specifications. Paragraph (cX2),
"Limiting Conditions for Operation," identifies a proposed
technical specification relating to the lowest functional
capability or performance levels of equipment required for
safe operation of the facility. Paragraph (cX3), "Surveillance
Requirements," identifies a proposed technical specifica
tion relating to test, calibration, or inspection to ensure
that the necessary quality of systems and components is
maintained, that facility operation will be within the safety
limits, and that the limiting conditions of operation will be
met. Paragraph (cX5), "AdministratiVrControls," requires
an applicant for a fa.ility operating license to provide pro
lIn this guide the phrase loose-part detection program encom
psses recommendations for system hardware and propammatic and
reporting procedures. Loose-part detection system refers only to
system hardware.
USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES
Regulatory
public Guidesacceptable
methods are Issued to
to describe
the NRC andstaff
makeofavailable to the
Implementing
specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech-
naques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or postu
lated accidents, or to provide guidance to appicknts. Regulatory
Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with
them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set
out In the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the
findings requiste to the issuance or continuance of a permit or
This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from
the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these
guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as
appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informa-
Ion or experience.
posed technical specifications relating to reporting neces
sary to ensure operation of the facility in a safe manner.
Paragraph 20.1(c) of 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for
Protection Against Radiation," states that, in addition to
complying with the requirements therein licensees should
make every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to
radiation as far below the limits specified in Part 20 as is
reasonably achievable.
This guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC
staff for implementing the above regulatory requirements
with respect to detecting a potentially safety-related loon
part in light-water-cooled reactors during normal operation.
This guide also outlines a program that can help licensees to
meet the Part 20 criterion that exposures of station personnel
to radiation during routine operation of the station will
be "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA).
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has.
been consulted concerning this guide and has concurred inj
the regulatory position.
B. DISCUSSION
The presence of a loose (i.e., disengaged and drifting)
part in the primary coolant system can be indicative of
degraded reactor safety resulting from failure or weakening
of a safety-related component. A loose part, whether it be
from a failed or weakened component or from an item
inadvertently left in the primary system during construction,
refueling, or maintenance procedures, can contribute to
component damage and material wear by frequent impacting
with other parts in the system. A loose part can pose a
serious threat of partial flow blockage with attendant
departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) which in turn could
result in failure of fuel cladding. In addition, a loose part
increases the potential for control-rod jamming and for
accumulation of increased levels of radioactive crud in the
primary system.
Lines indicate substantive changes from September 1977 issue.
Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,
Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
The guides are issued In the following ten broad divisions:
1. Power Reactors 6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Health
4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review
5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General
Copies of issued guides may be purchased at the current Government
Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spa
cific divisions is available through the Government Printing Office.
Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may
be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

T1. ptinkary purpose of the loose-part detection program
is the early detection of loose metallic parts in the primary
system. Early detection can provfde the time required to
avoid or mitigate safety-related damage to or malfunctions
of primary system components.
The loose-part detection program also serves a second
purpose since it can minimize radiation exposure to station
personnel by providing for the early detection and general
location of abnormal structural conditions. Information
from the program can be used by station personnel to focus
their efforts when taking remedial action to minimize the
formation -of wear-generated radioactive crud and to
minimize the need for extensive structural repairs. The
second purpose is consistent with the guidance contained in
Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Informationi Relevant to Ensuring
That Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power
Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable,"
which provides guidance to licensees for maintaining
occupational doses to individuals as far below the permissible
limits specified in the NRC regulations as is reasonably
achievable while, at the same time, providing guidance on
methods to ensure that the sum of the doses received
by all exposed personnel is also at the lowest practical level.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
and the NRC staff have, for the past several years, been
encouraging applicants to employ online loose-part detection
systems in an attempt to stimulate technological development
in that area. This approach has resulted in a substantial
increase in industry-wide experience and confidence in
these systems and has resulted in the commercial production
of loose-part detection systems by several engineering and
manufacturing organizations. All applicants for a construc
tion permit or an operating license are required to describe
the loose-part detection program for the proposed reactor
(Section 4.4.6, "Instrumentation Requirements," of Regula
tory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants").
