A Three Factor Model of Social Identity. Cameron, James E. Self and Identity

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A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity

James E Cameron
a
University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
b
Department of Psychology, Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, B3H 3C3 E-mail:
Version of record first published: 17 Feb 2007.
To cite this article: James E Cameron (2004): A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity, Self and
Identity, 3:3, 239-262
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Self and Identity, 3: 239–262, 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/13576500444000047
A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity
JAMES E. CAMERON
University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
Despite the importance of the social identification construct in research and theory
on group processes and intergroup relations, the issue of its dimensionality remains
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 02:42 17 December 2012
unresolved. It is proposed that social identity can be represented in terms of three

factors: centrality; ingroup affect; and ingroup ties. I examined the efficacy of this
model in five studies involving a total of 1078 respondents, one nonstudent sample,
and three group memberships (university, gender, and nationality). Results of
confirmatory factor analyses support the acceptability of the tripartite model, which
fits the data significantly better than one- or two-dimensional (cognition/affect)
alternatives. Correlations with theoretically relevant variables provide support for
the convergent and discriminant validity of the three factors. Advantages and
implications of the three-factor model are considered, with particular reference to
social identity theory.
Over the past 15 or 20 years, social identity has assumed an increasingly important
role in research on group behavior and intergroup relations. This can be attributed
not only to the theoretical significance ascribed to social identification by social
identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), but also to the availability of
measures of social identity, many of which are derivative of a scale developed by
Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, and Williams (1986). Furthermore, measures of
social identity provide potentially powerful tools for use in research on social groups,
because they allow predictions to incorporate who is likely to perceive and act in
group terms, to remain committed to the group in times of crisis (Spears, Doosje, &
Ellemers, 1999), for instance, or to discriminate against an outgroup (e.g., Perreault
& Bourhis, 1999). Despite this focus on social identity, several issues concerning the
conceptualization and measurement of the construct remain unresolved. One
fundamental and recurrent issue concerns whether social identification occurs along
a single low/high dimension, or whether it is better represented in terms of several
separable facets (Brown et al., 1986; Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, &
Ouwerkerk, 1999; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989; Jackson,
2002; Jackson & Smith, 1999). There is recent and mounting evidence that
Received 7 December 2001; accepted 6 April 2003

A University of Queensland Postdoctoral Research Fellowship and a University of Queensland New
Staff Research Grant supported this work. Portions of the data were presented in April 1999, at the
meeting of the Society of Australasian Social Psychologists. The data used in Studies 1, 3, and 4 derive
from larger data sets analyzed (respectively) by Cameron (1999), Cameron et al. (2002), and Cameron
(2001).
I thank Scott Reid, Mala McHale, and Daniel Johnson for their assistance with the data, and
Jolanda Jetten and Russell Spears for their helpful suggestions.
Address correspondence to James E. Cameron, Department of Psychology, Saint Mary’s University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3C3. E-mail: jim.cameron@stmarys.ca
239
240 J. E. Cameron
multidimensional measurement of social identity is indeed appropriate and useful

(Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002), although there is
not yet consensus on the nature and number of dimensions. The present article has
two primary goals: (1) to evaluate a multidimensional model of social identification
using confirmatory factor analysis; and (2) to demonstrate the viability and validity
of such a conception across a variety of real-life group memberships (university,
gender, and nationality).
Evidence of the Multidimensionality of Social Identity

The theoretical basis for the multidimensionality of social identity stems from
Tajfel’s (1978) often-quoted definition of the construct as ‘‘that part of an
individual’s self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her]
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional
significance attached to that membership’’ (p. 63). This definition has also prompted
attempts to represent the following three components in measures of identification:
awareness of group membership; group evaluation; and emotional aspects of
belonging (Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle et al., 1989). To date, however, there has been
mixed evidence that various measures of social identification—most based on Brown
et al.’s (1986) scale—allow reliable distinctions between these particular facets, or
indeed, between any components that do not simply reflect item directionality. For
example, a factor analysis by Brown et al. (1986) indicated one factor reflecting the
positively phrased items (e.g., ‘‘I am a person who is glad to belong to the group’’)
and two others reflecting the negatively phrased items. Kelly (1988) obtained a
similar (two-factor) solution using a closely related measure assessing identification
with political groups. On the other hand, some studies have produced factor
structures that suggest more meaningful interpretations. In Hinkle et al.’s (1989)
study of ad hoc decision-making groups, factor analysis of a nine-item measure of
identification indicated three components: (1) emotional or affective aspects of group
membership (e.g., feeling glad to belong to the group); (2) a second affectively-
relevant factor, which was interpreted as reflecting ‘‘the opposition between
individual needs and group dynamics’’ (p. 310; e.g., feeling held back by the group);
and (3) a factor comprising two items (perceiving the group as important and feeling
strong ties with the group), defined by Hinkle et al. as cognitive in nature. Karasawa
(1991), in two studies of Japanese students, found a distinction between
identification with group membership and identification with group members, but
no evidence of separable cognitive and affective facets of social identity. More
recently, Ellemers et al. (1999) reported three factors that represented the social
identity of minimal-group members in a laboratory context: group self-esteem (the
evaluation of group membership); self-categorization (the awareness of group
membership); and commitment to the group (the desire to remain a part of the
group). Jackson (2002) arrived at three comparable components based on his factor
analysis of 78 items that referred to a variety of real-life group memberships: a
cognitive component (labeled self-categorization); and two emotional facets, one
reflecting the evaluation of the group, and the other reflecting perceptions of
solidarity, togetherness, and common fate.
In summary, there is cogent theoretical (e.g., Deaux, 1996; Tajfel, 1978) and
empirical (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1999; Hinkle et al., 1989; Jackson, 2002) support for
the existence of multiple dimensions of social identity. The extent to which variations
in factor structures across studies are attributable to methodological variation,
Three-Factor Model 241
however, remains unclear. Moreover, no multidimensional model of social identity

has yet been subjected to confirmatory factor analysis within and across different
social groups, or systematically validated vis-à-vis comparable measures of
identification. Thus, the current state of affairs does not allow an unequivocal
statement about which components of identification can be viably represented in a
measure.
Development of a Three-factor Model

