DGS MU 207 - Rev 0

Abu Dhabi Oil Refining Company
TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

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DGS-MU-207
TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY

SIREN SYSTEM
0 Nov-17 DGS-MU-207_Rev-0 Minutes Of Jun&Oct-2017 DDC Meetings DDC TSFDM / VP (E&TSD)

SQDM
Rev Date Description Source Reviewed Endorsed Approved
Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 1 of 35


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CLAUSES REVISED IN THIS ISSUE

Clause. No.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 GENERAL ......................................................................................................................................... 6

1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Purpose ....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Definitions .................................................................................................................................... 6
2.0 CODES AND STANDARDS ............................................................................................................ 10
3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 12
4.0 DOCUMENT PRECEDENCE .......................................................................................................... 12
5.0 SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS / CONCESSION CONTROL ........................................................ 12
6.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE / QUALITY CONTROL ............................................................................ 13
7.0 DESIGN BASIS FOR TOXIC GAS REFUGE (TGR) ....................................................................... 13
7.1 Primary Objective ...................................................................................................................... 13
7.2 Toxic Gas Refuge ...................................................................................................................... 14
7.3 Designs of Toxic Gas Refuges .................................................................................................. 15
8.0 BUILDING SITING EVALUATION FOR TOXIC MATERIAL RELEASE ......................................... 16
8.1 General ...................................................................................................................................... 16
8.2 Determining the Toxic Effects at Buildings ................................................................................ 16
8.3 Occupant Vulnerability from Toxic Material ............................................................................... 17
8.4 Concept Selection for Buildings Exposed to Toxic Material Release ........................................ 19
8.5 Determining if Existing Buildings Require Mitigation................................................................. 20
8.6 Siting and Design of New Buildings .......................................................................................... 20
9.0 BUILDING SITING EVALUATION PROCESSES ........................................................................... 20
9.1 Building Siting Evaluation for Existing Buildings ....................................................................... 20
9.2 Design of New Buildings or Modifications to Existing Buildings ............................................... 21
9.3 Personnel Performing Building Siting Evaluation ...................................................................... 21
9.4 Management of Building Occupancy ........................................................................................ 23
9.5 Management of Change (MOC) ................................................................................................ 23
10.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .............................................................................................................. 23
10.1 Life support................................................................................................................................ 24
10.2 Structural support ...................................................................................................................... 25
10.3 Command support ..................................................................................................................... 26
10.4 Escape and evacuation ............................................................................................................. 26
10.5 Endurance Period ..................................................................................................................... 26
11.0 DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY / EMERGENCY SIREN SYSTEM ........................................... 28
11.1 Emergency Alert Siren: ............................................................................................................. 28


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11.2 Evacuation /Shelter-in-place Siren ............................................................................................ 28

11.3 All Clear Siren ........................................................................................................................... 28
APPENDIX 1: CHECKLIST GUIDELINE FOR BUILDING SITE AND BUILDING ENVELOPE ............... 29
APPENDIX 2: OXYGEN DEPLETION AND CARBON DIOXIDE ACCUMULATION ................................ 34
APPENDIX 3: ACUTE EXPOSURE GUIDELINE LEVEL (AEGL) ............................................................ 35


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List Of Authorized Signatures/ Initials
DGS Discipline Committee Member, ADRD Saleh Salem AL Katheeri

DGS Discipline Committee Members, CHSE&FD Naval Bhatt
DGS Discipline Committee Member, RR East Manjooran Reju Jose
DGS Discipline Committee Member, RR West Yasser Al Hammadi
DGS Discipline Committee Member, SCD Youaraj Nandayal Dhanapal
DGS Discipline Committee Member, E&TSD Arun Hindurao Karande
DGS Discipline Committee Leader, E&TSD Damien Douziech
Technical Safety & Fire Dept. Manager, CHSE&FD Hamad Abdulla Al Hammadi
Standards & Quality Dept. Manager, E&TSD Abdulla Musaed Al Harthi
Vice President, E&TSD Salem Obaid Al Dhaheri


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1.0 GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
Toxic gas refuge is protected locations where people can take shelter during a toxic
gas release. Some potential release of hydrogen sulphide can travel many
kilometers before dispersing to safe level. In such cases one or more TGR may be
required remote from the potential releases of hydrogen sulphide and for the benefit
of third party populations. This possibility shall be included in the evaluation.
Safe havens and refuges can be designed to protect personnel against a variety of
hazards, for example fire and explosion as well as toxic gas. In this section guidance
is given on the design of toxic gas refuges to protect people from toxic gas. In any
particular instance, a true safe haven will require additional design features to
protect people from other hazards like fire and explosion. Such features are not
considered here for toxic gas refuges.
When a full safe haven is provided to cover a particular area, which also meets the
toxic gas refuge requirements, a separate toxic gas refuge shall not be provided in
the same area. Provision of multiple refuges of different types complicates the
emergency muster count, and could lead to persons sheltering in a toxic gas safe
haven when they are in fact threatened by a fire of explosion.
1.2 Purpose
This document provides guidance for managing the risk from toxic material releases
to on-site personnel located in new and existing buildings intended for occupancy.
This DGS was developed for use at ADNOC Refining sites. Buildings covered by this
document are rigid structures intended for permanent use in fixed locations. Porta
cabins, tents, fabric enclosures, and other soft-sided structures are outside the
scope of this document.
1.3 Definitions
For the purpose of this specification, the following definitions shall apply:
General Definitions:
COMPANY – ADNOC Refining
CONTRACTOR – is the party that carries out the Design, detailed Engineering,
Procurement, Construction, Commissioning and Start-up.
SUBCONTRACTOR – is the party engaged by a Contractor to do part of the work
awarded to the Contractor by the Company. The work of the Subcontractor is carried
out under the direction and control of the Contractor. The Company maintains the
right to review all proposed Subcontractors and Subcontracts. However, the right to
review does not relieve CONTRACTOR of their obligations under the Contract nor