An improperly developed and poorly implemented
loose-part program may require excessive attention by plant
operating personnel and more frequent inspections of the
primary system that can result in increased radiation
exposure. For this reason, this guide emphasizes the need
for providing system features that will minimize false alert
signals and for developing diagnostic procedures that can be
quickly implemented to supplement information from the
loode-part detection system to determine the short- and
long-term safety significance of a loose part. A well-developed
loose-part detection system should enable discrimination of
the signal induced by the impact of a loose part from those
signals induced by normal hydraulic, mechanical, and
electrical background noise and large amplitude electrical
transients.
The loose-part detection program outlined in this
regulatory guide includes both automatic and manual
modes of data acquisition. These data acquisition modes
automatic and manual detection of loose parts.
I provide for
The automatic data acquisition mode provides for oontinuous
monitoring of signals, but data are recorded only when the
1.133-2
detection system senses that a predesignated alert level has
been reached or exceeded. An alarm alerts control room
personnel when the alert level is reached or exceeded. 'In
developing an automatic procedure for the continuous,
online detection of loose parts, some sensitivity will be
sacrificed to minimize the potential for false alert signals.
The manual data acquisition mode provides periodic moni
toring to detect loose parts, determine system operability
(including calibration), establish the alert level, and alert
the licensee to data that require evaluation but are of
insufficient magnitude or incorrect character to otherwise
initiate automatic alert procedures. Manual monitoring of
the audio portion of the sensor signals provides very high
sensitivity to loose-part impacts with good capability for
pecognizing spurious audio signals. Manual monitoring does,
however, have the potential for increasing the burden on
station personnel and should be used only on a periodic
basis.
The loose-part detection program outlined herein is not,
intended to be a research program. Instrumentation and:,
procedures that will result in the need for disproportionate,
amount of ittention by control room personnel are not I
encouraged. Instrumentation that can be used to determine I
the approximate size and location of a loose part but
that does not interfere with the normal alert and false signal
rejection function of the detection program would be
useful in complementing other instrumentation to determine
the safety significance of a detected loose part. Loose parts
traveling through the primary system will generally accumu
late, at least for a time, in such natural collection areas as
the plenumi in reactor vessels and steam generators. Therefore, 1-1
the NRC staff recommends that sensors be located at theie
and other natural collection areas. No benefit is seen in
instiumenting straight lines of pipe or other areas through
which a loose part will quickly pass. Close scrutiny of a
relatively small amount of clearly relevant data is consid
ered a better detection program than cursory review of a
large volume of less significant data.
A prime consideration in developing the loose-part
detection program is the avoidance of procedures requiring
excessive attention by control room personnel and excessive
reporting by the licensee. The recommended program
would require operator action or engineering review when
the detection methods indicate the presence or possibility
of a loose part or when performing periodic audio monitor
ing or when confirming the operability of the instrumenta
tion system. Licensee reports to the Commission during
operation are necessary when defining the alert level,
when a loose part is confirmed to be present, or when the
associated technical specification is violated.
Although current loose-part detection systems can, in a
large number of cases, detect and indicate the approximate
location and weight of a loose part, other information (e.g.,
that obtained from plant process signals, from an inspection
of the facility, or from prior operating history) will be
necessary in most instances to determine the safety sign-if
icance of the loose part. Therefore, no action with respect
to reactor operation is recommended based on the informa
tion •btained from the loose-part detection system alone.
An alert resulting from the loose-part detection system is
considered a warning, and it is important that followup
steps (e.g., acquisition of additional diagnostic information)
be taken to determine the significance of the alert signal.
If a loose part is shown to be present, its short- and long-term
safety implications need to be determined.
