The Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Negotiations of 1973-74

Abstract: This article discusses the Israeli-Syrian Disengagement negotiations

following the October 1973 war. Both sides' intransigence in linking the POW issue

to other issues prevented the beginning of negotiations, an impasse skillfully resolved

by U.S Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Throughout the negotiations he succeeded

in persuading both sides to soften their positions, especially during his May 1974

shuttle between Jerusalem and Damascus. The Disengagement agreement signed on

May 31, 1974 was implemented by June 26.

From the point of view of Israel, the October War of 1973 ended in military

success on the Syrian front. At the war's outset the Syrians made great territorial

gains, pushing the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) behind the ceasefire line of the Six

Day War, the Purple Line. In the southern Golan Heights the Syrians advanced

halfway to the Jordan River, while in the north they reconquered Israeli positions on

Mt Hermon. Yet by October 10th not only had the IDF pushed the Syrians back

across the Purple Line, its tanks were advancing towards Damascus. They captured 55

square kilometers more territory than they previously had and this was called the

salient. The forward position of the IDF enabled arterial shelling of the capital of

Syria. In the last days of the war the IDF succeeded in retaking its former

fortifications on Mt Hermon, acquiring even more territory on the mountain than it

had held before the war.1

2

From the End of the War to Kissinger's Diplomatic Shuttle

In the postwar negotiations Syria had only one card to play – the issue of

POWs. During the war Syria had captured 65 Israeli soldiers, while Israel claimed to

be holding 254 Syrian POWs. Israel got reports about the murder and torture its

POWs, a claim Syria denied. Following the war the POW issue became an obstacle to

Israeli-Syrian negotiations because it was linked to other not directly relevant

matters.2

In discussions with Syrian deputy foreign minister, Muhammad Isma`il, in

Washington DC on 2 November on Syrian-American relations, US Secretary of State,

Henry A. Kissinger, also brought up Israel's request for a POW exchange. Isma`il

replied that first both sides needed to exchange lists of names of the POWs in each

other's custody and that Israel was in contravention of the Geneva Conventions for

refusing to deliver the bodies of dead Syrian soldiers, and he also brought up the issue

of the 15,000 Syrian civilians expelled from the salient. On his own initiative Isma`il

proposed an exchange of lists of POWs in return for the dead soldiers' bodies and the

return of Syrian civilians to the salient. Complete exchange of POWs, he suggested,

could be made after Israel's return to the 22 October ceasefire line – meaning a

complete withdrawal from positions it held on Mt Hermon since according Syrian

understanding they were reconquered after the ceasefire had gone into effect. He also

pointed out that there was no guarantee that his own government would accept this

formulation.3

With some modification, Israel did accept this formula, suggesting an

exchange of lists of POWs as a first step, after which civilians would be permitted to

return to the salient. Then Israeli withdrawal from its positions on Mt. Hermon would

be submitted to the UN. Finally a full exchange of POWs would occur. Declining to
3

link the POW issue to an Israeli withdrawal, Syria rejected the plan, claiming that the

Israeli withdrawal was connected only to Security Council Resolution 339 and had to

be done immediately without any reference to the POW issue. Nevertheless Syria

promised to treat Israeli POWs according to the Geneva Conventions in exchange for

Israeli reciprocity toward Syrian POWs.4

In mid-November UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, sent Roberto E.

Guyer, his Deputy for Special Political Issues to Jerusalem and Damascus to try to

resolve the POW issue. Guyer met with both the Syrian foreign minister, 'Abd al-

Halim Khaddam and Isma`il, and after that with Syrian president, Hafiz al-Assad.

Khaddam and his vice minister suggested an exchange of wounded POWs following

an Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October ceasefire lines. They posited the return of the

Syrian civilians to the salient and the delivery of dead soldiers' bodies as a

precondition. Assad offered a POW exchange upon issuance of an Israeli statement

agreeing to withdrawal to the 22 October lines. Following this Syria would submit its

position on Mt Hermon to the UN. Israel rejected Assad's offer, noting that Damascus

raised its price with every discussion and that the POW issue wasn't intrinsically tied

to the other issues, and furthermore that Israel had obtained its position on Mt

Hermon before the ceasefire came into effect.5

At the end of November Syria rejected a publically announced offer by Israeli

Prime Minister Golda Meir in which Syrian civilians would be permitted to return to

their homes and that two Israeli positions on Mt Hermon would be turned over to the

UN in exchange for a release of POWs. The Syrian response, published in a Syrian

news source agreed only to a partial list of POWs in exchange for Israeli withdrawal

to the 22 October ceasefire lines and a civilian return to the salient. A full POW

exchange would be carried out only after an agreement for Israeli withdrawal from
4

Syrian territory was reached, with the pace of the POW release coinciding with the

pace of Israel's withdrawal of troops.6

Syria ignored attempts by other states to intercede on the POW issue. In mid-

December Great Britain appealed twice to Syria asking for a gesture on the POWs,

but Syria rejected the first appeal and ignored the second. A similar request from

