VI.

CERTIFICATION ELECTION PROCEEDINGS

1. GENERALLY
1.1. ROLE OF EMPLOYER
110. PT&T VS. LAGUESMA

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA AND PT&T SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES UNION - APSOTEU.

FACTS Private respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION) filed a petition before the Industrial Relations Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment
praying for the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T). UNION amended its
petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining
unit sought to be established.

PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION members were performing managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory
employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the petition.

Respondent UNION opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code supervisory employees are not eligible to join the Labor organization of the rank-and-
file employees although they may form their own.

PT&T filed its reply to the opposition and manifested that it is the function of an employee which is determinative of whether said employee is a managerial or supervisory
employee.

ISSUE RULING

Can a petition for The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads —
certification election filed
by supervisory employees Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be
of an unorganized conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.
establishment - one
without a certified The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the UNION, which is legitimate labor organization duly registered
bargaining agent - be with the Department of Labor and Employment, filed the petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory employees, PT&T
dismissed on the ground may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
that these employees are
actually performing The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already represented by a certified bargaining agent does not make PT&T an organized establishment vis-a-vis the
managerial functions? supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees."
Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by public respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for certification election among the
supervisory employee of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that said election should be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact,
Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election. It reads —

Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of
the assigned petition, shall have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition.

In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election . .

Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election even if based on the ground that its supervisory
employees are in reality managerial employees. It is well-settled that an employer has no standing to question a certification election since this is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it was
 requested to bargain collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a collective bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of labor.
What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of any disqualified employee in the certification election during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings before the
representation officer. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the exclusion-inclusion proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the employees are entitled to vote and be part
of the bargaining unit sought to be certified.

For, the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment is mandatory and must immediately be ordered upon petition by a legitimate labor organization,
which is the case here.

At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who sought to be included in the bargaining unit were in
fact performing managerial functions. On the contrary, while these supervisory employees did exercise independent judgment which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their
authority was merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they were still accountable for their actions to a superior officer, i.e., their respective superintendents.

As the Med-Arbiter himself noted, "It is incredible that only rank-and-file and managerial employees are the personnel of respondent firm, considering the line of service it offers
to the public" and the fact that it employed 2,500 employees, more or less, all over the country.

A word more. PT&T alleges that respondent UNION is affiliated with the same national federation representing its rank-and-file employees. Invoking Atlas Lithographic Services,
Inc. v. Laguesma, PT&T seeks the disqualification of respondent UNION. Respondent, however, denied it was affiliated with the same national federation of the rank-and-file
employees union, the Associated Labor Union or ALU. It clarified that the PT&T Supervisory Employees Union is affiliated with Associated Professional, Supervisory Office,
Technical Employees Union or APSOTEU, which is a separate and distinct national federation from ALU.

111. SM FOODS, INC., VS. LAGUESMA

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. CEBU B-MEG FEED PLANT, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA AND ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM)

FACTS A petition for certification election among the monthly-paid employees of the San Miguel Food, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant was filed by private respondent labor federation
Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM) before Med-Arbiter Achilles V. Manit, alleging, inter alia,

● That it is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under Registration Certificate No. 5369-IP.
● SMFI-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant (SMFI), herein petitioner, is a business entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines which employs roughly
seventy-five (75) monthly paid employees, almost all of whom support the present petition.
● It was submitted in said petition that there has been no certification election conducted in SMFI to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent thereat for the
past two years and that the proposed bargaining unit, which is SMFI's monthly paid employees, is an unorganized one.
● It was also stated therein that petitioner IBM (herein private respondent) has already complied with the mandatory requirements for the creation of its local or affiliate
in SMFI's establishment.

Herein petitioner SMFI filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned petition on the ground that a similar petition remains pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action before Med-Arbiter Achilles V. Manit.

SMFI was referring to an evidently earlier petition, docketed as CE CASE NO R0700-9304-RU-016, filed on April 28, 1993 before the office of Med-Arbiter Manit. Indeed, both
petitions involved the same parties, cause of action and relief being prayed for, which is the issuance of an order by the Med-Arbiter allowing the conduct for a certification
election in SMFI's establishment. The contention is that the judgment that may be rendered in the first petition would be determinative of the outcome of the second petition,
dated September 24, 1993.

Private respondent IBM filed its Opposition to SMFI's Motion to Dismiss contending, among others,
 ● That the case referred to by SMFI had already been resolved by Med-Arbiter Manit in his Resolution and Order dated July 26, 1993 and September 2, 1993,
respectively, wherein IBM's first petition for certification election was denied mainly due to IBM's failure to comply with certain mandatory requirements of the law.

ISSUE RULING

In any case, this Court notes that it is petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification election among its monthly-paid
rank-and-file employees. This must not be so, for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The only exception to this rule is where the
employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively, which exception finds no
application in the case before us. Its role in a certification election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a
mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related thereto. An employer that
involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact it wants to create a company union. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with a purely internal affair of labor.
While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with the concomitant right to
oppose it. Sound policy dictates that they should maintain a strictly hands-off policy.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. The certification election is
the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment
where they are working. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees
themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

2. CERTIFICATION ELECTION
112. FOITAF VS. NORIEL

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LA SUERTE FOITAF, VS. CARMELO C. NORIEL AND FEDERACION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW - LA SUERTE CHAPTER)

FACTS Private respondent Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte Chapter, filed a petition for certification election alleging that out of a bargaining unit of more or less 3,500, there
were 1,068 signatories. The previous certified collective bargaining agreement between the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory and petitioner labor union
terminated on December 5, 1975.

There was, eleven days later, a motion to intervene filed by petitioner followed on March 1, 1976 by a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent Union had not complied
with the thirty percent consent requirement and that the petition for certification was filed beyond the sixty-day period to the expiration of the collective bargaining contract.
When a few days later the employer submitted a list of the rank and file employees numbering 4,055, private respondent countered with an additional list of signatories, 331 in
number, making a total of 1,399 signatories.

Private respondent thereafter opposed the motion to dismiss, stating that there was compliance With the thirty percent consent requirement and that the filing was within the
period allowed by law.

Med-Arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and granting the petition for certification election filed by private respondent, the choice being
between petitioner and respondent unions, with employees likewise being given the opportunity to vote for "No Union."

ISSUE RULING

The present Labor Code, as the former industrial Peace Act, rightfully stresses the importance of a certification election to ascertain which labor union should be the collective
bargaining agent and thus assure the success of the collective bargaining procedure.

This excerpt from the recent case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations finds pertinence: "Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in

The objection of petitioner
as to the alleged lack of
the thirty percent
requirement in the number
of signatories according to
the present Labor Code is
without merit.
awareness of the significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining process. I t is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can
truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental Postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to
make their choice, is controlling.
No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.
As was pointed out by Chief Justice Castro in Rivera v. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., 'a collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant., To the same effect is this
explicit pronouncement in Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz: 'The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract- constitute the law between the parties.' What could
be aptly stressed then, as was done in Compania Maritima v. Compania Maritima Labor Union, is 'the primacy to which the decision reached by the employees themselves is
entitled.' Further, it was therein stated: 'That is in the soundest tradition of industrial democracy. For collective bargaining implies that instead of a unilateral imposition by
management, the terms and conditions of employment should be the subject of negotiation between it and labor. Thus the two parties indispensable to the economy are
supposed to take care of their respective interests. Moreover, the very notion of industrial self-rule negates the assumption that what is good for either party should be left to
the will of the other. On the contrary, there is an awareness that labor can be trusted to promote its welfare through the bargaining process. To it then must be left the choice of
its agent for such purpose.' ... There is, it would appear, a decidedly unsympathetic approach by petitioner to the institution of collective bargaining at war with what has so
often and so consistently decided by this Tribunal. The above principle has been adhered to in subsequent decisions of this Court.
Private respondent, as noted in the comment, "filed the petition for certification supported by 1,068 signatories of the employees of the employer or more than 30% of the
3,500 rank and file employees of the employer. After the petition was filed, the employer however submitted a list of its regular rank and file employees with a total number of
4,055. Private respondent, in order to comply with the 30% consent requirement, submitted an additional list of 331 rank and file employees. Thus, the signatories totalled 1,399
or more than 30% of the 4,055 employees." Even if, as contended by petitioner, there were among the signatories submitted 105 falsified or double entries and 7 came from
those not qualified to vote or a total of 112, that would still leave 1,287 signatories or more than thirty percent of the 4,055 employees. The matter is thus essentially factual in
character, the determination by respondent Noriel being entitled to respect.
Any rate, as again noted in the comment, petitioner did miss the point that such a requirement of thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when
it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election. So Article 258 explicitly provides. Petitioner ignored that respondent Noriel is likewise possessed
of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held. In such a case, there is no such thirty percent requirement.
So it was held in the above Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions decision. Thus: "Petitioner would minimize its failure to abide by what is settled law by invoking this
provision in the New Labor Code: 'Any petition for certification election filed by any legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all
the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of
determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the
employees in the unit.' It cannot change the outcome. It does not suffice to impress the petition with merit, ... Petitioner's contention to the effect that the 30% requirement
should be satisfied suffers from an even graver flaw. If fails to distinguish between the right of a labor organization to be able to persuade 30% of the labor force to petition for a
certification election, in which cage respondent Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of such governmental agency precisely entrusted with
implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine, considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a bargaining unit, to order such an election
precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative.
The decision of respondent Bureau of April 14, 1975 was intended for that purpose. To reiterate a thought already expressed, what could be more appropriate than such a
procedure if the goal desired is to enable 'labor to determine which of the competing organizations should represent it for the purpose of a collective bargaining contract?
Nor was there any improvident or arbitrary exercise of authority when respondent Noriel ordered the certification election after the lapse of the sixty-day period provided for by
law. The law cannot be any clearer. It argues against the pretension of petitioner. According to the Labor Code: "No certification election issue shall be entertained by the
Bureau in any collective bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization, except within sixty (60) days prior
to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining agreement. No other meaning can be attached to such provision, as applied to the present situation, except
that the former collective bargaining agreement having expired on December 5, 1975, sixty days prior to that date, a petition for certification election could have been filed.
 It does not mean that after December 5, 1975, no such petition could be entertained by respondent Noriel, provided there was no certified collective bargaining agreement that
had taken its place. It is undisputed that no subsequent certified collective contract was in existence at the time the petition for holding the certification election was filed by
respondent union on February 6, 1976, There was no legal bar then to such a move. Moreover, the restrictive interpretation sought to be fastened on such a provision by
petitioner would set at naught the basic objective of the Labor Code to institute a true system of industrial democracy, through the collective bargaining process with the
representative of labor chosen after a free and honest certification election.