The potential for damage initiated by a loose part is not
necessarily proportional to the impact energy of the loose
part. For example, a small piece of flat metal plate may
impart little impact energy but could restrict local flow to
the reactor core. However, there are technical difficulties in
trying to distinguish very-low-energy impact signals from
the normal reactor acoustic background noise. Experience
with loose-part detection systems for operating pressurized
and boiling water reactors provides the basis for establishing
an impact energy of 0.5 ft-lb (0.68 joules), e.g., the kinetic
energy of a 0.5-lb (0.23 kg) part traveling at 8 ft/sec (2.4 m/
sec), as the recommended system sensitivity in Regulatory
Position 1.b. Experience shows that signals resulting from
metallic-object impacts of that magnitude are distinguishable
from the normal background noise, and that, in some
instances, even smaller impact energies are discernible at
signal levels within background noise levels when the
manual audio monitoring mode is being used.
In order to ensure that, as a minimum, each loose-part
detection system has the ability to detect what the staff
considers to be the most significant range of loose-part
weights, the staff recommends (Regulatory Position 1.b)
that each loose-part detection system be capable of auto
matically detecting loose parts that weigh between 0.25 lb
(0.11 kg) and 30 lb (13.6 kg) and impact with an energy of
0.5 ft-lb (0.68 joules) or more. The specified weight range is
considered to be representative of the most common and
significant class of loose parts. In addition, the staff recom
mends periodic audio monitoring by station personnel to
complement the automatic detection system.
The high radiation and thermal cycling environment to
which most of the primary system is subjected could in
time alter operating characteristics of the loose-part detec
tion system so that surveillance becomes ineffectual either
by causing excessive alert signals or by decreasing sensitivity
to loose parts. Therefore, in Regulatory Position 1f the staff
recommends that provisions be incorporated into the system
to permit channel operability (including calibration) tests.
Regulatory Position 5 addresses operability tests as part of a
surveillance requirement for aproposed technical specification.
Since an earthquake could induce a loose part in the
primary system, it is desirable that the loose-part detection
system be designed to function following all seismic events
that do not require plant shutdown. Recording equipment,
however, need not be designed to function without main
tenance following such seismic events provided the system
retains audio or visual alarm capability.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
An inservice loose-part detection program should be
implemented for the primary system of light-water-cooled
1.133-3
reactors during preoperational testing and the startup and
power operation modes in accordance with the following
guidelines:
1. System Characteristics
The following fe atures should be incorporated into each
loose-part detection system.
a. Sensor Location. Sensors capable of detecting acoustic
disturbances should be strategically located on the exterior
surface of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. A mkimum
of two sensors, suitably located to provide broad coverage,
should be located at each natural collection region (e~g.,
reactor vessel upper and lower plenums and each pressurized
water-reactor steam generator reactor wolant inlet plenum).
b. System Senitivitly. The online sensitivity of the
automatic detection system should be such that, as a
minimum, the system can detect, metallic loose part that
weighs from 0,25lb (0.11 kg) to 301b (13.6kg) and
impacts with a kinetic energy of 0.5 ft-lb (0.68 joules)
on the inside surface of the reactor coolant pressure bound
ary within 3 feet (0.91 meter) of a sensor. If the recom
mended sensitivity cannot be achieved by automatic alert
because of specific in-plant conditions, these conditions and
the actual online sensitivity should be specified at the time
the alert level is provided (see Regulatory Position 3.a(2Xa)).
As an example, one acceptable method for verifying this
online sensitivity is to demonstrate (1) the basic system
sensitivity during plant shutdown and (2) that the background
noise measured during normal plant operation is sufficiently
small that the signal associated with the specified detectable
loose-part impact would be clearly discernible in the
presence of this background noise.
c. Channel Separation. The instrumentation channels
(e.g., cabling, amplifiers) associated with the two sensors
recommended at each natural collection region should be
physically separated from each other starting at the sensor
locations to a point in the plant that is always accessible
for maintenance during full-power operation.
d. DataAcquirition System. The system should include
both automatic and manual startup of data acquisition
equipment (see Regulatory Position 3). In the event the
alert level is reached or exceeded, the data acquisition
system should automatically activate, and an audible or
visual alarm should alert the control room personnel of that
condition. The data acquisition system should provide for
the recording of all sensor signal waveforms in either analog
or digital form with the acceptability for selecting, as a
minimum, any four sensors for simultaneous recording.