Egypt also received a negative Syrian response.7

The deadlock on the release of POWs clouded the future of the proposed

Geneva Peace Conference. Israel announced that it would not take part in the

conference even if Syria did attend as long as there was no progress in resolving the

POW problem. Not wanting to be blamed for sabotaging the conference if Syria were

unwilling to resolve the POW issue, Israel asked the US to exert 'maximal pressure on

Syria and the USSR in order to guarantee that before the scheduled opening date of

the conference, Syria would at least submit a list of POWs …, allow the Red

Cross…to visit them and would return the wounded POWs'8.9

At the end of November Kissinger informed Haytham al-Kaylani, Syrian

ambassador to UN about the proposed Geneva Peace Conference, mentioning that the

US and Egypt projected that the conference would open in mid-December with the

first phase devoted to military problems. Participation by the parties to the conflict ─

Syria, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan ─ would be at the ministerial level. In reply to

Kaylani's query what would the topics discussed at the conference be, Kissinger

replied disengagement of forces and a first stage Israeli withdrawal. Kissinger

surmised that there would be no substantial progress until after the Israeli elections

which were to take place at the end of the year.10

In mid-December Kissinger traveled to the Middle East in order to finalize the

details of the conference and to convince the Syrians to participate. It was his first
5

visit to Syria. Khaddam told to Kissinger that he didn't know whether it was better for

Syria to take part in a conference with Israel or not, saying that he wouldn't be the

first Syrian to sign a document with Israel. Afterward Kissinger and Assad met for six

and half hours and discussed the global dimensions of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Kissinger informed Assad that the conference was designed to provide a legal

framework for negotiations, but that all agreements would be reached outside of it. He

reiterated that before the beginning of the conference Syria had to deliver to Israel a

list of POWs, allow for a Red Cross visit, and release wounded POWs. A full POW

exchange would take place within the framework of the disengagement agreement.

Linking the POW issue to the disengagement agreement, Assad stipulated that the

POW list would be transferred only upon conclusion of the agreement. Nevertheless,

he assured Kissinger that the Israeli POWs were being well treated.11

Next Assad inquired about the nature of the conference: was it to be mere talks

or were binding arrangements to be arrived at? He said that 'he was not dreaming

about going to it'12, but that his final decision depended upon this conversation with

Kissinger. In the course of discussions a large gap between the two men's positions

became apparent: while Assad held that an agreement on disengagement had to be

reached before the opening of the conference, Kissinger maintained the just opposite.

When Kissinger asked Assad if he objected to the invitation to the conference, he

replied that he didn’t agree with the phrasing that said that all sides had agreed to

attend. In summarizing the Syrian position toward the end of the meeting, Kissinger

said that Syria didn't care about the opening date of the conference because it didn't

intend to attend anyway. Assad accepted Kissinger's summary as essentially correct.13

The gap between Kissinger's and Assad's positions didn't only concern linkage

of the Geneva Conference with disengagement, it also concerned the line of Israeli
6

withdrawal. Kissinger called Syrian insistence upon the 22 October ceasefire line

stupidity, asserting that under pressure a much larger Israeli withdrawal could be

achieved. After explaining the planned Israeli withdrawal in Sinai – first something

small followed by a withdrawal to the Mitla and Gidi Passes, Kissinger suggested a

similar approach to the Golan: begin with disengagement in January followed by

negotiation on boundaries, security and so on. Assad said Israel had to return all

captured Syrian territory ─ its claim that holding on to Syrian land would give it more

secure boundaries was ridiculous in light of the firepower of modern weaponry ─ and

in any case this claim shouldn't come at the expense of Syria. He added that if the US

told Israel to withdraw, as it did after the Sinai War of 1956, Israel would do so

immediately. Neither did Kissinger accept the Syrian demand to draw the withdrawal

line first, nor its desire to fix this line without Israel's participation.14

The disengagement agreement reached between Israel and Egypt in January

1974, enabled Kissinger to focus his full attention on Israeli-Syrian disengagement. In

his conversations with the Israelis about the Egyptian agreement, Kissinger asked for

Israel's thoughts on the agreement with Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan

delivered private nonobligatory offers in mid-January, which Kissinger referred to as

a cunning exercise. At the next Assad-Kissinger meeting on 20 January, the Syrian

president offered three alternative proposals for disengagement: Israeli withdrawal

from all of the Golan Heights which would then remain demilitarized, Israeli

withdrawal from most of the Golan except for a five kilometer strip, and Israeli

withdrawal to the middle of the Heights. Israel rejected all of those offers because it

didn’t want to begin any negotiation on territory without resolving the POW issue, or

at least receiving a list of POW names and a guarantee of a Red Cross visit, while
7