113. AIRLINE PILOTS VS. CIR

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GASTON GROUP) VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GOMEZ GROUP)

FACTS The Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines, represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed to be its President, filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying for certification
as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now under employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc, and are on active flight and/or operational assignments."

The petition was opposed in the name of the same association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of" the petition "because a certification proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the question as to who is the lawful
president of a legitimate labor organization."

After hearing the petition, Judge Salvador rendered a decision certifying the —

... ALPAP composed only of pilots employed by PAL with Capt. Ben Hur Gomez as its president, as the sole and exclusive Bargaining representative of all the pilots employed by PAL and
are on active flights and/or operational assignments, and as such is entitled to all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to its office and its union
funds.

The following circumstances were cited by Judge Salvador to justify the conclusions reached by him in his decision, namely:
(a) that there has been no certification election within the Period of 12 months prior to the date the petition for certification was filed;
(b) that the PAL entered into a collective bargaining agreement with ALPAP for "pilots in the employ of the Company" only for the duration of the period from February 1, 1969 to
January 31, 1972:
(c) that PAL pilots belonging to the Gaston, group, in defiance of court orders issued in Case 101-IPA(B) (see L-35206, infra) retired/resigned en masse from the PAL and retired/resigned
accompanied this with actual acts of not reporting for work;
(d) that the pilots affiliated with the Gaston group tried to then deposits and other funds from the ALPAP Cooperative Credit union on the ground that they have already
retired/resigned from PAL;
(e) that some of the members of the Gaston Group joined another airline after their retirement/resignation;
(f) that the Gaston group claimed before the industrial court that the order enjoining them from retiring or resigning constituted a violation of the prohibition against involuntary
servitude;
(g) that the contention that the mess retirement or resignation was merely an involuntary protest by those affiliated with the Gaston group is not borne out by the evidence as, aside
their aforementioned acts, the said group of pilots even filed a civil complaint against the PAL in which the cessation of their employment with PAL was strongly expressed by them.

It appears that prior to the filing of the certification petition below, a general ALPAP membership meeting was held on October 30, 1970, at which 221 out of 270 members adopted a
resolution amending ALPAP's constitution and by-laws by providing in a new section thereof that —

Any active member who shall be forced to retire or forced to resign or otherwise terminated for union activities as solely determine' by the Association shall have the option to either
continue to be and remain as an active member in good standing or to resign in writing his active membership with the Association. ...

According to ALPAP (Gaston), the foregoing amendment was adopted "In anticipation on the fact that they may be forced to resign or retire because of their 'union activities.' At this period of
time, PAL and ALPAP were locked in a labor dispute certified by the President to the Industrial court.
 Despite a no-work-stoppage order of the industrial court, a substantial majority of ALPAP members filed letters of retirement/resignation from the PAL.

Thereafter, an election of ALPAP officers was held. resulting in the election of Felix C. Gaston as President by 180 votes. Upon the other hand, on December 23, 1970, about 45 pilots who did
not tender their retirement or resignation the PAL gathered at the house of Atty. Morabe and elected Ben Hur Gomez as ALPAP President.

ALPAP (Gaston) filed an opposition in Case 101-IPAB to an urgent ex parte motion of the PAL to enjoin the members of ALPAP from retiring or resigning en masse It was claimed by ALPAP
(Gaston) that —
1. Insofar as herein oppositors are concerned, the allegations of respondent that their 'resignations' and 'retirements' are sham resignations and retirements and that 'There is no
honest or genuine desire to terminate the employee relationship with PAL are completely false. Their bona fide intention to terminate their employer-employee relationship with
PAL is conclusively shown by the fact that they have not sought reinstatement in or re-employment by PAL and also by the fact that they are either seeking employment in another
airline company;
2. Respondent in effect recognized such bona fide intention of the herein oppositors as shown by the fact that it accepted said resignations and retirements and did not initiate any
contempt proceedings against them; and
3. The action of herein oppositors in filing their resignations and retirements was a legitimate exercise of their legal and constitutional rights and the same, therefore, cannot be
considered as a valid ground to deprive them of benefits which they had already earned including, among others, retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the provisions
of an existing contract between petitioner and respondent. Such deprivation would constitute impairment of the obligations of contract.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or This Court has always stressed that a certification proceeding is not a litigation, in the sense in which this term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversary, fact finding
not the character in which the Court of Industrial Relations plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of employees as to the matter of their representation.
industrial
court abuse Such being the nature of a certification proceeding, we find no cogent reason that should prevent the industrial court, in such a proceeding, from inquiring into and satisfying itself about
its authority matters which may be relevant and crucial. though seemingly beyond the purview of such a proceeding, to the complete realization of the well-known purposes of a certification case.
for allowing
ALPAP Such a situation may arise, as it did in the case at bar, where a group of pilots of a particular airline, allegedly anticipation their forced retirement or resignation on account of strained relations
(Gomez), in a with the airline arising from unfulfilled economic demands, decided to adopt an amendment to their organization's constitution and by-laws in order to enable them to retain their
certification membership standing therein even after the termination of their employment with the employer concerned. The industrial court definitely should be allowed ample discretion to secure a
proceeding, disclosure of circumstances which will enable it to act fairly in a certification case.
to take over
the This Court nonetheless finds, after a close and dispassionate study of the facts on record, that the industrial court's conclusion, that the mentioned amendment to the ALPAP constitution and
corporate by-laws is illegal (a) because it was not adopted in accordance with the procedure prescribed and (b) because member of labor organization cannot adopt an amendment to their fundamental
name, office charter so as to include non employees (of PAL) as member, is erroneous.
and funds of
ALPAP. We have made a careful examination of the records of L-33705 and we find the adoption of the resolution introducing the questioned amendment to be substantial compliance with the
ALPAP constitution and by-law. Indeed, there is no refutation of the act that 221 out of the 270 members of ALPAP did cast their votes in favor of the said amendment on October 30, 1970 at
the ALPAP general membership meeting.

Their Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or
association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence
of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law.
The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the
employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such
organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employeewhom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
 There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and by-laws of ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL pilots alone. Although according to ALPAP (Gomez) there has
never been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such precondition for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable
authority for the association to accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ.

The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion, erroneous,
and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on December 18-22, 1970 Felix C. Gaston, and four other pilots, were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members as officers of their
association, this Court hereby rules that the mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid and binding the election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was elected at a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after
the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270. tender the provisions of section 4, article in of the
Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers of that association shall remain in office for ac least one year;

The term of office of the officers of the Association shall start on the first day of the fiscal year of the Association. It shall continue for one year or until they are re-elected or until their
successors have been elected or appointed and takes office in accordance with the Constitution and by-laws.

While this Court considers the ruling of the court below, on the matter of who has the exclusive rights to the office, funds and name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, we cannot
hold, however, that those belonging to the group of ALPAP (Gomez) do not possess any right at all over the office, funds and name of ALPAP of which they are also members.

In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively
with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that
directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended recognition to ALPAP
(Gomez) to enter and conclude collective bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow
the former a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated
authority to bargain collectively with PAL. Clearly, an intelligently considered adjustment of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests that not infrequently and, often,
unavoidably permeate the membership of a labor organization, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within the ranks of ALPAP. Of course, in the eventuality that the pilots
presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own separate office, name and union funds, nothing
can prevent them from setting up a separate labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a
result of their membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members of the association.

On the matter of whether the industrial court also abuse its authority for allowing ALPAP (Gomez) to appropriate the ALPAP name, it does not appear that the herein petitioner has shown
below any exclusive franchise or right to the use of that name. Hence, there is no proper basis for correcting the action taken by the court below on this regard.

114. REYES VS. TRAJANO

ALEXANDER REYES, ET AL. VS. CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO.

FACTS The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing unions
were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).
Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among
the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.

The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA;
and, conformably with established rule and practice, for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION."
 The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1
TUEU-OLALIA 95
NO UNION 1
SPOILED 1
CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing
unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in
the previous certification elections."

The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result
thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ."

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees petition. By Order, he certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
In that Order he decided the fact that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to exercise the rights to
be represented by a labor organization as the bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed of any legal personality to institute this present cause of action"
since they were not parties to the petition for certification election.

