VIII.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

1. Concept
Art. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the
legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace
and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and
punishment as herein provided.

Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor
practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor
Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are submitted for
decision.

Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.

No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor practice was committed, having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the
pendency of such administrative proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in
the administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein set forth.

2. Unfair Labor Practice of Employers

Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
1. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

2. To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

3. To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;

4. To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters;

5. To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or
in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may
be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the
collective bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent;

6. To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;

7. To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

8. To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
 9. To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor
practices shall be held criminally liable.

151. Insular Life Assurance Co. EA vs Insular Life Assurance Co.

FACTS The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-
NATU (the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
and the FGU Insurance Group (the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular
Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the
members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter
part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from
the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in
the collective bargaining with the Unions.

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which
were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed to extend the effectivity of the agreements to November 16, 1957 and to make whatever benefits
could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Unions' proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union
shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the
auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals in toto so that the said Unions might consider the
feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that
the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, in toto But the respondent Insular Life
Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals.

In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the
Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17,1958, the
remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.

From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958
the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the
Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the
financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.

Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of
Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
 The Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

The Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes, sent to each of the strikers a letter (Exhibit A).
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31,1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21,
1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of
the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered
injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front
of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's
Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of
Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until
further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of
persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.

On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to strikers a letter (Exhibit B).

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These
three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their
jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 63 strikers with pending criminal charges. However,
all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure
clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but
adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest
of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the
Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting
president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed
retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there
have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

ISSUES RULING

Whether or not the The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered special delivery mail at that — without being course through the Unions which were
Companies are guilty of representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
unfair labor practice in
sending out individually "The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be
to the strikers the marked operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference
Exhibits A and B. with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives."
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually
in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative.

Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their
return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining .
It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would
be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union
activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of
the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.

Moreover, since Exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions
of the Constitution. The same is true with Exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June
2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats,
or reprisal.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for
"work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually,
when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be. Likewise
violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the
making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of moUifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the
purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and
the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive
new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the
strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the
strikers returned to work and not the letters, Exhibits A and B This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on
account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere
with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it
was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in
determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.

"The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under Section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that an)' employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the
employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining."

Besides, the letters, Exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding
them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"

"x x x whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against
the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this"'doctrine' expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in
themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor
relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference."
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the
latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive
compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees
as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of
Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and inspite of urgings by the conciliators of the
Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands in toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went on strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of Exhibit A, enticing
them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager,
respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular
Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of
which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of
first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement
of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually
and by registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the
petitioners reported for work. the respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the
ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34
officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23,1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abel la, Enrique Guidote, Emilio
Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Fedcrico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning
strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically
the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and
by the courts.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, Exhibits A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed part of the
respondents' scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.

To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to
be an economic strike on the basis of Exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies
of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike.

However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27,1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the
deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of
the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:

"3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958,
citing 'deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (Exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958)

The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the
management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed
by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and (who) became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the
petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (Exh. 7, respondents'
letter dated April 7, 1958 ; (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of
Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies."
Whether or not the Exhibit B imposed three conditions for the readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (b) there
Companies are guilty of must be no criminal charges against him; and (c) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees
unfair labor practice for reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1958, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.
discriminating against the
striking members of the Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2,
Unions in the matter of 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective
readmission of clearances, 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute,
employees after the however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the
strike. strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring
and is therefore a violation of Sec. 4 (a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it,
on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with
respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the
strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows
that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.

"So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an
illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the
employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them."

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia,
assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved in unpleasant
incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.

"Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized."

Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed
back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning
employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers. Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while
admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management. But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies,
disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been
empowered to look into all cases of the strikers."

Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct
during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56) But even this
distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely
shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence of record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal letter cited "serious" misconduct, all the letters of
dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."

Whether or not the The record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the
Companies are guilty of striking employees reported back for work on June 2,1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except
unfair labor practice for three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from
dismissing officials and
members of the Unions
without giving them the
benefit of investigation
and the opportunity to
present their side in
regard to activities
undertaken by them in
the legitimate exercise of
their right to strike.
the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
"This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
"The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not
constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of PI,930.32 corresponding to one-half
month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged
before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not
report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the
respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his
group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them — when Olbes
refused them an audience—to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes'
secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for
the respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents'
attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958.
Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in
the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:
"... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the
latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true
reason for the discrimination against them." (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and
the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement
when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to
grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies, We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by
Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were
then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks)
dated May 9,1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on
the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls.
Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above _ sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board
examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the respondents never denied or
tried to disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with Section 9(a)
(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to
advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to
justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were
justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an
expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.

"Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on
any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn
publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men. ..."

The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics
of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is
this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin
Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The
firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to
favor the respondents rather than Tongos.

Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dano, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission
allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from
entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead— acts considered inimical to the interest of the
respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through
the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both
suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21,1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what
happened. The picketing on May 21,1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful ( see Police blotter report, Exh. 3 in CA-G.RNo. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where
Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street,
Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular
Life.Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges
against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to
yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend
themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, above adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence.

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary:

"We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the
picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight.
Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec.
163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded
to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would
deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement."

Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it
has been held that:
"Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement."

Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
"In cases involving misdemeanors, the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement."
 Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers
who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.

"[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference
that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement."

Lastly, the lower court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president
of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely
intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line
had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the
advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the
union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 752) The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to
reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former
member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the
union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (Annex C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the
circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the activities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable
interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.

"It has been held in a great number of decisions that espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference,
restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice, x x x 'Nothing is more
calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result.
The information obtained by means of espionage is invaluable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union.' The unfair labor practice is
committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow
employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee, x x x"

152. Steam Navigation vs. Philippine Marine Officer’s Guild

PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. VS. PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS GUILD, ET AL.

FACTS The Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc., (PHILSTEAM), is a domestic corporation, with head offices in Cebu City, engaged in inter-island shipping. In the year 1954 it had 16
vessels, with 8 officers to a vessel, or a total of 128 officers.

Philippine Marine Officers Guild (PMOG), is a labor union affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), representing, and which represented in 1954, some of PHILSTEAM's
officers. The Cebu Seamen's Association, CSA, is another labor union that represents and likewise represented in 1954 some of PHILSTEAM's officers.

PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands with a request for collective bargaining. PHILSTEAM received the letter embodying the same. Subsequently, PHILSTEAM transmitted its
answer to PMOG, requiring the latter to first prove its representation of a majority of PHILSTEAM's employees before its demands will be considered as requested.
PHILSTEAM, on the same date, started interrogating and investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out directly from them if they had joined PMOG or
authorized PMOG to represent them.

A reply was sent by PMOG to the answer of PHILSTEAM, insisting that PHILSTEAM consider its requests and demands first before requiring proof of majority representation.

PMOG thereafter filed a notice of intention to strike stating as reasons therefor PHILSTEAM's alleged refusal to bargain and unspecified unfair labor practices. The Department of
Labor brought PHILSTEAM and PMOG to a conference, without any success.

The CSA had meanwhile also transmitted its own set of demands to PHILSTEAM. PHILSTEAM and CSA met. PHILSTEAM therein recognized CSA as representing the majority of its
employees and proceeded to consider CSA's demands.

Another PHILSTEAM-PMOG conference at the Department of Labor was held, likewise to no avail.

Subsequently, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a collective bargaining agreement. On the same date, PMOG declared a strike against PHILSTEAM. Although not the subject of the
present appeal, it should also be mentioned that the dispute included two other shipping companies, namely, Compañia Maritima and Madrigal Shipping, and the PMOG
simultaneously struck against all three companies.

Around 46 officers of PHILSTEAM joined PMOG's strike; 15 of these later returned to work, leaving 31 PHILSTEAM officers on strike. Pier 4 of the North Harbor of the Port of
Manila, where PHILSTEAM vessels docked, was among the areas picketed during the strike.

