“Great-Power Competition in Southeast Asia: A Philippine Perspective”

Mr Mico A Galang
Defense Research Officer II
Research and Special Studies Division’
National Defense College of the Philippines

Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI)

Workshop on “ASEAN Centrality in an Era of Great-Power Competition”
Session II: ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) and Individual Country
Relations with Major Powers
16-17 December 2021

Introduction

Mr Chairman
Fellow NADI delegates
Distinguished guests
Ladies and Gentlemen

Good morning.

At the outset, let me state that, unless stated otherwise, the views expressed in
this presentation are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of
the National Defense College of the Philippines, the Department of National Defense,
and the Philippine Government.

Shown on the screen is the outline of my presentation: First, views on great

power competition; Second, the evolving regional security architecture; Third, the risks
and opportunities of great power competition; and Fourth, some considerations in
moving forward.

Great Power Competition

When ASEAN was founded, the regional security environment was likewise
defined by another era of major power competition—at that time between the United
States (US), and the Soviet Union. In many ways, the world was divided between the
countries which aligned themselves with Washington, and those which aligned with
Moscow. Unfortunately, the Cold War ideological struggle was, in Southeast Asia, not
always Cold. It was against this backdrop that the 1967 Bangkok Declaration was
signed.

It is important to underscore that ASEAN was established primarily to manage

the relations between and among its members. After all, it is no secret that before
ASEAN was established, its original members had contentious relations, and very
apparent colliding national interests. However, following the end of the Cold War,
ASEAN, having expanded its membership and established dialogue relations with
other countries, gradually became the driver of multilateral diplomacy in the broader

Page 1 of 4
Asia-Pacific region. Apart from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN is also at
the center of various platforms of dialogue and cooperation, such as the ASEAN-Plus
Three (APT), and East Asia Summit (EAS), as well as ASEAN’s primary regional
defense diplomacy platforms: ASEAN Defence Minsters’ Meeting (ADMM) and
ADMM-Plus.

At present, the Asia-Pacific region’s security environment is increasingly

defined largely by the strategic competition between and among the major powers,
principally between the US and China. Just like the Cold War, Southeast Asia is a key
area of major power competition. However, the US-Soviet competition is different from
the US-China competition in at least two respects. First, Washington and Beijing—as
well as other countries in the region—are much more economically interdependent
with each other. Second, with such economic interconnectedness, it is more difficult
for most countries to have clear-cut strategic alignment, as many states did during the
Cold War. The 21st century China is not the 20th century Soviet Union. The former’s
economy is very much interdependent with the economies of other countries, including
with its strategic competitors. At the same time, the US is a key security partner of
many countries in the region. Hence, being forced to choose sides is a decision that
may not necessarily be in line with the national interests of many countries in the Asia-
Pacific, including in Southeast Asia. In short, the Cold War binary thinking may not
necessarily apply in today’s era of great power competition.

Evolving Regional Security Architecture

As mentioned earlier, ASEAN’s diplomatic role expanded after the Cold War
ended. Indeed, the regional security architecture is defined not just by the US-led
system of alliances and partnerships, but also by multilateral platforms, particularly
those led by ASEAN. In recent years, however, we have witnessed the emergence of
new platforms for security cooperation such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or
the Quad, and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security
partnership. The rise of these new arrangements has led some to argue that ASEAN
is becoming “irrelevant”1 or least “sidelined.”2

While these comments are not entirely without basis, there must be a full
appreciation of ASEAN’s contributions to regional security. Indeed, ASEAN deserves
credit for helping maintain peace in Southeast Asia. After all, no Southeast Asian
country have gone to war with each other after becoming members of ASEAN.
Moreover, by advancing open regionalism, ASEAN is also responsible creating
inclusive platforms of dialogue and cooperation. The members of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, for instance, include countries with history of armed conflict such as India and
Pakistan, and the two Koreas.

