Professional Documents
Culture Documents
O n e C ol ony,Two M ot h er
C it ie s : C re ta n A g r icult ure
un derVen e t ia n a n d O t toma n
Rule
byAllaireB.Stallsmith
InthelatemedievalandmodernperiodsCretewasruledbytwopolities
thathardlycouldhavebeenmoredifferentintheirpoliticalandeconomic
organization:theVenetianRepublic(1211–1669)andtheOttomanEmpire
(1669–1898).1 For 450 years the island was controlled by theVenetian
Republic,amaritimecommercialempirewhoseterritorialholdingswere
widelyscatteredbutwhoseeconomicsystemwashighlycentralized.Under
thedirectionofitsmerchantoligarchy,theSenate,Venicewasabletoplan
andadministerasystemofstatecapitalisminitspossessions.Thissystem
wasintendedtobenefitthecitizensofthemothercitybeforeallothers.
Venice’scrucialsupportfortheFourthCrusadein1204wasanindi-
cationoftherepublic’sascendancytoworldpower.Originallyahumble
vassaloftheByzantineemperor,eagerfortheprotectionoftheByzantine
navyandforthehonorbestowedonitsdogebyanimperialtitle,Venice
wasnowthedominantmaritimepoweroftheeasternMediterraneanand
abletodemandasignificantrewardforitstransportofCrusadertroops.
1.IthanktheDepartmentofClas- Inadditiontogainingvariousportsandtradingconcessions,thecityalso
sicsoftheUniversityofCincinnati wasofferedtheopportunitytopurchasethestillunconqueredislandof
andSiriolDaviesandJackDavis,the Cretefor5,000goldducats.
convenorsoftheworkshop“Between Earlier,Venicehadpossessedcoastalwateringstationsandportsaround
VeniceandIstanbul,”forinvitingme
theAdriaticandMediterranean;nowithaditsfirstsignificantterritorial
topresentthepaperonwhichthis
essayisbasedandformakingmystay colony,38,000km2ofcoastal,arable,andmountainousland.By1211,the
inCincinnatisopleasant.Ialsothank Serene Republic controlled Crete, Euboia, Corfu, a number of Aegean
theworkshopparticipantsforhelpful islandssuchasCerigo,andthevitalPeloponnesianportsofCoronand
discussion. Modon.L’isolaeregnodiCandia(theislandandkingdomofCandia)be-
2.IsepoCivran,provveditorgenerale cameVenice’sprizedpossession,2valuednotonlyasacenteroftradeand
in1639,calledCrete“themostbeauti-
fulcrownevertoadorntheheadof
abastionagainstSaracensandpirates,butalsoasaproducerofessential
themostSereneRepublic”(Spanakis commoditiessuchasgrain.
1969a,p.429).Thecapitalcity(Irak- TheacquisitionofCreterequiredtheVenetianSenatetoworkouta
lion),aswellastheisland,wascalled planforitssettlementandagriculturalexploitation.Thegovernmentofthe
Candia(TurkishKandiye). islandwastightlycontrolled;everydetailofexport,import,taxes,prices,
3.OnVenetianCrete,seeDetorakis
military conscription, and forced labor was micromanaged by Venice’s
1994;Greene2000;Maltezou1990;
Margaritis1978;McKee2000;and manyboardsandofficials.Thesystemwasalsoflexible,however,sincethe
Spanakis1940,1950b,1958a,1958b, frequentvisitsofvariousofficialsandtheirdetailedreportsenabledthe
1969c,1969d,1991. Senatetoevaluatethesituationandinstitutenewpolicies.3
148 chapter8
Crete,conqueredbetween1645and1669,wasthelastsignificantter-
ritorialadditiontotheOttomanEmpire,whosewestwardexpansionwas
haltedin1687bydefeatattheSecondBattleofMohacsinHungary.
ForIstanbul,theconquestofCretedidnotrepresent,asithaddone
forVenice,asignificantincreaseinterritoryandasignofthegrowthofits
power.TheacquisitionofCretewasalmostanafterthought:atonestroke,
todepriveVeniceofits“crown”andtocompleteOttomancontrolofthe
easternMediterranean.TheOttomanconquerorsapparentlydidnotshare
theVenetiancapitalistmentality;theirexploitationofCrete’sagricultural
resources was intended to support the island’s Ottoman administrative
andmilitarypersonnel.4
It was not feasible for the Sublime Porte to monitor conditions in
CretecloselyinthemanneroftheVenetianSenate.Thiswastheresult
ofchangesinOttomanadministrativestructureduringthe17thcentury,
inwhichgreaterauthority,especiallyinfinancialmatters,wasdelegated
toprovincialrulersfromtheimperialcenterinIstanbul.Decentralization
andcorruptionatalllevelsmeantthatthesultan’sdecreescouldeasilybe
evaded.Apresentintherighthandexpeditedtheexportofgrainorolive
oilfromtheisland;paymentstotheappropriatejanissariesenabledthe
winehousesofKandiye(Iraklion)tostayinbusiness.5
ItisapparentfromthisbriefsummarythattheoriginsoftheVenetian
andOttomanregimesontheislandwereverydifferent,asweretheirad-
ministrativepurposes.Venicehadamasterplanforitsmercantilecolony:
ThesettlementofVenetiansontheislandwouldprovidemilitarycontrol
andestatesforlandlesscitizens;taxationfromtherichagriculturalproduce
oftheislandwouldsupporttheSereneRepublic;commoditiessuchasgrain
andwood,inshorterandshortersupplyonterrafirma,6couldbeexported
by mandate to the mother city; and production of exports, particularly
thesweetmalmseywine,wouldbenefittheVenetianstate,whosegalleys
monopolizedthetrade.SituatedbetweenNorthAfrica,theLevant,and
Byzantium,CreteservedasacenterforVenice’slucrativeeasterntradeas
wellasastoponthepilgrimageroutetotheHolyLand.7
TheOttomanstate’sclassicalconceptionofitsmissionwastheenlarge-
mentofthedar-al-Islam(therealmofIslam)attheexpenseoftheinfidel
realm(dar-al-harb);hencetheconquestofCretewas,initself,anobleand
holyendeavor.AlthoughIstanbulexpectedthetreasurytoprofitfromCre- 4.OnOttomanCrete,seeDetorakis
tanagricultureandtrade,mercantileconcernswerenotparamountasthey 1994;Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988;
hadbeenforVenice.UnliketheVenetians,theOttomansneverreserved andGreene1996,2000.
commercialprivilegesfortheirownelites,nordidtheyassertamonopoly 5.Greene2000,pp.89,124.
forTurkishbottoms.8IntheearlyyearsthedominantOttomanconcerns 6.McNeill1974,pp.144–146.
7.Greene2000,p.111;Maltezou
weremilitarysecurityandthepreventionofVenetianreconquest.9The 1990,pp.63–67.Venicewasthemost
Portehadnoambitiontomicromanagetheeconomyoftheislandfrom commonembarkationpointforWest-
afar,butcededconsiderableindependencetolocalCretanauthorities. ernEuropeanpilgrimstotheHoly
Differentastheirmotivesandmethodswere,thetwoimperialpowers Land;fortheirtestimonia,seeHem-
employedremarkablysimilarsystemstoexploitandcontrolthepeasant merdinger-Iliadou1967,1973.
8.Greene2000p.10.
population,calledvillani(villeins)inVenetiandocuments,andreaya(the
9.Venicegaveupitsambitionto
flock)inOttomandecrees.Whetherthefarmwascalledafeudumora reconquerCreteonlyin1715;until
timar,theimpactofthesystemonthepeasantwasmuchthesame.The then,Venetianraidswereconstant.See
Venetiansmayhavecalledthelandholdersfeudatarii,but,strictlyspeaking, Greene2000,p.70.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 149
theirregimeonCretewasnotfeudal,astheVenetianstatedidnotdelegate
judicialandfinancialauthoritytothefeudatories.10Likewise,eventhough
theclassicalOttomansystemintheoryregardedalllandasthepossession
ofthesultan,whogranteditsusetohissipahis,thesecavalrymenwerenot
feudallords,norweretheirdependentsserfs.11
Crete’sagriculturalregime,althoughultimatelydependentontheeco-
logicallimitsoftheMediterraneansoilandclimate,haschangeddrastically
overthemillennia.FromapastoralMinoanlandscapedottedwithsheep
andgoats,12toaseaofgrapevinesintheVenetianperiod,toaforestofolive
treesintheOttomanera,thelandscapehasundergoneradicalalteration
intunewiththepoliticaloreconomicpoliciesoftherulingelite,which
exercisedpowerful,evenifsometimesunintended,effectsonthepeople
andthelandscape.13
TheVenetiansimplementedacommercialmasterplantobenefitthe
distantmothercity,wherastheOttomanssupportedamilitarysettlement
ontheisland.Bothaimedtocontroltheproductionofstaplesthroughtax
andtradepolicies,andtodenythemtohostilestates.Thefocusofthisessay
willbethechangesintheCretansystemofagriculturalexploitationand
thewaysinwhichthepoliciesofVeniceandIstanbulaffectedthecrops
andagriculturaltechniquesfavoredbyitscultivators.