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does it create any contractual relationship whatsoever between the Subcontractor

and COMPANY.
CONSULTANT – is the party that performs specific services, which may include but
are not limited to, Engineering, Technical support, preparation of Technical reports
and other advisory related services specified by the party that engages them, i.e.
COMPANY, CONTRACTOR or its Subcontractors.
MANUFACTURER/VENDOR/SUPPLIER – is the party that manufactures or supplies
equipment and provides the support services at Site to install and commission the
supplied equipment.
NOTE: For the purposes of this DGS, Vendor is the supplier of the equipment and
not necessarily the Manufacturer.
SUB-VENDOR – any supplier of equipment and support services for an
equipment/package or part thereof supplied by a VENDOR.
FEED – Front End Engineering Design
EPC – Engineering, Procurement, Construction, Commissioning and Start-up
CONCESSION/DEVIATION REQUEST – Concession/Deviation requested by the
CONTRACTOR either on their behalf or on behalf of their SUBCONTRACTOR(s),
VENDOR(s) and/or SUB-VENDOR(s), after receiving the award of the Contract or
Purchase Order. It usually refers to an authorization to use, repair, recondition,
reclaim, or release materials, components or equipment already in progress or
completely manufactured but which does not meet or comply with COMPANY
requirements. A CONCESSION/DEVIATION REQUEST is subject to COMPANY
approval solely at their discretion.
DOCUMENT – Any form, letter, facsimile, contract, specification, requisition,
drawing, or record of any kind required to transmit information from one party to
another. It also includes computer generated drawings, lists, charts, etc. and other
data used to denote a permanent record of the Project progress.
SHALL – Denotes mandatory action or requirement.
SHOULD – Denotes an action or requirement which is not mandatory but which is
strongly recommended to comply with the requirements of this document.
Specific Definitions:
Acceptance Requirements against which the fulfilment of an objective can

Criteria be measured
Building A rigid, enclosed structure
Building siting The procedures described in this document used to evaluate


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evaluation the hazards and establish the design criteria for new buildings
and the suitability of existing buildings at their specific
location.
Consequence The potential effects of an explosion, fire, or toxic material

release. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or
quantitative.
Command The organization that is provided to control an emergency

structure
Consequence- The methodology used for building siting evaluation that is

based approach based on consideration of the impact of explosion, fire, and
toxic material release which does not consider the frequency
of events
Essential Personnel with specific work activities that require them to be

personnel located in buildings in or near a process area for logistical and
response purposes. The identification of essential personnel
will vary with operation and work activities including normal
operation, start-up, and planned shutdown. Examples of
essential personnel include, but are not limited to, operators
and maintenance personnel. Examples of persons who are
not essential personnel include, but are not limited to,
designers, timekeepers, clerical staff, administrative support,
and procurement staff.
Embarkation Area Place from which personnel leave the installation during
evacuation.
Hazard An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (e.g.

flammability, toxicity, corrosivity, stored chemical energy, or
mechanical energy) that has the potential for causing harm to
people, property, or the environment.
Occupant Proportion of building occupants that could potentially suffer a

Vulnerability permanent disability or fatality if a potential event were to
occur.
On-site personnel Employees, contractors, visitors, service providers, and others

present at the facility.


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Process area An area containing equipment (e.g. pipes, pumps, valves,

vessels, reactors, and supporting structures) intended to
process or store materials with the potential for explosion, fire,
or toxic material release.
Quantitative risk The systematic development of numerical estimates of the

assessment expected frequency and consequence of potential accidents
based on engineering evaluation and mathematical
techniques. The numerical estimates can vary from simple
values of probability/frequency of an event occurring based on
relevant historical industry or other available data; to very
detailed frequency modeling techniques.
Risk A measure of potential injury, environmental damage, or

economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the
severity of the loss or injury.
Risk-based A quantitative risk assessment methodology used for building

approach siting evaluation that takes into consideration numerical
values for both the consequences and frequencies of
explosion, fire, or toxic material release.
Toxic Gas Refuge A place where personnel will be adequately protected from
toxic hazards while they remain on an installation following a
major incident, and from where they will have access to the
communications, monitoring and control equipment necessary
to ensure their personal safety, and from where, if necessary,
safe and complete evacuation can be effected.
Toxic gas refuges are only met to protect employees from
toxic gases only. Toxic gas refuge will not protect employees
from fire or explosion hazards unless specified.
Safe Haven Protected location designed to allow people to shelter in the

event of an accident, sometimes referred to as a Temporary
Refuge Shelter. Protection is provided against toxic gas and
smoke ingress, fire and explosion blast, in some cases also
explosion projectiles.
Toxic material An airborne agent that could result in acute adverse human
health effects.


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Abbreviation:
AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level
AIDA Air Infiltration Development Algorithm (model)
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
TGR Toxic Gas Refuge (Refer to Safety Haven)
2.0 CODES AND STANDARDS
It shall be the CONTRACTOR’s, SUBCONTRACTOR’s, CONSULTANT’s,

VENDOR's and SUB-VENDOR’s responsibility to be, or to become, knowledgeable
of the requirements of the referenced Codes and Standards and to ensure that all
equipment, systems, installations, packages are designed, manufactured and tested
accordingly.
The Codes, Standards, Specifications including its referenced documents and
statutory regulations referred in this specification, form a part of this specification.
Unless specified otherwise, the latest edition in force at the time of award of Contract
or Purchase Order shall apply.
American Petroleum Institute (API)

API RP 505 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for
Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I,
Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2
API RP 752 Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process
Plant Permanent Buildings
API RP 753 Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process
Plant Portable Buildings
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineering

(ASHRAE)
ASHRAE 62.1 Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality
British Standards Institution (BSI)

BS 8468-3.1 Respiratory protective devices for use against chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents Part 3.1: Self-
contained open‑circuit compressed air breathing apparatus

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incorporating a hood for escape – Specification
Compressed Gas Association (CGA)

CGA G-7.1 Air Commodity Specification for Air
Health & Safety Executive (HSE)

RR997 Modelling smoke and gas ingress into offshore temporary refuges
Offshore Information Sheet No 1/2006:
Testing regime for offshore TR-HVAC fire dampers & TR
pressurisation requirements
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

IEC 60079-0 Explosive Atmospheres - Part 0: Equipment General requirements
IEC 60079-10 Explosive Atmospheres - Part 10: Classification of areas
IEC60079-29-3 Explosive atmosphere - Part 29-3: Gas Detectors - Guidance on
Functional safety of fixed gas detection system
International Society of Automation (ISA)

