Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray, Complainant, v. Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis, Respondent, A.C.

No 10868 [Formerly
CBD Case No. 07-2041], 26 January 2016 Facts: Complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the IBP on
30 July 2007, alleging that respondent filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that the
respondent signed the said Petition as “Counsel for the Petitioner,” referring to the complainant. The
complainant stated the respondent was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte Regala
Tamaray. The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because
Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-
Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any
petition, but she failed to do so. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.

Issue: The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl VascoTamaray
and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Thus, respondent's act of allowing the use of a
forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her
part. Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a scuffle inside
court chambers; openly doubting paternity of his own son; hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court;
harassing occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and engaging in an extramarital affair.
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is tantamount to
consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.
Facts:

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote
for the Court in Vinuya v. Romulo. Petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision
legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent committed plagiarism and/or infringement by failing to cite

his sources in a case he penned.

Ruling: NO.

There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws
involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written.
But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws
as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are “to stand by
precedent and not to disturb settled point.” And because judicial precedents are not
always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or
even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a
large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of
legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or
solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct,
judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such
precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the
originators.
Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961,
September 21, 1949
FACTS

Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney
Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente
Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to
have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado
a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said
that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty.
Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the
Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around
but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to
Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal
opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty.
Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely
a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case. Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was
not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a
copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to
disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said
case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD:

Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence,
Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent. As ruled by the
Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. Section 19 (e) of
Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty “to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.”  Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters
that might only further prejudice the complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore that the motion for
disqualification should be allowed.

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover

a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for
the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a
case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback
as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s
office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed
even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status
of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office
while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case.
The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court
was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of
the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out
that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse
that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown
the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because
he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively.
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered.
The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre  of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal

relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's
fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre  of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal
favor to the kumpadre,  the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed
to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to
protect the client's interest