A final conference at the Department of Labor between PHILSTEAM and PMOG on October 7, 1954 still failed to bring the parties to an agreement. The President of the
Philippines, on January 14, 1955, certified the dispute among the aforementioned shipping companies and their employees to the Court of Industrial Relations, as involving
national interest, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 875.

The Court of Industrial Relations held preliminary conferences and on January 18, 1955 issued a return-to-work order. The same, however, was not enforced in view of an
injunction issued by this Court in another case.[3]

Several formal complaints were accordingly docketed in the Court of Industrial Relations, as follows:

(1) Case 6-IPA, the dispute certified to the CIR by the President;

(2) Case 617-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against Maritima et al., for unfair labor practice;

(3) Case 618-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against PHILSTEAM and CSA, for unfair labor practice;

(4) Case 646-ULP filed on March 29, 1955 by PMOG against Madrigal Shipping, for unfair labor practice;

(5) Case 672-ULP filed on April 30, 1955 by the Marine Officers Association of the Philippines [4] against PMOG, for unfair labor practice;

(6) Case 1002-ULP filed on July 6, 1956 by PHILSTEAM against PMOG, for unfair labor practice.

A joint trial was held of all the cases and on December 23, 1962 the Court of Industrial Relations rendered thereon a single decision, finding in the cases pertinent to this appeal,
i.e., where PHILSTEAM is ,a party, as follows:

(1) Case 618-ULP, PHILSTEAM committed unfair labor practice in having interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;

(2) Case 1002-ULP, PMOG has not been shown to have committed unfair labor practice; and,

(3) Case 6-IPA, the strike of PMOG against PHILSTEAM was justified and lawfully carried out.

Accordingly, it stated in the dispositive portion relative to the abovementioned cases:

"IN THE VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING , the Court hereby orders:
 xxxxx

"2. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, its agents, successors and assigns, to cease and desist from interrogating and investigating their employees to
determine whether they have authorized Philippine Marine Officers Guild or any other labor organization to represent them for the purpose of collective
bargaining, discouraging or trying to discourage any of such employees from remaining as a member of Philippine Marine Officers Guild or any other labor
organization, and encouraging or trying to encourage any of such employees to join Cebu Seamen's Association or any other labor organization, and, in any
manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing their employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization and other rights guaranteed in Section 3 of this
Act; and offer all of their striking employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without back salaries and
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, unless they have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere during the pendency of
this case".

PHILSTEAM moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on May 18, 1962 by resolution of the Court of Industrial Gelations en banc. The present appeal by PHILSTEAM is
from the decision and resolution en banc in Case 6-IPA, Case 618-ULP and Case 1002-ULP.

Petitioner would contend that the respondent court erred in ordering it to reinstate the PMOG strikers. In support of this it advances the argument that, first, PHILSTEAM did not
commit acts constituting unfair labor practice; and, second, PMOG's strike was illegal.

The finding of respondent court in Case 618-ULP, as stated, is that PHILSTEAM interfered with, coerced and restrained employees in their rights to self-organization. The same, if
true, is unfair labor practice (Section 4[a] [1], Republic Act 875).

The acts found by respondent court constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice are (1) the interrogation and investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains;
deck officers and engineers, to determine whether they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation
of PHILSTEAM's pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union.

PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of its officers as to their membership in PMOG and whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them
in collective bargaining. The reason for this, PHILSTEAM would however aver, was merely to ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively with PMOG, a step
allegedly justified by PMOG's refusal to furnish proof of majority representation.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the The record discloses that such investigation was started by PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply stating a refusal to submit proof of majority representation.
interrogation and Specifically, the investigation was put under way on June 29, 1954 the same day PHILSTEAM sent its request that PMOG submit proof of majority representation - whereas,
investigation by PHILSTEAM knew of PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6, 1954, when it received PMOG's reply letter. The respondent court therefore aptly concluded that PMOG's
PHILSTEAM's supervisory refusal to submit evidence showing it represented a majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out the investigation.
officials of its captains;
deck officers and An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation, provided the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the
engineers, to determine employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists. Nonetheless, any employer who engages in interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor
whether they had practice if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.
authorized PMOG to act
as their bargaining agent The respondent court had found that PHILSTEAM's interrogation of its employees had in fact interfered with, restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of their
constitute the foregoing rights to self-organization. Such finding being upon questions of fact, the same cannot be reversed herein, because it is fully supported by substantial evidence.
unfair labor pratice.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a
way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice. PHILSTEAM's afore-stated interrogation squarely falls under this rule.
PMOG's subjection to vilification is likewise borne out by substantial evidence. Santiago Beliso, PHILSTEAM's Purchasing agent, told Luis Feliciano, on August 6, 1954, that PMOG
was a "money asking union," that "all the members of the FFW are low people" and that CSA "is a good union". Fernando Guerrero, PHILSTEAM's inter-island manager, had
authorized Beliso to assist him in his investigation of PMOG membership. The statement of Beliso was made in the presence of PHILSTEAM office manager Ernesto Mañeru and
PHILSTEAM pier superintendent Jose Perez, and these supervisory officials did nothing to disavow Beliso's conduct as not intended to represent PHILSTEAM's opinion. PHILSTEAM,
through its supervisory officials, obviously made it appear to Feliciano that Beliso was speaking for or on behalf of the company, when he made the remarks derogatory to PMOG
and favorable to CSA. PHILSTEAM thereby interfered with Feliciano's right to self organization.

Appellant would however assert an inconsistency on the part of respondent court in finding that Beliso was made to appear by PHILSTEAM supervisory officials as acting for them,
as testified to by Feliciano, when said court elsewhere rejected a testimony to this effect by Eugenio Obispo.

Appellant refers to the testimony of Obispo, an engine officer, that he signed up with CSA because sometime in July 1954 he was intimidated by Santiago Beliso. Obispo's
testimony, however, referred to a different incident, wherein there was no showing that Beliso acted in the presence and with the apparent approval of high supervisory officials
of PHILSTEAM. Furthermore, Obispo's credibility, unlike that of Feliciano, was put in doubt because he falsely stated that Beliso was an Assistant Manager of PHILSTEAM. We find
no inconsistency or discrimination in the appreciation of the evidence by respondent court in giving credence to Feliciano, as to one incident, while disbelieving Obispo, as to
another.

Finally, of record also stands the fact that PHILSTEAM pier superintendent Valeriano Teves helped bring about the affiliation of Diosdado Capilitan, a PMOG member, with CSA, by
telling him that his joining with CSA would not affect his PMOG affiliation. This incident was testified to by PHILSTEAM witnesses themselves. While such a statement, if considered
as an isolated remark, may be a harmless expression of opinion, it in reality amounted to support of CSA's membership solicitation drive, in light of the circumstances in which it
was made. For it in effect encouraged membership in the competing union and indorsed CSA's solicitation, at least with respect to Capilitan.

The respondent court absolved PMOG from the charge of unfair labor practice in Case 1002-ULP. The alleged threats and violence on the part of PMOG strikers were found not
sufficiently established by the evidence. And PHILSTEAM in this appeal no longer argues that said threats and violence were committed.

Nonetheless, PHILSTEAM would contend that PMOG's strike was illegal, for the reason that the purpose of the strike was illegal. It is argued that PMOG staged a strike so as to
compel PHILSTEAM to bargain collectively with it notwithstanding that it was a minority union.

First of all, the statement that PMOG is a minority union is not accurate. Respondent court precisely found that there has been no proof as to which union, PMOG, CSA or any
other, represented the majority of PHILSTEAM employees. For lack of showing that CSA represented ' the majority, it declared the PHILSTEAM-CSA collective bargaining
agreement null and void. It stated that the parties to the dispute were welcomed to file a petition for certification election to decide this point.

Secondly, PMOG's strike was in retaliation to PHILSTEAM's unfair labor practice rather than, as PHILSTEAM would picture it, an attempt to undermine the PHILSTEAM-CSA
agreement. For said agreement was signed only on August 24, 1954 but PMOG filed its notice of strike as early as July 17, 1954. PHILSTEAM's unfair labor practice, consisting in its'
interference with the employees rights to self-organization, started on June 29, 1954. It was because of said unlawful act of the employer that the union struck. The notice of
strike in fact mentioned company unfair labor practices as reason for the intended strike.

