FMEA/FMECA

UNIT 9 FMEA/FMECA
Structure
9.1 Introduction
Objectives

9.2 FMEA/FMECA Overview

9.3 Elements of FMECA
9.4 Application of Statistical Process Control (SPC)
9.5 Applications and Benefits of FMEA/FMECA
9.6 Environmental Requirements and Influence
9.7 Frequently used Terms in FMEA/FMECA
9.8 Failure Models
9.9 Process FMEA
9.9.1 Quality Objectives
9.9.2 The Qualitative Approach to FMECA
9.9.3 FMECA Quantitative Approach

9.10 Design FMEA

9.11 Steps for Carrying out Design FMEA
9.12 Quality Control Plan and Process FMEA
9.13 Hazard Function and Reliability
9.14 Summary
9.15 Key Words
9.16 Answers to SAQs

9.1 INTRODUCTION
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) are methodologies designed to identify potential failure modes for a
product or process, to assess the risk associated with those failure modes, to rank the
issues in terms of importance and to identify and carry out corrective actions to address
the most serious concerns.
Although the purpose, terminology and other details can vary according to type (e.g.
Process FMEA, Design FMEA, etc.), the basic methodology is similar for all. This unit
presents a brief general overview of FMEA/FMECA analysis techniques and
requirements.
The objective of an FMECA is to identify all failure modes in a system design. Its purpose
is to identify all catastrophic and critical failure probabilities so they can be minimized as
early as possible. Therefore, the FMECA should be started as soon as preliminary design
information is available and extended as more information becomes available in suspected
problem areas.
The effects of all failure modes are not equal with respect to the total impact on the
system concerning safety and overall system performance. The designer, faced with this
dilemma, needed a tool that would rank the significance of each potential failure for each
Quality Tools – (FMEA) process, thus creating Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
Others (FMECA).
This tool has been used extensively by the military in the last three decades. In recent
years, more commercial industries have been requiring the FMECA to evaluate new
designs and even more recently to improve the reliability of existing equipment. Military
Standard 1629 is a good reference for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis.
Objectives
After studying this unit, you should be able to
• understand the application of statistical process control (SPC),
• know the application of FMEA,
• explain quality control plan and process FMEA, and
• define the hazard function and reliability.

9.2 FMEA/FMECA OVERVIEW

In general, FMEA/FMECA requires the identification of the following basic
information :
• Item(s)
• Function(s)
• Failure(s)
• Effect(s) of Failure
• Cause(s) of Failure
• Current Control(s)
• Recommended Action(s)
• Plus other relevant details
Most analyses of this type also include some method to assess the risk associated with the
issues identified during the analysis and to prioritize corrective actions. Two common
methods include :
• Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs)
• Criticality Analysis (FMEA with Criticality Analysis = FMECA)
Standards and Guidelines
There are a number of guidelines and standards for the requirements and
recommended reporting format of FMEAs and FMECAs. Some of the main
published standards for this type of analysis include SAE J1739, AIAG FMEA-3
and MIL-STD-1629A. In addition, many industries and companies have developed
their own procedures to meet the specific requirements of their products/processes.
Table 9.1 shows a sample Process FMEA in the Automotive Industry Action
Group (AIAG) FMEA-3 format.
Basic Analysis Procedure for FMEA or FMECA
The basic steps for performing an FMEA/FMECA analysis include:
• assemble the team,
• gather and review relevant information, FMEA/FMECA

• identify the item(s) or process(es) to be analyzed,

Table 9.1
Quality Tools –
Others

• identify the function(s), failure(s), cause(s), effect(s) and control(s) for each
item or process to be analyzed,
• evaluate the risk associated its tangible evaluation with the issues identified
by the analysis,
• prioritize and assign corrective actions,
• perform corrective actions and re-evaluate risk, and
• distribute, review and update the analysis, as appropriate.

9.3 ELEMENTS OF FMECA

The elements of a complete FMECA are :
Failure Mode
The anticipated conditions of operation are used as the background to study the
most probable failure mode, locations and mechanism of the product or system and
its components.
Failure Effect
The potential failures are studied to determine their probable effects on the
performance of the whole product, process or service and the effects of the
various components on each other.
Failure Criticality
The potential failures of the various parts of the product or service system are
examined to determine the severity of each failure effect in terms of lowering of
performance, safety hazard, total loss of function, etc.