The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. There they argued that the Med-Arbiter had "practically disenfranchised petitioners who had
an overwhelming majority," and "the TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot be legally said to have been the result of a valid election where at least fifty-one percent of all eligible
voters in the appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes."

Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal in his Decision of July 22, 1988. He opined that the
petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the
unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate in previous certification elections
in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations."

ISSUE RULING

If the workers who are Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
members of the Iglesia ni bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 243 of the Code provides as follows:
Kristo in the exercise of
their religious belief opted ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable,
not to join any labor medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their
organization as a own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite
consequence of which they employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
themselves can not have a
bargaining representative, Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
then the right to be organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
representative by a organization . . . "
bargaining agent should
not be denied to other The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V
members of the bargaining (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus Rules provides as follows;
unit."
Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except
managerial employees, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant,
intermittent and without any definite employers people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection.
xxx xxx xxx
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to
engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.

Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any
union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-
evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person
has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.

As early as 1974 this Court had occasion to expatiate on these self-evident propositions in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., viz.:

. . .What the Constitution and Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories
propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right," it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a
right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself being
prevented by law; second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore the employee who should decide
for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave
and cancel his membership with said organization at any time (Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et al., 108 Phil. 1010, 1019). It
is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any unioN. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act have recognized, the guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by law but also in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. The original Rules
on Certification promulgated by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which of two or more
competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the
employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should
contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to be represented by any union. And where only one
union was involved, the ballots were required to state the question — "Do you desire to be represented by said union?" — as regards which the employees voting would mark
an appropriate square, one indicating the answer, "Yes" the other, "No."

To be sure, the present implementing rules no longer explicitly impose the requirement that the ballots at a certification election include a choice for "NO UNION" Section 8 (rule
VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and canvassing of votes," pertinently provides that:

. . . (a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check
in the square indicating "YES" or "NO."
xxx xxx xxx

Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is
doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently
coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is
 involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may
outnumber the "YES" votes — indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union — in which case, no union can
represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point,
and may not be inquired into at all.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be
represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the
workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers
in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees — who wish to have a union
represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different.
They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the
bargaining unit — upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-
organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.

That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well
as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization,
albeit in its negative aspect.

The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" — "but members of the INK which
prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization" — and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may
take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit,
whether they are members of a labor organization or not. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:

In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor
Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the
resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment for certification election. The law refers to
"all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit".

Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the
reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes
forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious
grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.

The petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for
the choices written therein.

115. PHIL. FRUITS AND VEGETABLES IND. VS. TORRES

FACTS On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting the petition for Certification election filed by the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).
Said order directed the holding of a certification election among the regular and seasonal workers of the Philippine Fruits and Vegetables, Inc.

After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative to the conduct of the certification election were threshed out except that which pertains to the voting qualifications
of the hundred ninety four (194) workers enumerated in the lists of qualified voters submitted by TUPAS.

After a late submission by the parties of their respective position papers, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order allowing 184 of the 194 questioned workers to vote, subject to
challenge, in the certification election to be held on December 16, 1989. Copies of said Order were furnished the parties and the notice of certification election was duly posted.
One hundred sixty eight (168) of the questioned workers actually voted on election day.

In the scheduled certification election, petitioner objected to the proceeding, through a Manifestation filed with the Representation Officer before the close of the election
proceedings. Said Manifestation pertinently reads:

The posting of the list of eligible voters authorized to participate in the certification election was short of the five (5) days provided by law considering that it was
posted only on December 12, 1988 and the election was held today, December 16, 1988 is only four days prior to the scheduled certification election.

By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list of qualified voters were allowed to vote, subject to challenge. Thirty eight of
them voted on election day.

Initial tally of the election results excluding the challenged votes showed the following:
Total No. of the Votes 291
Yes votes 40
No votes 38
Spoiled 7
Challenged (Regular) 38
——
Total No. of Votes Cast 123
Management and TUPAS agreed to have the 36 challenged votes of the regular rank-and-file employees opened and a canvass thereof showed:
Yes votes 20
No votes 14
Spoiled 4
——
Total 38
Added to the initial election results of December 16, 1988, the canvass of results showed:
Yes 60
No 52
Spoiled 11
——
Total 123
Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the majority of the votes cast in said certification election, hence, the necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes
to determine the true will of the employees.

Petitioner filed a position paper arguing against the opening of said votes mainly because said voters are not regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly
rendered work for less than 180 days.

ISSUE
Whether or not non-
regular seasonal workers
who have long been
separated from
employment prior to the
filing of the petition for
certification election would
be allowed to vote and
participate in a
certification election.
116. SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC. VS. PEPITO
FACTS
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), on the other hand, argued that the employment status of said employees has been resolved when Labor Arbiter
Ricardo N. Martinez, in his Decision dated November 26, 1988 rendered in NLRC Case No. Sub-Rab-01-09-7-0087-88, declared that said employees were illegally dismissed
.
In an Order, Med-Arbiter Basa ordered the opening of said 168 challenged votes upon his observation that said employees were illegally dismissed in accordance with the
foregoing Decision of Labor Arbiter Martinez. As canvassed, the results showed
Yes votes 165
No votes 0
Spoiled 3
——
Total 168
RULING
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible
to vote in certification elections. Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice
was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule which it has consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers and the employer is regarded as nothing more than a bystander with no right to interfere at all in the election. The only exception here is where the employer has to file
a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander Rule",
the instant petition would have been dismissed outright.
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election, alleging that its members, which included
private respondents Prisco Pepito, et al., were regular employees of petitioner Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI). Finding that the NFL members were rank-and-file employees of SSI,
the Med-Arbiter issued an order directing that a certification election be held.
However, in a Resolution then Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma reversed the Med-Arbiter’s Order and ruled that there was a valid subcontracting agreement between SSI
and its subcontractors, and that no employer-employee relationship existed between SSI and private respondents, since the latter were the employees of the subcontractors.
In 1993, several cases for illegal dismissal were filed by private respondents against SSI and its President, petitioner Vicente Sandoval. Private respondents alleged that they were
employees of SSI and that sometime in 1985, some sections of the company were temporarily closed while others remained open. Later, some of them were told to secure a
Mayor’s Permit then were made parties to contracts with SSI stipulating that they were labor-only contractors. They averred further that after they organized a workers’ union in
1992 to protect themselves against SSI’s persistent violation of labor standards, the company did not allow them to report for work. Consequently, SSI’s employees, including
private respondent, went on strike on March 26, 1992. On April 6, 1992, SSI accepted its employees back to work, except those who were identified as officers and members of
the union. The company claimed that these persons were not its employees but those of the contractors. In their complaint, private respondents prayed for reinstatement with
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision in the illegal dismissal cases. He found that while private respondents were illegally dismissed, they were not entitled to reinstatement
with backwages, damages and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between SSI and private respondents, reasoning that

ISSUE
A decision in a certification
election case regarding the
existence of an employer-
employee relationship
does not foreclose all
further dispute between
the parties as to the
existence or non-existence
of such relationship.
2.1 OTHER KINDS OF RECOGNITION OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES
117. UST FACULTY UNION VS. BITONIO
said issue has been laid to rest in the November 25, 1992 resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma in the certification election case.
Private respondents then appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Not satisfied with the decision of the NLRC, private respondents appealed the same to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the decision of the NLRC and held that
SSI is the direct employer of private respondents.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the present appeal. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying this Court’s pronouncement in Manila Golf & Country Club vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court that a decision in a certification election case regarding the existence of an employer-employee relationship does not foreclose all further dispute between the parties as
to the existence or non-existence of such relationship. They contend that such pronouncement is obiter dictum since the issue involved therein was whether or not the persons
rendering caddying services for the golf club’s members and their guests in the club’s courses or premises are employees of Manila Golf and Country Club and therefore within
the compulsory coverage of the Social Security System, not the correctness of the Med-Arbiter’s finding in the certification election case that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the golf club and the caddies.
RULING
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the ruling in Manila Golf & Country Club vs. IAC that "however final it may become, the decision in a certification election case, by the very
nature of such proceeding, is not such as to foreclose all further dispute as to the existence, or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship" between SSI and private
respondents herein.
This Court further explained in the Manila Golf case:
Clearly, implicit in these requisites is that the action or proceedings in which is issued the "prior Judgment" that would operate in bar of a subsequent action between
the same parties for the same cause, be adversarial, or contentious, "one having opposing parties; (is) contested, as distinguished from an ex parte hearing or
proceeding. *** of which the party seeking relief has given legal notice to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it," and a certification case
is not such a proceeding, as this Court has already ruled:
"A certification proceeding is not a ‘litigation’ in the sense in which this term is commonly understood, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-
finding character, in which the investigating agency plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of the employees as
to the matter of their representation. The court enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representatives by the employees."
Considering the foregoing, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC therefore erred in relying on the pronouncement of then Undersecretary Laguesma in the certification
proceeding that there was no employer-employee relationship between SSI and private respondents.
Moreover, the appellate court found that:
(1) The so-called subcontractors do not have a license to engage in subcontracting;
(2) The salaries of private respondents are actually paid by SSI and are given to the subcontractors who in turn give the salaries to the private respondents;
(3) It was SSI which hired the private respondents and placed them under their respective subcontractors; and
(4) Private respondents use SSI’s tools and equipment in their work.
UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU) VS. BITONIO
FACTS Petitioners-appellees [herein Private Respondents] Marino, et. al. (appellees) are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year
Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employer, the University of Santo Tomas (UST). The CBA was registered with the Industrial Relations Division, DOLE-NCR, on 20
February 1995. It is set to expire on 31 May 1998.’