Syria refused to budge from its demand that a prisoner exchange had to be negotiated

in parallel with a return of territory.15

In early February Kissinger, by simultaneously meeting the minimal demands

of both sides managed to resolve the two problems of the prisoner exchange and the

oil boycott. Offering the good offices of the US as a prop, he suggested that the US

receive the POW list from Syria but deliver it to Israel only after it presented realistic

proposals for disengagement. By 7 February both sides accepted the Kissinger

proposal. Syria disclosed the number of POWs it held and on 20 February delivered

the list of names of POWs to Kissinger. However, contrary to Kissinger's suggestion,

the Israeli proposal did not include withdrawal west of the Purple Line. With regard to

the oil boycott imposed by oil producing Arab states on the West during the war,

Kissinger twice informed Assad that he wouldn’t take any measures to promote

disengagement until the boycott was lifted. The Syria stance was to maintain the

boycott until disengagement had been achieved. By mid-February Kissinger had

prevailed: both Egypt and Saudi Arabia promised to lift the boycott the following

month.16

In his fourth journey to the Middle East at the end of February-early March

Kissinger also spent time in Jerusalem and Damascus. He gave Israel the POW list,

insisting that Israel fulfill its part of the bargain. Israel proposed dividing the salient,

part of it could become a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil administration and the

rest would remain under Israeli control. In the south and the center of the Heights

Israel would withdraw to the Purple Line in order to create a UN buffer zone. On both

sides of the line for a depth of 30 kilometers Israel proposed the establishment of

three zones containing limited weaponry. Kissinger called this proposal ridiculous. He

emphasized the necessity for an Israeli withdrawal west of the prewar line which
8

would include the city al-Qunitrah. However, he promised that there would be no

withdrawal from the settlements that Israel had established in the Golan Heights,

adding that this US administration didn't expect Israel to give up the entire Golan

Heights and there wouldn't be a second stage withdrawal with Syria (except for this

disengagement) as there was to be with Egypt. In Damascus Assad promised that the

Red Cross would start to visit the Israeli POWs on 1 March, and asked that the

withdrawal reflect territorial gain by Syria, in other words return of land west of the

Purple Line. Otherwise he threatened to break off negotiations. In the second Assad-

Kissinger meeting, Kissinger said the Israeli proposal wasn't worth introducing, but

that Assad's proposal was equally unreasonable. Kissinger and Assad agreed that a

Syrian representative would come to Washington DC for discussions on

disengagement, after which Israel would send its representative.17

Kissinger meanwhile exploited the time before arrival of the Israeli

representative in Washington to soften the positions of both sides. To the Israeli

ambassador in the US, Simcha Dinitz, he reiterated the necessity for withdrawal west

of the prewar line including Qunitrah, emphasizing that since there wasn't to be

second stage withdrawal on the Syrian front there was no need to keep territory. He

said the same to the Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, adding that he wouldn't

expect Dayan, the Israeli representative sent to Washington to accept this withdrawal

for reasons of negotiation management. Responding to a note from Assad demanding

an Israeli withdrawal to approximately the middle of the Golan Heights, Kissinger

conceded that Israeli withdrawal to the line that Syria proposed wasn't realistic, yet

promised him the best result possible. Meanwhile the US representative in Damascus

reported back in mid-March that Syria understood that if Israel withdrew from

Qunitrah and the salient, there would be no further negotiations in the coming years.18
9

In mid-April representatives from both sides' came to Washington for talks:

Dayan from Israel and Hikmat Khalil al-Shihabi, the head of military intelligence

from Syria. Dayan proposed to divide the salient between Syria and Israel with a UN

buffer zone placed in between. Syria would get the majority of the land, and the UN

buffer zone would be under Syrian civil administration. The buffer zone would

include Syrian positions on Mt Hermon currently held by Israel. In the center of the

Golan Heights and in the south the Purple Line would be maintained, with a UN

buffer zone established there. The government of Israel agreed to give up all of the

salient if the achievement of an agreement depended on it, but under no circumstances

would it withdraw west of the Purple Line. Regarding the limitation of forces, Israel

suggested three zones: ten, 25 and 30 kilometers. In the 30 kilometer zone both sides

wouldn't be allowed to place Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), in the middle zone they

would only be allowed one infantry brigade and 300 tanks and 100 guns, while in the

first ten km zone there could be only 60 tanks and 3,000 soldiers. Shihabi rejected this

proposal, claiming it entailed concessions of Syrian sovereignty and weakened the

defense of Damascus. Shihabi and Kissinger agreed that this proposal didn't have to

be shown to Assad. He presented a new disengagement line, slightly different from

Assad's but still in the center of the Heights. It included a UN buffer zone under

Syrian civil administration to a depth of only 6-3 kilometers. He objected to a large

presence of armed UN forces with enforcement authority in the buffer zone and in

response to Dayan's three zone proposal, he suggested one zone which would contain

a large number of UN observers having expanded authority. Kissinger told both

representatives that their proposals weren't realistic, and continued to pressure Israel

to give up territory west of the Purple Line including Qunitrah, promising Shihabi that

he could obtain such terms from Israel.19

10

Kissinger's Diplomatic Shuttle – May 1974

By the time of Kissinger's diplomatic shuttle the principles of the future

agreement had already emerged. Both sides had agreed to an Israeli withdrawal and a

Syrian advance, the establishment of a UN buffer zone, and a return of Syrian

civilians to territory that Israel intended to evacuate. The big gap between the two

sides was in drawing the disengagement line and the nature of the limitation of forces.

