Ethics and Information Technology

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09557-9

ORIGINAL PAPER

The “digital animal intuition:” the ethics of violence against animals

in video games
Simon Coghlan1   · Lucy Sparrow2

© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract
Video game players sometimes give voice to an “intuition” that violently harming nonhuman animals in video games is
particularly ethically troubling. However, the moral issue of violence against nonhuman animals in video games has received
scant philosophical attention, especially compared to the ethics of violence against humans in video games. This paper argues
that the seemingly counterintuitive belief that digital animal violence is in general more ethically problematic than digital
human violence is likely to be correct. Much video game violence against animals has at least some potential, even if only
a modest one, to contribute to moral indifference toward animals and to their routine mistreatment. These possible effects
have ethical implications for animals, society, players, and video game designers.

Keywords  Video games · Animals · Violence · Ethics · Philosophy

Introduction timely to critically examine digital animal violence and its

Video game players are encouraged or required to violently
harm and kill nonhuman animals1 in games ranging from
Minecraft to Grand Theft Auto. But despite its ubiquity,
violence against animals in video games has received little
attention from scholars,2 who have generally concentrated
on human-directed violence (Bartel 2012; Coecklebergh
2007; Cogburn and Silcox 2009; Ferguson 2010; McCor-
mick 2001; Patridge 2011; Schulzke 2010). The public too
has shown comparatively little interest in violence towards
animals in games (“digital animal violence”). Yet video
games displaying ever more graphic depictions of violence
towards animals occur at a time when society is increasingly
recognizing moral duties to the natural world and to sen-
tient animals—witness the recent growth in plant-based diets
(Forgrieve 2018). Meanwhile, an “animal turn” in academia
is underway, reflected in the new interdisciplinary field of
“Human-Animal Studies” (DeMello 2012). It is therefore
* Simon Coghlan
simon.coghlan@unimelb.edu.au
1  Rare exceptions include Chittaro amd Sioni (2012), Sawers and
Centre of AI and Digital Ethics (CAIDE), School
of Computing and Information Systems (CIS), The
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
2
School of Computing and Information Systems (CIS), The
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
relation to digital human violence.
Much digital animal violence is morally problematic. In
arguing for this thesis, we shall defend a seemingly counter-
intuitive intuition held by some players—namely, that digi-
tal animal violence is very likely more morally problematic
than digital human violence. Call this moral intuition the
“digital animal intuition.” Both the playing of certain games
involving digital animal violence and, more importantly, the
abundant production and availability of such games, can be
morally problematic. We do not find fault with digital animal
violence per se; rather, we seek to problematize common
forms of it. Our central claim is that much digital animal
violence runs a risk of reinforcing indifference and callous-
ness towards sentient animals—attitudes which enable and
perpetuate the fairly systematic mistreatment of animals
by society. Our aim here is to foster discussion amongst
philosophers, players, social scientists, psychologists, and
game designers about a neglected phenomenon of ethical
importance.
1
  Hereafter, “animals.”.
2
Demetrios (2010), and Van Ooijen (2018). Unlike our paper, how-
ever, these are not primarily philosophical analyses. Animals have
been discussed in ethical analyses of video game violence (e.g. Wad-
dington 2007) and moral choices in games (Neely 2019), but the
focus is usually not digital animal violence.

