Vincent Lynell B.

Walo
PS 264
May 13, 2021

The Philippines-Japan Security Partnership in Relation To Security Threats of

China

Introduction:
The Philippines and Japan both faced regional security threat in the South China Sea and East
China Sea with China. China’s attempt to aggressively claim territories in the East and South
China Sea made them both a rising power in the East and Southeast Asia, as well as a threat to
regional security on the part of the other states in ASEAN, as well as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and other powers/states , that has vested interests in the region, especially the United
States.

Research Questions:
And so, we must ask the following questions:
1.) What are the current Security Partnerships between the Philippines and Japan?
2.) Can the current Security Partnership between the Philippines and Japan
counter/balance the rising hegemony of China in the East and Southeast Asia?

Background:
Starting within the mid-1990s, states, in specific the USSR, have embraced the concept of
“strategic partnership” from the private segment into universal relations, as an elective gadget to
collusions and territorial educate for overseeing security and financial participation (Wilkins
2008). The concept, in any case, demonstrated to be more engaging to Asian states,
particularly China who utilized the term to depict the formal or inferred understandings it shaped
with major powers and states in 1996. Within the early 2000s, the concept and hone of vital
organizations spread past China, with Asian states fashioning different key associations of
shifting substance – both at a worldwide and territorial level. (Nañes, 2018)
Wilkins define “strategic partnerships” as a relationship between two or more states that involve
mutual expectations of some quite policy coordination on security issues under certain
conditions into the long run (Wilkins 2012). Compared to traditional varieties of alignment-such
as alliances, security communities, etc. – strategic partnerships don't bind states to cooperate
militarily or use force within the defense of an ally, nor are they necessarily formed in response
to a mutual perception of threat (Walt 1987; Nañes2018)
This concept finds application within the Philippines-Japan relationship, who as two maritime
countries bounded by shared values and customary strategic interests, have developed their
bilateral relations into ‘strategic partnership’ following the “Philippine-Japan Strategic
Partnership Declaration” in 2011. On the one hand, the bilateral relationship of the 2 countries
goes an extended way back in history when the primary Philippine Embassy was established in
Tokyo during the 1950s. Both are traditional allies of the US and are therefore important for the
latter’s power projection within the Asia-Pacific region. On the opposite, Philippine-Japan ties
face serious challenges given the foremost security developments caused the increasing
tension among claimant states within the South China Sea (SCS) and therefore the nuclear
crisis in Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (Nañes, 2018)
Given the actual fact that the Philippines and Japan faced a standard security
threat, that's China, it's necessary that the Philippine and Japan have a security and defense
agreement to counter China’s aggressive claim within the South China and East China Seas.
Also, both the Philippines and Japan have military alliances with the US and therefore
the us even have superpower rivalries with China. Courtesy of Military Alliance with the US, the
Philippines and Japan must forge alliances in addition so as to counterbalance China for its
rising power moreover as for its aggressive claims within the South China Sea.
The Enhancement of Philippines-Japan defense relations might be seen as strategically
important and essential for both respective additionally as shared reasons. “The Philippines has
got to leverage its alliances and defense engagements with foreign militaries to rectify the
deplorable state of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) and its inadequacy to reply to
security threats, while Japan has to assist Southeast Asian countries in active dispute with
China over the South China Sea since China would adopt an identical assertive attitude and
actions against Japan within the East China Sea”. Both the Philippines and Japan must confront
with the identical geostrategic challenge within the sort of China, and this has been the
important feature of their defense diplomacy and security cooperation. (Castillo, 2020)
The Philippines’ local defense industry and production of military goods and equipment
continues to be within the process of further developing its own technological base and
capacity, particularly when it involves producing its own advanced weapon systems. it's for that
reason that while the Philippines can produce good quality Small Arms and light-weight
Weapons and potentially decent ships and other naval vessels, its local military and defense
companies are still not fully capable of manufacturing more state of the art and complicated
weapons platforms and systems like submarines, modern armored fighting/fire support vehicles,
and missile systems.
The following gaps may probably function an opportunity for Japan and its military and defense
industries because they're also considering exporting to their allies and friendly nations within
the region. The close and cordial diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan
function an avenue for further deepening defense partnerships. together with Prime Minister
Abe’s promises for more grants and investment, the lease of the TC-90 reconnaissance aircraft
to the Philippine Navy was a part of Japan’s efforts in helping the Philippines economically and
militarily to counter China’s growing influence of Duterte’s administration. Japan’s transfer of
those reconnaissance planes to the Philippine Navy also showed that maritime security
cooperation between Japan and therefore the Philippines is developing smoothly despite this
relations between the Philippines and China. (Castillo, 2020)
Because Japan is trying to strengthen its strategic power and influence in geographic region,
this provides the prospect for increased partnership between Philippine and Japanese military
and defense industries. except for potentially providing certain defense equipment as required
by the AFP’s (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Modernization Program, Japan may also help
Philippine defense companies in further developing and producing their technological and
industrial capabilities and capacities. this can be particularly essential when it involves
developing naval and aerospace military technology because Japanese defense companies,
like Mitsubishi, Kawasaki and Komatsu, among others, have both the technical experience and
expertise in manufacturing advanced weapon platforms and systems. (Castillo, 2020)

