National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Big Bend National Park

Castolon Fire
Causal Analysis

Incident Number: TX-BBP-000169

Incident Date: May 22, 2019
Analysis Team Visit: June 16-19, 2019
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Executive Summary
On May 21, 2019, residents of the town of Santa Elena, Chihuahua, Mexico made the decision to ignite a
residential trash pile east of their town, along the Rio Grande. This practice is considered customary and
usually occurs when the weather is forecast to have a southwesterly flow, which carries smoke to the
east, away from residences. Over the next 36 hours the predominant weather flow would change and
cause winds to shift and increase dramatically. This caused spotting of the trash fire across the Rio
Grande and into the United States (U.S.) and Big Bend National Park. After crossing the river and the
international border in the late afternoon of May 22, 2019, fire behavior increased dramatically due to
weather and fuel conditions in the thick mesquite (procopis glandulous and procopis pubescens)
“Bosque” forest along the Rio Grande. Fuels contributed to fire spread with significant contributions
from intermixed
invasive/non-native dried
buffelgrass, (Cenchrus
ciliaris). One hundred foot
flame lengths, were
observed in the Bosque.
Fire raced through the dried
grass, creosote bush and
scattered mesquite in the
adjacent arroyos and ran
directly at the historic
structures in Castolon. Two
of these structures were
lost in the fire, the Castolon
Store/Visitor Center and the
Latrine. Numerous other
historic structures were
saved through the quick action of Big Bend National Park Wildland and Structural Firefighters.

The National Park Service (NPS) Intermountain Regional Office was notified of the loss and determined
that a Causal Analysis should be conducted to assess direct causes, indirect influences and determine
potential lessons learned from both the loss of the structures and the protection of numerous others.

A Causal Analysis team of two was mobilized by the Intermountain Region of the NPS to assess both the
Structural Fire Loss and the Wildland Fire event. The primary causes of the fire and structure loss
include:

1. Routine trash burning in Mexico.

2. Non-native vegetation species contributing to wildland fire growth.
3. Water supply and backup power off-line and insufficient for simultaneous structure and wildland
fire suppression.

This report documents the findings of that team through assessments, interviews, technical structural
fire protection plans, plan reviews, and a wide ranging suite of park documentation.
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History of the Castolon Area and Store

In the early 1900s settlers began to
farm the banks of the Rio Bravo del
Norte (Rio Grande), downstream of the
Santa Elena Canyon area. The fertile
fields allowed communities to expand.
Farmers in the area raised a variety of
crops including corn, beans, wheat,
squash, tomatoes, and melons. In 1901,
Cipriano Hernandez started the first
store in the growing community and
sold goods to his neighbors and to the
mining community in Terlingua. He
operated the store out of his home,
which is today known as the Alvino
House.

From about 1912 to 1920, revolution raged in Mexico. Resultant activity in the area brought the U.S.
military to defend the border. The National Guard established camps at Glenn Springs, La Noria
(northeast of Rio Grande Village), Lajitas (west of the park), and Castolon (Camp Santa Helena). In
response to a later revolution, the Air Corps established a landing field at nearby Johnson's Ranch.

Castolon was established in 1916. The National Guard lived in tents and the construction of a permanent
post began in 1919. By the time the buildings were completed in 1920, the Mexican Revolution was over
and the guard was pulled out of the area, never occupying the new construction. The buildings included
an enlisted men’s barrack, officer’s and non-commissioned officer’s quarters, a latrine, a granary and
tack shed, and a stable (which burned sometime before 1933). In 1921, the La Harmonia Company Store
moved into the new barracks building and began its eighty-year history of serving as a frontier trading
post (from 1918 to 1921, the store was located in "Old Castolon" across from what is today Cottonwood
Campground). The La Harmonia Company was involved in farming and ranching. In 1961, the NPS
acquired the La Harmonia Company holdings and began operating the store as a concession operation.
When the Castolon Store burned on May 22, 2019, it was operating as both an NPS Visitor Center which
housed historically significant objects and interpretive displays and a concession operation including a
gift shop and general store with food, drinks, and basic supplies sold.

Castolon includes the oldest known adobe structure in Big Bend National Park (the Alvino House),
another store building (Old Castolon), and numerous adobe ruins that were once homes for the many
Mexican American and Anglo families that lived in the area.
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Castolon Fire Causal Analysis

Timeline
Big Bend National Park (BIBE) entered wildland
fire “Step Up #01” on April 12, 2019. Upon
expiration of the Step Up the program applied
for and received Regional Wildland Severity
funding. BIBE dropped out of severity by the end
of April due to abundant precipitation. Energy
Release Components (ERCs) and fuels conditions
at their sampling sites could no longer justify
severity funding and staffing.

