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Clausewitz and Military Genius

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Clausewitz and Military Genius
Thomas H. Killion
No great commander was ever
a man of limited intelhct.
-Carl von Clausewitz
In the classic On War, Carl von
Clausewitz presents a comp&msive
war theory-the military genius con-
cept. 1 In Clausewitz’s view, com-
manders significantly influence the
war’s conduct through setting objec-
tives, combat decision making and
leadership during war’s chaos and
conihsion. Militarygeniusreflectsthe
instinctgreat commanders display fbr
assessingthe situationand making the
right choices on the battlefield. Addi-
tionally, a prirnaxy goal of Clause-
witz’s war theory was to capture the
essence of such genius, since “what
geniusdoes is the best rule, and theory
can do no better than show how and
why thiS should be the Ci3Sf3.”2
Defining Military Genius
Clausewitz’s starting point fm
defining military genius is his assess-
ment of the commonly acceptd
meaning of genius: “A vw highly
developed mental titude for a par-
%’ He then identi-
ticuku occupation.”
fies and discusses ViUiOUS CkWiCt&S-
tics that contribute to h OVd
militarygenius quality. These charac-
teristics fall into two general catego-
ries: intellectual and personality (or
temperament),as depictedin F@re 1.
On the intellectualside,Clausewitz
identifies the Mlc components.
Fm4 a rnilitq genius must have a
bread knowledge base, specifically
focused on militq+lated informa-
tion. Second, this knowledgemust be
so ingrained as to become innate,
directly influencing the commander’s
=sog~d decisions. AS~ause-
‘The commander’s
knowledge must be transformed into
a genuinecapability.’q This fostersan
ability to perceive the situation’struth
during uncxxtaintyand chaos. This
coupd’oeil (iituition) allowsthe com-
mander to quickly mognize the truth
ordinarily missed or only pemeived
after significantstudy and reflection.5
MILITARY REVIEW ● July-August 1995
The ability to assessthe situationrap-
idly and accuratelygives a great com-
mander the pesence of mind to deal
quickly and confidently with the
unexpected and the ability to make
rapid and accurate decisions in tk
pmence of uncertainty.
Finally, the commander must pos-
sess a “sense of locality”— spatial
awarenessthat allows him to visualize
the battlefieldand account for the ter-
rain influence on operations.6 ‘This
capability is a component of what is
now called the “commander’s
irnage.”7 This image incorporatesthe
commander’s pemeptions of unit
positions,statusof tiendly and enemy
fomes and relevant terrain and battle
objectives.
Clausewitzsummarizesthe import-
ance of intellectual capabilities in
warfare by stating, ‘The vital con-
tribution of intelligence is clear
thmghout No WOIKkXtkQ @it War,
though it may qqxxw to be uncom@-
cated, cannot be waged with distinc-
tion exce t by men of outstanding
intellect.”!
G nceming temperament or per-
sonality,Clausewitz identifies factm
equally important to military genius
intellectual capabilities. Primary
among these ftictorsis courage-per-
sonal courage in adversity and h
courage of one’s convictions con-
cerning the consequences of deci-
sions for the soldiers under one’s
Characteristics of Miiitary Genius
Intellectual
Sensitiveand discriminatingjudgment
CoUp d’oei/ (intuitiin)
Presence of mind
Sense of locality (spatialawareness)
Comprehensive knowledge
Fimmess of convictions
Understandingof human Mum
Understanding of frictiin
Experience in war
command. Factm such as determinat-
ion, firmness or stability,endurance
and strength of chamcter am essential
for effectiveleademhip. ~ includm
sticking to decisions and motivating
troops to overcome war’s wearing
effects. Bol- energy and vigor
must be temped by selkxmtml and
a calm nature.
~dy, these intdectual and per-
sonalitycharacteristics= interdepe-
ndent. lb ~ self-cOnfi&nce
and decisiveness that military
geniuses display are due in no small
measure to the knowledge level they
have achieved. Convemely, energy,
determination and ambition directly
contribute to the necessq pumuit of
education, training and experience
essential to developing this knowl-
edge and capability.