13
Vol.:(0123456789)

The “digital animal intuition” (DAI)
Video game players have expressed discomfort and
even guilt about digital animal harm (GameFAQs 2018;
Minecraft Forum 2014; Morris 2017; Stanley 2014). One
writes:
It’s weird how bad I feel about killing animals in
the game… I will [actively] try and shoot guys off
horses instead of just shooting the horses and will
fire warning shots if [I’m] being chased by wolves.
(GiantBomb 2011)
Some, like this player, worry about the moral implica-
tions for themselves as individual players who perform
acts of virtual animal violence. Others are concerned that
the proliferation of digital animal violence may be linked
to morally problematic societal attitudes and behaviour
towards living animals:
Are we right to view the mass murder of animal kind,
our fellow earthlings, as normal? What could the rise
of animal cruelty in games mean specifically about
the vast majority of society’s opinions on said issue?
(Morris 2017)
The animal liberation group, People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA), has criticized digital ani-
mal violence. Of a whale hunting game, a PETA spokes-
person reportedly said (Bernstein 2013):
[I]t’s disgraceful for any game to glorify it. PETA
encourages video game companies to create games
that celebrate animals—not games that promote hurt-
ing and killing them.
In view of these sorts of responses, we will construct
the following general “intuition” about violence towards
animals in video games:
Digital Animal Intuition (DAI): Digital animal vio-
lence is often morally problematic—and generally
more so than digital (adult) human violence—in
terms of (a) the morality of playing and/or (b) the
morality of the design and availability of some video
games that involve digital animal violence.
We will use this formulation of morally uneasy
responses to digital animal violence to explore the ethics
of this phenomenon. We should note that moral reactions
and intuitions can be misguided. Like any ethical reac-
tion, moral concerns and uneasiness about digital animal
violence must be justified with arguments. Furthermore,
perhaps the DAI is rare. We should also note that even
gamers who are troubled by digital animal violence com-
pared to digital human violence do not necessarily think
13
S. Coghlan, L. Sparrow
that it would be better if digital animal violence simply
disappeared. Morris (2017), for example, thinks that digi-
tal animal violence reflects society’s appalling indifference
to animal suffering rather than contributing to it.
Many gamers, moreover, completely reject the idea that
digital animal violence is in any way morally problematic.
PETA’s criticism of digital animal violence is frequently met
with scorn (Rougeau 2012). Responding to the first player
quoted above who expressed moral uneasiness about killing
animals in games, other players said:
Well [it’s] just a game. I don’t feel bad at all about it.
(GiantBomb 2011)
I kill humans in games all the time. Why would I care
about animals? (GiantBomb 2011)
Alongside in-game human violence, in-game animal
violence may seem unimportant, even trivial. Neverthe-
less, we argue that the DAI as we have constructed it can
be defended. In claiming this, we will not argue that video
games featuring animal violence should be censored or never
played. There can be stronger reasons not to censor even
when reasons to censor exist. Furthermore, we agree that
some criticism of digital animal violence is perhaps exces-
sive. Still, we believe there is reason for game designers
and society to reassess how animals are depicted in video
games. In order to explore digital animal violence, we shall
first briefly discuss digital human violence.
Digital human violence
Some thinkers argue that digital human violence can be mor-
ally problematic. Arguably, for example, digital human vio-
lence could promote actual violent behaviour (Waddington
2007), corrupt the moral characters of players (McCormick
2001), endorse immoral worldviews (Ostritsch 2017), or
promote prejudice against vulnerable and oppressed groups
(Patridge 2011). Gaming violence has also occasionally gen-
erated public disquiet. For example, human rights groups
opposed a scene in Grand Theft Auto 5 in which players
can waterboard, electrocute, and pull teeth from an alleged
terrorist for information (Hern 2013). Some countries have
banned certain violent games. New Zealand and Australia,
for instance, banned the game Postal 2, which allows play-
ers to engage in a wide range of violent actions, including
urinating on dismembered bodies.
However, others argue that digital human violence is gen-
erally or often morally unproblematic. Dunn (2012) points
to a limited asymmetry: immoral actions like assault and
murder are only sometimes wrong in games. “Virtual amor-
alists” (Gooskens 2010; Schulzke 2010) hold that otherwise
immoral acts escape ethical judgment when they occur in
the playing of video games and do not harm or affect actual
The “digital animal intuition:” the ethics of violence against animals in video games
people (cf. Patridge 2011; Ostritsch 2017). Doubt has been
cast on the causal power of violent video games to have
undesirable and antisocial effects on human behaviour
(Przybylski and Weinstein 2019). Studies have discerned
this amoral attitude in some players of both single-player
games, where no other human player is harmed (Malazita
and Jenkins 2017), and multiplayer video games, where
other human players may be harmed (Croft 2011; Flores
and James 2012; Sparrow et al. 2019). Hence, for some,
worries about digital human violence arguably constitute
“moral panic” (see Ferguson 2010; Sicart 2009).
Worries about digital animal violence may seem even
more misguided. However, we will contend that the phe-
nomenon of digital animal violence is morally problematic,
and generally more so than digital human violence, even if
violence against humans is morally worse than comparable
cases of violence against animals when it occurs outside of
video games. In introducing this argument, we must first say
something about animals, moral value, and social attitudes.
Society, ethics, and animals
Although most people believe that animals have weaker
moral claims than humans, moral concern for them is
increasing. This is occurring for various reasons, one of
which is the work of researchers and scholars. Scientists,
for example, continue to reveal to us remarkable overlaps
between human and animal cognitive and emotional capac-
ities (De Waal and Ferrari 2010), and philosophers from
various traditions continue their assaults on ethical anthro-
pocentrism (Derrida and Wills 2002; Hursthouse 2011;
Korsgaard 2013; Regan 2004). Anti-anthropocentric argu-
ments such as the “argument from marginal cases” (Pluhar
1987) and arguments against “speciesism” (Singer 1995)
have proven difficult to refute. If, however, animals have
no moral claims at all, then concerns about digital animal
violence are weakened, since any negative consequences of
such games for living animals would lack intrinsic moral
importance.3 Although we will not assume that (say) vegan-
ism is morally obligatory, our argument assumes that much
violent and harmful treatment of sentient animals is morally
objectionable. Objectionable treatment arguably includes
“factory” farming, recreational and trophy hunting, some
forms of captivity and confinement, and the mass killing of
unwanted pets.
3
  Note, however, that there could still be genuine (e.g. Kantian-fla-
voured) moral concerns about the effects that performing digital ani-
mal violence might have on one’s attitudes or behaviour towards other
human beings.
But while such treatment is increasingly questioned,
it still very often passes under our moral radar. We buy
factory-farmed meat with little acknowledgement of the
immoral means of its production. Unethical treatment of
animals remains profoundly socially normalized. As such,
people who question the violent exploitation of animals may
experience a distressing moral uncertainty (Diamond 2006).
The novelist John Coetzee (2016, p. 69) depicted this dis-
concerting moral experience through his character, Eliza-
beth Costello, who is repeatedly moved to question society’s
treatment of animals. As Costello explains to her perplexed
son:
It’s that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move
around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly
normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself,
that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefy-
ing proportions [against animals]? Am I fantasizing it
all? I must be mad! Yet every day I see the evidences.
The fact that nearly everyone appears much of the time to
accept the systematic brutalization of animals as normal
encourages even those who care morally about animals to
fall back into seeing it, or appearing to see it, as normal too.
Society seems to be so organized as to make the suffering of
animals largely morally invisible to us. But if Coetzee and
other critics like him are right, this is a significant moral
problem that deserves our attention. Indeed, for such critics,
we ought to resist the temptation to complacently acqui-
esce in society’s mistreatment of animals, and we should
listen harder to any nagging doubts we may have that our
attitudes towards animals are frequently indifferent and dis-
respectful. Perhaps we even have a duty to identify and to
try to alter, even if only gradually and incrementally, the
social conditions that facilitate the mass suffering and the
relative moral invisibility of animals. These considerations,
we believe, have implications for video games and digital
animal violence.
Digital animal violence
Most video games that involve digital human violence also
involve digital animal violence, even when the former is not
a core element. Killing “low-threat” animals such as rats is
a common exercise in many role-playing games (RPGs) (see
IGN Staff 2020). Quests prompting players to seek and kill a
quota of animals are also exceedingly common, and players
are often put in a position in which they are driven to kill
aggressive or hostile animals. In some video games, killing
animals is a prominent or notable feature of the game. In Far
Cry 3, for instance, the player can kill and skin animals such
as boars, dingoes, snakes and sharks on a hostile tropical
island. In even more realistic and graphic ways, in Red Dead
13