Throughout early May ERC outputs and Burning Pre-Fire condition of the Historic Store which burned in the Castolon Fire.

Index (BI) calculations rose towards the 80th

percentile. On May 21, 2019, the Castolon Fire started in Santa Elena, Chihuahua, Mexico. The fire was
started by residents burning trash east of town. Refuse burning with southwest winds, which carry the
smoke out across the desert, is seen as less of a fire threat to values at risk in the area. The surrounding
area is considered to be “desert pavement” and an NPS conducted Wildland Fire Risk Assessment (dated
February 20, 2014) documented the Castolon Store with a “low” threat rating.

Refuse burning is seen as a standard practice for Santa Elena residents and trash is discarded in this
manner on a fairly routine basis. Residents usually utilize accelerants to keep the fire burning. NPS
resources in Castolon kept an eye on the smoke, consistent with standard procedure.

“Hot, dry and windy is the norm for Castolon…” BIBE Fire Staff

2005: Fire Protection Sprinkler Systems were mapped and installed in the Castolon Historic
District for Structure Fire Mitigation. The system design included fire suppression systems
in all the historic buildings, a fire alarm panel for local alert only (not monitored), and
improvements to the water supply system. A backup generator and a supplemental fire
pump were installed around this time.

● Castolon Store: Sprinkler system included protection of the covered porch and rafter
tails. The attic was also protected by sprinklers. The alarm panel was for local alert
notification only and was not monitored by dispatch or a third party monitoring
company. Smoke detectors were installed in the structure.
● Latrine: Sprinkler system included protection of the restrooms and the attic. There
was no alarm panel associated with the latrine building.

2/20/2014: IMR facilitated NPS Wildland Fire Risk Assessment conducted for the historic structures in
Castolon. The Castolon Store rated at “low” in terms of risk from wildland fire. The 11
Castolon Historic Area buildings rated as follows; 3-High risk, 4-Moderate risk, and 4-Low
risk. Mowing of grass and opening up spacing between the brush were the
recommended treatment tactics.
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9/25/2014: Annual Sprinkler System inspection testing and maintenance (ITM) completed for
Castolon Store by Automatic Fire Protection (AFP).

Automatic Fire Protection, Inc. 4582 Old Christoval Rd., San Angelo, TX 76904.

9/15/2015: Annual sprinkler system ITM completed for latrine by Automatic Fire Protection. System
“Red Tagged” needing five sprinkler heads to be replaced.

9/17/2015: Annual Sprinkler System inspection completed for Castolon Store by Automatic Fire
Protection.

3/1/2016: Annual Sprinkler System inspection completed for latrine, service tag attached by
Automatic Fire Protection.

5/4/2016: Annual Sprinkler System ITM completed for latrine – yellow tag attached for out dated
gauges, replacement heads, and missing backflow handle by Tyco International
Simplexgrinnell.

5/14/2016: Annual Sprinkler System inspection completed for Castolon Store by Automatic Fire
Protection.

6/22/2018: An inspection of the sprinkler system at the Castolon Store was completed by Automated
Fire Protection of San Angelo, TX. The following was documented: “This system was
valved OFF by the parks and services, a complete inspection cannot be done until the
system is repaired and put back in to service,” – AFP Technician.

12/17-19/2018: AFP technician repairs Yellow Tag and Red Tag issues at Castolon Store. This included
repairs to the backflow device. There was a conference call between Dove Brown
(Forever Resorts) Lewis Carpenter (Forever Resorts) and an NPS employee about turning
the system on. The decision was made to leave the system turned off. This decision was
made by the NPS employee, see structure fire discussion for rationale.

5/21/2019: Santa Elena trash pile smoke first observed.

5/22/2019: Santa Elena trash pile continues to burn.

1321 hrs: BIBE Dispatch received reports of “gray smoke east of Santa Elena.” The investigating
ranger reported the fire was on the Mexican side of the river.

1656 hrs: Brewster County 911 received a call regarding the fire and passed it along to Big Bend
Dispatch.

- Temp 108, RH 3% Winds 15-20 SSW

1737 hrs: Law Enforcement (LE) Ranger reported that the fire is spreading rapidly.

- Temp 110, RH 3% Winds 12-20 S-SW

1749 hrs: BIBE Wildland Fire staff were mobilized and gearing up to respond. At 1755 they were
en-route.
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1811 hrs: LE Ranger reported that the fire had “crossed the river approximately 300 yards from the
residences.”

-Temp 107, RH 4%, Winds 10-15 SSE

1830 hrs: LE Ranger requested a “Structure Fire engine.”