A few days before Kissinger left on his Mid-East mission, Assad retracted his consent

for establishing a zone of restricted militarization, arguing that the UN buffer zone

rendered it unnecessary.20

The Withdrawal Line

The main sticking point in the discussions between Syria and Israel during

Kissinger's diplomatic shuttle was the line of Israeli withdrawal, especially around the

city of Qunitrah. The Israeli proposal of 2 May somewhat modified the Dayan

proposal made in March; it included a reduction in the depth of the withdrawal in the

northern Golan Heights and an increase in the territory returned to Syria in the south.

Israel objected to give up its positions on Mt Hermon and wanted to retain the

mountainous area between Mt Hermon and Qunitrah around Jubta al-Khashab which

was referred to as the Himalayas. However, Israel did agree to withdraw west of the

Purple Line around Rafid in the south. In response to Kissinger's warning that 'the

Syrians [would] go to war, [with] the high possibility the Egyptians [would also] go to

war'21 if he were to show that proposal to Damascus, Israel revised its offer the

following day. Kissinger suggested that Israel should at least withdraw from the

Qunitrah area which could be made into a UN buffer zone and it should withdraw in

the south as well. The new Israeli proposal did include making the mountain of the
11

Himalayas and Eastern Qunitrah into a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil

administration, a readiness to find a solution to the issue of Mt Hermon which

wouldn't include a Syria presence in positions from which Israel was to withdraw and

a willingness to widen the UN buffer zone westward if Syria would agree to a similar

widening eastward. Perceiving that Damascus would also find this new proposal

unacceptable and that it certainly wouldn't receive any support from Egypt, which was

critical in this round of negotiations, Kissinger argued that a line in which all of

Qunitrah would be placed in a UN buffer zone would provide the mechanism for

obtaining Egyptian support.22

On 3 May Kissinger and Assad met for the first time during the shuttle.

Kissinger avoided presenting the Israel proposal, instead showing him the earlier

Dayan proposal in order to demonstrate how far the Israelis had come. Assad

remarked sarcastically: 'Why didn’t you show me that right away? ... I would

certainly have accepted it…May I sign it now?'23 adding 'this makes it clear there is

no solution [to Arab-Israeli Dispute] until one of us exterminates the other'23. Assad

rejected the Israeli counter offer particularly in the north, averring that he had no

intention of giving up on his proposed line in the middle of the Heights.24

Israel's next offer did include partial concessions on Qunitrah, proposing to

divide the city into three: the eastern part would become a UN buffer zone populated

by Syrians and under Syrian civil administration, while the western part would be

under Israeli control and populated by Israelis. The middle zone would remain

unpopulated and would be UN buffer zone under Israeli civil administration. Israel

would withdraw west of the Purple Line in the north to Qunitrah, granting permission

to repopulate villages south of Qunitrah. Alternatively Israel agreed to make all of

Qunitrah into a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil administration if Syria agreed not
12

to repopulate it. The military lines would be outside the city on its eastern and western

flanks. Israel also agreed to withdraw from the all of the salient, except for the

Himalayas which could become a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil administration.

With regard to Mt Hermon, Israel agreed to hand over the old Syrian positions to the

UN, provided that the area wouldn't be repopulated, and in the south to withdraw

from Rafid which could be repopulated as a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil

administration. Kissinger contended that while this proposal indicated forward

movement, it was still inadequate because it would be regarded as a blow to Syrian

sovereignty and Egypt and the other Arab states wouldn't pressure Assad into

accepting it. Once again Kissinger reiterated that all of Qunitrah needed to be placed

in a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil administration, and that Assad wouldn't agree

to leaving the hills west of the city, Tel al-Aram (today's Avital) and Tel Abu-Nida

(today's Bental), in Israeli hands. Kissinger also asked Israel to withdraw westward

from the Purple Line between Qunitrah and Rafid.25

On 8 May when showing only part of the Israeli proposal to Assad, Kissinger

intimated that he could still get a little more. Upon reviewing the terms proposed for

Qunitrah Assad responded, 'it is totally out of the question'26, 'this isn't sufficient'27

and that in exchange for giving up his line 'he ha[d] to get something'27. He

emphasized that there wasn't a substantial enough Israeli withdrawal from the Purple

Line, nor was there consent to the return of Qunitrah as a populated city. Assad

reiterated that he needed to see an Israeli withdrawal from former Syrian positions on

Mt. Hermon and he would only agree to a line of withdrawal similar to that in

Shihabi's proposal. As Kissinger's plane was about to take off, Khaddam and Shihabi

reinforced that the return of Qunitrah was meaningless unless it were to be

repopulated, and for that purpose Syria needed the hills west of it.28
13

Four days later Kissinger came back to Damascus and showed Assad the

whole Israeli proposal. Assad pointed out that it would be impossible to repopulate

the villages from which Israel agreed to withdraw. It also would be impossible to live

in a divided Qunitrah with the hills west of it in Israeli possession as well. He

suggested that he might give up on the hills in exchange for additional villages,

among them Majdal Shams. He claimed that Rafid didn't interest him because it was

just a police station and not a populated village. He threatened to break off

negotiations once again if Israel didn't withdraw to the 22 October ceasefire line on

