Candidates' Issue Positions: The Role of Inference in Voters' Perceptions

Candidates, Issues and Voters: The Role of Inference in Political Perception
Author(s): Stanley Feldman and Pamela Johnston Conover

Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 810-839
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
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Candidates, Issues and Voters:
The Role of Inference
in Political Perception
Stanley Feldman
University of Kentucky
Pamela Johnston Conover
University of Kentucky
The study of political perception has been dominated by research on the perception of can-
didates' issue positions, focusing on the processes of projection and persuasion. This research
has limited our understanding of political perception by interpreting projection and persua-
sion narrowly in terms of cognitive balance theory. Only recently has the possible impact of
candidate ambiguity on voters' perception come to be appreciated. In this paper, we use a
more comprehensive theory of perception to specify a series of lagged recursive equations and
estimate the parameters using the CPS 1974-76 panel data. Our results provide no support
for the persuasion hypothesis, and only limited evidence of projection. Rather, the inference
of candidates' issue positions from party positions and the candidates' ideological stances are
much more important factors in candidate perception.
O ver the past decade, the study of voting behavior has come to
recognize the central role of candidate perceptions in the electoral pro-
cess. Research has clearly demonstrated important interpersonal dif-
ferences in how people perceive both candidate images (Nimmo and
Savage, 1976) and candidate issue positions (Aldrich and McKelvey,
1977; Page, 1978). Moreover, such perceptions of the candidates and
their issue positions have been found to be among the most important
components of vote choice in recent presidential elections (Markus and
Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979). Yet, despite the acknowledged
importance of candidate perceptions in the vote choice process, there
* The authors share equal credit and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. The data
analyzed in this paper were collected by the Center for Political Studies and made available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, neither of which
bears any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here. We thank Lee
Sigelman and several anonymous referees for their helpful comments on various earlier drafts
of this manuscript.
CANDIDATES, ISSUES AND VOTERS 811
have been few systematic attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of
the perceptual process. Instead, most studies that involve some con-
sideration of candidate perception do so as a byproduct of their concern
with some other element of the vote choice process (i.e., what is the im-
pact of issues?); and thus, they seem satisfied to be guided by essentially
"working" hypotheses about the nature of the perceptual process. Conse-
quently, there has been a limited growth in our understanding of the
various processes that underlie candidate perception.
The need for a theory of candidate perception is clearly illustrated by
the problems associated with the assessment of issue voting. Recent ef-
forts to measure the frequency of issue voting have led to the development
of proximity measures that gauge the distance between voters' own issue
positions and their perceptions of the candidates' stances (see Miller et al.,
1976). As has been noted (Page and Brody, 1972), however, high levels
of proximity may result not only from issue voting, but also from either
the "projection" of the voter's position onto the candidates or from "per-
suasion," a process in which voters adjust their own positions so as to
bring them in line with those of the candidates. Furthermore, in the
absence of theoretical direction, even sophisticated analytic procedures
cannot untangle these processes. Therefore, one important step toward
understanding the phenomena of issue voting would be a comprehensive
theory of the perception of candidates' issue positions.
In this paper, we attempt to go beyond the narrow interpretations of
political perception offered by previous research involving the perception
of candidates. By utilizing recent theory and empirical work in
psychology, we first specify a more general explanation of the inferential
processes involved in political perception. This approach not only ac-
counts for the effects commonly described as projection and persuasion,
but it also identifies previously ignored factors influencing political
perception. We then apply this theory to a particular problem: the
perception of candidates' issue positions.
PREvious RESEARCH
The need for an explanation of the perception of candidates' issue posi-
tions becomes readily apparent when one considers how much the public
varies in its perceptions of the same candidate. As Page (1978) has
shown, on certain issues a not insignificant portion of the public has
located the same candidate at every possible position on a seven-point
scale. In explaining such perceptions of candidates' issue positions, the
starting point for most studies is the often reported correlation between
the voters' own issue positions and the perceived stands of the candidates.
Much of this evidence has been accumulated through the use of simple
812 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 45, 1983
recursive models and cross-sectional data (for example, Brody and Page,
1972; Conover and Feldman, 1982; Granberg and Brent, 1974; Miller et
al., 1976; Kinder, 1978; and Bruner, 1978). Virtually all of these studies
have found some relationship between voters' issue positions and their
perceptions of the candidates' stances, although there is a pronounced
asymmetry: the relationship is much stronger (in the positive direction) in
the case of the preferred candidate than it is for the nonpreferred can-
didates (where the relationship is in the negative direction).
As noted above, two processes are typically advanced to account for
this relationship between the voters' own issue positions and their percep-
tions of the candidates' stands: projection and persuasion. Furthermore,
the degree of ambiguity in the candidates' issue positions may help deter-
mine which of these explanations is employed. Ambiguity should
facilitate projection while at the same time make it more difficult to
engage in persuasion (Bruner, 1978; Granberg and Brent, 1974; Kinder,
1978; Page and Jones, 1979). Since both theoretical argurnents (Downs,
1957; Page, 1976; Shepsle, 1972) and empirical evidence (Page, 1978)
suggest that the political environment is typically ambiguous, results from
the cross-sectional studies are usually interpreted as evidence of projec-
tion. In comparison, relatively few studies have examined either process
using panel data or nonrecursive models, and what research there is has
produced mixed results as to which process is more prevalent (Meier and
Campbell, 1979; Repass, 1976; Abramowitz, 1978; Markus and Con-
verse, 1979; Shaffer, 1981).
From a theoretical perspective then, a critical issue in any theory of
candidate perception must be the explanation of projection and persua-
sion effects. One important line of research has interpreted such em-
pirical findings from a cognitive consistency perspective, which assumes
that when a person's beliefs and/or behavior are inconsistent he or she ex-
periences an uncomfortable feeling that can be alleviated by altering the
inconsistent beliefs or behavior (see for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee, 1954; Kinder, 1978; Markus and Converse, 1979; Brent and
Granberg, 1982). Agreeing with a candidate one is voting against and
disagreeing with the candidate one is supporting are seen as inconsistent
positions to be avoided or resolved by the voter. Thus, from this perspec-
tive, both projection and persuasion represent internal mechanisms that
minimize the gap between the voter's own issue position and those of the
candidates, and thereby enable the individual to achieve cognitive
balance.
AN INFERENCE MODEL OF POLITICAL PERCEPrION
There is, however, an alternative to the strictly motivational inter-
pretation that cognitive consistency theory provides for projection and
persuasion effects. Recent research in social and cognitive psychology
(for a brief review, see Taylor, 1981) has viewed consistency effects from
a "mental economy" perspective. Rather than being motivated by a need
to reduce inconsistency, people may simply learn that certain aspects of
the social and political world are, in fact, constructed in a consistent
fashion; subsequently, they may apply this rule in processing new infor-
mation. ' In effect, in the absence of information to the contrary, an in-
dividual's assumption that certain types of consistency exist may be an ef-
ficient way of perceiving the world. Seen this way then, the projection
and persuasion effects associated with the perception of candidates' issue
positions are not so much processes of cognitive consistency as they are
processes of cognitive inference. Certainly this is by no means an entirely
new observation; other political scientists have also suggested that in-
ference processes may play a role in the perception of candidates (Jackson,
1975; Page, 1978; Page and Jones, 1979; Popkin et al., 1976). Yet, the
full implications of this fact have been left unexplored.
From our perspective, a shift towards a theoretical focus on cognitive
inference provides more than just a reinterpretation of consistency effects;
it suggests a basis for developing a more general explanation of political
perception. Three basic assumptions underlie this explanation. First,
perception is a process involving an active interpretation of the environ-
ment, motivated by people's need for information in order to engage in