Genius and Expert
concepts
h many ways, Clausewitz’s rnili-
tag genius concepthas much in com-
mon with today’smpeticoncept. Vhr-
ious expertise studies have shown the
impoilance of having a large,weU-in-
tegratedknowledgebase. This allows
theexpattommgnize many situa-
tions as representingcertain classesof
problems and to mpidly ident@ or
adapt -Pi@ St@f@X$for mtion.
Such analogical problem solving and
decision making are chmctemb “ “c of
experts.g
Personality
Courage
Determination
Strength of character
Self-control
Boldness
Energy and vigor
Ambition (for kmoror fame)
Firmness and stability
Endurance
15gl%e1
97
 Beyond such purely intellectual
factors,James Shanteauhas identified
numemus expert deckion-maker
characteristics that cmespond in
many ways to the essenceof mili
genius described by Clausewitz.1 T central mle in setting objectives,
The similarities between the two
descriptions, shown in Figure 2, ac-
centuate Clausewitz’s insightfulness
and the identifiedcharacteristics’con-
tinuing relevance. l%gwe2 also has
implicationsfor the ability to learn or
acquire each factor.
The militiuy genius concept was
critical to Clausewitz, given his
emphasis on the senior commander’s
or commander in chief’s (CINC’s)
assessingthe battle situation, making
decisionsand motivatingtroops. The
CINc’s understandingof the political
puq)ose WOWS him to establish
aPprOPri* mili~ objectives. The
militag genius’ intuition provides
accurate battle perception during
chaos and confusion, allowing the
commander to select the proper
course of action. The commander’s
energy and strength of chamcter
enable him to overcome the effectsof
fiction on his troops. Throughout his
worlq Clausewitz places heavy
emphasis on warfare’s psychological
aspects, which he refers to as the
“moral factors” in war. One of his
three principal moral elements is “the

Expert and Military Genius Concept Comparisons

Expert
Decision Makers*
A hghly developedperceptualabifii–
expertscanseewhatotherscarmot.
Mawarenessofthe differencebetweende- wti$~~d=htiwyd
vantandirreIevantinformation-+perts know mentraisedto a marvelouspitchd visicm,whii easi graspsanddismissesa thousandremote
howto concentrate on whatisimportant possibilities
An abil’ to Sirnpiii O)mplexities-experts
?
canmaesense oufdcfkwe.
A stron set of communication skills-
experts Inow how to convirn others of their
expertise.
A knowledge of when to make exceptions–
expert sknowvhe nandwhenndtofdbv
dedsicm rules.
A strong sense of responsibilii for their
CMcX?s-experts are d afraid to stand
behind their dedsbns.
AselecMyabout whiiproblems tosdve–
experts knowvd$idecisicm stomakeand
whii not to [make].
Anoutwardconfidence intheirdecisim–
expertsbeliiveinthernsdvesandtheirabiliis.
An abifii to adaptto ch~~ taskcondi-
tions-experts avoid ngiddy m decision
strategies.
Atighly c%ioped content knuwtedgeabout
their area-experts know a lot and stay up
with the latest developments,
A greater automaticity d nitiw pm
esses-experts can do rea VI iiy what others
can only do with dmity.
An ability to tolerate stress-experts can
work effectively under adverse conditions.
A capabilii to be cmath+xperts are able
to lid novel solutionsto problems.