Background on Japan’s Military:

On May 3, 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the amendment of the constitution, with
Article 9 as the priority target for the amendment. The clause makes Japan vulnerable against
foreign security threats. Despite having a Self-Defense Force (JSDF), it still remains legally
restricted to function like a normal military force should be performing. With the times changing
and many factors taken into consideration, Japan has decided to amend the country's pacifist
constitution and re-arm its military. With the amendment due in 2020, it garnered different
feedbacks from its neighboring states.
Although the country was prohibited from its war potential, Japan still maintains its own armed
forces. It was reinterpreted by the government to exercise its basic right to minimum military
strength for defense. Because of the political reinterpretation, Japan was allowed to have an
army called as the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to defend Japan’s own land and
people. Against foreign aggressions and international disputes, the country still heavily depends
on the US-Japan Peace Treaty of San Francisco. In 2014, another interpretation was introduced
by the government that strengthened the existence of the JSDF. It allowed Japan to aid its allies
in case that a war is declared upon them. It is wrong to assume that Japan’s military power falls
behind powers like China and India. The current reserves and strength of its military is in par
with other powerful states.
Currently, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is the “de-facto” military force of Japan.
However, because of its pacifist constitution, this military force has limited capabilities that could
endanger Japan's National Security. The Japan Self-Defense Force has a lot of legal
restrictions, thereby causing them to have limited capabilities.
The law-makers in Japan insisted through the ability of constitutional artifices to resist and
hedge against the exercise of collective self defense has come under increasing pressure in the
post–cold war period. Japan constantly faced pressure and security threat in the Asia-Pacific
because of North Korea’s threat of nuclear weapons, the rise to power of China as well as its
aggressive territorial claims in the Northeast Asian Region, and globally by the challenges of the
Gulf War of 1990–91 and the conflicts ensuing from 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early
2000s— has pressured the Japanese Government as to how should they support the United
States in the exercise of collective self-defense.(Hughes, 2017)
In order to stop possible threats, Japan must clearly show display both to potential rivals such
as China and North Korea and to its U.S. military ally and other potential security allies its
degree of vigilance and the restrictions for its use of military force. If Japan continues to be
vague in its resolve to prevent and stop an enemy from a specific course of action through force
and retaliation, then conflict cannot be prevented through the threat of deterrence.
The development of U.S.-Japan defense agreement cooperation supported by collective self-
defense and the amended Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation is considered by
some as only increasing general security issues and regional conflicts and also the high
probability of leading Japan into a regional conflict with the United States and China or North
Korea. (Hughes, 2017)
Between 1997 and 2014, Japan’s military and defense expenditure compared to China’s
decreased from four times the size to roughly one-third. Due to the increasing capabilities of its
military and geographical closeness to crises on Japan’s boundary, China had come to be
perceived in Japan as posing irregular and gradually symmetric possible threats.
China is revealed in its “maritime advance” and increased their interest and activities near
Japan’s islands as China’s navy seeks greater access to the western Pacific. Worsening
concerns, the political relations between China and Japan had been very tense, with high-level
political and military negotiations seldom and uncommon.
Since September 2012, Japan’s interests had increased over what many policymakers consider
as Beijing’s assertive policies and gray-zone activities proposed to state its claim to the Japan-
governed Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China).(Liff, 2017)