9.4 APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL PROCESS

CONTROL
Statistical process control uses sampling and statistical methods to monitor the quality of
an ongoing process such as a production operation. A graphical display referred to as a
control chart provides a basis for deciding whether the variation in the output of a process
is due to common causes (randomly occurring variations) or to out-of-the-ordinary
assignable causes. Whenever assignable causes are identified, a decision can be made to
adjust the process in order to bring the output back to acceptable quality levels.
A goal in the design of sample surveys is to obtain a sample that is representative of the
population so that precise inferences can be made. Sampling error is the difference
between a population parameter and a sample statistic used to estimate it. For example,
the difference between a population mean and a sample mean is sampling error. Sampling
error occurs because a portion, and not the entire population, is surveyed. Probability
sampling methods, where the probability of each unit appearing in the sample is known,
enable statisticians to make probability statements about the size of the sampling error.
than on probability, are frequently used for cost and time advantages. However, one FMEA/FMECA
should be extremely careful in making inferences from a non-probability sample; whether
or not the sample is representative is dependent on the judgment of the individuals
designing and conducting the survey and not on sound statistical principles. In addition,
there is no objective basis for establishing bounds on the sampling error when a non-
probability sample has been used.
Most governmental and professional polling surveys employ probability sampling. It can
generally be assumed that any survey that reports a plus or minus margin of error has
been conducted using probability sampling. Statisticians prefer probability sampling
methods and recommend that they be used whenever possible. A variety of probability
sampling methods are available. A few of the more common ones are reviewed here.
Simple random sampling provides the basis for many probability sampling methods. With
simple random sampling, every possible sample of size n has the same probability of being
selected.
Stratified simple random sampling is a variation of simple random sampling in which the
population is partitioned into relatively homogeneous groups called strata and a simple
random sample is selected from each stratum. The results from the strata are then
aggregated to make inferences about the population. A side benefit of this method is that
inferences about the subpopulation represented by each stratum can also be made.
Cluster sampling involves partitioning the population into separate groups called clusters.
Unlike the case of stratified simple random sampling, it is desirable for the clusters to be
composed of heterogeneous units. In single -stage cluster sampling, a simple random
sample of clusters is selected, and data are collected from every unit in the sampled
clusters. In two-stage cluster sampling, a simple random sample of clusters is selected
and then a simple random sample is selected from the units in each sampled cluster. One
of the primary applications of cluster sampling is called area sampling, where the clusters
are townships, city blocks, or other well-defined geographic sections of the population.
In many segments of industry, the application of statistical process control (SPC) has
become a common practice throughout the supply chain. It is more so in many of the
mass production industries such as automobile, automobile component or consumer
electronics manufacture. SPC is extensively applied within the organizations and also
encouraged amongst supplier companies.
The benefit of large organizations encouraging their supplier to use and to demonstrate the
capability of their processes has resulted in widespread application of the statistical tools
and techniques. The disadvantage of their customer imposed requirement has had only
narrow focus upon the techniques, such as control charts, rather than upon the philosophy
of understanding and reducing process variation.
The application of process control charts is only one element of the use of SPC. Many of
the benefits of using a systematic and statistical approach to analyzing why a particular
process varies are derived well before control charts are produced. Indeed very often
improved process understanding leading to improved process capability can reduce or
even eliminate the need for process control chart.
The application of SPC is in general in 3 stages :
(i) The application of SPC commences with developing an understanding of the
process, identifying the main process parameters and defining the control
mechanism available. The technique which is widely used during this initial
diagnostic plan is failure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA). This
technique helps to identify the critical characteristics of the process, which
require further more detailed analysis. A ‘criticality’ column is added to the
analysis, to allow the inclusion of an index related to the criticality of the
Quality Tools – failure effect. Sometimes as the criticality rating is omitted; the analysis is
Others then called FMEA.
(ii) The second stage involves the collection and analysis of the process data to
determine what is normal variation. The process has to be bounded to
include the inherent variability and to exclude the special causes of variation.
Determination of normal variation requires a fundamental understanding of
the process. The process data is also evaluated during this analysis phase to
check whether the distribution is normal.
(iii) The 3rd stage in the application of SPC involves the analysis of the critical
characteristics to determine the relationship between the natural variation of
the process and the allowable specification limits. This relationship, termed
the process capability, is used to evaluate whether the process variability is
acceptable. Finally, the ongoing control of the process can be monitored
using control charts.
The use of FMEA, therefore, represents the initial stage in the application of SPC. There
are two forms of FMEA which are
• design FMEA which involves the analysis of the potential failure of a new
product or service, and
• process FMEA which involves failure analysis of the process or processes in
the manufacture or provision of the product or service.
FMEA primarily plays a role as prevention oriented technique to improve the inherent
reliability of a product or service. Each item of a design is considered in relation to its
likely mode of failure, the probability of occurrence, and the effects of the failures.
A comprehensive FMEA for a complex design is a sizable task. However, this method is
a very effective formal reliability design review technique. The method is particularly
suited to analog system (whether electronic, electrical or mechanical), for purely digital
electronic systems are very complex. Also, the designer has less control over individual
elements of the system, since these are contained within the integrated circuit packages.
FMEA provides a valuable spin-off, as the analysis is an excellent starting point for
producing block diagram, reliability analysis and diagnostic charts for repair purposes. A
considerable amount of work in generating diagnostic routine and preparing user
maintenance handbooks can be saved if FMEA worksheets are used as the basis for this
work.
The detailed level to which FMEA is taken must be based upon the purpose for which it is
performed. For example, consideration of all possible failure modes within a hydraulic
sequence valve or an operational amplifier would not usually be included in the analysis of
a system of which they were components. Instead, we would be concerned with the
failure modes of their outputs. The designer of the valve or operational amplifier would,
however, have to analyse the effects of all modes of failure within the item. The level of
analysis can also be affected by the stage reached by the project. For large systems,
feasibility studies may only generate functional subsystems, with much of the detailed
design still to be performed. The initial FMEA would then be related to the failures of
these subsystems or blocks. This analysis forms the basis for updated versions as design
proceeds, and it is useful in its own right for aiding the assessment of options and
identification of critical features.