Military Genius*
“Cap d’oeil the quickrecognitiond a tfuththatthe mindwouldodnarily missor wouldperceive
onlyafterk)ngstudyend rektion.” (102)
tigkrhtitid gtikamdu~tia~rdjtig-
thatanordinarymindwouldIabortoiden’
$ ad vwaritselfoutin doingso.”(112)
Um~~Wm_inwar, dwm Win*, b~a@mydfadmk
tobe redated. . . . Themanresponsibleforevafuati thewhde mustbringtohis taskthe
qualiiT intuitionthatperceivesthe truthat everypoint.% rvkeachao sofopinicnsandwn-
Siirations Woukfariseandfatallyentanglejudgment:(112)
“As each man’s strength gm out, as it no Ionqer respoods to his will, the inertia of the whole
ra comes to rest on the wander’s Ml done. The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the
L%%? Pm I! ~! ti~; hs !nwad fk mustrevivetheirhope. Onlyto the extentthathe can
do thii WI he retainhs holdon h~ men and keep control.” (105)
“tt lay in the realm d genius, Midrrkes abow al rules.” (136)
‘13etenninatiorr [i] the mu to accept reqonsibiiii, courage in the face of a moral -r.
Looked aththiiway, the x of determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the pds of
hesitation when the motiws for action are inadequate.” (103)
War is the realm of uncettain~ three quarters of the f@ors on whii acbn in war are based are
wrapped in a f of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and dtihahg judgment is called
f~ a Mecf int3 Iigence to scent out the truth.” (101)
‘Often there is a gapbetweenprinciplesandadual eventsthatcannd alwaysbe bridgedby a
~dw~.~amamofw-tikti?(l~)
‘Theoomrrumder continually finds that things arenotas heexpectedhis isboundto influence
his plane, or at least the assumptions mck%ying them, If this infbence is Mfic4ently povvMul to
cause a change in h~ plans, he must usuaflywokout new ones.” (102)
~_*~awtir~r bd@n~W~~fad tiatfimm~h
attained by a special Me@ through the mediim of reflecbon, study and ht: an intelMuai
instincl which extracts the essence frcfn the phemna of Iiie, as a bee% honey from a
flower. In addii to study and refktion, life itself serves as a source.” (146)
“A*amdhti, imti~_s4MM wMdk~~~, _~
moves appropriately, so only the experienced officer will make the right de@40n in major and minor
matters-at every pufsekt c1war. Pradice and experience d~te the answer This is possible,
that is not.’” (120)
“Strengfh o(rnirrct the ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional stress and violent emo-
tions.” (105)
‘Bonaparte rightly said in this connedbn that many d the decisim fwed the mrnrnander in
tief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gti d a NewkxI or a? &r” (112)

An inabilii to articulate thdr dedsion proc- =~Wkw*ti htotimititi~ ti~*~be*in a*@mte, *-

esses-experts makedeciskms paseqon tiveway . . . ~~-mim*timWWMe,tim*fsH~m~b
expetierkz. transfti into a wine cwabiii! (147)

98 July-August 1995 “ MILITARY REVIEW


skill of the commander.”l 1 Military
genius is a key in influencing war’s
outcome,
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Thor-
ntonechoes this position by emphasiz-
ing the continuing importance of these
military genius qualities in the cOm-
mand and control (C*) arena. 12 He
identifies three primary areas where
such factors are important: the situa-
tion assessment; the operational deci-
sion (the commander’s intent); and the
organization and C* process tailored
to the commander’s needs.
Thornton states, “Despite the prog-
ress of [C*] support systems, the
nature of war remains the realm of
danger, exertion and uncertainty.
Because of these elements and the
inherent friction involved with wag-
ing war, Clausewitz saw the need for
genius in the military commander to
successfidly operate in such an envi-
ronment. The r uirement for genius
remains today.” Y1
Developing Military Genius
Given the options of “nature versus
nurture” as military genius develop-
mental factors, Clausewitz supports
both. He believes both intellectual
and temperament factors aR impor-
tant in such genius, saying, “&at
things alone can make a great
rnind.”14 In the intellectual domain,
education, training and experience are
needed to develop the great com-
mander. The most critical factor in
Clausewitz’s mind is war experience,
which cannot be sufficiently dupli-
cated in drills or exercises, since this is
what prepares the commander to deal
with the effects of friction.
Clausewitz states, “No activity of
the human mind is possible without a
certain stock of ideas; for the most
pm these are not innate but acquired
and constitute a man’s knowledge. . .
