11/3/22, 8:37 AM The US-Philippine Alliance: Shared Interests and Subtle Nuances | FULCRUM

US President Joe Biden meets with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in
New York City on September 22, 2022. (Photo: Mandel Ngan / AFP)

The US-Philippine Alliance: Shared Interests and

Subtle Nuances

PUBLISHED 31 OCT 2022

MICO A GALANG

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) identi es some shared interests

between Washington and Manila. However, there are nuances in the
strategic calculus of the allies when it comes to two key potential
ashpoints in the region: Taiwan and the South China Sea.

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I
n October 2022, the Biden administration released its National Security Strategy
(NSS) which identi ed the Indo-Paci c region as the “epicenter of 21st century
geopolitics,” with China as the only competitor with both the intent and capability
to reshape the international order. To advance its goal of a “free, open, prosperous, and
secure international order,” Washington reaf rmed its commitments to treaty allies and
pledged to “modernise these alliances.” This might appear to underscore the
convergence in views between the United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, particularly
on hot spots such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. But there are subtle differences
in perspectives between the two allies that warrant some examination.

While typically viewed as separate issue-areas, Taiwan and the South China Sea are
very much related. After all, the two are closely connected by geography as part of the
First Island Chain. Conceived by American diplomat John Foster Dulles, the chain is
used to illustrate an offensive and defensive perimeter running from the Japanese
home islands down to Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. As a concept, it sought to
contain Chinese military expansion in the Paci c. From the U.S. perspective, close
relationships with countries in the First Island Chain reinforce America’s strategic
foothold in the region amid talks of its relative decline. From China’s perspective, it is
surrounded by America’s allies and partners which prevent Beijing from having a
military presence commensurate to its status as an emerging superpower. If China
establishes preeminence in the South China Sea or successfully reuni es Taiwan with
the mainland, Beijing will be free to look outward and shift the regional balance of
power to its favour.

The NSS articulates the convergence of interests between the U.S. and its allies,
including the Philippines. Indeed, Washington and Manila share the broad security
interest of ensuring a favourable balance of power for both countries, as well as
constraining China’s maritime expansionism. In the case of Taiwan, the allies prefer
the preservation of the status quo in cross-strait relations.

However, there are nuances when it comes to the strategic calculus of both countries
regarding the two hot spots. For the U.S., its primary interest in the South China Sea is
to ensure “freedom of the seas and build shared regional support for open access to the
South China Sea.” The Philippines’ primary interests are more insular: its territorial
integrity, national sovereignty, and maritime rights, which are similar to those of other
Southeast Asian claimant states.

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While the last two U.S. administrations and a 2019 legislation

provided public assurance of military support, some measure of
uncertainty may be expected. This is not to suggest that Manila should
terminate the 71-year old Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with
Washington. On the contrary, the allies need to prepare coordinated
responses for various scenarios.

With respect to Taiwan, there is a subtle difference between both countries on the
“One-China” principle as propagated by the Washington (which is conceived as the
“One China” policy in the eyes of Beijing). Both the Philippines and the US recognise
the People’s Republic of China as the sole government of China. However, while the
Philippines “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of
China, the U.S. merely “acknowledges”, but does not recognise, that position.

The convergence and divergence of the allies’ interests and policies have two
implications for their security relationship.  

First, the Philippines will need to walk a delicate balancing act on the Taiwan issue.
Even if Manila wants to be insulated from cross-strait tensions and possible con ict,
Manila needs to balance its One-China principle, and the U.S.’ growing imperative to
muster allies for a Taiwan invasion contingency (only the Bashi Channel separates the
Philippines and Taiwan). Washington, in particular, may request access to Philippine
military bases. If the Philippines grants this, it must do so while being committed to
its One-China principle at the diplomatic level. At the same time, it is highly doubtful
that the distinction would matter to China, who would look at American boots on the
ground as a threatening forward-posture that adds to U.S. deterrence against an
invasion of Taiwan.   

Second, the Philippines needs to prepare for contingencies in the South China Sea.
Cognisant of the dynamics of alliance abandonment and entrapment, there is
imperative for the Philippines to prepare for scenarios in which US military support is
not forthcoming. While the last two US administrations and a 2019 legislation
provided public assurance of military support, some measure of uncertainty may be
expected. This is not to suggest that Manila should terminate the 71-year old Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) with Washington. On the contrary, the allies need to prepare
coordinated responses for various scenarios.

Despite the challenges, the NSS notes an opportunity for the US and its allies and
partners to shape China’s external environment “in a way that in uences (its)
behavior”. The full implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), which provides an increased rotational presence of US forces in the
Philippines, would allow Manila to complement the NSS’ “integrated deterrence”

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concept. There is an imperative for Manila and Washington to issue a statement stating
that the provisions of EDCA will continue beyond 2024. While the agreement provides
that it will “continue in force automatically” after its initial ten year term, the
statement would nevertheless send a message to opponents of EDCA — both foreign
and domestic — that the allies will continue working with each other in the pursuit of
their shared interests.

Capacity-building is another important component of the alliance. Two days after the
NSS was released, the U.S. Embassy in Manila announced that US$100 million would
be granted to the Philippines as part of Washington’s foreign military nancing
program. To promote interoperability, the allies had also agreed to conduct 496
defence and security engagements in 2023. This marks an increase compared to the
461 activities in 2022. These initiatives are important in order to strengthen Manila’s
capability to manage security challenges.

The NSS warns that the world is “now at an in ection point” and that the coming
“decade will be decisive.” A contested security environment is not necessarily
preferable for small powers like the Philippines. This behooves Manila to work closely
with Washington in promoting an effective alliance management through which they
would advance their shared interests while carefully navigating the nuances in their
interests and policies on Taiwan and the South China Sea.

2022/314

Mico A. Galang is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science,

University of Santo Tomas (Manila, Philippines).

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COPYRIGHT © 2020 ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

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