9.5 APPLICATION AND BENEFITS OF FMEA/FMECA

The FMEA/FMECA analysis procedure is a tool that has been adapted in many different
processes, resulting in higher reliability, better quality, increased safety, enhanced FMEA/FMECA
customer satisfaction and reduced costs. The tool can also be used to establish and
optimize maintenance plans for repairable systems and/or contribute to control plans and
other quality assurance procedures. It provides a knowledge base of failure mode and
corrective action information that can be used as a resource in future troubleshooting
efforts and as a training tool for new engineers. In addition, an FMEA or FMECA is often
required to comply with safety and quality requirements, such as ISO 9001, QS 9000,
ISO/TS 16949, Six Sigma, FDA Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), Process Safety
Management Act (PSM), etc.
Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a powerful design
analysis tool that is used to increase system reliability. It can be applied during the
initial design phase or to existing equipment. To be more effective, the FMECA
should relate to the nature of the design process itself. In either case, it considers
overall design, operating, and service problems, while at the same time addressing
process and safety problems.
The application of design and process FMEA is illustrated in Table 9.2.
Table 9.2
Design FMEA Process FMEA Working Variant
FMEA
Purpose Meeting Production in compliance Meets the expressed
specification with drawing and implied expectations
in working
Responsibility Design and Production Exploitation/usage/work
Development implementation
Objective Avoiding design Avoiding failures during Avoiding failures during
failures process planning, working (due to
production design/process/material
implementation s failures)
Timing for After design With production release Work phase after
Commencement selection completion of sales
Period of Prior to the first trial Prior to any investment Prior to first sale
Review run
FMEA first Prior to production Prior to bulk production After first market
Completion release feedback of produce

Design FMEA should be initiated before or at design concept finalization at

• component level
• sub-system level, and
• system level
whereas process FMEA should be initiated before or at feasibility stage, prior to tooling
for production.
The preparation of FMEA should always be undertaken by a team of people drawn from
all the relevant areas of the organization bringing the appropriate information and insight
as illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Manufacturing Team

Product and Reliability

Desig Marketing/ Process Data Customer
n Sales Team Specificatio Priority Data

Technical/
Quality Tools –
Others Manufacturing Team Inspection Process
Data Variability
Process
Marketing/ Description
Design Process FMEA
Team Sales Team

Maintenance Team

Figure 9.1 : Typical Inputs for the Preparation of FMEA

The advantages of a cross functional team as shown in the people input are as follows :
• Earlier possible, parallel working (not serial) – concurrent engineering
• Benefits of more extensive knowledge and experience
• Increasing creativity
• Increasing acceptance
• Simultaneous and not successive decision process.
If used as a design tool, the benefit of FMECA depends upon the timeliness in which
information is communicated in the early design phase. Timeliness is probably the most
important factor in differentiating between effective and ineffective implementation of the
FMECA. The efforts and sophistication of the approach used depend greatly on the
requirements of each individual program. In any case, the FMECA should contribute to
the overall program decision.

9.6 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS AND

INFLUENCE
When the FMECA team members are properly selected, the FMECA process will
address all problems concerning design, manufacturing, process, safety, and environment.
The consequences of these problems are addressed during the study of the Failure Mode
during the FMECA. Preventive measures for failures where an individual’s well-being in
the workplace is concerned should always be given top priority. According to John
Moubray (1991), “A failure mode has safety consequences if it causes a loss of function
or other damage which could hurt or kill someone.”
The overall design must consider how the environment influences the system during
testing, storage, installing, and operating. When considering the failure mode effects, think
about the impact on society in general if the failure happened. Society may, in some
cases, be considered as a customer because if the product is not accepted due to
environmental effects, it may not be successful in general, at all. “A failure mode has
environmental consequences if it causes a loss of function or other damage which could
lead to the breach of any known environmental standard or regulation” (Moubray, 1991)
or is hazardous for usage in any way.