Agreements Between the Philippines and Japan:

In early December 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo met in Manila to debate bilateral and regional cooperation between
their countries on a good range of security issues. the two leaders of both countries expressed
their “grave concern” over the North Korean nuclear arms and missile development program”
and convinced Pyongyang to deal with the international community’s security and humanitarian
concerns. They also expressed condemnation to the North Korean missile launch and nuclear
test and covinced Pyongyang to get rid of all nuclear weapons and current nuclear
programs. After the meeting of the two leaders of both countries, Prime Minister Abe and former
President Arroyo signed the “Philippine-Japan Joint Statement on Partnership between Two
Close Neighbors for Comprehensive Cooperation.” The statement made both the Philippines
and Japan to promote policy dialogue on the issues of security, maritime and consular affairs,
and on the enhancement of joint efforts to prevent and eradicate human trafficking. (De Castro,
2017)
On June 2015, former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III made his first state visit to Japan
and met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe how they could expand the Japan–Philippine
strategic partnership to counter China’s aggressive territorial claims in the South and East China
Seas. Before he returned to Manila, former President Aquino announced that the two countries
would soon begin the talks and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to give
the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (JSDF) access to Philippine military bases. After a few weeks, a
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) naval reconnaissance plane participated in a joint
training exercise with the Philippine Navy (PN) on the island of Palawan. On the saod joint
training, then Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin mentioned that there had been an
increasing convergence of security concerns between the Philippines and Japan. And so then
Secretary Gazmin’s statement, Professor Sheldon Simon said: “Of all Southeast Asian
countries, Japan’s security relations with the Philippines are the most advanced. Because it is a
close ally of U.S., Japan is seen by Manila as an important security partner.” (De Castro, 2017)
After becoming president in June 2010, then Philippine President Benigno Simon Aquino III
promised to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which has shifted its focus
from internal security to maritime/territorial defense. The March 2, 2011, incident at the Reed
Bank between two Chinese patrol vessels and a Philippine survey ship and China’s dismissive
response to the Philippines’ diplomatic queries caused the Aquino administration to make the
AFP’s modernization at a faster rate. In fact, China kept on badgering the Philippines and other
claimant states to recognize Chinese undisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea. Its
haughty and hostile attitude toward the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of 2011
increased tensions in the territorial dispute. During that time, former President Aquino saw and
had realized that the Philippines was possibly and could potentially be on a direct collision
course with China regarding the South China Sea issue. And so, the modernization of the
Philippine military capabilities under the Aquino Administration was externally influenced by a
changing balance of power in East Asia and by a geo-strategic reconfiguration of national
capabilities generated by China’s rise as a great power. (De Castro, 2017)

Security Threat from China:

During the 1980s, the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Admiral Liu
Huaqing, announced the Near Seas Active Defense doctrine. This doctrine called for the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to form layered defenses in the first island-chain to prevent a
potential enemy  from threatening China from the sea. In the mid-1990s, China made a weapon
of conventional yet inexpensive and very precise armed ballistic and cruise missiles targeted at
all the U.S.-air-base and port in the Western Pacific. These weapons are also made to attack
enemy surface vessels (including U.S. aircraft carriers) can operate hundreds of miles away
from China’s coast. Chinese military planners believe that their missiles, with anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities, can completely stop the U.S. Navy from making a confrontation with
the China in the region. And so, since the last decade of the 20th century, the U.S. Navy thinks
that China has the capacity to disrupt or slow down the deployment of American air and naval
forces to the theater of operations. China’s fast growing economy during the first decade of the
21st century made it into an engine of growth in East Asia and, indeed, the wider world. With
China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) surpassing Japan in 2010, it has become the second-
largest economy in the world next only to the United States. Its rapid economic progress has not
only made the confident and assertive in foreign affairs but also heightened its military prowess.
China had an annual double-digit increase in defense spending since 2006. Recently, the
Chinese government increased its military budget by 13% to boost the PLAN’s capability to
accomplish a range of military functions, including winning local wars under information age
conditions. (De Castro, 2017)
There is no doubt that China’s rise and its growing assertiveness in its territorial claim in the
South China Sea pose the greatest security challenge that the Philippines has ever faced since
1941. At the same time, their maritime dispute has come at a time when American presence
and influence in Asia was decreasing. In 1991, the Senate of the Philippines voted to reject the
renewal of U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement for it has been in effect since 1947. Since,
the activities ofChina’s in the South China Sea coincided with major readjustments in U.S.
foreign policy, including realignment of military troops after the Cold War in Asia and the
decreasing U.S. influence after many years of benign neglect in the region (Mauzy & Job,
2007). Whether or not U.S. military realignment directly contributed to China’s increased
assertiveness, the United States was obviously concerned with the decreasing influence of its
military in the region. In this light, the United States made a policy to reengage in the region
called “Pivot to Asia” under former President Barack Obama. However, the United States seems
to have returned to its foreign policy of benign neglect toward the region after the election of
Donald Trump to the presidency. (Trinidad, 2017)
Japan also tried to have its defense relations in Southeast Asia. Conducted by Japan with a
number of ASEAN countries, a dialogue was made that aims to promote confidence building-
measures between Japan and its Southeast Asian neighbors. And in the light of 9/11, the
dialogue is designed to enhance joint efforts in addressing international terrorism. An interesting
feature is the participation of military in these bilateral exchanges. In these annual bilateral
dialogues, Philippine and Japanese defense officials exchanged views on defense and security
policies, situation, and challenges such as regional security, North Korea, the Spratlys, and non-
nuclear proliferation in East Asia. In addition, they looked into the prospects of cooperation in
counter-terrorism and maritime security. (De Castro, 2017)
Despite the constitutional restrictions in Japan’s Constitution, the Philippines and Japan
organized a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea on May 12, 2015. Japan dispatched two
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers— the JS Harusame and Amigri that
conducted training exercises with a Philippine Navy (PN) frigate BRP Ramon Alcaraz on
communication strategies to respond to “unplanned encounters at sea.” Known as the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), the joint naval exercise was an offshoot of a security
agreement signed by Japan and the Philippines in January 2015 to strengthen defense alliance
between the two U.S. allies. On 21 June 2015, the JMDSF P3-C Orion with 20 crew members
from Kanoya Air Base in Kagoshima Prefecture arrived in the Philippines to participate in
another training exercise to prove the increasing pace of Philippine-Japan maritime security
agreement. According to the Philippine Navy press release, the training activity focused on
developing the fleet skills and the interoperability of the two countries’ navies in Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, especially on the search-and-rescue of troubled
vessels or crashed aircraft in the high seas. It involved one fixed-wing maritime aircraft from the
two navies and a Philippine Navy patrol vessel. The exercise was done in the high seas about
140 kilometers northwest of Palawan. Officials from both countries emphasized that it was
primarily a disaster-relief and search-and rescue exercise, not a reconnaissance operation.
They also added that the activity aimed to develop camaraderie, and strengthen the PN-JMSDF
partnership and alliance in promoting maritime security. (De Castro, 2017)

Research Methods:

The researcher shall review news articles, policy papers and research journal articles
about the security partnership between the Philippines and Japan and relate it to the
different issues concerning military matters that are written therein.
Philippines and Japan Security and Defense Partnership:
The strategic partnership between the Philippines and Japan was established in 2011 at first
just to make way for the exchange of goods, services, people and investments between the
economies of the two countries by implementing the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement. But since the start of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term, maritime security
partnership has become the main policy of the said strategic partnership. Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe reaffirmed Japan’s assistance towards the capacity building of the Philippine Coast Guard
by providing the agency with 10 patrol vessels through a loan agreement. Cooperation on
Maritime Security between the two allied countries has grown more dynamic, and that must be
expected. Both are maritime countries with mutual interests in maritime security and freedom of
navigation in the region’s vital Sea Lines of Communication. More importantly, the said
cooperation is in response to a common threat – China’s maritime build-up in the East and
South China seas. To strengthen the maritime cooperation with Japan is a part of the
Philippines’ broader strategy to intensify its security and defense cooperation with its allies to
compensate for its limited military capability and insecurity. It likewise signifies the Philippines’
determination to internationalize the South China Sea disputes in a bid to counter China’s
insistence on bilateralism, which may legally and strategically undermine the Philippines’
territorial claims. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said that the United States and Japan
will be given access to the Subic Naval Base, a former United States military facility facing the
South China Sea. The Philippines will indeed play a role in Japan’s developing military and
defense strategy of deploying marines and surveillance drones to protect its remote islands and
foreign policy strategy of re-engaging ASEAN. The maritime cooperation between the
Philippines and Japan is intended to project an image of a more dynamic relationship aiming at
China to be prevented from having aggressive territorial claims in the East and South China
seas. However, the Philippines is mistaken to consider Japan to counter China’s military build-
up. China is not likely to be intimidated. It is only the United States, who is still the dominant
military power in the Pacific, which maintains and protects the peace and stability in the region
through its military presence. To give and provide the Philippines with brand-new patrol vessels
and to give and provide Japan the access to Philippine military bases will not shift the balance
of naval power in the South China Sea. Despite all those things, the said developments will
increase the Philippines’ maritime domain awareness and help Japan monitor China’s maritime
activities and naval build-up. (Trajano, 2013)
Both the Philippines and Japan have maritime territorial disputes with China. Both China and
Japan  claim ownership of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, known as the Senkaku in
Japan and Diaoyu in China. China also claims most of the South China Sea through its 9 Dash
Line claim and has reclaimed and constructed military facilities on the reefs and shoals even
though they are partially claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. A
UN Permanent Court of Arbitration, acting on a Philippine plea, nullified Beijing's claims over the
strategic waterway that has a lot of aquatic resources, as well as oil and gas deposits. (Gagalac,
2019)
The Philippines-Japan security partnership helps achieve balance of power in the East and
Southeast Asian region. The two archipelagic countries have mentioned in their joint statements
that it is important to have open and stable seas in the region, thus, partnership and cooperation
in this field would be within their respective national interests. (Nañes, 2018)
In June 2015, President Benigno Aquino III and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed a joint
declaration between the Philippines and Japan. The said declaration recognizes and
acknowledges the shared goals of Philippines and Japan to ensure peace and stability within
the Asia-Pacific, to promote economic process, to address international challenges and to
achieve security within the East and Southeast Asian region. The said Declaration calls for the
Philippines and Japan in reinforcing security cooperation and continueing a interdependent
economic partnership. Both countries also had an agreement to trasfer military and defense