1 Shailaja Neelakantan, “New Regional Alliances Highlight ASEAN’s Irrelevance, Analysts Say,”
BernarNews, September 28, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/aukus-
makes-asean-irrelevant-analysts-09282021155144.html
2 Harish Metha, “Aukus may send Asian countries a huge bill for services provided,” The Business

Times, November 4, 2021, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/aukus-may-send-asian-

countries-a-huge-bill-for-services-provided

Page 2 of 4
 The fact that major powers continue to engage and participate in ASEAN-led
platforms suggest ASEAN’s continued diplomatic role. However, the evolving regional
security environment also suggests that ASEAN must adapt to the changing times.
The strategic milieu of the 1990s when ASEAN’s centrality in multilateral diplomacy
began to emerge is different from the geopolitical context of 2021. In this regard, the
emergence of new platforms, like the Quad or AUKUS, that likewise aim to manage
or address security challenges could be seen as complementary in some respects
rather than in competition with ASEAN.

Risks and Opportunities

Major power competition brings both risks and opportunities for Southeast
Asian countries. Among others, risks would include the potential of armed conflict if
geopolitical competition is not well managed. Armed conflict is not likely at the present
time. However, an inadvertent incident or miscalculation may lead to a crisis which
could potentially spiral out of control.

It must be noted that as geopolitical competition intensifies, the region is

increasingly becoming more and more multipolar. Hence, apart from commercial
opportunities, multipolarity also provides the opportunity for ASEAN to enhance its
agency.3 Indeed, multipolarity provides countries with more options, and therefore the
opportunity to have more space for maneuver and choice.

Policy Considerations

Southeast Asia is a very diverse region. Indeed, we are diverse in many

respects – culturally, politically, and economically. It goes without saying that we also
have diverse national interests, priorities, and threat perceptions. In recent years,
ASEAN has been the subject of criticisms not so much for what it has done, but for
what ASEAN has not done. It must be emphasized, therefore, that ASEAN’s primary
role from the time of its founding remains to be same today: that is to manage the
relations between and among its members. That may seem to be inward looking for
some. But managing intra-ASEAN relations plays a key role in the context of great
power competition. If ASEAN manages Southeast Asian relations well, great powers
would have minimal opportunities to exploit the organization’s internal divisions. 4 In
other words, a more coherent and peaceful ASEAN will enhance the organization’s
agency, as well as that of its member-states.

In moving forward, there is an imperative to bridge the development gap among

ASEAN member-states. Strengthening the capacity of ASEAN members to address
various security challenges is another key imperative. The ADMM-Wide Training and
Education Exchanges can be used in this regard. In both areas, ASEAN can leverage
its long-standing relations with dialogue partners/plus-countries to advance security

3 Bilahari Kausikan, “ASEAN’s Agency in the Midst of Great Power Competition,” Australian Institute of
International Affairs, October 30, 2020,
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/aseans-agency-in-the-midst-of-great-power-
competition/
4 Ibid.

Page 3 of 4
and development. There is also a need for ASEAN to enhance its current platforms
and initiatives. Despite criticisms, ASEAN – the ADMM in particular – has adopted
measures to help manage traditional security concerns, such as ASEAN Direct
Communications Infrastructure (ADI), Guidelines for Maritime Interaction (GMI), and
the Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME). The implementation of the Concept
Paper on the ADMM’s External Engagements, adopted this year by the ADMM, will
reinforce ASEAN centrality in regional defense diplomacy.

Moreover, there is also an imperative for ASEAN to continuously adapt to the

evolving security environment, as well as to contemplate and help address emerging
security concerns such as cybersecurity, and coercive actions which fall below the
threshold of armed conflict.

Conclusion

To conclude, we in Southeast Asia would like to promote the development of

our national economies, and advance our national security. However, the reality of
international relations is that we cannot isolate ASEAN from what is happening outside
the organization. We must adapt to the changing environment. In other words, for it to
promote its centrality (or at least its relevance), ASEAN must be resilient. And for
ASEAN be resilient, its members must be resilient. National and regional resilience
are mutually reinforcing. After all, one of the characteristics of the ASEAN Political
Security Community is: “A resilient community in a peaceful, secure and stable region.”

Thank you very much for your attention.

Page 4 of 4