A three-factor model of social identity, based on previous exploratory factor
analyses of identification with gender and ethnic groups, is presented in this paper.
In an initial study, Cameron and Lalonde (2001) developed a 28-item scale of
gender-derived social identification by drawing items from existing measures of
social identity (Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle et al., 1989) and collective self-esteem
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), as well as from previous work on the social identity of
women (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Gurin & Townsend, 1986). Factor and reliability
analyses on the responses of a mixed-sex sample supported the viability of three
components of social identity: (1) cognitive centrality (the amount of time spent
thinking about being a group member; see Gurin & Markus, 1989); (2) ingroup affect
(the positivity of feelings associated with membership in the group); and (3) ingroup
ties (perceptions of similarity, bond, and belongingness with other group members).
Subsequently, this tripartite structure has been replicated in the measurement of
ethnic identification in diverse samples (Boatswain & Lalonde, 2000; Cameron,
Sato, Lalonde, & Lay, 1997), and Obst, Zinkiewicz, and Smith (2002) reported that
it maps onto dimensions underlying a sense of community among science-fiction
fans. This preliminary evidence complements existing bodies of theory and research
regarding each of the centrality, ingroup affect, and ingroup ties facets of social
identity.
Centrality
Each of us belongs to many social groups, and yet these memberships are not likely
to be of equivalent psychological meaning, or formative of behavior at a given time
(e.g., Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Lewin, 1948). One reason is that
contextual factors, such as the salience of a particular social categorization, play a
strong role in bringing the relevant identity to the cognitive foreground. Such a
process is referred to in terms of shifting self-categorizations (Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), or momentary changes in the self-concept that
subsequently guide social perception and behavior. Another explanation for the
relative psychological primacy of a given social category, however, is its enduring
(i.e., cross-situational) cognitive prominence within the overall structure of the self-
concept; that is, some people are chronically readier to perceive and act in terms of
that category than others (Oakes, 1987; Gurin & Markus, 1989). For these people,
the social identification can be said to be relatively central.
If centrality is manifested in the cognitive accessibility of a social identity, then
one operationalization of this construct is the frequency with which membership in a
given group ‘‘comes to mind.’’ Another related way in which centrality has been
conceptualized is in terms of its subjective importance for the self (Hutnik, 1991;
Rosenberg, 1979; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997; Stryker &
Serpe, 1994). Ethnic and racial identification has been assessed, for example, by
242 J. E. Cameron
asking participants to select the most important identities from measures of

spontaneous self-concept (e.g., see Hutnik, 1991) or by adapting the items from the
importance-to-identity subscale of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-
esteem Scale (e.g., Sellers et al., 1997).
In summary, centrality is operationalized here in terms of: (1) the frequency with
which the group comes to mind (Gurin & Markus, 1989); and (2) the subjective
importance of the group to self-definition (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).
Ingroup Affect
As evinced by the vast literature on self-esteem, nearly all theoretical treatments of
the self recognize that aspects of identity have not only cognitive presence but also
emotional valence (e.g., Rosenberg, 1979). Not surprisingly, then, the evaluative
facet of social identity has received a great deal of attention, with prominent
historical roots in the ‘‘self-hatred’’ (Lewin, 1948) that was thought to accompany
the disadvantaged status of some ethnic and racial minority groups. Indeed, the
emotional quality of group membership plays a fundamental role in social identity
theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which posits that a negative social
identity, derived from intergroup social comparisons, will motivate attempts to
achieve a more positive identity by engaging in one of a number of strategies (e.g.,
leaving the group, engaging in more favorable social comparisons, or challenging the
intergroup status hierarchy). Accordingly, and as noted above, most measures of
social identity contain at least a few items that reflect the evaluation of group
membership (e.g., Brown et al., 1986; Ellemers et al., 1999; Hinkle et al., 1989).
Much of the recent empirical work regarding the evaluation of social identity is
associated with Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-esteem Scale, which
comprises four subscales: (1) membership esteem (one’s judged worthiness as a group
member); (2) private collective self-esteem (the subjective evaluation of the social
group); (3) public collective self-esteem (one’s judgment of how others perceive the
group); and (4) identity (the importance of the group to self-conception). Most
measures of social identity, including those designed to assess ethnic (e.g., Phinney,
1992) or racial identification (e.g., Sellers et al., 1997) tap group-derived self-
evaluation in a way that is closely aligned, or that shares item content, with
Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) private collective self-esteem subscale. In the present
model, this facet of social identity is termed ingroup affect, given that items refer to
specific emotions (i.e., being glad or regretful) that arise from group membership.
Ingroup Ties
A third aspect of social identity concerns the psychological ties that bind the self to
the group. For example, Allport (1979) described identification as an ‘‘emotional
merging of self with others’’ (p. 293), which resonates with Freud’s (1967) group
psychology in which the libidinal ties between group members echo those that exist
between parents and children. This sense of identification as emotional closeness is
reflected in a number of measures of social identity, in terms of a sense of belonging
with the group (Phinney, 1992), along with perceptions that one ‘‘fits in’’ (Hinkle et
al., 1989), has strong ties (Brown et al., 1986), and shares a common bond (Cameron
& Lalonde, 2001) with the group or other group members.
Much of the relevant theoretical and empirical work regarding ingroup ties is
associated with the literature on group cohesion. Although cohesion has been
conceptualized and assessed in a number of ways (see Dion, 2000, and Hogg,
1992, for reviews), one relevant distinction is between measures that take a
group-level approach and those directed at capturing individual-level perceptions
of the extent to which one feels bound to the group. Consistent with the latter
approach, ingroup ties are operationalized here as the extent to which ‘‘group
members feel ‘stuck to,’ or part of, particular social groups’’ (Bollen & Hoyle,
1990, p. 482).
Overview of the Present Studies

I hypothesized, then, that social identification can be represented in terms of
three (correlated) dimensions: centrality; ingroup affect; and ingroup ties. This
article presents confirmatory analyses of the three-factor model in five
independent samples, and concerning three social identities: university; gender;

and nationality. An advantage of the confirmatory factor analytic approach is
that it enables evaluations of the fit of the hypothesized model relative to
alternative models. One obvious alternative is a one-dimensional model, which
corresponds to the manner in which social identity is typically assessed. Another
relevant model, however, incorporates two dimensions—cognitive and emotional
aspects of identification—which mirror the distinction that is common to most
discussions of the multidimensional nature of social identity (e.g., Brown et al.,
1986; Deaux, 1996; Ellemers et al., 1999; Hinkle et al., 1989; Jackson, 2002;
Karasawa, 1991; Tajfel, 1978). This two-dimensional scheme embodies the
assumption that centrality is a cognitive aspect of social identity, whereas
ingroup affect and ingroup ties both reflect emotional features of group
membership (see Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). The administration of additional
measures in the final study provides an opportunity to evaluate the convergent
and discriminant validity, and the test – retest reliability, of the three-factor model
of social identity.
Method
The measure of social identification varied slightly across the five studies, ranging in
length from 11 items to 15 items (see Table 1), although the last three studies
employed the same 12-item version. This variation reflects the development of the
three-factor model over time, as well as attempts to balance subscale size and item
keying. In general, however, the selected items tended to have large estimated factor
loadings based on previous exploratory analyses across a number of samples (e.g.,
Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). In the service of economy and clarity, results are
presented collectively rather than by study.
Study 1: Participants and Procedure

A questionnaire including a variety of attitudinal and personality measures was
distributed in several residences at Mount Allison University (Cameron, 1999).
Respondents were 167 primarily first-year undergraduates (mean age 19.2 years) of
which 67% were female. Social identification with the university was assessed with
11 items, including four phrased in the negative direction. Responses could range
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), and were scored, as in all studies,
such that higher values indicate greater identification.
244 J. E. Cameron
TABLE 1 Completely Standardized Factor Loadings of Identification Items

Study
Factor and Item 1 2 3 4 5
Ingroup Ties
I have a lot in common with other — .72 .79 .67 .79
(ingroup members).
I feel strong ties to other (ingroup — .75 .86 .65 .71
members).b
I find it difficult to form a bond .65 .71 .50 .75 .59
with other (ingroup members).a
I don’t feel a sense of being — .74 .53 .86 .74
‘‘connected’’ with other