Mt Hermon. He rebuked Kissinger for not getting major concessions out of Israel,

reiterating that the Syrian position was peace based on the 1967 borders and not a

disengagement agreement.29

In Jerusalem between these two visits to Assad, Kissinger signified to the

Israelis that it was in their best interests to agree to the repopulation of entire city of

Qunitrah as part of a UN buffer zone under Syrian civil administration rather than

having it divided or unpopulated. Kissinger continued to press this point even after his

12 May visit to Damascus, stressing the importance of the hills to Syria and the

necessity of not bringing the disengagement line near the city. Upon realizing that

Israel would reject his recommendation to return Majdal Shams, he asked for

concessions somewhere else. The next Israeli offer did consent to turn all of Qunitrah

into a repopulated UN buffer under Syrian civil administration, with the border being

on its westernmost road. In order to give the city some breathing room, the Israeli

military line would be west of this border. Israel refused to give up the western hills,

but undertook not to station heavy weaponry upon them. Israel categorically rejected

Assad's claim that Rafid couldn’t be populated.30

14

In spite of Kissinger's strong advocacy for this plan ─ comparing it to the

Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement ─ Assad rejected this proposal. Kissinger

said that Israel had made the maximum concessions possible and that it wasn't going

to agree to anything more. Assad still maintained that while he wanted

disengagement, the present proposal wasn't acceptable since it would be impossible to

live in Qunitrah with Israeli forces on three sides of the city. He claimed willingness

to divide the hills between Syria, Israel and the UN, or even to concede the city

entirely if the second stage of the Israeli withdrawal could be accomplished quickly.

Assad continued to insist that Israel withdraw to the 22 October line on the Hermon

and west of the Purple Line between Qunitrah and Rafid, while handing over more

villages in that area.31

Kissinger's attempts to convince Israel to make more concessions were indeed

futile. He pointed out that the disengagement line that Israel was proposing would

bring negotiations to a standstill and render unobtainable the other issues under

negotiation such as the limitation of forces and the positioning of the UN force. While

claiming that Assad needed to liberate Qunitrah, the capital of the Golan Heights in

order to justify the agreement to Syrian public opinion, Kissinger thought that he

could get Assad to accept the Israeli line in Qunitrah if it could be straightened out

more and moved further away from the city, and if a solution to the problem of the

hills could be found, either by transferring them to the UN, or by obtaining an Israeli

commitment not to install heavy weaponry on them. Israel complained about all these

demands, arguing 'we have moved a long way since the Defense Minister came to

Washington…we offer[ed] them one-third of the new salient and then we moved…hill

by hill, and they knocked [all] these [offers] down. They always say it is

insufficient'32. Despite Israel's refusal to present a new line, Israel did agree to
15

Kissinger's introducing an American proposal resolving the situation in Qunitrah,

provided that it be placed in a demilitarized UN buffer zone administered by Syria,

with the hills remaining in Israeli hands without any UN presence, and the

disengagement line running as close to the city as possible.33

The American Proposal was introduced to both side between 18-16 May. Both

Israel and Syria agreed to it in principle, and ten days later they agreed on a

disengagement line after the other issues of the limitation of forces and the UN

positions had been settled. Kissinger proposed that in order to give the population of

Qunitrah breathing space, the line would run about one kilometer from the city both in

the north and the south, while the line in the west the border would be 200 meters

outside the city. The Israeli military line would start at the bottom of the hills, about

kilometer and half away. Israel would deliver guarantees to the US that it would

restrict the weaponry on the hills and these would be passed on to Syria. On 18 May

Assad agreed to this proposal, while the issue of Mt Hermon and the Syrian line were

settled on 28 May.34

UN Force

From the very beginning Israel demanded that the UN force in the buffer zone

have the same enforcement authority as the UN force in the Sinai. Kissinger

supported this demand over the Syrian position calling for UN observers only.

However, after Kissinger's first visit to Damascus Assad consented to an armed and

portable force and later on he was brought to accept the mandate of this force as per

the Israeli-American proposal. At first Syria opposed the UN presence would include

the word 'force', but later agreed to the United Nations Disengagement Observer

Force (UNDOF).35
16

The biggest discrepancy in the Israeli and Syrian positions regarding this force

was its size. At the onset Syria agreed to an 'adequate' number of soldiers without

specifying the exact number. However, when each side indicated the number of

soldiers it thought were required for the task, a significant gap appeared. The first

Israeli proposal was for a force of 3,000, while Syria wanted only 300. Later on Syria

capped the number of soldiers at 1,000. Syrian opposition to a large force resulted

from its reluctance to see foreign soldiers in Damascus, which might be interpreted by

the local populace as an occupation. When Kissinger clarified that the force would be

stationed around Qunitrah, Syria withdrew its demand and accepted a final number of

1,250.36

Limitation of Forces

The limitation on the type of armaments that would be allowed in the area on

either side of the UN zone was a critical issue in the negotiations, as well as the depth

of this area. In the first Kissinger-Assad meeting on 3 May, Kissinger brought up the

subject without specific details, and Assad rejected it totally, asserting that the entire