1833 hrs: LE Ranger reported that Cottonwood Campground, adjacent to Castolon, had been
evacuated.

1834 hrs: BIBE dispatch deployed a Send Word Now alert for Structure and Wildland firefighters.

1839 hrs: Wildland Fire Incident Commander (IC) arrived on scene.

“Rolling in to the fire it was apparent that the fire was more than river cane and grass…” - IC

1844 hrs: ICS initiated- IC identified, fire named the Castolon Fire.

Communications through the repeater were poor and the IC was having to consistently
go inside the Castolon Ranger Station to contact BIBE dispatch via telephone to maintain
communications. The incident began to evolve rapidly due to deteriorating fire weather
conditions.

“Every time I’d go in and come back out it was a different scene.” –IC

1845 hrs: Wildland Engine 864 (E-864) arrives on scene.

1848 hrs: Wildland Fire IC calls dispatch to stand down Structure Fire resources.

1857 hrs: Wildland Fire IC provides BIBE Dispatch with a size up. The fire is pushing north into the
“desert pavement” east of the Castolon Historic Area. Fires that crossed the river into
this area had always ran out of fuel in the past.

“40 acres, No Structures Threatened, Protection Mode, Moderate rates of spread with running and
torching. Flat terrain on a SE Aspect, Wind SE at 15 MPH.” -IC

- Temp 106, RH 4%, Winds 7-9, SSE

Sometime between 1857 and 1910 the wind shifted from a predominantly southerly
component to a predominantly easterly component and the fire status changed
dramatically.

1900 hrs: Wildland Fire IC requests five wildland fire fighters. Engine staff deploy at least three
progressive hose packs. E-864 initially begins structure protection on the barn, which
appeared to be most at risk.
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The fire now had a strong wind at its back from the east and was pushing the fire through
an area considered to be “Desert Pavement” at high rates of spread. The fire was burning
through buffelgrass, creosote bush, and mesquite. Once out of the thick river bottom
“bosque,” the fire continued to burn aggressively and at high rates of spread through
seemingly sparse fuels.

1903 hrs: Three wildland fire fighters en-route to Castolon from Panther Junction.

Re: mesquite trees torching out, “a couple of blades of grass burning under the mesquite was all it
took…” – BIBE Firefighter

1931 hrs: IC requests Structure Fire engine respond to Castolon.

“Wouldn’t think it could do what it did.”– BIBE Firefighter

1940 hrs: IC requests Type 3 IC, declares structures threatened.

- Temp 106, RH 4%, Winds 13-18, ESE

“There was LOTS of ember wash.” – BIBE Responder

1945 hrs: BIBE Dispatch requests Terlingua Fire and EMS (TFEMS) Engine through Brewster County
SO.

1946 hrs: Photo of “Ramada” shade structure beginning to burn.

1948 hrs: BIBE Facilities Water Tender being prepped in Panther Junction

1950 hrs: IC updates BIBE dispatch that the fire is making S to W progression, heading to Santa
Elena Canyon, requests to close Santa Elena Canyon area. E-864 working the residence
and ranger office.

“The Store and Restroom are involved” - IC to BIBE Dispatch

- Temp 106, RH 4%, Winds 13-18, ESE

At some point between 1955 hrs and 2032 hrs electrical power is lost in the area.
Hydrant pressure was nearly non-existent exacerbating the deteriorating conditions for
the firefighters on scene. This constrained fire suppression and structure protection to
only the light wildland engine with a 280 gallon water tank until additional resources
arrived.

1956 hrs: IC requests BIBE Dispatch contact Alamogordo Dispatch to request additional resources.
At 1959 the Terlingua Fire and EMS (TFEMS) resources had been requested to report to
Castolon directly.

2008 hrs: IC reported that the Castolon Housing area was okay.

2010 hrs: Dispatch notified IC that TFEMS Structure Engine and Tender were en-route.

2015 hrs: BIBE Dispatch requests Texas Fire Service Modules and a Type 3 IC through Alamogordo
Dispatch.
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2017 hrs: IC reports that the Castolon Store is fully involved with spotting on to the river cane
awning and that the wildland fire had grown to approx. 100 acres.

- Temp 106, RH 4%, Winds 16-18, E

2024 hrs: IC sums up total order to BIBE Dispatch, two Type 6 engines, Type 3 IC, from Alamogordo,
one Type 6, and six-person module en-route from Ft. Stockton.

2030 hrs approx.: BIBE Structure Engine 2 arrives.

2043 hrs: Official sunset.

2043 hrs: IC updates ICS change. Two Ops Chiefs identified, one for structure response, one for
wildland response.

