Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Implication in Bangladesh
1
Money Laundering Act and Implications
in Bangladesh
Prepared for:
Tazrina Farah
Assistant Professor
Department of Finance
University of Dhaka
Prepared by:
Group No. 02
Section: B
BBA 21st Batch
Department of Finance
University of Dhaka
2
Group Profile
Group Number 02
Section: B
BBA 21st Batch
Department of Finance
University of Dhaka
3
Letter of Transmittal
April 10, 2016
Tazrina Farah
Assistant Professor
Department of Finance,
University of Dhaka.
Dear Ma’am,
We would like to say that this report was helpful for us to know about the current situations
of Money laundering and existing acts and regulation regarding money laundering in
Bangladesh. We also got have practical view through the real-life cases. We are very thankful
to you for giving us such a wonderful opportunity of widening our knowledge from the pages
of our book to the field of practice.
You will be happy to know that, we have tried our best to make this report more & more
informative and factual.
Sincerely Yours,
ID NO: 21-262
BBA 21st Batch,
Section: B
Department of Finance
University of Dhaka
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Table of Content
Chapter 1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 07
Chapter 2
Theoritical Background ....................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 3
Implication,Limitations and Recommendation(With real life cases) .................................................. 20
Chapter 4 .............................................................................................................................................. 29
Appendix .............................................................................................................................................. 30
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Executive Summary
We were assigned to study and analysis the the Money Laundering act and its implications in
Bangladesh.
This money laundering act generally refers to describe the process by which criminals
disguise the original ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making
such proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate source.
Studying the money laundering act, We have tried to present the Existing act regarding
Money laundering, it’s implication in Bangladesh prospect, the cases regarding money
laundering, how those cases were handled, what conclusions were derived from the cases and
so on. Moreover the scope of money laundering, how Bangladesh is going through the
offence Money laundering etc.
Here we analyze some real life cases to represent the current situation on this context and
how these actually are being solved through the acts. Though Bangladesh has now acts for
preventing money laundering but even after that there are some limitations too. So we also
covered this limitation very significantly in our report.
Apart from this analysis,we also came up with the concepts that will be helpful for
controlling money laundering more efficiently.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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1.1The Origin of the Report
This report is a partial requirement of the Legal Environment of Business, F-205 course of
BBA curriculum at Department of Finance, University of Dhaka. This report is prepared on
the topic selected by us and assigned by our course teacher, Tazrina Farah .The report was
fully approved by our course teacher, Tazrina Farah, Assistance Professor, Department of
Finance, University of Dhaka. The topic of the Report is - “Money laundering Act in
Bangladesh.”
1.2 Background
The topic of this report is “Money laundering Act in Bangladesh.” In order to complete this
report we had to go through a research with the aid of a lot of secondary data. We did
research on our existing money laundering act , went through some real life cases regarding
money laundering.
1.4 Methodology
The main source of data used in this report is collected from several secondary source.
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1.5 Limitations
We face some usual restrictions during the course of our preparation.
Lack of Time: We face this constraint.
Data Insufficiency: Though we tried hard to have the access to all the data we could utilize,
there are still some routine lacking in the data in our report.
Inefficiency: As we are a beginner in money laundering act and its implication,we have this
problem.
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CHAPTER 2
Theoretical
Background
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Money Laundering:
Money laundering is the generic term used to describe the process by which criminals
disguise the original ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making
such proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate source.
The processes by which criminally derived property may be laundered are extensive. Though
criminal money may be successfully laundered without the assistance of the financial sector,
the reality is that hundreds of billions of dollars of criminally derived money is laundered
through financial institutions, annually. The nature of the services and products offered by the
financial services industry (namely managing, controlling and possessing money and
property belonging to others) means that it is vulnerable to abuse by money launderers.
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In practice almost all serious crimes, including, drug trafficking, terrorism, fraud, robbery,
prostitution, illegal gambling, arms trafficking, bribery and corruption are capable of
predicating money laundering offences in most jurisdictions.
Tax evasion and other fiscal offences are treated as predicate money laundering crimes in
most of the world’s most effectively regulated jurisdictions.
Traditionally money laundering has been described as a process which takes place in three
distinct stages.
Placement, the stage at which criminally derived funds are introduced in the financial
system.
Layering, the substantive stage of the process in which the property is ‘washed’ and its
ownership and source is disguised.
Integration, the final stage at which the ‘laundered’ property is re-introduced into the
legitimate economy.
This three staged definition of money laundering is highly simplistic. The reality is that the so
called stages often overlap and in some cases, for example in cases of financial crimes, there
is no requirement for the proceeds of crime to be ‘placed’.
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• For the purposes of this Act, money laundering shall be deemed to be an offence.