ISA 60079-29-1 Explosive Atmosphere - Part 29-1: Gas Detectors - Performance
requirements of detectors for flammable gases
ISA 60079-29-2 Explosive Atmosphere - Part 29-2: Gas Detectors - Selection,
installation, use and maintenance of detectors for flammable
gases and oxygen
ISA 92.00.02 Installation, Operation and maintenance of Toxic Gas Detection
Instrument
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

ISO 9001 Quality Management Systems - Requirements
ISO 9004 Managing for the Sustained Success of an Organization – A
Quality Management Approach
ISO 19011 Guidelines for Auditing Management Systems
ISO 17776 Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production
installations - Major accident hazard management during the
design of new installations


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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 70 National Electrical Codes
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code
NFPA 1989 Standard on breathing air quality for emergency services
respiratory protection
3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
The following reference documents, to the extent specified herein, form part of this
specification. When an edition date is not indicated for a document, the latest edition
in force at the time of award of Contract or Purchase Order shall apply.
ADNOC COPs
COPV3-07 Indoor air quality
COPV4-04 Personal Protective Equipment'
COPV4-10 Management of Hydrogen Sulphide
4.0 DOCUMENT PRECEDENCE
The CONTRACTOR, SUBCONTRACTOR, CONSULTANT, VENDOR and SUB-

VENDOR shall notify the COMPANY of any apparent lack of clarity and/or conflict
between this General Specification, the related data sheets, drawings, the Codes
and Standards and any other specifications noted herein. Unless specifically stated
otherwise, the most stringent requirements shall apply. In case of lack of clarity, the
resolution and/or interpretation precedence shall be obtained from the COMPANY in
writing before proceeding with the design, execution or manufacture.
5.0 SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS / CONCESSION CONTROL
Any concession/deviation to the Specifications and its attachments including, but not
limited to, the Data Sheets, Drawings and Narrative Specifications shall be sought by
the CONTRACTOR, SUBCONTRACTOR, VENDOR and SUB-VENDOR only
through CONCESSION/DEVIATION REQUEST format. CONCESSION/DEVIATION
REQUESTS (through Design Change Authorization) require COMPANY’s
review/approval prior to the implementation of the proposed changes. Changes
implemented prior to COMPANY approval are liable to be rejected at Company’s
sole discretion.


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6.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE / QUALITY CONTROL
Quality Management Systems shall comply with the applicable requirements of ISO
9001 and ISO 9004 with due regard to ISO 19011. The CONTRACTOR shall ensure
that the VENDOR shall have in effect at all times, a QA programme, which clearly
establishes the authority and responsibilities of those responsible for the quality
system. Persons performing quality functions shall have sufficient and well-defined
authority to enforce quality requirements that they initiate or identify and to
recommend and provide solutions for quality problems and thereafter verify the
effectiveness of the corrective action.
Quality System and Quality Control requirements shall be identified and included in
the CONTRACTOR’s Purchase and Subcontracting DOCUMENT(s). Based on these
requirements the VENDOR & SUBCONTRACTOR shall develop a QA/QC
programme which shall be submitted to the CONTRACTOR for review and approval.
The VENDOR’s QA/QC programme shall extend to his SUB-VENDORS.
COMPANY/CONTRACTOR reserves the right to inspect materials and workmanship
at all stages of manufacture and to witness any or all tests.
The Criticality Rating (CR) System outlined in Design General Specification DGS-
MU-013 shall be used by CONTRACTOR or CONTRACTOR’s designee to develop
the design checking levels and minimum requirements for shop inspection, testing
and material certification given in Design General Specification DGS-MU-014.
7.0 DESIGN BASIS FOR TOXIC GAS REFUGE (TGR)
7.1 Primary Objective

The TGR is required to maintain the safety of personnel during the period required
for the evacuation process to be completed. This period includes the following times
and activities:
 time to complete the full muster at the TGR;
 time to account for personnel not reporting to their assigned muster stations;
 time to evaluate the situation and make decisions;
 time to initiate responses to minimize the consequences and control the
emergency, if possible;
 Time to complete the evacuation (if required). This may be done in a phased
manner, initially evacuating non-essential personnel; and
 Contingency time to allow for the unforeseen.


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7.1.1 Guiding Principles

This document is based on the following guiding principles:
a. Locate personnel away from process areas consistent with safe and
effective operations;
b. Minimize the use of buildings intended for occupancy in close proximity to
process areas;
c. Manage the occupancy of buildings in close proximity to process areas;
d. Design, construct, install, modify, and maintain buildings intended for
occupancy to protect occupants against toxic material releases;
e. Manage the use of buildings intended for occupancy as an integral part of
the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of a facility.
7.2 Toxic Gas Refuge

Ordinary toxic gas refuges may be created from existing building by the following
measures:
 The building should be reasonable airtight, to the level usually required for
implementation of HVAC systems e.g. tight metal frame windows, non-
opening.
 Building entrances should be designed with double sets of doors and located
as far as possible away from sources of hydrogen sulphide. A mechanism
should be in place to prevent both airlock doors being open simultaneously
or to alarm to warn of this condition.
 Doors should be closed all the time except when in use, or be automatic
closing, for example by magnetic hold open, release on gas detection.
Attention should be paid to avoiding hazards with automatically closing doors
such as trapped fingers. E.g. doors should be slow closing (but not too slow).
 A hazard with has been noted on some installation is the use of excessively
heavy blast doors, which in themselves constitute a crushing hazard. These
should be avoided.
 The HVAC should automatically shut off on detection of gas at the air
intakes, and dampers should close in the air intakes. Reliability of detection
should be determined as part of the design, and should comply with the SIL
requirement for protection.
 Provide a mechanism to allow manual initiation of HVAC shutdown from
within the refuge and
 If air intakes are at roof level, then may be well above the level of a gas


