Marbury v.
Madison Issue: If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus
Towards the end of his presidency, John Adams
appointed as justices of peace William Marbury. Before
his term officially ended, John Adams signed the
commission which appoints Marbury as Justice of Peace
in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States,
affixed thereto by the Secretary of State. The
commission of Marbury, though signed and sealed, was
not delivered and was instead withheld by James
Madison, the Secretary of State of the US. Marbury has
applied for a Writ of Mandamus to deliver his
commission.
Angara vs Electoral Commission
Petitioner (Jose Angara) and the respondents (Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor), were
candidates for the member of the National Assembly for
the district of Tayabas, and the petitioner was
proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly
for the said district and hereby passed Resolution No.
8.Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed a “Motion of Protest”
against the petitioner. Eventually, petitioner filed before
Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”,
alleging that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
prescribe the period during which protest against the
election of its members should be presented, and that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period.
Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
issuing from this court?
Ruling: The constitution vests the whole judicial power
of the US to the Supreme Court and such inferior courts.
Also, the act to establish the judicial courts of the United
States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue Writs of
Mandamus even against the Secretary of State, because
he is a person holding office under the authority of the
United States. However, to enable this court to issue a
mandamus, it must be shown that it be an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy?
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
of its power to determine the law, and hence declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
constitution. Also, in cases of conflict the judicial dept. is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several dept. and among integral or constituent.
Judicial supremacy is but a power of judicial review it
does not assert any superiority over the other dept.; it
does not nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the constitution to determine the
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution.
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the
delivery of a paper is, the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong
to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. In this case, the
Act establishing the judicial courts of the United States
to issue writs of mandamus to public officers is not
warranted by the Constitution. In this case, there is
conflict between the Act and the Constitution. The
Constitution, being the Supreme Law of the Land, must
be upheld thus rendering the Act repugnant and void.
The writ of mandamus cannot be carried out for that
reason.
The resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protest against member of the National
Assembly, making the resolution of Electoral
Commission is mere surplus age and had no effect. As
contended by the resp., the Electoral Commission has
the sole power of regulating its proceedings, by which
the Electoral Commission fix the date as the last day of
filing protest against the member of the National
Assembly, should be upheld.
Therefore, the Electoral Commission was acting within
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the resp. against the election of the petitioner and that
the resolution of the National Assembly cannot toll the
time for filing protest against the members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
Garcia v. Board of Investments
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed
the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied
with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the
plant site. One of the terms and conditions for
registration of the project was the use of "naphtha
cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be
a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate
of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
However, A.T. Chong, the major investor in BPC, desires
to amend the original registration certification by
changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas.
The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency
and unstable labor situation, and the presence in
Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot
owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
Oposa v. Factoran
Plaintiffs all minors represented by their parents going
against then DENR secretary Fulegio Factoran. s plaintiff
asserts that the continued deforestation through the
approval of TLA (TIMBER LICENSE AGREEMENTS) by MR
FACTORAN would be grossly detrimental to the
Philippine forestry and its other natural resources.
Issue: WON BOI has committed grave abuse of discretion
in stating that the final choice of the site and the
decision on the feedstock belongs to the investors
Ruling: Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of
the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it
organized itself into a corporation bearing the
name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public
land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in
Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. The site is the result
of careful study long before any covetous interests
intruded into the choice.
Naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from
the ad valorem tax by the approval of Republic Act No.
6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from
exemption from ad valorem tax.
Issue: 1. WON plaintiff has CAUSE OF ACTION
2. WON respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion by declaring that petitioners have no legal
right
Ruling: 1. There is cause of action citing Sec. 16 of Art II.
Of the Philippine Constitution (recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology).
Petitioners assert intergenerational responsibility
(meaning that the rights of the unborn future
generations would be prejudiced because of the Mr.
The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical
industry. The policy determination by both Congress and
the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor
should disregard or contravene expressed policy by
shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI
committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the
transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason
that the final say is in the investor all other
circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No
cogent advantage to the government has been shown by
this transfer.
Factoran’s action of issuing TLA- timber licensing
agreements). Resulting to the cancellation of such TLAs.
2. Yes. Legal right of petitioners to a balance and
healthful ecology is mandated in the 1987 Constitution
Sec 16, Art II. The rights need not be written in the
constitution for this rights are assumed from the very
inception of humankind. The reason why it was written
because framers feared that w/o a mandate as stated in
the state policy future generations would inherent
nothing to sustain life. Hence there is a legal right on the
part of the petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Sale of 51% stocks of MHC, Malasian firm won the
bidding over MPH. the latter contended that he should
be qualified base on the Filipino first policy and that
MHC is a part of National Patrimony that should not be
sold to foreign company
Respondent maintain that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO which
grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,"
the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system.
After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating
an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad,
“became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad
organized with some Filipino investors a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended
to be the medium through which the technical and
management services required for the project would be
offered and delivered to PCSO."  procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
Ther agreement denominated as "Contract of Lease"
was finally executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC. The President, approved it on 20
December 1993. 
Issue: WON Sec.10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect?
Ruling: The presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. In case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
“qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter
shall be chosen over the former.”
Issue: 1. WON petitioner has locus standing
2. WON the contract of lease violates the charter
of the PCSO
Ruling: We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest. The
ramifications of such issues affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it
is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
advantage of.
It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution.  
GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion. Since
petitioner has already matched the bid tendered by
Renong Berhad. GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary documents to effect the sale in
accordance with the constitution. Refusal of GSIS to
execute the documents after the respondent matched
the bid of the malasian firm constitute grave abuse of
dicretion
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the
contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous
acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the
contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which
the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a
piece of work, but one of a collaboration or association,
in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between
the contracting parties.
Undoubtedly, the Berjaya Group Berhad knew all along
that in connection with an on-line lottery system, the
PCSO had nothing but its franchise. Howsoever viewed
then, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC
mutually understood that any arrangement between
them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical,
operations, and management aspects of the on-line
lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide
the franchise.
Kilosbayan v. Morato
Kilosbayan, an organization suing on behalf of taxpayers
that a certain contract between PCSO and PGM might
misappropriate public funds. It was denied since they are
not a proper party which is bound to suffer any injury or
have any of their rights denied. Moreover they did not
allege that Kilosbayan is bound to suffer injury on the
transaction between PCSO and PGM
Tanada v. Angara
Petitioners question the concurrence of respondents
acting in their capacities as Senators via signing said
agreement since petitioners viewed the WTO
agreements as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the constitution was
taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue: WON the petitioners have standing to sue
Ruling: the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case
and controversy"
Whether a party has a cause of action and, is a real party
in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional
question must turn on whether he has a right which has
been violated
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the
controversy?
Ruling: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable
Petitioners’s right to sue as taxpayer cannot be
sustained because this case does not involve illegal
disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizen
can they bring this suit because no specific injury
suffered by them is alleged.
, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Rather, it will only
exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or
not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its
three annexes.
Santiago v. Bautista
Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six
at the public school. As the school year 1964-1965 was
then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers for
the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and
Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before
that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
represented by his parents sought the invalidation of the
"ranking of honor students" alleging that the teachers of
the school compose the "Committee on the Rating of
Student for Honor", committed grave abuse of official
discretion in the selection of honor students
PACU v. Secretary
Act 1207 which is approved in 1917, ―An Act making
the inspection and recognition of private schools and
colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public
Instruction.
Petitioners assailed that Act 1207 is unconstitutional
because they deprive the owners of schools and colleges
as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property
without due process of law. They deprive parents of
their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic
efficiency.
Petitioners claimed that any law requiring governmental
approval or permit before a person can exercise a right
(in this case, creation of a private school) amounts to
censorship.
Issue: WON the committee of teachers does fall within
the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65 Section 1 of
the Rules of Court.
Ruling: In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil
action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions. A judicial function is an act
performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature
of the action of the court. The so called committee on
the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor
quasi judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task.
Issue: WON the requisites for justiciable controversy has
been met?
Ruling: No, in 37 years, DEPED supervised and regulated
all private schools without protest rather with general
consent. Respondents assert that the petitioners
suffered no wrong, nor allege any, from the enforcement
of the criticized statute. The petitioners are operating by
virtue of their permits and these are not threatened to
be revoked. Mere apprehension that the respondent
might under the law withdraw the permit of one of the
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or
quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
give rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and
the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.