The system should be capable of immediate visual and
audio monitoring of all signals.
e. Alert Level. Provision should be made for incorporat
ing into the system an alert level that is indicative of the
presence of a loose part consistent with Regulatory Position
1.b. Depending on the alert logic (i.e., internal processing of
system signals), raw or processed signals should be auto
matically and continuously compared to the alert level.
 Points to be considered In establishing the alert level are
noted in Regulatory Position 2..
f. Capabilityfor Senior Channel Operabi#ty Test:. Pro
vision should be made for periodic online channel check
and channel functional tests and for offline channel calibra
tion2 during periods of cold shutdown or refueling (see
Regulatory Position 3.a(3)).
g. Operabltyfor Seismic and Envwmnmental Conditions.
Components of the loose-part detection system within
containment should be designed and installed to perform
their function following all seismic events that do not
require plant shutdown, i.e., up to and including the Operat
ing Basis Earthquake (ODE). Recording equipment need
not function without maintenance folloiing the specified
seismic event provided the audio or visual alarm capability
remains functional. The system should also be shown to be
adequate by analysis, test, or combined analysis and test for
the normal operating radiation, vibration, temperature, and
humidity environment.
h. Quality of System Components. Components should
be of a quality that is consistent with minimum maintenance
requirements and low-failure rates. Components within the
containment should be compatible with the 40-year design
life of the reactor system. In those instances where a
40-year design life is not practicable, a replacement program
should be established for these parts that are anticipated to
have limited service life.
i. System Repair. The system should be designed to
facilitate the recognition, location, replacement, repair, and
adjustment of malfunctioning components. Equipment,
procedures, and layout should facilitate maintenance
to minimize personnel time in high radiation areas and
minimize occupational radiation exposure.
2. EstablidshIng the Alert Level
In all cases, the alert level should be consistent _with
Rejulatory Positions l.b and I.e and should include the
effects of background noise.
2
The standard technical specificatlons define channel
cannel funcional Wt, and chamnel calibmaton as follows. check,
A chlannl check Is the qualitative messment of channel behavior
during operation by observation, Including, where possible corn
parbon of the channel indication or status with other Indications or
status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the
same parameter.
A channel funcfoN•l test -for analog channels is the injection of a
simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor a
.racticable
to veaty oper bility, including alarm and trip functions;
or b.staboe channels it is the injection of a simulated signal
the channel sensor to vefy operability, including alarm and into trip
functions.
A channel calbrafion is the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel
output so that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to
known values of the parameter that the channel
chmel calibration encompasses the entire channel, monitors. The
including the
sensor and alarm and trip functions, and includes the channel
functional test. The channel calibration may be performed by any
serie of sequential overlapping, or total channel steps so that the
entire channel incalbrated.
1.133-4
The following points should be considered when estab
lishing the alert levels:
a. The alert logic should incorporate suitable internal
criteria to distinguish the transient signal caused by the
impact of a loose part from the signals associated with
normal hydraulic, mechanical, and electric noise and
large-amplitude electrical transients. For example, it may be
desirable to include logic that requires the comparison of
two or more sensor signals with the alert level.
b. False alert signals resulting from plant maneuvers
(e.g., c0ntrol-rod stepping, reactor trip, pump starts, and
other known sources that cannot be avoided by the pro
cedures associated with Regulatory Position 2.a) may be
avoided by automatic procedures that momentarily override
the alert-level alarm. Alternatively, administrative proce
dures may be used by control room personnel in lieu of
automatic procedures to identify and make allowance for
alert signals caused by plant maneuvers.
c. The alert logic maj provide for the alert level to be a
function of the normal steady-state operating condition.
d. As appropriate, it may be desirable for the alert logic
to provide for the alert level to vary from sensor to sensor
to compensate for the inherent level of background noise at
a specific transducer location.