goal-directed behavior (Neisser, 1976). Second, people tend to strive for
cognitive economy; they process information as efficiently as possible.2 In
other words, people attempt accurately to perceive the world while
minimizing information costs (Downs, 1957; Page, 1978). And third,
perception is guided by an individual's prior beliefs or schemas3 (Hastie,
1981; Taylor and Crocker, 1981).
I In addition to the new interpretation of consistency effects, a number of psychologists
have challenged the view that cognitive consistency plays a dominant role in people's lives; in-
stead, they argue that the need for consistency is only one narrow aspect of motivation (Bem,
1970; Freeman, 1968; Maddi, 1968). Empirical studies have indicated that people are in fact
able to tolerate large amounts of cognitive inconsistency and, under some circumstances, may
actually seek it out (Sears and Freedman, 1967).
2 In many ways, this resembles Simon's (1957) argument that people "satisfice"; that is,
they make decisions and judgments as efficiently as they can, given that they have limited
capacities for handling information.
3 Technically, a schema may be defined as "a cognitive structure that consists in part of the
representation of some defined stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge
about that domain, including a specification of the relationships among its attributes, as well
as specific examples or instances of the stimulus domain" (Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p. 91).
We use the concept somewhat more loosely as a means of linking our discussion to current
research on social cognition.
To elaborate on this last point, the prior beliefs or schemas that a per-
son holds influence perception by structuring how new information is
processed or interpreted. Yet, it is critical to recognize that this process is
a dynamic one in which the schemas themselves are products of previous
perceptual activity. Schemas develop over time as a consequence of an
individual's interactions with the environment, and, subsequently, as ex-
isting internal structures they influence how new information is organized
and so shape their own further development (Neisser, 1976). Thus, peo-
ple's schemas lend a certain stability over time to perceptions.4 Moreover,
not only do schemas help to structure the acquisition of new information,
but also they serve as a basis for filling in gaps in the available informa-
tion. It is this second function of schemas, or prior beliefs, that allows
people to maximize the cognitive value of the information available to
them. Specifically, when faced with a situation in which information is
missing or ambiguous, people will - based on their existing beliefs - effi-
ciently fill in the gaps with their best guess as to what the information
should be (Minsky, 1975; Taylor and Crocker, 1981).
Applied to the voting situation, then, the problem facing the electorate
is how best to obtain and utilize information about candidates in an am-
biguous political environment. In such a world of imperfect informa-
tion, voters are often forced to infer what the candidates' positions might
be. Such inferences may resemble projection in the sense that they are
based on the voters' own issue positions; given a lack of information,
voters may infer that candidates they like on other grounds will also share
their issue positions. Similarly, lacking sufficient information to reach an
issue position on their own, voters may take their cues from the candidates
by a process resembling persuasion. In essence, voters may be persuaded
to adopt the issue positions of a trusted and capable candidate (Page and
Jones, 1979).
Perhaps more important, however, is the observation that the voter's
own position is not the only basis of inferring candidates' positions, or
even necessarily the "best" means of doing so. Such inferences may also
be guided by a voter's prior beliefs about the issue positions of various
categories of politicians such as Republicans or conservatives (for a discus-
sion of this general process, see Conover, 1981; and Hastorf, Schneider,
and Polefka, 1970). For example, Page (1978) has shown that there have
been consistent differences in the policy positions of Democratic and
Republican presidential candidates on a number of domestic issues,
4 Specifically, new information - such as that provided by candidate advertising or na-
tional newscasts -is weighted or interpreted according to existing information. This
weighting process contributes to the over time stability of perceptions that is detected by the
cross-correlational techniques so commonly used in the study of candidate perception.
especially social welfare and race (also see Pomper and Lederman, 1980).
It is reasonable to think that voters will come to recognize such party dif-
ferences and develop more or less realistic beliefs about the positions
associated with each party. These beliefs need not be very elaborate; all
the voter requires is a general sense of the basic direction of the group's
issue position (see Rabinowitz, 1978). Various categoric characteristics
of a candidate can act as cues that trigger the voter's attribution to the
candidate of the general issue positions associated with that cue by the
voter's prior beliefs. For example, a voter may infer that a specific
Republican candidate is pro-business because over time the voter has
developed a belief that Republicans in general are pro-business. Thus,
the use of such prior beliefs to infer where specific candidates stand on
issues is an efficient means of minimizing information costs in an am-
biguous environment.
Which cues are most likely to be important to voters trying to ascertain
the candidates' issue positions? Certainly, as just implied, party- cues
represent a potentially rich source of inferential information. Further-
more, although many studies (e.g., Granberg and Brent, 1974; Kinder,
1978) that examine the impact of partisan cues on the perception of can-
didates are theoretically grounded in cognitive consistency theory, some
research has considered party cues from the perspective of what we would
call inference theory. For example, in his pioneering work, Downs
(1957) suggested that party cues may represent a "rational" short cut for
information gathering. Similarly, Converse (1975) has noted the "cue-
giving" function of political parties. More recently, Shively (1979) has
posited a functional model of party identification in which people iden-
tify with a party in order to establish an informational short cut to deci-
sion making. Along similar lines, traditional conceptions (i.e., Asher,
1980) of the meaning of ideological labels-liberals, moderates, conser-
vatives -implicitly suggest that such cues may be useful for inferring the
candidates' issue positions.5 Finally, research also suggests that a number
of ostensibly nonpolitical characteristics - for example, the race and sex of
the candidate - may function as cues that guide the inference of informa-
tion about a candidate, although intuitively we might expect such cues to
be more important to the inference of image traits rather than of issue
positions (Boles and Durio, 1980; Popkin et al., 1976; Sapiro, 1982).
Thus, previous research does suggest several potentially important types
of cues that may affect the perception of candidates.
To this point we have concentrated on how an individual's prior beliefs
5Recent work, however, suggests that such "ideological" cues or labels may not be linked
strongly to issue positions in the voter's mind (Levitin and Miller, 1979).
can be used to infer where candidates stand on specific issues. This is not
to argue, however, that inference only operates in one respect. On the
contrary, different types of inferences may also play an important role in
the perceptual processes underlying vote choice. We have already noted
that in a manner similar to persuasion, voters may use the perceived posi-
tions of the candidates (or for that matter the parties) as cues in shaping
their own issue positions. In addition, inference processes may influence
people's beliefs about where political parties stand on various issues and
where candidates and parties are located ideologically. Because over
time these other inference processes may become interdependent with
those directly affecting the perception of candidates' issue positions, we
should examine the entire set of dynamic relationships if we are to reach
an accurate understanding of the perception of candidates' issue positions.
Accordingly, in modeling the processes relevant to candidate perception,
our major goal will be to determine the degree to which voters rely on in-
ferences from political cues as a means of determining not only the can-
didates' issue positions, but also those of the parties and ultimately their
own issue positions. With this in mind, let us turn now to a more formal
specification of these inference processes.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
Most previous attempts to assess the processes of political perception
have relied on simple cross-sectional designs that fail to address the cen-
tral question of causality. The only way to eliminate such problems is to
specify accurately the causal processes in a fully identified model. But
the nature of causal relationships among political beliefs is seldom ob-
vious. Therefore, the development of such a model must depend on one's
theoretical understanding of these processes. Two aspects of the in-
ference process are critical for accurately specifying a model of candidate
perception: the operation of perception across time and the role of prior
beliefs. These two factors require that the measurement of the resulting
perceptions be preceded by the measurement of the prior beliefs that
helped to structure such perceptions. Given this situation, nonrecursive
models are clearly inappropriate since they imply simultaneous relation-
ships among the variables. Our model will be based instead on a series of