Redemption 2, the player must track, hunt, skin and dispose
of animals in order to acquire food, materials, and income
that will help them survive (Stevens 2018). Less common,
though still noteworthy, are games where the entire point
of the exercise is hunting and killing animals (e.g. the Deer
Hunter series).
In some games, digital animal harm is "justified” by the
game’s narrative. Hunting in Red Dead Redemption 2, for
instance, contributes to a realistic portrayal of the life of an
outlaw at the end of the nineteenth century in the United
States. At the same time, digital animal harm is often pre-
sented in games as a mere “given” and takes place in cur-
sory or instrumental ways. The killing of in-game animals
such as deer, sheep, cattle, and pigs for meat, leather, and
other animal-based resources is also a familiar task in many
massively multiplayer online roleplaying games (MMOR-
PGs) and sandbox games, such as in the popular World of
Warcraft (WoW) and Minecraft. This activity can often
become fairly routinized through a process of “grinding”
(or “leather-farming” in relation to the WoW example),
where players will repetitively seek out and kill animals to
acquire their resources and level up their skills. Digital ani-
mal violence can also take the form of yet more incidental
or gratuitous in-game options, such as having the ability
to kick chickens in the Fable series, or through seemingly
superfluous or excessively violent quests, such as the “Testy
Festy” side-quest in Far Cry 5 (Cooper 2018).
It is also important to note that, in many RPGs where
players have the freedom to attack or kill wild, non-hostile
animals of their own volition, such actions often do not
come with the same in-game moral consequences sometimes
afforded to digital humans. In Dragon Age: Inquisition, for
example, many in-game choices (such as behaving merci-
fully or cruelly to a person in the game) prompt the player’s
in-game companions to morally approve or disapprove of the
player’s actions, though killing non-aggressive wild animals
usually does not prompt any such response either way.4
Some players clearly enjoy something about committing
virtual acts of violence against animals. One study found
4
  We must note here that in some games that feature morality sys-
tems, acts of digital animal harm are sometimes considered immoral,
while treating animals well can be considered moral (see Neely
2019). In Red Dead Redemption 2, for instance, wounding animals
and letting them suffer without killing them results in a small loss of
“honour,” while returning caught fish to the water results in a small
gain in honour. In Fable 3, while players can kick chickens for fun
and kill rabbits with little to no negative consequences, they also
gain morality points for being a vegetarian. Indeed, there is much to
be said about how animal harm is morally weighted against human
harm in such games. However, it is not within the scope of this paper
to explore this issue, and it is enough for our current purposes to
acknowledge that the digital animal harm featured in many games is
nevertheless prolific and problematic.
13
S. Coghlan, L. Sparrow
players responded to killing animals (albeit insects) in a
“Whac-a-Mole” style game more positively than to simply
hitting abstract shapes (Chittaro and Sioni 2012, p. 235).
Gratuitous and “creative” methods of killing animals can,
for some players, make the game “even more fun” (Rougeau
2012). No doubt there is often some sort of attraction to the
(sometimes impressively realistic) spectacle and the bring-
ing about of violent effects on digital victims. To sum up
our observations: In-game animal violence is ubiquitous
and has different guises. Sometimes it appears in the game
to be narratively justified or morally “necessary” violence;
other times it is a way for players to level up their skills and
acquire resources; and often it is rendered in the game as
superfluous or fun or in ways that would be impermissible
outside the game. Furthermore, video games typically make
even less of an attempt to question animal-directed violence
than they do human-directed violence.
Problematizing digital animal violence
A few writers have questioned digital animal violence. Van
Ooijen (2018, p. 40) argues that open world video games
reflect and reinforce societal views of the “killing of other
species as something normal, natural and necessary.” Sawers
and Demetrious (2010, p. 248) discuss how hunting arcade
games indulge players in “traditional forms of masculinity
no longer sustainable in contemporary society” given grow-
ing ecological awareness.
In problematizing digital animal violence, however,
some important caveats must be mentioned. First, differ-
ent instances of digital animal violence may vary in moral
import (Sicart 2009; Schulzke 2010). Killing virtual ani-
mals in self-defence, for example, may be morally differ-
ent to killing animals in trophy hunting games. Second,
games that involve animal violence may express concern
and aim to promote respect for animals. The violence in
Fat Chicken, for example, serves as an ethical narrative that
opposes industrial animal farming. Violent games may be
expressly designed to prompt moral reflection about animals
of a kind that may be personally and/or socially desirable
(Neely 2019).
Third, some players may be led by games involving (say)
gratuitous virtual animal violence to engage in moral reflec-
tion about society’s unethical treatment of animals, even
if it is not intended by the games’ designers.5 Generally,
5
  For example, Stanley (2014) suggests that the shock of killing the
last existing Bison in Red Dead Redemption 2 can ultimately give the
player moral insight into the human domination of nature. This eco-