ThearchivesofVenetianCreteresidetodayintheStateArchivesinVen-
ice,underthetermsoftheVenetiantreatyofsurrender.14Thesearchives
containVenetiansenatorialdecreesrelatingtoCreteaswellasthereports
ofvisitinginspectors.LegaldocumentsinLatin,Greek,andItalianprovide
examplesofpropertyrelations,dowryagreements,andwills.15
Anecdotalaccountsofconditionsontheislandcanalsoilluminatethe
workingsofthelocaladministration.Theobservationsoftravelers,pilgrims,
officials,andlearnedtopographerscanbeuseful.Theirbiasappearswhen
theyventurepoliticalorreligiousopinions.Theyaremostreliableonthe
mundanedetailsoflifeincityorcountryside.
ThemostaccessiblesourcesfortheOttomanperiodaretheTurkish
ArchivesinIraklion,whichwereretainedbythegovernmentofCreteafter
independence.Thesetexts,beginningbeforethefallofthecapital,concern
theOttomanlandtenuresystem,marriage,inheritance,taxes,conversion,
crime,censuses,salesofland,prices,exportpermits,andimperialdecrees.16
ArchivalsourcesinAnkaraandIstanbularemoreinformativeregarding
thesettlementofCrete;theyare,however,unpublished.17
Travelers’accountsfromthe18thand19thcenturiesareespeciallyuse-
fulfortheirpreciseeconomicandagriculturalobservations.Thesereporters,
primarilyWesternEuropeans,havecommercialorscientificinterests.Their
biastendstobeculturalratherthanreligious,astheygenerallyregardthe
“slothfulTurk”asbackwardandlazy.18
Onefinalsourceofinformationistheremainsofvillagesandagricul-
turalsettlements,theruinsofthepremodernagriculturalinfrastructure,such
asabandonedoliveoilmills,cobbledpaths,wine-pressingvats,shepherds’
hutsandpens,vineyards,grainmills,threshingfloors,andterraces.Such
data,asrecoveredbyarchaeologicalsurfacesurvey,aremoreplentifulforthe
OttomanthanfortheVenetianperiod,althoughinformationofthissortis
spottyforallperiods.Thedecayandreuseofvillagebuildingseraseuseful
remains.Resurgenceofdensemaquisinfieldsandhamletsalikeobscures
theremainsofterraces,buildings,andopen-airprocessingsites.
Theidentificationoftheseremainscanbedifficult.Thesimplema-
chinesthatoncecrushedandpressedolivescanbemistakenforotherssuch
aswinepressesanddyeingvats.Oncethemachinesaretakenapartand
theirelementsreused,theloosemillstonesorpressweightsareessentially
undatable.19Remainsofἀλετρουβειδιά,20one-stoneolivemills,arefound
onlyinvillagesthathavenotexperiencedgrowthandrebuilding.Largewater
millsorwindmillsforgrindinggrain,builtinthelaterVenetianperiod,can
befoundinappropriatespots:inravines,nearwatersources,oronhilltops.
Smallerhandmillsordonkeymillsarenotaseasilyidentified,however.
Despitethesecaveats,archaeologicalsurveyprovidesdatablematerialevi-
dencethatcanoftenbelinkedtolocalfamilyandvillagehistories,andcan
helptoreconstructthepatternsofagriculturallifeintherecentpast.21 16.Textsfrom1657to1765were
publishedbyNikolaosStavrinidis
(1975,1976,1978,1984,1985).The
originaldocuments,ofwhichStavrini-
VENE T IAN SE T T LEMENT AND distranslatedonlyapart,areinOtto-
AD MINIST RAT ION OFT H E ISLAND manTurkishdialectandArabicscript,
andreadableonlybyspecialists.
17.Greene1996,pp.68–69,n.32.
After1211,Venice’seffortstotakepossessionofitsprizeweredisputed
18.“Orientalism”?Thereisasignifi-
bylargeCretanlandowners,thearchontoromaioiorarchontopouloi;accord- cantdifferenceintonebetweenearlier
ingtolegend,thesearchonshadbeensettledinCretebytheByzantine VenetianandlaterFrenchattitudes.
emperorAlexiusComnenus(1081–1118).Eagertoretaintheirprivileged Modernnationalismcontrastswith
status,theselocalwarlordsinstigatednumerousrebellionsduringthe13th thefluididentityshiftspossibleinthe
and14thcenturies.22 earlierera.SeeGreene2000,p.205.
19.Onthereuseofagricultural
The rebellion of 1283, led by Alexius Kallergis, came to a head in machinery,seeForbesandFoxhall
alegendaryconferenceonEasterSunday1293atthemonasteryofthe 1978.
PanagiaPhaneromeni,nearHierapetra.Summonedbytheabbottore- 20.EasternCretandialectfor
solvetheirdifferences,thevariousGreekrebelfactionsendedupbrawling ἐλαιοτριβείο.
instead.Therebellionendedinfailure,butitdidresultintheKallergides 21.Forexamplesofsucharecon-
struction,seeBrumfield2000;Hayden
beinggiventhestatusofnobiliveneti;theyweretheonlyCretanarchontic
etal.2004.
familytoachievesuchstatus.23 22.Detorakis1994,pp.135–136.
Under the terms of the Charter of 1211, the island was settled by 23.Psilakis1909,pp.73–88;D.L.
Venetiancolonists,whoweregivenlandinreturnforprotectingtheisland Papadakis1977.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 151
frominternalaswellasexternalthreat.24Originally,thelandavailablefor
distributionwasdividedintofeuda,mostofwhichwereallottedtonoble
Venetian feudatarii, with small numbers held by the Latin church, the
Cretan archons, and the Comune, the government of the island.These
feudaconsistedofestates,houses,mills,andentirevillages,alongwiththeir
peasantcultivators.Theincomeoftheselandswouldtheoreticallyenable
thefeudatoriestofurnishmen-at-armsforlocaldefense.
AlthoughthehierarchyoftheCretanchurchwasreplacedbyLatin
bishops, Orthodox churches and monasteries retained their lands and
peasants,payingaportionoftheirincometotheCatholicbishopasthey
hadbeforetotheOrthodox.25Allpriests,GreekorLatin,wereprivilegiati,
exemptfromtaxesandforcedlabor.26
TheCretanpeasants,calledvillaniorcontadini,wereboughtandsold
withtheirvillagesandlands.Theywereassignedaparticularplotonthe
feudumandlivedwherethefeudatorydesignated.Eventhoughtheybuilt
theirownhouses,theystillpaidrenttothefeudatory.Theextentofland
cultivatedbythepeasantdependedonthenumberofoxenheowned.If
hehadnooxen,hecultivatedone-quarterofaζευγάρι;ifhehadoneox,
itwashalfaζευγάρι;ifhehadapairofoxen,itwasanentireζευγάρι.27
Fieldsweremeasuredin ζευγαρά or βουδεά.28Landwasalsomeasured
intermsoftheamountofseedneededtosowit,forexample, χωράφη
µουζουριών τρίω,afieldrequiringthreeµουζούρια(Italianmesure,Turk-
ishmuzur).29Orchardandvineyardlandwasmeasuredbythenumberof
workersrequiredperday.
Thepeasantgavethefeudatoryone-thirdofeverythinghegrew(the
terzariaorτρίτος),30whethercereals,must(unfermentedgrapejuice),oil,
orfruit.Thepeasantalsoowedthefeudatoryafixednumberofdaysof
ἀγγαρία,orforcedlabor.Inaddition,theComunecouldrequirethepeasant
24.McKee1998,pp.x–xi;McKee toworkonfortificationsandgalleyduty.Buyinghimselfoutofthislatter
2000,pp.35–39.
25.Thiriet1966,p.211.
obligationmightrequirehimtosellallheowned.31
26.Giannopoulos1978,pp.49–53; Asearlyasthe13thcenturytherewasaclassoffreepeasants(habita-
Spanakis1969b. toresorchoritifranchi)thathadtheresourcestorentlandfromthestate,a
27.Giannopoulos1978,p.51.A monastery,orafeudatory.Thesesmallentrepreneurscouldemployvillani
ζευγάρι wastheacreagethatcouldbe toworktheirproperties,andpaidtheirrentinkind,commonlyingrain
cultivatedbyapairofoxeninoneyear.
andmust.Thefreepeasantsseemtohaveachievedthisstatusbecauseof
BothTurkishçiftandGreekζευγάρι
canbetranslatedas“yokeofoxen.” servicestotheComuneintimeofrebellion.Theirnumberwasneverlarge,
28.M.M.Papadakis1977,p.14.A buttheremayhavebeenmorefreepeasantsinthefirsttwocenturiesof
βουδέαwas30–35µουζούριαofland, Venetianrule,wheninsurrectionsweremorefrequent.Althoughtheywere
or360acres;seeTriandafyllidou-Bala- privilegiati,theywerestillliabletoprovideforcedlabor.32
die1990,p.49. Anothercategoryofpeasantswerethegonicari(fromGreekγονικοί,
29.M.M.Papadakis1977,p.13.A
µουζούριequals19kgofwheator15
inheritors),whocouldwillorselltheirproperty.Gonikolandwasseparate
kgofbarley;Chourmouzis1842,p.34. fromthatoftheothervillaniandwasusuallyinbettercondition.Peasants
30.Giannopoulos1978,p.52. becamegonicariasaresultoftheirlongresidenceandpaymentofrent.
