The Evolution of Cooperation

Robert Axelrod
Copyright © 1984 by Robert Axelrod. Published by Basic Books, a subsidiary of Perseus
Books LLC
264 pages
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Rating Take-Aways

10
9 Applicability • People, groups, organizations and nations can achieve mutually satisfying cooperation
based on a simple, sensible strategy.
10 Innovation
8 Style • The best strategy for dealing with others over time is to cooperate initially, and to be
ready to reciprocate in kind, “Tit for Tat,” if you are not treated correctly.

• Cooperation can evolve in a largely uncooperative environment if at least one small

  group of people continues to cooperate.
Focus • Forgiveness is tremendously helpful in promoting cooperation.
Leadership & Management • The Prisoner’s Dilemma – to cooperate or not – helps explain cooperation.
Strategy
Sales & Marketing
• In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, mutual cooperation pays steadier dividends, but one-sided
betrayal pays more, if you can get away with it.
Finance
Human Resources • You should cooperate if the other player cooperates.
IT, Production & Logistics
• The Prisoner’s Dilemma shows that cooperation evolves best between individuals who
Career & Self-Development
know they will need to deal with one another repeatedly in the future.
Small Business
Economics & Politics • Cooperation can develop among deadly enemies, even in unlikely circumstances.
Industries
• Cooperation is such an eminently feasible strategy that it does not require foresight,
Global Business friendship or even an iota of intelligence.
Concepts & Trends

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getabstract

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Relevance
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What You Will Learn
In this summary, you will learn:r1) What is game theory’s Prisoner’s Dilemma 2) How it proves that a “Tit-for-Tat”
strategy is effective; 3) Why an even more forgiving strategy could achieve even better results; 4) How this applies
to the concept of cooperation; and 5) How a spirit of cooperation can prevail even in unpromising situations.
getabstract
Review
Every so often a book comes along that is so groundbreaking it changes the popular worldview. This book, written
in 1984 by Robert Axelrod, is just such a seminal work, an original analysis that changed the way experts view
cooperation. Its ramifications apply to individuals, organizations, countries and even nonthinking – but nevertheless
cooperative – biological life forms, such as bacteria. Axelrod based his book on the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, a
classic game created in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher of the Rand Corporation. Canadian mathematician
Albert W. Tucker added the prison sentence payoffs and gave the game its colorful name. Players have two choices:
cooperation or betrayal. Axelrod organized two repeating Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments played by computer
programs devised by game theorists, scientists and other experts. His analysis of the tournaments’ results confirmed
that cooperation is always a better long-term strategy than betrayal and, thus, evolution has favored it. This book,
based on that analysis, has become a true classic. getAbstract suggests that anyone who wants to understand the
dynamics of cooperation should start with this pivotal study.
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Summary
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider cooperation in a few different forms. If you are in a long-term relationship with
getabstract another person, does it make the most sense in terms of your personal goals to cooperate
“In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the strategy with that individual? Do you gain any advantage by showing kindness to someone who
that works best never reciprocates? What could your business gain by working with another company if it
depends directly
on what strategy
was soon going to go bankrupt? How should your country react to an overt hostile action
the other player is by an enemy nation? Can your country deal with – or manipulate – this enemy so that it
using and...whether will cooperate? A helpful way to portray and answer such questions is to use an iterated
this strategy leaves
room for...mutual (repeating) “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
cooperation.”
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The original conundrum is: The police capture two criminals and separately offer them a
deal. The men are not allowed to confer. If one informs against the other and confesses,
he will be released from prison, and the other will get a 10-year prison term. If they both
remain silent, they each will get a minor, six-month term. If both inform against the other,
they each get a two-year term. The dilemma is, if both inform, they each gain less than
if they remain silent. In game theory, a Prisoner’s Dilemma again provides three possible
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“It is the very outcomes between two players: 1) Both players benefit modestly when they cooperate with
complexity of reality each other; 2) One betrays the other and benefits handsomely if, at the same time, the other
which makes the
analysis of an player is trying to cooperate (that player gains nothing); and 3) Both players receive minimal
abstract interaction benefits if they betray each other simultaneously. The Prisoner’s Dilemma always has two
so helpful as an aid to
understanding.” players. Both have two distinct choices: cooperate or betray (that is, defect or inform against
getabstract the other player). Each player chooses to cooperate or not without knowing what the other
player will do. Defection always pays better than cooperation. The dilemma? If both players
defect, they each gain less than if they both decide to cooperate.