(ingroup members).a
I really ‘‘fit in’’ with other .72 — — — —
(ingroup members).c
In a group of (ingroup members), .83 .69 — — —
I really feel that I belong.
Centrality
I often think about the fact that I .56 .72 .74 .64 .63
am a(n) (ingroup member).d
Overall, being a(n) (ingroup .47 .45 .26 .68 .52
member) has very little to do
with how I feel about myself.ae
In general, being a(n) (ingroup .82 .35 .79 .40 .77
member) is an important part of
my self-image.e
The fact that I am a(n) (ingroup — .75 .48 .81 .61
member) rarely enters my
mind.a
I am not usually conscious of the .50 — — — —
fact that I am a(n) (ingroup
member).a
Being a(n) (ingroup member) is an .88 — — — —
important reflection of who I
am.e
In my everyday life, I often think — .66 — — —
about what it means to be a(n)
(ingroup member).d
Ingroup Affect
In general, I’m glad to be a(n) .92 .70 .82 .64 .71
(ingroup member).e
I often regret that I am a(n) .64 .79 .79 .72 .49
(ingroup member).ae
I don’t feel good about being a(n) — .74 .74 .85 .66
(ingroup member).ae
(continued opposite)
TABLE 1 (continued )
Study
Factor and Item 1 2 3 4 5
f
Generally, I feel good when I .72 .60 .24 .71 .82
think about myself as a(n)
(ingroup member).
Just thinking about the fact that — .46 — — —
I am a(n) (ingroup member)
sometimes gives me bad
feelings.a
Note. Researchers are advised to employ the 12-item version of the measure used in Studies 3,
4, and 5, which taps the three factors reliably and with relative economy, and which has the
advantage of balanced item keying within each subscale. Items were worded in terms of the
specific group membership considered in each study (e.g., ‘‘ingroup member(s)’’ were ‘‘Mount
Allison student(s)’’ and ‘‘Australian(s),’’ for Studies 1 and 3 respectively). All factor loadings
are significant at p5 .001. aReverse-scored item. bAdapted from Brown et al. (1986). cAdapted
from Hinkle et al. (1989). dAdapted from Gurin and Markus (1989). eAdapted from Luhtanen
and Crocker (1992). fThe modified three-factor model included an additional loading of .62 on
the Centrality factor.

The second sample comprised 148 University of Queensland undergraduates (80
females and 68 males; mean age 19.1 years) who signed up for a study on ‘‘social
psychological attitudes,’’ and received course credit for their participation. A 15-
item measure of gender-derived social identification was embedded in a
questionnaire assessing gender-related attitudes and a number of personality
variables. All scale items in the questionnaire were randomly ordered. Ques-
tionnaires were administered in mixed-sex groups of approximately 10 to 15 people.
Response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Seven
items of the social identity measure were phrased in the negative direction.

In Study 3, 12 items assessing national identification were included as the first
measure in a larger survey on Australian identity and intergroup attitudes
(Cameron, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2002). The survey was mailed to residents of
Queensland randomly selected from the 1996 electoral role for the divisions of
Brisbane, Capricornia, and Maranoa, and was returned by 129 women and 124 men
(mean age 48.8 years). The response rate was approximately 30%. The response
options for the identification items ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree), with a neutral middle point. Half of the items were reverse-scored.

In the fourth study, gender-derived social identification was assessed prior to an
experimental investigation, using adapted versions of the 12 items used in Study 3.
Participants (206 women and 115 men, mean age 20.0 years) were recruited in the
same manner as Study 2.
246 J. E. Cameron

Following the same procedure as Study 2, 189 University of Queensland
undergraduates (153 women and 36 men; mean age 19.6 years) were recruited to
complete a questionnaire that included the 12-item measure used in Studies 3 and 4,
adapted in this case to assess university-derived social identity. Embedded in the
questionnaire were a number of additional measures of social identity and relevant
constructs. As a means of gathering data on the stability of social identification,
participants were asked (with the incentive of additional course credit) to return one
week later (176 did) to complete a second questionnaire containing the 12 social
identity items.
Measures of social identity and group-specific constructs. Four scales were adapted to
reflect the specific context of university-group membership (coefficient alphas for the
present sample are shown in parentheses): (1) Brown et al.’s (1986) 10-item group
identification scale (a = .82); (2) the Collective Self-esteem Scale (Luhtanen &
Crocker, 1992), comprising the Membership (a = .69), Public (a = .65), Private
(a = .67), and Identity (a = .73) subscales; (3) the 6-item Perceived Cohesion Scale
(Bollen & Hoyle, 1990), which has two distinct but correlated subscales assessing a
Sense of Belonging (i.e., the feeling that one is a member of the group; a = .86) and
Feelings of Morale (e.g., the happiness and enthusiasm associated with group
membership; a = .63); and (4) a modified version of the Inclusion of Other in Self
Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), a single-item measure in which the response
options are seven Venn-like diagrams depicting increasingly overlapping circles
representing the relationship between self and other. Tropp and Wright (2001)
presented evidence that their similar Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self measure is a
valid representation of social identity (see also Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). In the
present case, the instructions read, ‘‘Please circle the picture below that best describes
the relationship between yourself and other University of Queensland students.’’
Personality measures. A number of other measures were included to assess the