2045 hrs: BIBE Dispatch reports fill on the Type 3 IC order- reporting 0730 next morning. Two Type
6 engines from TFS came back Unable to Fill (UTF).

2049 hrs: Report received by BIBE IT that the router had gone down at the Castolon Ranger Station.
This points to battery power loss. Reports put initial power outage at 2032.

2054 hrs: 3000 Gallon Water Tender en-route from Panther Junction to Castolon.

2101 hrs: IC reported the fire has progressed west to the Cottonwood Campground. One vehicle
remained in the campground associated with a kayaker on the river.

2103 hrs: TFEMS resources arrive on scene.

2111 hrs: IC reports high rates of spread to the west towards Santa Elena Canyon. Winds reported
to be 10-15 out of the east with active running and torching in the Mesquite Bosque.

2205 hrs: E-864 repositions to Cottonwood Campground. Scouts area to assess potential firing
operation to defend the campground.

2208 hrs: IC requests spot weather forecast.

2300 hrs: Wildland Fire resource reports that 20 Diablos will be gathered in the morning to assist
on the incident.

2316 hrs: TFEMS Units, Road Crew Tender are released from incident.

2321 hrs: IC reports fire behavior remains similar with heading to the west in the mesquite and
backing on the east side of the fire into the wind.

Resources remained active on the fire until well into the next morning.

“The Park really came together to fill the different roles and needs.” -IC

After two more days of active burning the Castolon Fire was contained at 992 acres, with
nearly 80 percent of area burned on Big Bend National Park.
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Narrative:
Fuels and Weather Conditions: Fire Behavior and Photographs- Fire Behavior – Day one (5/22/19)
exhibited extreme fire behavior for the fuel type. Local RX fire plans model the areas adjacent to the
river bottoms as both Grass and Brush fuel models (GR 8 and SH1 respectively). The fire modeling
program, Behave 6.0, provided modeled rates of spread, considering the documented on scene weather
conditions, at 98.9 chains per hour and 12-foot flame lengths in the grass.

The intermixed buffelgrass and mesquite in the

bosque had not burned in recent history. (See
attached photo of adjacent representative fuels
that did not burn.)

On scene photographs and firefighter estimations

documented flame lengths in the mesquite at 100
feet and rapid rates of spread. Strong southeasterly
winds initially pushed the fire up the scabby arroyos
towards the Castolon Housing Area. Lack of
adequate fuel and an eventual 90-degree wind shift
Fuel conditions in the bosque – intermixed buffelgrass
caused the fire to change course and follow minor
and mesquite.
arroyos directly westward uphill towards the
Castolon Store and Historic Structures.

The fire progressed through “desert pavement” by

consuming clumps of buffelgrass mixed with
creosote bush and occasional mesquite. Large
swaths of barren ground did little to slow the fire
due to the high winds pushing the fire through
favorable terrain.

The Big Bend Chief of Science and Resource

Management noted 2014 as a high water mark in
the Southwest for spread of annual invasive exotic
grasses such as Layman’s Love Grass and buffelgrass.
The NPS has committed the Chihuahuan Desert
Exotic grasses carried fire through mostly barren ground Network to BIBE and other neighboring National
Park units to assess spread of buffelgrass along road
corridors. Through monitoring it has been documented that the interstitial space between vegetation in
the Chihuahuan Desert is shrinking due to encroachment of these grasses. When dried they become
available to carry wildland fire across landscapes that ordinarily would not burn under these weather
conditions.

These exotic grasses, growing under the larger vegetation, quickly caused torching and spotting which
advanced the fire rapidly towards the historic structures. Micro-patterns displaying fire direction of
travel witnessed include staining, (see attached photo to the right). Buffelgrass consumed nearly 100
percent (see attached photo above of remaining grass stobs, with both consumption and angle of char
showing fire direction and intensity). Flowering creosote bush (Larrea tridentata) in full turgor also
 10

portrayed fire intensity and direction of travel through foliage freeze, (see photo to the left). The
buffelgrass has begun to resprout from roots on scene and assisted in the estimation of area spatial
coverage on the land surrounding the Castolon Historic Area.

Wildland Suppression Actions- Engine 864 was the first Initial Attack resource on scene. The module
initially bumped from structure to structure performing whatever prep they could with two people,
knocking down both advancing fire edge and suppressing spots near the barn. As the wind shifted fire

Foliage freeze indicates direction of fire spread Rock staining as an indicator of fire spread direction.
matching with reports from firefighters.

intensity increased and the engine repositioned to the Store/Ranger Station residence area, parked and
tapped a hydrant to supply water for the structure protection stand. Firefighters deployed a “simple
progressive” hoselay off of the hydrant and utilized the engine pump and hardline to attempt to
suppress the spot fires. Fire hydrant water flow was noted to be barely adequate to charge 300 feet of
1.5 inch hose and 100 feet of 1 inch lateral hose. Firefighters mentioned they had very little water
pressure to perform fire suppression in the wildland fuels adjacent to the structures.