The Evolution of Cooperation                                                                                                                                                         getAbstract © 2014 2 of 5

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 Picturing the Prisoner’s Dilemma
To visualize the Prisoner’s Dilemma graphically, think of a simple matrix, like a box, with
two rows and two columns resulting in a square cut vertically and horizontally to form four
adjoining boxes. One player selects a horizontal row, either betraying or cooperating. The
getabstract choices are symbolized by letters: “R” for reward, “T” for temptation to defect, “S” for
“Under suitable
conditions, cooperation sucker’s payoff and “P” for punishment for mutual defection. The other player chooses a
based upon reciprocity vertical column. Together, these choices provide one of four separate outcomes as shown
proves stable in the
biological world.” in each box of the matrix:
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• Box 1: Cooperation column and cooperation row – When both players cooperate, each
receives R, the reward for mutual cooperation, worth three points.
• Box 2: Defection column and cooperation row – When the column player chooses to
defect and the row player chooses to cooperate, the defecting column player wins. This
player receives T, for yielding to temptation and defecting. This is worth five points. The
row player earns S, the sucker’s payoff, worth zero points.
• Box 3: Cooperation column and defection row – When the column player chooses to
cooperate and the row player chooses to defect, the winner is the defecting player. This
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“In situations where player receives T, worth five points. The column player earns S, worth zero points.
each individual has an • Box 4: Defection column and defection row – If both players defect, each receives P,
incentive to be selfish,
how can cooperation the punishment for mutual defection. This is worth one point each.
ever develop?”
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As the breakdown shows, the game assigns points based on each prisoner’s specific choices.
A set number of points accompany each choice, that is, R (3), S (0), T (5) and P (1).
Considering these payoffs, if you are the horizontal row player, defecting is always to your
advantage, no matter what choice you think the other player plans to make. Thus, defection,
not cooperation, is your sensible, strategic choice. This logic also applies to the other player,
who should always choose to defect, too. Thus, it is always logical for both you and your
opponent to defect. However, in such a scenario (Box 4), you and your opponent receive
only one point each. This is a smaller payoff than if you both cooperate, which earns three
points each (Box 1). What a conundrum! Rational choices lead to poorer individual payoffs.
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“It is not an Thus the dilemma.
exaggeration to say that
reciprocity is a way of
life in the Senate.”
There is no way around this fix. If you and your opponent take turns defecting, the outcome
getabstract will, nevertheless, always be worse than if mutual cooperation prevails. The three-point
reward for mutual cooperation is greater than the average (two-and-a-half points) each
player gets if one earns five points for defecting and the other earns zero points for being
a sucker. When the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played only once, both players logically choose
defection, and win one point each, a less successful payoff than if both had cooperated. If
two people play the game a finite number of times, defection remains a logical, rational
choice for both. Each player assumes defection on the other player’s part based on the last
move and, by extension, the next to the last move. Thus, cooperation makes no sense. In
such a scenario, it just isn’t the logical choice.
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“The iterated The Emergence of Cooperation
Prisoner’s Dilemma has This logic changes if the game is played repeatedly and indefinitely. In that case, a
become the E. coli of
social psychology.” cooperative strategy can emerge if the individual players are not certain when the game
getabstract (that is, the interaction) will reach its last move. With that unknown, cooperation may make
more sense than defection. This indefinite scenario is more realistic and lifelike than one in
which two individuals (or groups or businesses or nations) precisely plan a finite number of
interactions. In an indefinite scenario, cooperation becomes possible because both players
understand that they may be interacting with one another again and again. Choices that

The Evolution of Cooperation                                                                                                                                                         getAbstract © 2014 3 of 5

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 individual players make now can influence subsequent choices. Thus, the future affects
the present. But as in life, present payoffs are always more attractive than future ones.
Therefore, the payoff for the current move always seems more valuable than the payoff for
getabstract the next move.
“In an iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma
of long duration, the “Tit for Tat”
other’s success is Considering all of this, what is the best strategy for an individual player in an
virtually a prerequisite
of your doing well for iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma of indefinite length? To find out, researchers organized a
yourself.” tournament. They invited psychologists, economists, political scientists, mathematicians
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and sociologists to submit computer programs that would compete with one another. They
received 14 entries.

The winning program – which also was the simplest submitted – was “Tit for Tat,”
entered by Anatol Rapoport, a University of Toronto professor. Tit for Tat’s first move
is cooperation. After that, it always mimics the other player’s previous moves. In a 200-
move game, Tit for Tat averaged 504 points per game. Other programs that did well in the
tournament all shared a common characteristic with Tit for Tat: They all were nice. They
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“One purpose of having never defected on the first move. It makes sense that the nice programs performed well.
a reputation is to The tournament included a large enough number of them to demonstrate that they worked
enable you to achieve
deterrence by means of well with each other, thus raising their average scores. Tit for Tat incorporates a high degree
a credible threat.” of what can be termed “forgiveness.” If the other player defects, and subsequently then
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cooperates, Tit for Tat does the same. Plus, Tit for Tat is virtually nonexploitable. If the
other player defects, so does Tit for Tat, quite remorselessly.