The State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state
control of all educational institutions. It enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit,
the development of moral character, personal discipline,
civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control
of private education was intended by the organic law.
Gonzalez v. Hechanova
Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign
rice and created rice procurement committee. Gonzales,
a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, filed petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of
decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Petitioner states
that RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and
corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any other
gov’t agency. Respondent opposed and said that
Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed by
RA 3452 because importation was authorized by
President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile
purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats without
waiting for any special authority. Petitioner has not
exhausted all administrative remedies available before
coming to court.
Gonzales v. Marcos
President Marcos issued Executive Order no. 30 which is
a trust that provides for the construction of a national
theatre, national music hall and an arts building and
facilities that promote, preserve enhance, and develop
the Philippines’ cultural heritage. In the Court of First
Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by
the Center as coming from donations and contributions
and not a single centavo raised by taxation. Respondents
argue that petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite
personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO 30
as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from
donations and contributions and not one centavo came
from taxation. Later, PD 15 was issued creating the
Cultural Center of the Philippines.
Issue: WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling: Yes. RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to
purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils.
Petitioner has sufficient interest. Case at bar involves
question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the
exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The proposed importation is
governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers “all
importations of rice and corn into the Phils.” RA 2207
and 3452 also applies to importations of the government
itself because RA 2207 talks about imports authorized by
the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452
also indicates that only private parties may import rice
under its provisions.
Issue: WON the petitioner has standing?
WON the issue on validity of EO 30 became moot
and academic
These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth Act
No. 138 which says that in all purchases by gov’t, incl.
those for armed forces, preference is given to materials
produced in the Phils. The “benefit of the people”
argument can’t be accepted because there is no local
rice shortage. And the importation is said to be for
stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population.
The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive
agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being
against the RAs
Ruling: No. The court ruled that taxpayer has no legal
standing to question executive acts that do not involve
the use of public funds. The funds administered by the
President of the Philippines came from donations and
contributions and not by taxation. There was that
absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.
EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit became
moot and academic
People v. Vera
Cu Unjieng was found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment. Cu Unjieng applied for probation before
the trial court.The City Fiscal of Manila opposed the
granting of probation and questioned the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.They argued that the
judge lack jurisdiction in as much as his basis, the
Probation Law is unconstitutional on 3 grounds: a.
infringed on the executive prerogative to grant pardon
and reprieves, b. undue delegation of leg power, c.
violates equal protection clause. However respondents
argue: that the case is premature since the same issues
being raised by petitioners are still pending before the
trial court. They have also a pending appeal before the
said court. The SC should cannot impair the latter’s
jurisdiction, The private petitioner may not intervene in
a probation case. While the Sol Gen is estopped from
questioning a law which govt promulgated.
Flast v. Cohen
In 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
was passed. Title I was aimed to give financial assistance
to local educational agencies in their programs in the
form of grants. The petitioners filed this case, suing in
their capacity as federal taxpayers, to challenge the
constitutionality of Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1964. They stated that the federal funds
appropriated under the law were being used to finance
the purchase of instructional materials of religious
schools as well. They believe that their taxes were being
used for religious purposes, which is contrary to what
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause mandates.
Issue: WON the government has the standing to
question the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
Ruling: Yes. The government has the standing to
question the constitutionality of the law, which was
eventually declared unconstitutional. The unchallenged
rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such as that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines have a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Issue: Does the appellants established standing to bring
suit?
Ruling: Yes. Standing basically depends on establishing a
logical connection between the status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated There are 2 aspects to
consider in establishing personal stake and interest in
the case:
1.) Establishing a link between status and type of
legislative enactment attacked.
- A taxpayer will be considered as a proper party if he is
able to allege that there is unconstitutionality on the
part of the congress in exercising its power, following
the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution.
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been
repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of
Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded
by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the
People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its
validity.
As a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit
may question the constitutionality of a statute involved
in a judicial decision. The H&S Banking Corp is not the
proper party to raise it, the People of the Phils. is. The
state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
2.) Establishing a link between status and nature of
alleged constitutional infringement.
- The challenged law must exceed specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the congressional taxing and
spending power.
The petitioners were able to fully satisfy the 2 important
aspects in establishing legal standing. As taxpayers, they
challenged the congressional power to spend for general
welfare. They were able to clearly identify that the
congress violated a specific provision in the Constitution,
which is the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
An impeachment complaint was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
and 7 Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes”. However the House Committee on Justice voted
to dismiss the complaint. A day after 2nd impeachment
complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General
by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The 2nd impeachment
complaint was signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members
of the House of Representatives. Due to the events that
took place, several instant petitions were filed against
the House of Representatives, mostly contending that
the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the
Constitution and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.
Tan v. Macapagal
The petitioner seek for the court to declare that the
deliberating Constitutional Convention is “without
power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
and Republic Act no. 6132, to consider, discuss and
adopt proposal which seek to revise the present
constitution in the adoption of a form of government
other than the form now outlined in the present
Constitution merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein.”
Issue: W/N the issue is justiciable
Ruling: Yes. The constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of the
congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion through the power of judicial review.
Locus standi – case is of transcendental importance
Ripe for adjudication – the 2nd complaint had been filed
and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced
Lis mota – WON Sec 15 and 16 of the Rule V of the house
impeachment rules are unconstitutional for violation the
constitution
Judicial restraint – not an option because court is not
legally disqualified, no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred
The impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action; therefore, no second
verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action.
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: Petition was dismissed. The unchallenged rule is
that the person who impugns the validity of a statue
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result of its enforcement.
An impeachment proceeding takes place not in the
Senate but in the House and consists of several steps:
(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) the processing of this complaint by
the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) the processing of the same complaint
by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. (5) If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate.
At the time the case was filed, the Con-Con has not yet
finalized any resolution that would radically alter the
1935 Constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial
review. As long as any proposed amendment is still not
acted on, there is no room for the interposition of
judicial oversight.
Poe v. Uliman
These appeals challenge the constitutionality, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, of Connecticut statutes which,
prohibit the use of contraceptive devices and the giving
of medical advice in the use of such devices. The
plaintiffs, two married couple, had the same problems
with their pregnancy, so they consulted Dr. Buxton who
recommended that the “best and safest” medical
treatment for their condition is the use of contraceptive
devices or drugs.Also, plaintiff Dr. Buxton alleges that
the prohibition is unconstitutional as to depriving him of
liberty and property without due process.
US v. Richardson
Respondent, as a federal taxpayer, brought this suit for
the purpose of obtaining declaration of
unconstitutionality on the Central Intelligence Agency
Act, which permits the CIA to account for its
expenditures “solely on the certificate of the Director.”
Respondent, in his complaint, attempted to obtain from
the Government, information concerning expenditures
of the CIA, in compliance with Article I, Section 9(7) of
the US Constitution.
Sanlakas v. Exec. Secretary
300 officers of the AFP, stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in t July 27, 2003 and demand
resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense
and the Chief of the PNP. The President then issued later
that day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the armed
forces to suppress the rebellion. On August 1, 2003, the
President lifted the declaration.
Issue: WON the case is justiciable
Issue: WON respondent has legal standing
Ruling: Regardless that he is a taxpayer, his challenge is
not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to
the statutes regulating the CIA.
The respondent makes no claim that appropriated funds
are being spent in violation of a “specific constitutional
limitation upon the taxing and spending power.” Rather,
he asks the courts to compel the government to give him
information on how the CIA spends its funds.
Several petitions were filed before the Court challenging
the validity of the declaration. The Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by
the lifting of the declaration.
Issue: WON the petitions are moot and academic
Ruling: the case was dismissed. The records in these
cases do not present controversies justifying the
adjudication of a constitutional case.
There is want of immediate danger of sustaining direct
injury or has sustained injury as the result of its
enforcement.
The petition failed to meet the two-tier tests as a
taxpayer: (1)Link between being a taxpayer and the
challenged legislative enactment
(2)Nexus(link) between the plaintiff’s status and specific
constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and
spending power.
It must be proved that he sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the continual operation of the
alleged statute.
Ruling: Yes. Although the Supreme Court recognizes
jurisdiction over cases that are capable of repetition yet
evading review. The petition is moot and academic
because the state of rebellion has been lifted already on
Aug 1, 2003. The Lacson v. Perez precedent prove that
this case is capable of repetition; in the case angry mob
stormed malacanang on May 1, 2001 to compel the
president to call upon the AFP and PNP to supress the
rebellion through Proc. No. 38 and Gen. Order No. 1
De Funis v. Odegaard
De Funis was not admitted to a state-operated law
school; consequently, he sued the school in behalf of
himself for injunctive relief, claiming that the school’s
admissions policy discriminated (racial discrimination)
him and is in violation of the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The TC granted the
injunction for his admission and ordered the school to
admit him.
Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had
his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt
amounted to P218,294.10. Due to the failure of Engracio
to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument
to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left
for China and he never returned til he died. Since
Engracio is a non-resident El Banco has to notify Engracio
about their intent to sue him by means of publication
using a newspaper. The lower court further ordered the
clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be
sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El
Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente appeared on behalf of Engracio as his
administrator and petitioned for the annulment of the
ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the summons.
On appeal, the Washington SC reversed the judgment of
the TC and held that the law school admissions policy did
not violate the Constitution. by this time, he was in his
2nd year at law school. De Funis petitioned for a writ of
certiorati, but the trial began when he was already
enrolled in his final term.
Issue: WON the case is already moot and academic
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction to enable it
to proceed with the forclosure
WON due process was observed
Ruling: 1. Jurisdiction of the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority. Jurisdiction of the property
which us the subject of the litigation may result either
from seizure of the property under a legal process
whereby it is bought under the custody of the law or it
may result to the institution of legal proceeding wherein
the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. The property itself is the subject of
the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the
jurisdiction of the court is based exclusively on the
power which it possesses over the property
Ruling: Yes. Because even if the decision was to come
out nothing would happen because de funis was already
in his last term and would be allowed to finish anyway.
Judicial review may only be done if there is an actual
controversy. The controversy here is gone
2. Yes. The SC ruled against Palanca and stated that
requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are;
(a) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before
it.
(b) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property subject of
the proceedings.
(c) The defendant must be given the opportunity to be
heard.
(d)Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Ang tibay v. CIR
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor
Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as
it averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while  no members of the rival labor
union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and
Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to
the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme
Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for
the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
Ateneo v. CA
A waitress in the cafeteria inside the university campus
charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, (son of private
respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado) a
boarder and first year student of the university with a
conduct of unbecoming for striking her at her left
temple. The incident came about when Juan Guanzon
was asking for siopao at the counter, however he was
asked to wait which made him madder.  Issue: WON absence of notice to the dismissed student’s
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping
incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan
Issue: Should the motion for new trial be granted?
Ruling: Yes.
SC outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
comply to the requirements of due process.
Ramon was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents
stating that Juan Ramon was expelled from school
without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right
to due process and that they are entitled to actual,
moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's
fees.  When informed about the meeting of the board he was
parents negate the compliance of the requirement of
administrative due process.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied
with by observing the following:
(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2)     The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3)     A decision must have something to support itself
(4)     The evidence must be “substantial.”
(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing.
(6)     The administrative body or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
(7)     The administrative body should, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered.
Ruling: No. Juan Ramon was given notice of the
proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side.
All requisite of administrative due process were met. It
cannot be negated by the fact that the parents were not
given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon was 18,
intelligent, mature enough to know his responsibilities.
He was fully cognizant of the gravity of his offence.
asked to seek advice to his parent or guardian. The fact
that he chooses to remain silent and did not inform
them was not fault of the university
Non v. Judge Dames
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini
Colleges, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for
the academic year 1988-1989 for participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding
semester. Petitioners filed a petition in the court
seeking their readmission to the school, but the trial
court dismissed the petition. The court said that
petitioners waived their privilege to be re-admitted with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and
used its enrollment form for the first semester of school
year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College
reserves the right to deny admission of students whose
scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to
require withdrawal of students
Goldberg v. Kelly
This case was brought by residents of New York City who
received financial aid under the federally assisted
program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or under New York State’s Home Relief Program.
Their complaint alleged that City officials administering
these programs terminated such aid without prior notice
and hearing, denying them due process of law.
UP v. Hon ligot – Telan
Ramon Nadal, a student from the College of Law, applied
for a scholarship under Iskolar ng Bayan program. A
precautionary measure to ensure the integrity of the
program a fact finding team was created to visit the
applicants’ homes and verify the truth of the info
provided in their application. Accordingly, Ramon
Nadal’s home was visited, the team found out that he
withheld information about his ownership of a car and
that his mom worked in the US to support his brothers’
schooling On March 29 a special meeting was held
without Nadal to witness, the BOR found Nadal “guilty”,
and he was suspended and demanded for the
whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students, therefore, are
required to behave in accord with the Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline
Issue: WON petitioner were denied of due process
Ruling: Yes.
It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded
due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman,
After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for
notice and hearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then
challenged as constitutionally inadequate.
Appellees’ challenged that the procedure did allow for a
post-termination “fair hearing,”
Issue: WON a State that terminates public assistance
benefits to a particular recipient without affording him
an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination deny the recipient due process of law?
reimbursement of STFAP benefits. Nadal filed with the
RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
and prayerfor TRO against the BOR and other UP
officers, stating that he was denied due process since he
was not present during the March 29 meeting.
Issue: WON Nadal was denied due process in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against him
Guzman Case: There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Ruling: Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only
a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the
recipient with procedural due process.
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only means
to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical
care.
Ruling: Admission to the UP falls under the ambit of the
school’s academic freedom; hence, the “process that is
due” is governed under the UP’s rules. UP’s rules do not
necessitate “the attendance in BOR meetings of
individuals whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board.” Besides, in the March 29 meeting,
they were only supposed to reconsider their previous
decision, so Nadal’s attendance was indeed unnecessary.
Thus, he was not denied due process. Moreover, since
the issue falls within the school’s academic freedom, it is
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. As a result, they
won’t be able to give him any legal remedy regarding the
matter.
DPB v. NLRC
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
Estrada was charged of the violation of the Anti-
Plunder Law on April 4 2001. and stated that Anti-
plunder Act is unconstitutional under the “void for
vagueness” doctrine which states that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute.
Lochner v. New York
A New York labor law required employees to work NO
more than 60 hours in one week.
The 1897 Labor Law stated that no employee can be
required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or cake
bakery or confectionery establishment more than 60
hours in a week or more than 10 hours in one day,
unless to make work on the last day of the week shorter.
NDC and AGRIX v. Phil Veterans
Balacuit v. CFI
An ordinance was passed by the municipal board of
Butuan ordering that the price of the admission of
children in movie houses and other places of
amusements should be half that of adults.
Owners of 4 theaters (petitioners) maintain that
Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause for it
is unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and amounts to a
restraint of trade and violative of the right of persons
to enter into contracts. The municipality claim that it is a
valid exercise of policy under the general welfare clause
in their charter.
Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with
due process since the terms in Sec. 1, par. D and Sec. 2
(“combination”, “series”, “pattern”) are precisely vague
& overbroad, which denies the petitioner of
the right to be informed of the nature &
cause of the accusation against him.
Issue: WON the law deny due process
Issue: WON the law is reasonable practice of police
power
Ruling: This law is an abridgment to the liberty of
contract and a violation of due process.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his
business is part of the “liberty” of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The only way
a state may counter this right is to show they are
exercising a valid police power with their regulation.
Those powers relate to the safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the public.
Issue: Is Ordinance 460 a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No. The ordinance is not justified by any
necessity of public interest. A theater ticket, is an
evidence of a contract bet the movie house and its
patrons. It may also be considered a license, allowing the
purchases to enjoy the entertainment being provided. In
either case, the ticket is a species of property. The
operators, as the owners, have the right to dispose of it
at a price it wants and to whom he pleases.
Ruling: the overbroad and vagueness doctrines,
according to the SC, have a special
application for free-speech cases & are
inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. Therefore, the Anti-Plunder law does not
violate due process since it defines the act which it
purports to punish, giving the accused fair warning
of the charges against him, and can effectively
interpose a defense on his behalf.
The Court rejected the labor law justification of the
statute on police power grounds because this was not a
valid exercise of police power.
First, that power is extended to the protection of “public
welfare” and not the re-adjustment of bargaining power
between employees and employers. The effect of this
legislation was to regulate labor conditions and not to
protect workers.
Second, there is no valid health of safety rationale in this
case. Bakers were not endangered like miners were in
the Holden v. Hardy case. Mining is a profession that
needed regulation, but this is not.
The courts have declared valid laws regulating
the prices of food and drugs during emergency;
limiting the act profit of utilities. But the theater
is not of the same nature—it is not a public utility
or a public good.