Golan Heights was Syrian territory 'so that any additional limitation on this

territory…should lead to an Israeli withdrawal from…this territory'37. In the next

meeting, Assad neither rejected nor accepted the idea of a limitation of forces.38

On 11 May Israel proposed two limitation zones, the one closest to the

disengagement line would be ten km deep with the second zone extending 15 km

behind the first. In the first zone only two infantry battalions and two armored

battalions (altogether 3,000 soldiers, 60 tanks, and 30 APCs) could be stationed. In

the second zone only two infantry battalions, four armored battalions and one artillery

battalion, (a total of 10,000 soldiers, 140 tanks, and 18-12 guns with a 17-12 km

range) could be stationed. There would be no offensive weaponry, meaning SAMs or

17

antitank missiles. Behind the 25 km line SAMs and long range artillery capable of

reaching the other side's territory could not be positioned. Kissinger presented the

plan to Syria as one 25 km zone which could contain up to 200 tanks and 13,000

soldiers, without giving any details on the artillery. Syria rejected it, claiming that its

intention was to undermine the defense of Damascus. However Syria agreed in

principle to a force limitation in one 10-5 km zone.39

Denying any intention to undermine the defense of Damascus, Israel rejected

the Syrian position. It noted that identical restrictions would be placed on both

countries and the plan demanded only light redeployment of the Syrian army around

Damascus. Israel withdrew its demand for a written Syrian consent to a second

demilitarized zone in the agreement and was ready to accept a written American or

Soviet guarantee stating that within a 25-10 km zone from the disengagement line

both sides would refrain from emplacing weaponry that could reach the other's

territory.40

In the second half of May Syria presented a counter offer consisting of one 6-5

km zone in which a maximum of 9,000 soldiers, 100 tanks, and three short range gun

batteries, or up to 54 guns could be stationed. Syria rejected Israel's proposal that 25

km behind the disengagement line, weaponry that could reach the opponent's territory

could be placed. Nevertheless, Assad did accept this principle on the emplacement of

SAMs. Assad reasoned that redeployment of the Syrian army could be interpreted by

citizens of Syria as a defeat, which in turn would undermine his regime. Israel

rejected the Syria offer, claiming that it threatened the Israeli settlers in the Golan

Heights. Contending that it had made the maximum concessions for the line, Israel

now asserted that it was Syria's turn to do the same regarding the limitation of forces,
18

but expressed willingness to give up the whole subject if Syria agreed to change the

line.41

After a strenuous month of negotiations, both sides agreed to a ten km zone,

which allowed emplacement of only 6,000 soldiers, 75 tanks, and 36 short range guns.

Assad agreed to putting his long rang guns and SAMs at distances of 20 km and 25

km, respectively. He also agreed to a second zone in which up to nine brigades, two

or three of them armored could be stationed. This would include 162 long range guns.

However, Assad stipulated that the details of the second limitation zone could not be

included in the written agreement because he didn't want to acknowledge it publicly.

Israel refused to be satisfied with a verbal commitment from Syria. The solution once

again was an American proposal containing a written guarantee to Israel from Syria

communicated through the US, exactly like the Israel guarantee about the Qunitrah

hills.42

Towards the end of the negotiations Israel raised the issue of foreign forces in

Syria, announcing that it wouldn't sign any agreement allowing foreign forces to be

stationed in the limitation zones. At the time of the negotiations Saudi, Moroccan, and

Cuban forces were stationed near the ceasefire lines. Contrary to Kissinger's fears,

Assad accepted a secret written commitment, but stressed that any public reference to

this commitment would necessitate his bringing those forces closer to the line.43

Israel also insisted upon receiving a clear statement from Syria regarding

terrorism across the ceasefire line. Israel demanded a sentence in the agreement

requiring both sides to 'prevent other people [from] act[ing] from [within] their

territory'44 and that 'each party [would be] responsible that no other military or

paramilitary [force would] act from [within its] territory'44. Kissinger was skeptical

that Assad would agree to this, and offered to give Israel a letter stating that the US
19

supported the Israeli interpretation of the agreement regarding infiltrators and if the

issue arose, it would be handled by the US within the framework of US-Syrian

relations. At first Assad refused to accept any obligation in this regard, but later he

agreed to a vague formula to prevent hostile action, provided it wouldn't be published.

Kissinger assured Israel that he would declare its right of self defense against

terrorism publically, and that the US would support Israel on this matter in every

international arena.45

Israel wasn't satisfied by this vague formulation nor by Kissinger's assurances.

It insisted upon a clear and unambiguous statement from Damascus. At Israel's

request Kissinger went back to Damascus proclaiming that was going to publicly

announce that attacks 'by whomever' across the ceasefire line were contrary to the

ceasefire, and he asked Assad to clarified 'exactly what might happen…what were

[his] intentions'?46 Kissinger added that a letter summarizing the conversation would

be forwarded to Israel. Under Kissinger's pressure, Assad reiterated Syria's obligation

to maintain the ceasefire declaring: 'there will be no firing across the lines by anyone.