lagged recursive equations. Consequently, estimation of the model re-
quires the use of panel data.
Having settled on the need for lagged models, it is necessary to consider
the specification of the required time lag. This is a difficult problem
because perception is a continuous process; albeit there may be more
perceptual activity at some times than others (Neisser, 1976). In a real
world setting there is no possible way of specifying a time lag that isolates
a single, discrete unit of perceptual activity.0 In effect, there is no right
or wrong time lag to be identified. Rather, our task is to specify those
time frames that are most useful and interesting for studying the dynamics
of political perception under varying conditions. Specifically, it is im-
portant to note that the greater the political activity or stimulation at a
point in time, the more likely a person will be to seek out information,
and thus the greater the perceptual activity.
With respect to prior beliefs, two additional points must also be kept in
mind when specifying a model of these perceptual processes. First, the
prior beliefs or schemas that a person holds are not isolated from the
political and social environment in which he or she exists. Thus, for ex-
ample, people from different economic, racial, and social environments
are expected to hold different prior beliefs or schemas. Yet, because the
impact of these environmental factors on perception is mediated by the
prior beliefs themselves (Neisser, 1976; Taylor and Crocker, 1981), they
should not have any direct effect on perception and, therefore, need not
be explicitly considered in our examination of these inference processes.
Second, the impact of these various inference processes on the perception
of candidates' issue positions is likely to vary from candidate to candidate
as well as across individuals. When people have very well-developed
prior beliefs about a candidate-as might be true in the case of a well-
known incumbent-then the adjustment or change in the prior beliefs
resulting from the perception of new information may be slight. On the
other hand, if a voter is dealing with a candidate who is essentially
unknown, then a short period of perceptual activity may well account for
much of the information that the voter comes to have about the can-
didate. With these points in mind, let us turn to our models of the
various inference processes that are relevant to understanding the percep-
tion of candidates' issue positions.
Specifically, our model is composed of four equations. The first ex-
amines the relative impact of the projection process, as opposed to in-
ferences from party and ideology cues, on the perception of candidates'
issue positions. The second equation models the relative influence of can-
didate persuasion and inferences from party cues on the voters' own issue
positions. And the third and fourth equations concern the degree to
which perceptions of the parties' perceived positions and the candidates'
perceived ideologies are themselves the products of projection and in-
ference processes.
6 In a laboratory setting and through the use of experimental methods, researchers can
considerably improve their ability to isolate perceptual events.
Projection and Inferences from Party and Ideology Cues
As noted earlier, one of the most popular explanations for the percep-
tion of candidates' issue positions has been the argument that voters pro-
ject their own issue positions onto the candidates. Although projection is
one way of dealing with an ambiguous political environment, it is also
possible that voters infer the candidates' issue positions from other cues,
the most obvious of which are party and ideology. The relative impact of
these processes on perceptions of candidate one's (C1) stand on issue i at
time t is modeled in the following equation:
Ci's stand iz(t) = b10 + b11C1's standi(t-1)
+ b12 (R's standi(t-1)) C,Eval(t-1)
+ b13C1's Pty's standi(t_1)
+ b14C1's Ideo standi(t_l) + u1. (1)
Each of the terms in equation 1 represents a distinct process that con-
tributes to the perception of a candidate's issue position on issue i. The
first of these is a constant. The second term, the candidate's perceived
position at time t -1 (C1's standi(,l)), represents the stability remaining in
such perceptions once the other processes have been controlled. However,
a small stability coefficient (b1i) does not necessarily mean that percep-
tions of issue positions fluctuate randomly; their stability could be main-
tained by consistency over time in the other processes. The third term in
the equation, (R's standi(t ,))CiEval(,_,), describes the impact of the pro-
jection process as an interaction between the respondent's stand and his or
her evaluation of the candidate. It is essential to note that we have
modeled projection as an inference process. In effect, we argue that the
more highly evaluated the candidate then the more likely a voter is to in-
fer the candidate's position from his or her own. Thus, the relationship
between the voter's and the candidate's positions is positive for those can-
didates who are favorably evaluated and negative for the rest. This
treatment of the projection process stands in clear contrast to the
cognitive consistency interpretation in which the more highly evaluated
the candidate, the more likely voters are to reduce the perceived dif-
ference between their own issue position and the actual position of the
candidate (Markus and Converse, 1979). Our modeling projection as an
inference process is consistent with recent arguments that projection is
motivated less by an internal need for consistency than by the exigencies
of a political environment in which there is imperfect information (Page,
1978; and Page and Jones, 1979). Projection can be thought of as an in-
ference tool that is available to virtually all voters whenever ambiguity in
the political environment must be considered.
The third and fourth terms in equation 1 both represent inference pro-
cesses in which the voter uses political cues in order to determine a can-
didate's issue position. The third variable (C1's Pty's standi(t-,)
represents inferences based on the perception of where candidate one's
party stands on a particular issue. A voter may infer, for example, that
since the Democratic party is pro-welfare the Democrat's candidate is also
pro-welfare. The fourth variable (C1's Ideo standi(t-)) deals with a
similar inference process, only this time the relevant cue is the candidate's
ideology - his or her perceived position on the liberal/conservative con-
tinuum. It is posited, therefore, that a candidate labeled a "liberal" will
be attributed issue positions typically associated with liberals.
Persuasion from Candidate and Party Cues
As in the case of projection, persuasion may be thought of as a process
of cognitive inference. For example, voters may adopt the position of a
preferred candidate because they may actually be persuaded that a
trusted candidate's positions are justified (Page and Jones, 1979). Yet,
voters need not rely solely on candidates for the information necessary to
form their own issue positions. Voters may also make use of party cues as
a means of clarifying their own issues stands, so that over time their posi-
tions come into line with the parties' perceived positions. To test this
possibility we model the relative impact of persuasion from candidate and
party cues on voters' descriptions of their own issue stands.
R's standi(t) = b20 + b21R's standi(t_1) + b22(C1's standi(t_l))C,Eval(,_l)
+ b23(C2's standi(t-1 ))C2Eval(t-l)
+ b24(Repub's standi(, _))PID(t_i)
+ b25(Dem's standi(t_.))PID(t_l) + u2 (2)
In equation 2, the second term (R's standi(,-l)) again represents the stabil-
ity in the respondent's stand on issue i from time t -1 to t. The third and
fourth terms of the equation model the candidate's persuasion effects that
may occur in a two-candidate race. Both terms represent interactions
between the candidate's perceived stand (CQ's standi(t-1)) and the voter's
evaluation of that particular candidate (C,Eval(t_ )). As such, they are
intended to capture the positive or negative persuasion effects that may be
associated with varying degrees of candidate evaluation. For example,
the more positive a voter's evaluation of a candidate, the more likely he or
she is to adopt that candidate's issue position. Thus, as in the case of pro-
jection, persuasion is modeled as a process of cognitive inference. Fi-
nally, the last two terms represent the impact of party cues on the voter's
own issue positions. This process is modeled as an interaction between
the party's perceived stand (Dem's standi(,-l)) and the voter's party iden-
tification (PID(t1,)). Thus, there is a positive relationship between the
voter's position and the perceived stand of the party with which he or she
identifies, and a negative relationship with the opposing party.
Party and Ideology Cues
We have not yet considered the origins of the beliefs that guide a voter's
inferences from party and ideology cues. Earlier, we argued that a
voter's beliefs concerning the issue positions of a particular party or
ideology would be grounded in reality. Others might argue, however,
that there is another possibility: the inferences from party and ideology
cues modeled in equations 1 and 2 could themselves originally be the
product of projection. In essence, voters may actually project their own
issue positions onto a favored party, or project their own ideological iden-
tification onto a preferred candidate. Alternatively, since a party's
presidential candidate is often its most visible aspect, an individual's
perception of the party's position on a particular issue could be inferred
from where the party's candidate is seen as standing. Consequently, to
judge adequately the projection and persuasion processes modeled in
equations 1 and 2, it is essential to consider the origins of the voter's
perceptions of both the parties' issue positions and the candidates'