Note 3 instances when the exercise of police
power by local govt are invalid:
a. violates the consti
b. violates the act of Congress of the leg
c. against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, discriminating or in
derogation of common rights.
Olmstead v. US
Petitioners here were convicted of a conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act through the unlawful
possession, importation and selling of liquor. Petitioner
Olmstead is the leading conspirator and general
manager of the operations. To be able to gather
information on the operation, four federal prohibition
officers intercepted messages on the telephones of the
conspirators. There was no trespass into the property of
any of the defendants as the taps came the streets near
the houses
Skinner v. Oklahoma
The right to have offspring is a fundamental right,
requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with.
The Petitioner, Skinner (Petitioner), was habitual
criminal and sentenced to involuntary sterilization under
Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act).
He now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal
protection under the laws. According to the Law such
habitual criminals could be subject to forced
sterilization.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Appellants were charged of violating a statute
preventing the distribution of advice to married couples
regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants
claimed that the statute violated the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Appellant Griswold,
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a physician were
arrested and charged with giving information,
instruction, and medical advice to married persons on
means of preventing conception. Appellants were found
guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
Issue: WON wiretapping amounts to violation of the 4th
amendment
Ruling: No, wire-tapping does not amount to a violation
of the 4th amendment.
Issue: WON the legislation violate the equal protection
under the 14th amendment
Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory
statute violated the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Issue: Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right
for married couples?
Lastly, the court brought up the common-law rule that
evidence will be appreciated no matter how it was
obtained. “Where there is no violation of a constitutional
guarantee, the verity of the above statement is
absolute.”
In wire-tapping, there is no physical taking. What was
used was the recording of audio and nothing else. In the
court’s eyes, this does not qualify as a taking. Moreover,
there was no trespassing involved as the taps were done
in the streets and not in the houses of the conspirators.
Ruling: Yes. (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of
habitual offenders does not guarantee that new
offenders will not be born. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn
offenders themselves. J. Douglas cannot justify the
distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude)
and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the
eyes of the statute. This is clear discrimination in J.
Douglas’s view. As such, equal protection is violated.
Ruling: The First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. . The
association of marriage is a privacy right older than the
Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital
activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and
therefore impinges on protected Constitutional
freedoms.
Eisenstadt v. Baird
Appellee William Baird was convicted under a
Massachusetts State law for exhibiting contraceptive
articles, and for giving a woman a package of Emko
vaginal foam. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set
aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives on the
grounds that it violated Appellee’s First Amendment
rights. But sustained the conviction for giving away the
foam. The law permitted married persons to obtain
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but forbid single
persons from obtaining them.
Roe v. Wade
Texas statutes made it a crime to attempt an abortion
except when medically advised for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a
declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional and an injunction to prevent defendant
from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she
was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable
to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician
because her life was not threatened by her pregnancy.
Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women,
claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague
and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Bowers v. Hardwick
Issue: Is there a rational ground for the different
treatment of married and unmarried persons under the
Massachusetts State law?
Ruling: The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated
married and unmarried persons under the
Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
First, the deterrence(prevention) of premarital sex
cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the
law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to
the proffered objective.
Issue: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right
possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
Ruling: The reason for the enactment of the criminal
abortion law is that the abortion method is hazardous,
therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant
women. However, modern medical techniques have
altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe
particularly in the first trimester. Another is that the
State’s interest is protecting the prenatal life. However,
this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant
woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
Issue: Whether the act of consensual homosexual
sodomy is protected under the fundamental right to
Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both
discriminatory and overbroad.
Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the
same for married and unmarried individuals.
The right of privacy is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,
and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the
first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways
reasonably related to maternal health based upon the
State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may
regulate and even proscribe(ban) abortion, except
where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s
life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential life
of the unborn child.
Dissent: (J. Blackmun). “[T]he right of an individual to
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or
A male homosexual was criminally charged for
committing consensual sodomy with another male adult
in the bedroom of his home.
The Respondent, Hardwick, brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute insofar as it
criminalized consensual sodomy. The Respondent
asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the
Georgia statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest
and that the statute violated his constitutional rights.
Laurence v. Texas
Police found two men engaged in sexual conduct, in
their home, and they were arrested under a Texas
statute that prohibited such conduct between two men.
In Houston, Texas, Police officers were dispatched to a
private home in response to a reported weapons
disturbance. They entered the home where John Geddes
resided, and observed Lawrence and another man,
Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men were
arrested, held overnight and charged with violating a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
Board of Education v. Earls
privacy.
Ruling: (J. White). No. The act of consensual sodomy is
not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or
any right protected under the US Constitution. There is
no precedent to support the Respondent’s claim of
constitutional right to commit sodomy. Fundamental
liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States throughout history and through its
traditions have in no way set any foundation to include a
case such as this under the Constitutional umbrella of
protection.
Issue: Whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts
violates liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Ruling: Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between
consenting adults, is a liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue: Whether a school policy that requires drug testing
her own home [as seen in this case] seems . . . to be the
heart of the Constitution’s protection of privacy.”
Discussion: The Supreme Court states that sodomy is not
immune from being criminalized because it may occur in
the home. The Supreme Court has held other acts that
may take place within the home, such as illegal
possession and/or use of drugs, as criminal.
Dissent. Justice Scalia: believes that since the court does
not find homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right,
and merely describes it as an “exercise in liberty”, a
rational scrutiny(analysis) should be applied, and in
doing so, the law would be upheld. In addition, the
courts willingness to overturn Bowers rather than use
stare decicis, is inconsistent with other case law such as
Planned Parenthood, and thus, feels the court should be
consistent and stable rather than being “manipulative in
invoking the doctrine”.
Dissent. The dissenting justices argued that drug “risks . .
. are present for all schoolchildren,” and so the limit to
“In the context of safety and administrative regulations,
a search unsupported by probable cause may be
reasonable” if there are “special needs” that make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.
A school district mandated urinalysis drug tests for
students in extracurricular activities. The Tecumseh
School District adopted a policy which required all
middle and high school students to consent to drug
testing in order to participate in any extracurricular
activity. Two students challenged the policy.
Ople v. Torres
This is a Petition for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of AO No. 308, entitled “Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference
System (NCIRS)”on the ground: It impermissibly intrudes
on our citizenry’s protected ‘zone of privacy’
Section 4 of AO 308: provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies” through
the use of “Biometrics technology” and “computer
application designs”
Duncan Assoc. v. Glaxo Welcome
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a med rep. he signed a
contract that provides that he agrees to abide by the
company rules: to disclose to the management any
existing or future relationship by employees to the
employees of competing drug companies and should the
management find that the relationship possess a conflict
of interest, to direct resignation from the company.
Subsequently after Tecson’s employment he entered
into a relationship with bettsy, a branch coordinator of
Bellinger v. Bellinger
for extracurricular activities is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. Based on the Vernonia standard of special
needs, the court found that the students were
voluntarily participating in the activities that the
urinalysis was insufficiently intrusive and the results
sufficiently private.
Issue: WON AO 308 violates the right to privacy
Ruling: Yes. AO 308 does not state what specific
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek
its coverage. It does not state whether encoding of data
is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. The indefiniteness of AO 308 can
give the gov’t the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification
of the individual through his PRN. AO 308 does not tell
us how the information gathered shall be handled. It
does not provide who shall control and access the data,
under what circumstances and for what purpose. These
factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information.
Astra a competitor which eventually, they got married.
Tecson was adviced by his supervisor that his marriage
gave rise to conflict of interest and as a result he was
transferred to butuan city Sales area.
Issue: WON the company policy violated the equal
protection clause?
Issue: WON Sec 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
testing of student in extracurricular activities was
counter to the “concern for student health and safety.”
Moreover, the extracurricular activities, while voluntary,
“are part of the school’s educational program.”
In the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the ruling in Griswold v.
Connecticut that there is a constitutional right to privacy
was adopted. “The right to privacy is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with
liberty… The concept of limited gov’t has always
included that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen… A system
of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public sector, which the State can control.”
Ruling: No. Glaxo has the right to protect its economic
interest, which the constitution provides. What the
company seeks is to avoid conflict of interest between
employees and the company that may arise out of such
relationship because the company has the right to guard
its trade secrets and information from its competitors.