There [will be] no possibility for organized armed bands to cross into Israel. No

fedayeen (terrorist) can be stationed in the front areas47'. He warned Kissinger not to

publish this, but said he wouldn't deny an Israeli statement about it as long as it didn't

refer to a written guarantee or letter.48

The final agreement between the two states was approved on 28 May by Syria

and a day later by Israel. The signing ceremony took place in Geneva on 31 May.

Following discussions about the details of the application of the agreement, a second

document was signed on 5 June in Geneva. Injured POWs were exchanged on 1 June

and the remainder of the POWs were returned six days later. By 26 June both sides
20

assumed positions along the agreed upon disengagement line and implemented the

limitation of forces.49

Conclusions

Despite of the initial gap in the Israeli and Syrian positions, the desire on both

sides to achieve a agreement resulted in its success six months after the start of the

war. During the negotiations the American secretary of state threw his weight behind

its success, first by loosening the Gordian knot of the linkage of the POW issue to the

disengagement negotiations, and then by his indefatigable shuttling between

Jerusalem and Damascus to pressure both sides into reaching an agreement on the

fractious issues of the disengagement line and the limitation of forces. Kissinger's

efforts still bear fruit almost four decades later, for in spite of the endemic volatility of

the region, there is quiet across Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line.

1
H. Bartov, Daddo: 48 Years and 20 more Days (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2002),pp.409-587; B. Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (Tel Aviv: Am Embassy Oved,
2003),p.386; M. Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers, 1976), pp.595-662
2
Dayan, Story of My Life, p.709; NARA, RG 59, 1970-1973, Box 2614, POL 15 SYR, NEA – Joseph
J. Sisco to The Secretary, "Meeting with Syrian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed
Zakariya Ismail Friday, November 2, 5:00 pm", 1 Nov. 1973
3
ISA/RG93/A/4996/6, Gazit to Dinitz, 31 Oct. 1973; E.C. Keefer, et al (ed.), Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 25 (Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973), (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 2011), pp.849-53.
4
ISA/43/A/7049/4, "P.M Conversation with Naftali at Saturday night; November 3"; ISA/93/A/4996/6,
Shalev to Eli Mizrahi, "re Deputy P.M – Ahrale Yariv Conversation on Syrian Issue", 4 Nov. 1973;
NARA, RG 59, 1970-1973, Box 2614, POL SYR-BEL, Joseph J. Sisco to The Secretary, "Syrian
Response to your Proposal", 4 Nov. 1973; NARA, AAD, RG 59, Am Embassy Tel Aviv to Department
of State, "Subjrct: Syria/Israel: Growing Differences", 12 Nov. 1973; NARA, RG 59, 1970-1973, Box
2614, POL SYR-BEL, Department of State – Briefing Paper, "Syria – Syrian Position on the Ceasefire
and Prisoners of War", Dec. 1973
5
ISA/93/A/4996/6, Gazit to Dinitz, "re Shalev LV/475", 16 Nov. 1973; NARA, RG 59, 1970-1973,
Box 2614, POL SYR-BEL, "Syrian Position on the Ceasefire and Prisoners of War", Dec. 1973
6
NARA, RG 59, 1970-1973, Box 2614, POL SYR-BEL, "Syrian Position on the Ceasefire and
Prisoners of War", Dec. 1973
7
ISA/43/A/366/6, London to Office, "from Conversation with Hope from the ForOff", 14 Dec. 1973;
ISA/130/MFA/5201/13, Washington to Office, "from Meeting with British Reeve on His Initiative", 19
Dec. 1973; ISA/43/A/366/9, London to Office, " Introductory conversation with la-Ken", 29 Jan. 1974
8
ISA/93/A/4996/6, Dinitz to Gazit, 28 Dec 1973
9
Ibid; W.B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p.139
10
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, pp.962-6
11
H.A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), pp.778-83; S.L.
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making American's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
21