31.Giannopoulos1978,pp.49–50, Thestatusofgonicarusalsoseemstohavebeenawardedtoencouragethe
55,59. cultivationofabandonedland.Gonicariwerenotfreeholdowners.Likethe
32.Thiriet1967,pp.39–41;
villani,theyowedthefeudatoryone-thirdofalltheircrops.Theyowed
Giannopoulos1978,pp.63–65.
33.Giannopoulos1978,p.63; forcedlaborandservedinthegalleys.Still,theyhadakindofsecurity
E.M.Papadakis1976,pp.30–32; unknowntoothervillani,astheycouldnotbedispossessedormovedto
M.M.Papadakis1977,p.11. otherproperties.33
152 chapter8
EarlyintheVenetianperiod,intermarriagebetweenCretanarchontic
familiesandVenetiannobles,aswellasirregularunionsbetweenVenetians
andlower-statusCretans,fosteredaVeneto-Cretanculture.ThatVenetian
colonialnoblesjoinednativeCretansinthe1363revoltofSt.Titusindicates
howearlythisculturalsynthesishadbeguntojell.34
Bythe16thcentury,Venicehadtoassumethedefenseoftheisland,
asthefeudatorieswereclearlyunabletomusteralocalmilitia,oneoftheir
originalduties.35ManyfeudahadpassedintothehandsofCretans.The
feudatoriesthemselveshad“gonenative”;theyspokeGreek,marriedGreek
Orthodoxwomen,attendedtheOrthodoxchurch,andnolongeridentified
theirinterestswiththoseoftheVenetianRepublic.36Indeed,Veniceno
longertrusteditscolonistsandregardedthemasessentiallyGreek.37
Venetiansourcesreportthatbythe16thcenturythesituationofthe
peasanthadnotimproved,butratherhadbecomeevenmoredesperate.
AccordingtoMocenigoin1589,“thevillaniarestilltreatedcompletely
asslavesbythefeudatories.Thefeudatoriesdonotthinkofthemselvesas
owningonlytheland,butthepeopleaswell.”38
Inthisperiod,thefeudatoriesbegantoengageintrade.Evenhighoffi-
cials,althoughforbiddentoengageincommerce,wereexportinggoodsand
usingtheirpositiontoavoidtaxes.39Consequently,officialssentoutfrom
VenicetoreportonthesituationinCretefoundthemselveschampioning
thedestitutepeasantryagainsttheiroppressors,thefeudatories.40
Meanwhile, the Ottoman threat grew ever more pressing.The last
centuryofVenetianrule,fromthefallofCyprusin1573,wasaperiodof
34.McKee2000,pp.135,165.
militarypreparation,markedbyconstantexaminationsoftheable-bod- 35.McKee2000,pp.37–38;Greene
iedpopulation,ofthefortificationsandharbors,andoftheagricultural 2000,p.32.
resourcesoftheisland.41Despiteallthiseffort,however,bythemid-17th 36.Tafur1926,pp.50–51;Spitael
centuryeventheconsiderablebureaucraticandmilitaryresourcesofthe 1981,p.23.
Venetianstatewouldproveinadequatetorepelthesultan’sarmada. 37.Greene2000,pp.43–44,61;
Giannopoulos1978,p.41.
38.Giannopoulos1978,p.49.
39.Giannopoulos1978,pp.57–58.
AG RICULT URAL PROD UCT IO N INVENE T IAN 40.Greene2000,p.13.
CRE T E 41.Giannopoulos1978,pp.87–100.
42.Howearlythe“triad”cameinto
useisdebatedamongprehistorians;see
SincetheBronzeAge,the“Mediterraneantriad”ofgrapes,olives,andgrain
Rackham1990;Blitzer1993;Sarpaki
havebeentheprimarycropsofCrete.42Grainhaseverbeentheessential 1992.
foodofthepeasant,somuchsothat“bread”issynonymouswith“food”in 43.LiddellandScott1968,s.v.
ancientandmodernGreek.43AsinmostoftheMediterranean,winehas σιτός,givesthetranslation“food”as
beenanimportantsourceofcalories,andthefatcontentofoliveoilmade wellas“bread”;modernGreekuses
itasignificantsourceofenergy.Inthepreindustrialperiod,oliveoilwas ψωµί (bread)for“food.”
44.Unwin1991,p.149;Mattingly
notonlyafood;itwasalsothemajorlubricant,soap,andlampfuel.44 1996,pp.222–223;Allbaugh1953,
CretealoneamongVenice’sterritoriesexportedwheat.45Thefertil- p.106.
ityoftheislandwasfamousandthequalityofitsbreadwaspraisedby 45.Thiriet1959,pp.317–318.
travelersandmerchants.46Venicecontrolledthewheattradeandexacted 46.Tafur1926,pp.50–51;Hem-
one-quarterofthewheatharvestfromthefeudatoriesastax.Producers merdinger-Iliadou1967,p.557;Dan-
dini1698,p.6;Villamont1627,p.67;
wereforbiddentoexportwheatwithoutthepermissionoftheVenetian
Newett1907,p.316;Falkener1854,
Senateandhadtosellittothestateatafixedprice.47Thegrainyield, p.266.
however,wasneverpredictable.In1414,abumpercropledtheSenateto 47.Giannopoulos1978,p.55;
allowCretanproducerstoexportgrain;onlysevenyearslater,thegrain Maltezou1990,pp.64–65.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 153
supplywassolowthatgrainimportationhadtobeauthorized.48Frequent
senatorial decrees regulating imports and exports fine-tuned the wheat
supplyofthemothercityandthefleet.
TheothermajorCretanexportintheVenetianperiodwaswine.Al-
readyinthe14thcentury,Cretanmalvoisie(malmsey)wasingreatdemand
innorthernEurope,whereitcosttwiceasmuchasother“brands.”49The
greatappealofthiswinewasthatitkeptmuchlongerthanthedrywines
ofItalyandFrance.Crete’scentralpositioninthewinetradewasassured
bytheprotectionistpolicyofVenice,whichheldthemonopolyinCretan
malmseysandmuscatelsfromtheearly14thcenturytothelastofthean-
nualFlandersgalleysin1535.50
Olivetrees,sonumeroustodayintheCretancountryside,werefarless
visibleintheearlyVenetianperiod.Indeed,in1415,thetravelingpriest
Buondelmontireportedthathelearnedfromalocalnotarywhytherewere
sofewolives:Cretansarelazy!51Farfrombeingaresultofthelazinessof
thevillani,thelackofolivegroveswasaresultofVenetianeconomicpolicy,
whichdidnotencourageoliveoilproduction.TheVenetianoliveoilminis-
try,theTernaria,enforcedstringentpoliciesregardingoilproduction,prices,
andtradethroughouttheVenetiandominions.Incentiveswerenotoffered
fortheexporttoVeniceofCretanoliveoil,astheywereforgrain.
PerhapsfearingshortagesinCrete,Venicedidnotpermitthefeuda-
toriestotradeinoliveoil,eitherwithinoroutsidetheisland.Thepriceof
Cretanoilwasrelativelyhigh,inpartbecauseofitslimitedsupply.This
situationresultedfromVenice’spolicyofmanagingitssubjects’mercantile
activitiesforthebenefitoftherulingoligarchyandthemothercity.This
policywasfrequentlycontrarytotheinterestsofitsCretancolonists.52
Viticultureandthewinetradecontinuedtoexpand.In1512,halfof
Crete’swineproductionof100,000tonswasexported.53Thefeudatories,
influencedbyVenetianmercantilepolicyandrespondingtodemandfrom
abroad,concentratedonwinetothenear-exclusionofallotheragricultural
products,managingthewinemakingprocessandtheprofit.54Bythemid-
16thcentury,despiteotherVenetianpoliciesdesignedtoassuregrainfor
theislandpopulation,cerealproductioninCretehadceasedtomeetlocal
48.Thiriet1959,p.414. demandandgrainhadtobeimported,largelyfromAnatolia.55
49.Thiriet1959,p.320.Cretan
Thewealththatcouldbegainedinthewinetradewasanincentiveto
winewasalsoimportedbytheMuslim
emiratesofAnatolia;seeZachariadou peasantandfeudatoryalike.Thelucrativecharacterofthetradeingrape
1983,p.171. mustisevidentfromthefactthatapeasantwhocultivatedgrapevinesin-
50.Francis1973,pp.31,39. steadofcerealsonthelandassignedhimbythefeudatorywasstillobliged
51.Spitael1981,p.152:rusticorum topaytheterzariainwheat,inadditiontoone-thirdofhismust.That
inertia. peasantsneverthelessdidgrowgrapesshowsthatitwasworththeirwhile;
52.Gasparis1996,pp.156–157.
