You are on page 1of 33

Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM EA applicat ions in asset


int egrit y management

Don Ogwude
Principal Consultant
Lloyd’s Register Energy Consulting
October 10, 2013
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Overview

Asset integrity management has become a major focus area for


competitive advantage with industry leaders and top tier
companies.

Benefits:
• Insures reliable systems/ components that
result in production uptime optimization;
• Reduces/ prevents failures that could have
severe impact on personnel safety, the environment, and/or
assets
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Overview
• FMEA (Failure Modes Effect Analysis) is the baseline for effective
reliability analysis and the preferred systematic technique for
failure analysis
• Many industries are integrating the use of this technique to
eliminate or reduce downtime and refine the design of their
assets
• The history, evolution and application of this technique will be
discussed including its application in reduction of costly product
design issues and in the development of new processes and
procedures that improve a facility's asset integrity throughout
its life cycle
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Def init ion

F - Failures of given component: Consider a component in a


system
M - Modes of Failure: Determine the possible ways in
which the component can fail
E - Effects: Determine the effects of each failure
mode on the system under consideration
A – Analysis: Analyze the impact that this mode of
failure will have on the environment, people, and the
system itself; assess how to mitigate the impact.
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Hist ory
• FMEA was developed by the U.S. Military. The first guideline was Military
Procedure MIL-P-1629 “ Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and
criticality analysis” dated November 9, 1949

• First systematic techniques for failure analysis and most widely used reliability
analysis technique in the initial stages of product/system development and
system reliability studies

• Usually performed during the conceptual and initial design phases of the system
in order to assure that all potential failure modes have been considered and the
proper provisions have been made to eliminate these failures
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM EA Derivat ives

• DFMEA - Design or static/theoretical EN298/EN230/UL1998. Design


FMEA is carried out to eliminate failures during equipment design,
taking into account all types of failures during the whole life-span of
the equipment
• PFMEA - Production FMEA is focused on problems stemming from
how the equipment is manufactured, maintained or operated
• System FMECA looks for potential problems and bottlenecks in larger
processes, such as entire production lines
• FMECA – Criticality assessment based Military/Space program
standards
• FMEDA – Used for statistical safety analysis per IEC61508/61508
Safety Integrity Levels
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA

• FMECA is composed of two separate analyses, the Failure Mode and


Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the Criticality Analysis (CA)
• FMEA analyzes different failure modes and their effects on the system
while the CA classifies or prioritizes their level of importance based
on failure rate and severity of the effect of failure
• The ranking process of the CA can be accomplished by utilizing
existing failure data or by a subjective ranking procedure conducted
by a team of people with an understanding of the system
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA

• Quantitative method is used when failure rates, failure modes,


failure mode ratios, and failure effects probabilities are known
• These variables are used to calculate a " criticality number" to be
used to prioritize items of concern
• Typically used after the design has been completed when
confident data on the system can be collected - Data from other
sources may also be used
• Provides concrete figures which can be used for other types of
analyses including fault tree analysis and a reliability centered
maintenance (RCM) program
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA

• Qualitative method is used when no known failure rates are


available
• The criticality or risk associated with each failure is subjectively
classified by the team members
• The use of a subjective ranking system is applied to the severity,
and occurrence of the failures
• This method will provide a relative ranking of item failure mode's
effects for identifying areas of concern and for initiating other
analyses such as RCM, fault tree, and logistics
• As the system matures it is recommended that data be collected
to enhance the analysis through a quantitative method
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA

Data Triangle
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

When t o use FM ECA

• Early stages when a new process, product or service is being designed


• After system, product, or process functions are defined, but before specific
hardware is selected or released to manufacturing
• When an existing process, product or service is being redesigned or applied
in a new way
• When analyzing failures of an existing process, product or service
• Periodically throughout the life of the process, product or service to better
understand failure modes
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM EA Requirement s
Resources:
(1) Documentation of mission requirements
(2) Schematics or drawings of the system.
(3) An understanding of component, subsystem, & systems operations
(4) Block diagram which graphically shows the operation and interrelationships
between components of the system defined in the schematics
(5) Bill of materials list (for hardware only)
(6) Component failure rate data
• Meeting facility with enough space to display schematics, block diagrams or other
documents for all members to view
• Convenient to have two computer display projectors; one for drawings, the other
displays the FMECA form
• Ground rules and the goals of the mission should be established at the beginning of
the meeting
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology

Function level / Top-down approach

• Used in early design phase before the whole system structure is decided - the
analysis is usually function oriented
• Analysis starts with the main system functions - and how these may fail
• Functional failures with significant effects are prioritized in the analysis
• The analysis may not capture all components for analysis
• The top-down approach may also be used on an existing system to focus on
problem areas
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology
Component Level/ Bottom-up Approach (Commonly used)

• The bottom-up approach is used when a system concept has been decided
• Each component on the lowest level of indenture is studied one-by-one, starting
at the component level and expanding upward
• The bottom-up approach is also called hardware approach
• The analysis is complete since all components are considered
• A general rule: the analysis should be conducted at a level where failure rate
estimates are available or can be obtained
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology
• Identify all functions in scope of study and decompose each function into
components
• For each component, determine the ways in which it can fail
• For each failure mode, determine effects
• Select a SEVERITY level for each effect

• Identify potential causes of each failure mode


• Select an OCCURENCE level for each cause

• List current controls for each cause


• Select a DETECTION level for each cause
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology

Risk Priorit y Number (RPN)

RPN is the product of the severity, occurrence, and detection scores

Severity X Occurrence X Detection = RPN


Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology

Failure Effects

Item Potential Compensat


Item Failure Next Detection Severity
Functional Failure Local End ing Remarks
Number Mechanism Higher Method Class
ID Modes Effects Effects Provision
Level
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology
• Failure effect levels are:
a. Local effects are those effects that result specifically from the failure mode of the item in the
indenture level under consideration
b. Next higher level effects are those effects which concentrate on the effect of a particular
failure mode has on the operation and function of items in the next higher indenture level
c. End effects are the effects of the assumed failure on the operation, function and/or status of
the system

• End or system level effects:


a. System failure where the failed item has a catastrophic effect on the operation of the system
b. Degraded operation where the failed item has an effect on the operation of the system but
the system's mission can still be accomplished
c. No immediate effect where the failed item causes no immediate effects on the system
operation
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA
Risk Ranking - Probability

Failure frequency class Description


P=1 Could occur, but never heard of in the world. Less than
once in 10000 years (P = 10-5-10-4)
P=2 Has occurred in the world, but very unlikely. Once every
1000 - 10000 years (P = 10-4 - 10-3)
P=3 Incident has occurred in some operators. Once every
100-1000 years (P = 10-3 - 10-2)
P=4 Incident has occurred several times in some operators.
Once every 100-10 years (P = 0,01-0,1)
P=5 Incident has occurred several times in most operators.
Once every 1-10 years (P = 0,1-1)
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA
Risk Ranking - Consequence

Effect severity Description


C=1 First aid / medical treatment case, minor economic loss/downtime
C=2 Serious Injury, Medium economic loss/downtime
C=3 1-10 fatalities, Large economic loss/downtime
C=4 10-30 fatalities, major economic loss/downtime
C=5 30+ fatalities, catastrophic economic loss/downtime
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM ECA
Risk Ranking - Matrix
PROBABILITY

P=1 P = 2 P = 3 P = 4 P = 5

Could occur, Has occurred Incident has Incident has Incident has
but never in the world, occurred in occurred occurred
heard of in but very some several times in several times
the world. unlikely. operators some in most
operators. operators.

Description Less than Less than Once every Once every Once every
once in once in 10000 100 - 1000 100 - 10 years 1 - 10 years
10 000 years years years

C= 5 30+ fatalities

C= 4 10 - 30 fatalities
CONSEQUECE

C= 3 1 - 10 fatalities

C = 2 Serious Injury

C = 1 First aid /
medical
treatment case
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

M et hodology - General
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Lessons Learned
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Success crit eria


• Preparation to ensure good understanding of system
• System should be accurately broken down to subsystems and
components
• Preparation of worksheet with components and failure modes prior
to start of FMECA
• Good communication with client to ensure agreement on system
limits, criticality matrix and worksheet format
• Updated and detailed drawings and procedures are available prior to
start of study
• FMECA team composed of participants possessing relevant and
sufficient knowledge in system being analysed
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Success crit eria


• FMECA leader with good facilitation skills
• Clear and consistent description of failure modes, causes, effects,
detection methods and safeguards
• Clear and concise recommendations
• The follow-up and close-out responsibility must be defined
• A follow-up / close-out report should include all the action items from
the FMECA
• The effects of redundancy should be taken into consideration when
calculating criticality numbers or assigning occurrence rankings
because redundancy reduces the failure rate, thus increasing the
availability
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Pit f alls