logically and morally edifying outcome could occur even if it was not
a deliberate part of the game’s design.
The “digital animal intuition:” the ethics of violence against animals in video games
however, such moral reflectiveness very likely does not
occur. If it is true, as Neely (2019) argues, that many play-
ers probably do not reflect on the immorality of the abuse
of human beings as a result of performing digital human
violence (cf. Sicart 2009), then it is also possible that many
players do not seriously question the morality of how we
treat animals as a result of performing digital animal vio-
lence. The ubiquity and normalization of digital human and
animal violence makes such reflection unlikely as a general
rule. We note that players often upload in-game depictions
of animal violence to YouTube in ways that are supposed to
be humorous and fun but that lack critical ethical reflection.
Fourth, some games involve unusual types of “animals”
such as “bad” zombie animals, mythical creatures, dino-
saurs, and mutants. Violence against these creatures may
or may not be morally problematic (in the aforementioned
senses). We do note, though, that extinct animals (e.g. mam-
moths in Skyrim) and some mythical or mutant animals (e.g.
“Brahmins” in Fallout 4) are similar in appearance and
behaviour to the animals that society routinely mistreats.
In that case, it is possible that games that feature “atypical”
creatures are, on our argument, also morally problematic.
Having entered the above caveats, we now present four
possible effects that begin to problematize in-game animal
violence. To some degree, these effects variously reflect val-
ues and effects discussed in the literature on digital human
violence (e.g. Cogburn and Silcox 2009; McCormick 2001).
Digital animal violence, we claim, may arguably do the
following:
Effect 1: Harm animals by directly promoting or rein-
forcing morally objectionable or disrespect-
ful behaviour from players themselves towards
actual animals. This may include cruel, neglect-
ful, indifferent, and callous behaviour.
Effect 2: Harm animals by indirectly promoting or rein-
forcing cruel, neglectful, indifferent, and/or cal-
lous attitudes and behaviour in society towards
animals. This undermines (albeit perhaps in sub-
tle and limited ways) society’s gradual trajectory
towards greater respect for animals and better
animal welfare.
Effect 3: Harm players by promoting or reinforcing cal-
lousness and disrespect towards animals (who,
we assume, are worthy of our moral respect).
Players’ characters are thereby corrupted
(McCormick 2001) to some extent, and this is
regrettable in itself, even if animals are not oth-
erwise harmed.
Effect 4: Harm society by promoting or reinforcing dis-
respectful views towards animals, which have
moral claims on us.
For each of these effects, which encompass ethical values,
a comparable suggestion may be made for human subjects.
For example, the harm done to society by the promotion or
reinforcement of callous and cruel views towards animals
(Effect 4) has a parallel in the harm done to society as a
result of the corruption of enough of its members’ moral
views about a marginalized group of people. Consider, for
instance, the social harm that would be done simply through
the widespread promotion and reinforcement of “benign”
racism (i.e. racism that results in no natural harm to mem-
bers of the relevant group).
Effects 1–2 are “consequentialist-style” concerns about
animal wellbeing. Effect 3 is reminiscent of a virtue ethics
or Aristotelian concern about corrupted individual charac-
ter. Effect 4 is a “communitarian-style” concern about harm
done to society’s character. Note that characterizing these
effects in this way is not vital: people who have no adherence
to those theoretical approaches may still think the relevant
values are morally important (although others may not). We
shall simply assume that some or all of the “values” here
have moral substance. Our focus is on whether video games
might have these effects, which, for many people, are mor-
ally important effects. Although all four effects are signifi-
cant, we believe that Effect 2 is perhaps the most significant.
That is, the most morally problematic effect of digital animal
violence is probably its potential contribution to social atti-
tudes that make animals morally invisible to us and thereby
perpetuate their systematic mistreatment.
Problem of inconclusive evidence
All four claims face the problem of inconclusive empiri-
cal evidence. Consider existing debates about the impact of
violent video games (and films). Meta-analyses of literature
have raised concerns about the possibility that harming virtual
humans may lead to a number of negative effects, including
antisocial or aggressive behaviour, desensitization of attitudes
towards violence, and decreased empathy (e.g. Anderson et al.
2010; Calvert et al. 2017). But this is disputed (Przybylski and
Weinstein 2019). Some studies find no link between playing
violent video games and such behaviours and attitudes (e.g.
Kühn et al. 2019). Other studies find no positive correlation
between playing violent games and actual crime or violence,
or else find a negative correlation (e.g. Cunningham et al.
2016)—perhaps because games provide “catharsis” (Cogburn
and Silcox 2009; Durkin and Barber 2002). So, the requisite
evidence is inconclusive. That, at least, appears to be the only
reasonable conclusion that those of us who are not experts in
the relevant sciences can arrive at.
Importantly, however, conclusive evidence is not required
for judging digital animal violence to be morally problematic
(McCormick 2001; Waddington 2007). Morally speaking,
13