Tecson was informed of the company policy and he
knows and voluntarily entered into the contract, the
stipulation therein has a force of law between them and
thus should be complied with in good faith
Ruling: Yes. Although it was noted that there was an

The appellant, who had been classified at birth as a man
had undergone gender reassignment surgery and in
1981 had gone through a form of marriage with a man
who was aware of her background. She sought for a
declaration under the Family Law that the marriage was
valid. Pursuant to Sec. 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973 which provides that a marriage is void unless
the parties are ‘respectively male and female’, the Court
of Appeals held the appellant's marriage invalid. The
parties were not respectively male and female, which
terms were to be determined by biological criteria Mrs.
Bellinger seeks a declaration that Sec 11(c) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is incompatible w/ Articles
8 & 12of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Churchill v. Rafferty
There was a billboard that was put up by petitioner in
the Rizal Province. But some German and British consul
find the said billboard offensive to sight and otherwise a
nuisance. In pursuan to the complaint Defendant
Collector of internal revenue in Accordance with Act No.
2339 decided to remove the billboard. Plaintiff contends
that the billboard is not offensive nor a nuisance to the
public and not dangerous to the safety of the people
also do not contain advertisement that are against
morals.
People v. Fajardo
1973 is incompatible w/ articles 8 & 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights; Art 8 is the right to
respect for private life; Art 12: right to marry
Issue: WON Act 2339 is unconstitutional for depriving
the property w/o due process?
Issue: WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power
increasing emphasis upon the impact of psychological
factors on gender, there was no clear point at which
such factors could be said to have effected a change of
gender. A person correctly registered as male at birth
who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and
was now living as a woman was biologically a male and
therefore could not be defined as female for the
purposes of marriage. It was for Parliament, not for the
courts, to decide at what point it would be appropriate
to recognize that a person who had been assigned to
one sex at birth had changed gender for the purposes of
marriage.
Ruling: No. the said act is a valid exercise of police
power. The regulation of billboards and their restriction
is not a regulation of private property as it is a regulation
of the use of streets and other public thoroughfares.
Unsightly advertisement which are offensive to the sight
are not disassociated from the general welfare of the
public, therefore can be regulated by police power.
Hence the act is constitutional
As the case now stands, every structure that may be
erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own
The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating
that construction of a building, which will destroy the
view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be
destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an
ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with
the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request
was denied, for the reason that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction
of the building without a permit. Thereafter, defendants
were charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted.
Ynot v. CA
Ynot transported 6 carabaos which were confiscated by
the police for having been transported from Masbate to
Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for
replevin, and challenging the constitutionality of the E.O.
626 – A. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the
animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on
the ground that it lacked authority to do so.
US v. Causby
Ruling: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right
to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. The
State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of
police power and a violation of due process
Ruling: Supreme Court find that the challenged measure
is an invalid exercise of police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The minimum requirements
of due process are notice and hearing which generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as as afeguard against official arbitrariness.
Issue: WON Respondents’ property been taken within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?
beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with the view of the
public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and
unused. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellants just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard. Municipal Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to
enact, and is therefore null and void.
We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, w/ no difficulty on the province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there; any more
than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the
petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him elementary fair play.
The airspace, is part of the public domain. The court
does not set the precise limits of the line of
Respondents claim that their property was taken, within
the meaning of the 5th Amendment, by the regular army
and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken
farm. Respondents own 2.8 land near an airport outside
of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property
contained a house and a chicken farm. The United
States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when
flying above the property, and have very bright lights.
Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop,
because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls
from fright.
Republic v. PLDT
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private
respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection
between the Government Telephone System and PLDT,
so that they could make use of the lines and facilities of
PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contact where there is no
agreement between the parties.
Republic v. Castelvi
In 1947, the Republic, through AFP, entered into a lease
agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi.
When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in
1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent
installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected on the property. She
then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP.
In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Bel-Air Association v. IAC
Ruling: Yes. The court noted the common law doctrine
of ownership of land extends to the sky above the land.
However, the court notes that an act of Congress had
given the United States exclusive national sovereignty
over the air space. The airspace is a public highway. But
it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full
enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of
the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If
this were not true then landowners could not build
buildings, plant trees or run fences.
Issue: WoN interconnection between PLDT and the
Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be
determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling: Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not
be reckoned(estimated) as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of
the value of the property as of that year. Taking of
property began upon the filing of complaint for eminent
domain, not from the start of lease
Taking of property for the purpose of eminent domain:
1. Exproprietor entered a private property
2. Entry to said property for indefinite period
3. Entry under legal authority
4. Property devoted to public use
5. Property utilized in a way that deprives the owner of
all his beneficial enjoyment of Property
Issue: WON the demolition of the gates and opening of
the street by the mayor of Makati is valid?
demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking,
unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand,
determine the value of the easement and whether it is a
temporary or permanent easement.
Ruling: Yes. In the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone companies to permit interconnection as the
needs of the government service may require for the
benefit of the public but subject to the payment of just
compensation. The use of lines and services to allow
inter service connection between both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an
easement of right of way.
In the present case, all the requirements were met
except number 5. Castellvi still benefited from the
property by receiving payment from the lease because
Castellvi was still in control of the land since the contract
was renewed on a yearly basis price of the land will be
determined at the time the Republic took possession of
the land, not on the price of property during their first
lease of the land.
Ruling: Yes. The opening of Jupiter and orbit streets
were warranted by the demands of common good in
The gates of Jupiter and orbit street of Bel-air village
were ordered demolished by the mayor in pursuant to
the opening of both streets to vehicles for traffic
decongestion and public convenience. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA) opposed the demolition. They
claimed that it amounted to deprivation of their
property w/o due process and compensation. The mayor
stated as his justification the Municipal Ordinance 17 as
amended by Resolution No. 139 which requires the
mayor to remove or demolish any illegal construction
EPZA v. Dulay
The subject of this case is the 4 parcels of land where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA)
is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation, owner of the land, claimed
that the lands were expropriated by the government
without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay issued an order
for the appointment of the commissioners to determine
the just compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio would be
P15 per square meter. Which was objected by the EPZA
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower.
NPC v. CA
Issue: WoN the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of
determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just
compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment
to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts
inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The
determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of NPC and
terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.
The mayor’s act was not an exercise of eminent domain
but of police power. Hence no just compensation is
required. The gates is a public nuisance because it
hinders or impairs the use of property. The mayor’s
notification to BAVA that both Jupiter and orbit streets
were going to be opened constitute a compliance with
the due process
The executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the
private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings.
Ruling: Yes. P3.75 per square meter is reinstated. The

The National Power Corporation instituted proceedings
for eminent domain against the spouses Sadang and B.E.
San Diego Inc. The Sadang spouses were originally the
owner of a parcel of land. Later on, San Diego Inc.
acquired ownership of the said land by public auction.
Before San Diego Inc. acquired ownership of the land,
the NPC already had negotiations with the spouses for
the purchased of a portion of the latter's land for the
purpose of constructing a road to its Angat River
Hydroelectric Project.
Manotok v. NHA
The Tambunting and Sunog Apog estate were included in
the metro manila zoning improvement program after
being classified by the National Housing Authority as
blighted communities. However on Jan 1980, President
issued P.D. No. 1669 which expropriates Tambunting
Estate, and designates the NHA to do the expropriation
and 8M will be paid to the owners within period of 5
years in 5 equal installments. Petitioner Eliza Manotok
assails P.D. No. 1669 and P.D. No. 1670 as
unconstitutional.
Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operatos v. City of
Manila
Assoc. of Small land owners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
Luz Farms v. Secretary
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business The said business were affected by the
enforcement of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. This petition praying for the said laws be declared
unconstitutional. It argued that livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming.
Cariday v. CA
authorized the latter to pay defendant a just
compensation of Php 3.75 per square meter which is the
market value of the agricultural lands per sqm. On
appeal, the CA modified the judgment and states that
the just and reasonable compensation is Php7.00 per
sqm which is the market value of the residential land per
square meter at that time.
Issue: Did respondent Court of Appeals err in fixing the
amount of P7.00 per square meter as just compensation
based on its planned convertibility into a residential
subdivision?
The laws violated their constitutional right to due
process because it expropriated their properties and to
contest the just compensation to which they are
entitled.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. no. 1669 and P.D. No. 1670 is
unconstitutional
Doctrine not applicable according to Jamon
Ask classmate????
Issue: Whether or not Luz Farms contention of the laws
as unconstitutional is valid
Issue: Should the regulation of FPA regarding building
price of just compensation should be the value at the
actual taking, not the value it may serve in the future. It
is the time of taking and not the "potential building" site
that is the determining factor, the nature of the land at
the time of taking by the government is the principal
criterion for awarding compensation to the land owner .
