Mico A.

Galang IS 290
MIS Dr. Arugay

Think Piece # 9 (22 October 2015)

The assigned reading for this week is the book Helen V. Milner entitled “Interests Institutions,
and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations,” a work which falls under the purview of
Rational Liberalism. As a whole, the theory adopted the Liberal perspective in the sense that it rejects
the notion that the state is a unitary actor and that its behavior emanates from the systemic level.
Rather, the theory posits that state behavior is underpinned by domestic politics. In addition, the actors
at the domestic level are assumed to be rational, i.e. they pursue their respective objectives and seek
to attain them in the most efficient fashion.

There are three sets of domestic political actors. First, the executive, which refers head of
government as well as the bureaucracy, is typically headed by a president, prime minister, or dictator.
Second, the legislature, which is the body that enacts statutes, can either be unicameral or bicameral.
And third, the societal groups, which are outside the formal state apparatus, can either be dovish, i.e.
those that favor cooperation, or hawkish, i.e. those that are against cooperation.

Such cooperation—or otherwise—with other states is the central focus of the book. Contrary to
the Realist assumption that states cooperate based on the calculation of relative gains, the theory of
Milner posits that the same is based on certain domestic political considerations. Moreover, unlike the
former, the latter theory likewise assumes that domestic politics is not hierarchical. Instead, both
domestic and international politics can be characterized as a polyarchy. A concept which falls
somewhere in between anarchy-hierarchy spectrum, polyarchy is defined by three elements. First, the
preferences or interests of domestic actors which the theory assumes to be different frome each other.
For their part, the executive and legislature have a common general interest—to remain in office. This
goal is affected by two factors: (1) the state of the overall economy, which is primary concern of the
voters; and (2) preferences of certain interest groups that support the elected government officials. The
legislature, however, differs in the manner by which such interests are pursued because it has a
different constituency vis-à-vis the executive. Thus, whereas the exeutive is a elected by a national
constituency, the latter is elected in local districts. In this sense, if the policy of cooperating with other
nations positively affects the two factors, the domestic political actors are likely to adopt such a course
of action. Otherwise, cooperation will not be pursued.

Second, the role of institutions through which power is shared among the domestic actors. In
particular, Milner discussed the institutions through policies are formulated—a procedure which she

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labaled as legislative process. This process has four elements: (1) the capability to initiate and
determine the agenda; (2) revise any policy; (3) ratify or reject policy; and (4) propose referendums in
which citizens will participate. In this way, the policy preferences of actors can be truly reflected.

Third, the role of information, which plays a key role in determining political outcomes.
Specifically, Milner noted that assymetrical information spells difference between those win or lose in
the competion over policies anchored on different interests. Nevertheless, the author pointed out that
such assymetry is usually tilted in favor of the executive, which has the means to do so.

Thereafter, Milner also explained in detail a model of two level game. In a nutshell, the model
postulates that political leaders are simultaneously operating in the realms of domestic and international
politics. With respect to the former, there are various domestic groups which are jockeying for
government support of their interests. At the international level, leaders are faced with states, which are
likewise promoting their interests to assuage their own domestic constituents.

After providing a detailed account of the theory, Milner then applied the same to four case
studies, i.e: (1) the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement and the International Trade Organization; (2)
the Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the Internatuional Civil Aviation Agreement; (3) the European
Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community; and (4) North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Masstricht Treaty on European Monetary Union.

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