Sometime around 1945 firebrands from the torching in adjacent wildland fuels initiated fire on the dried
cane awning of the Castolon Store. Despite the best efforts of the firefighters on scene strong winds
pushed the fire through the awning rapidly and soon both the Castolon Store and adjacent restroom
latrine were involved (see Structural Fire portion of the report for further information).

The resources on scene successfully protected five structures from the Castolon Fire.
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Fire behavior of involved structures shows wind direction, and energy release from the structure fires as
wildland fire resources protect other structures in the area. The latrine building is burning as a vented
fire in the attic and the Ramada shade structure has nearly consumed. Vents through the roof of the
Historic Store show heavy smoke indicative of an attic fire. Dark grey pressurized smoke is visible at the
enclosed porch/visitor center entryway.
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Map and Final Fire Size

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Investigative Conclusions:

Location: N 29° 6.986’ W 103° 30.584’ (Likely Origin).

Jurisdiction: Santa Elena, Chihuahua, Mexico (Likely Origin), US Jurisdiction: Brewster County, Big Bend
National Park, State of Texas, United States of America.

Event Sequence: see included timeline above.

Wildland Fire Behavior: The Castolon fire was a heading and flanking, wind-driven fire after it crossed
the Rio Grande into the United States of America, State of Texas, Big Bend National Park. The fire
burned aggressively in both the mesquite bosque and across sparse Chihuahuan Desert vegetation
known as “desert pavement.” Photographic and video documentation of rates of spread, intensity,
smoke volume, color, and direction all support that assessment. The fire was likely fed by dried bunches
of the invasive perennial exotic buffelgrass, which was reported by on scene responders to be fueling
both fire spread and torching of mesquite and creosote bush.

At 1840 hrs wind direction shifted from a southerly component to an easterly component. At that point
the fire that was working its way northward up the dry arroyos towards the Castolon Residential Area.
When the wind shifted towards
the west the fire was pushed up
minor arroyos directly towards the
Castolon Historic Area and up the
main Rio Grande corridor.
Buffelgrass intermixed with brush
and mesquite caused torching,
spotting, and rapid fire spread
across an area previously
considered to be unable to
support wildland fire.

Fire in the thicker bosque fuels

exhibited 100-foot flame lengths
and wide flame zone depths. The
fire effects assessment showed
nearly complete consumption of
Photo of fire behavior observed in the mesquite bosque.
fuels in many areas along the river
and the fire burned as a chapparal fuel type. Rather than under-burning deciduous trees the intermixed
grasses and brush fueled a flaming front that consumed all available fuel in its path. Impacted soil in the
dry arroyos directly east of the Castolon Historic Area showed deep scarring from wildland fire and
exhibited characteristics of hydrophobicity as a result of the intense heat that impacted that area.
 14

Weather: An on scene Remote Automated Weather

Station associated with the West Texas Mesonet
(http://www.mesonet.ttu.edu/obsframe.html
CASTOLON) reported temperatures between 105 and
110 degrees Fahrenheit during the hours leading up to
the loss of the Castolon Store and restroom. Relative
humidity was recorded on average at three to four
percent. Wind speeds averaged between 10-20 mph
out of the SW to ESE.

Soils impacted by high fire temperatures.

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Wildland Fire Cause Determination: Due to the inability to access the estimated specific cause location
in Mexico many potential causal factors cannot be assessed for or absolutely ruled out. All interviews
point to a refuse debris pile burn in Santa Elena as the primary causal factor.

National Cause Categories Likelihood

Children Possible
Debris Burning Probable
Equipment Possible
Incendiary Possible
Smoking Possible
Campfire Possible
Lightning Excluded
Railroad Excluded
Miscellaneous Possible

Subjects: Unknown for reasons mentioned previously.

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Estimated Fire Spread during Castolon Fire:

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Structure Fire Analysis:

In determining why a structure catches fire and burns, various factors such as building construction, fire
protection systems, adjacent fuels or exposures, and building occupancy classification are evaluated and
compared with on-scene personnel testimony and photos to determine the likely avenues of fire
initiation, incipient stage, growth, and decay. In the Castolon fire there is little doubt that the source of
fire initiation was from the burning wildland fuels. The Historic Store was staffed that day and the sole
employee from the concession operation was preparing to leave for the day when the wildland fire
began increasing in activity. This employee did not report anything out of the ordinary inside the store
or NPS Visitor Center which would have contributed to fire initiation inside the structure. The employee
closed and locked doors as they left for the day.