Appellee Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General of USTFU, posted a notice addressed to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly to be held on 05 October
1996. Among others, the general assembly was called to elect USTFU's next set of officers. Through the notice, the members were also informed of the constitution of a
Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to oversee the elections.

Some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, directed against herein appellees and the members of the COMELEC. Docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-M-9610-001, the petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFU's constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued
to govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election.

The secretary general of UST, upon the request of the various UST faculty club presidents (See paragraph VI, Respondents' Comment and Motion to Dismiss), issued notices
allowing all faculty members to hold a convocation on 04 October 1996 (See Annex "C" Petition; Annexes "4" to "10", Appeal). Denominated as [a] general faculty assembly, the
convocation was supposed to discuss the "state of the unratified UST-USTFU CBA" and "status and election of USTFU officers" (Annex "11", Appeal)
On 04 October 1996, the med-arbiter in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 issued a temporary restraining order against herein appellees enjoining them from conducting the
election scheduled on 05 October 1996.

Also on 04 October 1996, and as earlier announced by the UST secretary general, the general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by
members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by "non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective
Bargaining Unit.” On this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU's new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands.

The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez, admittedly not a member of USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and "the rules of the election be
suspended and that the election be held [on] that day."

On 11 October 1996, appellees filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs and the nullification of the results of the 04 October 1996 election. Appellees alleged that the
holding of the same violated the temporary restraining order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001. Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the election as
spurious for being violative of USTFU's CBL, specifically because the general assembly resulting in the election of appellants was not called by the Board of Officers of the USTFU;
there was no compliance with the ten-day notice rule required by Section 1, Article VIII of the CBL; the supposed elections were conducted without a COMELEC being constituted
by the Board of Officers in accordance with Section 1, Article IX of the CBL; the elections were not by secret balloting as required by Section 1, Article V and Section 6, Article IX
of the CBL, and, the general assembly was convened by faculty members some of whom were not members of USTFU, so much so that non-USTFU members were allowed to
vote in violation of Section 1, Article V of the CBL.

On 24 October 1996, appellees filed another urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining order, this time alleging that appellants had served the former a notice to
vacate the union office. For their part, appellants moved to dismiss the original petition and the subsequent motion on jurisdictional grounds. Both the petition and the motion
were captioned to be for "Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." According to the appellants, the med-arbiter has no
jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, "including the ancillary remedies of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which are merely incidental to the main petition
for PROHIBITION" (Paragraph XVIII3, Respondents' Comment and Motion to Dismiss). Appellants also averred that they now constituted the new set of union officers having
been elected in accordance with law after the term of office of appellees had expired. They further maintained that appellees' scheduling of the 5 October 1996 elections was
illegal because no rules and regulations governing the elections were promulgated as required by USTFU's CBL and that one of the members of the COMELEC was not a
registered member of USTFU. Appellants likewise noted that the elections called by the appellees should have been postponed to allow the promulgation of rules and
regulations and to "insure a free, clean, honest and orderly elections and to afford at the same time the greater majority of the general membership to participate" (See
paragraph V, Idem). Finally, appellants contended that the holding of the general faculty assembly on 04 October 1996 was under the control of the Council of College/Faculty
Club Presidents in cooperation with the USTFU Reformist Alliance and that they received the Temporary Restraining Order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 only on 07
October 1996 and were not aware of the same on 04 October 1996.

ISSUE
Whether the Collective
Bargaining Unit of all the
faculty members in that
General Faculty Assembly
had the right in that
General Faculty Assembly
to suspend the provisions
of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the USTFU
regarding the elections of
officers of the union[.]
A. DIRECT CERTIFICATION
118. CENTRAL NEGROS VS. SECRETARY
CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO) VS. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND CENECO UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE)
FACTS
On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Consequently, appellees again moved for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent appellants from making further representations that [they] had entered into a new agreement with UST. Appellees also
reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were usurping the former's duties and functions and should be stopped from continuing such acts.
On 11 December 1996, over appellants' insistence that the issue of jurisdiction should first be resolved, the med-arbiter issued a temporary restraining order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors of USTFU.
In the meantime, appellants claimed that the new CBA was purportedly ratified by an overwhelming majority of UST's academic community on 12 December 1996 (Annexes 1 to
10, Idem). For this reason, appellants moved for the dismissal of what it denominated as appellees' petition for prohibition on the ground that this had become moot and
academic. 5
RULING
Union Election vs. Certification Election
A union election is held pursuant to the union's constitution and bylaws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be distinguished
from a certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit, for purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented
by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.
In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining
unit is entitled to vote in said election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union
cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union
activity.
In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down in the
USTFU's CBL for the election of officers was not followed. It could not have been a certification election either, because representation was not the issue, and the proper
procedure for such election was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.
CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of three years retroactive to
April 1, 1987 and extending up to March 31, 1990. CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
CENECO denied CURE's request on the ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative
are not entitled to form or join a union.
Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members, in a general assembly, approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that 'tall union
members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members' membership from Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail (of) under the renewed CBA.This
was ratified by 259 of the 362 union members. CENECO and the Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod District, were furnished copies of this resolution.
However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO under Resolution No. 90 "for the reason that the basis of withdrawal is not among the grounds covered by
Board Resolution No. 5023 and that said request is contrary to Board Resolution No. 5033.”
 By reason of CENECO's refusal to renegotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election, supported by 282 or 72% of the 388 rank-and-
file employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.

CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there are legal constraints to the filing of the certification election, citing the ruling laid down by this Court in Batangas I
Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young,(BATANGAS case) to the effect that "employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not
entitled to form or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners."

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the Med- From a perusal of petitioner's motion to dismiss filed with the med-arbiter, it becomes readily apparent that the sole basis for petitioner's motion is the illegality of the
Arbiter has no jurisdiction employees' membership in respondent union despite the fact that they allegedly are still members of the cooperative. Petitioner itself adopted the aforesaid argument in
to rule on the issue of seeking the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed with the med-arbiter, and the finding made by the latter was merely in answer to the arguments advanced by
withdrawal from petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have submitted the issue of membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and it is now
membership of its estopped from questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon.
employees in the
cooperative which CENECO Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to have a valid certification election at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. It is apparent that
claims, is properly vested incidental to the power of the med-arbiter to hear and decide representation cases is the power to determine who the eligible voters are. In so doing, it is axiomatic that the
in the NEA which has med-arbiter should determine the legality of the employees' membership in the union. In the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to consider first the propriety of the
control and supervision employees' membership withdrawal from the cooperative before a certification election can be had.
over all electric
cooperative.

Whether or not employees
of an electric cooperative
who at the same time are
members of the electric
cooperative are prohibited
from forming or joining
labor unions for purposes
of a collective bargaining
agreement.
Whether or not the
employees of CENECO who
withdrew their
membership from the
cooperative are entitled to
form or join CURE for
purposes of the
negotiations for a accorded the highest consideration.
collective bargaining
agreement proposed by
the latter.
The BATANGAS case referred to merely declared that employees who are at the same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor
union.
Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By- Laws of CENECO provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with such uniform
terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same section provides that upon withdrawal, the member is merely required to surrender his membership certificate and
he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative. There appears to be no other condition or requirement imposed upon a
withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause for petitioner's denial of the withdrawal from membership of its employees who are also members of the union.
The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying the withdrawal of the members concerned were never presented nor their contents disclosed either before
the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor if only to prove the ratiocination for said denial. Furthermore, CENECO never averred non-compliance with the terms and conditions
for withdrawal, if any. It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from membership which accordingly gives rise to the
presumption that the same may be done at any time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom
cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same.
The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of
the member- employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall
protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be
Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial
and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice. Besides, the 390 employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of the
cooperative, represent a very small percentage of the cooperative's total membership of 44,000. It is inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of members
could adversely affect the business concerns and operations of CENECO. We rule, however, that the direct certification ordered by respondent Secretary is not proper. By virtue
 of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification originally allowed under Article 257 of the Labor Code has apparently been
discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. This amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct
certification which is no longer available now under the change in said provision.
We have said that where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. In said case which
has similar features to that at bar, wherein the respondent Minister directly certified the union, we held that:

.. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure
provided under the law for representation cases because: ... (c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect
arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the employee's to choose their collective bargaining representative. (d) He has in effect imposed upon the
petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the
blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union
whose right to bargaining status has not been legally established.

While there may be some factual variances, the rationale therein is applicable to the present case in the sense that it is not alone sufficient that a union has the support of the
majority. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election.

B. VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION ABANDONED BY REQUEST FOR SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT (SEBA) CERTIFICATION (D.O. NO. 40-I-15)
119. ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA VS. CALLEJA

ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGAGAWA (IBM) LOCAL NO. 56, VS. FERRER - CALLEJA AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

FACTS Petitioner Union, formerly registered with the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations, as the San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union Calasiao Beer
Region-IBM Local No. 56, a local union of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), which is a national union, requested San Miguel Corporation for voluntary recognition as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the covered employees which consist of the monthly and daily-paid employees of the Calasiao Sales Office, now Dagupan Sales
Office. As the territorial coverage of the Calasiao Beer Region embraces the regional sales office and the six (6) sales offices in Calasiao, Carmen, Alaminos, Tarlac, Cabanatuan
and San Isidro, SMC denied the union's request and instead, suggested that it avail of a certification election. So, SMC, through its North-Central Luzon Sales Operations
Manager, filed a petition for certification election among the sales personnel of the Region only, excluding the daily-paid and monthly paid employees, but including the sales
offices of the entire beer region.