9.7 FREQUENTLY USED TERMS IN FMEA/FMECA

The definitions which follow form the fundamentals of FMECAs. These definitions will
enable the reader to understand the differences between Part Function, Part Failure
Mechanism, Failure Effect, Failure Detection, and Failure Modes. (These definitions were
taken from MIL-STD-1629.)
Failure Mode
 The manner by which a failure is observed. Generally it is the description of the FMEA/FMECA
way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation.
Failure Effect
The consequence(s) of a failure mode on the operation, function, or status of an
item. Failure effects are usually classified according to how the entire system is
impacted.
Failure Cause
The physical or chemical process, design defects, part misapplication, quality
defects, or other processes that are the basic reason for failure or which initiate the
physical process by which deterioration proceeds to failure.
Environments
The conditions, circumstances, influences, stresses and combinations thereof,
surrounding and affecting systems or equipment during storage, handling,
transportation, testing, installation, and use in standby status and operations.
Detection Mechanism
The means or methods by which a failure can be discovered by an operator under
normal system operation or can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some
diagnostic action.
Severity
The consequences of a failure as a result of a particular failure mode. Severity
considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of
injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur.
Criticality
A relative measure of the consequences of a failure mode and its frequency of
occurrence.
Criticality Analysis (CA)
A procedure by which each potential failure mode is ranked according to the
combined influence of severity and probability of occurrence.
FMECA-Maintainability Information
A procedure by which each potential failure is analyzed to determine how the
failure is detected and the actions to be taken to repair the failure.
Single Failure Point
The failure of an item that would result in failure of the system and is not
compensated for by redundancy or alternative operational procedure.
Undetectable Failure
A postulated failure mode in the FMEA for which there is no failure detection
method by which the operator is made aware of the failure.
FMECA Planning
Planning the FMECA work involves the contractor’s procedures for implementing
their specified requirements. Planning should include updating to reflect design
changes and analysis results. Worksheet formats, ground rules, assumptions,
identification of the level of analysis, failure definitions, and identification of
coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor and other organizational elements
should also be considered.
Ground Rules and Assumptions
Quality Tools – The ground rules identify the FMECA approach (e.g., hardware, functional or
Others combination), the lowest level to be analyzed, and include statements of what might
constitute a failure in terms of performance criteria. Every effort should be made to
identify and record all ground rules and analysis assumptions prior to initiation of the
analysis; however, ground rules and analysis assumptions may be adjusted as
requirements change.
Analysis Approach
Variations in design complexity and available data will generally dictate the analysis
approach to be used. There are two primary approaches for the FMECA. One is
the hardware approach that lists individual hardware items and analyzes their
possible failure modes. The other is the functional approach that recognizes that
every item is designed to perform a number of outputs. The outputs are listed and
their failures analyzed. For more complex systems, a combination of the functional
and hardware approaches may be considered.
Hardware Approach
The hardware approach is normally used when hardware items can be uniquely
identified from schematics, drawings, and other engineering and design data. This
approach is recommended for use in a part level up approach often referred to as
the bottom-up approach.
Functional Approach
The functional approach is normally used when hardware items cannot be uniquely
identified or when system complexity requires analysis from the top down.
Level of Analysis
The level of analysis applies to the system hardware or functional level at which
failures are postulated. In other words, how the system being analyzed is
segregated (e.g., a section of the system, component, sub-component, etc.).
Failure Definition
This is a general statement of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms of
performance parameters and allowable limits for each specified output.
Trade -off Study Reports
These reports should identify areas of marginal and state-of-the-art design and
explain any design compromises and operating restraints agreed upon. This
information will aid in determining the possible and most probable failure modes and
causes in the system.
Design Data and Drawings
Design data and drawings identify each item and the item configuration that
perform each of the system functions. System design data and drawings will
usually describe the system’s internal and interface functions beginning at system
level and progressing to the lowest indenture level of the system. Design data will
usually include either functional block diagrams or schematics that will facilitate
construction of reliability block diagrams.
Block Diagrams
Block diagrams that illustrate the operation, interrelationships, and
interdependencies of the functions of a system are required to show the sequence
and the series dependence or independence of functions and operations. Block
diagrams may be constructed in conjunction with, or after defining the system and
shall present the system breakdown of its major functions. More than one block
diagram is sometimes required to represent alternative modes of operation,
depending upon the definition established for the system.
 Functional Block Diagrams FMEA/FMECA

Functional block diagrams illustrate the operation and interrelationships between

functional entities of a system as defined in engineering data and schematics. An
example of a functional block diagram, taken from MIL-STD-1629, is shown in
Figure 9.2.
Temperature and
Pressure Readout

Air Pressure Relief

Automatic Shutdown Instrumentation
and Monitors
Signals Temperature (20) Pressure and
and Oil Pressure Temperature Sensor
Output
Electric Power Motor Torque Compresso
Control
(10) r High Pressure Air
440 V

Cooling and
Moisture
Separation Cooled
(30) and
Salt to Fresh Fresh Water Dried Air
Water Exchange Cooled Air

Lubrication Oil
(40)

Figure 9.2 : Functional Block Diagram

Reliability Block Diagrams

Reliability block diagrams define the series dependence, or independence, of all
functions of a system or functional group for each life-cycle event. An example of
a reliability block diagram, taken from MIL-STD-1629, is shown in Figure 9.3.

High Pressure
Air
Compressor

Unit Level

Motor Instrumentatio Cooling and Lubricatio Compressor

(10) n and Monitors Moisture n (50)
(20) Separation
Assembly level

Filter
(44A)
Reservoir Oil Heaters Main Pump Cooler Oil Piping
(41) (42) (43) (45)
Filter
(44B)

Figure 9.3 : Reliability Block Diagram

Severity Classification
Quality Tools – assigned to each identified failure mode and each item analyzed in accordance with
Others the loss statements below. It may not be possible to identify an item or a failure
mode according to the loss statements in the four categories below, but similar loss
statements based on various inputs and outputs can be developed and included in
the ground rules for the FMECA activity. Severity classification categories that are
consistent with MIL-STD-882 are defined as follows :
• Category I–Catastrophic : A failure that may cause injury or death.
• Category II–Critical : A failure which may cause severe injury, major
property damage, or major system damage that will result in major downtime
or production loss.
• Category III–Marginal : A failure which may cause minor injury, minor
property damage, or minor system damage which will result in delay or loss
of system availability or degradation.
• Category IV–Minor : A failure not serious enough to cause injury,
property damage or system damage, but will result in unscheduled
maintenance or repair.
These categories can be attached to a cost or any other factor, but when used in
the established criteria, should be consistent throughout the analysis.
FMECA Report
The results of the FMECA and other related analyses should be included in a
report that identifies the level of the analysis, documents the data sources and
techniques used in performing the analysis, and gives the system definition.