A subsequent, actual open-for-all-entries Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament drew 62

proposals from six countries. Tit for Tat was the clear winner in the first and second rounds.
Its simplicity gave it an edge over other tactics. In the second tournament, as before, “Nice
guys finished first.” The programs that did best against Tit for Tat capitalized on its niceness.
getabstract A hypothetical “Tit for Two Tats” game would have done even better than the actual Tit
“A nation may act
in part out of regard for Tat program. In it, defection would occur only if the opposing player defected on the
for the interest of its two previous moves.
friends, but this regard
does not mean that
even friendly countries If researchers projected a large number of Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments, the results
are always able to would show that the nice programs would thrive, while the other programs (called the
cooperate to their
mutual benefit.” “meanies”) would tend to drop out eventually. Thus, cooperation, in effect, evolves over
getabstract time to become a dominant strategy when repeated interactions occur. Indeed, in such
circumstances, it is logical that Tit for Tat would become a universal strategy that everyone
would apply.

What about the Real World?

In addition to the artificial construct of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the efficacy of Tit for Tat
applies in far more practical realms. Consider the value of reciprocity (Tit for Tat’s ruling
getabstract principle) in the U.S. Congress, where “you vote for my bill and I will vote for your bill” is a
“If the other player is
not likely to be seen
philosophy that has been in play for years. Individual congressmen cannot succeed without
again, defecting right their colleague’s assistance. Their bills would never pass. Eventually, their constituents
away is better than would deem them ineffective and vote them out of office.
being nice.”
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Other examples of the logic and sensibleness of cooperation abound, not only in terms of
human relations, but also widely throughout nature. Consider the relationship of ants to
acacia trees (also known as thorn trees). The acacias provide food and domicile for the ants
inside their inflated thorns; the ants protect the acacias from hungry herbivores and trim

The Evolution of Cooperation                                                                                                                                                         getAbstract © 2014 4 of 5

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 competing plants. Similarly, alga and fungus join in symbiosis to form lichen. Even bacteria
sometime employ a conditional strategy to thrive. Cooperation, based on reciprocity (Tit
for Tat), evolves even among nonthinking life forms.

“Live and Let Live”

Activity at the Western Front in France and Belgium during World War I provided a vivid
example of the all-consuming cooperative power of reciprocity among human beings.
Enemy soldiers shooting from trenches fought gruesome and bloody battles against each
other for years, often for gains of only a few small yards of territory.
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“The foundation
of cooperation is However, in between the actual battles, enemy soldiers commonly exhibited remarkable
not really trust, but restraint about attacking each other. German soldiers would walk about, in clear sight and
the durability of the
relationship.” within rifle range, but the Allies would not shoot at them. This applied equally to Allied
getabstract troops. Often, shelling on both sides would cease precisely at meal times. Snipers and
artillery gunners knew not to attack certain areas marked by flags. Often, between battles,
riflemen and artillery operators on both sides would purposely shoot to miss each other.
And, the troops would not fire on each other when bad weather prevailed.

Both German and Allied troops honored such unspoken rules. Indeed, this “live and let live”
philosophy, while not formalized in any way between the deadly trench combatants, was
nevertheless starkly evident across the entire 500-mile Western Front. One British veteran
explained it this way to a comrade who was new to the trenches, “Mr. Bosche ain’t a bad
fellow. You leave ’im alone; ’e’ll leave you alone.”

What took place in those trenches was nothing less than an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Since the opposing soldiers routinely attacked each other’s trenches, a policy of mutual
defection (always shooting and shelling to kill) was the sensible choice in the short
term. This would weaken the enemy. However, the enemy troops that faced each other
across that No Man’s Land did so for extended time periods. Thus, the combatants could
develop conditional strategies that fit their lengthy interactions. Therefore, it should come
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“For cooperation to as no surprise that, given these circumstances, a mutually cooperative policy based upon
prove stable, the future reciprocity developed among the enemy combatants.
must have a sufficiently
large shadow.”
getabstract In the trenches, reciprocity was the controlling factor. If the Germans began shelling the
British at the dinner hour, then the British would immediately follow by shelling the
Germans at dinner, and also at breakfast. If the British snipers suddenly become accurate
marksmen in between battles, then so would the German sharpshooters. This was essentially
Tit for Tat with machine guns.

Throughout most of WWI, cooperation was a spontaneous, self-replicating and evolving

phenomenon along the entire Western Front. This proves that cooperation is an immensely
powerful strategy. In fact, it can quickly take shape, unspoken, amongst the deadliest
of enemies.
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About the Author
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Political scientist Robert Axelrod is a former MacArthur fellow. His interdisciplinary work on the evolution of
cooperation has been cited in more than 5,000 articles. His current research interests include complexity theory and
international security.

The Evolution of Cooperation                                                                                                                                                         getAbstract © 2014 5 of 5

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