• Any person who commits or abets or conspires to commit the offence of money
laundering, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of at least 4(four)
years but not exceeding 12(twelve) years and, in addition to that, a fine equivalent
to the twice of the value of the property involved in the offence or taka 10(ten)
lacks, whichever is greater.
• In addition to any fine or punishment, the court may pass an order to forfeit the
property of the convicted person in favor of the State which directly or indirectly
involved in or related with money laundering or any predicate offence.
• Any entity which commits an offence under this section shall be punished with a
fine of not less than twice of the value of the property or taka 20(twenty) lacks,
whichever is greater and in addition to this the registration of the said entity shall
be liable to be cancelled.
• It shall not be a prerequisite to charge or punish for money laundering to be
convicted or sentenced for any predicate offence.
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(b) ask for any information or obtain a report from reporting organizations with
regard to any transaction in which there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the transaction involves in money laundering or a predicate offence;
(d) issue, from time to time, any directions necessary for the prevention of money
laundering to the reporting organizations;
(f) arrange meetings and seminars including training for the officers and staff of
any organization or institution, including the reporting organizations,
considered necessary for the purpose of ensuring proper implementation of
this Act by Bangladesh Bank;
(g) Carry out any other functions necessary for the purposes of this Act.
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3. If any reporting organization fails to provide with the requested information
timely under this section, Bangladesh Bank may impose a fine on such
organization which may extend to a maximum of taka 5 (five) lacks at the rate of
taka 10 (ten) thousand per day and if any organization is fined more than 3(three)
times in 1(one) financial year, Bangladesh Bank may suspend the registration or
license of the organization or any of its branches, service centers, booths or agents
for the purpose of closing its operation within Bangladesh or, as the case may be,
shall inform the registration or licensing authority about the fact so as to the
relevant authority may take appropriate measures against the organization.
4. If any reporting organization provides with false information or statement
requested under this section, Bangladesh Bank may impose a fine on such
organization not less than taka 20 (twenty) thousand but not exceeding taka 5
(five) lacks and if any organization is fined more than 3(three) times in 1(one)
financial year, Bangladesh Bank may suspend the registration or license of the
organization or any of its branches, service centers, booths or agents for the
purpose of closing its operation within Bangladesh or, as the case may be, shall
inform the registration or licensing authority about the fact so as to the relevant
authority may take appropriate measures against the said organization.
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(4) The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit shall provide with information
relating to money laundering or terrorist financing or any suspicious transactions to
the Financial Intelligence Unit of another country on the basis of any contract or
agreement entered into with that country under the provisions of this Act and may
ask for any such information from any other country.
• impose a fine of at least taka 50 (fifty) thousand but not exceeding taka
25 (twenty-five) lacks on the reporting organization; and
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in addition to the fine mentioned in clause (a), cancel the license or the
authorization for carrying out commercial activities of the said
organization or any of its branches, service centers, booths or agents, or
as the case may be, shall inform the registration or licensing authority
about the fact so as to the relevant authority may take appropriate
measures against the organization.
3. Bangladesh Bank shall collect the sum of fine imposed under sub-section (2) in such
manner as it may determine and the sum collected shall be deposited into treasury of the
State.
To battle the problems of money laundering, the government enacted the Money laundering
prevention Act in 2002. Then, in 2007, the government enacted the UN Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC). Also in 2007, the government recognized the Central Bank’s
Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD) as the country’s official Financial Intelligence
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Unit (FIU). In 2008, the government promulgated the Money Laundering Prevention
Ordinance (MLPO 2008) and the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (ATO 2008). Both ordinances
facilitate international cooperation in battling money laundering, including working to
recover funds illegally transferred to or from foreign countries.
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CHAPTER 3
Implications in
Bangladesh
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In case of money laundering, Bangladesh actually follow the amended rule of 2012.But
further amendment also added to this act in 2015.According to the latest amendment money
laundering cases are settled down.
So now we will see some real life cases which will be heplpful to resemble the implication of
money laundering act in Bangladesh.
BB HEIST 2016
$951 million. Exactly this is the amount that has been attempted to steal from Bangladesh Bank by
the hackers. This much of amount has been attempted to steal from the Bangladesh central bank's
account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York within February 4 to 5. At that time, Bangladesh
Bank were closed. The perpetrators managed to compromise Bangladesh Bank's system, to observe
how transfers are done, and gained access to the bank's credentials for payment transfers, which
they used to send about three dozen requests to the Fed Bank to transfer funds to Sri Lanka and the
Philippines. 35 transactions worth $851 million transfer were prevented by the banking system but
five requests were granted; $20M to Sri Lanka and $81 million lost to the Philippines, entering the
Southeast Asian country's banking system on February 5, 2016. This money was laundered through
casinos and some later transferred to Hong Kong.