53.Hemmerdinger-Iliadou1967,
theymadeabetterprofitsellingmustthangrain.56
p.563. Thus,despiteVenetianpoliciesintendedtoensurecerealcultivation,
54.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1990, the peasants and feudatories followed their own economic interests by
p.48. producingmusttoselltowinemakersinthecities,ratherthanwheatto
55.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, besoldtothestateatacontrolledprice.57
p.168.
TheFourthVeneto-TurkishWarof1569–1573resultedinarisein
56.Giannopoulos1978,pp.52,54.
57.Thiriet1959,pp.317–318. piracyandadeteriorationintraderelationsbetweentheOttomansand
58.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, Venice.Thegrainshortagebecameparticularlynoticeableafter1575,when
p.168. theexportofcerealsfromOttomanlandswasforbidden.58
154 chapter8
OtherreasonsmaybeadducedforCrete’s16th-centurygrainshort-
age.CoolerconditionsandcropfailuresintemperateEuropeandAnatolia
beginninginthelate16thcenturyareattributedtotheclimaticperiod
knownastheLittleIceAge,whichwascharacterizedbymajoranomalies
inprecipitation,lowertemperatures,andthegrowthofAlpineglaciers.59
InCretetheperiod1548to1648wasmarkedbyseverewinters,deluges
causingmassiveerosionofsoilintovalleys,mountainsnowcoverlasting
longerthannormal,andearlywinterdroughtsthatpreventedthesowing
ofcereals.Springdroughtswerecausedbyaburningsouthwindfromthe
Sahara,whichcoulddestroyanentireyear’swheatcropinthreedays.60
ReportstotheVenetianSenatein1577and1602notedadeclinein
cerealproduction,particularlyinviewofthefleet’sgreatneedforbiscotti
(παξιµάδι).ThesolutionofferedwastheuprootingofCretanvineyards
toplantgrain.61
TheVenetianSenatehadbeenissuingdecreesintendedtopromote
Cretangraincultivationsincethe15thcentury.62In1584,landownersin
theCandiaareawereorderedtoreplacevineyardswithcereals.63Venetian
inspectorsthroughoutthe16thcenturyurgedthereplacementofvines
withwheat—whichdidnothappen.64
AnumberoffactorscontributedtothenewVenetianpolicytoward
Cretanviticulture.Thetradeinsweetwinesdeclinedinthe16thcentury,
duetoeconomiccrisisinWesternEurope.65Alreadyin1532theVenetian
tradinggalleyshadmadetheirlastofficialvisittoEngland,andVenicelost
itsmonopolyofthesweetwinetradetonorthernEuropeanports.Cretan
wine exports up the Dniester to Poland came to an end in 1592 when
foreigntraderswereexcludedfromtheOttomanBlackSeaports.66
Inthefirsthalfofthe17thcentury,malmseywentoutoffashionin
England.SweetwinenowcamefromSpain,wherethemuscatgrapehad
beenplanted.67By1700,theFrenchtravelerTournefortreportedthathe
59.Fagan2000,p.100.Braudel
couldfindnomalmseyinCrete.68 (1972,pp.179–187),writingbefore
ThedropinCretangrainproduction,whichwasincreasinglyevident thedevelopmentoftheconceptofthe
duringthe16thcentury,wascertainlynottheresultofastrategicplan, LittleIceAge,makesfrequentrefer-
butratherwastheunintendedconsequenceofVenetiantradeandtaxpoli- encetotheharshweatherconditionsof
ciesasappliedtotheagriculturalproducersofCrete.AsbadlyasVenice the16th-centuryMediterranean.
60.Grove1990;GroveandGrove
neededCretangrainforconsumptionandtrade,andasmuchasitswar
1992;GroveandConterio1995,
galleys needed“biscuit,” especially after the escalation of the Ottoman pp.233,239;RackhamandMoody
threat,thetradeinsweetwinehadbecomecentraltotheCretaneconomy. 1996,pp.81–82.
TheVenetianSenate,thoughinstrumentalininstitutingthistrade,was 61.Spanakis1958b,p.158.
notabletoreversethetrend,evenbyorderingtheuprootingofvinesand 62.Noiret1892,entryforMarch
theplantingofwheat.TheeconomicinterestsoftheCretanfeudatories 21,1465.
63.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
conflictedwiththestrategicneedsoftheVenetianstate.69 p.169.
Having invested in the specialized and labor-intensive viticultural 64.Giannopoulos1978,pp.74–75.
enterpriseinordertoparticipateinthelucrativemarketinsweetwines,the 65.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
agriculturalpopulationunderstandablyresistedplowingtheirvinesunder p.168.
togrowwheat,whosepricewascontrolled.Winecontinuedtobecentral 66.İnalcık1973,p.132.
67.Francis1973,p.52.
totheCretaneconomy.
68.Tournefort1741,p.38.
Attheendofthe17thcenturytheEuropeanmarketforCretanwine 69.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
slackened,whiletraderouteswerethreatenedorlost.70Manyskilledvint- pp.168–169.
nersdepartedwiththeVenetiansandmanyvineyardsweredestroyedin 70.Spanakis1969a,pp.422–425.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 155
thelengthysiegeofCandia(1647–1669).71DespiteMuhammad’sprohi-
bitionofalcohol,winecontinuedtobedomesticallyproduced,especially
byOrthodoxmonasteries,whichboughtupthevineyardsabandonedby
fleeingVenetianlandowners.72BothMuslimandChristianmerchantswere
involvedinthewinetrade,asisevidentindocumentsfromtheMuslim
courtofKandiye.73
An additional factor that ensured the demise of the Cretan wine
tradewastheinventioninFranceofthecorkandglassbottleattheend
ofthe17thcentury.ThesweetwineofCretehaddominatedthemarkets
becauseofitsabilitytokeepforlongseavoyages,unlikedrywines,which
couldturntovinegarwithinayear.Oncewinecouldbetightlysealedand
fermentationstopped,vintagewinecouldbeproduced,andevendrywines
couldbestoredforyears.74
Aswehaveseen,Venetianpolicyconcentratedontheexportofwineand
wheat.Cretanoliveoilwasstrictlyregulatedandreservedforlocalconsump-
tion,notforexport.Oliveoilproductionmethodshadremainedprimitive
inCreteandhadchangedlittlesinceantiquity.Therotaryolivemill,with
itssingleimmenseverticalmillstone,wasthemostadvancedmachineavail-
ableforcrushingolivesintopulpuntilthe19thcentury.Itwaspairedwith
71.Ofmajorcrops,vinesareeasily thebeam-press,whichusedtheprincipleofthelevertosqueezetheoilout
themostvulnerableinwar(especially ofthecrushedolivepaste.Suchcrudeandlaboriousmethodshampered
comparedtoolives).Theyrepresent productionofasurplusandlimitedtheamountavailableforexport.75
aninvestmentofatleasteightyears’ Such primitive methods were sufficientin the earlier period, when
labor,yetuprootingorburningthemis
Venicewasnotpromotingoliveoilproductionandexport.76Bythe17th
quicklydone.SeeHanson1998,
pp.68–71. century, large olive plantations and oil production facilities were being
72.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, developedinVenetianterritoriessuchasCorfu.77Venicebegantopromote
pp.186–187. theCretanoliveoiltradeaswell,inanefforttostemtheeconomicdecline
73.Stavrinidis1984,p.143;Greene resultingfromthefailureofthewinetradeandtheshortfallingrainpro-
2000,p.124. duction.78Bythetimethisnewpolicybegantobearfruit,however,Venice
74.Unwin1991,p.261;Triandafyl-
lidou-Baladie1990,p.49.
hadlostpossessionofits“mostbeautifulcrown.”