• Poorly defined scope and objectives


• Inaccurate or out-dated documentation
• Inadequate facility or resources
• Poor teamwork due to personality issues
• Wrong team composition
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Asset Int egrit y M anagement and FM ECA

Asset Integrity Management -Cradle to FMECA


grave asset optimization • Can highlight single point failures that require
corrective action;
Design Phase • Can be used to establish relative ranking of
equipments' effects on the overall system.
• Reliable components
• Can be used as an evaluation method to address
• System architecture with redundancy's affect on failure rates and
redundant components probability of occurrence.
• Component failure rate • Provides the baseline for safety analysis,

• Safety analysis maintainability, maintenance plan analysis, and


for failure detection and isolation of subsystem
design.
• Can identify high risk items whose failure would
jeopardize the production, endanger personnel
result in environment damage.
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Asset Int egrit y M anagement and FM ECA


Asset Integrity Management -Cradle FMECA
to grave asset optimization • Can highlight single point failures requiring
corrective action;
• Aid in developing test methods and
Design Phase troubleshooting techniques;
• Reliable components • Can be used as a tool for troubleshooting for
• System architecture with identifying corrective actions for a given failure.
redundant components • Provides data for analyses such as a Fault Tree
Analysis or a Reliability-Centered Maintenance
• Component failure rate
(RCM) analysis.
• Safety analysis • Assist in selecting design alternatives with high
reliability and high safety potential during the
early design phases
• Ensure that all conceivable failure modes and
their effects on operational success of the system
have been considered
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Asset Int egrit y M anagement and FM ECA


Asset Integrity Management -Cradle to FMECA
grave asset optimization • Provides the baseline for safety analysis, failure
detection, and isolation of subsystem design.
Operation Phase • Can identify high risk items whose failure would
• Asset operated within control bands
jeopardize the production, endanger personnel
while maximizing production and/ or result in environment damage.
• Excursions outside control bands do • Can highlight single point failures requiring
not lead to incidents corrective action;
• Component failures and impact to • Aid in developing test methods and
operation fully understood troubleshooting techniques;
• Built-in diagnostic capabilities • Can be used as a tool for troubleshooting for
• Optimized alarm management identifying corrective actions for a given failure.
strategies • Ensure that all conceivable failure modes and
their effects on operational success of the system
have been considered.
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Asset Int egrit y M anagement and FM ECA


Asset Integrity Management -Cradle to FMECA
grave asset optimization
• Can be used to establish relative ranking of
equipments' effects on the overall system.
Maintenance
• Can be used as an evaluation method to
• Predictive maintenance address redundancy's affect on failure rates and
practices probability of occurrence.
• Component failure rate • Provides the baseline for safety analysis,
database management maintainability, maintenance plan analysis.
• Reliability Centered
• Can assist in failure detection and isolation of
Maintenance
subsystem design.
• Can identify high risk items whose failure would
jeopardize the production, endanger personnel
result in environment damage.
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

Asset Int egrit y M anagement and FM ECA


Asset Integrity Management -Cradle to FMECA
grave asset optimization
• Can highlight single point failures requiring
corrective action.
Maintenance
• Aid in developing test methods and
• Predictive maintenance troubleshooting techniques.
practices
• Can be used as a tool for troubleshooting for
• Component failure rate identifying corrective actions for a given failure.
database management
• Provides data for Reliability-Centered
• Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) analysis.
Maintenance
• Ensure that all conceivable failure modes and
their effects on operational success of the
system have been considered.
Saf et y Driven Perf ormance Conf erence 2013

FM EA St andards
• MIL-STD 1629 “ Procedures for performing a failure mode and effect analysis”
• IEC 60812 “ Procedures for failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)”
• BS 5760-5 “ Guide to failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMEA and
FMECA)”
• SAE ARP 5580 “ Recommended failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
practices for non-automobile applications”
• SAE J1739 “ Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design
FMEA) and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and
Assembly Processes (Process FMEA) and Effects Analysis for Machinery
(Machinery FMEA)”
• SEMATECH (1992) “ Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A Guide for
Continuous Improvement for the Semiconductor Equipment Industry”
• ISO 14224 – Examples for breakdown etc…
• ISO 20815. RAM and production assurance
For more inf ormat ion, please cont act :

Don Ogw ude


Principal Consult ant
Lloyd’s Regist er Consult ing

T 832-638-8646
E don.ogw ude@lr.org
W w w w .lr.org/consult ing
W w w w .riskspect rum.com

Services are provided by members of t he Lloyd's Regist er Group.


For f urt her inf ormat ion visit w w w.lr.org/ent it ies

You might also like