ideological placements. Towards this end, equation 3 depicts a party's
perceived issue position at time t as a function of four variables measured
at time t-1.
C1Pty's standi(t) = b30 + b3lC1Pty's standi(t-,) + b32C1's standi(t,)
+ b33C1Pty's Ideoi(,-,)
+ b34(R'sstandi(t_,))PID(t_l) + U3. (3)
The second term again represents the stability of the voter's perceptions
over time. The third term (C,'s standi(t-,,) models the inference of the
party's position from the perceived position of the party's candidate -a
process which reverses the causal ordering suggested in equation 1. The
fourth term (C, Pty's Ideoi(t-,)) depicts a process in which voters infer a
party's specific issue stands based on their beliefs about the party's general
ideological position. Thus, for example, those specific issue positions
associated with the "liberal" label would be attributed to a party placed
on the liberal end of the left/right continuum. The final term (R's
standi(t ,)PID(t,)) deals with the possibility that the parties' perceived
positions are shaped by the voter's own issue positions. This projection
process is modeled as an interaction between the voter's issue position and
his or her party identification.
Finally, a voter's perception of a candidate's position on the
liberal/conservative continuum is modeled in equation 4. The possibility
that voters project their own ideological identifications onto the can-
didates is captured in the third term. The fourth term represents a pro-
cess in which voters infer a candidate's ideological identification from the
placement of the candidate's party on the liberal/conservative continuum.
Finally, we have included a series of terms which test the possibility that a
voter's perception of a candidate's general ideological identification is in-
ferred from the candidate's specific issue positions. For example, voters
might infer that a candidate who adopts a conservative position on the
busing issue is in general a "conservative." These terms reverse the causal
ordering suggested in equation 1; consequently, they should help to
establish the true nature of the relationship between perceived ideological
position and perceived issue stands.
C1's Ideo(,) = b40 + b4l Cl 'sIdeo(,-l) + b42(R's Ideo(,-l))C,Eval(t,l)
+ b43C1's Pty Ideo(t,l) + E b4i C1's standi(t_l)
i =4
+ U4. (4)
DATA AND METHODS
We use the 1972-74-76 CPS National Election Panel Study as the data
base for estimating the parameters of the model. An initial issue is the
specification of the time lags to be examined. Given our previous discus-
sion of the relationship of perceptual activity to environmental stimula-
tion, it should be clear that it is impossible to identify a "correct" time lag
based on the expected duration of perceptual activity since the latter is
variable. Instead, we must select time lags that provide interesting van-
tage points from which to view the evolution of people's perceptions of
political candidates. Based on this criterion, we have chosen two time
frames for study. First, the model is estimated over the 1974-76 period
using respondents' perceptions of the issue positions of Gerald Ford and
the Republican party on five issues: guaranteed jobs and standard of liv-
ing, urban unrest, rights of the accused, school busing, and government
aid to minorities. This time frame is a useful one in several respects.
Because Ford was a relatively new national political figure in 1974, this
time lag allows us to follow the development of the public's percep' 'on of
him over time. Furthermore, a two-year time period permits a careful
examination of processes which may occur beyond a single election
period, such as the perception of the parties' issue positions. Finally, the
potential variation across issues in these processes may be examined with
these 1974-76 data.
The second test of our model involves the much shorter time frame en-
compassed by the 1976 pre- and post-election waves of the panel. The
pre-election wave was conducted in the two months preceding the elec-
tion while the post-election wave occurred within four months after the
election. These data allow us to examine perceptions of both Ford and
Carter with respect to a single issue - guaranteed jobs and standard of liv-
ing. Thus, we are able to assess the degree to which these various pro-
cesses differ between candidates. Moreover, the relatively short time
frame affords us the opportunity to examine these perceptual processes
within the context of a single election period when political activity is
relatively high. This should be especially true given that the two tele-
vised debates between the candidates took place during the pre-election
interviewing.
For both of these time lags, it is likely that a great deal of perceptual ac-
tivity is contained within the measurement period. In such cir-
cumstances, it can be shown that the parameter estimates obtained will
reflect the cumulative effects of the repeated perceptual activity, assum-
ing that there are no major changes in the prior beliefs and attitudes that
influence such perceptions.7 For the 1976 pre/post panel this assumption
presents no real problem since the relevant attitudes and beliefs should be
fairly constant across the panel interval. For the longer panel, this
assumption may be more tenuous -candidate evaluations, for example,
may vary significantly over a two-year period. Consequently, for the
two-year panel, the mean value of candidate evaluations [(x, + x, 1)/2]
will be used to estimate the evolution of the process across the panel
waves.8
A second important issue concerns the estimation of the four equations.
Since each equation contains a lagged endogenous variable, ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates could be biased since OLS assumes independence
of the independent variables and the error term. This assumption
becomes tenuous for lagged endogenous variables (Hibbs, 1973; Markus,
1979). Our solution for this is to employ two-stage least squares, using
instrumental variables in place of the lagged endogenous term (Hanushek
and Jackson, 1977; Markus, 1979)."
7 The structure of this process can be deduced by starting with the basic lagged model,
Y(t) = f(Y(,,), X(,,1)), and successively reexpressing the lagged endogenous factor in terms of
the previous period. Thus, for any number of such intervening cycles Y(,) can be expressed as
a function of Y(,),,, Y(t2), . . , Y(,,,) and X(,-,), X(t2), . . ., X(, n). The validity of the
parameter estimates from the equation based only on Y(, and X(- will then be seen to be a
function of the relative stability of these variables over the measurement period.
8 In fact, from an empirical perspective, it makes relatively little difference whether the
average candidate evaluations or the prior candidate evaluations (those made at t-1) are used
in the estimation of the model. The basic findings are quite similar regardless of which
operationalization is employed.
9 In estimating the model, the only variables treated as exogenous were party identifica-
tion, liberal/conservative identification, and candidate evaluations. In principle, of course,
With respect to the operationalization of the variables in our model,
the seven-point CPS issue scales are used to measure the respondents' posi-
tions on the issues as well as their perceptions of the parties' and the can-
didates' stands. For our purposes, each of these scales is recoded so that it
ranges from -3 to + 3. Similarly, the respondents' ideological self-
placements and their perceptions of the candidates' positions on the
liberal/conservative continuum are assessed in terms of a seven-point scale
that is recoded to range from -3 to + 3. But unlike party inferences, in-
ferences from ideology cues are not measured in terms of the respondents'
own perceptions of what specific issue positions are associated with each
ideological group. Rather, it is assumed that the "liberal" label is
associated with inferences that the candidate favors the following:
guaranteeing jobs, solving the problems contributing to urban unrest,
protecting the rights of the accused, school busing, and aid to
minorities.'0 Evaluations of the candidates are based on feeling ther-
mometer ratings that have been rescaled so that they range from -50 to
+ 50. As noted above, the mean evaluation {[eval(t) + eval (t -1)]/21
will be employed for those portions of the analysis involving the two-year
time lag.11 Finally, the standard CPS party identification measure is col-
lapsed into three categories-Democrats, Independents, and
Republicans - coded -1, 0, + 1 depending on the interaction between
the voter's and the candidate's party identification. Specifically, when
the voter and candidate share the same identification, the measure
attitudes towards the candidates should have been treated as an endogenous variable (as were
the other issue scales). However, such a model would have presented difficult identification
problems.
10 This measurement procedure was necessary because on most issues respondents were not
asked to place liberals and conservatives on the seven-point scale. We do not regard the
assumption underlying this procedure as being too unrealistic since this does not require that
all voters be able to identify correctly the liberal and conservative sides of each issue; obvi-
ously, many people are not able to do this. All we require is that a sizable number of people
are sufficiently able accurately to connect ideology and issues in order to use ideological labels
as cues. It is likely that those people who would use ideology as a cue are the same people
who can interpret issues along liberal/conservative lines. In this regard, Levitin and Miller
(1979) find evidence that the well educated in particular are able to distinguish liberal from
conservative sides of some issues. These same people are also likely to use ideology as a means
of inferring issue positions. In our analysis, then, a significant ideological inference term
