SSR MODE S

DOWNLINK AIRCRAFT PARAMETERS

VALIDATION AND EVALUATION

Keisuke Matsunaga, Atsushi Senoguchi, and Tadashi Koga

Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI), Tokyo, Japan

ICNS 2013
April 23-25, 2013
Herndon, VA, USA

ICNS2013 1
- Contents -

1. Overview of DAPs

2. Necessity of DAPs Validation

3. Methodology of DAPs Validation

4. Results of Validation Tests

5. Conclusions

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 1.1 Outline of DAPs via SSR Mode S
SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) Mode S has
Surveillance function + Datalink function
Aircraft
z Mode S sensor sends an
interrogation to an interrogation Mode S Transponder MCP
individual aircraft. Address: 0xXXXXXX FMS
BDS registers
z 255 registers (BDS reply altimeter
BDS01
registers) connected to BDS02
GPS
aircraft sensors, storing … weather
sensor
aircraft parameters BDSff
…
z Responding to an
interrogation requesting a Mode S Sensor
BDS register,
GICB Radar data Data Storage
the transponder sends back controller monitor
a reply with the BDS
register value. ICNS2013 3
1.2 Benefits of DAPs for ATC services

¾ DAPs (Downlink Aircraft Parameters) data

- Avionics configuration information
- Aircraft identification information
- Intent parameters (Selected Altitude)
- State parameters (Ground Speed, Heading, Roll Angle, etc.)

DAPs provides …
9 Improved situational awareness on the ground
9 Reduction of voice communication between pilots and ATCs
9 Improved trajectory estimation for TBO

DAPs enhances efficiency, capacity, and safety of ATC services

ICNS2013 4
1.3 Example of DAPs Application
- Radar Display of SSR Mode S Experimental System -

Flight Number
Mode S Address
Baro-Alt Selected-
Alt
GS IAS Heading

DAPs (Downlink Aircraft Parameters)

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2.1 Problems for DAPs Deployment
Aircraft
To employ DAPs for ATC service,
Mode S Transponder MCP
the reliability of DAPs is important.
Address: 0xXXXXXX FMS
However…
BDS registers
Erroneous DAPs data have been observed. altimeter
BDS01
GPS

Interface
„ Drawbacks of conventional ground tests BDS02
… weather
Difficult to cope with … sensor
BDSff
¾Complexity of equipment …
¾Variety of equipment and configuration
¾Covering test patterns completely
¾Detection of failures and anomalies after testing

-> To ensure the reliability of DAPs,

it is important to develop a Fleet Monitoring System
using data obtained from actual aircraft
collected at Mode S sensors.
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2.2 Status of Fleet Monitoring
z Europe
9 Mode S avionic equipage is mandatory
9 Fleet monitoring is conducted by EEC
(Eurocontrol Experimental Centre) in AMP
(Airborne Monitoring Project).

z U.S.
9 MIT Lincoln Laboratory developed a Mode S Monitoring
monitoring system for DAPs validation. - Participating Ground Stations
http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public
/standard_page/modes_amp.html

z Japan
9 To prepare for future deployment of DAPs function with SSR Mode S,
ENRI started R&D of DAPs monitoring system.
DAPs validation methodology
and the results of DAPs validation tests are presented.
ICNS2013 7
 - Contents -
1. Overview of DAPs
2. Necessity of DAPs Validation

3. Methodology of DAPs Validation

3.1 BDS Registers of Test Objects

3.2 Validation Tests
3.2.1 Details of Static Value Tests
3.2.2 Details of Tests due to Transmission Problems

4. Results of Validation Tests

5. Conclusions

ICNS2013 8
3.1 BDS Registers of Test Objects
BDS registers (56bit x 255)
BDS Content Applications
code
05 Extended squitter airborne position ADS-B
10 Datalink capability report ELS/EHS
17 Common usage BDS capability report ELS/EHS
18 Mode S specific services capability report (BDS01~38) ELS/EHS
19 Mode S specific services capability report (BDS39~70) ELS/EHS
20 Aircraft identification ELS/EHS
30 ACAS active Resolution Advisory ACAS
40 Selected vertical intention EHS
44 Meteorological routine air report future use
50 Track and turn report (RA, TTA, GS, TAR, TAS) EHS
60 Heading and speed report (HDG, IAS, MACH, BAR, IVV) EHS
65 Extended squitter aircraft operational status future use