convergent and discriminant validity of the hypothesized three factors of social
identity from a personality-based perspective. These were: (1) the Self-construal
Scale (Singelis, 1994), which has two subscales corresponding to independent
(a = .73) and interdependent (a = .68) dimensions of self-construal (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991); (2) 10 items from Altemeyer’s (1988) Right-wing Authoritarianism
Scale (a = .77), reported by Zanna (1994) to be highly correlated with the full scale;
(3) the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), a well-validated measure of
global, personal self-evaluation (a = .90); and (4) the Marlowe – Crowne Social
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), a measure of the tendency to present
the self in a favorable manner (a = .80).
Hypotheses. The analyses of data from the final study focus on evaluating evidence
of the convergent and discriminant validity of the three factors of social identity.
Such evidence should indicate not only that the three factors of social identity are
more strongly related to other measures of social identification and closely-related
constructs (collective self-esteem and perceived ingroup cohesion) than to measures
of personality variables, but also that the identity facets correlate in unique and
predictable ways with other variables. Thus, the validity of the three-factor model
will be supported by a number of more specific relationships: (1) between centrality
of group membership and the Identity facet of the Collective Self-esteem Scale,
which assesses the importance of the group to self-conception; (2) between ingroup
affect and other measures of the subjective evaluation of self and group, particularly
private collective self-esteem, feelings of morale, and global self-esteem; and (3)
between ingroup ties and a sense of belonging. Although independent and
interdependent dimensions of self-construal are theoretically distinct from social
identity, Sato and Cameron (1999) found, in two cultures (Japan and Canada), that
interdependence was positively associated with the importance of group member-
ship to the self, whereas independence was positively correlated with private, public,
and membership aspects of collective self-esteem. If this pattern is replicable, then
centrality and ingroup affect should be particularly related to (respectively)
interdependence and independence. Finally, Altemeyer (1994; pp. 136 – 137)
presented evidence that people who agree with authoritarian sentiments have a
‘‘heightened concern for social identity.’’ Although it is not clear which aspect(s) of
social identity are particularly relevant in this respect, Duckitt’s (1989) analysis of
authoritarianism in terms of a ‘‘commitment to group cohesiveness’’ (p. 71) suggests
that ingroup ties might play a key role.
Results
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Confirmatory factor analysis assesses the fit between the observed relationships
between items and a hypothesized pattern of factors and factor loadings. In the
present case, in addition to the three-factor structure of social identification, the
model specified that the factors would be correlated, that each item would load on a
single factor, and that the measurement error terms would be uncorrelated. For each
sample, the three-factor model was further assessed by comparing its fit to that of a
one-dimensional model and a two-dimensional model corresponding to a distinction
between cognitive and affective aspects of social identity. Analyses were conducted
using LISREL 8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993).
Given the assumption of multivariate normality, the data were screened for
outliers. Using the criterion of Mahalanobis distance at p5 .001 (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 1996), four cases were deleted from the first sample, three from the second
sample, eight from the third sample, eleven from the fourth sample, and four from
the fifth sample.1 With the additional restriction that analyses should be based on
complete data (Bentler & Chou, 1987), covariance matrices for the five studies were
based on sample sizes of 160, 144, 230, 302, and 181.
A number of ‘‘goodness of fit’’ indexes aided the interpretation of results. A
significant w2 value indicates that the observed relationships between the variables
depart from the hypothesized model; the sensitivity of this statistic to sample size,
however, necessitates the use of other indexes (see Hu & Bentler, 1995). These
include the goodness-of-fit index (GFI; see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993), the
incremental fit index (IFI; Bollen, 1989), and the comparative-fit index (CFI;
Bentler, 1990). The GFI reflects the extent to which the hypothesized model fits the
data better than no model at all (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993), whereas the IFI and
the CFI compare the performance of the estimated model to that of the
independence model, in which the variables bear no relationship to one another.
Values above .90 on these indexes are typically interpreted as indicating good fit,
248 J. E. Cameron
although the reliability of this rule-of-thumb criterion varies across indexes and
samples (Hu & Bentler, 1995).
Fit statistics for the confirmatory factor analyses are summarized in Table 2.
Although w2 values for all models were significant, indicating that no model
completely accounted for the data, the hypothesized three-factor models were
associated with acceptable levels of goodness-of-fit in most cases. Goodness-of-fit
values for the three-factor model were high in Study 1 (university identification),
acceptable in Studies 2 and 4 (gender-derived social identity), but somewhat below
the .90 rule-of-thumb cut-off in Study 5 (university) and Study 3 (national
identification). Modification indexes provided by LISREL suggested that the fit of
the latter model could be improved by allowing one item (‘‘Generally, I feel good
when I think about myself as an Australian’’) to load on the Centrality factor, in
addition to its hypothesized loading on the Ingroup Affect component. It is possible
that this reflects the presence of the word ‘‘think,’’ which is a prominent feature of
two items in the Centrality factor. Respecification of the model to allow the cross-
TABLE 2 Summary of Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Model w2 df GFI CFI IFI
Study 1
One-factor model 204.41*** 44 .78 .77 .78
Two-factor model 108.01*** 43 .89 .91 .91
Three-factor model 70.20** 41 .93 .96 .96
Study 2
One-factor model 454.72*** 90 .65 .47 .46
Two-factor model 325.37*** 89 .72 .65 .65
Three-factor model 155.72*** 87 .88 .90 .90
Study 3
One-factor model 363.66*** 54 .78 .72 .72
Two-factor model 330.70*** 53 .79 .76 .77
Modified three-factor 171.94*** 50 .88 .89 .89
modela
Study 4
One-factor model 700.17*** 54 .67 .46 .47
Two-factor model 494.97*** 53 .74 .63 .63
Study 5
One-factor model 279.50*** 54 .77 .69 .70
Two-factor model 205.54*** 53 .83 .79 .80
Note. GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; IFI = incremental fit index.
a
One item allowed to load on both the Ingroup Affect and Centrality factors. **p5 .01;
***
p5 .001.
loading led to a significant improvement in fit, Dw2 (1) = 62.60, p5 .001.

Standardized factor loadings for all items are presented in Table 1.
In comparison to the three-factor model of social identity, the fit of the one- and
two-factor models was relatively poor, as indexed by both the goodness-of-fit and w2
values. In each sample the two-dimensional (cognition/affect) model fit the data
reliably better than a single factor (p5 .001), but the three-factor model in turn
provided a significant increase in fit (p5 .001).
Subscale Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

For reasons of consistency and theoretical coherence, the cross-loading item in
Study 3 was treated as a member of the ingroup affect subscale (subscale scores
computed with and without the item were strongly correlated, r = .95). Correlations
between subscales indicate that the components of social identification tended to be

moderately associated (see Table 3). Ingroup affect and ingroup ties had the most
consistent and strongest relationship across social groups and samples, consistent
with the a priori notion that these both reflect emotional aspects of social identity.
Indeed, they were relatively independent of centrality for gender-derived social
identity.2
Internal consistencies of the total scales and subscales were acceptable, with alpha
coefficients for the latter ranging from .76 to .84 for ingroup ties, from .67 to .78 for
centrality, and from .77 to .82 for ingroup affect (see Table 3). It can also be seen
that the patterns of means were relatively consistent across the studies, with the
lowest responses on the centrality subscale and the highest on the ingroup affect
subscale.
Stability of Social Identification

Most participants in Study 5 completed the social identity subscales twice, one
week apart. Test – retest reliability coefficients indicated substantial stability across
occasions, for centrality, r(174) = .73, p5 .001 (aTime 2 = .81), ingroup affect,
r(174) = .65, p5 .001 (aTime 2 = .81), and ingroup ties, r(174) = .77, p5 .001
(aTime 2 = .86).
Relationships with Other Variables

The results of confirmatory factor analyses indicated that three factors fit the data
better than did one or two, but judgments of construct validity also rest on
relationships with theoretically-relevant constructs. The data from Study 5 allow an
evaluation of convergent and discriminant validity, vis-à-vis measures of subjective
dimensions of group membership and personality variables. Bivariate correlations
are presented in Table 4, along with standardized regression coefficients representing
the unique predictive relationship between the three factors of social identity
(treated as predictor variables and entered simultaneously into the regression
equations) and the other variables.
Correlations between responses to the three social identity subscales and other
group-specific measures were consistently and reliably positive, providing broad
evidence of convergent validity. For instance, the combined three factors accounted
for 72% of the variance in responses to Brown et al.’s (1986) widely-used measure of
social identity. The three factors also collectively accounted for considerable
250 J. E. Cameron
TABLE 3 Scale Statistics, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations

Scale Meana SD 1 2 3 4
Study 1
1. Ingroup ties 4.76 .98 .76 .43*** .61*** .77***
2. Centrality 4.01 .99 .78 .50*** .87***
3. Ingroup affect 5.14 .85 .78 .79***
4. Total scale 4.52 .78 .85
Study 2
1. Ingroup ties 4.36 .88 .84 .13 .27*** .76***
2. Centrality 3.46 .90 .73 7 .07 .60***
3. Ingroup affect 5.24 .67 .77 .52***
4. Total scale 4.39 .54 .74
Study 3
1. Ingroup ties 5.53 1.04 .76 .43*** .59*** .82***
2. Centrality 4.45 1.15 .67 .47*** .81***
3. Ingroup affect 6.24 .88 .80 .81***
4. Total scale 5.41 .83 .84
Study 4
1. Ingroup ties 4.45 .95 .80 .20*** .29*** .74***
2. Centrality 3.85 1.06 .73 .10 .71***
3. Ingroup affect 5.28 .71 .82 .58***
4. Total scale 4.53 .62 .76
Study 5
1. Ingroup ties 3.74 1.06 .81 .38*** .53*** .83***
2. Centrality 3.16 1.08 .72 .32*** .77***
3. Ingroup affect 5.11 .71 .78 .73***
4. Total scale 4.01 .74 .83
Note. Values on the diagonals are alpha coefficients. aResponses were made on six-point
scales, with the exception of Study 3, which used a seven-point scale. ***p5 .001.
amounts of variance in measures of related constructs: collective self-esteem;

perceived cohesion; and inclusion of others (group members) in the self. Against this
backdrop of convergence, however, are patterns consistent with the hypothesized
distinctions between facets of social identification. Centrality was uniquely related
only to the Identity facet of the Collective Self-esteem Scale. Conversely, ingroup
affect was significantly predictive of all aspects of collective self-esteem, with the
exception of Identity (the only manifestly non-evaluative facet of the Collective Self-
esteem Scale). Ingroup affect was also significantly associated with perceived
cohesion, but, as the regression coefficients indicate, this was particularly true with
respect to feelings of morale. Ingroup ties, on the other hand, were uniquely
predictive of a sense of belonging but not morale. Moreover, of the three aspects of
social identity, ingroup ties was most closely associated with, and the only significant
predictor of, the modified Inclusion of Other in Self Scale, consistent with the notion
TABLE 4 Associations Between the Three Factors of Social Identity and Other
Variables: Correlations and Simultaneous, Standardized Regression Coefficients
Ingroup ties Centrality Ingroup affect
Measure r b r b r b R2
Brown et al. (1986) scale .64*** .27*** .40*** .10* .80*** .63*** .72
Collective Self-esteem Scale
Membership CSE .62*** .44*** .23** 7 .05 .59*** .38*** .48
Public CSE .36*** .13 .17* 7 .02 .50*** .44*** .26
Private CSE .47*** .04 .31*** .04 .82*** .79*** .68
Identity CSE .47*** .24*** .74*** .67*** .29*** 7 .05 .60
Perceived Cohesion Scale
Feelings of morale .49*** .06 .42*** .18*** .77*** .68*** .64

*** ***
Sense of belonging .74 .56 .37*** .07 .60*** .28*** .60
*** ***
Inclusion of Other in Self scale .59 .57 .18* 7 .05 .38*** .09 .36
Self-Construal Scale
Independence .14 .02 .05 7 .04 .25*** .26*** .07
Interdependence .11 .04 .18* .15a .10 .02 .03
Authoritarianism .21*** .26** .02 7 .07 .07 7 .05 .05
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale .40*** .22** .10 7 .12 .50*** .42*** .29
MCSDS .21** .11 .08 7 .03 .25*** .20* .07
Note. N = 189. CSE = Collective Self-Esteem. MCSDS = Marlowe-Crowne Social Desir-
ability Scale. ap5 .06. * p5 .05. **p5 .01. ***p5 .001.
that these variables both reflect the perceived connectedness of self and ingroup
members.
Correlations and regressions involving the three factors of social identity and the
personality measures indicated several patterns of interest (see Table 4). First, and as
hypothesized, interdependence was correlated specifically with the centrality of
social identity, whereas independence was reliably associated only with the positivity
of ingroup affect. Second, there was evidence of an association between social
identity and authoritarianism, although this was limited to the subjective strength of
ties between the self and other ingroup members. Global self-esteem was positively
and moderately correlated with ingroup affect and ingroup ties but not with
centrality, and was uniquely associated only with ingroup affect, providing evidence
of both convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, scores on the Marlowe –
Crowne Social Desirability Scale were positively associated with ingroup ties and
ingroup affect, and uniquely predicted by the latter. An additional regression that
controlled for global self-esteem, however, rendered the effect of ingroup affect
insignificant, b = .10, t(184) = 1.15, p = .25. Thus, there is no indication that
socially desirable responding substantively biases scores on the three subscales.
Factor Analysis of Group-Specific Measures

As a means of determining whether the group-specific constructs aligned with the
hypothesized dimensions of social identity, and whether the scale-level data
corresponded to the same factors as those obtained using item-level data (see
252 J. E. Cameron
Bernstein & Teng, 1989), an exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood
estimation was conducted on mean responses on the measures (and associated
subscales) of social identity, collective self-esteem, perceived cohesion, and inclusion
of group members in the self. The analysis yielded three factors with eigenvalues
greater than one (5.99, 1.35, and 1.04), accounting for 76.2% of the variance. As
evident from the scale loadings for the obliquely-rotated factors shown in Table 5,
the pattern is consistent with the three-factor model of social identity. (Principal
components analysis and principal axis factoring yielded very similar results.) The
first factor was defined primarily by scales that tap ingroup evaluation and
associated feelings (ingroup affect, private collective self-esteem, and feelings of
morale), although Brown et al.’s (1986) more general measure of social identification
was also implicated. The second factor clearly reflected the prominence of the group
in thought and self-definition, as assessed by the centrality subscale and the Identity
facet of the Collective Self-esteem Scale. The three scales that loaded strongly on the
third factor—ingroup ties, the modified Inclusion of Other in the Self scale, and the
‘‘belonging’’ aspect of group cohesion—reflected the extent of perceived closeness to
other ingroup members.
Discussion
Early work on the measurement of social identification was based on the premise
that group membership can mean different things to different people (Brown &
Williams, 1984). This article addresses a complementary question: does group
membership mean different things to the same person? The results indicate that it
does, and suggest that a multidimensional conception of social identification will be
advantageous in both research and theory on group membership and intergroup
relations.
Dimensions of Identification
The results of five studies demonstrated that: (1) social identification can be
conceptualized and reliably measured in terms of three factors (Centrality, Ingroup
TABLE 5 Factor Loadings of Group-Specific Measures

Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Ingroup affect .94 7 .03 7 .01
Private CSE .94 7 .02 7 .08
Feelings of morale .81 .15 7 .03
Brown et al. (1986) scale .73 .09 .19
Public CSE .46 7 .02 .13
Centrality .08 .93 7 .11
Identity CSE 7 .05 .77 .16
Ingroup ties 7 .02 .13 .85
Inclusion of Other in Self 7 .03 7 .02 .67
Sense of belonging .23 .08 .64
Membership CSE .35 7 .05 .52
Note. Loadings greater than .50 are bold. CSE = Collective Self-esteem.
Affect, and Ingroup Ties); and (2) the three-factor model accounted for the data
better than either a one-dimensional model or a simple distinction between cognitive
and affective facets of social identity. The tripartite structure mirrors dimensions
that have surfaced repeatedly in the literature—Phinney (1990) suggested, for
example, that self-identification (i.e., an awareness of group membership), a sense of
belonging, and pride in one’s group are aspects of identity common to all ethnic
groups—but does so in a way that clarifies previously ambiguous distinctions. For
example, Tajfel’s (1978) definition of social identity, generally interpreted as
pointing toward three dimensions (awareness, evaluation, and emotion), does not
clearly distinguish between the ‘‘value’’ and ‘‘emotional significance’’ of group
membership.3 Moreover, the ‘‘awareness’’ of group membership, represented in the
three-factor model by centrality, can be interpreted in several ways, depending on
theoretical emphases on process versus content (see Deaux, 1996).
If centrality represents the enduring psychological salience of group member-

ship (cf. Gurin & Townsend, 1986), then ingroup affect reflects the value ascribed
to it. Indeed, the evaluative dimension of social identity appears most
consistently in other measures and models, variously termed private collective
self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), private regard (Sellers et al., 1997),
group self-esteem (Ellemers et al., 1999), attraction to the ingroup (Jackson,
2002; Jackson & Smith, 1999), or simply affective aspects of identification
(Deaux, 1996; Hinkle et al., 1989). Whereas ingroup affect and centrality reflect
the evaluation and prominence of the group in the self-concept, ingroup ties
concern relationships with other group members. This dimension thus
corresponds to the subjective dimension of belonging tapped by individual-level
conceptualizations of group cohesion (including feelings of self-ingroup common-
ality and connection; Bollen & Hoyle, 1990).
The three dimensions represent social identification relatively well across various
group memberships and despite variations in item content. Factor and subscale
correlations were generally moderate, with the most consistent positive relationships
occurring between ingroup ties and ingroup affect. This suggests that ingroup ties
are invested with emotional importance, perhaps contributing to the feelings that
are associated with the group (see Bollen & Hoyle, 19903). There was also some
indication that interrelationships between identity components differed across
groups, such that the centrality and affective valence of group membership can be
relatively independent, as they were for gender (see also Cameron & Lalonde, 2001).
Correlational and regression analyses involving the three-factor model of social
identity and various related constructs lend evidence of both convergent and
discriminant validity. The three factors were broadly associated with other measures
assessing subjective aspects of group membership, but there was also support for
expectations regarding relationships between the three factors and specific facets of
collective self-esteem and perceived cohesion. Self-esteem, independent and
interdependent dimensions of self-construal, and authoritarianism were each
significantly related to only one of the three factors, providing further evidence
that the social identity subscales tap distinct constructs. Moreover, the factor
analysis of the group-specific measures yielded a tripartite pattern congruent with
distinctions between ingroup evaluation (and associated affect or morale), centrality,
and ingroup ties. One important implication for researchers is that, even if a one-
dimensional operationalization of identification is deemed appropriate, the use of
any measure should be accompanied by an awareness of which aspect(s) of social
identity it incorporates or emphasizes. The present results suggest, for example, that
254 J. E. Cameron
Brown et al.’s (1986) scale reflects the evaluative dimension of social identity most
strongly.
Comparisons With Existing Measures

The three-factor model of social identity compares favorably to alternative
operationalizations in several respects. The Collective Self-esteem Scale (Luhtanen
& Crocker, 1992) merits special consideration here, particularly because two of its
four subscales overlap substantially with the present model. A number of points of
comparison are worth making. First, social identity researchers (Long & Spears,
1997; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) have taken issue with Luhtanen and Crocker’s
(1992) conception of collective self-esteem in global terms; that is, as a self-
evaluation averaged across all or some of one’s group memberships. Second,
although the Collective Self-esteem Scale is often adapted for group-specific

assessment, subscales and items may not be equally effective at tapping evaluations
of certain group memberships. It is not clear, for example, how well the item, ‘‘I am a
cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to,’’ translates to large social
categories such as gender or race. Third, Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) measure
reflects primarily the evaluation of group membership(s), despite the inclusion of the
Identity subscale, which assesses the importance of group membership to self-
definition. From the perspective of social identity theory, it would seem more
appropriate to treat evaluative and cognitive aspects of group membership as facets
of social identification, rather than the psychological importance or centrality of the
group as a facet of collective self-esteem. Finally, as Rubin and Hewstone (1998)
noted, only the private collective self-esteem subscale is consonant with the
conceptualization of ingroup evaluation in social identity theory.
The multidimensional measures of Ellemers et al. (1999) and Jackson (2002) also
provide salient points of reference, because of both their recency and their tripartite
structure. Like the present model, these measures comprise a cognitive component,
an evaluative facet, and a third affectively-toned dimension (labeled ‘‘commitment to
the group’’ by Ellemers et al. and ‘‘affective ties’’ by Jackson). That three
independently-developed models share at least this superficial structural similarity
indicates a certain degree of conceptual and operational convergence. At the same
time, however, there are several differences that might be noted by researchers
seeking a measure of social identity for various purposes. A consideration of three
issues will serve to amplify the uniqueness of the present three-factor model in this
context: (1) a focus on real-life versus minimal groups; (2) a corresponding
theoretical emphasis on enduring versus ephemeral self-categorizations; and (3) the
psychological meaning of ties with other group members.
First, the items analyzed here are easily adaptable to any number of real-group
memberships, which will facilitate comparative analyses across social groups,
including large social categories defined by nationality, gender, or ethnicity (e.g.,
Deaux et al., 1995). In contrast, certain items in the Ellemers et al. (1999) scale,
particularly those assessing commitment to the group (e.g., ‘‘I would rather belong
to the other group,’’ ‘‘I would like to continue working with my group’’), are better
suited for assessing attachment to small interactive groups that may be arbitrarily
constituted and/or have a limited existence. A second (and related) point of
comparison concerns underlying theoretical notions of the nature of social
identification itself—specifically, a tension between focusing on the structural
prominence of a particular identification within the self-concept, and its situational
(momentary) activation. In the present model, centrality is operationalized as the

enduring psychological salience of group membership (cf. Gurin & Townsend, 1986).
In contrast, self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), while acknowledging the
role of the chronic accessibility of social identifications, prioritizes their dynamic
response to contextual factors. Similarly, Ellemers et al. (1999) and Jackson (2002)
explicitly couch their treatments of the cognitive dimension of social identity in the
situated and fluid nature of self-categorization. Jackson’s (2002) operationalization
of self-categorization, for instance, includes items that reflect the magnification of
within-group similarities and between-group differences that accompany the
momentary salience of a particular social categorization. Ellemers et al. (1999) also
emphasized the flexibility of self-categorization, and demonstrated that identifica-
tion with minimal groups was responsive to contextual variables such as group size
and status.
Indeed, it might be useful to distinguish between two cognitive dimensions of