it is enough that the relevant empirical claims have some
plausibility. For comparison, it is surely plausible to believe
that video games which involve violently assaulting women
or people of colour tend to promote or reinforce (a) disre-
spect toward individuals or harmful actions towards them in
a direct and/or indirect causal way6 (recalling Effects 1–2);
and (b) corruption of character at the societal and/or indi-
vidual levels (recalling Effects 3–4). True, such effects may
not occur in some, or in many, players. Nonetheless, if we
can judge that some games plausibly tend to promote those
kinds of effects, at least in certain individuals or groups, then
that judgment is sufficient to render those games morally
problematic. Such effects, of course, have many causes—
video games may be only one causal influence on problem-
atic attitudes and behaviour towards animals, and they may
be a relatively minor one. Nevertheless, insofar as they do
exert any causal influence, they are morally problematic.7
Note that this argument can in theory be accepted even by
“virtual amoralists” (e.g. Gooskens 2010; Schulzke 2010).
Virtual amoralists hold that it is never in itself right or wrong
to commit virtual acts of any kind, including murder, rape,
animal cruelty, and so on. Our argument in this paper, how-
ever, is not that (much) digital animal violence is morally
problematic “in itself”, but rather that it is morally problem-
atic because of the effects it plausibly has. But does it plausi-
bly have any of the four effects, which we enumerated above?
Defending the digital animal intuition (DAI)
We think that digital animal violence may well contribute
to some or all of those effects and that, moreover, it is more
likely to do so than digital human violence is to bring about
comparable effects. In other words, we believe the DAI is
probably correct: Video game violence involving animals
is generally more morally problematic than video game
violence involving adult humans. We now provide further
supporting considerations for this argument. These consid-
erations stem from differences between the way animals and
humans are often treated, regarded, and portrayed.
Consideration 1: Compared to (non-marginalized) human
beings, living animals are vulnerable,
powerless, and only weakly protected—
for instance, animals may legally be gra-
tuitously and violently killed.
6
 Recent research by, e.g., Gabbiadini et  al. (2016, 2017), sug-
gests an “indirect” link between playing violent-sexist video games
and reduced empathy for women, which has been associated with
increased male aggression to women.
7
  Once again, it is a separate question whether such games warrant
censorship or other action (Cogburn and Silcox 2009).
13
S. Coghlan, L. Sparrow
Consideration 2: Despite increasing respect for animals
in society, many people historically have
had, and still have, minimal and fragile
respect for them (as indeed some people
do for marginalized humans). Indiffer-
ence to animal suffering and wrong-
ful exploitation is, as we explained in
Sect. 3, rife—the systematic abuse of
animals remains normalized.
Consideration 3: The context (Cogburn and Silcox 2009)
of digital animal violence makes a dif-
ference (Sects. 4 and 5). While games
involving human violence may some-
times present violent options as a
dilemma, effectively becoming oppor-
tunities for moral reflection and training
(Schulzke 2010), animal violence is more
often presented in an unquestioned and
unconsidered manner, e.g. for training
exercises or trophy collection. Further-
more, because we perceive animals as,
like young children, morally innocent,
we are more likely to not regard them as
“deserving” violent treatment (compared
to some adult humans). In-game animal
portrayals, which may lack the condi-
tions to more-or-less effectively “justify”
violence, regularly single out animals as
objects for harmful exploitation.
Consider Consideration 3 first. It is helpful to compare
the way digital animal violence is often presented with
the context in which women have traditionally tended to
be depicted (or not depicted) in video games. For example,
Cogburn and Silcox (2009, p. 69) write:
[The] overwhelming majority of FPS [first-person shooter]
games habituate players to the idea that the world could be
purged of any constructive female presence whatsoever.
Insofar as they generally exclude the constructive pres-
ence of women, FPS games potentially promote and rein-
force a pernicious gender stereotype. Furthermore, if video
games were to include certain active portrayals of marginal-
ized and traditionally oppressed humans, such as the violent
targeting of those people, they would rightly be considered
to have at least some (even minor) potential to promote prej-
udices against those humans (Patridge 2011).8
8
  Although we say “portrayals”, we should not overlook a key differ-
ence between video games and, say, movies. As others have said, con-
sumers of video games are players who exert their agency in pecu-
liar ways (Cogburn and Silcox 2009; Jurgensen 2018; Nguyen 2017;
The “digital animal intuition:” the ethics of violence against animals in video games
Of course, these are empirical questions. Nonetheless, we
would surely have reason to be concerned if video games
appeared in which women or certain racial groups were the
only characters that players could choose to gratuitously
harm or violently exploit. We would also be concerned if
virtual female characters or “people of colour” (for example)
were apparently singled out within the game for significantly
different treatment from, say, white male characters. Both
the availability and the uncritical playing of such games
would be morally dubious. The point here parallels Con-
sideration 2 above: women and certain racial groups have
been historically marginalized, whereas white males have
enjoyed positions of power. And this affects how we view
video games. Imagine, for instance, a game in which only
women or people with darker skin can be incidentally hunted
for sport, while only white males can be killed in order to
reach higher game levels.
The reverse of this, by contrast, would be less problem-
atic, because white males are not marginalized or historically
oppressed, but rather enjoy positions of power and social
protection. Even if video games contributed to an erosion of
moral respect for white males (a relatively unlikely eventual-
ity), white males are, in general, likely to be comparatively
well protected by social institutions: a loss of respect for
them is likely to be counteracted by strong social forces.
This is significantly less probable in the case of marginalized
groups. And this recalls Consideration 1 above.
Our suggestion here, then, is that something similar to
these problematic cases involving marginalized or histori-
cally oppressed groups applies to animals. Digital animals
are commonly portrayed and encouraged to be treated by
players in more unthoughtful and problematic ways than dig-
ital humans. It is not just that animals are presented to us in
games as having weaker moral claims than human beings—a
lower moral status for animals is, as we said, consistent with
our overall argument. Rather, the salient fact is that digital
animals are often depicted, in a range of ways, as mere tools
for players to violently use and abuse. And even when (white
male) human characters in games are treated in, say, gratui-
tously violent ways, the context of the game often presents
animals in more instrumentalizing ways still. For example,
the Far Cry series provides players with many opportunities
for slaughtering both digital animals and digital humans, and
for the player-controlled protagonist to come to harm. How-
ever, quests and rewards that involve animal killing often
Footnote 8 (continued)
Sageng 2012). Hence, video games may, at least in theory, have more
pronounced effects than movies do on human attitudes and behav-
iour—including on overtly misogynistic and on subtly sexist behav-
iour.
lack the (however questionable) context or motivation that
is sometimes afforded to the killing of “bad” digital humans.
In Far Cry 3, for instance, the player must hunt and skin
certain animals in order to get a better wallet, while in Far
Cry 5 players are invited to run animals over with a vehicle
to acquire “roadkill” meat for a chef. Consideration 3, then,
partly explains why (much) digital animal violence is mor-
ally problematic.
However, this Consideration would not have much force
if Considerations 1–2 did not also apply. Consideration 2
says that people, both historically and currently, routinely
and unthinkingly disregard (sentient) animals’ significant
moral claims on us. In this context, it is plausible to sug-
gest that most forms of digital animal violence reflect and
reinforce such moral disregard (Van Ooijen 2018), even if
they are only one cause amongst many, and even if their
causal influence is relatively minor. Again, this parallels the
situation for, say, women. Women have historically been
oppressed and continue to be discriminated against. Digital
violence applied differentially to women as to men reflects
and expresses this social situation in the wrong way and is
therefore more likely to cause the sorts of morally problem-
atic effects identified above. Digital animal violence is, plau-
sibly, morally problematic for an analogous reason. Morally
problematic possible effects, as we said, include harm to
players and to society from corrupted moral attitudes as well
as harm, both direct and indirect, to animals themselves.
Further, as Consideration 1 says, the legal and social
protections animals enjoy from wrongful and often violent
exploitation remain minimal. Animals are at greater risk
of being harmed in severe, systematic, and violent ways
than are humans. This gives us some reason to think that
activities or phenomena such as video games which arguably
reinforce or promote callousness and indifference towards
animals are morally problematic. As noted in Effects 1–2,
increased risks of harm to animals may result both from the
actions of players themselves (Effects 1) and, probably more
importantly and plausibly, from the longer-term reinforce-
ment of morally undesirable and often unthinking social atti-
tudes that inhibit morally necessary changes in our treatment
of animals (Effects 2)—changes that philosophers, novelists,
and many others have been pressing for. All this supports
the “digital animal intuition:” The design and availability
of such video games, and the uncritical playing of them, are
morally problematic—and probably more so than is the case
for many games involving digital human violence. Certain
video games involving digital animal violence are not mor-
ally problematic merely because they reflect moral indiffer-
ence to animals in society (Morris 2017), but also because
they may contribute it.
In fact, we want to make a further claim about digital ani-
mal violence. To make this additional and somewhat more
difficult claim, let us briefly revisit digital human violence.
13