would mean that people who perceive a candidate as liberal (conservative) would infer that
he or she took traditional liberal (conservative) issue positions. Building this assumption into
our analysis should result in an underestimate of the impact of ideological cues on political
perception.
11 The correlation between the Ford feeling thermometers in 1974 and 1976 was .61. In
contrast, the correlations of the average rating with each of the two years is as follows:
average with 1974 rating = .87; average with 1976 rating = .89.
assumes a value of + 1; when the voter is an independent, a 0 is assigned;
and when the voter and candidate have the opposite identification, a -1
is assigned.'2
FINDINGS
Projection and Inferences from Party and Ideology Cues
Let us look first at the estimates for equation 1, which compares the im-
pact of projection, party, and ideology inferences on perceptions of the
candidates' issue positions.13 Presented in table 1 are the unstandardized
regression coefficients for Ford's position on the five issues during the
1974-76 period.'4 The stability coefficients for perceptions over the two
12 This coding of party identification was used to facilitate the interpretation of the regres-
sion coefficients. The analysis was replicated using the entire seven-point measure with no
significant change in the estimates. Party identification proved to be more stable than the
feeling thermometer ratings (correlation of '74id and '76id = .81); consequently, as modeled,
party id is measured at t-I for both time lags. For this analysis, the independent leaners are
treated the same as the pure independents.
13 Before turning to our findings let us note that one consequence of our measurement pro-
cedures was a relatively sizable shrinkage in the number of cases available for analysis; most
of the tables that will be presented are based on less than half of the sample. In effect, a
number of respondents were unable either to place themselves, the candidates, or the parties
on the issue scales, or they might not have had a partisan or liberal/conservative identification
to report. Respondents were eliminated from the analysis only if they had any missing data
for the particular equation being estimated; nonetheless, the cumulative effect was a signifi-
cant reduction in the N. Yet, interpreting the impact of this reduction on our findings is
somewhat problematic. In general, the respondents who remained in the analysis may be
slightly better informed and more interested in politics than those eliminated from the
analysis. Consequently, they might be expected to have fewer information "gaps" to fill in
and thus, generally, may make less use of inference processes. In this sense our findings may
possibly underestimate the general impact of inference processes. At the same time,
however, our findings about the relative use of specific inference processes may also be
somewhat biased. In particular, the role of ideological cues may be greater among this subset
of the electorate. Similarly, given that it is perhaps the easiest inference tool to use, projection
may be more common among that portion of the electorate left out of the analysis. Of
course, more in depth studies need to be done in order to ascertain specific levels of inference
among broader cross-sections of the electorate.
14 All the estimates reported here are from the application of two-stage least squares where
the other lagged independent variables in the equation are used as instruments for the lagged
endogenous term. These estimates turned out to be virtually the same as OLS estimates for
the same equations, which could mean that there is little or no autocorrelation with these
time lags (Hibbs, 1973; Markus and Converse, 1979). We report unstandardized coefficients
throughout since they are directly comparable within and across equations (all variables are
in the same basic units), and are unaffected by differences in variances. Standardized betas,
in contrast, would be influenced as well by the relative variances of the variables and would
be difficult to interpret in the case of interaction terms. The absolute size of the estimates
should be viewed with some care since they would likely be systematically depressed by
stochastic error in the measurement of the issue variables (Achen, 1975).
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years are generally quite low; for one issue - jobs -the coefficient is not
even statistically significant. Only in the case of busing does the stability
coefficient begin to achieve sizable proportions. Such variation across
issues may stem from differences in the prominence of these issues. In
contrast to the stability coefficients, both inference terms are significant
for all five issues. The party inference term especially has a consistently
strong effect across issues; on average, inferences from the Republican
party's position are about 40 percent stronger than either the stability
coefficients or inferences from Ford's perceived ideological position.
In order to judge the relative magnitude of projection effects, it is
necessary to convert those coefficients into the same units as the other
coefficients. This can be done by multiplying the projection coefficient
by a specific level of candidate evaluation. For example, the mean
evaluation of Ford by Ford voters was + 25 on the converted feeling ther-
mometer -an evaluation that produces an average projection coefficient
of .105. Such a projection effect is relatively modest when compared to
the average effect of either the ideology or, especially, the party inference
processes. In fact, it is only among voters who evaluate Ford the most
positively (a score of 500) that the average projection effect, .21, ap-
proaches that of the party inference term. Thus, over a two-year period,
although the projection and inference processes are about equal in
strength among voters with the most extreme evaluations of Ford, for the
average voter both inference terms are greater in strength than the projec-
tion process.
These findings may be contrasted with those produced by estimating
equation 1 for perceptions of both Ford's and Carter's positions on the
"jobs" issue during the 1976 election. Once again using unstandardized
regression coefficients with their standard errors in parentheses, the
parameter estimates for these two equations are as follows:
Ford's stand(,, = .57 + .31 Ford's stand(,l)
(.037)
+ .0019(R's stand(,tl,) Ford Eval(,tl,
(.0008)
+ .07 Repub's stand(tl,) + .08 Ford's Ideo(tl,)
(.037) (.033)
R2 = .19);
Carter's stand(t) = -.44 + .18 Carter's stand(t l,
(.041)
+ .0031 (R's stand(t ,)) Carter Eval(tl,)
(.0008)
+ .17 Dem's stand(,l-) + .04 Carter's Ideo(t-l)
(.042) (.038)
(R2 = .15).
Comparing first perceptions of Ford's position on the "jobs" issue dur-
ing the two time periods, we find, not surprisingly, considerably greater
consistency in the voters' perceptions during the 1976 election period than
during the longer 1974-76 period. The stability coefficient is roughly
five times higher for the election period than for the two-year time lag.
Similarly, although the inference processes again have a greater influence
on perceptions of Ford than does projection,'5 the impact of all three
processes is less than half of what it was during the longer time period.
Two explanations may be offered for this pattern of findings. The pro-
jection and inference processes may be relatively gradual in nature, thus
requiring longer time periods for the detection of their cumulative effects.
Alternatively, by 1976 Ford's media exposure as president may have been
sufficient to allow the voters to establish relatively clear, stable percep-
tions of his issue positions.
The relative validity of these two explanations may be explored by com-
paring the estimates of equation 1 for perceptions of Carter on the "jobs"
issue with those for Ford's position. If the processes occur only gradually
over long periods of time, then the estimates should be similar. If, on the
other hand, the stability of the estimates for Ford are primarily a function
of the length of time he had been on the national scene, then we would ex-
pect to find stronger inference and projection effects on perceptions of
Carter, since he had not yet received the exposure accorded a president.
A comparison of the two equations suggests that the latter is the more
probable explanation.
Apparently, by the final stages of the campaign, Ford's tenure as presi-
dent had worked to stabilize perceptions of him on the jobs issue. In con-
trast, late in the campaign voters still seemed to be struggling to define
Carter's position on the "jobs" issue; the stability coefficient for Carter is
much smaller than Ford's-.18 compared to .31. At the same time, the
inference and projection terms for Carter both approach substantial pro-
portions. Furthermore, as was the case in the two-year and six-month
estimates for perceptions of Ford, the party inference term for Carter
dominates the projection estimate among average voters. Only among
voters with very strong evaluations of Carter does the projection effect
15 Here again we are dealing with the case of projection effects calculated for average
(? 25) evaluations of Ford.
begin to approach the strength of party inferences (projection
effects = .16 for those with a 500 rating). Finally, in contrast to both
sets of Ford estimates, inferences based on Carter's perceived ideological
stance have very little impact on perceptions of his position on the "jobs"
issue. This suggests that voters may have encountered some difficulty in
labeling Carter as either a "liberal" or "conservative," and consequently
they made little use of ideology cues.
Taken together, these three sets of estimates help us understand the
various processes which shape a voter's perception of the candidates' issue
positions. The relatively modest levels of stability apparent in such
perceptions may be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, they