Structure fire initiated from ember wash and direct flame contact with extremely dry wood framing
components of the structures. Incipient fire quickly transitioned into full growth due to the condition of
the fuel and high winds leaving little or no time for firefighters to react to fire on the structures. The
Ramada shade structure constructed out of metal pipe and cane thatch certainly contributed to fire
initiation on the Historic Store building. Significant time and investigation was spent working to
determine how fire was able to extend from the exterior of the structure to the interior. The further
extension of fire throughout both structures posed questions since both buildings had fire sprinklers
installed, fire resistant roofing, and adobe walls. Based on the evidence observed at the scene, and the
reports and photographs of witnesses, there are five basic causes for the loss of the two historic
structures.

Causes of Structure Loss:

1. Wildland fire from escaped refuse burning in Mexico (Santa Elena) caused fire to burn into Big
Bend National Park.

2. Fuel loading in the Castolon developed area wildland interface includes exotic species as carriers
of the fire causing more active fire behavior than previously witnessed.

3. Ramada shade structure at the Historic Store made with cane was extremely receptive to ember
wash (spotting) from the wildland fire causing additional fire and heat pulses to impact the
structure.

4. Wooden gable end attic vents were receptive to heavy ember wash despite metal screening.
This contributed to the extension of fire from the wildland to the combustible roof components
of the structures.

5. Water supply insufficient for simultaneous wildland and structure fire suppression caused
inability of suppression systems to produce effective fire flows.

a. Initial water pressure for wildland suppression from hydrant was found to be “not too bad”
according to one wildland firefighter. However, multiple responders mentioned that water
pressure was poor through the whole event and barely able to fill supply lines for the fire
engines.
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b. Water supply valves for the fire suppression system at the Castolon store were in the closed
or off position prohibiting water from flowing into the sprinkler system.
i. Inspection Testing and Maintenance contractor requested the system be turned
on after service was complete.
ii. NPS employee contacted regarding re-activation of the sprinkler system
directed the contractor to leave the supply valves closed. This employee felt
they did not have the proper authority to change the status of the system from
off-line to armed and ready for use.

c. When the power was lost between 2000 hrs and 2030 hrs there was no source for water
pressure. Gravity will flow some water to lower parts of the system at low pressure.
i. Backup generator for the water system including sprinklers, was out of service
waiting for parts.
ii. Backup generator is known to have starting problems when ambient
temperatures are greater than 100 degrees.
iii. Fire pump has not been inspected or had documented tests since it was
installed in 2005.
iv. Water system contained approximately 27,000 gallons available out of 30,000
gallons at the beginning of the incident.
v. Well pump supplying water storage tanks will not operate when power is out.
vi. Well pump supplies the tanks at one gallon per minute (gpm).

Backup Generac Generator Model 3370460100

Fire Pump and electric motor. 40 horsepower

motor with pressure set at 60 PSI. No
gallons/minute placard found.
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Specific fire initiation and spread by structure:

#602 – Historic Latrine 25 ft. x 30 ft. = 750 sq. ft.

Latrine Side A view – Photo of wildland fire impacting the C side of the structure. It is
believed the B-C corner is where fire initially extended from the wildland to the
structure.

1. Fire evidence and photos from the incident indicate fire initiated on the B/C corner of the
structure in the rafter tails and B side gable end.

2. Fire was able to enter the attic through the rafter tails and gable ends by extension through the
very dry painted wood.

Latrine Side B - showing heat and char signature

Latrine Side C – Heat inside the building caused
indicative of fire burning from the roof down into the
plexiglass windows to melt and sag but interior
building. Wildland fuels likely initiated fire in rafter tails
conditions never created strong vent staining out of
at the B-C corner (a)
windows indicating the primary fire load was in the roof
structure.

3. Once in the attic, heat buildup would have initiated sprinkler activation of the two heads in the
attic.
4. Sprinkler system required 107 gpm for six sprinkler heads at 49.5 pounds per square inch (psi).
 20

5. Unknown gpm available during fire suppression.

6. Sprinkler system last inspected in 2016.
7. Water pressure was inadequate to fill structure fire engine supply lines. This lack of pressure
would have created poor sprinkler performance.

a. Much of the interior of the structure was heat damaged but several paper items were
not fully consumed indicating that some water may have been coming out of sprinkler
heads but not enough to knock down or suppress fire in the roof system.