Concerns about digital human violence tend to arise, when
they do, from cases of harming that are widely regarded
as immoral (e.g. torture, rape) outside of games. Acts that
are more often regarded as morally permissible outside of
games, such as killing in self-defence and killing “baddies”
and “enemies”, (arguably) attract little or no moral concern
in video games, at least in the case of adult players, even if
they are realistically and graphically portrayed.
But this general idea, we shall now suggest, may not be
true of digitally harming animals. Take games in which play-
ers “must” or can violently kill animals, not gratuitously or
for fun, but for food or fibre (or to advance in the game). Sup-
pose these acts as depicted in the video games are morally
permissible acts outside of games. It does not necessarily
follow that the possibility of such acts are morally unprob-
lematic when they feature in video games. This, once again,
is because of contextual differences that obtain between the
situations of living animals and (non-marginalized, non-
historically oppressed, etc.) humans. Living animals’ moral
claims are routinely disregarded; animals are highly vulner-
able; and, despite growing moral concerns, social respect for
them remains relatively weak. In fact, animals’ systematic
abuse remains, to a significant degree, socially normalized.
These contextual factors support the view that the routine
and unquestioned harming of animals in video games—even
in the case of acts which are arguably morally permissible
outside of games9—may be morally problematic.
Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the contextual fac-
tors which we have placed emphasis upon in our discus-
sion, things could well be different if animals were to be
portrayed differently in video games. Imagine, for example,
that more and more video games begin to appear that treat
virtual animals in relevant ways more like virtual humans, or
that games appear that more expressly or effectively encour-
age players to reflect on society’s mistreatment of animals.
Things would also be different if the general playing public
began to have different responses to digital animal violence.
If, as a result of playing violent video games, players in
general began to critically reflect on the moral claims of
animals and to see them as being routinely mistreated, then
even those games that now comprise part of the moral prob-
lem of digital animal violence would cease to be morally
problematic, or become less so. Or at least, some morally
problematic elements would be eliminated or reduced—for
example, problems associated with society’s general attitude
towards animals. Other problems, such as the corruption of
the moral views of certain susceptible players, may persist,
just as presumably they would persist for games in which
9
  At the same time, we might think that digitally harming animals in
ways that are impermissible outside of games, such as virtually tor-
turing and killing them for fun, is more morally problematic still.
13
S. Coghlan, L. Sparrow
marginalized (digital) human beings are treated “worse”
than others. However, the most significant problem (on our
view) is the way that digital animal violence, as it currently
occurs, may contribute, even if to a limited degree, to the
moral invisibility of animals and to their systematic mistreat-
ment by society.
Finally, while many players are adults, we should not for-
get that many others are children. Children are likely to be
even more susceptible to some of the moral effects of the
prevalence of digital animal violence in many of its current
forms (unless perhaps their parents or guardians use these
games as an opportunity for encouraging in those children
the right sorts of moral reflections). Indeed, the DAI may
be at its strongest in regard to possible moral effects upon,
and involving, children—at least in terms of the design and
distribution of games which might reinforce morally prob-
lematic attitudes towards animals (Coghlan et al. 2019).
Conclusion
In this paper we argued that digital animal violence, or at
least digital animal violence in general and as it currently
occurs, is morally problematic. Certain ubiquitous sorts of
violence risk reinforcing the moral invisibility of animals
and their moral claims on us, both in relation to adult and
(perhaps especially) child players. We argued that this con-
sequence may, even if in small ways, plausibly increase the
chances of harm occurring to animals, players, and society.
It is true that such effects of video games are probably minor
compared to other causes. Nevertheless, in light of what is
morally at stake, they are important effects. Empirical stud-
ies into the effects of in-game animal violence, currently
almost non-existent, may help shed more light on issues
we have raised. This includes examining whether and how
depictions of animals in games can reinforce—or reduce—
moral prejudices against them. Critical discussion amongst
philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, game designers,
and others would also help to illuminate the moral questions
we raised about playing, designing, and distributing games
involving animals and violence.
Acknowledgements  Our thanks for Christopher Bartel for his help-
ful comments on a draft of this paper. Thanks also to an anonymous
reviewer for useful comments.
Funding Nil.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest  All authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
The “digital animal intuition:” the ethics of violence against animals in video games