75.Onthehistoryofoliveoiltech-
nologyinCrete,seeBrumfield2000,
pp.64–69. T H E O T TO MAN CO NQ UEST A ND SE T T LEMENT
76.Processingoliveoil“byhand” OFT H E ISLAND
continuedonasmallscaleeveninto
the20thcentury;seeBrumfield2000,
p.69. TheOttomanconquestofCretewascompletedin1669,whenthefortress
77.Sordinas1971,p.14;Thiriet ofCandiafelltotheOttomancommander,GrandVizierKöprülü.Most
1959,p.415. oftheislandhadalreadyyieldedtotheOttomanarmiesby1647,andhad
78.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, beensubjecttoafairlyroutineOttomanadministrationforsomeyears.79
p.136. TheOrthodoxCretansexpectedtheOttomansystemtobemoretolerant
79.TheTurkishArchivesofIraklion
begindocumentingtheOttoman
thantheruleofCatholicVenicehadbeen,inaccordancewiththesaying,
administrationinRethymnonin1657; “BettertheTurkishturbanthantheLatinmiter.”80
seeStavrinidis1975;Greene2000, ThelossofCretemarkedtheendofVenetiandominanceoftheeast-
p.18. ernMediterranean.Crete,however,wouldprovetobethelastsignificant
80.Creditforthisbonmotisusu- territorialadditiontotheOttomanEmpire.Theabsorptionofthisnew
allygiventotheGrandDukeNotaras
provincewasnotcarriedoutbytheOttomanadministrativesysteminits
ofConstantinople,ontheoccasionof
thelast-minuteunionoftheOrthodox classicalform,asithadexistedinthetimeofSüleymanI(1520–1566).
andCatholicchurchesin1452(Fran- AccordingtooneOttomanhistorian,“TheincorporationofCretewas
zius1967,p.421). peculiarforseveralreasons.ItcameacenturyaftertheageofOttoman
156 chapter8
expansionhadcometoanendandatatimewhentheclassicalinstitutions
ofconquesthadfallenintodisuse.”81
Duringthe17thcenturythestructureoftheOttomangovernmentwas
changing,aswastheadministrationofitsvastterritorialempire,stretching
fromEgypttoHungary.ThecentralgovernmentinIstanbulwaslosingthe
abilitytomaintainclosesurveillanceandcontrolovertheprovinces.This
wassoforanumberofreasons:Changesinthemannerofsuccessionto
thesultanateafterSüleymantheMagnificentandtheconsequentriseof
theharemhaveoftenbeenseenascontributingtoadeclineinthesultan’s
capability;successionbyprimogenitureunderminedthecentralizingpower
andeffectivenessofthePorte.82Decentralizationofimperialadministra-
tion,coupledwiththeriseinpowerofjanissariesandprovincialtax-farmers
meantalossofauthorityforthemilitaryandtheimperialadministration.
Thislossofauthorityisreflectedintheslowabandonmentofthetimar
(land-grant)system.83Theinstitutionofthetax-farmingsystem(malikane)
decentralizedeconomiclifethroughouttheempire.84
Atthispointinournarrative,the“Ottomandeclinethesis”raisesits
uglyhead.Thistheory,nolongeracceptedbyOttomanhistorians,posits
thattheOttomanEmpirebeganaslowdissolutioninthelate16thcentury,
alengthysenescencethatendedonlywiththeFirstWorldWarandthe
riseofAtatürk.85
Wecannotengageherewiththeissueofchangeversusdeclineinthe
OttomanEmpireasawhole.TheevidencefromCrete,however,clearly
indicatesthattheOttomanadministrationoftheislandwaslesssystem-
aticthantheVenetianhadbeen.Inthe17thcenturytheCretaneconomy
becamedecentralizedandmoreregional;theOttomansemployed“more
archaicformsofbusinessorganization”thanhadtheVenetians.86
ThelengthofthesiegeofCandia(1647–1669)isasgoodanindica-
tionasanyofthedeclineoftheOttomanmilitary;itwasnolongerthe
juggernautithadbeenacenturyearlier.87TheinsanityofSultanİbrahim
IV(1640–1648)andtheindecisivenessofMehmedIV(1648–1687)made
Ottomanpolicyerratic.OnlywiththeriseofthegrandvizierKöprülü,
beginningin1661,didOttomanpolicyregaincoherence.Köprülüreen-
ergizedthesiegeofthefortressofCandiaandbroughtabouttheVenetian
81.Greene2000,pp.7,18–19.
capitulationin1669.88 82.Goffman2002,pp.112,121.
As the successful conqueror of the island, Köprülü undertook the 83.Sugar1977,p.208;Goffman
organizationoftheadministrationofCreteandtherepopulationofthe 2002,p.199.
desertedcapitalofKandiye.ThetreatysignedbyMorosinipermittedthe 84.OnthelaterOttomaneconomy,
evacuationoftheentirecitypopulation,militaryandcivilian,alongwith seeİnalcık1994;KeyderandTabak
1991;Goffman2002,pp.112–121.On
theirmoveableproperty.Whentheconquerorsenteredthecity,theyfound themalikaneinCrete,seeGreene2000,
onlytwoGreekpriestsandthreeJews.89 pp.20–21.
Thedepopulationofthecapitalcitywasonlyoneofthereasonswhy 85.Faroqhietal.1994,pp.468–469,
thesettlementofCretedifferedfromtheincorporationofanypreviously 545–575;Greene2000,p.20;Goffman
conqueredOttomanprovince.Anotherwasthenonmilitarynatureofthe 2002,pp.123–126.
86.Greene2000,pp.169,173.
17th-centuryOttomanadministrativesystem.Fewtimarsweredistributed
87.Sugar1977,pp.197.
onCrete,anindicationthatthelocaljanissarycorps(mostlyconvertsto 88.Goffman2002,pp.215–222.
Islam),notthesipahis,wereexpectedtopoliceanddefendtheisland.90Few 89.Greene2000,pp.55,79–82.
TurkishMuslimsactuallysettledinCrete;themajorityofjanissaries,beys 90.Greene2000,pp.25,87–88.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 157
(commanders),andağas(officials)wereinfactconvertedCretanpeasants,
whoembracedIslamnotonlytoescapetheheadtax,butalsotojointhe
askeri(military)classandriseintheOttomanhierarchy.91
AlsodistinctivetoCretewasthemassiveconversionofthepopula-
tiontoIslam,whichtookplaceonamuchgreaterscalethaninanyother
conqueredChristianprovince.Crete’shighrateofconversionisthereason
whymanyoftheMuslimlandownersmentionedintheTurkishArchives
ofIraklionwereinfactCretanconvertswhoacquiredthepropertiesof
thosewhofledtheisland.92ConversiontoIslambyentirevillagesbeganin
the1650s,whentheOttomanarmycontrolledthecountryside,butbefore
theVenetiansurrenderofCandia.93
The ethnic terminology used by contemporary observers and later
historianshasservedonlytoconfusetheissue.Greekhistoriansand,later,
GreekgovernmentdocumentsrefertoallMuslimsas Τούρκοι,whether
they are Albanians or Cretan converts. On the other hand, the official
category “Christian” can include Armenians, Venetians, and French as
wellasCretanGreeks.Thisusagehasmuchobscuredthereality,thatthe
“beastly” janissaries described by popular Greek histories were, in fact,
convertedCretans.EuropeantravelersnotedthattheTurksofCretewere
rarelyofTurkishorigin,butwereGreek-speakingconverts,referredtoas
“renegades”or“Turcocretans.”94
TheclassicalOttomanideologyofconquestcharacterizednon-Muslim
lands(thedar-al-harb)asavailableforconquestandincorporationintothe
Islamicstate(thedar-al-Islam).TheGazis,thewarriorsofIslam,werere-
wardedfortheirfightingskillswithspear-wonland.TheclassicalOttoman
systemoflandownershipcategorizedalllandaseithermiri,belongingto
thesultan,ormülk,privatelyowned.Thetimarwasmiri;itwasgrantedby
thesultantoasipahi(cavalryman)inreturnformilitaryservice.Thesipahi
wasgiventheuseofthelandandthecareofthenon-Muslimreaya(flock),
whichpaidthecizye(headtax)inreturnforprotectedstatus.Theland
grantortimarwasnothereditary,asitwasnotprivatepropertyandnever
couldbe.Landcouldbecomeprivateonlyifitwasmadevakıf,property
dedicatedtothesupportofacharitableinstitution,suchasaMuslimor
Christianshrine.95
Cretewasdividedintofoursancaks(provinces),eachruledbyapasha
(militarygovernor).96Legally,thesettlementofCretediffereddrastically
fromearlierconquests,especiallyinthedefinitionofproperty.Onereason
for this was a legal reform movement in late 17th-century Istanbul to
restoretheimportanceofshari ca(HolyLaw)attheexpenseofOttoman
91.Goffman2002,pp.215–216;
Greene2000,pp.7,40–44.
custom;anotherwasthepracticalnecessityofkeepingthelandcultivated
92.Stavrinidis1975,pp.11–13. andpreventingthepeasantryfromfleeing.97
93.Stavrinidis1975,pp.23–24. The kanunname (legal code) promulgated for Crete after the final
94.Tournefort1741,p.79;Greene surrenderin1669declaredthelandtobeharaçı(tribute);itwastoremain
2000,pp.38–39. inthepossessionofitsChristianownersaslongastheyacknowledged
95.İnalcık1973,p.46;Imber2002,
Ottomanauthorityandpaidtheharaç(landtax).Venetianswhoresisted
pp.193–194.