may indicate the presence of substantial measurement error (Achen,
1975). Yet, at the same time, such instability may actually reflect the
nature of the voter's political world. Often, voters confront an am-
biguous political world in which candidates deliberately try to cloud their
issue positions (Page, 1978). Faced with such ambiguity, voters appear
to do the best they can; they use available information to infer what the
candidates' issue positions must be. In this regard, previous studies had
focused on the role of projection in generating such needed information.
Although our findings do reveal some projection effects, they also strongly
suggest that inferences from political cues, particularly party cues, play a
more important role in the perception of candidates' issue positions.
Persuasion from Candidate and Party Cues
Let us now consider the factors contributing to voters' own issue posi-
tions. In this regard, table 2 provides the parameter estimates of equa-
tion 2 for the 1974-1976 period. The most striking feature of this set of
estimates is the substantial size of the stability coefficients. This is not
particularly surprising, however, given that people's own issue positions
are usually considerably more stable than their perceptions of some
political candidate (Bruner, 1978; Kinder, 1978).
Much more surprising is the almost total lack of support for the persua-
sion hypothesis. None of the five Ford persuasion terms is significant;
voters apparently did not adjust their own issue positions based on their
perceptions of Ford. Furthermore, voters are only slightly more likely to
allow party cues to shape their issue positions. Although one of the
Democratic party terms and four of the Republican ones manage to attain
statistical significance, substantively the effects are rather minimal. Thus,
for these issues, there is little evidence that either Ford's issue stands or
those of the two parties had any sizable effect on the voter's own issue
positions. This failure to uncover any substantial persuasion effects may
be attributable to several different factors. On the one hand, voters may
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have been persuaded to alter their issue positions by political figures other
than Gerald Ford. Alternatively, persuasion may be a relatively infre-
quent process, occurring primarily in response to the intense rhetoric that
candidates and parties produce during certain moments of a national
campaign. Both of these possibilities may be considered by examining
the following estimates of equation 2 for perceptions of the voters' posi-
tions on the "jobs" issue during the 1976 pre- and post-election time
period:
R's stand(,) = .51 + .38 R's stand(,-,)
(.023)
+ .0014(Carter's stand(, -,)Carter Eval(,l)
(.0008)
+ .0002(Ford's stand(- ,))Ford Eval(,,
(.0009)
+ .05(Dem's stand(,_,))PID(t_1)
(.025)
+ .09(Repub's stand(t_,))PID(t1 ) (R2 = .31).
(.027)
As indicated by these estimates, the persuasion hypothesis again does
not fare very well; both candidate persuasion terms are statistically in-
significant. Thus, the lack of persuasion effects is apparently not can-
didate specific since it applies to both of the major candidates in the 1976
presidential election. The party inference or persuasion terms do
somewhat better; both are statistically significant, although relatively
weak in their impact on the voters' positions on the "jobs" issue. In sum-
mary, both our tests reveal that candidate persuasion has virtually no in-
fluence on voters' issue positions while the effects of party persuasion ap-
pear to be only modest.'6
16 Our results on persuasion are apparently at odds with two recent studies of this process.
Our differences with Markus and Converse (1979) are actually quite small since their results
showed significant but substantively weak persuasion effects on four of the five issues they ex-
amined. The much stronger persuasion effects found by Abramowitz (1978) are more dif-
ficult to reconcile with our findings. Based on a small panel interviewed just before and after
the first presidential debate in 1976, Abramowitz found substantial persuasion effects on an
issue question similar, although not identical to, our jobs and standard of living item. Using
this issue on the 1976 pre- and post-election waves we attempted to replicate Abramowitz's
analysis. In accord with our previous estimates no persuasion effects could be detected. We
have no firm answer for this discrepancy although the much shorter time span of his panel
and the more specific question wording could be responsible. In effect, specific persuasion
effects may have a short-lived impact of only a few days or weeks. If this is in fact the case,
then the importance of persuasion to electoral behavior is limited to that which occurs at the
last minute before an election.
Party Cues
To this point, two findings have consistently emerged from our
analysis. First, although voters do engage in some projection, inferences
from party and ideology cues are more important in determining their
perceptions of the candidates' issue positions. Second, voters' own issue
positions are not a product of candidate persuasion, although they are
shaped slightly by party cues. Still, we must consider the possibility that
inferences made from party and ideology cues are themselves products of
some earlier projection. Focusing first on party cues, we can test this
possibility by considering three different sets of estimates of equation 3,
which models the voter's perception of a party's issue stands. Table 3
contains parameter estimates for the perception of the Republican party's
stand on the five issues during the 1974-76 time period.
Looking first at the stability coefficients for perceptions of the party's
issue positions, we find that they fall between the high levels of stability
characterizing the respondents' own issue positions and the considerably
lower levels of stability associated with perceptions of the candidates'
issue positions. The more critical question-whether perceptions of the
Republican party are a product of projections from the voters' own issue
positions-must be answered in the negative. For two of the five issues
the projection coefficients are not even statistically significant, while for
the other three issues they are quite small, albeit significant. Thus, the
impact of party inferences on perceptions of both the candidates' stands
and the voters' own issue positions does not appear to be undermined by
previous projections from the voters.
Two other aspects of these estimates also provide interesting insights
into those inference processes relevant to vote choice. First, there ap-
pears to be a strong tendency to infer the party's positions on specific
issues from its general location on the liberal/conservative continuum. For
example, voters who place the Republican party on the conservative end
of the ideological continuum tend to infer that the party also adopts
conservative stands on specific issues. This suggests that a perceived shift
in the ideological position of a party could lead voters to infer more
specific changes in the party's issue positions. Alternatively, the stability
over time of a party's perceived issue positions may be due in large part to
consistent perceptions of the party's general ideological location.
Also apparent from table 3 is the tendency of voters to infer the
Republican party's stands from Gerald Ford's issue positions. Taken
together with our earlier findings, this suggests that there is a reciprocal
relationship between perceptions of a party's issue stands and those of its
presidential candidate. Furthermore, although in the case of the
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Republican party and Gerald Ford, the party effect (i.e., inference from
the party to the candidate) is on average stronger than the candidate ef-
fect for the five issues, it is possible that the balance between the two ef-
fects may depend on which particular candidate or issue is involved. On
issues where party cleavages are not clear, voters may rely more heavily
on candidate inferences in determining the party's position. Voters also
may be more likely to infer a party's positions from a well-known can-
didate who is an established party leader than from a relatively new can-
didate. Evidence pertaining to this point is provided by estimating equa-
tion 3 for perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties' positions
on the "jobs" issue during the 1976 election:
Repub's stand(,) = 1.07 + .18 Repub's stand(,-,)
(.035)
+ .03(R's stand( ,))PID(_1,)
(.020)
+ .17 Ford's stand(,-,) + .16 Repub's Ideo(,-,)
(.034) (.031)
(R2 = .23);
Dem's stand(t) = -.02 + .23 Dem's stand(,,)
(.039)
+ .06(R's stand(t,1))PID(t1 )
(.023)
+ .09 Carter's stand(t-,) + .17 Dem's Ideo(t-,)
(.035) (.033)
(R2 = .19).
Based on the above argument, we would expect voters to be more likely
to make inferences from Ford's than from Carter's issue stands, given that
Ford's presidency should have installed him in the public's eye as more the
Republican's "leader" than Carter - a relative newcomer - was the
Democrat's leader. The estimates for equation 3 confirm this; Ford is
used more as a cue for inferring the Republican party's position on the
"jobs" issue than Carter is used to infer the Democratic party's position. In
other important respects, however, these estimates are similar across the
two parties and tend to support the conclusions of our analysis from the
1974-76 period. Specifically, of critical importance to the validity of our
earlier findings, the estimates for both parties again reveal little evidence
that perceptions of the parties' positions are a consequence of projection.
Finally, the estimates for this short time lag are almost as large as those
from the two-year lag equations, suggesting that this particular inference
process is fairly robust under widely varying conditions.
