Manuscripts submitted to Analysis

A Refutation of Sequence Arguments for Nontransitive

Betterness

Journal: Analysis

Manuscript ID ANALYSIS-2022-627

Manuscript Type: Article

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Keywords: Refutations, Sequence, Arguments, Nontransitive, Betternesses
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A Refutation of Sequence Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness
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8 Several philosophers have proposed “sequence arguments”, intended to show that the relation
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11 “better than” is not generally transitive.1 These arguments proceed by describing a sequence
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13 of states of affairs, involving two factors that affect a person’s level of well-being. These
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15 factors intuitively combine so as to make the first state in the sequence better than the second,
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the second better than the third, and so on. Nevertheless, the last state in the sequence is,
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20 intuitively, better than the first.2
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22 A representative and much discussed sequence argument is Larry Temkin’s “Hangnails”

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argument, in which the two factors are intensity and duration of pain. Temkin considers a
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27 sequence of states A, B, …, Z. State A is two years of excruciating torture, while B is four
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29 years of slightly less intense pain. C, in turn, is eight years of pain slightly less intense than
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31 that in B. And so on down the alphabet. State Z is millions of years of very mild pain, such as
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34 a hangnail. According to Temkin, most would judge B worse than A, C worse than B, and so
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36 on down to Z. Transitivity of betterness would then imply that Z is worse than A. Temkin
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38 finds it clear, however, that A is worse than Z. Hence, he concludes, transitivity does not
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hold.3
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43 I shall suggest a simple, general and, as far as I know, novel objection to sequence
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45 arguments. Suppose that there are n available states of the kind deployed in such arguments.
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50 1 Quinn (1990); Rachels (1998, 2001); Temkin (1987, 1996, 1997, 2012). Here, and in what follows, ‘better’
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52 should be read as ‘strictly better’.
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2 In some sequence arguments, the states are instead ordered in such a way that the second state intuitively is
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56 better than the first, the third better than the second, and so on, but the first better than the last. This difference
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is, of course, immaterial.
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59 3 Temkin (1996, p. 180).
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3 A state could, for example, be to feel pain of a certain intensity for a certain duration.
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6 Suppose also that there are n persons who are alike in all well-being relevant respects (maybe
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8 they are perfect replicas), and that we are to assign a unique state to each person. That is, we
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10 must bring about a one-to-one correspondence between persons and states. Let us call such a
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one-to-one correspondence an “arrangement”.
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15 The following principle seems difficult to deny:
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18 Permutation. All arrangements of the n persons and states are equally good, as
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concerns general well-being.
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24 Since the n persons are exactly alike, as regards capacity for feeling pain, and so on, it cannot
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26 matter, from the perspective of promoting general well-being, which individual is in which
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state. A second extremely plausible principle is as follows:

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32 Dominance. If all the n persons are better off in arrangement X than in

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34 arrangement Y, then X is better than Y, as concerns general well-being.
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37 No matter what one’s views are about aggregation of well-being, one should accept that
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general well-being is promoted by making everybody better off.
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42 Now consider these two arrangements:
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45 Arrangement 1. Person i is in state i, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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48 Arrangement 2. Person j is in state j – 1, for all j, 1 < j ≤ n. Person 1 is in state n.
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51 Assume, for reductio, that transitivity of betterness is violated with regard to person P and the
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sequence of states, 1, 2, …, n. Thus, P would be better off in state k than in state k + 1, for
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56 every k < n, but better off in state n than in state 1. Given that all the n persons are relevantly
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58 like P, it follows that they would all be better off in Arrangement 2 than in Arrangement 1.
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3 By Dominance, therefore, Arrangement 2 is better, as concerns general well-being, than
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6 Arrangement 1. This contradicts Permutation.
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8 The upshot is that defenders of sequence arguments against transitivity must reject either
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10 Permutation or Dominance. Neither option looks appealing.4
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15 References
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18 Barnett, Zach 2018. “No Free Lunch: The Significance of Tiny Contributions,” Analysis vol.
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78, pp. 3-13.
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23 Quinn, Warren S. 1990. “The Puzzle of the Self-torturer,” Philosophical Studies vol. 59, pp.
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79-90.
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28 Rachels, Stuart 1998. “Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than,” Australasian
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30 Journal of Philosophy vol. 76, pp. 71-83.
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Rachels, Stuart 2001. “A Set of Solutions to Parfit’s Problems,” Noûs vol. 35, pp. 214-38.
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35 Temkin, Larry S. 1987. “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox,” Philosophy and
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37 Public Affairs vol. 16, pp. 138-87.

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39 Temkin, Larry S. 1996. “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity,” Philosophy and Public
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42 Affairs vol. 25, pp. 175-210.
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44 Temkin, Larry S. 1997. “Rethinking the Good, Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical
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46 Reasoning,” in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 290-345.
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Temkin, Larry S. 2012. Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical
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51 Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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4 My argument is inspired by Zach Barnett’s “Staircase Argument” (Barnett 2018, pp. 8-9). However, Barnett
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does not discuss the transitivity of betterness. His argument relies, moreover, on a Pareto principle that seems
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considerably more questionable than Dominance.
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