From Latrine Riser Room - Sprinkler system inspection Latrine Riser Room – Wooden door and wall framing was
tags made of paper did not burn and exhibit signs of water not fully consumed. This room would have been mostly
damage. Suppression resources did flow water into the protected from defensive suppression fire streams
structure. possibly indicating some water flow from sprinkler system

b. Heat damage to building contents was significantly less than on the Historic Store
structure indicating lower heat volumes which could indicate some water flow into the
sprinkler system.

c. Responders did not observe any signs of sprinkler activation such as steam from vents or
water running out of the building.

d. Responders did apply water to the structure in an effort to knock out the fire in the roof
but were unable to generate enough fire flow to extinguish the fire.
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#600 - Historic Store 143 ft. x 30 ft. = 4290 sq. ft.

1. The Ramada shade structure was extremely susceptible to spotting and began to burn in several
areas nearly simultaneously.

Latrine (right) and Historic Store (left). Photo shows first fire observed in the ramada
shade structure on the front of the Historic Store. Structure fire appears to have
originated from the wildland.

2. Radiant heat from the Ramada created rapid pyrolysis of the rafter tails and the underside of
exposed roof decking on the Store’s covered deck allowed fire to spread from the Ramada to
the porch structure of the Historic Store.
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3. Heavy ember wash reported by firefighters likely simultaneously began fire on the screened
wooden gable end vent of the attic on the D side of the building and the Ramada.

b
c
a

Pre-fire view of the D side of the historic store building showing the construction
detail of the screened gable end vent (a), the porch (b), and Ramada (c). This is the
most likely point of extension of fire wildland fire to the structure.

4. Heat from the fire on the Ramada would have initiated sprinkler activation along both the fascia
boards of the porch structure and the covered porch/building interface.

Pre-fire view of sprinkler layout along the fascia/rafter tails. Pre fire view of sprinkler layout along the porch/building interface.
Sprinklers were placed every 12 feet along the A side of the building Sprinklers were placed every 12 feet along the A side of the building
to protect the porch.
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a. Post-fire investigation found the water supply valves in the off position indicating no water
was able to enter the sprinkler system.

Photo showing the indicator valves in the off position. Valves isolate the required
backflow prevention appliance and would have shown a “trouble” indicator on the
alarm panel. Water was unable to enter the system due to closed valves.

b. The sprinkler system was engineered for seven heads to run 453 gpm at 37.7 psi. Thirteen
sprinkler heads were positioned along the fascia boards. Thirteen more were under the
porch along the structural outer wall.

c. Unknown gpm available at the time of the incident due to power outage.

5. Fire extended into the porch roof structure from the drip edge along the Ramada where it built
in intensity and began to impact the main roof structure.

6. Fire extended into the attic from the gable end vent framing and continued to find receptive
fuels in the rafters under the roof.

Pre-fire photo showing general

b fuel load and roof
construction, screened gable
vent (a), and attic sprinkler (b).

a
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7. Photos and post fire evidence indicate the fire initiated in the attic and burned down into the
structure where it found additional fuel load in the contents of the building.

Photo showing smoke staining from fire burning in the roof structure.

Photo showing blue rafter tails and roof planking that burned through on the interior of
the building then fell to the ground indicating fire was burning in the attic
 25

Observations and Recommendations

Defensible Space Considerations:
1. Defensible space for NPS values at risk could be addressed in the PMIS planning process for new
construction and during facility repair of existing structures. Project line items for defensible space
may be utilized to fund this work. Clearing of flammables around NPS values is not a one-time
project, but is cyclic maintenance and could be planned and programmed accordingly.

2. Identify a program/division that is responsible for defensive space maintenance. Some of the
structures at Castolon were considered to be at Moderate to High Risk, yet a structure considered to
be at Low Risk burned. The division which is responsible for maintenance of defensible space is
unclear in many park units. Big Bend Fire has done an excellent job working on defensible space in
the Chisos Basin and Rio Grande Village. That work could be prioritized, assigned, and continued
elsewhere in Big Bend developed areas.

3. Firewise considerations and flame resistant materials should be utilized whenever available. Aged
materials with which historic structures were constructed are at great risk from wildland fire as
evidenced by events at Castolon and at Sperry Chalet in Glacier National Park. A risk assessment
should be completed prior to any rehabilitation of operational historic structures and if the structure
has a real threat from the negative impacts of wildland fire flame resistant materials should be used
in its rehabilitation.