References Minecraft Forum [Online discussion forum]. (2014, Jan 21). “Any-
body feel guilty for killing animals or whatever?” Retrieved
from https​://www.minec​raftf​orum.net/forum​s/minec​raft-java-
Anderson, C. A., Shibuya, A., Ihori, N., Swing, E. L., Bushman,
editi​o n/discu​s sion​/ 19323​7 -anybo​d y-feel-guilt​y-for-killi​n g-
B. J., Sakamoto, A., et al. (2010). Violent video game effects
anima​ls-or. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
on aggression, empathy, and prosocial behavior in Eastern and
Gabbiadini, A., Bushman, B. J., Riva, P., Andrighetto, L., & Volpato,
Western countries. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 151–173.
C. (2017). Grand Theft Auto is a “sandbox” game, but there are
Bartel, C. (2012). Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and Infor-
weapons, criminals, and prostitutes in the sandbox: Response to
mation Technology, 14(1), 11–16.
Ferguson and Donnellan (2017). Journal of Youth and Adoles-
Bernstein, J. (2013). 11 Classic video games that PETA should pro-
cence, 46(4), 2460–2466.
test. BuzzFeed News. Retrieved from https​://www.buzzf​eedne​
Gabbiadini, A., Riva, P., Andrighetto, L., Volpato, C., & Bushman, B.
ws.com/artic​le/josep​hbern​stein​/11-class​ic-video​-games​-that-
J. (2016). Acting like a tough guy: Violent-sexist video games,
peta-shoul​d-prote​st. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
identification with game characters, masculine beliefs, & empathy
Calvert, S. L., Appelbaum, M., Dodge, K. A., Graham, S., Nagayama
for female violence victims. PLoS ONE, 11(4), e0152121.
Hall, G. C., Hamby, S., et al. (2017). The American Psychologi-
GameFAQs [Online discussion forum]. (2018). “Is it weird to feel
cal Association Task Force assessment of violent video games:
guilty for killing animals in video games?” Retrieved from https​
Science in the service of public interests. American Psycholo-
://gamef​aqs.games​pot.com/board​s/69108​7-plays​tatio​n-4/75311​
gist, 72(2), 126–143.
373. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Chittaro, L., & Sioni, R. (2012). Killing non-human animals in video
Giant Bomb [Online discussion forum]. (2011). “Feel bad about killing
games: A study on user experience and desensitization to vio-
animals?” Retrieved from https​://www.giant​bomb.com/forum​s/
lence aspects. PsychNology Journal, 10(3), 215–243.
red-dead-redem​ption​-3153/feel-bad-about​-killi​ng-anima​ls-41995​
Coeckelbergh, M. (2007). Violent computer games, empathy, and
2/. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
cosmopolitanism. Ethics and Information Technology, 9,
Gooskens, G. (2010). The ethical status of virtual actions. Ethical Per-
219–231.
spectives, 17(1), 59–78.
Coetzee, J. M. (2016). The lives of animals. Princeton: Princeton
Hern, A. (2013). Grand Theft Auto 5 under fire for graphic torture
University Press.
scene. The Guardian. Retrieved from https​://www.thegu​ardia​
Cogburn, J., & Silcox, M. (2009). Philosophy through video games.
n.com/techn​ology​/2013/sep/18/grand​-theft​-auto-5-under​-fire-
London: Routledge.
for-graph​ic-tortu​re-scene​. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Coghlan, S., Vetere, F., Waycott, J., & Neves, B. B. (2019). Could
Hursthouse, R. (2011). Virtue ethics and the treatment of animals. In
social robots make us kinder or crueller to humans and animals?
T. L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
International Journal of Social Robotics, 11(5), 741–751.
animal ethics (pp. 119–143). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, D. (2018). Far Cry 5 has a really weird side mission. Gam-
Jurgensen, Z. (2018). Appreciating videogames. In J. Robson & G.
eRant. Retrieved from https​://gamer​ant.com/far-cry-5-bull-testi​
Tavinor (Eds.), The aesthetics of videogames (pp. 60–77). Lon-
cles-side-missi​on/. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
don: Routledge.
Croft, J. (2011). “It’s just a game”: Ethical reasoning within vir-
Korsgaard, C. M. (2013). Kantian ethics, animals, and the law. Oxford
tual worlds. GoodWork Project Report Series, 73. Retrieved
Journal of Legal Studies, 33(4), 629–648.
from https​: //thego​o dpro​j ect.org/pdf/73-Its-Just-a-Game.pdf.
Kühn, S., Kugler, D. T., Schmalen, K., Weichenberger, M., Witt, C.,
Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
& Gallinat, J. (2019). Does playing violent video games cause
Cunningham, S., Engelstätter, B., & Ward, M. (2016). Violent video
aggression? A longitudinal intervention study. Molecular Psy-
games and violent crime. Southern Economic Association,
chiatry, 24, 1220–1234.
82(4), 1247–1265.
Malazita, J. W., & Jenkins, A. (2017). Digital games and moral pack-
De Waal, F. B., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up per-
aging: The impacts of in-game decisions on public pedagogical
spective on animal and human cognition. Trends in Cognitive
deliberation. Journal of Gaming & Virtual Worlds, 9(1), 3–20.
Sciences, 14(5), 201–207.
McCormick, M. (2001). Is it wrong to play violent video games? Ethics
DeMello, M. (2012). Animals and society: An introduction to human-
and Information Technology, 3, 277–287.
animal studies. New York: Columbia University Press.
Morris, H. (2017, Aug 27). What could the rise of animal cruelty in
Derrida, J., & Wills, D. (2002). The animal that therefore I am (more
games mean? GoombaStomp. Retrieved from https:​ //goomba​ stom​
to follow). Critical Inquiry, 28(2), 369–418.
p.com/rise-anima​l-cruel​ty-games​-mean/. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Diamond, C. (2006). The difficulty of reality and the difficulty of
Neely, E. L. (2019). The ethics of choice in single-player video games.
philosophy. Reading cavell (pp. 108–128). London: Routledge.
In D. Berkich & M. V. d’Alfonso (Eds.), On the cognitive, ethical,
Dunn, J. (2012). Virtual worlds and moral evaluation. Ethics and
and scientific dimensions of artificial intelligence (philosophical
Information Technology, 14, 255–265.
studies series, vol. 134). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Durkin, K., & Barber, B. (2002). Not so doomed: Computer game
Nguyen, C. T. (2017). Philosophy of games. Philosophy Compass,
play and positive adolescent development. Journal of Applied
12(8), e12426.
Developmental Psychology, 23(4), 373–392.
Ostritsch, S. (2017). The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gam-
Ferguson, C. J. (2010). Blazing angels or resident evil? Can violent
er’s moral obligation. Ethics and Information Technology, 19,
video games be a force for good? Review of General Psychol-
117–128.
ogy, 14(2), 68–81.
Patridge, S. (2011). The incorrigible social meaning of video game
Flores, A., & James, C. (2012). Morality and ethics behind the
imagery. Ethics and Information Technology, 13, 303–312.
screen: Young people’s perspectives on digital life. New Media
Pluhar, E. B. (1987). The personhood view and the argument from
and Society, 15(6), 834–852.
marginal cases. Philosophica, 39(1), 23–38.
Forgrieve, J. (2018). The growing acceptance of veganism. Forbes.
Przybylski, A. K., & Weinstein, N. (2019). Violent video game engage-
Retrieved February 24, 2020, from https​: //www.forbe​s .com/
ment is not associated with adolescents’ aggressive behaviour:
sites​/ janet​forgr ​i eve/2018/11/02/pictu​r ing-a-kindl​e r-gentl​e r-
Evidence from a registered report. Royal Society Open Science,
world​-vegan​-month​.
6(2), 1–16.