equipment and technology and to expand the exercises for capacity building that was included
in the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Department of
National Defense of the Philippines and Ministry of Defense of Japan. (Trinidad, 2017)
The security problems with both the Philippines and Japan had became more and more intense.
There are also tensions that are starting to rise with different challenges as well as there are
destabilization factors that becomes more acute.  The both maritime countries (the Philippines
and Japan) are also being confronted with different security threats from different countries and
regions round the world like Syria and United States (US)’ ‘Global War on Terror’. There is also
the use of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), like nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons that becomes more and more widespread. That issue poses a major threat to the
international community. (Nañes, 2018)
Up against an increasingly volatile situation within the South China Sea, the Philippines is
currently seeking to develop its defense capabilities against potential external threats. During
the time when the United States rebalances itself towards Asia, the Philippines has a chance to
continuously work with its ally to increase bilateral military-to-military cooperation. Aside from
that, the Philippines’ evolving strategic partnership with Japan is continously proving to be an
asset with Japan providing the Philippine Coast Guard with patrol boats through its official
development assistance program. One option for the Philippines to enhance its defense
capabilities is to produce access for US forces to its military bases with the likelihood that other
countries, especially Japan, could enjoy the identical privilege. This, in turn, has reignited the
domestic military bases debate—a sensitive issue within the country. (Amador, 2013)
Inviting Japan to possess access to the identical facilities would even be another opportunity for
the Philippines to exercise increased influence on the changing regional security dynamic,
especially within the South China Sea. Both countries are concerned by the irredentist actions
of China and thus have common cause to hunt closer security cooperation with one another. In
2011, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
formalized the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III
and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe committed to further deepen their bilateral relationship
when the latter visited the Philippines in July and also the two leaders agreed to coordinate and
cooperate closely on security and maritime issues. (Amador, 2013)
Granting Japan access, however, is complicated by the very fact that there's currently no
formal Philippines-Japan agreement on defense cooperation that's a precondition for access. If
the Philippines is bent giving Japan access, a visiting forces agreement has to be negotiated.
The said agreement should and must include certain legal constraints with regards personnel in
each other’s territories, legal jurisdiction for criminal offenses, movement of vessels and aircraft,
and other elements. (Amador, 2013)
Decades of neglect by Filipino policymakers, together with a spotlight on act of terrorism and
corruption within the military, have made the Philippines’ military one in all the weakest within
the region. Rejuvenating the mutual defense treaty with the United States, while at the
identical time deepening security cooperation with Japan, are pragmatic approaches that
Aquino’s government have taken, but these are just stop-gap solutions. The Philippines
still must develop and sustain its own capacity to supply for its own defense. One strategic
consideration for Filipino policymakers is that the Philippines is fast becoming the middle of the
pushback against Beijing’s attempt at regional supremacy. China’s perceived assertive and
domineering stance and continued stalling in negotiations for a Code of Conduct within
the South China Sea is pushing regional states, primarily those with shared interests, to
cooperate more closely than ever. Unlike back in the past, small countries just like
the Philippines might not be as easily bullied by larger states. Having China as a direct neighbor
should make political leaders within these countries realize that they need to carefully give some
thought to their strategic and policy  choices in the coming years. This lesson should apply more
so to the Philippines—and  Vietnam—as both have remained resolute when making a
decision to not be docile within the face of Chinese bellicosity. (Amador, 2013)
The Philippines and Japan should strengthen their maritime cooperation. Aside from economic
cooperation, maritime territortorial issues make up another prominent agenda in Duterte’s