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cloud. Any automatic closing of doors shall therefore either be activated from
the F&G system. Or on signal from a local gas detector.
In addition to these measures, a high integrity toxic gas safe haven should have
positive air pressure (0.5-1.0 inch water gage). For smaller buildings, positive
pressure can be provided by means of stored air (at high pressure). For large
buildings, a breathable air supply taken from a safe place (e.g. from two alternative
intakes, at opposite side of the plant), or filters or scrubbers in the air intakes may be
used. Positive air pressure must be tested at an internal, which ensures high
reliability (low probability of failure on demand). This is typically every 6 months. Any
air intake for stored air supplies must have a multi gas detector and must shut off
automatically on gas detection at their intake.
In all cases, toxic gas refuges should be assessed for rate of gas ingress (for each
toxic gas being considered), and corresponding maximum safe duration of use.
For existing buildings where sealing and positive pressure arrangement are not
feasible (i.e. workshops); special rooms within the buildings shall be modified to
serve the purpose of gas shelter. The toxic gas shelter requirements shall comply
with zoning. Escape routes to these shelters shall be clearly marked, shelters shall
be readily accessible for all.
An example of typical TGR would be a pressurized building equipped with airlock
doors which close automatically on either detection of applicable toxic gases
approaching the building or detection in the ventilation inlets.
7.3 Designs of Toxic Gas Refuges

Toxic gas refuges must be designed for purpose. In many cases where there is a
possibility of toxic gases release,
An effective toxic gas refuge can be made by:
 Providing toxic gas detectors in the air intake, and arranging automatic shut
off of the air inlet of the air conditioning system. However internal circulation
of HVAC system shall continue to maintain internal temperature.
 The toxic gas detectors at air intake shall comply with ADNOC COP V4-10,
section 12 which requires that reliability of detection shall be determined as
part of the design and shall comply with the SIL requirement for the
protection.
 Providing dampers in the air intakes which are automatically closed in the
case of toxic gas detection. Dampers shall be tight shut to maintain positive
pressure inside the TGR.
 Providing split unit air conditioning for individual rooms where centralized air
conditioning is impractical.


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 The windows in TGR shall be sealed and provided with shutter proof glass.
 Providing two sets of doors so that the door inter-space functions as an air
lock/weather lock.
 Keeping the doors closed, or providing automatic door closing on toxic gas
detection.
 Checking the ceiling and floor for possible routes of gas ingress, and sealing
any leaks.
 Provide a positive pressure safe air (breathing air CGA grade D) supply by
providing bottled compressed air for minimum 1 hour. The capacity of air
bank shall have 100% spare. Air bank shall be inside the TGR.
 Providing and evacuation or rescue strategy for the case of refuge
engulfment for an extended period.
 HVAC system for TGR shall comply with hazardous area classification.
During design phase, the contractor shall verify by mathematical modelling that
control measures for TGR adopted are reducing Risk as per ALARP requirement for
the endurance time span.
During commissioning, the contractor shall test tightness to verify that control
measures for TGR incorporated are reducing Risk to ALARP requirement for the
endurance time span. The testing Method shall be proposed by contractor and
agreed by COMPANY prior to feed stage.
8.0 BUILDING SITING EVALUATION FOR TOXIC MATERIAL RELEASE
8.1 General
Determine if the building intended for occupancy under consideration could be
impacted by a toxic material release. Where no potential toxic material release
scenario is identified which could adversely affect the occupants of the building
under consideration, a building siting evaluation for toxic material release is not
required. A systematic process for building siting evaluation for toxic material release
is shown in Figure 1. The process is applicable to both new and existing buildings
intended for occupancy.
8.2 Determining the Toxic Effects at Buildings

Assume that on-site buildings intended for occupancy can be impacted by releases
of toxic materials or carry out toxic gas dispersion modelling for each building
intended for occupancy. If a gas dispersion modelling approach is selected, establish
thresholds for use as building siting evaluation criteria for toxic material release. The
threshold may be either a toxic material concentration/dose external to the building

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(which could impair escape) or toxic material concentration/dose inside the building.
Use one or more gas dispersion models to calculate the concentration of toxic
material at specified outdoor locations.
8.3 Occupant Vulnerability from Toxic Material

Building occupant vulnerability from toxic material depends on the dose
(concentration and duration) inside the building. A building may initially shield
occupants providing a finite period of time to enact protection measures such as
shutdown of ventilation systems, sealing of openings, or donning of PPE. Occupant
vulnerability from exposure to toxic materials can be estimated based on the
concentration of toxic material that infiltrates the building and the associated
exposure time.


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Fig.-1: Building Siting Evaluation for Toxic Material Release.


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8.4 Concept Selection for Buildings Exposed to Toxic Material Release

8.4.1 General
There are two protection concepts:
 Shelter-in-place for toxic material release,
 Evacuation for toxic material release.
CONTRACTOR shall select at least one of these concepts and submit for
COMPANY approval. The selected concept for the protection of building occupants
from toxic materials shall be reflected in the site emergency response plan, building
design features and escape route design.
8.4.2 Shelter-in-place for Toxic Materials Release
When the “shelter-in-place for toxic materials release” concept is chosen,
owners/operators should consider providing the following features for each
building intended for occupancy:
 HVAC systems capable of shutdown of the system and placement in
recirculation mode;
 Systems to notify occupants of external material release;
 Emergency communications equipment
 Escape PPE;
 Seals for windows, doors, and penetrations. The performance requirements
for these features may be designed/ assessed based on:
 length of time personnel are required to remain in the building;
 length of time that the toxic material impedes escape from the
building; or
 Appropriate industry standards, guidelines and practices.
Some materials are both toxic and flammable. A toxic exposure could precede or
follow a fire or explosion. The building siting evaluation should consider potential
explosion damage, which may compromise their performance as a shelter-in-place
for toxic material release.
8.4.3 Evacuation for Toxic Material Release
When the “evacuation for toxic material release” concept is chosen,
owners/operators shall provide the following:
 Emergency response features for each building intended for occupancy,
 Emergency action procedures and training that will facilitate evacuation,


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 Emergency exits and safe evacuation routes,

 Evacuation plan that directs personnel to a designated “shelter-in-place” or
specified assembly area,
 Means to warn building occupants to the presence of a toxic material
release,
 Plan to account for occupants,
 PPE as necessary for scenario potential exposure.
8.5 Determining if Existing Buildings Require Mitigation

Existing buildings intended for occupancy shall be compared with the building siting
evaluation criteria for toxic material release. Buildings which fail to meet the building
siting evaluation criteria shall be included in the mitigation plan or subjected to more
detailed analysis.
8.6 Siting and Design of New Buildings

