Commentary on the Liberal Ideology

This commentary shall be structured accordingly: it shall begin with the criticism upon
the group’s actual manner of presentation; subsequently, I shall input my insights and take
upon the ideology; and lastly, I shall try to evaluate the ideology as a whole.

The group was substantial in terms of information and in terms of objectivity.

Furthermore, I would like to comment on how well-structured it was: there were no buffers and
the reporters had equally divided the labor so the points were not dragged. On the other hand,
they did fail to expound on how the ideology had evolved throughout the decades and how it is
continuously relevant–skocpol would have been a great source. In essence, everything was
well presented but making it a little more extensive would have elevated their attempt to paint
the whole picture of conservatism. I have read from Fawcett that conservatism joins socialism
and liberalism as one of the most dominant political philosophies and ideologies at present but,
really, the only guide of conservatives to base their ideology on is that “their framework shall be
based on experience rather than reason.” Hence, I say "attempt" because I have found that
this raises quite a few complications even throughout the Post-Enlightenment Era; most of
which the reporters failed to address.

First, the idea of what it is and what it ought to be remain unsettled. Conservatism
popularly refers to the generic “right-wing viewpoint” on the liberal-fascist political spectrum.
However, upon reading Kirk (2019), I found that conservatism is more of a social attitude rather
than a framework for abstract reasoning in politics; as an expression of the instinctive human
fear of sudden change and tendency to habitual action. Cecil, for instance, contrasts modern
conservatism with natural conservatism from which it arises and depends on, found “in almost
every human mind” (Cecil, 1912, 8). In this regard, conservatism is neither a dogmatic reaction
nor the right-wing radicalism of neoconservatives.

To put this into the context of politics, I think that many scholars have a negative
connotation of conservatism because contemporary settings fail to distinguish economic and
moral conceptions. Since conservatism simply tackles the root of moral conceptions such as
‘which values do we like and how can we keep them,’ it becomes problematic when politicians
need to sell themselves in order to win and economic questions begin to monopolize. This is
the same for all the processes of power and not just the political arena. Take for example, the
evolution of language: grammatical classes are now abhorred by many universities worldwide
due to elitism. Language is seemingly apolitical–particularly grammar–however, if the
educational setting is taken into consideration, marginalized groups of students react to issues
of grammatical correctness. They claim grammatically conscious people to be elitist; which, for
a fact, is an economic view of education: private schools cost more but provide better
foundational skills such as grammar or the communities which poor people grow up in are
much more colloquial than the formal villages of the rich. A conservative analysis to this is:
yes, it is elitist but that perspective is essential in order to distinguish who are correct and who
are wrong because if we accept every ounce of change to language, there would come a time
when no one understands anyone anymore. In essence, it is imperative that we must first
understand the nature of conservatism, both broad and narrow, instead of tagging the ideology
as non-progressive marked by prejudice in order to see its relevance in society.

I also think that Scruton raises a valid complication regarding the interaction between
modernity and conservatism. Keke argues that conservatism’s skepticism and opposition to
“rationalism” in politics contrasts with liberalism and socialism in rejecting priori
value-commitments. Hence, liberalism is not the actual polar opposite of conservatism; they, in
fact, innately have similar means but different goals. It is notable, of course, to say that I think
revolutionary Jacobinism remains conservatism’s polar opposite. It rejects revolutionary
jacobinism’s espousal of political rationalism that aims to reconstruct society based on abstract
principles without reference to traditions. Conservatives, instead, view society as an incredibly
complex organism, and hold therefore that “without the aid of experience, reason cannot
prescribe political ideals that can be realized in practice” (Beiser, 1992, 283). Conservatism
therefore rests on particularist skepticism concerning abstract principles that cannot be applied
to specific circumstances. So, conservatives become particularists who reject the modernist
requirement of liberating practical rationality from all particularism.

Another complication that I have encountered while reading about conservatism is the
exclusively mutual relationship between conservatism and intellectualism. Take for example,
UP communities: students coming from the university are highly liberal. For me, this is true
because thinking about politics through reason creates a bubble of systematic ways of
answering questions almost like a template. And, to function with an ideology that acts on
impulse and “muscle memory” is sort of contradictory to burkean conservatism and intellectual
conservatism.

In conclusion, I think the experience-over-reason mindset of conservatism makes it

highly grounded and practical but I also think that the mindset makes the ideology broad and
fluid, which is why conservatives fail to separate the ideal from the practical. I also think that
this is the root of conservative thinkers highly criticizing their rivals (i.e. liberalism and
socialism) for making utopian exaggerations on the ability of reason and of human
perfectibility. Nevertheless, I totally agree with them when they claim that it addresses
problems of modernity despite holding traditional values such as paternalism and authority
central to their prescriptions. On the other hand, painting the whole picture of conservatism
goes beyond simply articulating how conservatism’s “organic” social vision is inherently
skeptical of the state and more likely puts trust in family, private property, and religion. Instead,
intellectuals must expound on its nature such as broad and narrow sense of conservatism,
burkean conservatism as skepticism about reason, and formal procedural and substantive
sense of the ideology in contrast to neoconservatives. Also, there is the importance of
addressing the precursors of burkean thought and analyzing contemporary thinkers such as
Oakeshott, Sidgwick, and Scruton.