Clearly, most of these are not quali-
ties that can be acquired through book
laming. If they can be taught at all,
a general will have to receive his
instruction from sources other than the
printed word. . . . We have identified
danger, physical exertion, intelligence
and friction as the elements that
coalesce to form the atmosphere of
war and turn it into a medium that
impedes activity. In their restrictive
effects, they can be grouped into a
single concept of general friction. Is
there any lubricant that will reduce
this abrasion? Only one, and a com-
MILITARY REVIEW s July-August 1995
mander and his army will not always
have it readily available: combat
experience.”*5
Clausewitz considers education
and experience essential to developing
military genius’ intellectual aspects.
He views personality factors such as
boldness, courage and decisiveness as
innate or untrainable. At best, one can
expect them to be shaped or fimsed
by training and experience. This is
similar to Shanteau’s position that
such personality factors are mom a
matter of selection than experience. 16
Genius and
Expert Similarities
Whatimplications can be drawn
fium the similarities between Clause-
witz’s military genius concept and
cumnt expert concept? First, there is
the continuing importance of effective
leadership. Clausewitz attributed mili-
tary success, in large ~ to the com-
mander’s capabilities. Key factors
include the ability to accurately per-
ceive the situation, make effective
decisions and motivate troops. As
Thornton argues, such factors axe
important on today’s battlefield.17 In
the information age, with its acceler-
ated planning and decision-making
pace and increasing dependence on
dispersed operations, the criticality of
such capabilities is magnified,18
Second, training plays a critical role
in developing military expertise.
Although Clausewitz felt that only
combat could provide the necessary
experience, this is an area where train-
ing and warfare technology advances
have made it easier to provide the
appropriate experience outside of
combat. Ttiy, most senior com-
manders interact with the battlefield
through synthetic environments cE-
, Y
DE ThomasH. Killionis the USArmy
ReseamhLaboratorylkison to the&puty
arsiskzntsecmtaty of theArmy (Reseamh
and Technology). He receiveda PhD.
jium the Universityof Oregon. Previous
positionsincluakexecutiveassistantto the
director US Army ResearchLabomtory;
advancedtechnologyteam kwderfor the
unrnannedAerial VehiclesJoint Project;
and princijmlscientistin ekctmnic com-
bat trainingfor the OperationsTrainhg
Divisiofi US Air Fo~e (USAF) Human
Resoumes Ldoratoq (now the Aitww
TrainingDivisw4 USAFArmstmngLub-
oratoq). He co-authcvvd “BattleCom-
d and Digitim”on: A MANPRl~
Perspective,” March-April1995Military
Review.
4 using CoVKI’. This mquims some
INSIGHTS
ated by command control, commu-
nications and intelligence (C31)sys-
tems. This makes it feasible to cmte
live, virtual and constmctive environ-
ments using modeling and distributed
interactive simulation that are realistic
and challenging. Thus, training and
exemises can approach combat’s rea-
lism,at least as far as the mmminder’s
interfaces are concerned.
Understanding the essential factors
in expertise development can help us
provide the appropriate training envi-
ronment to foster military genius.
Advances in cognitive task analysis
techniques and training methods can
contribute to effective training regime
development. However, as suggested
by both Clausewitz and Shanteau, we
must also recognize that personnel
selection plays a mle in identifjhg
potential Ieadem who have the essen-
tial characteristics that cannot be
achieved through training. Factors
such as decisiownmking speed, in-
formation synthesis tlom multiple
soums and battlefield visualization
will become increasingly important
for the next generation’s leaders. On-
going mearch at the US Army
Research Institute on leader skill as-
sessment and developmental technol-
ogies, battle command and battlefield
visualization will provide insights into
this issue’s selection and training
aspects.lg
I%dly, consideration of the char-
acteristics and information needs of
military commanders who represent
the expertise spectmrn must M&m
the design of the C31systems that sup-
port the commanders. For example,
the Army Research Laboratory
(ARL) is investigating the capabilities
essential for an integrated battlefield
intelligence system and has identified
these essential features:
. commander’s intent
● ~rations battlefield area (such
as ten-am and weather)
● Current situation
. Battle analysis tools and the
mission-critical support data
ARL is using a rapid prototyping
tool--Cmnrnander (and stail) Visual-
ization Research Tool (CoVKT)-to
investigate content and format issues
supporting integrated batdespace
visualization, The information con-
tent and format must be responsive
to the varying levels of experience
and expertise of the commandem
99
xfity ~ tk resdting displays.