New buildings intended for occupancy shall be sited and designed to meet the
building siting evaluation criteria for toxic material release.
9.0 BUILDING SITING EVALUATION PROCESSES
9.1 Building Siting Evaluation for Existing Buildings

Building siting evaluations shall be carried out for existing buildings intended for
occupancy in accordance with Section 8.
9.1.1 Mitigation Plan for Existing Buildings
Prioritized list of all buildings intended for occupancy that fail to meet the building
siting evaluation criteria (Table-1) shall be developed. The basis for the prioritization
may include, but is not limited to:
 Combination of building damage and building occupancy;
 Mitigation measures that can be implemented more quickly than others such
as:
 Relocation of personnel (especially those who are not categorized as
essential personnel),
 Provision of blast resistant modular buildings,
 Window hazard mitigation;
 Risk


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Develop and implement a mitigation plan and an associated schedule to address all
existing buildings requiring mitigation. This plan may include measures described in
9.1.2. The building mitigations may be phased-in consistent with other relative risk
mitigation efforts.
9.1.2 Hierarchy of Mitigation Measure
Each building’s potential exposure to explosion, fire, or toxic material release is
unique. Table 1 provides examples of possible options to consider in the mitigation
plan to reduce the consequence or frequency of scenarios. The list of measures
shown in Table 1 is not all inclusive. Elect to implement measures that reduce the
consequence and/or frequency of scenarios. Measures are listed in order of
decreasing reliability (passive, active, or procedural) and categorized by type
(eliminate, prevent, control, and mitigate). When selecting a mitigation measure it is
important to evaluate how effective the measure will be in reducing the consequence
or the frequency of the scenario.
Protection of building occupants requires a balanced approach between passive,
active, and procedural measures.
9.2 Design of New Buildings or Modifications to Existing Buildings

Building siting evaluations shall be carried out for new buildings intended for
occupancy in accordance Section 8.
New buildings intended for occupancy, modifications to buildings intended for
occupancy, and building additions intended for occupancy shall be designed to meet
the building siting evaluation criteria.
9.3 Personnel Performing Building Siting Evaluation

Personnel performing the building siting evaluation shall have competence in the
analytical methods used in the evaluation. Areas of competency include, as
appropriate, the application of the methodology being employed, hazard
identification, scenario development, flammable and toxic gas dispersion modelling,
fire modelling, explosion modelling, blast response of structures, design of buildings
to resist thermal loading and gas ingress, frequency assessment, and quantitative
risk assessment techniques.


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Table-1 Hierarchy of Mitigation Measures
Example Measure
eliminate hazard substitute with nonhazardous material/process conditions
prevent release (i.e.  upgrade metallurgy or design of equipment

reduce frequency of
scenario)
 Reduce leak sources (eliminate flanges, drains, small bore
piping, etc.)
 rate equipment for maximum upset pressure
control size of  minimize confinement

scenario
 minimize congestion
Passive
 utilize spill control dikes, curbs, etc., to limit extent of pool fires
and limit vapor dispersion from pools of flashing liquids
 minimize release rate—provide process flow restrictions (either
limiting pipe size or adding restricting orifices) to reduce the
potential severity of a release from downstream equipment
 reduce inventory of hazardous material (can reduce duration of
fire and gas release scenarios)
mitigate effect to relocate personnel (especially personnel that are not essential) design
building occupants or upgrade existing building to protect occupants from explosion, fire,
or toxics tightly seal windows and tight double doors (airlocks) to
minimize toxic/flammable gas and smoke ingress
prevent release (i.e. safety instrumented systems

reduce frequency of
scenario)
control size of fire and gas/emergency shutdown systems (reducing quantity

Active
scenario released)
fixed/automatic active firefighting systems
mitigate effect to issue occupants with personal protective equipment (PPE) for hazards
building occupants HVAC air intake shut down on detection of flammable/toxic gas
prevent release (i.e. Mechanical integrity inspection, permits for hot work, lockout/tag out,
reduce frequency of line breaking, lifting, etc.
scenario) sampling to prevent contamination of reactive material
Procedural
control size of manual active firefighting systems

scenario
mitigate effect to Emergency response plan including, as appropriate: evacuation,

building occupants escape routes, shelter-in-place, etc.
evacuate building occupants during start-up and planned shutdowns


SYSTEM Nov-2017
9.4 Management of Building Occupancy

Develop policies and practices to address housing of personnel located in buildings
intended for occupancy considering exposure level to explosion, fire, and toxic
material release. Personnel (essential and nonessential) may be located in a
building intended for occupancy that meets the owner/operators’ building siting
evaluation criteria. Consideration should be given to locating nonessential personnel
as far as practicable from the hazard and discouraging congregation of personnel in
buildings close to process areas.
Owner/operators should periodically confirm that buildings not intended for
occupancy remain unoccupied.
9.5 Management of Change (MOC)

COMPANY/CONTRACTOR shall identify situations that require MOC. Situations that
may require MOC evaluation include, but are not limited to:
 changes to plant operations, processes or equipment (including
decommissions or additions) cause a change in potential for, or severity of,
explosion, fire, or toxic impacts at the building location;
 a new building intended for occupancy is added to the facility;
 a modification or addition to an existing building occurs that could cause a
change in the potential for, or severity of, explosion, fire, or toxic material
release impacts;
 the building’s occupancy status changes from not intended for occupancy to
intended for occupancy;
 the number of personnel or time spent inside the building increases either
permanently or for a defined period of time.
The actions from the MOC evaluation may vary depending on whether the change is
permanent or for a defined period of time. Where the change is permanent, a
revision of the building siting evaluation may be necessary. For change which is for a
defined period of time, interim risk mitigation measures may be appropriate.
Contractor will submit this evaluation for company review and approval if applicable.
10.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
The two categories of acceptance criteria are:

 conditions required for integrity;
 Endurance period.
The acceptance criteria during endurance period shall meet each of the following

SYSTEM Nov-2017
four systems:
 life support;
 structural support;
 command support; and
 Escape and evacuation.
10.1 Life support