In summary, our earlier findings concerning party cues are not eroded
by these estimates of the processes underlying the perceptions of the par-
ties' issue positions. In all three estimates of equation 3-estimates which
encompass two time periods and both parties - we find little evidence that
voters project their own issue positions onto the parties. Instead, to the
degree that voters are unsure of where the parties stand on an issue, they
rely on candidate and ideology cues as a means of generating the missing
information. Furthermore, their use of such cues varies according to the
issues and candidates involved. Where the voter lacks information about
a party's stand on an issue that cuts across party cleavages, he or she is
likely to turn to the candidates, rather than basic ideology, for the
necessary cues. Yet, at the same time, voters distinguish between can-
didates, relying more heavily on those who appear to be party leaders.
Thus, perceptions of the parties' issue positiors, like those of the voters
and the candidates, are significantly influenced by inference processes.
Ideology Cues
Finally, as in the case of party cues, ideology cues may also have been
influenced by prior projection, and this possibility must be investigated
before the interpretation of equations 1 and 2 can be accepted. Conse-
quently, using the 1974-76 panel, we have estimated equation 4, which
models the perception of the candidate's ideological position:
Ford Ideo(,) = .69 + .23 Ford Ideo(t,,
(.057)
+ .0022(R's Ideo(, ,))Ford Eval(,l)
(.002)
+ .28 Repub's Ideo(t,) + .09 Ford Jobs(,,)
(.051) (.049)
- .02 Ford U. Unrest(,,) - .01 Ford C. Rights(,,)
(.045) (.040)
+ .01 Ford Busing(,,) - .03 Ford Aid(,-,)
(.040) (.049)
(R2 = .26).
Three aspects of these estimates deserve comment. First, as in the case
of party cues, there is only limited evidence of projection effects; voters do
not heavily base their estimates of a candidate's ideology on their own
ideological identification. Thus, both of the inference effects - party and
ideology -found in equation 1 seem relatively uncontaminated by prior
projection effects. Second, there is little evidence that voters infer a can-
didate's general ideology from the candidate's specific issue positions. Of
the five issues examined, "jobs and standard of living" was the only one in
which perceptions of Ford influenced the voters' estimates of his basic
ideology. Thus, ideology acts as a cue for inferring specific issue posi-
tions, while, as recent research (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Levitin and
Miller, 1979) has argued, such identifications seem to have their own
origins elsewhere. Finally, although projection and inferences from
specific issue positions have little impact on perceptions of Ford's
ideology, party inferences do have a strong impact on such perceptions.
In fact, the Republican party's perceived ideology has a greater impact on
perceptions of Ford's ideology in 1976 than do perceptions of Ford's own
ideology in 1974. Thus, once again we find strong evidence that voters
rely heavily on inference processes to help them fill in needed information
about the candidates.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a general framework for the study of
political perception that stresses the role of inference. Specifically, our
theory provides an inference explanation for the previously hypothesized
processes of projection and persuasion. In addition, we have identified
another important set of factors - political cues and prior beliefs - that
have not received a great deal of attention from political scientists.
Perhaps most importantly, the general inference model that we have
outlined provides a basis for integrating the analysis of projection and
persuasion effects with the impact of political cues. The resulting focus
of this approach is clearly broader than the simple working hypotheses of
previous studies.
Our empirical analysis focused on the application of the general in-
ference model to the specific case of the perception of candidates' issue
positions and the various cues and beliefs associated with such percep-
tions. Several very clear conclusions emerged from this analysis. First,
we found very little evidence of persuasion effects; there were no persua-
sion effects whatsoever for the two candidates and only marginal effects
for the parties. Despite the strength of these findings, however, let us
hasten to add that further analysis is still required to determine whether
persuasion may occur under specific conditions such as the period at the
beginning of a campaign. Second, we found that projection, or in-
ferences from voter's own issue positions, did play a role in the perception
of candidates' stands. Thus, to some extent, voters do infer that the can-
didates they feel positively toward also share their issue positions. Much
more substantial, however, were the effects of inferences based on two
other cues: candidate ideology and partisan affiliation. For the voters we
considered, both of these factors, especially the latter, were more impor-
tant determinants of perception of the candidates' stands than was projec-
tion. Specifically, our analysis clearly revealed that when voters attempt
to determine where candidates stand on various issues they rely to a great
extent on their prior experiences with the issue positions of members of
that party or ideological group. Furthermore, these substantial effects of
party and ideology cues were detected despite the possibility that our two
time lags may have missed periods during which inference might have
had a greater impact.
We also discovered strong effects of inference in people's perceptions of
where candidates stand ideologically and in perceptions of the parties'
positions on issues. People apparently make little use of the candidates'
specific issue positions when making judgments about where the can-
didates stand ideologically. Rather, voters tend to infer the candidates'
ideological stances from party cues; voters infer, for example, that the
candidate of a conservative party may also be labeled a conservative. In
addition, the parties' ideological positions are useful in a second respect:
people use them to infer where the party stands on specific issues. Thus,
although the origins of voters' liberal/conservative self-identifications are
largely non-issue based (Levitin and Miller, 1979; Conover and Feldman,
1981), they nonetheless are able to use liberal/conservative cues in order
to infer where parties and candidates stand on issues. Finally, our
analysis showed that perceptions of party issue positions are influenced by
the candidates' stands on those issues. This suggests a reciprocal relation-
ship in which, over time, the leading party figures are used to generate ex-
pectations about where the party itself stands; in turn, these expectations
are used in the perception and judgment of new candidates from that
party.
In terms of the study of electoral choice and issue voting, the various
tests of our model have several interesting implications. As just noted,
our tests reveal virtually no candidate persuasion effects and only modest
levels of projection, thus suggesting that proximity measures are not
seriously biased by these two processes. This is not to imply, however,
that proximity measures are uncontaminated by various perceptual pro-
cesses. On the contrary, if we think of issue voting in the strictest sense as
being based on the direct and accurate perception of distinct candidate
stands, the inference processes discussed here would bias proximity
measures so that they overestimate issue voting. Yet, it can be argued
that the overestimation of issue voting due to such inference processes is
not particularly serious; in many instances, a voter is likely to be fairly ac-
curate (to the extent that parties choose candidates consistent with their
long-term ideology and issue positions), and, consequently, a vote based
on such inferences may approximate the traditional conception of issue
voting.
The broader theoretical implications of our findings are also encourag-
ing. When faced with the adverse conditions created by an ambiguous
political world, voters do the best they can; they use political cues to
generate information about the candidates and parties. Furthermore,
though it is not a perfect substitute for the unbiased perception of clear
candidate or party stands, the use of political cues is an efficient and
reasonable response to ambiguity. In fact, the voters' reliance on in-
ference processes may be more than simply cognitively efficient, it may be
rational as well. Often, the candidates' campaign strategies and media
coverage of the election combine to minimize the amount of information
that is readily available to potential voters. This increases ambiguity and
therefore raises the costs of information by forcing voters to invest more
time and effort into the process of uncovering the candidates' issue posi-
tions. In such circumstances, it becomes quite rational-rational in the
sense of cutting costs and making a best guess about reality -to rely on in-
ference processes as a means of generating information. Of course, even
though voters' inferences may be both satisficing and optimizing, whether
they are also realistic ultimately depends upon the particular situation.
For example, inferences from party cues about a candidate's position
should be more realistic on those issues for which the parties clearly differ
than on issues which cut across party cleavages (Page, 1978). Similarly,
it makes more sense to infer a party's position from that of an established
leader than to rely on a "newcomer" for political cues. But although in
some instances a voter's inferences may be misleading, we suspect that the
general contribution of inference processes to vote choice is a positive one.
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Candidates' Issue Positions: The Role of Inference in Voters' Perceptions