The taking commences when San Diego bought the land.
Ruling: Yes, Tambunting Estate and Sunog Apog were
expropriated automatically when the decrees were
signed.
They were directly expropriated by decree without any
hearing or proceeding.
Ruling: Yes, framers never intended to include livestock
and poultry industry in the government’s Agrarian
Reform Program in the Constitution. Framers agreed
that “agrarian lands” do not include commercial,
industrial lands and residential properties. Livestock and
poultry farm workers are covered by the minimum wage
law and Those involved in the livestock business do not
primarily rely on land as their resource. In fact, the use
of and is merely incidental in this business.
Ruling: Yes. Restriction contemplates to avoid

Cariday Investment Corporation is the owner of a
residential building in the Forbes Park Subdivision,
hence, a member of the FPA. Such Building did not pass
Forbes Park Association (FPA; corporation promoting
interest of Forbes Park residents). The Deed of
Restrictions of FPA indicates that only one family is
allowed to live in a residential building and states that
one lot can only hold one residential building. Cariday
admitted that its building has the exterior appearance of
a single family residence but it is designed inside to allow
occupancy by two families. In spite of FBA’s demands,
CARIDAY still leased portion of the house. Clearance
approving CARIDAY’s lease was denied by FPA. The FPA
advised Cariday that it would not allow Cariday to lease
its house to more than one tenant as this would violate
the rule regarding “one single-family residential
restriction”.
Ichong v. Hernandez
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 which prohibits aliens
and associations, partnerships, or corporations whose
capital are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Lao Ichong, in
behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to
declare the Act unconstitutional for the reason that it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives them of their liberty and property without
due process  and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this
Korematsu v. US
structures is valid?
Issue: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal
protection of the laws.
Ruling: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it
does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the
laws. The equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality among residents. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Official statistic points out to the increasing dominance
domination and control that is the legislature’s target in
the enactment of the Act.
The Petitioner, of Japanese descent, was convicted
overcrowding in the houses and subdivision; such will
result to pressure common facilities and create problems
for the subdivision in terms of sanitation and security.
The Deed of restrictions provided for number of families
allowed, which is one.
Petitioner’s contention on exterior and interior
differences is not warranted. Because such reason would
circumvent the law. But leasing one's house in Forbes
Park, as the petitioner has done, to two or more tenant
families who are not related to the owner, nor to each
other, would be impermissible under the one single-
family restriction recorded on the title of the property.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he
temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no
allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of the country.
Dissent. (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue

During World War II, a military commander ordered all
Japanese descent to evacuate the West Coast. The
Petitioner, Korematsu, a US citizen of Japanese descent,
was convicted for failing to comply with the order.
President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order
authorizing military commanders to prescribe military
areas from which any or all persons may be excluded.
Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of
Japanese descent, whether or not they were United
States citizens, to leave their homes on the West Coast
and to report to “Assembly Centers.”
Plessy v. Ferguson
A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to
provide separate, but equal accommodations for its
Black and White passengers. Plaintiff, who was seven-
eighths white, was prosecuted under the statute after he
refused to leave the section of a train reserved for
whites. The alleged purpose of the statute was to
preserve public peace and good order and to promote
the comfort of the people.
Brown v. Board of Education
The Plaintiffs, various black children, were denied
admission to schools attended by white children under a
laws that required segregation by race. Plaintiffs sued,
seeking admission to public schools in their communities
on a non-segregated basis.
under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply
with such military orders.
Issue: WON there is violation of the equal protection
Ruling: No. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was
justified. Justice Hugo Black stated that although the
exclusion order imposed hardships upon American
citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under
conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened by
hostile forces, the power to protect them must be
proportionate with the threatened danger.
Issue: Was the statute requiring separate, but equal
accommodations on railroad transportation consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution?
Ruling: Yes. (J. Brown) stated that although the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce
the equality between the races, it was not intended to
abolish distinctions based on color. Laws requiring the
separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of
either.
Issue: Do separate but equal laws in the area of public
education deprive black children of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution
Ruling: Yes. (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible”
factors of segregated schools are equal, to separate
black children from others of similar age, solely on the
basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with
respect to their status in the community and may affect
their hearts and minds.
goes over the brink of constitutional power and falls into
the abyss of racism. Although we must extend great
deference(respect) to the judgments of the military, it is
essential that there be definite limits to military
discretion.
Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the
States’ police powers.
The 14th Amendment of the Constitution require that the
exercise of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws
enacted is in good faith, for the promotion of the public
good and NOT for the annoyance or oppression of
another race are reasonable.
A law, which authorizes or requires the separation of the
two races on public conveyances, is consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution unless the law is unreasonable.
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) is relying on the same rationale to
invalidate the segregation laws. The rationale is that it’s
the intangible factors that make segregation laws in the
area of public education “inherently unequal.”
Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently
unequal.
Univ. of California v. Bakke
The Respondent, Bakke, a white applicant to the
University of California, Med School, sued the University,
alleging his denial of admission on racial grounds, was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment of the US Constitution. The University of
California, Med School reserved 16 spots out of the 100
in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The
Respondent, when compared to students admitted
under the special admissions program, had more
favorable objective indicia of performance, while his
race was the only distinguishing characteristic.
Gratz v. Bollinger
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of
Michigan's College with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT
score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the
University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score
of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other
schools. The University admits that it uses race as a
factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a
"compelling interest in achieving diversity among its
student body." In addition, the University has a policy to
admit all qualified applicants who are members of one of
three select racial minority groups - African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered
"underrepresented" on the campus.
Grutter v. Bollinger
Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, applied for admission to
University of Michigan Law School in 1997 with an
undergraduate GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT of 161. She was
denied. Petitioner, who is white, is challenging the law
school’s use of race as a factor in the admissions
process.
Issue: Can race be considered as a factor in the
admissions process?
Ruling: The special admissions program is
unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor
in the admissions process. (J. Powell), says that the
Supreme Court of the US should not pay attention to
past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the
University, as this is tantamount to allowing political
trends to dictate constitutional principles.
Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the
District Court held that the admissions policies for years
1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the
policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly
tailored.
Issue: Does the University of Michigan's use of racial
preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Issue: Did the University of Michigan’s use of racial
preferences in the admissions process violate the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964?
Concurrence.
J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur
so much as to allow race to be considered as a factor in
the admissions process. However, the Justices believe
that in this particular example, race should be allowed as
a single determining factor.
Although race may be a factor in determining admission
to public educational institutions, it may not be a sole
determining factor.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the University of
Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate
admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity
cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court
reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or
one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission,
to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant
solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did
not provide the individualized consideration
Ruling: No. The law school in this case was conducting
highly individualized reviews of each applicant, and
Justice O’Connor determined that race was only one of
many factors considered to determine the applicant’s
eligibility. Schools have a compelling interest in having
diverse student bodies.
Schools may consider race as a part of the admissions
process as long as it is only one factor in an
individualized process.
Bradwell v. Illinois
Mrs. Myra Bradwell was denied in her application to
practice law in the Illinois Supreme Court. Her petition
included the requisite certificate attesting to her good
character and qualifications. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed.
Goesart v. Cleary
A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold
licenses in cities, but the statute also stated that a
woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the
wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor
establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the
law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on
the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment.
Geduldig v. Aiello
California operated a disability insurance system that
supplemented workers compensation, which provided
for payments for disabilities not covered by workers
compensation. The list of disabilities paid for by the
State of California was not complete. Among those
disabilities not paid were certain pregnancy related
conditions. Suit was brought challenging the system as
an unconstitutional gender-based classification.
Issue: Does the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provide that one of the privileges
and immunities of women as citizens is to engage in any
profession?
Ruling: The admission to the bar is a matter reserved to
the states and Bradwell’s right to practice law is not
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue: Did the Michigan statute, in denying female
bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Ruling: No. the Court concluded that the Constitution
"does not preclude(prevent) the States from drawing a
line between the sexes", or shifting social standards.
Issue: Does the exclusion of the pregnancy-related
conditions violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause?
Concurrence. Justice Bradley. The Illinois Supreme Court
requires a certificate from the court of some county of
his good moral character, and is otherwise left to the
discretion of the court.