96.Stavrinidis1976,pp.134–135. theOttomansorfledtheislandforfeitedtheirland,whichwasthensold
97.Greene1996,pp.60–63. atauctiontoOttomanmilitaryofficials,taxcollectors,peasants,andnewly
98.Greene2000,p.85. enrolledjanissaries.98
158 chapter8
Animperialfermân(edict)from1671(kanunnamei-cediddir)docu-
mentstheuniquenatureoftheOttomansettlementofCrete:99
Itisnecessarytoimposeontheinhabitantsofthisconqueredisland
whoagreetothetribute,thelandtaxontaxablelandandthehead
taxonitsinhabitants.
Thetaxablelandisthecompletefreeholdofitsowners.They
areallowedtosellitandbuyitanddisposeofitastheywish.After
deaththeirlandmaybeinheritedjustlikeallotherproperty,among
theirheirs,onthebasisofinheritancelawasprovidedbyHolyLaw
(shari ca).
The anomalous nature of landholding in Ottoman Crete has been
noted.100Thisdocumentmakesitclear,however,thatfields,houses,and
all immovable properties, instead of being miri, property of the sultan,
weremülk,freeholdpropertythatcouldbebought,sold,andinherited;101
thiswassimilartotheVenetiancategoryofgoniko,inheritableproperty.
Ottomanpolicygoalsweretokeeplandundercultivationandtoensure
theloyaltyofthepeasantrybymakingabandonedVenetianagricultural
landavailabletothem.102Cretanmonasteries,asvakıfinstitutions,retained
theirlandsandvillages;theirpeasantswereexemptfromcertaintaxesand
fromforcedlabor.103
ThoselandownerswhohadinitiallyfledtheOttomaninvasioncould 99.Stavrinidis1975,pp.307–311;
cf.Barkan1945;Greene1996.
regain their lands by submission to Ottoman rule and payment of the
100.Veinstein1991;Veinsteinand
headtax,astheMiliotisbrothersdidin1658.104InonecaseChristian Triandafyllidou-Baladie1980;Barkan
villagerswhohadresistedtheOttomanarmyforfeitedtheirpropertyto 1983,p.22;Greene(1996,2000)
anağa(official),whorentedoutthecollectionofthevillagetaxestothe discussestheimplicationsofthisnew
Orthodox Metropolitan of Crete.105 In cases where Christian villagers policy.
convertedtoIslaminordertoavoidcertainagriculturaltaxes,theywere 101.Veinstein1991,pp.40–41.
102.Greene1996,pp.74–77.
instructedthatnewMuslimsandChristiansweretopaythelandtaxat 103.Detorakis1994,p.388.
thesamerates,basedontheextentoftheirproperty.106Muslims,ofcourse, 104.Stavrinidis1975,pp.52–54;
didnotpaythecizye. Greene2000,pp.29,194–197.
TaxassessmentandcollectionwereofgreatimportancetotheOtto- 105.Stavrinidis1975,p.12.
manrulersofCrete.Ontheonehand,incomewasneededforthesupport 106.Stavrinidis1975,pp.21–22,
123–124.Thisequalizationintaxrates
ofthemilitaryestablishment;ontheother,rapacioustaxcollectionmight
originatedinthe16th-centurylegal
drivethereayaintothehills,leavinglanduncultivated.107IntheTurkish
reformsofEbu csu c ud;seeGreene1996,
ArchivesofIraklion,legalauthoritiesfrequentlyaddressthequestionof p.24,n.43.Onthequestionofwhether
equitabletaxationaccordingtoshari ca.108 convertsmustpaytheçift(land)tax,see
Thedifficultiesthatfacedthenewrulersintheearlyyearsareapparent Greene2000,p.100,n.40.
fromanOttomanarchivaldocumentthatexplainsataxshortfallin1691, 107.Peasantflightwasaproblemin
theresultofapoorharvestaswellasattacksby“ourwarlikeenemiesfrom the17th-centuryOttomanEmpire;see
Faroqhietal.1994,pp.433–452.
Spinalonga[theVenetians],theattacksmadebypiratefrigates,andthe 108.Stavrinidis1975,pp.21,23,47.
actionsofCretanoutlawsandthieves.”109 109.Stavrinidis1978,pp.107–109;
TravelerstoCretereportamassivedropintheChristianpopulation Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,p.47.
after1669,whichisascribedtothelengthofthesiegeandthedeparture 110.Randolph1687,pp.93–94;
oftheVeneto-Cretans.110Travelers’reportsmaynotbereliable,however. Detorakis1994,p.71;Pouqueville
1826–1827,p.48.
Ottomancensusfiguresandagriculturalyieldfiguresshowthatpopulation
111.Greene2000,pp.52–54,69,
droppedincertainpartsoftheisland,butnotcatastrophically.In1671 n.92.Suchsurveyslistonlymale
therewere26,674Christianheadsofhouseholdliableforthepaymentof Christianheadsofhousehold;Muslims
theheadtaxorcizye.Thisnumberdeclinedto18,246in1693.111 arenotcounted.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 159
The last Venetian census, in 1644, showed a Cretan population of
257,066.112 In 1671, according to the first Ottoman census, the total
Christianpopulationwas133,370;by1693ithaddroppedto91,230.113
TheChristianpopulationofCretecertainlydeclined.
IsthisdropinChristianpopulationtheresultofwarandthedeparture
oftheVenetians,orisittheeffectofChristianconversiontoIslam?One
travelerestimatedthat,withinafewyearsoftheconquest,60%oftheCre-
tanpopulationhadconvertedtoIslam.114Anothergavethepopulationin
1679as80,000:50,000Christiansand30,000Muslims.115Reliablestatistics
forChristiansandMuslimsbecomeavailableonlyinthe19thcentury.
ClassicalOttomanadministrationhadbeenknownasrelativelyef-
ficientandequitable,butduringthe17thcenturythisbegantochange.
Taxespreviouslycollectedinkindwereconvertedintomoney;temporary
taxesbecamepermanent.After1720therighttocollecttaxesinacertain
areacouldbepurchasedforlife,andcouldevenbehereditary.116Thema-
likanesystemcametoreplacethetimarsystemasawayfortheimperial
governmenttocollectlandtaxes,particularlyinCrete.117
Yet,wellintothe18thcentury,thedocumentsheldintheTurkish
Archives of Iraklion continued to employ the traditional terminology,
describinglandownersassipahisortimar-holders,whichmasksthereal-
itythatthetimarsystemwasnolongersignificanttoimperialdefenseor
finance.118Tax-farmers(inCretemostlyjanissaries),notsipahis,werethe
agentsoftheimperialfisc.119
AnothernewdevelopmentinOttomanagriculturalorganizationinthe
17thcenturywastheçiftliksystem.Theçiftlikdevelopedoutofthebasic
farmingunitoftheçift,whichwastheamountoflandneededtosustain
onepeasantfamilyandayokeofoxen,roughly56–140stremmata(14–35
acres),onwhichtaxeswerecalculated.120
Çiftlikswerelargeestates,oftenfraudulentlyconvertedintoprivate
property,thatweretypicallyworkedbytenantfarmers,whoreceivedone-
halfofthecrop.Theçiftliksystemencouragedthecommercializationof
agricultureandthecultivationofspecializedcropsforexport.121InCrete
thefavoredexportturnedouttobeoliveoil,despiteanimperialprohibition
onexportofagriculturalgoodsorstrategicminerals.122
112.Spitael1981,p.34.
113.Usingamultiplieroffive.
114.Pouqueville1826–1827,p.48. T H E O T TO MAN AG RIC ULT URA L
115.Randolph1687,p.93. EXPLO I TAT IO N O F C RE T E
116.Detorakis1994,p.253;Greene
2000,pp.20–21. MajorchangesintheagricultureoftheislandaccompaniedtheOttoman
117.Faroqhietal.1994,pp.531–
547;Greene2000,pp.19–21.
conquestofCrete,inpartbecauseofchanginginternationalmarketsand
118.Stavrinidis1975,1976,1978, inpartbecauseoftheunintendedconsequencesofgovernmentpolicies.
1984,1985. Generally,thePortedidnotmicromanageCrete’seconomytotheextent
119.Greene2000,pp.33–36. thatVenice had tried to do. Ottoman agricultural planning focused on
120.Sugar1977,p.98;İnalcık1994, keepingtaxablelandincultivationandensuringasupplyofstaplesforthe
p.xlvi.
militaryadministrationandthecitypopulation.
121.Ontheçiftlik,seeFaroqhietal.