From the foregoing it follows that PMOG's strike was for a lawful purpose and, therefore, justified.

As to the question of reinstatement, we have already ruled, in Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) vs. C.I.R., et al., L-19778, September 30, 1964, that
striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, whether or not, the strike was the consequence of the employer's unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the
consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and has promised them continued employment.

The present strike was the consequence of PHILSTEAM's unfair labor practice. Reinstatement of the strikers, who have not found substantially equivalent employment
elsewhere, therefore follows as a matter of right, notwithstanding that the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers for the purpose of continuing the operation
of the plant or the business of the industry.
153. Visayan Bicycle vs. National Labor Union

VISAYAN BICYCLE MANUFACTURING CO., INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR UNION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.

FACTS Workers in the Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co., Inc. formed the Visayan Bicycle Employees and Workers Union (VIBEMWU). Pedro Evangelista was its president. VIBEMWU and
the company signed a collective bargaining agreement. Among other things it provided for union security, check off, wage increases, fifteen days vacation leave and fifteen days
sick leave.

On February 21, 3959, Pedro Evangelista was again elected president, for 1959. Felicisimo Rodiel was elected board member. For the year 1960 VIBEMWU, on December 12, 1959,
re-elected Pedro Evangelista president and elected Fulgencio Besana and Felicisimo Rodiel, vice-president and secretary, respectively.

On February 27,1960, through its executive board headed by Besana, acting as president, VIBEMWU affiliated with the National Labor Union (NLU). Subsequently, on March 4,
1960, the Constitution and By-laws of VIBEMWU were amended. On March 9, 1960, another election was held and Besana was chosen president thereby replacing Evangelista.

On March 17, I960, the national secretary of NLU, by a letter, informed the company of VIBEMWU's affiliation to NLU, and demanded enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreement. The company, however, did not accede to the demand. Consequently, on April 5, 1960, VIBEMWU filed a notice to strike.

The Department of Labor's Conciliation Service held several hearings on the union's demands and strike notice, but the company still refused.

On April 25, 1960, the company dismissed Besana and Rodiel after they figured, on the same day, in a fight with two other employees, within the premises and during working
hours. Alleging unfair labor practice, NLU, on behalf of VIBEMWU, as well as of Besana and Rodiel, filed on May 6, 1960 a complaint against the company in the Court of Industrial
Relations. The company answered it on May 23, 1960. It stated that the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel was due to violation of a company rule that penalizes "Inciting or provoking
a fight or fighting during working hours or on company premises."

The presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, after trying the case, rendered a decision on March 3, 1962 in favor of the complainant union. An unfair labor practice,
according to said decision, was committed by the company in dismissing Besana and Rodiel due to their union activities.

After receipt of copy of the decision on March 13, 1962, the company filed on March 15, 1962 a motion for reconsideration. It contained no argument but reserved the "right" to
file supporting memorandum within ten days from March 18, 1962. A motion, however, was filed on March 27, 1962, requesting for 15-day extension of time to file the
memorandum.

Adhering to a "no-extension” policy thereon, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied, on March 28, 1962 the aforesaid motion for extension to file memorandum
Accordingly, on April 6, 1962, it further denied the motion for reconsideration.

Following its receipt on July 6, 1962 of the last resolution, the company filed this petition for review on July 16,1962.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the The record shows that on April 25, 1960, Besana and Rodiel were provoked by Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia into a pre-arranged fight pursuant to a strategy of the
company’s dismissal of company designed to provide an apparently lawful cause for their dismissal. Reyes and Pacia were hired only within that week. Besana and Rodiel were not shown to have
Besana and Rodiel previously figured in similar incidents before or to have violated company rules and regulations in their many years with the company. The company did not investigate the
constitute unfair labor incident, and its manager, Co Hing, admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was a "hard-headed leader of the union". It was this manager who had warned VIBEMWU's
practice. officers responsible for the affiliation that if they will not withdraw VIBEMWU from the NLU, he would "take steps in order to dismiss them from work".

The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations to the foregoing effect are supported by substantial evidence. No reason obtains to alter the conclusion that Besana and Rodiel
 were in reality dismissed because of their union activities and not because of their violation of a company rule against fight in the premises or during working hours. Furthermore,
the so-called violation of company rules having been brought about by the company itself, thru the recent employment of Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Paciawho provoked the
fight as above indicated, the same cannot be regarded as a ground to punish the aforementioned employees.

Such being the case, the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel constituted unfair labor practice under Section 4 (a) (1) and (4) of Republic Act 873.

Rothenberg has this to say:

* * * If it can he established that the true and basic inspiration for the employer's act is derived from the employee's union affiliations or activities, the assignment
by the employer of another reason, whatever its semblance or validity, is unavailing. Thus, it has been held that the facts disclosed that the employer's acts in
discharging employees were actually prompted by the employer's improper interest in the affected employee's union affiliations and activities, even though the
employer urged that his acts were predicated on economic necessity, desire to give employment to more needy persons, lack of work, cessation of operations,
refusal to work overtime, refusal of non-union employees to work with union employees, seasonal lay-off, libelous remarks against management, violation of
company rules.

Since the only reason or basis for Besana and Rodiel's dismissal was in fact their actuation as officers of VIBEMWU, the dismissal is clearly discriminatory.

It is this inconsiderate act of power that makes a subordinate a rebel; it is this malicious tactic that forces labor to dislike management; this unjustifiable conduct that creates a
gap between management and labor; and this attitude that makes the laborer hate the officials of the company to the detriment of all efforts to harmonize management and
labor for the benefit of both as envisioned by the Industrial Peace Act. So plain from the record is the bad faith that attended the company's deliberate and calculated act of unfair
labor practice that we find in the present appeal an obvious attempt to delay and carry on a pretense which this Court can ill afford to let go without stern disapproval.

154. Judric Canning vs. Inciong

JUDRIC CANNING CORPORATION, VS. THE HONORABLE AMADO G. INCIONG

FACTS Private respondents Norma Pineda, Vicky Peñalosa, Leonila Morales, Teresita Balmaceda, Adelina Valenzuela, and Juanita Reposar are employees of the petitioner corporation
and are members of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP). The said complainants were allegedly not allowed to report for work due to their union
activities in soliciting membership in a union yet to be organized in the company and their time cards were removed from the rack. As a result, the said complainants and their
labor union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioner with Region IV of the Ministry of Labor, seeking the reinstatement of the complainants with full
backwages.
The herein petitioner denied having locked out the complainants and claims that the said complainants failed to report for work and abandoned their positions. The petitioner
also denied having knowledge of the union activities of the complainants until August 30, 1978, when it was served notice of a petition for direct certification filed by the
complainant union.
After hearing the parties, the Regional Director of Region IV of the Ministry of Labor, after finding that the petitioner had dismissed the complainants without valid cause, ordered
the petitioner to immediately reinstate the complainants to their former positions with full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to their actual reinstatement.
The petitioner corporation appealed to the Ministry of Labor, but its appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the This contention is untenable. The record shows that after the parties had submitted their respective position papers, a hearing was held, at the conclusion of which, the
petitioner is guilty of respondent Regional Director found that the private respondents did not abandon their jobs but were dismissed because of their union activities. This is a finding of fact which
unfair labor practice for may not now be disturbed.
terminating the services
of the respondent union Besides, the private respondents immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, seeking their rein statement, on August 24, 1978, soon after their services were terminated on
 members due to their
alleged union activities, is
not supported by the
evidence of record.
Whether or not he
petitioner could not have
committed the unfair
labor practice charge for
dismissing some of its
employees due to their
alleged union activities
because the alleged
dismissal took place more
than four (4) months
before the organizational
meeting of the union and
more than one (1) year
before actual registration
of said union with the
Labor Organization Divi-
sion of the Bureau of
Labor Relations.
155.Manila Hotel Co. vs. Pines Hotel Employees Asso.
August 19, 1978. It would be illogical for the private respondents to abandon their work and then immediately file an action seeking their reinstatement.
Moreover, there was no reason at all and none has been suggested by the petitioner, for the private re spondents to abandon their work. No employee with a family to support,
like the private respondents, would abandon their work knowing fully well of the acute unemployment and underemployment problem and the difficulty of look ing for a means of
livelihood. As the Solicitor General stated: "To get a job is difficult; to run from it is foolhardy."
But, most of all, the petitioner stated that in spite of its position that the private respondents had abandoned their jobs, it "offered to pay respondent union members severance
pay of one (1) month."This is a clear admission of the charge of arbitrary dismissal, for why should the petitioner offer to pay what it calls "severance pay" if the private
respondents were not, indeed, dismissed, or if the petitioner sincerely believed in the righteousness of its stance?
The contention is without merit. Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in their exercise of the right to self-
organization" is an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to initiate, dominate,
assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it. In this particular case, the
private respondents were dismissed, or their services were terminated, because they were soliciting signatures in order to form a union within the plant. In their affidavit,
executed on September 19, 1978, the private respondents stated:
"Na kami ay nagkampanya upang papirmahin namin sa 'membership form' ng ULGWP ang nakakarami (majority) sa mga empleyeado at nagharap kami ng
petisyon sa Ministri ng Paggawa upang masertify ang aming unyon sa Case No. R4-LRD-M-8-403-78;
"Na dahil sa aming pagreklamo sa Pangasiwaan na ibigay sa amin ang mga biyaya sa ilalim ng Kodigo ng Paggawa at dahil sa pagtayo at pagkampaniya namin sa
mga empleyeado na sumapi sa unyon ay kami ay pinag-initan at tinanggal sa trabaho ng Pangasiwaan."
For sure, the petitioner corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice in interfering with the formation of a labor union and retaliating against the employees' exercise of their
right to self-organization.
156. Wise & Co. vs. Wise & Co. Employees Union