engagement with Japan. The increasing instability over the South China Sea dispute may be
a motivating factor for the Philippines to pursue capacity-building measures with a long-term
ally, Japan. On the opposite hand, the Japanese government through the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), has been committed in pushing for maritime cooperation with the
Philippines to market maritime safety and boost regional trade. Since 1974, JICA has been
providing technical and capability support, likewise as scholarship programs to professionalize
the Philippine Coast Guard. As a maritime nation, the Philippines could greatly enjoy these
initiatives because it is within its interests to confirm that the identical is implemented in step
with established Rules of Engagement (ROE). additionally, the Philippines and Japan should
increase the frequency of joint maritime patrols, military exchanges, and trainings as a part
of their confidence-building measures. The establishment of the Philippine Coast Guard
Academy would be the primary step towards the achievement of those goals. (Nañes, 2018)
Back in June 2015, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III made another state visit to Japan,
this time, to debate and negotiate with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe the ways during
which they might strengthen and enhance their countries’ strategic partnership within the face of
China’s aggressive behavior within their respective maritime area. the two leaders agreed and
signed a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared
Principles and Partnership and Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and
Beyond.” The said document also expressed the two countries’ commitment to make
sure maritime safety and security, the South China Sea and their serious opposition to unilateral
actions to alter the established order within the South China Sea including large-scale
reclamation and building of outposts.
Specifically, the agreement commits Japan to the following: (1) to enhance the capacity of the
Philippines Coast Guard (PCG); (2) to ensure economic autonomy within the Bangsamoro Area;
(3) to sustain the Philippine government’s efforts in improving its business climate through
development of Quality Infrastructure utilizing Official Development Assistance and other modes
of cooperation, including support for the further expansion of Japanese enterprises within
the Philippines; and most significantly (4) to ensure regional stability by maintaining open and
stable seas through increased maritime security and maritime domain awareness (Manila:
Department of Foreign Affairs 2015; Nañes, 2018)
While Japan and also the Philippines have long had a bilateral relationship, the event of the
defense aspect of ties has accelerated over the past few years, covering various issues
including not just defense equipment and transfer, but also it is critical to the capacity-building
and to the broader regional cooperation in areas starting from cybersecurity to maritime
security. A number of that has continued in spite of the challenges posed by the increase of
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. From among the areas of defense cooperation between
the two countries, it has always been the defense industry. Collaboration during this area as
factored into consultations by each side additionally as agreements, with a case in point being a
pact on the transfer of defense equipment and technology inked by each side back in 2016.
While inroads made are quite slow on the defense industry side, there are some equipment
transfers, with a case in point being one for helicopter spare parts in March which
constituted the primary exchange of surplus Japanese defense equipment to a Southeast Asian
state. (Parameswaran, 2019)
The first Philippines-Japan Defense Industry Forum, hosted by the international cooperation
division of the Japan defense ministry’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA),
was held in Taguig City on October 1. The forum saw the attendance of the different of defense
industry and government stakeholders from the two countries, with the aim of discussing options
and sharing experiences about policies and procedures on the procurement and export of
defense equipment and technologies. During the dialogue, each side discussed areas of
potential collaboration in defense industry, including research, development, production, and
transfer of different equipments. While few specifics were publicly unveiled by either side,
defense outlet IHS Jane’s said it understood that the precise area of focus was on maritime
security, with technologies and platforms for potential collaboration including unmanned and
robotic systems; communications, command-and-control systems; and radar and surveillance
equipment. (Parameswaran, 2019)