The Union filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition for certification election was premature as it did not ask SMC to bargain collectively with it. It cited Article 258 of
the Labor Code which provides:

ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. — When requested to bargain collectively, an employer may petition the Bureau for an election. If there is no existing
certified collective bargaining agreement in the unit, the Bureau shall, after hearing, order a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within twenty (20) days in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.

The Med-Arbiter issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: “let therefore, a certification election be conducted among the sales force personnel of the SMC-North
Central Luzon Beer Region covering the following sales offices: Dagupan City, Carmen, Alaminos, Tarlac, Cabanatuan and San Isidro, within twenty (20) days from receipt
hereof.”
Parenthetically, the certification election was actually conducted on September 19, 1988 resulting in "NO UNION" as the winner.

ISSUE RULING
 Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the SMC Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining
agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect
asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees — a certification which the employer has no authority to give, for it is the employees'
prerogative (not the employer's) to determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be.

The petitioner's request for voluntary recognition as the bargaining representative of the employees was in effect a request to bargain collectively, or the first step in that
direction, hence, the employer's request for a certification election was in accordance with Article 258 of the Labor Code, and the public respondents did not abuse their
discretion in granting the request.

C. CONSENT ELECTION
(SECTION 24, RULE VIII OF DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 40-03)
120. ALIGRE VS. DE MESA

CATALINO ALGIRE AND OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (URTMSEU)

FACTS Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed a petition for the holding of an election of union
officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order directing that
such an election be held.

In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et al.) and private
respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer.

The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:

Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:

LINO ALGIRE REGALADO
and DE MESA
his officers and his
officers
1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the two contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of collecting bargaining.
2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings.

The result of the election were as follows:

Lino Algire group — 133
Regalado de Mesa — 133
Spoiled — 6
———
Total votes cast 272

Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion, which DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the effect that one of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks
inside the box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to as the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a
valid vote in their favor. The group argued that the two checks made even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his political franchise in favor of Algire's group.

During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope containing the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot contained two (2)
checks in the box opposite petitioner Algire's name and his officers.
 On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the questioned ballot valid, thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and accordingly certified
petitioner's group as the union's elected officers.

Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January 31, 1991, the
latter's office granted the appeal and reversed the aforesaid Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of another election of officers of the Universal Robina
Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the election of 15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference."

Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE set the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22, 1991, reset to
April 2, 1991, and finally reset to April 5, 1991.

ISSUE RULING

The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of
the validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. Therefore, any ruling made by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an
absolute nullity because — such is the allegation — it was done without or in excess of his functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this
controversy, was a consent election, not a certification election.

It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to
determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the
import and effort of a certification election.

The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such
officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings thereon
other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.

If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass
of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election. Moreover, petitioners even question
at this stage the clear instruction to mark a check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be
interpreted that a voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or Vice-versa," notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had already been held
where no such question was raised.

In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be
achieved through the democratic process of an election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be
allowed to freely express their choice once and for all in a determination where anything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is
minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering.

D. RUN-OFF ELECTION
(RULE X OF DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 40-03)

121. CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS VS. NORIEL

CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNION (CCLU) AND REDSON EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION, VS. CARMELO C. NORIEL AND REDSON TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION.

FACTS Petitioner Confederation of Labor Unions (CCLU) was one of the four unions wanting to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of the employees in the Redson
Textile Manufacturing Corporation with place of business at Brixton Hill Street, Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro Manila. Its co-petitioner, the Redson Employees and Laborers Association,
is a CCLU local in the said corporation.

The other unions aspiring to become the collective bargaining representative were the National Union of Garments Textile and General Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD)
the National Trade Union (NATU) and the Associated Labor Unions (ALU).

A certification election was held in the premises of the corporation from eight-twenty in the morning to five-thirty in the afternoon. Out of the 831 votes cast, CCLU garnered
356 votes; ALU 338 votes; NATU, 82 votes and GATCORD 42 votes. Eight votes were spoiled and five votes were challenged or segregated.

As no union obtained a majority vote, CCLU and ALU, which had the two largest number of votes, agreed in a pre-election conference on September 2, 1980 that a run-off
election would be held on November 6, 1980 from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in the evening. CCLU requested that the certification election be conducted for two
days but ALU objected to that request.

Margarita C. Enriquez, Reynaldo F. de Luna and one Francisco, three election supervisors from the Ministry of Labor and Employment, arrived at around seven o'clock in the
morning near the Redson Textile compound but they were not allowed by the security guard to enter the company premises in spite of the heavy rain. So, after consulting
through the phone with their chief, a certain Attorney Padilla, said that the election supervisors decided to hold the certification election "outside the premises of the company
in a small store outside of the annex building." They used as ballot box "an improvised carton box." The union representatives did not object to the improvised polling place and
ballot box.

Voting started at eleven o'clock. During the election and just before it was closed at six-thirty in the evening, the ALU representative, Sebastian P. Taneo, executed a written
protest or manifestation, alleging that the management of Redson Textile did not allow the run-off election to be held within its premises; that the company prevented fifty
percent of the workers from voting by not allowing them to get out of the company premises and inducing them to work overtime; that its security guards "manhandled" the
ALU vice-president and that their "active intervention" caused "chaos and confusion" for around thirty minutes; that the company refused to furnish election paraphernalia like
the polling place and the ballot box and that the election supervisors declared the election closed in spite of ALU's objection.

Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day be scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the company be ordered to allow its workers to
vote.

At around seven-thirty in the evening, the votes cast were canvassed. Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were
1,010 voters. Because ALU won, its representative, Taneo, withdrew his protest or manifestation by writing on the minutes of the proceeding that his protest or manifestation
was withdrawn "before the close of the proceedings". On the other hand, the CCLU representatives refused to sign the minutes of the election.

On the following day, November 7, CCLU through its representative, Juan L. Fresnoza filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a protest wherein he prayed that the November 6
certification election as well as the "continuation of the election" on November 7 be annulled.

Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was irregular and disorderly because (a) no booths were provided for by the company; (b) the election started
much later than the hour agreed upon by the parties, and (c) ALU distributed white T-shirts printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides to ALU voters and hired around
fifteen husky men and around twenty-five women who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.

According to Fresnoza, when he and Oscar Sanchez, the acting president of Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELA-CCLU), protested against those activities before
election supervisor Margarita C, Enriquez, the latter allegedly retorted, "Wala akong magagawa, magagalit na naman si Mr. Taneo."

On November 10, 1980, Fresnoza and Sanchez filed with the Bureau of labor Relations a joint affidavit attesting to what transpired during the certification election as alleged in
 the aforesaid protest and added therein that when they protested before the election supervisors, the latter told them to "place their protest in writing so that they
(supervisors) could consolidate the protests in their election report”.

On February 19, 1981, CCLU informed the Bureau of Labor Relations that the election was conducted without regard to the provisions of section 6, Rule VI, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in his resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed CCLU's protest for lack of merit. He observed that CCLU
failed to submit the pleadings and evidences required in the hearing on January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either "before or during the election proceeding"
and, therefore, pursuant to section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is deemed to have waived its right to protest.

ISSUE RULING

The certification election is invalid because of certain irregularities such as that:

(1) The workers on the night shift (ten p.m. to six a.m.) and some of those in the afternoon shift were not able to vote, so much so that out of 1,010 voters only 692 voted
and about 318 failed to vote;
(2) The secrecy of the ballot was not safeguarded;
(3) The election supervisors were remiss in their duties and were apparently "intimidated" by a union representative; and
(4) The participating unions were overzealous in wooing the employees to vote in their favor by resorting to such tactics as giving free tricycle rides and T-shirts.

The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees "true representation in their collective bargaining with an employer." That purpose was not achieved in the run-
off election because many employees or union members were not able to vote and the employer, through apathy or deliberate intent, did not render assistance in the holding of
the election.

Another run-off certification election should be conducted inside the premises of Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation. The management is ordered to allow all its
employees to participate in the certification election and to assist in the holding of an orderly election. The election supervisors or representation officers are also enjoined to
fulfill their duties under the Labor Code and the rules and regulations implementing the same.

3. BARS TO CERTIFICATION ELECTION

122. NACUSIP - TUCP VS. TRAJANO

FACTS Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of
Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
while private respondent Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of the private
respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue of the certification election held on March 30, 1981.

Petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor and Employment). In order to
obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed to submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration on July 14, 1982 and was docketed as RAB Case No. VI-0220-82.