Reagan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.271; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 25,
pp.1066-85; ISA/43/A/270/6, Washington to Office, "from Lunch with David Korn", 28 Dec. 1973
12
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.782
13
Ibid, 778-83; Quandt, Peace Process, p.140; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, pp.1066-85
14
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, pp.1066-85; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.778-84
15
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.848-50, 939; ISA/43/A/366/8, Washington to Office, "The
Ambassador Meeting with the Secretary at 1900 o'clock. Were Present Peter Rodman and the
Undersigned", 9 Jan. 1974; ISA/43/A/366/9, Office to Washington, "Performance on the
Disengagement agreement", 30 Jan. 1974; E.C. Keefer et al (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United
States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 26 (Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976), (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 2012), p.105
16
Keefer FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.108-22
17
Ibid, pp.123-5, 187-200; ISA/130/MFA/5976/4, "Meeting between Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister
of Israel and Delegation and Dr. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Delegation", 27 Feb.
1974; ISA/130/MFA/5976/4, "P.M-Kissinger Conversation at the Dinner in the P.M House on
February 27, 1974"; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.965
18
ISA/130/MFA/5976/1, Shalev to Gazit, "Simha Meeting with Naftali Tonight at 2100 o'clock in the
State Department", 7 March 1974; ISA/130/MFA/5976/1, Dinitz to Gazit, "After the Conversation
Remained for tete a' tete which lasted Half an Hour", 7 March 1974; ISA/130/MFA/5976/4,
Washington to Office, FonMin-Kissinger Conversation on 15.3.74", 15 March 1974;
ISA/130/MFA/5976/1, Dinitz to Gazit, "before the Beginning of the Meeting Naftali Asked FonMin
and Me to a Separate Conversation", 19 March 1974; Nixon, NSC Files, Box 631, Syria Vol.1,
Department of State to Damascus, "Subj: Message from the Secretary to President Asad", 9 March
1974
19
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.168-200; ISA/130/MFA/5976/2, "Disengagement of Forces
Plan", Undated
20
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.1045-7
21
ISA/43/A/7061/1, "Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State of USA and Delegation
and Mrs. Golda Meir Prime Minister of Israel an Delegation", 2 May 1974
22
Ibid; ISA/43/A/7067/1, "Conversation between Dr. K and P.M. in Rodman and Dinitz's Participation
in 3.5.74 at 0800 o'clock in P.M house Jerusalem"; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.215-18
23
ISA/43/A7061/1, "Working Session, Saturday Evening, May 4, 1974"
24
Ibid; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, p.220; ISA/43/A/7038/18, "Meeting – U.S. Secretary of
State Dr. H. Kissinger and Delegation and Prime Minister Golda Meir and Delegation", 5 May 1974
25
ISA/43/A/7038/18, "Meeting – U.S. Secretary of State Dr. H. Kissinger and Delegation and Prime
Minister Golda Meir and Delegation", 5 May 1974; ISA/43/A/7061/1, "Meeting between Dr. Henry
Kissinger, United State Secretary of State and Delegation and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of
Israel and Delegation", 6 May 1974; ISA/43/A/7067/1, "P.M Meeting with Kissinger + DefMin", 7
May 1974; ISA/43/A/7067/1, "Meeting P.M – K' and DefMin in P.M Office", 7 May 1974
26
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. pp.26, 256
27
ISA/43/A/7067/1, "Meeting between P.M – K' – 8.5.74 – 8:00 in the evening"
28
Ibid; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.241-69
29
ISA/43/A/7061/3, "Meeting U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, and Delegation and Prime Minister
Golda Meir, and Delegation", 12 May 1974
30
Ibid; ISA/43A/7061/2, " Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Ministers Dayan, Eban, Peres, and Rabin and Delegation", 11 May 1974;
ISA/43/A/7038/18, Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel and Delegation", 13 May 1974
31
ISA/43/A/7061/4, "Meeting U.S. Sec'y of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and Delegation and Prime
Minister Golda Meir, and Delegation", 14 May 1974; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.1075
32
ISA/43/A/7061/4, " Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Mr. Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel and Delegation", 16 May 1974
33
Ibid; ISA/43/A/7061/4, "Meeting of U.S. Sec'y of State Dr. Henry Kissinger and Delegation and
Prime Minister Golda Meir and Delegation", 14 May 1974; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.1079-82
34
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.284-351
35
ISA/43/A/7061/1, "The Conversations with Dr. Kissinger – 2.5.74"; ISA/43/A/7061/1, "Working
Session, Saturday Evening, May 4, 1974"; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.220 ,292; Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval, p.1099
22

36
ISA/43/A/7061/1, "Working Session, Saturday Evening, May 4, 1974"; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. 26, pp.292-297; ISA/43/A/7061/5, "Meeting U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. H. Kissinger , and
Delegation and Prime Minister Golda Meir, and Delegation", 20 May 1974; Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval, p.1099
37
ISA/43/A/7061/1, "Working Session, Saturday Evening, May 4, 1974"
38
Ibid; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.252-69
39
ISA/43/A/7061/2, "Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Ministers Dayan, Eban, Peres, Rabin and Delegation", 11 May 1974; ISA/43/A/7061/3,
"Meeting U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, and Delegation and Prime Minister Golda Meir, and
Delegation", 12 May 1974
40
ISA/43/A/7061/5, "Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel and Delegation", 19 May 1974
41
ISA/43/A/7061/5, " Meeting U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and Delegation and Prime
Minister Golda Meir, and Delegation", 22 May 1974
42
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.296-364; Quandt, Peace Process, p.152; Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval, pp.1093-9
43
ISA/43/A/7061/5, "Meeting U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and Delegation and Prime
Minister Golda Meir, and Delegation", 24 May 1974; ISA/43/A/7038/18, "Meeting between Dr. Henry
Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and Delegation and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of
Israel and Delegation", 26 May 1974
44
ISA/43/A/7061/5, "Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Delegation and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel and Delegation", 19 May 1974
45
Ibid; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.1090-1106; Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, pp.316-48
46
ISA/130/MFA/7031/11, "Meeting between Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and
Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel and Delegation", 29 May 1974
47
Keefer, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 26, p.353
48
Ibid, 335-60
49
ISA/43/A/4183/4, "A. Events Table since October 6, 1973"; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.1104-7