The function of the life support system is to maintain an environment which is not
hazardous to personnel and which maintains their ability to take rational action.
The scope and extent of the life support system will vary, from little or no specific
provision to a purpose-designed enclosure incorporating specialist environmental
control facilities.
Analysis of the major incident scenarios shall determine whether and at what point
normal life support related services (e.g. normal power, HVAC, etc.) will be impaired
or lost. This shall be taken into account when evaluating life support endurance.
The life support acceptance criteria relate to potentially hazardous conditions for
persons unprotected by special equipment or clothing. Where personnel do have
such protection, the life support acceptance criteria may be redefined to reflect
corresponding human limitations under the relevant restrictions (such as absolute
limits for use of equipment). Any such redefinition of acceptance criteria shall be
clearly substantiated.
The calculation of TGR impairment times will depend on the assumptions made for
the integrity and leakage of the TGR following an incident. For TGR design the
anticipated wind driven leakage should be calculated using a model such as AIDA
(Air Infiltration Development Algorithm).
CONTRACTOR shall submit all of above for COMPANY review. CONTRACTOR
shall demonstrate the performance of life support system as per specification given
in cause 7.3.
10.1.1 Generation of smoke
A CO (Carbon mono oxide) concentration of 1200ppm is taken as the limit for
impairment of an escape route in 30 minutes (CO sensors/detectors to be provided).
The absence of vision may delay or prevent escape, mustering and evacuation. A
visibility of 4 m (13 ft) to 5 m (16 ft) is about the threshold of diminished performance.
A minimum visibility of 3 m (10 ft) for escape from a primary compartment and 10 m
for an escape route is recommended. Where escape and evacuation routes are
predicted to have a visibility in credible fire events below 10m (33 ft) consideration
should be given to the length of route, changes in direction and elevation and the


SYSTEM Nov-2017
benefits of improved lighting.

10.1.2 Generation of flammable gases
The acceptance criteria for those gases or vapours that may be released and are
flammable at concentrations below the level at which they become an asphyxiant or
toxic (e.g. methane, propane, ethane) is a concentration equal to or less than 60 %
of the LFL.
10.1.3 Generation of toxic vapours
TGR shall be design for maximum toxic gas concentration up to each TLV.
10.1.4 Oxygen deficiency and carbon dioxide accumulation (enclosed TGRs)
If air is not renewed, (i.e within an enclosed TGR with lost ventilation), breathing will
decrease the concentration of oxygen and increase the concentration of carbon-
dioxide. Muscular coordination disturbance occurs at an oxygen level below 17 %.
The acceptance criterion is therefore a minimum internal oxygen level of 17 % for 60
minutes.
At a carbon dioxide level of 20,000 ppm (2 %), respiration increases. This is not
harmful in itself, but will increase the effects of other toxins that may be present. The
acceptance criterion for carbon dioxide accumulation is therefore a maximum carbon
dioxide level of 20,000 ppm (2 %).
Appendix 2 shows how to determine the required breathable air volumes. These are
determined by carbon dioxide accumulation and not oxygen deficiency.
10.1.5 Heat stress
As a screening criterion the maximum air temperature inside the TGR should not
exceed 45 Degree C for at least one hour during toxic gas release.
10.1.6 Use of respiratory protective equipment (RPE)
In certain circumstances (e.g. in open spaces and high applicable toxic gases being
considered), the use of RPE may be considered as a protection measure for
personnel at the TGR, and while using escape and evacuation routes. The use of
RPE requires careful consideration to ensure that the primary objective is achieved.
In particular, consideration should be given to the possible effects on the command
structure (organisation, communications), the provision of sufficient air supply for the
duration required, and the difficulty of putting RPE on injured persons. Enclosed
TGRs should be designed so that RPE is not necessary while personnel are within
the TGR.
10.2 Structural support

The TGR structural acceptance criterion is the maintenance of the integrity of the
supporting structure, so that the TGR as a whole remains in a stable, usable and
accessible condition during the endurance period.

SYSTEM Nov-2017
10.3 Command support

The acceptance criterion for command support is the availability, for the endurance
period, of the following essential command support functions. These functions are
not specific to any scenario and are:
 the ability to initiate general alarm conditions;
 the ability to communicate with all personnel at muster stations and
embarkation areas;
 the ability to request outside assistance;
 two-way voice communications with a secondary TGR, for the endurance
period of the secondary TGR;
 the ability to monitor fire, smoke and those toxic and flammable gases which
may occur, and to monitor their propagation in the TGR, on evacuation
routes, at embarkation areas and in adjacent to TGR.
It should be ensured that critical equipment required in an emergency is likely to
work for the purpose intended during conditions that could prevail, e.g. elevated
temperatures.
10.4 Escape and evacuation

The conditions of integrity for escape and evacuation shall be maintained for their
respective endurance periods:
 on at least one escape route to the TGR(s);
 on at least one evacuation route from the TGR(s) to safe assembly point
10.5 Endurance Period

The endurance period of the TGR is the period during which the relevant conditions
of integrity shall be maintained.
The endurance period of the TGR SHALL [PS] be based on one of two criteria,
whichever is the shorter:
 maximum major incident duration; or
 time required to complete evacuation.
The endurance period shall begin from the time of "call to muster" (allowing for
delays in calling). The effect on the TGR of an incident will not necessarily be
present at the beginning of the endurance period.
NOTE: Evacuation is an inherently risky activity and the TGR should be designed
to ensure that unnecessary Evacuations are not required. For example if
many major incident durations are up to 45 minutes and the time required

SYSTEM Nov-2017
to complete evacuation is 30 minutes, the TR endurance period should be

set at 45 minutes in order to avoid unnecessary evacuation and hence
reduce risk in accordance with the ALARP principle.
A Checklist guideline to improve a building against toxic release infiltration attached
as Appendix-1.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
11.0 DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY / EMERGENCY SIREN SYSTEM
For declaring emergency, three types of emergency sirens shall be used. They are:
1. Emergency Alert Siren: Declaration of emergency- Broken tone
2. Evacuation/Shelter in place- Wailing Sound
3. All clear- Steady Tone
11.1 Emergency Alert Siren:

An interrupted (BROKEN TONE) tone sounded to announce an emergency, such as,
fire, explosion, major oil leak or an uncontrolled toxic gas release (whether
originating onsite or from the neighbouring industries). Emergency siren shall be
actuated in case the incident is categorized as Tier-I or above. This will be followed
by the announcement on the Public Address system.
All personnel shall remain at their work place (except those in the incident area) and
wait for further instructions. Personnel in the incident area may proceed to local
assembly point as per the instructions from the authorized personnel such as On
Scene Commander/Operations coordinator.
11.2 Evacuation /Shelter-in-place Siren