9.8 FAILURE MODELS

The key elements of an FMEA are as follows :
Severity
A numerical measure of how serious is the effect of the failure to the customer.
Example
Will the component or system failure result in a mere nuisance or can it result in
serious injury.
The degree of severity is measured on a scale of ‘1’ to ‘10’ where 10 is most
severe.
Occurrence
A measure of probability that a particular mode will actually happen. The degree of
occurrence is measured on a scale of ‘1’ to ‘10’, where ‘10’ signifies the highest
probability of occurrence.
Detection
A measure of probability that a particular mode would be detected in the
manufacturer’s own operation and not reach the customer.
Example
A computerized system detects 100% defective components as opposed to visual
inspection which is no more than 80% effective at best.
The level of detection is measured on a scale of ‘1’ to ‘10’, where ‘10’ signifies
Risk Evaluation Methods FMEA/FMECA

A typical FMEA incorporates some method to evaluate the risk associated with the
potential problems identified through the analysis. The two most common methods,
Risk Priority Numbers and Criticality Analysis, are described next.
Risk Priority Numbers
It is a numerical and relative “measure of overall risk” corresponding to a particular
failure mechanism and is computed by multiplying the severity, occurrence and
detection numbers.
To use the Risk Priority Number (RPN) method to assess risk, the analysis team
must :
• rate the severity of each effect of failure,
• rate the likelihood of occurrence for each cause of failure,
• rate the likelihood of prior detection for each cause of failure (i.e. the
likelihood of detecting the problem before it reaches the end user or
customer), and
• calculate the RPN by obtaining the product of the three ratings :
RPN = Severity × Occurrence × Detection
The RPN can then be used to compare issues within the analysis and to prioritize
problems for corrective action.
Criticality Analysis
The MIL-STD-1629A document describes two types of criticality analysis:
quantitative and qualitative. To use the quantitative criticality analysis method, the
analysis team must :
• define the reliability/unreliability for each item, at a given operating time,
• identify the portion of the item’s unreliability that can be attributed to each
potential failure mode,
• rate the probability of loss (or severity) that will result from each failure
mode that may occur, and
• calculate the criticality for each potential failure mode by obtaining the
product of the three factors :
Mode Criticality = Item Unreliability × Mode Ratio of Unreliability
× Probability of Loss
• calculate the criticality for each item by obtaining the sum of the criticalities
for each failure mode that has been identified for the item.
Item Criticality = SUM of Mode Criticalities
To use the qualitative criticality analysis method to evaluate risk and prioritize
corrective actions, the analysis team must :
• rate the severity of the potential effects of failure,
• rate the likelihood of occurrence for each potential failure mode, and
• compare failure modes via a Criticality Matrix, which identifies severity on
the horizontal axis and occurrence on the vertical axis.
Critical Characteristics
Quality Tools – A failure mode which can conceivably result in personal injury, loss of life or
Others violate a government (e.g. automobile emission norms) mandate is
considered critical.
Such a failure mode will be assigned a severity level value (s) of ‘10’
irrespective of the level of occurrence or detection.
Significant Characteristics
A failure mode which is not deemed to be critical but needs stringent process
control (e.g. SPC, 100% inspection etc.) to ensure product quality is
considered significant.
Such a failure mode will be assigned a severity level value(s) of 6 or more
irrespective of the level of occurrence or detection.

9.9 PROCESS FMEA

As discussed earlier, the process FMEA is used primarily to identify areas of criticality to
control and to emphasize the design of inherently more reliable process. The preparation
of a process FMEA should always be the starting point in the application of SPC. The
FMEA helps in understanding of the process and in the pinpointing of the critical areas to
control. Process FMEA :
• is an analytical technique,
• identifies potential product related process failure modes,
• customer normally is end user but can be next process too,
• assesses the potential effects of the failures on the customer,
• identifies the process causes and process variables on which to focus
controls for :
Ø occurrence reduction,
Ø detection of failure conditions,
• develops ranked list of potential failure modes leading to prioritization of
corrective actions,
• documents the results,
• catalyzes to stimulate interchange of ideas between functions affected and
promote team approach,
• is a living document and should be initiated
Ø before or at the feasibility stage,
Ø prior to tooling for production,
Ø take into account all manufacturing operations, and
Ø before introducing a new or a modified process.
(During manufacturing planning stage of a new model or component).
9.9.1 Quality Objectives
The quality objectives of process FMEA are as follows :
Process Improvement
The FMEA drives process improvements as the primary objective, with an
High-risk Failure Modes FMEA/FMECA