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Candidates, Issues and Voters: The Role of Inference in Political Perception

Author(s): Stanley Feldman and Pamela Johnston Conover

The Role of Inference

Pamela Johnston Conover

candidate ambiguity on voters' perception come to be appreciated. In this paper, we use a

much more important factors in candidate perception.

recognize the central role of candidate perceptions in the electoral pro-

cess. Research has clearly demonstrated important interpersonal dif-

ferences in how people perceive both candidate images (Nimmo and

Savage, 1976) and candidate issue positions (Aldrich and McKelvey,

1977; Page, 1978). Moreover, such perceptions of the candidates and

components of vote choice in recent presidential elections (Markus and

importance of candidate perceptions in the vote choice process, there

have been few systematic attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of

sideration of candidate perception do so as a byproduct of their concern

pact of issues?); and thus, they seem satisfied to be guided by essentially

"working" hypotheses about the nature of the perceptual process. Conse-

quently, there has been a limited growth in our understanding of the

various processes that underlie candidate perception.

The need for a theory of candidate perception is clearly illustrated by

suasion," a process in which voters adjust their own positions so as to

bring them in line with those of the candidates. Furthermore, in the

absence of theoretical direction, even sophisticated analytic procedures

cannot untangle these processes. Therefore, one important step toward

understanding the phenomena of issue voting would be a comprehensive

theory of the perception of candidates' issue positions.

In this paper, we attempt to go beyond the narrow interpretations of

political perception offered by previous research involving the perception

of candidates. By utilizing recent theory and empirical work in

psychology, we first specify a more general explanation of the inferential

processes involved in political perception. This approach not only ac-

counts for the effects commonly described as projection and persuasion,

but it also identifies previously ignored factors influencing political

perception. We then apply this theory to a particular problem: the

perception of candidates' issue positions.

The need for an explanation of the perception of candidates' issue posi-

varies in its perceptions of the same candidate. As Page (1978) has

shown, on certain issues a not insignificant portion of the public has

located the same candidate at every possible position on a seven-point

scale. In explaining such perceptions of candidates' issue positions, the

perceptions of the candidates' stances, although there is a pronounced

asymmetry: the relationship is much stronger (in the positive direction) in

didates (where the relationship is in the negative direction).

As noted above, two processes are typically advanced to account for

tions of the candidates' stands: projection and persuasion. Furthermore,

mine which of these explanations is employed. Ambiguity should

facilitate projection while at the same time make it more difficult to

engage in persuasion (Bruner, 1978; Granberg and Brent, 1974; Kinder,

suggest that the political environment is typically ambiguous, results from

the cross-sectional studies are usually interpreted as evidence of projec-

tion. In comparison, relatively few studies have examined either process

produced mixed results as to which process is more prevalent (Meier and

Campbell, 1979; Repass, 1976; Abramowitz, 1978; Markus and Con-

verse, 1979; Shaffer, 1981).

From a theoretical perspective then, a critical issue in any theory of

candidate perception must be the explanation of projection and persua-

pirical findings from a cognitive consistency perspective, which assumes

periences an uncomfortable feeling that can be alleviated by altering the

inconsistent beliefs or behavior (see for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld,

Granberg, 1982). Agreeing with a candidate one is voting against and

disagreeing with the candidate one is supporting are seen as inconsistent

positions to be avoided or resolved by the voter. Thus, from this perspec-

tive, both projection and persuasion represent internal mechanisms that