ICNS2013 9
3.2 Methodology of DAPs Validation
„ Static value tests
… based on Methodology of MIT DAPs Validation (MDV) system
Tests to verify the bits and fields of BDS registers are properly set compliant to
ICAO provisions
(1) MDV Tests for ELS/EHS registers (27 items)
… results of MDV system are not reported for long term data
(2) Additional tests for BDS 10 and BDS registers of future use (7 items)
(3) Additional tests for related information between BDS registers (19 items)

„ New Test Items for errors due to transmission problems

… for errors which were observed in the preliminary analysis
Tests to detect erroneous values of all 56-bit data of a BDS register
(2 items) Zero-BDS, BDS swap

… enables to process a large amount of data in a short time

and can be executed in real time.
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3.2.1 Static Value Tests (1) – Examples -
… to verify the bits and fields of BDS registers
are properly set compliant to ICAO provisions
‹ Tests for BDS 10
<TM13> BDS code = ‘0x10’ BDS bit Content
code
<TM14> Mode S subnet version (Hex)
= ‘3’ or ‘4’ 10 1: 8 BDS code
<TM15> Mode S specific service 17:23 Mode S subnet version
= ‘1’
25 Mode S specific service
‹ Tests for BDS17/18/19 19 12 BDS65 is installed
BDS17/18/19 are consist of status 17 BDS60 is installed
flags for each BDS registers. 33 BDS50 is installed
Status flags for each BDS 45 BDS44 is installed
register shall be set to ‘1’, 49 BDS40 is installed
if the BDS register is available
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 3.2.1 Static Value Tests (2) – for Related Information
BDS40/50/60 downlink procedure
To validate Mode S aircraft Acquisition
BDS05/20/30/40/44/50/60/65,
BDS10 request
capability status flags in
BDS10/17/18/19 must be BDS18 request
examined. BDS19 request Initial
Phase
BDS17 request
BDS10/17/18/19 of each aircraft
Checking BDS17
are stored at initial phase. No
BDS40/50/60 Surveillance
capable ? Only

Status flags in BDS10/17/18/19 Yes

Within No Stop
are examined every time when Coverage ? Request Every
Yes
BDS05/20/30/40/44/50/60/65 are scan

downlinked. BDS40/50/60 request

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3.2.2 Tests for Transmission Problems
¾ Zero BDS register data
All 56-bit data in a BDS register are zeros.
¾ BDS swap
All 56-bit data in different BDS registers are the same.
These 2 tests are executed at first prior to other test items.
When these errors are detected;
- all the BDS data from the aircraft at the same scan are treated as invalid.
- all the other test items are not executed on all the BDS data.
Table 2. Example of BDS swap
BDS Time of Scan
08:05:35 08:05:45 08:05:55
BDS05 605f80c056966f a3280030a40000 605f845303ce8d
BDS40 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000
BDS50 fff8cf1f800489 a3280030a40000 ffb8cf1f80048a
BDS60 cc299f1b7ffc00 cc399f1b600401 cc399f1ba00400
ICNS2013 13
- Contents -
1. Overview of DAPs
2. Necessity of DAPs Validation
3. Methodology of DAPs Validation

4. Results of Validation Tests

4.1 Data Collection
4.2 Results
(1) Tests for Transmission Problems
(2) Summary of Static Value Tests
5. Conclusions

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4.1 Data Collection at SSR Mode S Experimental System

Location: Chofu, Tokyo Coverage

At Alt.
Coverage: ~250NM 

• 10,000 ft
Rot. Period: 10sec 

• 20,000 ft
Power: 1.5kW max. 
• 30,000 ft

• 40,000 ft

/DWLWXGH>'HJUHH@

‡ Data Collected:


Jun. 2011 to Oct. 2012 

(17 months) 

Targets : 39,091,727 


Aircraft : 3,192

          
Flights : 256, 536 /RQJWLWXGH>'HJUHH@

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4.2 Results (1) – Tests for Transmission Problems

Test No. Test Item Total Number of Targets

Executed Fail
TE62 Zero-BDS 39,091,727 3,022
TE63 BDS swap 39,091,727 27

Zero-BDS : ~ 1 / 10,000 fraction ( 0.01 % )

BDS swap : ~ 1 / Million fraction

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4.2 Results (2) – Static Value Tests

Distinctive Failing Results:

(1) Mode S subnet version in BDS10

(2) Status Flags of BDS20/30 in BDS10/17/18

(3) Character Coding in BDS20

(4) Errors due to equipment failure

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4.2 Results (2-1) – Mode S Subnet Version
Failing Results:
„ Mode S subnet version in BDS10
<TM14> : Mode S subnet version = ‘3’ or ‘4’
Total Test Count Aircraft
Test No.
Executed Error Error [%] Executed Error Error [%]

TM14 355,834 299,651 84.21 3,192 2,568 80.45

Not properly set for more than 80% of aircraft

… This is a recognized issue at ICAO meetings.
-> This test item should not be used for validation.

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4.2 Results (2-2) – Status Flags of BDS20 / BDS30
„ Status Flags of BDS20/30 in BDS10/17/18
BDS20 <TM16> : [Aircraft identification capability flag in BDS10] = ‘1’
<TE12> : [Availability flag in BDS17] = [Installation flag in BDS18]
BDS30 <TE23> : [Installation flag in BDS18] = ‘1’
<TE24> : [ACAS status flag in BDS10] = ‘1’
Total Test Count Aircraft
Test No.
Executed Error Error [%] Executed Error Error [%]
TM16 355,834 4,401 1.24 3,192 102 3.20
TE12 384,281 1,274 0.33 3,187 73 2.29
TE23 620 34 5.48 106 4 3.77
TE24 626 33 5.27 106 1 0.94
Improper settings for more than about 1% of aircraft
… BDS10/17/18 were not necessarily downlinked at the same timing
-> Wrong setting or faulty timings of flag setting caused errors.

ICNS2013 19
4.2 Results (2-3) – Character Coding
„ Character Coding in BDS20
<TM24> : Character conforms to ICAO 6-bit character coding
<TM25> : Space characters are at the end of the character string for padding

Total Test Count Aircraft

Test No.
Executed Error Error [%] Executed Error Error [%]

TM24 405,619 1,091 0.27 3,173 104 3.28

TM25 405,619 12 0.00 3,173 3 0.09

Character coding were not compliant to ICAO provisions

-> caused by faulty data input.

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4.2 Results (2-4) – Errors due to Equipment Failure
„ Errors due to equipment failure
<TM29> : Reserved fields are set to zeros
<TM30> : Unavailable data fields are set to zeros
Total Test Count Aircraft
Test No.
Executed Error Error [%] Executed Error Error [%]

TM29 37,657,551 416 0.00 3,192 1 0.03

TM30 37,657,551 416 0.00 3,192 1 0.03
Tests failed for data from an aircraft.
Error
40
35
Error-Test #

30
25 TEST#29
Error Occurrence 20 TEST#30
15
in Time Series 10
5 Pass
0
14 15 16 17 18
Localtime [Hour]
ICNS2013 21
 5. Conclusions
We evaluated DAPs Validation Methodology using
z Static Value Tests based on MIT DAPs Validation (MDV) system
z Tests for errors due to transmission problems (Zero-BDS, BDS swap)

Tests worked properly, detecting errors of bits/fields in BDS registers

due to
9Incidental errors
9Wrong installations / faulty timing to set status flag
9Erroneous character coding by faulty data input.
9Errors due to equipment failure

The Testing Methodology can be used for DAPs Validation

to ensure the reliability of DAPs data for ATC services.
ICNS2013 22
Thank you

Questions?

ICNS2013 23