Challenges in the Philippines and Japan Security Partnership:

Japanese defense companies have been producing and manufacturing advanced weapon
systems and platforms for the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) with technology formally
acquired from the United States (US). However, Japanese defense companies have been
selling their military equipment solely to the JSDF and have yet to make any major export of its
defense equipment. Nevertheless, this provides an opportunity for both the Philippines and
Japan. The Philippines is looking for more partners to help in its military modernization program,
while Japan is looking to bolster its economy by exporting its defense equipment and
technology. Hence, there are prospects for a mutually beneficial defense partnership between
both nations in the area of military industries and capability development. (Castillo, 2020)
Despite having long cordial ties, there are two underlying issues that pose as salient obstacles
for a defense industry partnership between the Philippines and Japan. The first underlying issue
is that Japan is a newcomer in an industry where other economically developed countries have
been exporting all kinds of advanced defense equipment and technology for decades, therefore
highlighting a lack of awareness, exposure, and experience on the part of Japan’s defense
industries. Japan has never developed weapons with an eye on export and instead focused on
their suitability for domestic forces. Japan has isolated its weapons industry from the needs of
other countries, and it hinders the appeal of Japan's weapons with clients from other countries.
This brings several problems on the side of Japanese defense companies when it comes to
defense exports and technology partnership. One problem is that the Japanese government—
and not international markets—set the prices for Japanese arms. Another problem has to do
with Japan’s lack of experience in defense exports which, consequently, has led to a lack of
market discipline in the industry, with Japan’s sector of defense is like “a world of its own, with
their own rules”. (Castillo, 2020)
At the same time, the Philippines has its own issues to tackle if deeper defense industry and
technology partnership with Japan are to push forward. One challenge is the long-winded
bureaucratic process, which has led to inefficiencies in the country’s procurement system. This
is manifested in the bidding process under Republic Act 9184 (RA 9184), or the Philippines’
Procurement Law, which has long been viewed as time-consuming and too constraining.
Bidders are required to provide several requirements in order for them to meet the prerequisites
of the bidding process. The awardee, which is usually the one who made the lowest offer, still
needs to submit another set of requirements for the post-qualification step in order to verify the
authenticity of the required documents and, if needed, will also make a review of all the bidder’s
facilities. (Castillo, 2020)
The next challenge for the Philippines is a question on the focus of the country’s political and
military leadership towards a serious implementation of a capable external defense posture.
While the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has formed plans to address external defense
issues, it remains unclear on how to approach it. This can be attributed to its institutional
experience that has largely been based on army leadership rather than from the navy and air
Force. For more than a decade, the AFP has been predominantly led by military officers from
the Philippine Army due their actual combat experience. However, their experience has been
shaped mostly by counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Very few Filipino
Philippine Air Force commanders became Chief of Staff of the AFP, and, if the Philippine Navy
is to be considered, the candidate should come from the Philippine Marines Corps. In addition,
higher posts of military leadership are considered political appointments. Military officers
aspiring to be Chief of Staffs of the AFP should not only have a distinguished combat record,
but also toe the line of the country’s political leadership. (Castillo, 2020)
The Philippines should consider improving its means of safeguarding the intellectual property
and sensitive information about Japanese defense technology if this level of defense
partnership is to be seriously pursued. Japan can also help the Philippines develop further its
cybersecurity capabilities as part of the defense industry and technological agreements between
the two nations. This partnership can increase and strenghten relations between Philippine and
Japanese defense companies and better increase in facilitating activities between the two
countries, as a secured line of information exchange can help build trust and confidence that
classified Japanese defense technology information will be protected. There should also be a
review of RA 9184 with regard to its public nature. The law “covers all procurement undertaken
by various agencies and instrumentalities, and opens to the public nearly everything for
monitoring. This ‘general public participation,’ instead of congressional oversight, compromises
the confidential nature of certain goods and services lined up for procurement. Thus, crafting
new rules and regulations to govern the purchase of major and highly classified defense articles
will enhance national security” (Marayag, 2016; Castillo, 2020).
Amending provisions under RA 9184 is recommended to facilitate speedier and easier
processing of defense-related acquisitions with respect to their cost and timing from the moment
prospective suppliers have won the bidding. Alternatively, a special law could be made that
could grant defense-related acquisitions in support of defense industry and technology
partnerships quicker to facilitate. (Castillo, 2020)

Conclusion:
Given the fact that the Philippines and Japan faced a common security threat, that is China, it is
necessary that the Philippines and Japan have a security and defense agreement to counter
China’s aggressive claim in the South China and East China Seas. Also, both the Philippines
and Japan have military alliances with the United States and the United States also have
superpower rivalries with China. Courtesy of Military Alliances with the United States, the
Philippines and Japan must forge alliances as well as over to counterbalance China for it’s
rising power as well as for its aggressive claims in the South China Sea.
In order for the Philippines and Japan to have a more effective Military Alliance, Japan should
rearm itself and amend the Article 9 of their Constitution. As for the Philippines, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) should continue to modernize in its weaponry and equipment by
procuring more equipments from all possible sources (namely from India, Russia, Europe, etc.)
as well as the Philippines should also develop its own equipment from local industries as well as
through the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
Forging a Military Alliance between the Philippines and Japan can make both countries less
dependent on the United States in terms of Military capabilities. With both the Philippines and
Japan having a huge potential of being a maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region, both
countries should learn from each other’s background, share each other’s strategic geopolitical
location in other to challenge, control and balance China’s rising hegemony in the region.

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