Communications:
1. Adjustments to enhance radio coverage may be necessary. The BIBE Castolon Fire Incident
Commander adapted quickly and effectively to communication challenges. Through interviews it is
apparent that radio communications are spotty in to Big Bend Dispatch via the “AD Emory” repeater
from the Castolon area.
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Fuels:
1. Areas where both buffelgrass and values at
risk are present require new assessment. Any
treatments deemed necessary may be
accomplished through a variety of mechanical
and/or chemical means.
2. Utilize in-house best practices to drive a
collaborative effort to address fuels
mitigation/defensible space needs. The Big
Bend Fire Management Officer has created a
valuable matrix to assess and prioritize
necessary fuels work. This matrix is
recommended to be utilized to steer a
collaborative effort with other divisions to
ensure structure protection projects are
ranked, prioritized and completed.
Exotic species have changed fuel profiles and fire behavior in
the bosque.
Operations:
1. Wildland fire staff at Big Bend had structural fire experience and cohesion with the ranger staff.
This created good interoperability between wildland and structural fire resources during a chaotic
environment. This familiarity led to the good outcomes experienced, including the successful
protection of numerous structures that likely would have burned without their effort during an
abnormally aggressive wildland fire event.
2. Safety of responders was paramount from the top down at Big Bend. Crucial leadership staff
members encouraged and advocated for appropriate risk management and adequate rest for
responding resources.
3. Big Bend is a long way from additional assistance outside of sparse local resources. The team at
the park came together quickly and effectively to manage this incident. BIBE staff should be
commended for their interoperability, the wide ranging diversity of talent and the flexibility to rise
to the occasion in a safe manner and to meet objectives.
4. External partners offered crucial assistance and support. Big Bend has built relationships with
Terlingua Fire and EMS and maintains “militia” resources with talent in the local area. This was
helpful in the response to the Castolon Fire and is crucial to maintaining a pool of responders to pull
from. Big Bend is commended for cultivating and maintaining these relationships.

Structure Fire:
1. Annual inspection, testing, and maintenance of alarm systems and suppression systems. Complete
annual requirements to inspect, test, and perform needed maintenance on all fire alarm and fire
suppression systems in the park. RM-58 recommends this be the responsibility of the Facilities
Maintenance Division. This ITM work must include inspection of any fire pumps and associated
backup generators required to operate the systems. Documentation of annual inspections must also
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include descriptions of systems taken off-line and any measures taken to mitigate systems being off-
line.
a. Clarify responsibilities between the NPS and Concession for fire suppression systems. The
Concession clearly had responsibility to maintain the fire suppression system according to
interviews. The Concession did not have the ability to get the system turned back on at the
standpipe following repair work. The NPS should provide a consistent point of contact for
decisions involving fire suppression and alarm systems throughout the park and include the
Park Structure Fire Coordinator in communications about fire suppression systems.
b. Prioritize repair of non-functioning suppression and alarm systems. If systems are taken
off-line for repair or found to be non-functional, specific documentation of how fire
protection and detection will take place, and designation of who is responsible for fire
detection and protection while the system is off-line must be documented. (RM-58 Chapter
6) This information needs to be communicated to the Park Structure Fire Coordinator and
consultation with the AHJ is recommended.
2. Annual hydrant testing. Flow testing of hydrants annually (NFPA 291) to determine if hydrants and
water delivery systems meet performance requirements.
3. Analyze current protection of cultural resources housed in NPS structures. This is a requirement for
all NPS units and RM-58 Chapter 7 has required information for determining the fire protection
levels for structures housing collections and for historic properties.
4. Maintain Structure Fire Response. Big Bend is remote and has many structures and suppression
systems. The mutual aid from Terlingua seems to work well and exhibited strong relationships.
Continue to train staff in structure fire response and work with neighboring jurisdictions to further
boost capabilities and familiarity with responding equipment.
5. Improve understanding of existing water delivery and fire suppression systems. No responders
were able to accurately describe the fire suppression systems in the Castolon area. Similarly,
responders were unaware of the size and complexity of the water supply system for both domestic
water and fire suppression systems. Improving knowledge of systems by both structure fire
responders and maintenance personnel will assist in assuring backup systems run as they are
designed.
6. Discontinue use of flammable shade structures immediately adjacent to historic buildings: While
wildland fire may have ignited the Historic Store regardless of the Ramada shade structure, the
construction of this structure almost guaranteed it would burn during a wildland fire. The park
should consider all of its shade structures adjacent to buildings, and remove/replace existing
structures containing flammable materials with flame resistant material. Additionally, a
comprehensive review of building materials used and connected to structures should be evaluated
against the Firewise standard. https://www.nfpa.org/Public-Education/Fire-causes-and-
risks/Wildfire/Firewise-USA
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