Wailing Tone is sounded to alert site personnel to be ready to evacuate, remain
indoors or proceed to assigned safe shelter, as announced on the public address
system and/or as directed by the authorized personnel (such as OSC, IC).
Authorized person (as directed by ON-Scene Commander / Incident Commander)
shall activate the siren and shall announce on the Public Address system:
 Extent of evacuation / Evacuation route (depending upon the wind direction)
/ main assembly point or
 To stay indoors / proceed to assigned safe shelter/assembly points.
11.3 All Clear Siren

Continuous uninterrupted tone sounded to declare the incident close-out followed by
PA announcement.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
APPENDIX 1: CHECKLIST GUIDELINE FOR BUILDING SITE AND BUILDING ENVELOPE

To improve a building against toxic release infiltration, the following should be considered:
A.1 Site
 Proximity to toxic materials releases of hazardous quantity affects concentrations at the

building. Remote location is best.
 Locate personnel emergency exits and outside access paths away from the hazard
release.
 Travel path to the emergency rescue building and escape apparatus should be
convenient for personnel.
 Location of ventilation air intakes should be away from the hazard.
 Certain buildings, such as some control rooms, must be pressurized at all times. A
remote or alternate air intake may be required.
 Emergency egress paths from the area should be free of obstacles and clearly defined
considering day, night or vapor fog conditions.
 Handrails or guardrails may be needed in some cases.
A.2 Building walls
 Seal around all through-the-wall penetration and weather hoods for:

 ducts
 conduits
 electrical/instrument wiring trays
 pipes
 Reduce infiltration through wall construction:
 Masonry walls, mortar joints, lintels, and through-the-wall flashing should be
tight.
 Sheet or panels (metal, plastic, etc.) wall siding. Seal tight all lap or butt joints.
Make certain caps, covers, and flashings do not have hidden voids due to siding
configurations (flutes, corrugations, etc.).
 Protect from infiltration through open trenches:
 pipe or conduit
 waste water


SYSTEM Nov-2017
 Wall louvers:
 blades can close tight
 frame sealed
 automatic emergency damper may be required
A.3 Exterior doors
 Reduce infiltration at personnel doors:

 Install weather strip seals including automatic door bottom.
 Use automatic door closers without hold-open devices.
 Each time a door is opened about 1,000 cu ft (40 cu m) of air can infiltrate. A
vestibule door system can make a 40% reduction. Vestibule depth should assure
the first door closes before the second door is opened.
 Reduce infiltration at large access doors such as overhead or sliding type:
 Install jamb, head, and button weather strip seals.
 Keep doors normally closed.
A.4 Windows
 Windows should be constructed so glazing and frame joints are sealed against
infiltration.
 Fixed, non-operating window preferred.
 Some international building codes may require operating windows for ventilation.
Consider automatic release overhead shutters for emergency closing of window
openings.
 Windows should resist any pressures that could occur from a sudden gas or vapour
release.
 No windows or minimum windows are the preferred design.
A.5 Roofs
 Eave closures, cant, flashings, and facias between roof and wall should not have voids
that can allow toxic gas/vapour infiltration.
 Through-the-roof ducts and pipes should have space between the duct or pipe and the
curb adequately sealed.
 Platform or equipment support flashing should be sealed so there can be no infiltration
around and behind the flashing and into the building.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
 Roof penetrations should be minimised to reduce the potential for gas or vapour
penetration.
A.6 Ducts & trenches sealing:
 The number of penetrations for cables and ducts should be minimized.

 Penetrations for cables and ducts must be sealed. Services (water, instrumentation,
electricity etc.) trenches, cellars or ventilated voids must be sealed.
 All mortar joints must be tight, especially around the lintels and where there is through-
the-wall-flashing.
 Joints between or associated with profiled cladding/inner wall and ceiling must be
sealed with non-hardening mastic compound or such fixings.
A.7 Airlock System
 The critical factor is to prevent ingression of toxic gases inside the toxic gas refugee
building, especially during the initial mustering phase.
 The toxic gas refugee needs to be kept at positive pressure with respect to outside
atmosphere. Airlock doors are required to be designed at the building entry point.
Airlock is required to maintained at a lesser positive pressure than the main building
(toxic refugee) and at higher positive pressure than outside to prevent toxic ingression.
 Interlocking of the doors to be provided. The inner door is blocked until the outer door is
open.
 The air lock is required to have AIRWASH system so that personnel entering the toxic
refugee should not carry toxic gasses inside the building. The Air wash shall operate on
auto-activation upon opening the outside door. The air wash system shall operate
continuously during emergencies.
 All other entry doors to the building shall be closed and sealed for entry from outside
the building, however, they shall be openable from inside the building to ensure
evacuation in case of building fire.
A.8 EEBAs for safe evacuation
 EEBA (Emergency Escape Breathing Air) sets shall be provided inside the building in a
designated place to facilitate safe evacuation of the personnel from the building.
A.9 HVAC
 HVAC shall be shutting down the air intake upon sensing the toxic gas concentrations.
Refer ADNOC guidelines for preparation of HSE Philosophy for more specifications.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
 Air intake and exhausts shall have self-sealing flaps with manually operability option.
 Oxygen depletion and CO2 accumulation within Toxic Refugee Oxygen depletion and
CO2 accumulation occurs after HVAC fresh air damper is closed. To monitor the levels
of O2 depletion and CO2 accumulation, O2 & CO2 detectors shall be provided inside
the toxic gas refugee building at various points.
 The toxic refugee shall be evacuated when the air quality exceeds the permissible
limits.
A.10 Heat Exhaustion
The temperature in the room shall be maintained at 25oC and relative humidity at 50%.
 The existing air conditioning system is required to run in re-circulation mode.
 Emergency split type room air conditioners are required for personnel which will
operate in case of emergency.
A.11 Emergency Communications
 Toxic gas refugee must have means of communication (Public address call point, radio
or mobile communication etc) which the occupants can call for assistance to the
emergency management centre.
 Emergency power shall be made available to the building which is proposed for
conversion as toxic gas refugee.
A.12 Signage
 Safety signs shall be provided to direct personnel to toxic gas refuge from different
areas.
 Safety signs within the refugee such as Location of the EEBAs, First Aid equipment, etc
shall be clearly marked along with the precautions to be taken inside the refugee.
A.13 Escape & evacuation routes:
 Escape and evacuation routes to and fro toxic refugee shall be clearly marked,
illuminated and obstruction free.
A.14 Muster Space:
 If personnel are mustered within the TR in groups of more than 20, then an area of 1.25
m² per person should be provided. This is based upon 50% seated and 50% standing,
without baggage and allowing for cross-flows.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
 If personnel are mustered in groups of 20 or less, such as in multiple muster stations,