The FMEA addresses all high risk failure modes, as identified by FMEA team with
executable action plans. All other failure modes are considered.
Control Plans
The pre-launch and production control plans consider the failure modes from the
process FMEA.
Integration
The FMEA is integrated and consistent with the process flow diagram and the
process control plan. The process FMEA considers the design FMEA, if available
as part of its analysis.
Lessons Learned
The FMEA considers all major “Lessons learned” (such as warranty, campaigns,
non-conforming product, customer complaint is input to failure mode identification.
Special or Key Characteristics
The FMEA identifies appropriate key characteristics candidate as input to the key
characteristics selection process, if applicable due to company policy.
Timing
The FMEA is completed during the “window of opportunity” where it could most
efficiently impact the design of product or process.
Team
The right people participate as part of the FMEA team throughout the analysis and
are adequately trained in FMEA methods. A facilitator should be used, if required.
Documentation
The FMEA document is completely filled out “by the book”, including “action
taken” and new RPN values.
Time Usage
Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effective and efficient use
of time, with a value added result.
9.9.2 The Qualitative Approach to FMECA
This approach should be used when specific failure rate data is not available. Failure
modes identified by the FMECA process are assessed by their probability of occurrence.
To establish qualitative measures of occurrence, severity, and detection, criteria must be
established that subjectively relate to the overall effect on the process. Examples are
offered in Tables 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 to serve as guides in establishing qualitative measures.
The product of the measures of occurrence, severity and detection is called the Risk
Priority Number (RPN). Tables 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 are for example only. The numbers or
criteria assigned to any particular ranking system are at the discretion of the user.
9.9.3 FMECA Quantitative Approach
Method Table 9.3 outlined in MIL-STD-1629 is the quantitative approach used for the
FMECA process. Figure 9.3 is the worksheet used for this method.
Table 9.3 : Occurrence Probabilities

Ran Occurrence Criteria Occurrence

k Rates (Cycles,
hrs, etc.)
Quality Tools –
Others 1 Unlikely : Unreasonable to expect this failure —
mode to occur.

2 Isolated : Based on similar designs having a low 1/10,000

number of failures.

3 Sporadic : Based on similar designs that have 1/1,000

experienced occasional failures.

4 Conceivable : Based on similar designs that have 1/100

caused problems.

5 Recurrent : Certain that failures will ensue. 1/10

Note : The ranking criteria selected must be consistent throughout the FMECA.

Table 9.4 : Severity Probabilities

Ran Severity Criteria

k

1 Minor : No noticeable effect. Unable to realize that a failure has occurred.

2 Marginal ; Annoying. No system degradation.

3 Moderate : Causing dissatisfaction. Some system degradation.

4 Critical : Causing a high degree of dissatisfaction. Loss of system function.

5 Catastrophic : A failure which may cause death or injury. Extended repair

outages.

Note : The ranking criteria selected must be consistent throughout the FMECA.

The failure mode and criticality number (Cm) is the portion of the criticality number for the
item due to a particular failure mode. This criticality number replaces the RPN number
used in the qualitative method described in the previous section. The Cm for a failure
mode is determined by the expression
Cm = b a l p t
. . . (9.1)
where b = conditional probability of loss of function,
a = failure mode ratio,
l p = part failure rate, and
t = duration or operating time.
Table 9.5 : Detection Probabilities

Ran Detection Criteria Probability

k
 FMEA/FMECA
1 Very high probability of detecting the failure before it 80%–100%
occurs. Almost always preceded by a warning.

2 High probability of detecting the failure before it 60%–80%

occurs. Preceded by a warning most of the time.

3 Moderate probability of detecting the failure before it 40%–60%

occurs. About a 50% chance of getting a warning.

4 Low probability of detecting the failure before it occurs. 20%–40%

Always comes with little or no warning.

5 Remote probability of detecting the failure before it 0%–20%

occurs. Always without a warning.

NOTE: The ranking criteria selected must be consistent throughout the FMECA.

The b values represent the analyst’s judgement as to the conditional probability that the
loss will occur and should be quantified in general accordance with Table 9.6.
Table 9.6 : b Values Represents the Analyst’s Judgement

Failure effect Probability of Loss of Function

Actual loss b =1

Probable loss 0.10 < b < 1.00

Possible loss 0 < b < 0.10

No effect b=0

The failure mode ratio, a, is the probability that the part or item will fail. If all potential
failure modes of a particular part or item are listed, the sum of the a values for that part
or item will equal one. Individual failure mode multipliers may be derived from failure rate
source data or from test and operational data. If failure mode data are not available, the
values should represent the analyst’s judgement based upon an analysis of the item’s
functions.
Part failure rates, l p, are derived from appropriate reliability prediction methods using
mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) data or possibly other data obtained from handbooks
or reference material. Manufacturers often supply failure data; however, it is important
that the environment the item will be subjected to is similar to the environment the
manufacturer used when obtaining the failure data.
The operating time, t, is usually expressed in hours or the number of operating cycles of
the item being analyzed.
The a and b values are often subjective, thus making the supposed quantitative method
somewhat qualitative. All things considered, it is generally understood that the FMECA
process is a qualitative method of analysis.
SAQ 1
Quality Tools –
Others