The $20 million fund to Sri Lanka, was intended by hackers to be transferred to Shalika Foundation, a
Sri Lanka-based non-profit organization. The hackers misspelled "foundation" in their request to
transfer the funds, spelling the word as "fandation". This spelling error gained suspicion
from Deutsche Bank, a routing bank which put a halt to the transaction in question after seek
clarifications from Bangladesh Bank.
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Philippine Events
The money transferred to the Philippines was deposited in five separate accounts with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and later found to be deposited under fictitious identities.
The funds were then transferred to a foreign exchange broker to be converted to Philippine pesos,
returned to the RCBC and consolidated to an account of a Chinese-Filipino businessperson. The
conversion was made from February 5 to 13, 2016.NThe four U.S. dollar accounts involved were
earlier opened with the RCBC in May 15, 2015, which remained untouched until February 4, 2016.
In February 8, 2016, during the Chinese New Year, Bangladesh Bank through SWIFT informed RCBC
to stop the payment, refund the funds and to "freeze and put the funds on hold" if the funds had
been transferred. Chinese New Year is a non-working holiday in the Philippines, and a SWIFT
message from Bangladesh Bank containing a similar information was received by RCBC a day later.
By this time, a withdrawal amounting to about $58.15 million was already processed by RCBC's
Jupiter Street Branch.
The Governor of Bangladesh Bank requested Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas assistance on February 16
regarding the recovery of its $81 million funds saying that the SWIFT payment instructions issued in
favor of RCBC in February 4, 2016, to be fraudulent.
DHAKA, Bangladesh--Hackers who last month stole more than $100 million from
Bangladesh's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had been remotely
monitoring activity at the South Asian nation's central bank for several weeks and may have
breached as many as 32 computers at the bank, a report from private investigators said.The
hackers introduced malicious code, known as malware into the Bangladesh bank's server,
which allowed them to process and authorize the transactions, according to an interim report
from FireEye Inc.
Bangladesh Bank Governor Atiur Rahman has resigned after this incident. Fazle Kabir, a
former finance minister, has been chosen as Rahman's replacement.
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Limitations
I. Limitations of the Financial System to
Money Laundering:
1. Money laundering is often thought to be associated solely with banks and
moneychangers. All financial institutions, both banks and non-banks, are susceptible
to money laundering activities. Whilst the traditional banking processes of deposit
taking, money transfer systems and lending do offer a vital laundering mechanism,
particularly in the initial conversion from cash, it should be recognized that products
and services offered by other types of financial and non-financial sector businesses
are also attractive to the launderer. The sophisticated launderer often involves many
other unwitting accomplices such as currency exchange houses, stock brokerage
houses, gold dealers, real estate dealers, insurance companies, trading companies and
others selling high value commodities and luxury goods.
2. Certain points of vulnerability have been identified in the laundering process, which
the money launderer finds difficult to avoid, and where his activities are therefore
more susceptible to being recognized. These are:
• Entry of cash into the financial system;
• Cross-border flows of cash; and
• Transfers within and from the financial system.
3. Financial institutions should consider the money laundering risks posed by the
products and services they offer, particularly where there is no face-to-face contact
with the customer, anddevise their procedures with due regard to that risk.
4. Although it may not appear obvious that the products might be used for money
laundering purposes, vigilance is necessary throughout the financial system to ensure
that weaknessescannot be exploited.
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5. Banks and other Financial Institutions conducting relevant financial business in liquid
products are clearly most vulnerable to use by money launderers, particularly where
they are of high value. The liquidity of some products may attract money launderers
since it allows them quickly and easily to move their money from one product to
another, mixing lawful and illicitproceeds and integrating them into the legitimate
economy.
7. Electronic funds transfer systems increase the vulnerability by enabling the cash
deposits to beswitched rapidly between accounts in different names and different
jurisdictions.
8. However, in addition, banks and non-banking financial institutions, as providers of a
wide range of services, are vulnerable to being used in the layering and integration
stages. Other loanaccounts may be used as part of this process to create complex
layers of transactions.
10. Investment and merchant banking businesses are less likely than banks and money
changersto be at risk during the initial placement stage.
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11. Investment and merchant banking businesses are more likely to find them being used
at the layering and integration stages of money laundering. The liquidity of many
investment products particularly attracts sophisticated money laundering since it
allows them quickly and easily to move their money from one product to another,
mixing lawful and illicit proceeds andintegrating them into the legitimate economy.
12. Although it may not appear obvious that insurance and retail investment products
might be used for money laundering purposes, vigilance is necessary throughout the
financial system toensure that nontraditional banking products and services are not
exploited.
13. Intermediaries and product providers who deal direct with the public may be used at
the initial placement stage of money laundering, particularly if they receive cash.