identifying with social groups (see also Deaux, 1996). The first, captured in the
present model, refers to the structure of social identity, and the position of various
group representations within the overall architecture of the self-concept. The
second, emphasized by Ellemers et al. (1999) and Jackson (2002), concerns the
process of social identification, whereby the self becomes a group member via the
merging of mental representations of self and group (see Smith & Henry, 1996), or,
to paraphrase Turner et al. (1987, p. 44), via the grouping of self as the same as one
class of stimuli as opposed to another. This distinction also serves as a reminder that
whereas a given group will tend to be more important for some people than for
others, the process of social identification is ultimately not reducible to an individual
differences level of analysis. Still, for many researchers, the relatively enduring
contribution of groups to self-conception—that is, the social identities that people
bring to situations and bring to bear on social perception, or what McGarty (1999)
referred to as the individual ‘‘climate’’ of identification—overshadows the issue of
whether a social identity is activated at a particular moment (i.e., the fluctuating
‘‘weather’’ of self-categorization). Such an emphasis is consistent with many
treatments of gender, ethnic, racial, and national identities, and it is therefore
unsurprising that researchers commonly use the Identity facet of the Collective Self-
esteem scale to assess identification with such categories (e.g., Ethier & Deaux, 1994;
Schmader, 2002). The notion of enduring identification is also consistent with
evidence from the present data and elsewhere (Ethier & Deaux, 1994) that individual
differences on various dimensions of social identity, including centrality, can be
quite stable over time.
The third issue that distinguishes the present three-factor model concerns the
conceptualization of ingroup ties. Whereas Ellemers et al. (1999) operationalized
‘‘commitment’’ as a desire to stay with the group, and Jackson’s (2002) ‘‘affective
ties’’ factor reflected a variety of feelings and perceptions, including loyalty,
commitment, togetherness, and common fate, ingroup ties were operationalized
here explicitly in terms of the subjective bond with other group members. As noted
above, this makes ingroup ties congruent with the (individual-level) measurement of
group cohesion. It also makes it particularly relevant to Prentice, Miller, and
Lightdale’s (1994) distinction between common-bond groups, which ‘‘are based
primarily on attachments between group members’’ (p. 485), and which they
distinguish from common identity groups (i.e., those for which direct attachment to
the collective is primary). Although Prentice et al.’s (1994) analysis was directed
toward defining a typology of groups, the present framework suggests that member-
256 J. E. Cameron
oriented attachment (i.e., ingroup ties) is also separable from group-level dimensions
of attachment (i.e., centrality, ingroup affect) at the level of individual differences
(see also Karasawa, 1991). Thus, an assessment of ingroup ties, as operationalized in
the present model, might be particularly useful for researchers interested in group
cohesion and other interpersonal aspects of group membership, along with their
correlates and consequences.
In sum, the three-factor model presented in this article allows efficient and reliable
assessment of social identification with groups that leave a lasting impression on the
self-concept and in which interpersonal ties might assume psychological importance.
It is also apparently the only multidimensional measure of social identity that has
been tested in multiple studies, across various social categories, and with respect to
commonly-used instruments.
Theoretical Implications
The three dimensions considered here reflect aspects of group identification that
recur in the social identity literature, but that are sometimes not formally defined or
theoretically distinguished. For example, Turner et al. (1987) referred to ‘‘the
centrality and evaluative importance of a group membership in self-definition’’ (p.
55) as aspects of identification, and thus determinants of category accessibility, but
they did not ascribe different roles to these facets. It seems reasonable to propose,
however, that if centrality determines one’s cognitive readiness to respond as a group
member (Turner, 1999)—consistent with previous findings that centrality is
particularly predictive of perceptions of group-based discrimination and disadvan-
tage (Cameron, 2001; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Gurin & Markus, 1989)—then the
emotional tone of the identification influences the range and nature of potential
responses, in terms of intergroup attitudes and behavior. As the three-factor model
suggests, this can be examined with respect to at least two dimensions of social
identity: ingroup affect and ingroup ties. Indeed, the first of these is implicit in
theoretical treatments of the role of self-esteem in intergroup discrimination, if self-
esteem is conceptualized in terms of the evaluation of a specific group membership
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Long & Spears, 1997). The evidence concerning the
relationships between self-esteem, social identification, and biased evaluations of the
ingroup is mixed, but this is at least partly because the measurement of social identity
is often confounded with group evaluation (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000;
Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Thus, treating group-derived affect as a distinct and
separable component of identity would allow more precise tests of the predictions of
social identity theory. Ellemers et al. (1999) and Jackson (2002) have already
demonstrated the benefits of this approach, although their data point to other
emotionally significant facets of social identity—commitment and ties to the group—
as particularly important predictors of ingroup bias. Interestingly, this is consistent
with the unique relationship, in Study 5, between ingroup ties and authoritarianism,
given that the latter is characterized by an inclination toward social categorization
and prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1994). Thus, it appears that understanding the
sharpness and evaluative asymmetry of the ‘‘us versus them’’ distinction will be aided
by particular attention to the aspect of social identity that reflects feelings of ingroup
cohesiveness.
If ingroup ties have potentially pernicious consequences in terms of ethnocentr-
ism, there is also some indication that they carry various social and psychological
benefits. For example, university students’ ingroup ties were predictive, via global
self-esteem, of both satisfaction with life and (inversely) depression (Cameron,

1999). Consistent with Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) nomination of the need to
belong as a fundamental human motivation, this suggests that interpersonal ties
with other group members are likely to provide an important basis for positive
mental health. Ingroup ties might also provide the psychological glue that allows
high-identifiers to ‘‘stick with’’ the group during threats to the status or positive
image of the collective (e.g., Spears et al., 1999). Cameron et al. (2002) reported that
perceived threat to national identity was generally associated with a psychological
distancing of self from the group (i.e., attenuated judgments of self-ingroup
similarity), but this was true only for individuals with relatively weak ingroup ties.
Thus, there is preliminary evidence that distinguishable dimensions of social
identity have unique relationships with a range of group-relevant criteria, including
intergroup discrimination, psychological adjustment, self-stereotyping, perceptions
of discrimination, and culture-linked dimensions of self-construal. This should

encourage researchers to apply multidimensional models of identification to further
test existing hypotheses and to generate new ones. One possibility, for example, is
that various facets of social identity map on to different functions or motivations
that may or may not involve intergroup social comparison (e.g., needs for social
support, interpersonal connectedness, and self-efficacy; Cameron, 1999; Deaux et
al., 1999; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). In a related vein, the associations between social
identification and independence and interdependence provide evidence that these
dimensions of self-construal are associated with specific aspects of group-derived
self-definition and self-esteem. Consistent with research linking cultural background
to the content of the spontaneous self-concept (e.g., Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu,
Thapa, & Rettek, 1995), group membership tended to be more psychologically
salient (i.e., central) for people with relatively interdependent self-construals. The
personality dimension of independence, on the other hand, appears to be more
closely associated with self-evaluation rather than self-definition, consistent with the
notion that being independent entails not only being separate from others, but also
being better than them (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; see also Sato & Cameron,
1999).4
Another avenue for investigation concerns the possibility that aspects of social
identity interact with each other in predicting various criteria. Given the
expectation, for example, that the negative evaluation of a social identity will
motivate efforts to improve individual or collective status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979),
social change strategies (e.g., collective action) might be particularly likely when
affect is negative and centrality is high (see Kawakami & Dion, 1995), whereas social
mobility (e.g., attempts to dissociate oneself from the group) might be more likely
when affect is negative and ingroup ties are weak and/or centrality is low. Interactive
effects involving various components of racial identity were reported by Rowley,
Sellers, Chavous, and Smith (1998), who found that the global personal self-esteem
of African-American college students was predicted by positive feelings about the
ingroup, but only for those for whom racial membership was central.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that social identification (and its facets) can be
regarded as both independent and dependent variables, as both generative of social
perception and behavior and reflective of social context (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1999).
Thus, whereas the three-factor model emphasizes the relatively enduring nature of
social identity, it is necessary to maintain a conceptual distinction between chronic
levels of identification and self-categorization at a particular point in time
(McGarty, 1999; Turner, 1999). It remains, then, for social identity structure to
258 J. E. Cameron
be articulated in a broader theoretical context that recognizes the power of the

situation to shape the waxing and waning of the group in the self (Turner et al.,
1987).
A Caveat and a Conclusion

The three-factor model of social identity permits a brief assessment of relatively
enduring group identification along three theoretically-based dimensions. A number
of critiques of factor analysis (e.g., Block, 1995) have pointed out that the
interpretation of results can foster the illusion that the dimensions are ‘‘discovered’’
while masking the role of the researcher in selecting the initial items. Given that such
‘‘prestructuring’’ characterized the approach taken in the present research—albeit
with a grounding in prior exploratory analyses and existing theory—the items
inevitably do not represent other conceivable dimensions of social identification.