9.10 DESIGN FMEA

Design FMEA is performed to identify and address areas of potential risk within the
component or system design. The objective is to review the product design and to
establish the following :
• What are the main functional elements of the design?
• Which are the potential failures?
• What are the effects of the failure?
• Which are the main causes of failure?
• Which are the controls used to prevent failure?
From this analysis, an assessment of the failure potential of the design is made and this is
expressed as the risk priority number (RPN). The reliability of the component or the
sub-system is used to calculate the occurrence value. Where the value of the RPN is high
(typically greater than 90), this indicates the need for design corrective action to prevent
the likelihood of reliability problems. So the design FMEA may recommend changes to be
made to a product design so as to reduce risk of failure in the field or of the
manufacturing process. Following is the list of recommended document which would
facilitate the efforts of design FMEA team.
(i) Customer specifications.
(ii) Engineering drawings.
(iii) Warranty information of similar project.
(iv) Previously performed design FMEA on similar product.
(v) Process flow diagram.
(vi) Process capability data.
(vii) Reliability test results. (experimental as well as batch analysis reports or
prototype evaluation)
(viii) Prototype build failure data and list of problems experienced.
(ix) Design of experience data.
SAQ 2
What is the significance of Risk Priority Number (RPN)? What is the follow up
action after RPN is determined?
 FMEA/FMECA

9.11 STEPS FOR CARRYING OUT DESIGN FMEA

The following are steps for carrying out Design FMEA.
• Select a system, sub-system or part and identify its functions.
• List potential failure modes.
• List potential effects of the failure.
• Estimate the severity numbers.
• List potential causes or mechanisms of failure.
• Estimate the occurrence number (O).
• What design verification measures were taken (e.g. prototype testing, pilot
run etc.).
• Estimate the detection number (D).
• If D is equal to or greater than 5, take closure look at measures for detection
(D > 5 implies high risk).
• Compute the RPN.
• Can the system fail because of customer abuse or other in-use condition. If
so, re-estimate S, O, D and re-compute RPN.
• List recommended actions where applicable to lower RPN.
• List individuals (or departments) responsible for completing recommended
corrective actions.
• List actual actions taken.
• Re-compute RPN after corrective actions are implemented.
• Repeat all the steps above for all systems, sub-systems and components
which are deployed in the product.
A broad guideline for severity, occurrence and detection ratings levels for design FMEA
is follows.
Table 9.7
Severity Level Severity No.
High : Can result in injury or loss of life (Example : Brake 10
failure in automobiles) or result in significant loss of
revenue or business for manufacturer.
Medium High : Causes serious inconvenience to 7
customer (Example : Automobile does not start) or result
in moderate loss of revenue or business for
Manufacturer.
Medium Low : Product functional but causes moderate 5
inconvenience to customer (Example : Automobile
Quality Tools – Low : Product functions but causes some annoyance to 2
Others customer. (Example : Automobile functional but there is
some vibration in door at high speed).

Occurrence and Detection Rating Level for Design FMEA

The likelihood of occurrence and detection of defects will drive the corresponding
Occurrence and Detection Numbers within the ‘1’ to ‘10’ range with the higher
number corresponding to higher risk. These numbers would have to be assigned by
the participating FMEA team numbers as shown in Table 9.8.
Table 9.8
High probability of occurrence at manufacturers’ location – 10

Low probability of occurrence at manufacturers’ location –1

Low probability of detection within manufacturers’ location – 10
High probability of detection within manufacturers’ location –1

SAQ 3
What is Potential Failure Mode?

9.12 QUALITY CONTROL PLAN AND PROCESS FMEA

After the identification of potential risk in the manufacturing process through process
FMEA, it is essential that appropriate measures and actions be incorporated within the
process quality control plan. For example, a process has identified an X-ray inspection to
be performed after a given process step to reduce the RPN to an acceptable level. It now
becomes imperative that the quality engineer ensures that the X-ray inspection be installed
and carried out at the desired location as well as on the quality control plan. Thus, the
Process FMEA will always drive the quality control plan and the two documents would be
closely linked to each other. With the passage of time as manufacturing engineers gain
experience, they will incorporate changes in the process to make it more risk free and less
prone to producing defects. Accordingly, both the process FMEA and the control plan get
modified simultaneously to reflect the changes and improvements made. Both the Process
FMEA and the Quality Control Plan are living documents for reference on the factory
floor. They should be kept on the factory floor readily accessible to factory personnel
when required. The continual updating of these documents contribute significantly in
maintaining a healthy manufacturing process flow.

9.13 HAZARD FUNCTION AND RELIABILITY

The key concept in the management of reliability is based upon the relationship between
the failure probability and time. Accordingly, ‘Reliability’ is defined as the probability that
a product (or system) will perform its intended function satisfactorily for a stated period of
time under specific operating conditions. All of the characteristics used to describe and
measure reliability are based upon this probability-time relationship.
The basic function describing the variation of the failure probability with time is the FMEA/FMECA
probability density function (pdf). The cumulative distribution function (cdf), f (x), gives
the probability that a measured will fall between – ∞ and x.
x
f (x) = ∫
−∞
f (y ) dy

In reliability engineering, we are concerned with the probability that an item will survive
for a stated interval (e.g. time, cycle, distance etc.) i.e. there is no failure in the interval (0
to x). This is given by reliability function R (x) and it follows that :
∞
R (x ) = 1 − f (x) = ∫
x
f (y) dy

The hazard function or hazard rate h (x) is the conditional probability of failure in the
interval x to (x + dx), given that there was no failure by x
f (x) f (x)
h (x ) = =
R (x) 1 − f (x)

SAQ 4
When a product may be defined as ‘defective’?