13

Regan, T. (2004). The case for animal rights. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Rougeau, M. (2012). 10 things you can do in ’Far Cry 3’ that will
totally piss off PETA. Complex. Retrieved from https​://www.
compl​ex.com/pop-cultu​re/2012/12/10-thing​s-you-can-do-in-far-
cry-3-that-would​-total​ly-piss-off-peta/. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Sageng, J. R. (2012). In-game action. In J. R. Sageng, H. Fossheim,
& T. M. Larsen (Eds.), The philosophy of computer games (pp.
219–232). Dordrecht: Springer.
Sawers, N. C., & Demetrious, K. (2010). All the animals are gone?
The politics of contemporary hunter arcade games. Continuum:
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 24(2), 241–250.
Schulzke, M. (2010). Defending the morality of violent video games.
Ethics and Information Technology, 12, 127–138.
Sicart, M. (2009). The ethics of computer games. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Singer, P. (1995). Animal liberation. New York: Random House.
Sparrow, L., Gibbs, M., & Arnold, M. (2019). Apathetic villagers and
the trolls who love them. Proceedings of OZCHI’19, 447–451.
ACM, Fremantle, WA, Australia.
IGN Staff. (2020, Jan 14). The 21 side-quests that are always in RPGs.
IGN. Retrieved from https​://au.ign.com/artic​les/2019/10/28/
13
S. Coghlan, L. Sparrow
the-21-side-quest​s-that-are-alway​s-in-rpgs. Accessed 24 Feb
2020.
Stanley, S. (2014, Jul 16). The Last Dragon: Why one ecologist strug-
gles with video games and extinction. Polygon. Retrieved from
https​://www.polyg​on.com/2014/7/16/59091​33/drago​ns-ecolo​gy-
bison​-drago​n-age. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Stevens, C. (2018). Red Dead Redemption 2: Hunting, fishing, and
wildlife detailed. IGN. Retrieved from https​://au.ign.com/artic​
les/2018/09/28/red-dead-redem​ption​-2-hunti​ng-finis​hing-and-
wildl​ife-detai​led. Accessed 24 Feb 2020.
Van Ooijen, E. (2018). On the brink of virtual extinction: Hunting and
killing animals in open world video games. Eludamos: Journal
for Computer Game Culture, 9(1), 33–45.
Waddington, D. I. (2007). Locating the wrongness in ultra-violent
video games. Ethics and Information Technology, 9(2), 121–128.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.