3. Using the Data Acquisition Modes
The loose-part detection program should include data
acquisition in automatic and manual modes. The automatic
mode is for continuous, online detection of loose parts. The
manual mode Is to be used periodically for detecting loose
parts, determining systqm operability (including calibration),
establishing the alert level, and detecting significant safety
related trends in the sensor signals and for diagnostic
purposes.
a. Manual mode. This mode of data acquisition should
be used at the following times for the indicated purpose.
(1) Preoperational testing: Establish alert level for
this test phase.
(2) Startup and power operation.
(a) Establish alert levels for startup and power
operation. The alert level for power operation should be
submitted to the Commission (in the startup report when
one Is provided) within 90 days following completion of
the startup test program If the alert level is for power
operation following initial startup or there is a change to
the preexisting alert level for power operation. Temporary I
changes to the alert level need not be reported.
(b) At least once per 24 hours: Perform channel I
check.
(c) At least once per 7 days: Listen to audio
1-1
portion of signals from all recommended sensors foro the
 a. Sensor types, mounting locations, and mounting
indicate the presence or possibility of a loose part, station procedures, including criteria for choice of sensor and
nnel should actuate the data acquisition system to mounting locations.
9purpose of for
sin data detecting
furtherthe presence of loose parts. If signals
evaluation.
b. Data acquisition, recording, and calibration equipment.
(d) At least once per 31 days: Perform channel
functional tests. c. Anticipated major sources of external and interiel
extraneous noise.
(e) At least once per 92 days: Verify that the
background noise measured during normal plant operation is d. Precautions taken to ensure acquisition of quaUty
sufficiently small that the signal associated with the specified data.
detectable loon-part impact would be clearly discernible ip
the presence of this background noise. Verify that the signal
e. Description of the manner in which the alert level will
from each recommended sensor does not falsely indicate
be determined and also the alert logic (if any) employed by
the presence of a loose part. This should include comparison
with data, including audio data, obtained at the time of the the system hardware and software in gnerating an alert
last two quarterly measurements to verify that there does signal. This should include a description of the Program
not exist a significant trend or anomaly that may falsely capability for distinguishing between a loose part and
normal background noise.
indicate the presence of a loose part. The alert level and alert
logic may be revised to provide for the background noise of
f. Reference to the technical specification (see Rgula
these later measurements. If the revision is not temporary,
tory Position 5).
its details should be submitted within 60 days to the Com
mission as an amendment to the program description.
g. Summary of supplemental data and diagnostic
procedures that are available and that can be used as part of
(3) Cold shutdown or refuellng: At least once per a diagnostic program to confirm the presence of a loom
18 months, verify channel calibration using a controlled
part. The summary should address the use of Information
mechanical input (e.g., weight falling through a known
distance that impacts the external surface of the reactor from plant process; signals, radiation lakap monitors,
operating history, exercising of control rods, cycling of
coolant pressure boundary). Channels should, as necessary, primary coolant pumps, and inspection of the. primary
be recalibrated at this time. If recalibration Is necessary,
coolant system.
...,.onsideration should be given to replacement of unstable
mponents. h. Procedures for performing channel check, channel
functional test, and background noise measurements.
b. Automatic mode. The automatic mode should S-- be
activated automatically when the predesignated alert level is
I
exceeded. Activation should comprise an audible or visual I. Procedures for minimizing radiation exposure to
station personnel during maintenance, calibration, and
alarm to the control room operator and simultaneous initia
diagnostic procedures. (Reference in Chapter 12, "Radiation
tion of data recording equipment. Data should be acquired
Protection," of the Safety Analysis Report.)
for a sufficient period of time to properly characterize the
signals from sensors suitably selected to provide maximum
J. Training program for plant personnel that addreses
diagnostic information (e.g., the alarming sensor and several operation of the system hardware and the purpose and
adjacent sensors may be selected). Each alert should be implementation of the loose-part detection prsoram.
documented with regard to time and plant condition. (Reference in Chapter 13, "Conduct of Operations," of the
Safety Analysis Report.)
If the alert level is exceeded or if the weekly audio
monitoring or quarterly measurements indicate the presence
or possibility of a loose part, diagnostic steps should be k. The applicant should verify that the system within
containment will be designed and installed to functionI
taken within 72 hours to determine whether a loose part is
following. all seismic events up to and including the ODE.
present and to determine its safety significance.