Thus, although the results clearly show that the three-factor model performed better
than the one- and two-dimensional alternatives, they do not demonstrate that the
model represents the universe of social-identity-relevant dimensions—a criticism that
might also be directed at other existing representations of social identity. There
appears, however, to be a comforting convergence between the three-factor model
and a number of other recent approaches (Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002), and
a corresponding congruence with theoretical elaborations of the group’s contribu-
tion to the self (e.g., Deaux, 1996; Tajfel, 1978). Ultimately, the important issues
concern not whether this three-factor model is the only ‘‘true’’ model of social
identity (it is not), but whether it serves to bring theoretical issues into greater focus,
and whether it facilitates and generates research on the psychological concomitants
and consequences of belonging to social groups.
Notes
1. Preliminary examination of item statistics indicated that some responses, most
associated with the hypothesized affective component, were negatively skewed.
Considering that this is typical in the measurement of self-esteem (e.g., Gray-Little,
Williams, & Hancock, 1997), no attempt was made to normalize the items for the
primary analyses. To ensure the robustness of the results, however, transformations
were performed on five items with significant skews in Study 3 (where nonnormality
was particularly marked); following Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), log transformations
were applied after ‘‘reflecting’’ the distributions (reflection changes a negative skew to
a positive skew). A confirmatory factor analysis of the transformed data yielded a
somewhat greater w2 value than the comparable statistic for the three-factor model in
Table 1, but the remaining (rounded) goodness-of-fit indexes were unchanged.
2. In Study 2, there was unexpected evidence of a negative, though nonsignificant,
relationship between centrality and affect in the case of gender. Correlations computed
for each sex showed that scores on these subscales were negatively related for men,
r(66) = 7.29, p5 .05, but not for women, r(78) = .13, ns. In Study 4, however,
centrality and affect were positively and nonsignificantly associated for both men,
r(106) = .14, and women, r(192) = .12.
3. Following Tajfel (1978), a distinction between ‘‘affective’’ and ‘‘evaluative’’ aspects of
identification is often made (e.g., Brown et al., 1986, p. 275; Ellemers et al., 1999, p.
373; Hinkle et al., 1989, pp. 306 – 307). Whereas there is general agreement that the
evaluation of group membership constitutes group-specific self-esteem (or collective
self-esteem; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), the ‘‘emotional’’ aspects of social identity
have been less consistently defined. Indeed, some conceptualizations (or operationa-
lizations) of the emotional or affective aspects of group membership include reference
to (or items that reflect) group-specific self-esteem (e.g., Deaux, 1996; Hinkle et al.,
1989; Jackson & Smith, 1999). The present model similarly embodies the assumption
that the positive or negative evaluation of social identity has emotional consequences
(thus the label ‘‘ingroup affect’’). A second way in which the emotional significance of
group membership has been considered refers to interpersonal ties within the group
and/or perceptions of common fate. Jackson (2002), for example, referred to the
relevant factor in his measure as ‘‘affective ties,’’ which corresponds most closely to
‘‘ingroup ties’’ in the present model. Such apparent ambiguity need not be
problematic, however, considering its consistency with empirical relationships
between indexes of psychological well-being (including self-esteem) and perceptions
of ties to, or belonging with, the group (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hoyle &
Crawford, 1994; Cameron, 1999), as well as evidence, deriving from the present data
and elsewhere (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990) that factors reflecting group-derived esteem and
perceived cohesiveness are empirically related. Nevertheless, researchers should be
aware of various conceptual and semantic variations that are potential sources of
confusion.
4. That ingroup ties were unrelated to the interdependent facet of self-construal might
seem contradictory. However, the personality dimension of interdependence, at least
as operationalized by Singeles (1994), appears to hold a somewhat different
psychological meaning than interdependence as articulated, for example, in terms of
interpersonal bonds with ingroup members, or the perception of common fate
(Jackson, 2002). This suggests that interdependence can occur, and can be defined, in
several ways, only some of which are captured by the present model (see also Deaux,
1996).
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A Three Factor Model of Social Identity. Cameron, James E. Self and Identity

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Self and Identity

A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity

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A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity

unresolved. It is proposed that social identity can be represented in terms of three

Received 7 December 2001; accepted 6 April 2003

multidimensional measurement of social identity is indeed appropriate and useful

Evidence of the Multidimensionality of Social Identity

however, remains unclear. Moreover, no multidimensional model of social identity

Development of a Three-factor Model

asking participants to select the most important identities from measures of

Overview of the Present Studies

independent samples, and concerning three social identities: university; gender;

Study 1: Participants and Procedure

TABLE 1 Completely Standardized Factor Loadings of Identiﬁcation Items

‘‘connected’’ with other

Study 2: Participants and Procedure

Study 3: Participants and Procedure

Study 4: Participants and Procedure

Study 5: Participants and Procedure

Personality measures. A number of other measures were included to assess the

TABLE 2 Summary of Fit Statistics for Conﬁrmatory Factor Analyses

loading led to a signiﬁcant improvement in ﬁt, Dw2 (1) = 62.60, p5 .001.

Subscale Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

between subscales indicate that the components of social identiﬁcation tended to be

Stability of Social Identiﬁcation

Relationships with Other Variables

TABLE 3 Scale Statistics, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations

4. Total scale 4.39 .54 .74

amounts of variance in measures of related constructs: collective self-esteem;

Feelings of morale .49*** .06 .42*** .18*** .77*** .68*** .64

Factor Analysis of Group-Speciﬁc Measures

TABLE 5 Factor Loadings of Group-Speciﬁc Measures

If centrality represents the enduring psychological salience of group member-

Comparisons With Existing Measures

although the Collective Self-esteem Scale is often adapted for group-speciﬁc

(momentary) activation. In the present model, centrality is operationalized as the

Indeed, it might be useful to distinguish between two cognitive dimensions of

self-esteem, of both satisfaction with life and (inversely) depression (Cameron,

of discrimination, and culture-linked dimensions of self-construal. This should

be articulated in a broader theoretical context that recognizes the power of the

A Caveat and a Conclusion

inevitably do not represent other conceivable dimensions of social identiﬁcation.

Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the ﬁve-factor approach to personality description.

Practice, 3, 179 – 189.

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Feelings of morale .49* .06 .42* .18* .77* .68*** .64