9.14 SUMMARY
It is possible to analyse products, services and process to determine possible modes of
failure and their effects on the performance of the product or operation of the process or
service system.
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is the study of potential failures to determine
their effects. If the results of FMEA are ranked in order of seriousness, then the word
Criticality is added to give FMECA. The primary objective of FMECA is to determine the
features of product design, production or operation and distribution that are critical to the
various modes of failure, in order to reduce failure. It uses all the available experience,
from design, technology, purchasing, production/operation, distribution, marketing, service,
etc. to identify the importance levels or criticality of potential problems and simulate action
to reduce these levels. FMECA should be a major consideration at the design stage of a
product or service.
FMECA may be applied to any stage of design, development, production/operation or
usage, but since its main aim is to prevent failure, it is most suitably applied at the design
stage to identify and eliminate causes. With more complex product or service systems, it
may be appropriate to consider these as smaller units or subsystems, each one being the
subject of a separate FMECA.

9.15 KEY WORDS

Failure : The termination of the ability of an item to perform

its required function.
Quality Tools – Failure Mode and : A procedure by which each potential failure
Others Effects Analysis (FMEA) mode in a system is analyzed to determine the
results, or effects thereof, on the system and to
classify each potential failure mode according to
its severity.

9.16 ANSWERS TO SAQs

SAQ 1
• FMEA identifies potential problem from the customer point of view.
• It is a proactive approach so it is predictive and preventive oriented.
• It prioritizes the variables to be focused for further analysis and follow up
action.
• It can be used in conjunctions with advanced quality planning processes.
These functions are achieved through :
• Identifying known and potential failure modes.
• Identifying the causes and effects of each failure modes.
• Prioritizing the identified failure modes according to the risk priority number
(RPN) which is the product of the frequency of occurrence, severity and
detection.
• Follow-up and corrective actions.
Accordingly some of the benefits of conducting an FMEA are as follows :
• Helps define the most significant opportunity to organization for achieving
fundamental differentiation.
• Improves companies’ image and competitiveness.
• Improves the quality, reliability and safety of the products or services.
• Helps increase customer satisfaction.
• Reduces product development time and cost.
• Helps select the optimal system design.
• Determine redundancy in the system.
• Priority for design improvement is established.
• Identifies critical and significant characteristics.
• Helps error identification and prevention.
• Helps in analysis of new manufacturing processes.
• Ensures that all conceivable failures and their effects on operation have been
considered.
• Develops easy criteria for manufacturing process, assembly, service, and
usage of products.
• Provides historical documentation for future reference to aid in the analysis
of field failures.
 Risk priority number (RPN) is the product of severity, occurrence and detection. It FMEA/FMECA
defines the priority of failure. By itself RPNs have no value on incoming. They are
used for defining or ranking the potential process deficiencies.
• The severity can be reduced only by a change in design. If severity is
reduced considerably, then the failure is eliminated.
• The occurrence can be reduced by improving technical specifications or
requirements in the process with the intent of preventing causes or reducing
their frequency.
• The detection can be reduced by improving evaluation techniques, increasing
sample size or having additional detection equipment.
No FMEA should be completed without a recommended action. The recommended
action may be specific actions or it may be further study. The idea of the
recommended action in a FMEA is to reduce the severity, occurrence, detection or
all of these factors. It is necessary to identify the responsible person, area and the
target date for completion of the recommended action.
Follow up is always necessary for recommended action. It is necessary that
someone, usually the process engineer, will follow up the implementation of the
recommendation to see if they have been addressed adequately or whether there is
any need for updating.
After the actions are incorporated in the process, the FMEA team should
re-evaluate the consequence of severity, occurrence and detection. The results
should be reviewed by FMEA team and new RPN calculated for failure ranking.
SAQ 3
Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the process could
potentially fail to meet the process requirements or design intent. It is a description
of the non-conformance at that specific operation. It can be a cause associated
with a potential failure mode in a subsequent operation or an effect associated with
a potential failure in a previous operation. However, in preparation of the FMEA,
the assumption should be made that the incoming parts and materials are correct.
Potential Failure Mode
• Fail to operate
• Fail to provide adequate power
• Coil fail to provide required EMF
• Speed cannot be controlled
• Part leaking
• Part undersize, oversize
Some of the questions asked to detect ‘Potentia l Failure Mode’ are as follows :
• How could this process fail to do its intended function?
• How the customer will find it unacceptable?
• How the part will not conform to specification?
• Why could a part be injected at a particular operation?
SAQ 4
Products may be defined as defective because they
• deviate from intended condition set by the manufacturer.
• are unsafe due to design effects.
Quality Tools – • are dangerous because they lack adequate warnings and instructions.
Others
A design defect is a defect that effects are entire line of products. And a
manufacturing defect exists when the product does not meet the manufacturers
own specifications.
A product presents a reasonable risk and is defective when
• The product meets customer’s expectations.
• Risks are reduced to the greatest extent possible by design or safety
features.
• The user is given adequate information about the associated risk.
• The benefits can be retained with less association of risk.
• Evaluation of the product shows that the benefits outweigh the risk
involved.