Premiums on insurance policies may be paid in cash, with the policy subsequently
being cancelled in order to obtain a return of premium (e.g. by cheque), or an insured
event may occur resulting in a claim being paid out. Retail investment products are,
however, more likely to be used at the layering and integration stages. The liquidity of
a mutual funds may attract money launderers since it allows them quickly and easily
to move their money from one product to another, mixing lawful andillicit proceeds
and integrating them into the legitimate economy.
14. Lump sum investments in liquid products are clearly most vulnerable to use by money
launderers, particularly where they are of high value. Payment in cash should merit
further investigation, particularly where it cannot be supported by evidence of a cash-
based business asthe source of funds.
15. Insurance and investment product providers and intermediaries should therefore keep
transaction records that are comprehensive enough to establish an audit trail. Such
records can also provide useful information on the people and organizations involved
in launderingschemes.
16. Corporate vehicles trust structures and nominees are firm favorites with money
launderers as a method of layering their proceeds. Providers of these services can find
themselves much indemand from criminals.
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17. The facility with which currency exchanges can be effected through a bureau is of
particularattraction especially when such changes are effected in favor of a cheque or
gold bullion.
a) Lease/Term Loan Finance: Front company can take lease/term loan finance from a
financial institution and repay the loan from illegal source, and thus bring illegal
money in the formal financial system in absence of proper measures. The firm can
also repay the loan amount even before maturity period if they are not asked about the
sources of fund. In case of financial or capital lease, the asset purchased with FI‘s
financing facility can be sold immediately after repayment of the loan through illegal
money and sold proceeds can be shown as legal. So the money launderers and
terrorist financer can use this financial instrument for placement and layering of their
ill-gotten money.
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opportunity to make their money legal. Later the money launderers can sell these
instruments and bring their money in the formal financial system.
c) Personal Loan/Car Loan/Home Loan: Any person can take personal loan from FIs
and repay it by illegally earned money; thus he/she can launder money and bring it in
the formal channel. After taking home loan or car loan, money launderers can repay
those with their illegally earned money, and later by selling that home/car, they can
show the proceeds as legal money.
e) Deposit Scheme: FIs can sell deposit products with at least a six months maturity
period. However, the depositor can encash their deposit money prior to the maturity
date with prior approval from Bangladesh Bank, foregoing interest income. This
deposit product may be used as lucrative vehicle to place ill-gotten money in the
financial system in absence of strong measures.
f) Loan Backed Money Laundering: In the “loan backed” money laundering method,
a criminal provides an associate with a specificamount of illegitimate money. The
associate then provides a “loan or mortgage” back to the moneylaundering for the
same amount with all the necessary “loan or mortgage” documentation. This createsan
illusion that the trafficker‘s funds are legitimate. The scheme is reinforced through
“legislatively”scheduled payments made on the loan by the money launderer.
Money laundering has potentially devastating economic, security, and social consequences.
Money laundering is a process vital to making crime worthwhile. It provides the fuel for drug
dealers, smugglers, terrorists, illegal arms dealers, corrupt public officials, and others to
operate and expand their criminal enterprises. Money laundering diminishes government tax
revenue andtherefore, indirectly harms honest taxpayers. It also makes government tax
collection more difficult. In order to combat Money Laundering:
➢ Banks should at all times pay particular attention to the fundamental principle of
good business practice “know your customer (KYC)”. Having a sound knowledge of
a customer’s business and pattern of financial transactions and commitments is one
of the best methods by which Bank and its Officials will recognize attempts at money
laundering. Itis not only a principle of good business but is also an essential tool to
avoid involvement in moneylaundering.
➢ Thus efforts to combat money laundering largely focus on those points in the process
where thelaunderer's activities are more susceptible to recognition and have therefore
to a large extentconcentrated on the deposit taking procedures of banks i.e. the
placement stage.
➢ Institutions and intermediaries must keep transaction records that are comprehensive
enough toestablish an audit trail. Such records can also provide useful information on
the people andorganizations involved in laundering schemes.
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Conclusion
So we see the definition of money laundering act,impact on developing countries like us and
the limitations of recent act against money laundering and some recommendations.
Ultimately how to control money laundering has been described.By following these steps it
is expected that “Money Laundering”which is the recent world concern can be solved.
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CHAPTER 4
Appendix
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Sources:
1. Managing corerisks in banking: Guidance notes on prevention of money laundering,
Bangladesh Bank.
2. Updated Manual (Guidelines) on prevention of money laundering and combating
financing on terrorism: 2013, Bank Asia.
3. Guidelineson preventionofmoneylaundering (Revised-2014), IFIC Bank.
4. Anti-money laundering Act-2012 of Bangladesh.
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