1994,pp.447–452;İnalcık1991;Vein- TheOttomansdidactuallymanagetoincreaseCrete’sgrainproduc-
stein1991. tion,sothatattheendofthe17thcenturytherewasasurplusforthefirst
122.Sugar1977,pp.213–218. timeindecades.Thisincreaseingrainproductionwasaccompaniedby
160 chapter8
anexpansionofolivecultivationandadeclineinvineyards.Venetianrule
wastheeraofthewinetrade;thecashcropandexportofOttomantimes
wasoliveoil.123
Asviticulturedeclined,thecultivationoftheolivegreatlyincreased,for
anumberofreasons.Venetianeffortstode-emphasizeviticulturedidnot
actuallycometofruitiononCreteuntilafter1669,althoughotherareas
underVenetiancontrolbegantodevelopoliveplantationsandlarge,fac-
tory-stylepressingoperations.124Inthe16thand17thcenturiesVenicewas
losingitsmonopolyoneasternMediterraneantrade.125Frenchmerchants
begantoplayagreaterroleinCrete,andthecommoditythatinterested
themmostwasoliveoil,forthesoapfactoriesofMarseilles.
DrivingtheincreasedEuropeandemandforoliveoilwastherepeated
failureoftheFrencholiveharvestinthe17thcentury,perhapsaresultof
climaticchange.Theperiodafter1690sawsomeoftheharshestdecades
oftheLittleIceAgeinnorthwesternEurope.Weatherpatternsmanifested
wildlyerraticshiftsfromdroughttodeluge,fromfreezingcoldtoparched
harvests.126
WhatwouldhavebeentheeffectinCrete?Suchaclimaticpattern
couldhavenegativelyaffectedgraincultivation.Yetoliveorchards,wemay
speculate,wouldhavebenefitedfromincreasedrainfallandwouldnothave
beendestroyedbyeventhemostdetermineddeluge.Theburningsouth
windmighthavedestroyedthegrain,butinearlyspringtheolivetrees
wouldnothavebeensufficientlyinfruittosufferdamage.127Couldthis
unevenlydestructiveweatherpatternbeapartialreasonfortheincrease
inolivecultivation?
AfterthedepartureoftheVenetians,Frenchmerchantswereableto
negotiatemorefavorabletradetermswiththeOttomanrulers,andasa
resultbecamethemaincarriersofCretanoliveoiltoWesternEuropein
the18thcentury.UnliketheVenetians,theOttomansdidnotreservelong-
distancetradeprivilegesfortheirownnationals,butgrantedtradingrights
toothernations,especiallytheFrenchandtheVenetians.128After1720,
oliveoilbecametheprimaryexportofCrete,carriedbyFrench,Russian,
Greek,Turkish,Jewish,andVenetianmerchants.129Thetraditionalview 123.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
ofCrete’stradeasdominatedbytheFrenchiscontestedbyGreene,who pp.133–136.
pointsoutthesizeandlongevityoftheMuslimmerchantpopulationof 124.Sordinas1971,p.14.
125.Greene2000,pp.142–147.
Candia.130TheeconomyoftheeasternMediterraneanbetween1645and
126.Fagan2000;seethediscussion
1720wasdiverse,ratherthanbeingbasedononlyoneexportcrop,wine. inthischapter,pp.000.
Theexcellentrecord-keepingsystemsofVeniceandMarseillestendto 127.Grove1990;GroveandGrove
make Ottoman Crete’s economic activity, by contrast, relatively invis- 1992;GroveandConterio1995,pp.
ible.Crete’sregionaltradingnetworkwasgearedtoaccommodatelocal 233,239.
consumption.131 128.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
pp.14–15,p.137.
Demographicchangethatfavoredolivecultivationovergrapeswas 129.Stavrinidis1976,p.275;
anotherreasonfortheincreaseinCrete’soliveproductionaftertheOtto- Stavrinidis1978,pp.143–146,316,
manconquest.TheOttomanswhotookoverVenetianestatestendedto 331–332,429,430,433–444.
live in the cities, leaving dependent laborers to till their çiftliks.132The 130.Greene2000,pp.155–158.
longsiegeofCandiahadcausedgreatdestruction;vineyards(unlikeolive 131.Greene2000,pp.9,132.
132.Foradetaileddescriptionof
groves)areeasilydestroyed,andquicklydiewhenuntended.Olivetrees,
amid-19th-centuryCretançiftlik,see
per contra, do not require the constant and specialized care that vines Hitier1881,pp.589–591.
need,butcanbetendedseasonallybyunskilledwomenandchildren.133 133.Hitier1881,pp.589–610;Tri-
Also, olive trees can easily share the same field with wheat or barley. andafyllidou-Baladie1988,p.186.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 161
Polycroppinginvineyardsislessbenign,especiallyifvintagewinegrapes
arethedesiredproduct.134
Venetianviticultureproducedfine-qualitywinesforexport,using16th-
century“stateoftheart”methods.Ottomanoilproductionaimedonlyat
producingoilinquantity,withlittleregardforitsquality,sincemostof
itwasdestinednotforeatingbutforthesoapfactoriesofMarseillesand
Iraklion.Forallthesereasons,Creteconvertedfromanintensiveformof
cultivation,viticulture,toamoreextensivesystemofoleoculture.135
Ottomanmethodsfordirectingagriculturalproductionandassessing
taxesweresimilartothoseoftheirVenetianpredecessors.JustasVenetian
feudatorieshadcontrolledthebuildingofwinevatssotheycouldexact
the terzaria, Ottoman landowners in each community owned the olive
mills.136
The military authorities in Kandiye scrutinized the movement of
goodstoassurethatnosupportwasbeinggiventotheenemiesofIslam.
ExportersofoilfromCrete,whetherMuslimorEuropean,hadtogive
guaranteesthattheywerenottraffickinginenemy-controlledareas.137As
earlyas1659,andonmanysubsequentoccasions,thePorteforbadethe
exportofoliveoilfromCrete.Thisenabledlocalgovernorstoextractpay-
mentsfrommerchantsforallowingitsexport.138
FrenchmerchantsweretheprimarypurchasersofCretanoliveoil,ac-
countingforatleastone-thirdofexports.WhentheProvençalcropfailedin
1669,theFrenchboughttwo-thirdsoftheCretanoliveoilcrop.139During
thecourseofthe18thcenturyCretanoliveoilproductiontripled.This
wasperhapsduetoapopulationincreaseinthatcentury,butalsotoarise
indemandandhenceinprice.140Beginningin1723,Cretansoapmakers
becamemajorpurchasersofoliveoil;bytheendofthecentury,soapwas
secondonthelistofCretanexports,afteroliveoil.141
OliveoilbecameCrete’smostimportantexportafterthemid-18th
century,eventhough,astheFrenchcommercialattachéatChaniacom-
mented,“the oil of Crete is nauseating and almost uneatable. . . . It is
onlygoodformakingsoap.”142Pickingandpressingtheolivesinatimely
mannertominimizerancidityandseparatingthefirstpressingfromthe
134.FieldworkwithLoetaTyree, coarserproductrequiredskilledlaborandcapitalinvestmentonascale
oftheWienerLaboftheAmerican unavailableinCreteinthisperiod.
SchoolofClassicalStudiesatAthens,
TheOttomanpolicyforbiddingtheexportofgrainwasthereverse
hascontributedgreatlytomyunder-
standingofCretanviticultureand oftheVenetianone,sincethePorte’smainconcernwasanadequategrain
oleoculture. supplyfortheisland’sadministrationinthecitiesofCrete.Asearlyas
135.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, 1671,animperialfermândirectedthestorageofgrainsufficienttosupply
pp.133–136. thecitypopulationof“peacefulreaya”andtheOttomantroopsstationed
136.Stavrinidis1975,pp.13–14. inthefortressofKandiye.143Fortheseandotherreasons,towardtheend
137.Stavrinidis1978,pp.143–144.
138.Stavrinidis1975,p.103;
ofthe17thcenturythegrainsupplyofCreteseemstohaveimproved,
Stavrinidis1978,pp.146,429–430. despitefluctuatingharvests.144
139.Tournefort1741,p.23. Theerraticnatureofthegrainsupplymeantthatthesituationhadto
140.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, bemonitoredconstantly.Abadharvestcouldmeanfamine,towhichthe
pp.137–144. localauthoritiesmightrespondbyimportinggrain.Whydidgrainproduc-
141.Olivier1801,p.365.
tionandsupply,asreflectedinavailablestatisticsandchanginggovernment
142.Hitier1881,p.602.
143.Stavrinidis1975,pp.319–320. policies,varysowidely?Eventhoughtheproductivecapacityofthearable
144.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988, landisnotastaticquantity,thequestionmustbeasked:Howcouldthe
p.171. famineof1693,whichcauseddeathsfromhungerinthecityofChania,
162 chapter8
havebeenfollowedsoquickly,in1699,bymassivesurplusesmakingpossible
theexportof500metrictonsofwheat?145Inpartthesefluctuationsinthe
grainyieldmayhavebeentheresultoftheerraticweathercharacteristic
oftheLittleIceAge,mentionedearlier.146
The authorities attempted to ensure a regular supply of grain for
administrativeandmilitaryunitsstationedinthecities,andforthecity
populationofusefulChristiansandconvertedMuslims.Thiswasareason-
ablegoal,giventhefertilityofCrete.Thattheyhadsuchgreatdifficulty
doingsoistheresultoftwooftenunderestimatedfactorsthatapplypar-
ticularlytoCrete:thenaturalirregularitiesofagriculturalyield,andthe
scarcity,beforethe20thcentury,ofadequateoverlandtransportationfor
agriculturalgoods.147
Aspopulationroseinthe18thcentury,grainshortagesbecamemore
common,andgrainhadtobeimportedintoCrete.Undoubtedlythegreat
growthinoliveorchardsalsoaccountsforanunderproductionofwheat.