WISE AND CO., INC. VS. WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU AND HONORABLE BIENVENIDO G. LAGUESMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR.

FACTS The management issued a memorandum circular introducing a profit sharing scheme for its managers and supervisors the initial distribution of which was to take effect March 31,
1988.

The respondent union wrote petitioner through its president asking for participation in this scheme. This was denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by the parties of the CBA which was due to expire on April 30, 1988. The negotiation thus begun earlier than the
freedom period. Petitioner wrote respondent union advising the latter that they were prepared to consider including the employees covered by the CBA in the profit sharing
scheme beginning the year 1987 provided that the ongoing negotiations were concluded prior to December 1987. However, the collective bargaining negotiations reached a
deadlock on the issue of the scope of the bargaining unit. Conciliation efforts to settle the dispute on 29 March 1988 were made but no settlement was reached.

Petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to managers and supervisors but also to all other rank and file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused the
respondent union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice because the union members were discriminated against in the grant of the
profit sharing benefits. Consequently, management refused to proceed with the CBA negotiations unless the last notice of strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone
discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was concluded. After a series of conciliation conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary
arbitration. After the parties submitted their position papers, a rejoinder and reply, on March 20, 1989 the voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner to likewise
extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing scheme to the members of respondent union

ISSUE RULING

Whether or the grant by The petition is impressed with merit.

management of profit
sharing benefits to its Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1988 it was agreed that the "bargaining unit" covered by the CBA "consists of all
non-union member regular or permanent employees, below the rank of assistant supervisor." Also expressly excluded from the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are all regular rank and file
employees is employees in the office of the president, vice-president, and the other offices of the company - personnel office, security office, corporate affairs office, accounting and treasury
discriminatory against its department.
workers who are union
members. It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the "bargaining unit" and who do not derive benefits from the CBA that the profit sharing privilege was extended by
petitioner.

There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. Indeed,
discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated.

Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of discretion by the petitioner in extending the benefits of profit sharing to the non-union employees as they are two (2)
groups not similarly situated. These non-union employees are not covered by the CBA. They do not derive and enjoy the benefits under the CBA.

The contention of the respondent union that the grant to the non-union employees of the profit sharing benefits was made at a time when there was a deadlock in the CBA
negotiation so that apparently the motive thereby was to discourage such non-union employees from joining the union is not borne by the record. Petitioner denies this
accusation and instead points out that inspite of this benefit extended to them, some non-union workers actually joined the respondent union thereafter.

Respondent union also decries that no less than the president of the petitioner agreed to include its members in the coverage of the 1987 profit sharing benefit provided that they
would agree to an earlier negotiation for the renewal of the CBA which expired in 1988. Be this as it may, since there was actually a deadlock in the negotiation and it was not
 resolved and consummated on the period expected, private respondent can not now claim that petitioner has a duty to extend the profit sharing benefit to the union members.
The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate, according to its discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. This flows from the established rule
that labor law does not authorize the substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its business. Such management prerogative may be availed of without fear of
any liability so long as it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers’ interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees
under special laws or valid agreement and are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite.

The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the "bargaining unit" falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have been
done in good faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the CBA where the employees are classified into those who are members of the
union and those who are not. In the case of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which constitute the law between
the contracting parties. Both the employer and the union members are bound by such agreement.

However, the court serves notice that it will not hesitate to strike down any act of the employer that tends to be discriminatory against union members. It is only because of the
peculiar circumstances of this case showing there is no such intention that this court ruled otherwise.

157. Sime Darby Philipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC

SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) AND SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-TUCP), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP),
private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina
including members of private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30 minute paid “on call” lunch break.

Petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality
Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus –

Lunch break will be between:

12:00 NN –1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call” lunch break, it filed on behalf of its
members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby International
Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch
break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the
effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight (8) hours.

The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be justly enriched if they continued to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer “on call” or
required to work during the break. He also ruled that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case was not applicable to the instant case because the former involved discrimination
of certain employees who were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the discriminated
employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch break.

Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal. [4]However, upon motion for
reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with two (2) new commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its arlier decision of 20 April 1994 as well
as the decision of the Labor Arbiter. [5] The NLRC considered the decision of this Court in the Sime Darbycase of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner was ordered to pay
“the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks.” The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the
employees of the benefits of time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges
prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction: (a) in ruling that petitioner committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the change in the work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. – 3:45 p.m. to
 7:45 a.m. – 4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in holding that there was diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch break was
eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby case affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to discontinue the practice of having a 30-
minute paid lunch break should it decide to do so; and (d) in ignoring petitioner’s inherent management prerogative of determining and fixing the work schedule of its employees
which is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and private respondent.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed in lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the petition be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992
memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the act of We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer,
management in revising cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production. It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-
the work schedule of its minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they were “on call.” Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well
employees and be considered as working time because the factory employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work schedule, the
discarding their paid employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and
lunch break constitutive effectively use this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the employees
of unfair labor practice. are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new
work schedule fully complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory
similarly situated whether they are union members or not.

158. Alhambra Industries vs. CIR

ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (FTUP).

FACTS The complaint for unfair labor practice for violation of section 4(a) subsection (4) and (6) of the Industrial Peace Act, was filed by the acting prosecutor of respondent court against
petitioner, upon the charges of respondent union that fifteen of the union members, employed as drivers and helpers of petitioner, were being discriminated against by
petitioner's not affording them the benefits and privileges enjoyed by all the other employees for no justifiable reason other than their union membership; and that the union had
asked petitioner to negotiate with respect to said fifteen drivers and helpers who were being excluded from the benefits of their subsisting collective bargaining agreement, but
petitioner refused to do so. The union prayed for a desistance order and that petitioner be ordered to bargain collectively in good faith and to grant the drivers and helpers the
same benefits and privileges extended to and enjoyed by all its other employees.

In answer, petitioner denied the unfair labor practice imputed to it and countered that the fifteen drivers and helpers were not its employees, but separate and independent
employees of its salesmen and propagandists who exercised discretion and control over their selection, employment, compensation, suspension and dismissal.