On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional Office No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City a petition for certification election among the rank and file
employees of private respondent company, alleging that: (1) about forty-five percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees had disaffiliated from petitioner union
and joined private respondent union; (2) no election had been held for the past twelve (12) months; and (3) while petitioner union had been certified as the sole collective
bargaining agent, for over a year it failed to conclude a collective bargaining agreement with private respondent company. Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the

ISSUE
Whether or not a petition
for certification election
may be filed during the
pendency of a bargaining
deadlock submitted to
arbitration or conciliation.
petition for certification election filed by private respondent union.
By order dated July 23, 1982, the Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V. Militante dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of merit since the petition is barred by a
pending bargaining deadlock.
Private respondent union filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila.
The Bureau of Labor Relations through respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano rendered a decision on September 30, 1982 setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter
and remanding the case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo City for hearing and reception of evidence.
On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued an order in LRD Case No. 4293 giving due course to the petition of private respondent FUR-TUCP and ordering
that an election be held within 20 days from receipt of the order.
From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
During the pendency of the appeal or on September 10, 1983, a collective bargaining agreement was entered and executed by the management of the National Sugar Refineries
Co., Inc. and petitioner union and was subsequently ratified by a majority of the rank and file employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, the Honorable Executive Labor
Arbiter Celerino Grecia II issued an award dated September 12, 1983 adopting the submitted agreement as the CBA between the parties.
On November 18, 1983, respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision affirming with qualification the order of Med-Arbiter Correa dated May 2, 1983, the pertinent portions
of which provide as follows:
It appears that the Calinog Refinery Employees, Union-NACUSIP-TUCP no longer commands the support of the majority of the employees. This observation is
buttressed by the fact that more than seventy five percent (75%) of the workers have disaffiliated from the intervenor and joined the ranks of the petitioner. Thus,
intervenor's status as sole and exclusive bargaining representative is now of doubtful validity.
For the above-mentioned reason, we stand obliged to resort to the most expeditious, practical and democratic option open to us, that is, the conduct of a certification election.
Through this forum, the true sentiments of the workers as to which labor organization deserves their loyalty can be fairly ascertained. In any event, it is our view that the 10
September 1983 collective agreement should be respected by the union that shall prevail in the election not only because it is an arbitration award but also because substantial
benefits are provided thereunder. Otherwise stated, the winning union shall administer said agreement. In passing, it may be pointed out that CAREFCO has been included as
one of the contending parties in the election. We feel that it is error for the acting Med-Arbiter to do so considering that the company is a mere bystander in this representation
dispute.
From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated December 6, 1983.
The respondent Director in his order dated March 21, 1984 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the Bureau's decision of November 18, 1983.
RULING
The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.
 If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for certification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement.
Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election in the following cases:
(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period;
(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result; or
(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.

The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification election. The same petition
was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an order dated July 23, 1982 on the sole ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock.
However, respondent Director set aside the same order and subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the petition for certification election and ordering that an
election be held.

The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.

123. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER ACE VS. LAGUESMA

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES - UNIFIED FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS (CMC - ACE - UFSW) VS. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

FACTS Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an Order which granted respondent union's petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical
Center. Respondent CMC appealed the Order to the Office of the Secretary by questioning the legal status of respondent union's affiliation with the Alliance of Filipino Workers
(AFW). To correct any supposed infirmity in its legal status, respondent union registered itself independently and withdrew the petition which had earlier been granted.
Thereafter, it filed another petition for certification election.

Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz issued an order granting the petition for certification election. Respondent CMC again appealed to the Office of the Secretary which affirmed the
Order of the Med-Arbiter granting the certification election.

Elections were finally held with respondent union garnering 204 votes, 168 in favor of no union and 8 spoiled ballots out of a total of 380 votes cast. Thereafter, Med-Arbiter
Cruz issued an Order certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees at CMC.

Unsatisfied with the outcome of the elections, respondent CMC again appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor which appeal was denied. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent CMC was likewise denied.
Respondent CMC's basic contention was the supposed pendency of its petition for cancellation of respondent union's certificate of registration. In the said case, Med-Arbiter
Paterno Adap issued an Order dated February 4, 1993 which declared respondent union's certificate of registration as null and void. However, this order was reversed on appeal
by the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations in her Order issued on April 13, 1993. The said Order dismissed the motion for cancellation of the certificate of
registration of respondent union and declared that it was not only a bona fide affiliate or local of a federation (AFW), but a duly registered union as well.

Subsequently, this case reached this Court in Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Perlita Velasco,, where we issued a Resolution dated December 13, 1993, dismissing the petition
of CMC for failure to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. The motion for reconsideration filed by CMC was likewise denied in our
Resolution dated February 2, 1994. Thereafter, on March 23, 1994, we issued an entry of judgment certifying that the Resolution dated December 13, 1993 has become final and
executory.
Respondent union, after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent CMC by Med-Arbiter Cruz, presented economic proposals
for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). However, respondent CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of the Order issued on
February 4, 1993 by Med-Arbiter Adap declaring the registration of respondent union as null and void. In spite of the refusal of respondent CMC, respondent union still persisted
in its demand for CBA negotiations, claiming that it has already been declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the hospital.

Due to respondent CMC's refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union filed a notice of strike on March 1, 1993. After complying with the other legal requirements,
respondent union staged a strike on April 15, 1993. On April 16, 1993, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an order certifying the same to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration where the said case is still pending.
It is at this juncture that petitioner union, on March 24, 1994, filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical Center
Inc. It alleged in its petition that: 1) three hundred thirty one (331) out of the four hundred (400) total rank-and-file employees of respondent CMC signed a petition to conduct a
certification election; and 2) that the said employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said union to represent them as they have joined and formed the union Capitol
Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE). They also alleged that a certification election can now be conducted as more that 12 months have lapsed since the
last certification election was held. Moreover, no certification election was conducted during the twelve (12) months prior to the petition, and no collective bargaining
agreement has as yet been concluded between respondent union and respondent CMC despite the lapse of twelve months from the time the said union was voted as the
collective bargaining representative.

On April 12, 1994, respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal. It contended that it is the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
Hospital, which was confirmed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and by this Court. It also alleged that it was not remiss in asserting its right as the certified bargaining
agent for it continuously demanded the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital despite the latter's avoidance to bargain collectively. Respondent union was even constrained to
strike on April 15, 1993, where the Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the dispute for compulsory arbitration. Furthermore, it alleged that majority of the signatories
who supported the petition were managerial and confidential employees and not members of the rank-and-file, and that there was no valid disaffiliation of its members,
contrary to petitioner's allegations.

Petitioner, in its rejoinder, claimed that there is no legal impediment to the conduct of a certification election as more than twelve (12) months had lapsed since respondent
union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent and no CBA was as yet concluded. It also claimed that the other issues raised could only be resolved by conducting another
certification election.

In its surrejoinder, respondent union alleged that the petition to conduct a certification election was improper, immoral and in manifest disregard of the decisions rendered by
the Secretary of Labor and by this Court. It claimed that CMC employed "legal obstructionism's" in order to let twelve months pass without a CBA having been concluded
between them so as to pave the way for the entry of petitioner union.

On May 12, 1994, Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon, issued an Order granting the petition for certification election among the rank and file employees. It ruled that the issue was the
majority status of respondent union. Since no certification election was held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result and there was no
bargaining deadlock between respondent union and the employees that had been submitted to conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lock out,
there is no bar to the holding of a certification election.

Respondent union appeared from the said Order, alleging that the Med-Arbiter erred in granting the petition for certification election and in holding that this case falls under
Section 3, Rule V Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. It also prayed that the said provision must not be applied strictly in view of the facts in this case.
Petitioner union did not file any opposition to the appeal.

On November 18, 1994, public respondent rendered a Resolution granting the appeal. He ratiocinated that while the petition was indeed filed after the lapse of one year form
the time of declaration of a final certification result, and that no bargaining deadlock had been submitted for conciliation or arbitration, respondent union was not remiss on its
right to enter into a CBA for it was the CMC which refused to bargain collectively.

CMC and petitioner union separately filed motions for reconsideration of the said Order.

ISSUE
whether or not public
respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition
for certification election,
and in directing the
hospital to negotiate a
collective bargaining
agreement with the said
respondent union.
CMC contended that in certification election proceedings, the employer cannot be ordered to bargain collectively with a union since the only issue involved is the determination
of the bargaining agent of the employees.
Petitioner union claimed that to completely disregard the will of the 331 rank-and-file employees for a certification election would result in the denial of their substantial rights
and interests. Moreover,it contended that public respondent's "indictment" that petitioner "capitalize (sic) on the ensuing delay which was caused by the Hospital, . . ." was
unsupported by the facts and the records.
RULING
We do not subscribe to petitioner's contention.
The errors pointed to by petitioner can be classified as mere typographical errors which cannot materially alter the substance and merit of the assailed resolution.
Petitioner cannot merely anchor its position on the aforementioned erroneous' names just to attain a reversal of the questioned resolution. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, petitioner is merely "nit-picking vainly trying to make a monumental issue out of a negligible error of the public respondent."
Petitioner also assails public respondents' findings that the former "capitalize (sic) on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non-
conclusion of a CBA within the certification year.'' It further argues that the denial of its motion fro a fair hearing was clear case of denial of its right to due process.
Such contention of petitioner deserves scant consideration.
A perusal of the record shows that petitioner failed to file its opposition to oppose the grounds for respondent union's appeal.
It was given an opportunity to be heard but lost it when it refused to file an appellee's memorandum.
Petitioner insists that the circumstances prescribed in Section 3, Rule V, Book V Of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code where a certification election should be conducted,
viz:
(1) that one year had lapsed since the issuance of a final certification result; and
(2) that there is no bargaining deadlock to which the incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to conciliation or arbitration, or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout, are present in this case.
It further claims that since there is no evidence on record that there exists a CBA deadlock, the law allowing the conduct of a certification election after twelve months must be
given effect in the interest of the right of the workers to freely choose their sole and exclusive bargaining agent.
While it is true that, in the case at bench, one year had lapsed since the time of declaration of a final certification result, and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock,
public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in respondent union's favor since the delay in the forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the
fault of the latter.
A scrutiny of the records will further reveal that after respondent union was certified as the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the employer hospital to the bargaining table by
submitting its economic proposal for a CBA. However, CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and instead challenged the latter's legal personality through a petition
for cancellation of the certificate of registration which eventually reached this Court. The decision affirming the legal status of respondent union should have left CMC with no
other recourse but to bargain collectively; but still it did not. Respondent union was left with no other recourse but to file a notice of strike against CMC for unfair labor practice
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. This eventually led to a strike on April 15, 1993.
Petitioner union on the other hand, after this Court issued an entry of judgment on March 23, 1994, filed the subject petition for certification election on March 24, 1994,
claiming that twelve months had lapsed since the last certification election.
Was there a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union, before the filing of petitioner of a petition for certification election, which had been submitted to
conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout?