Separate spheres ideology allowed Illinois to prohibit
women from practicing law. Women’s admission to the
bar is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is a
matter reserved to the states. The law has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman.
The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in
enacting the statute, could have determined that
allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and
social problems against which it may devise preventive
measures."
Ruling: No. The list of conditions covered by the
disability insurance system is not exclusive. Furthermore,
there are conditions not covered by the system that
affect both men and women. The excluded conditions do
not affect women alone.
Underinclusive legislation is appropriate under the Equal
Protection Clause, so long as the line drawn by the State
is “rationally supportable.”
Mississippi Univ. School for Women v. Hogan
The Respondent, Hogan, was denied admission to
Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) nursing
program solely on the basis of gender. He now alleges
this is a denial of equal protection.
MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution
maintained by the State of Mississippi. The Respondent
was otherwise qualified for admission to the school’s
nursing program, but he was denied admission on the
basis of being male.
Michael M. v. Superior Court
The Petitioner, Michael M., was charged with statutory
rape in California. The Petitioner, at the time of the
complaint, was a 17-year-old male who had sexual
intercourse with a 16-year-old female. Because
California’s statute only criminalized such behavior in
males, the female involved was not charged with any
crime. The Petitioner now alleges that this
disparity(inequality) in the statutory rape laws is
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution
Personel Administrator v. Feeney
The Respondent, Feeney, challenges the Petitioner,
Personnel Administration of Massachusetts’s rule that
provides a hiring preference to military veterans.
Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for
veterans over non- veterans for civil service positions,
the Petitioner is discriminating against women. The
District Court found that this practice has a severe
impact on job opportunities for women, since most of
the veterans are men.
Issue: Does the operation of a female only nursing
school by a State violate Equal Protection?
Ruling: Yes. Applying intermediate scrutiny, (J.
O’Connor) notes that the State of Mississippi failed to
advance an important state interest for operating a
single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that
women did not lack opportunities to be trained as
nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW.
J. O’Connor also argues that as MUW allows male
auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the
classroom, the state is not technically operating a single-
sex nursing program.
Issue: Does the California statutory rape statute violate
principles of Equal Protection?
Ruling: No. J. Rehnquist gives great deference(respect)
to the fact that the State’s objective was to discourage
teenage pregnancies.
The majority states that a state may attack the stated
objective directly by prohibiting the conduct only to
males. The reasoning behind this assertion is that
females already have significant prevention to abstain
from the behavior, namely pregnancy itself and its
attendant difficulties.
Issue: Does the hiring practice that favors veterans
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution?
Ruling: No. The benefit of this act was offered to any
person who was a veteran. The law prefers for veterans
of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was not
designed to favor men over women.
Dissent. (J. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not
suffered a cognizable injury, as there were state-
operated nursing programs that accepted men
elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a
state-run university close to one’s hometown.
A state may not prevent one gender or the other from
participating in a unique educational environment solely
on the basis of gender.
Dissent: (J. Stevens) dissents, arguing that since both
parties are equally guilty of the conduct, it is irrationally
for the State to only punish a single party.
*A state may provide for punishment only for males to
equalize deterrents to teenage pregnancy.
Discussion: At the time only 1% of the veterans were
women. So, it appeared that this legislation was meant
for men only. But, its application and by definition a
veteran is gender neutral.
*A gender neutral statute that adversely impacts one
gender does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if it
does not have a discriminatory purpose and it does not
actually classify one gender.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required
all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a permit issued
by the city's Board of Supervisors. The board had total
discretion over who would be issued a permit. No single
Chinese owner was granted a permit. Yick Wo and Wo
Lee each operated laundry businesses without a permit
and, after refusing to pay a fine, were imprisoned. Each
sued for writ of habeas corpus, arguing the fine and
discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance violated
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu
Fragante applied for a clerk’s job with the City and
County of Honolulu. Although he placed high on a civil
service eligible list to be chosen for the position, he was
not selected because of a deficiency oral communication
skills caused by his “heavy Filipino accent.” Fragante
brought a suit, alleging unequal treatment on the basis
of national origin.The district court dismissed Fragante’s
complaint on the ground that the oral ability to
communicate effectively and clearly was a legitimate
occupational qualification for the job in question.
International School Alliance v. Quisumbing
Private respondent International School, Inc., is a
domestic educational institution. The School hires both
foreign and local teachers, classified into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. Foreign-hires are paid a
salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The School
justifies the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held petitioner
ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
hires.
Issue: Did the unequal enforcement of the city
ordinance violate Yick Wo and Wo Lee's rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment?
Issue: Was this a case of discrimination on the basis of
national origin?
Ruling: No. Using the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
Defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for Petitioner’s non-selection. “There is no doubt
that the oral ability to communicate effectively in English
is reasonably related to the operation of the clerk’s
office.”
Issue: WON the School unduly discriminated against the
local-hires.
Ruling: If an employer give employees the same position
and rank, it is presumed that these employees perform
equal work. Herein, the International School has failed to
provide evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions. The School
cannot invoke the need to invite foreign-hires to leave
their domicile to justify the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal
pay. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy.
Ruling: Yes. According to the Court, even if the law is
impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so
as to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution." The kind of biased
enforcement experienced by the plaintiffs, amounted to
"a practical denial by the State of that equal protection
of the law" and therefore violated the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was not a
mere pretext(excuse). The hiring process involved scores
on a variety of categories, and Fragante was given a 3 on
a scale of 1-10 for speech. Furthermore, “the record
does not show that the jobs hired to persons less
qualified than Fragante.”
In sum, the court noted, “Fragante was passed over for
employment because of the harmful effect of his Filipino
accent on his ability to communicate orally.
Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under
the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-
hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-
hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits
are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires,
and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter.
The principle of equal pay for equal work requires that
persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort, and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Board of directors v. Rotary Club
The Rotary Club of Duarte, California was a member club
of the larger Rotary international. Membership in Rotary
Clubs traditionally had been limited to men though
women were invited to attend meetings, give speeches,
and receive awards. The Duarte Club admitted three
women to active membership. As a result, the Duarte
club was notified that admitting women to the club
violated Rotary International’s constitution, and Rotary
International revoked the Duarte Club’s charter,
terminating its membership in Rotary International.
Issue: Whether the law which required California Rotary
Clubs to admit women members violate Rotary
International's First Amendment rights of association?
Ruling: No. The Court found that the relationship among
the club's members was not intimate or private variety
which warrants First Amendment protection. Justice
Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities
(including their meetings) are conducted in the presence
of strangers, and because women members would not
prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there
was no violation of associational rights.
Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment
on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal
infringement would be justified since it "serves the
State's compelling interest" in ending sexual
discrimination.
The court ordered the Duarte club’s reinstatement and it
permanently enjoined the enforcement of the gender
requirements against the Duarte Rotary club.
The Unruh Act does not violate the First Amendment by
requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women. The
Act provides, in part: All persons within the jurisdiction
of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

Boy Scout of America v. Dale
The Respondent, Dale (Respondent), was an eagle scout,
a life-long boy scout, was an assistant scout master in
New Jersey. The Boy Scouts of America (Petitioner),
learned that he was a homosexual and revoked his
membership. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit
organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was
inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in
young people.
Issue: Whether application of New Jersey's public Dissent: (J. Stevens) noting that by allowing the
accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Petitioner to revoke the Respondent’s membership, the
Amendment right of expressive association to bar Supreme Court was allowing the organization to prevail
homosexuals from serving as troop leaders? over the anti-discrimination laws of the state.
Ruling: Yes, The court found that, while the Petitioner’s
laws and oaths do not mention sexuality, the purpose of
the organization to foster “morally straight” and “clean”
membership would not be disregarded if the Petitioner
was forced to accept the Respondent.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health
Advocates for GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders) filed suit against the Massachusetts
Department of Health on the ground of denial by the 7
same-sex couple a marriage licenses. The Superior Court
ruled in favor of the Department. The plaintiffs
appealed. In the appeal, Massachusetts Attorney
General argued that the issue of “the broader public
interest” should prevail. “same-sex couples cannot
procreate on their own and therefore cannot accomplish
the ‘main object’ of marriage as historically understood,”
Issue: Whether the denial of a marriage license to same
sex couples violates the equal protection clause and/or
the Mass. state constitution?
Ruling: Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall
be allowed marital rights in the state of Mass. The denial
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated
provisions of the state constitution guaranteeing
individual liberty and equality. The court argued that
modern day technology and fertilization techniques
nullified the procreation argument. Same sex couples,
through adoption or other fertilization methods could
procreate.