It is admitted that respondent union is the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative for all the employees of petitioner and that collective bargaining agreements had
been successively signed between the union and petitioner on March 14, 1962 and on February 18, 1964. Both the union and petitioner exhausted steps 1 to 3 of the grievance
machinery provided in the collective bargaining agreement with regard to the union's claim that the benefits thereof should be extended to the fifteen drivers and helpers and the
petitioner's contrary stand that they were not its "employees. " Hence, as they could not resolve by conferences this dispute, the union invoked the final step in the grievance
machinery, after written notice thereof, and elevated the issue of the true status of said drivers and helpers to respondent court through its complaint for unfair labor practice.

Respondent court in its decision affirmed by its resolution en banc of April 11, 1966, categorically held petitioner's disclaimer of the employee status of the drivers and helpers to
be baseless and untenable, as follows: “In accordance with the 'memorandum of instructions', Exhibit '24', which the respondent corporation issues to the salesman or
propagandist, it is really from here that the latter is authorized by the former to engage the services of a driver or helper. So that even when the driver or helper does not apply
directly to the respondent corporation for the job but to the salesman or propagandist, nevertheless, the authority of the salesman or propagandist to employ the driver or helper
emanates from the respondent corporation. It is, therefore, apparent that in truth and in fact, the respondent corporation is the 'employer' of the driver or helper and not the
 salesman or propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such services.

"The salary of the driver or helper also comes from the respondent corporation in the form of 'driver allowance' which is appropriated for the purpose. This allowance is given to
the salesman or propagandist who in turn pays the same to the driver or helper for salaries or wages. Of course, we realize that this mode of paying the salaries or wages of the
driver or helper indirectly through the salesman or propagandist will save the respondent corporation the burden of record keeping and other similar indirect costs. Nevertheless,
it could not be denied that it is the respondent corporation that pays the wages and salaries of the driver or helper.

"The duties and obligations of the driver or helper do not come from the salesman or propagandist but are expressly stated by the respondent corporation in the 'memorandum
of instructions.' He does not only accompany the salesman or propagandist in all the trips, but also drives or watches the truck which is the property of the respondent
corporation. He also assists the salesman in making deliveries to different stores and in the preparation of inventories. These duties are the dictates of respondent corporation
and not of the salesman or propagandist. It is therefore clear that the terms and conditions of employment of the driver or helper are those fixed and determined by the
respondent corporation. From all the foregoing considerations we are convinced that the driver or helper is an 'employee' of respondent corporation."

It therefore rendered the following judgment against petitioner:

"IN CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, we rule and so hold that all the fifteen (15) drivers and helpers whose names are listed in the 'Partial Stipulation of Facts' are
employees of the respondent Alhambra Industries, Inc., and as such they should be given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and benefits that are given to
all the other regular employees, including those fringe benefits provided for in the Collective Bargaining agreement signed and concluded between the
complainant union and the respondent corporation, retroactive as of the effectivity of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present."

Petitioner, in this appeal, does not dispute the respondent court's basic ruling that the fifteen drivers and helpers are in truth and in fact its employees and that its making use of
its salesmen and propagandists, as the ostensible "employers" of the drivers and helpers was in effect but an elaborate artifice to deprive the drivers and helpers of their status as
employees of petitioner, entitled to enjoy all the privileges, rights and benefits provided for all other employees under the collective bargaining agreements.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the Petitioner uses as props for this lone assigned error respondent court's statements in the body of its decision that "(S)ince the grant of benefits to the drivers and helpers will
petitioner had committed depend on a finding by the Court that they are 'employees' of the respondent corporation and not on account of their membership with the complainant union or activities
any act of unfair labor therein, then the charge of discrimination against the respondent corporation is without basis in fact and in law.
practice.
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that in order to adjudge an employer of discrimination in accordance with the Act, it must be due to the union affiliation or activities of the
employee concerned" and that “both parties tried their level best to decide the issue extra judicially. The elevation of the issue before the Court is the last step provided for in
their grievance machinery, Step No. 4. ...Since the grant of benefits to the drivers and helpers hinges on the decision of the Court that they are 'employees' of the respondent
corporation, then the latter could not have been guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act. " Petitioner, invoking section 5(c) of the Industrial Peace Act, thus contends
that "it is mandatory upon the respondent court to order the dismissal of the complaint, once it finds out that no unfair labor practice has been committed," and it should have
"left the parties alone to settle their differences through conciliation, mediation and recourse to the ordinary courts."

Petitioner's appeal must be dismissed. It is speciously grounded on mere form rather than the realities of the case. In form, respondent court gently treated petitioner's scheme
to deprive the fifteen drivers and helpers of their rightful status as employees and did not denounce it as a betrayal of the salutary purpose and objective of the Industrial Peace
Act, but instead remarked that since the grant of employees' benefits hinged on the court's decision on their status as such employees, petitioner "could not have been guilty of
refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act."

The reality, however, is that respondent court expressly found that "in truth and in fact, (petitioner) corporation is the 'employer' of the driver or helper and not the salesman or
propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such services." Petitioner's failure to comply with its duty under the collective bargaining agreement to
extend the privileges, rights and benefits thereof to the drivers and helpers as its actual employees clearly amounted to the commission of an unfair labor practice. And
consequently respondent court properly ordered in its judgment that said drivers and helpers "should be given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and benefits that are
given to all the other regular employees ... retroactive as of the effectivity of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present." In so ordering, respondent court was but
 discharging its function under section 5(c) of the Act, supra, to order the cessation of an unfair labor practice and "take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this
Act.”

Failure on petitioner's part to live up in good faith to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement by denying the privileges and benefits thereof to the fifteen drivers and
helpers through its device of trying to pass them off as 'employees' of its salesmen and propagandists was a serious violation of petitioner's duty to bargain collectively and
constituted unfair labor practice in any language.

As succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Castro in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, in unfair labor practice cases, "(T)he question is whether the (respondent)
committed the act charged in the complaint. If it did, it is of no consequence, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive law, what the act is denominated -- whether as a
restraint, interference or coercion, as some members of the Court believe it to be, or as a discriminatory discharge as other members think it is, or as refusal to bargain as some
other members view it, or even as a combination of any or all of these."

159. Balmar Farms vs. NLRC

BALMAR FARMS, INC., VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU).

FACTS Med-Arbiter Antonino G. Jolejole issued an order certifying the ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers and employees of BALMAR,
Kapalong, Davao del Norte, it appearing that in the certification election held at the premises of the employer Balmar on October 19, 1982, the ALU obtained the majority of the
votes cast,

Sometime, BALMAR received a copy of the letter signed by Johnny Y. Luces in his capacity as President of the BALMAR Employees Association, addressed to the Regional Director,
Hon. Eugenio Sagmit, Jr. The letter states that:

"x x x after discussing this matter among ourselves, it was agreed by more than a majority of all that we disregard ALU in representing us. We do not have any CBA
at present. We are in better position to negotiate directly with management for our working conditions being aware of what are our basic needs.

"We are filing this with your Office so that you could help us in requesting BALMAR FARMS to negotiate directly with us and not thru ALU."

ALU sent a letter to BALMAR, attaching therewith their proposals for collective bargaining agreement.

BALMAR made a reply to the effect that it can not favorably act on their request for the reason, among others, that it has been furnished a copy of the letter of Mr. Johnny Luces,
president of the Balmar Farms Employees Association, addressed to the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), about their "disaffiliation from ALU”.

In another letter, ALU answered BALMAR’s letter and requested that it be recognized as the bargaining representative it being certified by the MOLE as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of BALMAR’s rank and file workers.

BALMAR replied to ALU’s letter, stating that the management was requested by Balmar Farms Employees Association to negotiate with them directly and not with ALU because
ALU has been dis-authorized as the agent of the BALMAR employees. BALMAR further contended that ALU has to disprove the dis-authorization for only then can BALMAR
negotiate with ALU.

For alleged refusal to bargain, ALU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and damages against BALMAR.

The parties were required by the Labor Arbiter to submit their position papers. ALU filed its position paper, while BALMAR filed its position paper.
On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties, Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the respondent Balmar Farms, Inc. guilty of
the unfair labor practice acts complained of. From the foregoing decision, BALMAR appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by filing a Memorandum on
 Appeal.

The NLRC rendered its questioned resolution: “ the appeal is as it is hereby DISMISSED for obvious lack of merit and the appealed Decision affirmed en toto.”