an area of 0.8 m² per person should be provided. This is based upon 25% seated and
75% standing, without significant cross-flows
 These are clear areas, including loose furniture but excluding fixed furniture and fittings
Heat stress, oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide build-up also affect the space
requirement for enclosed TGRs. Based on oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide build-
up, the minimum volume of a TRG is 1.4 cubic meters of air per person per hour of
TGR endurance.
A.15 Special provisions for TGR
Ordinary TGR may be created from existing/new buildings without any additional external air
supply through cylinder banks or internal air purification systems. However, the requirement of
external air supply for positive pressure or purification shall be determined based on the
location of the toxic gas refugee, likely toxic concentrations in the event of worst case scenario,
duration of mustering inside the building before evacuation and endurance period of the life
support.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
APPENDIX 2: OXYGEN DEPLETION AND CARBON DIOXIDE ACCUMULATION

Where the TGR is an enclosure and analysis of incident scenarios indicates that significant
smoke and gas impingement may occur, a probable protection measure will be to seal the TGR.
Under such circumstances it will be necessary to ensure that from the instant when a
breathable external air supply is lost, an adequate internal air supply is available for the
remainder of the endurance period.
Oxygen consumption and carbon dioxide production are linked to energy expenditure. For a
daily energy expenditure of 3000 kcal, 620 litres of oxygen are consumed and 510 litres of
carbon dioxide produced (at STP - 0 °C/760 mm Hg).
Assuming an air temperature of 20°C (70ºF), this equates to 665 litres of oxygen and 547 litres
of carbon dioxide per day. Taking initial oxygen content of 21 % and a lower acceptable limit of
17 % then each cubic metre of air contain 40 litres of usable oxygen;
Therefore every person requires 16.6 cubic metres (585 ft3) of air per day or 0.69 cubic metres
(24 ft3) per hour. As carbon dioxide is exhaled at a rate dependent on oxygen consumption, the
carbon dioxide level in an atmosphere reaching the 17 % limit for oxygen would be 3.3 %. This
is above the acceptance criteria for carbon dioxide accumulation. To ensure that the limit of 2 %
carbon dioxide is not exceeded the requirement would be 1.2 cubic metres (42 ft3) of air per
person per hour.
However during exercise and conditions of stress the ratio of carbon dioxide produced to
oxygen increases from 0.82 to approximately 1.0. This increases the space requirement to 1.4
cubic metres (50 ft3) of air per person per hour of TGR endurance.
Other factors that could affect oxygen and carbon dioxide levels, e.g. combustion, have not
been taken into account in the above.


SYSTEM Nov-2017
APPENDIX 3: ACUTE EXPOSURE GUIDELINE LEVEL (AEGL)

AEGLs estimate the concentrations at which most people—including sensitive individuals such
as old, sick, or very young people—will begin to experience health effects if they are exposed to
a hazardous chemical for a specific length of time (duration). For a given exposure duration, a
chemical may have up to three AEGL values, each of which corresponds to a specific tier of
health effects.
The three AEGL tiers are defined as follows:
 AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million (ppm) or
milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3), of a substance above which it is predicted that the
general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening
health effects or death.
 AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible
individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health
effects or an impaired ability to escape.
 AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible
individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic no
sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible
upon cessation of exposure.

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Abu Dhabi Oil Refining Company

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY

0 Nov-17 DGS-MU-207_Rev-0 Minutes Of Jun&Oct-2017 DDC Meetings DDC TSFDM / VP (E&TSD)

Rev Date Description Source Reviewed Endorsed Approved

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 1 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

CLAUSES REVISED IN THIS ISSUE

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TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

1.0 GENERAL ......................................................................................................................................... 6

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TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

11.2 Evacuation /Shelter-in-place Siren ............................................................................................ 28

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 4 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

List Of Authorized Signatures/ Initials

DGS Discipline Committee Member, ADRD Saleh Salem AL Katheeri

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 5 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 6 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

does it create any contractual relationship whatsoever between the Subcontractor

Acceptance Requirements against which the fulfilment of an objective can

Building A rigid, enclosed structure

Building siting The procedures described in this document used to evaluate

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 7 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

Consequence The potential effects of an explosion, fire, or toxic material

Command The organization that is provided to control an emergency

Consequence- The methodology used for building siting evaluation that is

Essential Personnel with specific work activities that require them to be

Hazard An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (e.g.

Occupant Proportion of building occupants that could potentially suffer a

On-site personnel Employees, contractors, visitors, service providers, and others

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 8 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

Process area An area containing equipment (e.g. pipes, pumps, valves,

Quantitative risk The systematic development of numerical estimates of the

Risk A measure of potential injury, environmental damage, or

Risk-based A quantitative risk assessment methodology used for building

Safe Haven Protected location designed to allow people to shelter in the

Printed 15-Nov-17 Page 9 of 35

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level

AIDA Air Infiltration Development Algorithm (model)

ALARP As low as reasonably practicable

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

TGR Toxic Gas Refuge (Refer to Safety Haven)

2.0 CODES AND STANDARDS

It shall be the CONTRACTOR’s, SUBCONTRACTOR’s, CONSULTANT’s,

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineering

British Standards Institution (BSI)

TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0

incorporating a hood for escape – Specification

Compressed Gas Association (CGA)

Health & Safety Executive (HSE)

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

International Society of Automation (ISA)

International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

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TOXIC GAS REFUGE DESIGN CRITERIA AND EMERGENCY SIREN DGS-MU-207_Rev-0