In a related vein, meat work by
Gary A. Klein and his associates on
naturalistic decision making has led
to some specific recommendations
for new approaches to decision aid-
ing.m Through studies of real woriZ
decision makem, including tactical
commanders, Klein and associates
developed the Recognition-Primed
Decision (RPD) model. Simply put
the RPD model asserts that decision
makers draw upon their experience
to identify a situation as representa-
tive of or analogous to a particular
class of problem. This recognition
process then leads to the generation of
an appropriate course of action—
either directly when prior cases are
sufficiently similar, orthmugh *
tation of previous approaches, if nec-
essary-which the deciion maker
evaluates through a mental simula-
tion process. This approach to the
decisioninaking process differs
markedly from earlier analytical mod-
els that focused on generation and
option comparisons W on
weighted f~.
% upclhk? WiL$ P?l?pa?t?d by the
Chcepts and Doctrine Directomte
(CDD), US Army command and
Gemd St@T CoUege,Foti Leaven-
woti~ Kansas. Futwe joint dbctn”ne
upaktes wdl appear periodically in
Military Review.-liliitor
Joint doctrine is being rapidly
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tions with accompanying current (C)
or pdicted (P) publication dates as of
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100
The RPD model has led to the for information age warfare. A4R
design of decidedly diffimmt decision
support systems that focus on accurate NOTES
situation assessment and case+sed 1.caIiktNlaauaavbi@
onwaLaditadandbwtslaM
byMii Hovafd and Patar Parat (Plincamn, NJ:
Iwscming as opposed to f@m&baXd wmUni~ Press, 1976).
option comparisons. Studies of deci-
3:
Ibid:: 100:
sion making in natural settings prove 4.
Ibid., 147.
5.
Ibid., 106.
that decision makers employ RPD and 6.
Ibid., 109.
analyticalstrategiesat diffenmttimes, 7.
Jamea Kahan, D. Robart Worlayand CatMaan
- ~~ Cunmandwa’ Infmmatb
depending on the problem situation, Naada.” RAND Rmorl R-3761-A (Santa Mmii @
theii experience level and other fac-
tom.21 Display format and decision
aid designs must take such alternative
strategies into account to support opti-
mal performance.
Clausewitz’s military genius view
is surprisingly modern in terns of the
11.”c—awaz1=
elements it shares with cument expert 12. LTC Pam Thonlon, US Amy War Collage atud-
iaa~papar,WiRavMad Hurnan@actad
concepts. Involving both intellectual Cammandand~(Carliabs Sarlac@Pk usAnny
and personality factors, it influences yz~~l).
the extent to which we can expect 14.-’145.
15. Ibid., 145,262 Wld 122.
such genius to be developed as 16. ~U.
opposed to being an innate individ- 17. ThDmbJn.
16. AM and l-laid Totllar, WarandAn&Wsr Surdd
ual quality. Concern for the nature atf/w Q?wofft?a Tww&FkafCanfury (NawYcslc Liltla,
of such expertise should inform our ~J?&o., 19s3).
Raaearch InsMule(Ml) asporata
processes of personnel selection, a&, T
Fml w15SMScimnxand T
-G
training and system design. By doing !ZZX%%%V’A———’—”
so, we can improve command quality 20. Klain.
21. Klah, %magkd Dadaim~Mifaty
and enswe our leaden axe prepared Raww(May 19W).