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not The petition is devoid of merit.

petitioner BALMAR is
guilty of unfair labor
practice for refusing to
bargain collectively with
ALU.
The record shows that on October 27, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonino G. Jolejole issued an order certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and
file workers and employees of BALMAR, it appearing that in the certification election held at the premises of the employer BALMAR on October 19, 1982, ALU obtained the
majority of the votes cast.
Employees (like the employees in the case at bar) have a constitutional right to choose their own bargaining representative and it is only through certification election that they
can obtain this purpose.

In the bargaining process, the workers and employer shall be represented by their exclusive bargaining representatives. The labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit, shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. In
the case at bar, it is the ALU which is the exclusive bargaining representative of BALMAR employees and as such it has the right and duty to bargain collectively with BALMAR.

The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions or employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or questions arising under such
agreement if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession (Art. 252, Labor Code, as amended).

Procedurally, ALU sent a letter to BALMAR, attaching therewith its proposals for collective bargaining agreement. In reply, BALMAR refused to negotiate with ALU allegedly
because it received a copy of a letter purportedly written on November 12, 1982 by one Johnny Luces, who claimed to be the president of Balmar Farms Employees Association,
informing the Labor Regional Director that more than a majority of them would like to negotiate directly with their employer BALMAR. There is no showing, however, that said
letter was favorably acted upon, much less, is there an order superseding the Med-Arbiter’s order of October 27, 1982 certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file workers of BALMAR.

BALMAR cannot also invoke good faith in refusing to negotiate with ALU, considering that the latter has been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of BALMAR rank
and file employees. As observed by the Solicitor General, BALMAR’S pretense that majority of its rank and file employees disaffiliated simply because of a letter it received to that
effect, all the more sustains the finding of bad faith for it is not for the petitioner BALMAR to question which group is the collective bargaining representative of its rank and file
employees.

Balmar’s taking side with the rank and file employee who allegedly disaffiliated, renders its stand on the matter highly suspicious.

It can, therefore, be inferred that BALMAR’s refusal to bargain collectively with ALU is a clear act of unfair labor practice. Article 248 (Labor Code, as amended), enumerates unfair
labor practices committed by employers such as for them:

"(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;"

3. Unfair Labor Practice of Labor Organizations

Article 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
 (a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to
be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually
participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981)

160. Salunga vs. CIR

FRANCISCO SALUNGA VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., & MIGUEL NOEL; NATIONAL BREWERY & ALLIED INDUSTRIES LABOR UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NABAILUP-
PAFLU), JOHN DE CASTILLO & CIPRIANO CID.

FACTS Petitioner had, since 1948, been an employee of the Company, which, on October 2, 1959, entered with the Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a
collective bargaining agreement, effective up to June 30, 1962. Section 3 thereof reads:

"The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by this agreement who either are members of the UNION on the date
of the signing of this agreement, or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier
than thirty 30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as
herein-before stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker." (Exh. 4-A-
Union.)

Petitioner was a member of the Union since 1953. For reasons later to be stated, on August 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union, which accepted it on August
26, 1961, and transmitted it to the Company on August 29, 1961, with a request for the immediate implementation of said section 3. The Company having informed him that his
aforementioned resignation would result in the termination of his employment, in view of said section, petition wrote to the Union, on August 31, 1961, a letter withdrawing or
revoking his resignation and advising the Union continue deducting hit monthly union dues. He, moreover furnished a copy of communication to the Company. The latter, in
turn, notified the Union of the receipt of said copy and that "in view thereof, we shall not take any act on this case and shall consider Mr. Francisco Salunga still a member of
your union and continue deducting his union dues. On September 8, 1961, the Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not be reinstated and insisted his
separation from the service, conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. One Company replied, on September 12, 1961, stating:

"x x x We asked Mr. Salunga if he realized that by resigning from the Union he would in ef fect be forfeiting his position in the company. When he answered in
the negative, we showed him a copy of our Collective Bargaining Agreement and called his attention to Sec. 3, Art. 11 thereof. He then told us that he did not
realize that he would be losing his job if he were to resign from the Union. We did not at any time ask or urge him to withdraw his resignation; neither are we
now asking or insisting that you readmit him into your membership. We thought that informing him of the consequences of his resignation from, the Union, was
the only humane thing to do under the circumstances.

"Nevertheless, if notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as having actually resigned from your organization, and you insist that we
dismiss him from the service in accordance with Sec. 3, Article II of our agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so." (Exh. L).
In a letter to the Company, dated September 20, 1961, the Union reiterated its request for implementation of suit section 3, for which reason, on September 22, 1961, the
Company notified petitioner that, in view of said letter and the aforementioned section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause. You are, therefore, hereby
notified of your dismissal from the service effective as of the close of business hours, September 30, 1961."

Meanwhile, petitioner had sought the intervention of PAFLU's National President, respondent Cipriano Cid, to which the Union was affiliated, for a review of the latter's action.
The PAFLU gave due course to petitioner's request for review and asked the Company, on September 29, 1961, to defer his dismissal, for at least two (2) weeks, so that its
(PAFLU's) Executive Board could act on his appeal. On October 6, 1961, respondent Cid advised petitioner that the PAFLU had found no ground to review the action taken by the
Union and that, on the expiration of the 15-day grace granted to him by the Company, the decision thereof to terminate his services would take effect.

Thereupon, or on October 11, 1961, petitioner notified the PAFLU that he was appealing to its supreme authority - the PAFLU National Convention - and requested that action on
his case be deferred until such time as the Convention shall have acted on his appeal. A letter of the same date and tenor sent, also, by the petitioner to the Union.
Furthermore, he asked the Company to maintain the status quo, in the meantime. This notwithstanding, at the close of the business hours, on October 15, 1961, petitioner was
discharged from the employment of the Company, through its assistant-secretary and vice-president, herein respondent Miguel Noel.

At petitioner's behest, on or about December 7, 1961, a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations commenced, therefore, the present proceedings, for unfair labor practice,
against the Union, its president, respondent John de Castillo, respondent Cipriano Cid, as PAFLU president, the Company, and its aforementioned Vice-President, Miguel Noel. In
due course, thereafter, the trial Judge rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. and Miguel Noel and National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines
(PAFLU), John de Castillo, and Cipriano Cid, are hereby declared guilty of unfair labor practices as charged, and ordered to cease and desist from further
committing such unfair labor practice acts complained off; and as affirmative reliefs:

(a) The National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU), John de Castillo and Cipriano Cid, their offi cers and agents, are
hereby directed to readmit and to continue the membership of Francisco Salunga in the membership rolls of the union after paying all union dues,
with all the rights and privileges being enjoyed by bonafide members;
(b) The San Miguel Brewery, Inc., and Miguel Noel, their officers and agents are hereby directed to immediately reinstate Francisco Salunga to his former
or substantially equivalent position with one-half back wages, without prejudice, however, to his seniority and/or other rights and privileges; and
(c) Respondents Union and Company, their respective officers and agents, are likewise directed to post two copies of this decision in conspicuous places
in their respective offices or plants for a period of one month, furnishing this Court with certificate of compliance after the expiration of said period.