5. Technical Specification br die Loos&Part Detectimo System
4. Content of Safety Analysis Reports
A technical specification for the loose-part detection
A description of the loose-part detection program should
be submitted to the Commission in response to the NRC system should be provided.- The technical specification
should include:
staff request for information on loose-part detection systems
in Section 4.4.6, "Instrumentation Requirements," of Regu
latory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of
Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
a. The location of the required sensors.
I
b. A limiting condition for operation requiring the
The program description should include those items loose-part detection system to be operable during startup
-covered in Regulatory Positions 1,2, and 3. Special attention and power operation. If all channels of one or more collec
tion regions are inoperable for more than 30 days, the
S-should
be given to the following items: reactor need not be shutdown, but a special report should

1.133-5
be prepared and submitted to the Commission within
the next 10 days outlining the cause of the' malfunction
and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to an operable
status.
c. A surveillance requirement that each channel of
the loose-part detection system be demonstrated operable
by a channel check performed at least once per 24 hours,
a channel functional test performed at least once per
31 days, and a calibration test performed at least once per
18 months.
6. Notification of a Loose Part
If the presence of a loose part is confirmed, the Commis
sion should be notified according to the guidelines for
reportable occurrences that call for "prompt notification
with written followup" as summarized in Regulatory
Guide 1.16, "Reporting of Operating Information-Appendix
A Technical Specifications."
The followup report to be submitted to the Commission
within 2 weeks of the initial notification of the presence of
a loose part should include (1) a summary of data obtained
in the manual and automatic data acquisition modes; (2) a
summary of the analysis, inspections, and correlations with
operating data that were performed to evaluate data from
the loose-part detection program; and (3) a summary of
conclusions and a description of modifications or other
actions planned or already performed to evaluate the safety
implication of the loose part or to ensure that system and
component safety functions are not impaired.
D. IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of this section is to provide information to
applicants regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this
regulatory guide.
This guide reflects current NRC staff practice as outlined
in Section 4.4 of the Standard Review Plan. The method
presented in this guide has been recognized as acceptable
for complying with the Commission's regulations since
January 1, 1978.
Therefore, except in thQse cases in which the applicant
proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying
1.133-6
with the specified portions of the Commission's regulations, I
the method described herein will be used by the NRC staff
in the evaluation of all construction permit applications and
all operating license applications under review by the staff
after January 1, 1978.
For reactors licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1978,
loose-part detection systems that conform to commitments
of the license application should be installed and operable.
The installation should be reviewed by the licensee to
ensure that the quality of the installation and the calibra-.
tion and use of the equipment are consistent with the recom
mendations of this guide to the extent feasible for the loose
part detection system to which the licensee committed. The
review should include an evaluation of the conformance to
the appropriate programmatic aspects of the guide, specifi
cally Sections C.2 and C.3, and whether specific hardware
or installation modifications are needed to make the systems
effective for the detection of loose parts.
In cases where licensees of operating reactors (licensed
prior to January 1, 1978) have not previously committed to
install a loose-part detection system or where the design of
an existing system precludes upgrading to an effective
functional capability, the licensee should install a system in
conformance with the programmatic aspects of the guide,
specifically Sections C.2 and C.3, or propose an acceptable
alternative. In cases where a loose part is known to be
present or there exists a high probability that a part may
become loose based on experience with other reactors of
similar design, a loose-part detection system conforming td
this guide should be installed.
A letter will be sent to the licensee for each operating
plant requesting that each licensee complete a review of his
loose-part detection program and make any appropriate
provisions for equipment and program revisions. Documenta
tion describing the results of this review and the resultant
loose-parts detection program should be prepared and
available for inspection. It is the intent of the NRC to
require that this effort, including the documentation, be
completed within 6 months after the effective issuance
date of this guide unless additional time is justified by the
licensee in response to the NRC request to review the
loose-part detection program.
 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555