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Qoeration.s,(P) 08/15B5
3-05.3, Joint Special Qoerm”ons@era-
tionalProcedures,(’P)07/18AM,(C) 0W25/93
3-05.5, Joint S@?ckl@erations Xvgeting
and Mission Pkmning Pmcehvs, (P)
07/03/00,(c) 0W1W93
3-06, Doctrinefor Joint Riverine @era-
tions,(P) 09/29/96
347, MilitaryOperationsOtherThanWw,
(P) 0601195
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3-07.1, J77P for Fotvign In@tnalDefewe
(F/D), (P) 11/13K10,
(C) 12L2W93
3-07.Z JTTP for Antitermr@ (P)
05/18/00,(c) W2W3
3-07.3, JTTPfor PeacekeepingQoemtiom,
(P) 03L24A)l,(c) 04L29t?M
3417.4,Joint CountenirugQverations,(P)
07/03/01, (c) MLO!X94
3-07.5, Joint Doctrineand J17P for Con-
tingency@erations, (P)09/29B5
3-07.6, ForeignHumanith Assistance,
(P) 1008/96
347.7, Domestic Support Operti”ons,(P)
3-08, Interagency Coadination During
Joint Qoemtions,(P) 03/2696
349, Doctrinefor Joht Fiw Support,(P)
o8J01/96
3-09.1, Joint tier Designation Proce-
dutvs, (P) 04/25/98, (C) WW91
3-U9.2, J17’P for Gnwnd Ra&.r Beacon
Qoeratiom (J%eacon), (P) 03/18KX2(C)
04/23/93
3-09.3, JITP for Cbse Air SuppoZ (P)
07/15/95
3-10, JITPforJoint RearAma Qoerations,
(P) 01/2000, (c) 02./2493
310.1, J7TP for Base D@ense, (P)
0M18m0,(c) 03/15/93
311, JointDoctrinefor NuclearBiological
and Chendcal (NBC) D.q5eme,(P) 03/1001,
(c) 04/15/94
3-12, Docttine for Joint Nuclear @era-
tiom, (P) 03/24/00, (c)04/29/93
>12.1, Doctrine for Joint Nonstrategic
Nuch.r WeapowEmp@rnent,(P) 07/3W95
3-12.2, Nuclear Weapons Empkynent
Eflecfi Data, (P) 01/2202
3-12.3, Nuclear Weapons Employment
E#ectsData (Notional),(P) 121301
3-13, C3CM [Command, Contsol and
CommunicationsCwmmeasures] in Joint
Miii@y Operatiom,(P) 09K)5B5
3-14, J7TP for $oace C@r@”ons,(P)
09mlt95
3-15, JointDoctrinefor Barriers,Obstacles
and Mine War$are,(P) 05/23KKl,(C) 06/3093
3-16, Doctrinefor Multinational Qoera-
tions,(P) 05m96
3-17, JITP for i%eaterAirliji Opemtions,
(P) 0601/95
3-18, Joint Doctrinefor Fonible Enoy
Operations,(P) 08/29/95
3-18.1, JointDoctrinefor Airborneand Air
Assault @er&”ons,(P) OILW’96
3-50, NationalSeamhand RescueManual
W 1: Nationalsearchand RescueSystenL(P)
12/26?37,(c) 0201/91
3-50.1, National Seamh and Rtxcue
Md Vol 2: Pkvuukg Handbook @)
12/’2697,(c)WW91
3-50.2Doctrinefor Joint CombatSearch
and Rescue(CSAR),(P)064W01,(C) 01/12/94
3-50.21, JITP for Combat Search and
Rescue, (P) 09/15/95
3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evaswn d
Recovery,(P) 07K11/95
3-51, Ekctmnic Wa~am k Joint Military
Operations,(P) 0@31D5,(C) 06/3W91
3-52, Doctrinefor JointAirspxe Controlin
a CombatZme, (P) lW27K10,(C) 12/03/93
3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological
Operations,(P) 06/2M10,(C) 07/’30533
3-54, Joint Lhctrinefor @er&”onsSecu-