On motion for reconsideration of the respondents, this decision was reversed by the Court of Industrial Relations sitting en banc - with two (2) judges concurring in the result and
the trial judge dissenting - which dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

The appeal is well taken, for, although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon later - upon learning that his
withdrawal from the Union would result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above referred to - revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and
the Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union had not only acted arbitrarily innot allowing petitioner to continue his membership trial Judge
found said refusal of the Union officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them. As set forth in the decision of the trial Judge:

"x x x Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he believed were illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds, i.e., allowing
Florencio Tirad, a union official, to receive six months advanced salaries when Tirad went to the United States, which objection he openly manifested in a
meeting of the board of directors and stewards, but instead of receiving favorable response, he (Salunga) was twitted and felt insulted by the laughter of those
present after Mr. Torio of the Glass Factory remarked that he would be the next man to be sent to America; second, granting Ricardo Gar cia, union secretary,
two months advance salaries when preparing for the bar examinations, which objection he broached to union officer Efren Meneses; third, the union's additional
monthly expense for the salary of a counsel when the PAFLU, their mother union, is well staffed with a number of lawyers who could attend and handle their
cases and other legal matters, and to which mother union the NABAILUP has been paying a monthly assessment of more than P1,000.00; and fourth, giving
salary to Charles Mitschek who was dismissed by the company but denying the same privilege to other similarly situated member-employees. Salunga was later
removed by the union from his position as steward without his knowledge. It also appears that the power of attorney executed in his favor by co-worker
 Alejandro Miranda for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him (the latter has cer tain amount in possession of the Union) was not honored by
the union.
xx xx xx
"The record is clear that feeling dejected by the inaction of the union officials on his griev ances and objections to what he believed were illegal disbursements of
union funds, coupled with the fact that he was later removed from his position as a union steward without his knowledge, as well as the fact that the union did
not honor the power of attorney executed in his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him, he
submitted his letter of resignation from the union on August 18, 1961. It mutt be stated here that no evidence was adduced by the respondent union to
overcome complainant's testimonies about his objections to the disbursements of union funds but only tried to elicit from him on cross examination, that the
funds of the union are only disbursed upon authority of the Executive Board of the union. x x x.”

It should be noted that the Court of Industrial Relations en banc did not reverse these findings of fact or even question the accuracy thereof. What is more, the officers of the
Union have, in effect, confirmed the fact that their refusal to allow the withdrawal of petitioner's resignation had been due to his aforementioned criticisms. lndeed said officers
tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true, not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union,
but certain acts of its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but, also, because, the constitution and by-laws of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its members to
give their views on "all transactions made by the Union." As a consequence, the resolution appealed from cannot be affirmed without, in effect, nullifying said right which,
independently of the constitution and by-laws of the Union, is part and parcel of the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a condition sine qua
non to the sound growth and development of labor organizations and democratic institutions.

Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as
a matter if privilege,[1] the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with
which it has a closed-shop agreement.[2] The reason is that

“x x x The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade unions to become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a closed
shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the pu blic interest.”

Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the
employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground
therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise
the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he
forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily be denied readmission.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was reluctant - if not unwillingly to
Company was guilty of discharge the petitioner. When the Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged implementation of section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company
unfair labor practice. advised petitioner of the provisions thereof, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the Company notified the
Union that it (the Company) would not take any action on the case and would consider the petitioner "still a member" of the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioner's discharge, the Company still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations, springing from the
belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner
that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with "regret".

Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for his
plight. It even tried to help him, although to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from inter fering in purely internal affairs of the Union. At the same
time, the Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true
motives were not manifest, without such inquiry, and petitioner had concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature of the decision of said officers
was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon the other hand, the Company can not be blamed for assuming the
 contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had
inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union Officers.

In finding, this notwithstanding, that the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice, the trial Judge seemed to have been unduly influenced by the fact that the former had
dismissed the petitioner despite his announced intention to Appeal from the decision of the Union and that of the Officers of the PAFLU to its "supreme authority", namely, the
PAFLU's "National Convention". In other words, said Judge felt that the Company should have waited for the action of the national convention before issuing the notice of
dismissal.

There is no evidence, however, that petitioner had really brought this matter to said "Convention". Much less in there any proof that the latter had sustained him and reversed
the PAFLU officers and the Union. Thus, the record does not show that petitioner was prejudiced by the Company's failure to maintain the status quo, after the Union had been
sustained by said officers. In fact, petitioner did not even try to establish that he had submitted to the Company – as he has not introduced in the lower court - satisfactory proof
that an appeal had really been taken by him to the aforementioned Convention. In short, it was error to hold the Company guilty of unfair labor practice.

Just the same, having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner
is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or right and
privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the Union. In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the lower court may, however, take
such measures as it may deem best, including the power to authorize the Company to make deductions, for petitioner's benefit, from the sums due to the Union, by way of
check off or otherwise, with a view to executing this decision, and, at the same time, effectuating the purposes of the Industrial Peace Act.

161. United Restator’s Employees Labor Union vs. Torres

UNITED RESTAUROR'S EMPLOYEES & LABOR UNION-PAFLU VS. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES AND THE DELTA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

FACTS The case arose from a verified complaint for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by Delta Development Cor poration (Delta), against the Union on January 16,
1965. It is there averred that:

Delta is the owner of the Makati commercial center situated at Makati, Rizal. It is in the business of leasing portions thereof. The center has its own thoroughfares,
pedestrian lanes, parking areas for the benefit of customers and clients of its lessees.

On the other hand, the Union is an association of some employees of Sulo Restaurant, a lessee of Delta.

On January 8, 1965, the Union sought permission from Delta to conduct picketing activities "on the private property of plaintiff surrounding Sulo Restaurant." On January 11,
Delta denied the request because it "may be held liable for any incident that may happen in the picket lines, since the picketing would be conducted on the private property
owned by plaintiff." Despite the denial, the Union picketed on Delta's property surrounding Sulo Restaurant on January 16 and continued to conduct said activity. Such act of
the Union is violative of the property rights of, and would cause great and irreparable injury to, Delta. No employer-employee relationship exists between Delta and the Union
members. Delta then prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction issue and that, after hearing, such injunction be made permanent.

As aforesaid, respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The Union's move to reconsider was denied on January 26, 1965.

On January 19, 1965, the Union filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case.

Without awaiting resolution of its motion to dismiss, the Union commenced in this Court the present original petition for certiorari on September 18, 1965, claiming that
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive writ "as no restraining order could be validly issued against the right to picket as part of
freedom of speech"; that respondent judge issued the questioned writ "without the benefit of a previous hearing"; that it was issued in violation of Section 9(d) of Republic Act
875; that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) "for the same involves acts of unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act 875 in
 connection with Sec. 5(a) thereof"; and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On September 29, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the Union's P1,000.00-bond.

On October 12, 1965, Delta answered. It alleged, amongst others, that respondent judge validly issued the injunctive writ in question because the same "never enjoined
petitioner from picketing against the Sulo-D & E, Inc. but only from doing their picketing on the private property of respondent who is not in any way privy to the relationship
between Sulo-D & E, Inc. and petitioner"; that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the case involving as it does an action to protect Delta's property rights; that it has no labor
relation or dispute of any kind with the Union; and that the injunctive writ was issued after due hearing on January 19, 1965. Delta asked that the present petition be denied.

After the submission of the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, Delta moved to dismiss the proceeding at bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic. It
averred that the Union lost in the consent election conducted by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC, and thereby also lost its right
to picket; and that in said election cases, a rival union - Sulo Employees Labor Union (SELU, for short) - was certified by CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
employees of Sulo Restaurant pursuant to CIR's order of December 23, 1965.

The Union opposed. It argued that the picketing was conducted on or about January 16, 1965, that is, around 8 months before the consent election on October 4, 1965; and that
the issues that triggered the Union's labor strike of January 16, 1965 are entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC.

ISSUE RULING

The petition must be dismissed. Really, the case before us has become moot and academic.

When the union struck and picketed on January 16, 1965, it might have been true that the Union commanded a majority of Sulo's employees. Without need of certification, it
could, under such circumstances, conclude a collective bargaining agreement with Sulo. But it is not disputed that on October 4, 1965, i.e., shortly after this case was filed on
September 18, 1965, a consent election was held. Not controverted, too, is the fact that, in that consent election, SELU defeated the Union, petitioner herein. Because of this,
SELU was certified to the Sulo management as the "collective bargaining representative of the employees x x x for collective bargaining purposes as regards wages, hours of
work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law."
The consent election, it should be noted, was ordered by CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct certification docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar petition for
certification filed by SELU docketed as Case 1464-MC. Verily, the Union can no longer demand collective bargaining. For, it became the minority union. As matters stand, said
right properly belongs to SELU, which commands the majority. By law, the right to be the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit is vested in the labor union "designated or selected" for such purpose "by the majority of the employees" in the unit concerned. [4] SELU has the right as well as the obligation
to hear, voice out and seek remedies for the grievances of all Suloemployees, including employees who are members of petitioner Union, regarding the "rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."