In the case of Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, we had the occasion to define what a deadlock is, viz:

A "deadlock" is . . . the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; . . . . There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed forces . . . . The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which . . "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which,
despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties."

Although there is no "deadlock" in its strict sense as there is no "counteraction" of forces present in this case nor "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining," such can be
attributed to CMC's fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were never answered by CMC. In fact, what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock
for CMC employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file; and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain
with respondent union. Thus, we can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with respondent union. CMC has not at any instance shown
willingness to discuss the economic proposals given by respondent union.
As correctly ratiocinated by public respondent, to wit:

For herein petitioner to capitalize on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non-conclusion of a CBA within the certification
year, would be to negate and render a mockery of the proceedings undertaken before this Department and to put an unjustified premium on the failure of the
respondent hospital to perform its duty to bargain collectively as mandated in Article 252 of the Labor Code, as amended, which states".

"Article 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively — the duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by
either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession."

The duly certified bargaining agent, CMCEA-AFW, should not be made to further bear the brunt flowing from the respondent hospital's reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to
bargain.

If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason should it not be
conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation table by the "no reasonable effort in good faith" on the employer certified bargaining agent, there was to
bargain collectively.

In the case of Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino vs. Trajano 201 SCRA 453 (1991), penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, the factual milieu of which is similar to this case,
this Court allowed the holding of a certification election and ruled that the one year period known as the "certification year" has long since expired. We also ruled, that:

. . . prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such "bargaining deadlock . . (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation
table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance, and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken tiny action to
legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone
on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, that its
attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no
adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON. 24

Although the statements pertinent to this case are merely obiter, still the fact remains that in the Kaisahan case, NAFLU was counseled by this Court on the steps that it should
have undertaken to protect its interest, but which it failed to do so.
 This is what is strikingly different between the Kaisahan case and the case at bench for in the latter case, there was proof that the certified bargaining agent, respondent union,
had taken an action to legally coerce the employer to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively, i.e., charging the employer with unfair labor practice and conducting
a strike in protest against the employer's refusal to bargain. It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as similar in nature to a
"bargaining deadlock" when no certification election could be held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous
employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules should be interpreted liberally so as to
include a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform its duty to bargain collectively.

The order for the hospital to bargain is based on its failure to bargain collectively with respondent union.

124. NACUSIP - TUCP VS. FERRER-CALLEJA

FACTS Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of
Labor and Employment, while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment.

Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about
three hundred (300) on off-milling season.

Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire on
November 14, 1987.

When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with reservation to
negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.

However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension
to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a
representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.

Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.

Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Petition was filed out of time;
2. There is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central. (Rollo, p. 25)

Dacongcogon filed an answer praying that the petition be dismissed.

By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of certification election
among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not a petition We find the petition devoid of merit.

for certification election
may be filed after the 60- A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:
day freedom period.
Sec. 6. Procedure — . . .
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate
labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective
bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.
The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.

xxx xxx xxx

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed
outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.
It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. It
is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and
the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need
only to stress, quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the
law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.

Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the
Labor Management Council.

125. ALU VS. FERRER-CALLEJA

FACTS 1. The associated Labor Unions (ALU) thru its regional Vice-Presidents Teofanio C. Nuñez, in a letter informed GAW Trading, Inc. that majority of the latter's employees
have authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW Trading Inc., in the same Letter for a conference for the execution of
an initial Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);
2. GAW Trading Inc. received the Letter of ALU aforesaid on the same day of May 7, 1986 as acknowledged thereunder and responded (sic) ALU in a letter indicating its
recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for conference and/or negotiation at 4:00
P.M. on May 12, 1986 at the Pillsbury Office, Aboitiz Building Juan Luna Street, Cebu City;
3. ALU in behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and GAW Trading Inc. signed and executed the Collective Bargaining Agreements (ANNEX F) . . . .
4. In the meantime, at about 1:00 P.M. of May 9, 1986, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW)
undertook a ... Strike ... after it failed to get the management of GAW Trading Inc. to sit for a conference respecting its demands presented at 11: A.M. on the same day
in an effort to pressure GAW Trading Inc. to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of its employees,
 as to which strike GAW Trading Inc. filed a petition for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, dated June 1, 1986 and which strike Labor Arbiter Bonifacio B.
Tumamak held as illegal in a decision;
5. GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation ... filed a Certification Election petition, but as found by Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba in its (sic) Order, without
having complied (sic) the subscription requirement for which it was merely considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in the other petition for direct
recognition as bargaining agent filed on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as found in the same order;
6. In the meantime, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by ALU and GAW Trading Inc. was duly filed May 27, 1986 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
in Region VII, Cebu city;
7. Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba in his order ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of GAW Trading Inc. in Cebu City, as to which
ALU filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was treated as an appeal on that questioned Order for which reason the entire record of subject certification case was
forwarded for the Director, Bureau of LAbor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila;
8. Bureau of Labor Relations Director Cresencio B. Trajano, rendered a Decision on August 13, 1986 (Annex B) granting ALU's appeal (Motion for Reconsideration) and set
aside the questioned Med-Arbiter Order of June 11, 1986 (Annex K), on the ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable;

The aforesaid decision of then Director Trajano was thereafter reversed by respondent director in her aforecited decision which is now assailed in this action. A motion for
reconsideration of ALU appears to have been disregarded, hence, its present resort grounded on grave abuse of discretion by public respondent.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the We find no reversible error in the challenged decision of respondent director. A careful consideration of the facts culled from the records of this case, especially the allegations
collective bargaining of petitioner itself as hereinabove quoted, yields the conclusion that the collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective hence unproductive of the legal
agreement involved herein effects attributed to it by the former director in his decision which was subsequently and properly reversed.
is defective because it
"was not duly submitted in We have previously held that the mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,
accordance with Section I, (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for
Rule IX, Book V of the by the Labor Code;
Implementing Rules of (2) proof of majority representation; and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130." (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code.

In the present case, the standing of the petitioner as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious, to say the least. It may be recalled that respondent company, in a letter
and addressed to petitioner, merely indicated that it was "not against the desire of (its) workers" and required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by the majority
thereof in a meeting to be held on the same date. The only express recognition of petitioner as said employees' bargaining representative that We see in the records is in the
collective bargaining agreement entered into two days thereafter. 6 Evidently, there was precipitate haste on the part of respondent company in recognizing petitioner union,
which recognition appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. Furthermore,
at the time of the supposed recognition, the employer was obviously aware that there were other unions existing in the unit. As earlier stated, respondent company's letter is
dated May 12, 1986 while the two other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter, SPFL and Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU, for short), went on
strike earlier on May 9, 1986. The unusual promptitude in the recognition of petitioner union by respondent company as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers
in GAW Trading, Inc. under the fluid and amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was decidedly unwarranted and improvident.

It bears mention that even in cases where it was the then Minister of Labor himself who directly certified the union as the bargaining representative, this Court voided such
certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal certainty whether the union enjoyed a majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a
certification election at a proper time would not necessarily be a mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union.

An additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was the failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the establishment at least five
days before its ratification. 8 Petitioners rationalization was that "(b)ecause of the real existence of the illegal strike staged by SPFL in all the stores of GAW Trading, Inc. it had
become impossible to comply with the posting requirement in so far as the realization of tits purpose is concerned as there were no impartial members of the unit who could be
appraised of the CBA's contents. " 9 This justification is puerile and unacceptable.
 In the first place, the posting of copies of the collective bargaining agreement is the responsibility of the employer which can easily comply with the requirement through a mere
mechanical act. The fact that there were "no impartial members of the unit" is immaterial. The purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the employees in the
bargaining unit of the contents of said agreement so that they could intelligently decide whether to accept the same or not. The assembly of the members of ALU wherein the
agreement in question was allegedly explained does not cure the defect. The contract is intended for all employees and not only for the members of the purported
representative alone. It may even be said the the need to inform the non-members of the terms thereof is more exigent and compelling since, in all likelihood, their contact with
the persons who are supposed to represent them is limited. Moreover, to repeat, there was an apparent and suspicious hurry in the formulation and finalization of said
collective bargaining accord. In the aforementioned letter where respondent company required petitioner union to present proof of its support by the employees, the company
already suggested that petitioner ALU at the same time submit the proposals that it intended to embody in the projected agreement. This was on May 12, 1986, and promptly
on the following day the negotiation panel; furnish respondent company final copies of the desired agreement which, with equal dispatch, was signed on May 15, 1986.

Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective bargaining is the finding of respondent director that one hundred eighty-one( 181) of the two hundred eighty-one
(281) workers who "ratified" the same now " strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification of the CBA. “ Although petitioner claims
that only seven (7) of the repudiating group of workers belong to the total number who allegedly ratified the agreement, nevertheless such substantiated contention weighed
against the factual that the controverted contract will not promote industrial stability . The Court has long since declared that:

... Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select representatives can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount.
Excepted from the contract which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from
such contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law.
At this juncture, petitioners should be reminded that the technical rules of procedure do not strictly apply in the adjudication of labor disputes. Consequently, its objection that
the evidence with respect to the aforesaid repudiation of the supposed collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered for the first time on appeal on the Bureau of Labor
Relations should be disregarded, especially considering the weighty significance thereof.
Both petitioner and private respondent GAW Trading, Inc. allege that the employees of the latter are now enjoying the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement that both
parties had forged. However, We cannot find sufficient evidence of record to support this contention. The only evidence cited by petitioner is supposed payment of union fees
by said employees, a premise too tenuous to sustain the desired conclusion. Even the actual number of workers in the respondent company is not clear from the records. Said
private respondent claims that it is two hundred eighty-one (281) 13 but petitioner suggests that it is more than that number. The said parties should be aware that this Court is
not an adjudicator of facts. Worse, to borrow a trite but apt phrase, they would heap the Ossa of confusion upon the Pelion of uncertainty and still expect a definitive ruling on
the matter thus confounded.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May
27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been filed on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of thirty percent (30%) of the
workers in the bargaining unit, the same was enough to initiate said certification election.

126. FIRESTONE VS. ESTRELLA

FACTS The National Labor Relations Commission certified a three-year collective bargaining agreement between respondents Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company of the Philippines. Said collective bargaining agreement was to be effective from February 1, 1973 to January 31, 1976.

The aforementioned respondents entered into a "Supplemental Agreement" extending the fife of the collective bargaining agreement for one year, making it effective up to
January 31, 1977. The extension was not ratified by the covered employees nor submitted to the Department of Labor for classification.

Within the sixty-day period prior to the original expiry date of the agreement, some 233 out of about 400 rank-and-file employees of respondent Company resigned from
respondent ALU. subsequently, the number of these employees who resigned from the union was increased to 276 and, by way of letter to the Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, they requested for the issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of petitioner Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Employees' Union (FEU).
 Registration Permit No. 8571-IP was issued to petitioner FEU. On February 10, 1976, ten (10) days after the original expiry date of the collective bargaining agreement, petitioner
FEU filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations for direct certification or certification election, with the written consent of 308 employees, or 77% of the 400-man
bargaining unit.

Respondent ALU filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for the cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner FEU, alleging that at the time of FEU's
registration, respondent ALU was the recognized and certified collective bargaining agent in the unit, and that FEU had not submitted the required sworn statement that there is
no recognized or certified collective bargaining agent therein.

Respondent ALU prayed for the dismissal of R04-MED-143-76 on the grounds, among others, that it has a pending petition for the cancellation of FEU's registration certificate
and that there is an existing collective bargaining agreement, due to expire on January 31, 1977, which constitutes a valid bar to the holding of a certification election.

Respondent Company likewise opposed the holding of a certification election on the ground, however, that the petition therefore was filed late, considering that it was filed ten
(10) days after the expiry date of the collective bargaining agreement.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition for certification election, Respondents ALU and the Company filed separate appeals from the order before the Bureau of
Labor Relations.

The Order of the Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the Honorable Director Carmelo C. Noriel on September 23, 1976, and Motions for Reconsideration were filed by ALU and the
Company on October 1, 1976.

On January 25, 1977, respondent Acting BLR Director Francisco L. Estrella issued a Resolution reversing the Order of the Med-Arbiter which was affirmed by Director Noriel.

ISSUE RULING

We find this petition meritorious. In BLR Case No. 2160-76, Director Carmelo C. Noriel, resolving the pivotal issue of whether or not the failure of FEU to submit "a sworn
statement ... to the effect that there is no recognized or certified collective bargaining agent in the bargaining unit condemned warrants the revocation of its registration, said:

This Bureau answers in the negative.

(1) ... notwithstanding the existence of a certified or recognized collective bargaining agent, the policy of this Office sanctions a registration of new union during the
freedom period especially if it has become apparent that a substantial number of union members has decide(, to form a new labor organization, as aptly illustrated in
the case at bar. If the rule were otherwise, no recourse whatsoever hall be accorded to members of a bargaining unit who would like to make a free choice of their
bargaining representative, thereby placing the constitutional rights of the workers to self-organization and collective bargaining in mockery, if not, in utter illusion.

This view is supported by precedents, it seems to be the better view that a contract does not operate as a bar to representation proceedings, where it is shown that because of a
schism in the union the contract can no longer serve to promote industrial stability, and the direction of the election is in the interest of industrial stability as well as in the
interest of the employees' right in the selection of their bargaining representatives. 4 Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select
representatives can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial
stability, such as contracts where the Identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of
choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law. 5

In the case at bar, it is doubtful if any contract that may have been entered into between respondent ALU and respondent Company will foster stability in the bargaining unit, in
view of the fact that a substantial number of the employees therein have resigned from ALU and joined petitioner FEU. At any rate, this is a matter that must be finally
determined by means of a certification election.
 In Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS vs. Noriel, We said:

... The question of whether or not the disaffiliation was validly made appears not to be of much significance, considering that the petition for direct certification is
supported by eighty (80) out of a total of one hundred twenty (120) of the rank and file employees of the unit. Pursuant to Article 256 of the Labor Code, 'if there is
any reasonable doubt as to whom the employees have chosen as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining, the Bureau shall order a secret ballot
election to be conducted by the Bureau to ascertain who is the freely chosen representative of the employees concerned, ... It is very clear from the aforementioned
circumstances that there is actually a reasonable doubt as to whom the employees have chosen as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.

As to whether or not the disaffiliation was actually and validly made, or whether Foamtex Labor Union of respondent Belga is the true collective bargaining representative of the
employee are questions that need not be resolved independently of each other. Such questions may be answered once and for all the moment is determined, by means of the
secret ballot election, the union to which the majority of the employees have really reposed their allegiance. The important factor here is the true choice of the employees, and .
the most expeditious and effective manner of determining this is by means of the certification election, as it is for this very reason that such procedure has been incorporated in
the law. To order that a separate secret ballot election be conducted for the purpose of determining the question of policy, i.e., whether or not the majority of the employees
desire to disaffiliate from the mother union, should be merely a circuitous way of ascertaining the majority's true choice.

As observed PAFLU v. Bureau of labor Relation (69 SCRA 132, 139), a certification election for the collective bargaining process is one of the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given in an honest election with
freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business
enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.

Similarly, in Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., it was held that once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a
certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.

It appearing that the extension of the life of the collective bargaining agreement for a period of one year was not certified by the Bureau of Labor Relations, it cannot, therefore,
also bar the certification election. Only a certified collective bargaining agreement would serve as a bar to such election.
Corollarily, therefore, petitioner's application for registration was not premature, as it need not have waited for the expiration of the one-year extension, the agreement having
expired on January 31, 1976.

127. UNITED CMC VS. BLR

UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS UNION VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS

FACTS Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective bargaining representative of all rank and file workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a
legitimate labor organization seeking representation as the bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of CENTEX.

Petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (the ULP Case)) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had "helped and cooperated in the organization of the
Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the company who are members of the complainant
union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the following days
thereafter."

While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU filed a Petition for Certification Election (the Certification Case) among the rank and file workers of CENTEX, alleging that:
1) there has been no certification election during the 12 months period prior to the filing of the petition;
2) the petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file workers of CENTEX;
3) the collective bargaining agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978;
4) the petition is filed within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and
 5) there is no legal impediment to the filing of the petition.

Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that:
1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and bars the holding of the certification election; and
2) PAFLU failed to comply with the 30% requirement for mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are
required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for deadlock in the CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect a conciliation, the
Labor Minister assumed jurisdiction on the Deadlock Case.

A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner on December 7, 1978 alleging that the Labor Minister had already taken cognizance of the
deadlock in the CBA negotiations and constituted an impediment to the holding of a certification election.

In the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision directing petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978 up to
October 30, 1981 based on the guidelines enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of the Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the renewed agreement not later than
January 31, 1979.

In the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby qualified voters could choose
either PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at all. This was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in
the challenged Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order certification election where several unions are contending for representation
and when there is doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in
CBA negotiations must occur prior to the petition.

ISSUE RULING

Is the pendency of the ULP
Case charging a election, the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.
participating union in the
certification election
proceedings as company-
dominated a prejudicial
question to the conduct of
the election?
Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification
The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to
the respondent public official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was
instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in point:
"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed purposely to forestall the certification election. So, no reason existed for the
Industrial Court to depart from its established practice of suspending the election proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the
reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, `if there is a union dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among
workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees because the votes of the members of the
dominated union would not be free.’

"And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that until decided, shall suspend or bar
proceedings for certification election.

"Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255-ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered dissolved as a company dominated union, any election held
in the meantime would be a waste of energy and money to all parties concerned."

The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as follows:
 "What is settled law, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the participation in a certification election of a company-dominated union, as a result of which a
complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting
could take place.

`A complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more
labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer.

The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining representative, and
when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election
proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’

`We agree with the CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification election, the
reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company
would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of
the company dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free.

It is equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed and maintained by
the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election,
the reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and dominated by the Company,’

It is easily understandable why it should be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union
were allowed to participate in a certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast their votes in
favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of
the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a labor
organization that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before the certification election."

The Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a certification election is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall continue to be in force and effect until the status is cleared of respondent
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled "In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of
Central Textile Mills, Inc., Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner, United CMC Textile Workers Union, Intervenor."