rity,(P) 07/1W8, (C) 08/22/91
3-55, Doctrinefor Reconnakznce, Sur-
veillance,and T~et AcquisitionSupportfor
Joint @erations (lUTA), (P) 0309M10,(C)
DOCTRINEUPDATE
04/14/93
3-55.1, J7TP for Unmanned Aerial
Wdlich?s,(P) o7/20KMJ(c) ow27/93
3-56, TmticalCommandant ContmlPhn-
ning Guichnce and Pnxedures for Joint
@em!ions (1’ormation Eduznge Planning
Guidance),(P) 02KEMKi
3-56.1, Commandand Contmlfor JointAir
Operations,(P) 1WIK411, (C) 1W31N4
3-57, Doctrinefor Joint Civil A@irs, (P)
07/15/95
3-58, Doctrhe for Joint Operatiorud
Deception,(P) 04/3001
3-59, JointDoctrinefor Meteorologicald
~~c~aphic Suppoi, (P) 1l/15h0, (c)
3-59.1, JITP for Meteorological and
OceanographicSupport,(P) IW29195
4-O,Docm”ne for LogisticsSupportof Joint
Operations,(P) 12/1601, (C) 09/25/92
4-01, MobilitySystemPolicies,Pnxedums
and Consideration, (P) 0W28@5
4-01.1, Air#i Supportto Joint Operations,
(P)07115D5
4-01.2, J77’Pfor Seal#l Support to Joint
Operatbns, (P) 1W29D5
441.3, J1’TPfor Movement Control, (P)
0Y2MI0, (c) 01/2694
4-01.5, J7TP for Water TerminalOpera-
tions,(P) 05KEMI0,(c) 06 Ut593
4-01.6, J1’TPfor Joint L.og~ticsOver the
Shore (JW7X), (P) 07/1$98, (C) 08/21/91
4-01.7, J7’TPfor Use of Intermodd Con-
tai.nm in Joint Operations,(P) 09/11195
m Doctrinefor HeaJthSenice Support
in Jotit @erations, (P) 10/09/01,(C) 11/1594
4-02.1, JZZPfor Health Loghtics Support
in Joint Operations,(P) 07f3W95
4-02.2, J1’7Tfor Patient Evacuation in
Joint Qoemtions,(P) 0MM@6
443, Joint Bulk Petmkwm Doctrine, (P)
w15/95
444, Joint Doctnhefor Civil Engineering
Suppoti,(P) 01/18’02
4-05, Mobilimtion,(P) 06/01@5
4-M, J17’Pfor Mortuaty @hirs in Joint
Operations,(P) 08/29/95
5-O, Docm’nefor Planning Joint Opera-
tions,(P) OIAXXX?, (c) 08/15/94
540.1, Doctrhe for Joint CampaignPkm-
ning, (P) 0V3W96
5-00.2, Joint Tmk Fmre Planning Guid-
ance and Procedwes, (P) 02/27/96, (C)
09/03/91
5-03.1, Jobt Operation Planmhg and
ExecutionSystem VolI: PlanningPolicyand
Pmcedurvs,(P)06Q7KX),(C) 0W04@3
5-03.11, Joint Opemtion Pknning and
~;~~ System Execution Pkmning, (P)
5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning cud
ErecutionSystem I-WII: Pkznningand Execu-
tion Formatsand Guh2mce,(P) 02ABt99, (C)
03/1092
5-03.21, Joint 0per@2m Planning and
ErecutionSystem VolII: Plamuhgand Execu-
tion Formats and Guiahnce (Secret Supple-
ment), (P) lw12@5, (c) 03/lw92
5-03.3, Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System Wd III: ADP [Automadc
Data Pmwssing] Suppoti, (TO k Determined)
64, Doctrinefor CommandContmLCom-
municationsand Comput2r(C4) SystemsSup-
port to Joint Optv@ions, (P) 04/27/97, (C)
06#3t92
WXZ Joint Doctnh.efor QtxrationaV7iwti-
cal ~ Control and Communic~”ons
Systems,(P)05/2095, (C) 0307/78
101