LiketheVenetiansbeforethem,theOttomanscontrolledthepriceand
distributionofbreadandgrain,butthisonlyencouragedhoardingamong
thepeasantsandmadegrainproductionlessattractivetotheagricultural
entrepreneur.148
TravelerstoCreteinthe18thcenturynotedthattheislandwasno
longerself-sufficientingrain,asithadbeenintheearlier,now-idealized
Venetianperiod.Grainwasnowimported;undertheVenetians,ithad
beenexported.UnderOttomanrule,largeareasoflandwentuncultivated.
Theseconditionswereascribedtothelazinessandpoormanagementofthe
Ottomans;totheirconfiscatorytaxsystem,whichdiscouragedenterprise
amongChristians;andtoasupposedOttomanlackofinterestincommerce.
ThesechargesespeciallycamefromtheFrench,whowerecompetingfor
theoliveoiltradeandfelttheycouldmanagetheentirebusinessmuch
betterthantheOttomansdid.149
Thisnegativepicturerequirescomment.ThecriticismsofOttoman
Cretanagriculturaltechnologyarejust;improvementscomingintousein
theWestbythe18thcentury,suchasthefour-fieldcroprotationsystem,
advancesinanimalbreedingandmanuring,metalplows,screwpresses,and
othermachinesdidnotspreadtoCreteuntilmuchlater,undoubtedlyasa
resultofthelackofcapitalandentrepreneurialspirit.TheVenetiansystem
oftaxationcertainlydidnotfallmorelightlyontheruralpopulationthan
didtheOttoman,however,norwasVenetiandirectionoftheagricultural
systemanymoredesignedtobenefitthepeasantry. 145.Triandafyllidou-Baladie1988,
Throughoutbothperiods,tax-collectionmethodsandamountsvar- pp.169–170.
iedconstantly.Ifthegeneralobservationsofhistoriansandvistorscanbe 146.Fagan2000;GroveandConte-
rio1995,pp.233,239.
trusted,itappearsthatthelandownersbecamemorerapacioustowardthe 147.Thesetwofactorshadeven
endofeachperiodofruleovertheisland,aseachimperialpowerfeltitself moreforceinantiquity;seeGarnsey
inamilitarypinchwithregardtotherestofitsdomainsanditsrelations 1988,pp.3–16.
withotherstates.Inthe16thand17thcenturies,VenicefeltOttoman 148.Asfarascanbedetermined,
militarypressuremostseverely,andthisisalsothetimewhenwehavethe thepeasantrylivedonbarley;the
authoritieswereconcernedwithwheat
clearestevidencefromVenetianofficialsthatthepeasantrywasinadesper-
breadfortheurbanpopulation.
atestate.Inthe18thand19thcenturies,theOttomanEmpireexperienced 149.Savary1781,pp.415–417;
nationalistrebellionsintheBalkansasinCrete,andthiswasalsowhen Olivier1801,pp.365–366;Sonnini
taxeswerebeingmultipliedtosupportthemilitary. 1801,p.405.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 163
A MO D ERN EXAMPLE
Arecentinstanceshowinghowpoliticalandeconomicfactorsinfluence
landusecomesfromasmallgroupoffieldslocatedinavillageineastern
Crete,whereahistoryoflandusehasbeenobtained.150Terracesonthese
upperslopes,builtinthelateOttomanperiod,ifnotearlier,weresown
withgrainbeforetheSecondWorldWar.Afterthewar,grapevineswere
planted.Bythelate20thcentury,theseterraceswereallplantedwitholive
trees,whoseoilisexportedtoEuropeandAmerica.
Whythesechanges?Beforethewar,thetoppriorityforthepopulation
(atitspeakin1940)wassufficientgrain.Theimmediatepostwarerasawa
boominraisinsproducedfromSultaninagrapes,exportedtoAthensandto
northernEurope,wheretheywereapopularcondiment.Raisinproduction
islabor-intensive,however,andastheruralpopulationemigratedtothe
citiesinthe1960sand1970s,andastheraisinmarket’s“bubble”popped,
orchardsofµουρέλλες(oliveslips),lessdemandingintermsoflabor,took
theplaceofthevineyards.151
Theprecedingexampleshowsapopulationmakingitsowndecisions
aboutwhatcropstocultivate,unlikethedowntroddenvillaniofthe13th
century,whooperatedunderthedirectionofthefeudatories.Nevertheless,
thepoliciesofthecentralauthority,andmarketforces,whetherdirected
bythatauthorityoruncontrolled,obviouslyplaythemostimportantrole
inwhatcropsareemphasized.
CONC LUSIO N
The Venetian and Ottoman landholding systems were similar, but the
managementtechniquesusedtocontroltheeconomywerevastlydiffer-
ent.Venetianmercantilisminvolvedcentralizedplanningandaconscious
attempttocounteractthegreedandcorruptionoftheindividualeconomic
actor.Ottomaneconomicadministrationseemstohavebeensimplerand
morelaissez-faire.Bothempiresneededtheagriculturalrichesoftheisland
tosupportamilitaryforce.TheVenetianemphasiswasonthemothercity
anditstrade;theOttomansemphasizedthesupportofthe“warriorsof
Islam.”
Thecultivatedcropschangedbetweenthetwoperiodsforanumber
ofreasons.Internationaltrademovementswereinfluential,butalossof
150.Haydenetal.2004,pp.312– population,especiallyofskilledfarmersandvintners,meantthataninten-
318. sivefarmingsystemhadtobereplacedbyanextensiveone.
151.Today,forthefirsttimeinhis-
tory,self-sufficiencyingrainproduc-
TheQuran’sprohibitionagainstwineforthebelieverdoesnotseem
tionisnottheprimaryconcernofthe tohavebeenanimportantfactorinthedemiseoftheCretanmalmsey
Cretanpeasant.The“greenrevolution” trade.Rather,anumberofunrelatedevents—theinventionofthecork
andrapiddevelopmentinmarketsand andbottle,thetransplantationofthemuscatgrapetoSpain,thewartime
transportationmeanthatpeasantscan destructionoftheCretanvineyards,andthelossofaskilledagricultural
exporttheexoticfruitsofCretanhot-
population—allcontributedtotheswitchfromgrapestoolivesandthe
housesandimportgrain,whilereceiv-
ingacashsubsidyfromtheEuropean concomitantincreaseingrainproduction.
Unionforeveryliterofoliveoilthey Venice and Istanbul each in turn, for their particular purposes, at-
produce. tempted to manage the Cretan grain supply. Poor land transportation,
164 chapter8
administrativeinefficiency,andcorruptionimpededtheireffortsasmuch
as crop failure. Both powers attempted to ensure the wheat supply by
controllingitspriceanddistribution;theseactionsappearoftentohave
broughtaboutshortagesinstead.
Thesystemsoftaxationofthetwoimperialpowersweresimilar.Both
exactedtaxesinkind,fromtheproduceoftheland,althoughtheOttoman
headtaxwaspaidincoin.Theamountsofthetaxburdensofeachmay
differ,butitisdifficulttoascertainwhichwasheavier.Ifanything,one
couldarguethattheCretanpeasantpaidlowertaxesundertheOttoman
system.TheVenetiansrequiredone-thirdofthecrop,whereastheOt-
tomanlandlordrequiredonlyone-seventh.UndertheOttomansystem,
however,therewasalsotheheadtax.Underbothsystemswehaveanecdotal
evidenceofabuses:theVenetianfeudatoryexactingmorethanhisshare,
theOttomanağaexpropriatingthepropertyofthereaya.
TheconclusionstobedrawnfromthisbriefsurveyofCretanagricul-
turalhistoryunderVenetianandTurkishdominionwereanticipatedinthe
firstparagraphsofthisessay.ThepossibilitiesoftheCretanlandscape,the
cropsthatcanbegrownthere,andthecarryingcapacityofitsarableland,
althoughrestrictedtosomeextentbytheecologicalparametersimposed
bythelandscapeandclimate,arenotdeterminedonlybythesephysical
factors.Equallyimportantarethepolicygoalsoftheelitemanagersof
theeconomy,whetherresidentontheislandordirectingmattersfroma
distantcapital.Whethertheeffectsoftheirpoliciesareplannedorarean
unintendedsideeffect,itisthetaxpolicies,import-exportcontrols,and
military-politicalgoalsoftheseelitesthatdeterminewhatcropsaregrown
andinwhatproportions.
o n e c o l o n y, t w o m o t h e r c i t i e s 165
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