The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and
equality of all individuals and the state's denial of
marriage rights to same-sex couples violated the state
constitution's guarantee of equal protection and due
process. The Court indicated that the State may not
“deny the protections, benefits and obligations
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the
same sex who wish to marry.”
Tecson v. COMELEC
Victorino Fornier, petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to cancel his COC upon the thesis that
FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner averment, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Because Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
Near v. Minnesota
A Minnesota law that “gagged(silenced)” a periodical
from publishing derogatory statements about local
public officials was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States
The Saturday Press published an attacks on local officials.
The Press claimed that the chief of police had “illicit
relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained
an injunction in order to stop the publishing of the Press
newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of
action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public
nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper, or other periodical.
Issue: Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino
citizen?
Ruling: Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, in the absence of
evidence, Philippines could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou could
have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
A state court ordered to stop the Press and enjoined the
Defendants, from publishing or circulating such
“defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.
Issue: Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is
consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press
as historically conceived and guaranteed?
Ruling: No. Judgment of the state court is reversed. The
fact that the liberty of press may be abused by
miscreant(wrongdoers) purveyors(gossipmongers) of
scandal does not effect the requirement that the press
has immunity from previous restraints when it deals
with official misconduct.
The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
should only remain in the sphere of civil law and should
not unduly intrude on the domain of political law.
The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot
inherit the father’s citizenship has no textual basis in the
Constitution and violates the equal protection clause.
To disqualify the illegitimate child from holding a public
office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents.
There is neither justice nor rationality in that. Thus, it
transgresses the equal protection clause.
Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not
consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press
as historically conceived and guaranteed thus, it is
unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be
justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is
permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the
matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld,
could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the
statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the
press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution
New York Times v. US (pentagon paper case)
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) held that the Government failed to meet the
requisite of burden of proof needed to justify a prior
restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the
New York Times and Washington Post from publishing
contents of a classified study.
Freedman v. Maryland
Maryland requires that all films be submitted to a board
of censors before being exhibited. The board could
disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupt
morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time
limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman
challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the
procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that
prior approval itself was unconstitutional.
The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times
and Washington Post from publishing contents of a
confidential study about the Government’s decision
making with regards to Vietnam policy.
Issue: Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent
the publication of what it termed "classified
information" violate the First Amendment?
Issue: Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of
expression protected by the First Amendment?
Ruling: The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid.
The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute
provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected
expression."
Ruling: Yes. Justice Brennan reasoned that since
publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and
immediate event imperilling(endangering) the safety of
American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.
These guidelines are to:
(1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected
expression on the censors,
(2) require judicial determination to impose a valid
determination, and
(3) require prompt determination "within a specified
time period."

People v. Perez
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Sorsogon,
and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, and became
engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of
Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself,
should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood, because he has recommended a bad
administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated
the independence of the Philippines and for this reason,
we have not obtained independence and the head of
that Governor-General must be cut off." Charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of
article 256. of the Penal Code having to do with
contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority, and convicted
Issue: WON Perez committed Libel? Concurring: Villamor J. The accused should not be
convicted of the crime of sedition because there is no
Ruling: No he was guilty of a portion of treason and allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record,
sedition. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the showing that when the accused uttered the words that
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the gave rise to these proceedings, he had the intention of
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and inciting others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite
effect be seditious. any conspiracy or rebellion, or to disturb the peace of
the of the community or the safety and order of the
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Government
Executive of the Philippine. His official position
seems to invite abusive attacks. But in this
instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the
bounds of free speech and common decency. More than
a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a
feeling of to remain loyal to the Government and be
obedient to the laws. The Governor- General is the
representative of executive civil authority in the
Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious
attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights
of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
Dennis v. US
The Smith Act made it a criminal offense for a person to
knowingly or willfully advocate the overthrowing of
government in the US by force or to attempt to commit
or conspire to commit the same. The Petitioners were
charges under the Act for (1) willfully and knowingly
conspiring to organize a Communist Party of the United
States, a group whose members advocated the
overthrowing of the US government by force and (2)
willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty
to do the same. It was clear from the record that the
leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a
revolution when the opportunity came. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute
under which the Petitioners were convicted was
challenged.
Abrams v. US
The defendants’ convicted for distributing leaflets
advocating strikes during the Russian Revolution were
upheld because their speech was not protected by the
US Constitution based on the “clear and present danger”
test. The Defendants, Abrams and others were Russian
immigrants. The Defendant were self-proclaimed
revolutionists and anarchists who wrote and distributed
thousands of circulars advocating a general strike and
appealing to workers in ammunitions factories to stop
the production of weapons to be used against Russian
revolutionaries.
Issue: Was the statute invalid because it prohibited Concurrence: (J. Jackson) An individual cannot claim the
academic discussions on topics such as that of the merits constitutional protections of the First Amendment in
of Marxism-Leninism? advocating or teaching the overthrow of government by
violence. I think such conduct can be made a crime, even
Ruling: (J. Vinson) We must apply the “clear and present without requiring a showing of an extremely high
danger” test. Accordingly, the overthrow of the probability of success of a scheme.
Government by force is certainly substantial interest for
the Government to limit speech. Obviously, “clear and The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
present danger” does not mean the government may Court) is essentially allowing the prohibitions of
not act until the Overthrow has been plotted and on is advocacy of a particular doctrine in this case – the
the verge of being executed. overthrow of the government by force
On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite
danger to act existed here: (1) the formation by the
Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly
disciplined members subject to call when the Petitioners
felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable nature of
world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries;
and (4) the touch and go nature of our relations with
other countries with whom the Petitioners were
ideologically aligned. Thus, the convictions of the
Petitioners were justified.
Issue: Whether the Defendants’ speech was protected Clear and present danger assures special attention to the
by the First Amendment of the Constitution? time dimension. Speech may not be curtailed(cut) until
there is an immediate risk of evil.
Ruling: No. Men must be held and to be accountable for
the effects which their acts are likely to produce. The
plain purpose of Defendants’ propaganda was to
stimulate, at the crisis of war, disaffection, sedition,
riots. Therefore, their speech is not protected by the
First Amendment of the Constitution.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans
Radio Station DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of
nat'l security. It was alleged that DYRE was used to incite
people to sedition which arose because they were
shifting to coverage of public events and airing programs
geared towards public affairs. Petitioner raises freedom
of speech. Before court could promulgate it's decision,
the petitioner suddenly withdrew its petition because
DYRE was bought by another company and it had no
more interest in the case, nor does the buying company
have an interest. Moot and academic.
US v. O’ Brien
The Defendant, O’Brien, was convicted for symbolically
burning his draft card under a federal statute forbidding
the altering of a draft card. The Defendant was convicted
under Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in
1965 which made it an offense to “alter, knowingly
destroy, knowingly mutilate” a Selective Service
registration certification. Defendant knowingly burned
his draft card on the front steps of the local courthouse.
The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment
unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of
speech.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District
Tinker (Petitioner) was suspended from school for
showing his support of the anti-war movement.
Petitioner was a high school student who joined his
parents in protesting the Vietnam War. The form of
protest was to wear a black armband. When Petitioner
arrived at school he was told to remove the armband or
be suspended. He took the suspension and did not
return to school until after the protest period ended.
Issue: Moot and academic
Issue: Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional
as applied to Defendant because his act of burning the
draft card was protected “symbolic speech” within the
First Amendment?
Ruling: No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.
It cannot be accepted that there is an endless and
limitless variety of conduct that constitutes “speech”
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to
express an idea. However, even if the alleged
communicative element of Defendant’s conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is
constitutionally protected activity.
Issue: Is symbolic speech by public school students
protected under the First Amendment?
Ruling: Yes. Students are persons worthy of
constitutional protections both while in school and out
of school.
Ruling: The gov’t has a right to protect itself against
broadcasts which incite sedition. But the people have
the right to be informed too and obsequious
programming will not serve. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy.
Broadcast media as the most popular and convenient
info disseminators around deserve special protection by
the due process and freedom of speech clauses.
First, a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the government.
Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these
requirements. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is
constitutional as applied to Defendant.
Discussion. The wearing of the armband was singled out
of all other symbolic speech engaged in by the student
body. Clearly there was no evidence that the wearing of
the armbands caused any disruption of any class or
school function.
Student speech may be regulated when such speech
would materially and substantially interfere with the
discipline and operation of a school.