Indeed, petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of Sulo employees must come to a halt. [5]Collective bargaining cannot
be the appropriate objective of petitioning Union's continuation of their concerted activities. The record before us does not reveal any other legitimate purpose. To allow said
Union to continue picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective bargaining table would obviously be to disregard the results of the consent election. To
further permit the Union's picketing activities would be to flaunt at the will of the majority.

The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute. Those
who voted in the consent election against the labor union that was eventually certified are hidebound to the results thereof. Logic is with this view. By their very act of
participating in the election, they are deemed to have acquiesced to whatever is the consequence of the election. As to those who did not participate in the election, the
accepted theory is that they "are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting."
Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving industrial peace; one such method is certification election. It is the
intent and purpose of the law that this procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not continue them. Pertinent is
the following observation to which we fully concur: "Before an election is held by the Board [9] to determine which of two rival unions represents a majority of the employees,
one of the unions may call a strike and demand that the employer bargain with it. A labor dispute will then exist. Nothing in the statute makes it illegal for a minority to strike
 and thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become the sole bargaining agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union
to compel an employer to bargainwith it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in such a case."
Upon the law then, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket ceased by its defeat in the consent election. That election occurred during the pendency before this
Court of this original petition for certiorari lodged by the Union the thrust of which is to challenge the power of the Court of First Instance to enjoin its picket ing activities. The
Union may not continue to picket. The object of the case before us is lost.

162. Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND MELBA C. BELONCIO.

FACTS The petition was filed on January 19, 1987. The private respondent filed her comment on March 7, 1987 while the Solicitor General filed a comment on June 1, 1987 followed by
the petitioner's reply on August 22, 1987. We treat the comment as answer and decide the case on its merits.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Herein private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, an employee of Manila Mandarin Hotel since 1976 and at the time of her dismissal, assistant head waitress at the hotel's coffee
shop, was expelled from the petitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The union demanded the dismissal from
employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union security clause of their collective bargaining agreement and the Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave effective
August 10, 1984.
The union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement provides:
"Section 2. Dismissals.
x x x x x
b) Members of the Union who cease to be such members and/or who fail to maintain their membership in good standing therein by reason of their resignation
from the Union, and/or by reason of their expulsion from the Union, in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws of the Union, for non-payment of union
dues and other assessment, for organizing, joining or forming another labor organization shall, upon written notice of such cessation of membership or failure to
maintain membership in the Union and upon written demand to the company by the Union, be dismissed from employment by the Company after complying
with the requisite due process requirement; xxx" (Underlining supplied)" (Rollo, p. 114)
Two days before the effective date of her forced leave or on August 8, 1984, Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against herein petitioner-
union and Manila Mandarin Hotel, Inc. before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch.
Petitioner-union filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the complainant had no cause of action against it and the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint.
This motion was denied by the Labor Arbiter.
After the hearings that ensued and the submission of the parties’ respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter held that the union was guilty of unfair labor practice when it
demanded the separation of Beloncio. The union was then ordered to pay all the wages and fringe benefits due to Beloncio from the time she was on forced leave until actual
reinstatement, and to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. The charge against the hotel was dismissed.
The Union then appealed to the respondent NLRC which modified the Labor Arbiter's decision as earlier stated.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration and a second motion for reconsideration were denied.
Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE RULING

On the issue of the NLRC jurisdiction over the case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC conclusion that the dispute is not purely intra-union but involves an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provisions and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. Under the CBA, membership in the union may be lost
through expulsion only if there is non-payment of dues or a member organizes, joins, or forms another labor organization. The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from
her emotional remark to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala akongtiwala sa Union ninyo". The remark was made in the course of a heated discussion
regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he noted that:
"xxx The Labor Arbiter explained correctly that '(I)f the only question is the legality of the expulsion of Beloncio from the Union undoubtedly, the question is one
cognizable by the BLR (Bureau of Labor Relations). But, the question extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto. Necessarily, when the hotel
decides the recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny. Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly,
violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice.'
"Article 250 of the Labor Code provides the following:
"'Art. 250. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
"’(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is
made available to other members.' (Underscoring supplied)
Article 217 of the Labor Code also provides:
"'Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide x x x the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non agricultural;
"‘(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
xxx xxx xxx
“'(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.'” (Rollo, pp. 155-157.)
The petitioner also questions the factual findings of the public respondent on the reasons for Beloncio's dismissal and, especially, on the argument that she was on forced leave;
she was never dismissed; and not having worked, she deserved no pay.
The Court finds nothing in the records that indicates reversible error, much less grave abuse of discretion, in the NLRC's findings of facts.
It is a well-settled principle that findings of facts quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Akay Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
140 SCRA 381; Alba Patio de Makati v. Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association, 128 SCRA 253; Danganv. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 706; De La
Concepcion v. Mindanao Portland Cement Corporation, 127 SCRA 647).
The petitioner now questions the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent and directing the Union to pay the
wages and fringe benefits which she failed to receive as a result of her forced leave and to pay attorney's fees.
We find no error in the questioned decision.
The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not for the union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of the hotel to
dismiss Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor practice. The hotel
was then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop payment of her salary from September 1, 1984.
Furthermore, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner - the Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel, "the Union shall hold the Company free
and blameless from any and all liabilities that may arise" should the employee question the dismissal, as has happened in the case at bar.
It is natural for a union to desire that all workers in a particular company should be its dues-paying members. Since it would be difficult to insure 100 percent membership on a
purely voluntary basis and practically impossible that such total membership would continuously be maintained purely on the merits of belonging to the union, the labor
movement has evolved the system whereby the employer is asked, on the strength of collective action, to enter into what are now familiarly known as "union security"
agreements.
The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause - a closed-shop agreement.
A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good
standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism". It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of
employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. (National Labor Union v. Aguinaldo's Echague, Inc., 97 Phil. 184). It is a very effective form of union security
agreement.
This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang v. Artex Development Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561).
The Court stresses, however, that union security clauses are also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and legality. Union security clauses cannot be used by
union officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness.
A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and
 in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.
This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel customers in the
coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to customers, and
disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to a member who was only doing her
work for the best interests of the employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve.

IX. STRIKES, LOCKOUTS AND CONCERTED ACTIONS

1. Generally
163. Gold City Integrated Port Services vs. NLRC

GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC. (INPORT) VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay
and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union - Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective
bargaining agreement.

Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port.

On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction.

The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who
continued their protest.
Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the remaining strikers could be accepted back
to work.

Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on
whose behalf the motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the
strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew
their notice of strike and returned to work.

The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated July 23, 1985, granted their prayer to be excluded as respondents in the
complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with the strike.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, [3] the strike staged by petitioner's workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor
Arbiter to be illegal.[4] The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal
acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return
to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice
for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after

ISSUE
The formal requisites for a
declaration of a strike are
mandatory.
Furthermore, what the
employees engaged in was
more of a spontaneous
protest action than a
strike.
seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. [5]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered that the strike undertaken by the officers and majority union members of Macajalar Labor Union-FFW is
ILLEGAL contrary to Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended. Our conclusion on the employment status of the illegal strikers is subject to our discussion
above."[6]
Both petitioner and private respondents filed motions for reconsideration, which public respondent NLRC treated as appeals. [7]
On January 14, 1991, the NLRC affirmed with modification [8] the Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike.
Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between
the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with modification in accordance with the foregoing resolution. Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in
lieu of reinstatement, to pay respondents the equivalent of twelve (12) months salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is further ordered to pay
respondents two (2) years backwages based on their last salaries, without qualification or deduction. The appeal of complainant INPORT is Dismissed for lack of
merit."[9]
Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution on December 12, 1991. [10]
The Commission ruled that since private respondents' were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary
as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of "equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages,
compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991 is Modified reducing the award for separation pay to six (6) months each in favor of respondents, inclusive of
lawful benefits as well as those granted under the CBA, if any, based on the latest salary of respondents, as and by way of financial assistance while the award for
backwages is Deleted and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, respondents are granted compensation for their sudden loss of employment in the sum of P1,000.00 each.
The motion of respondents to implead PPA as third-party respondent is Noted. Except for this modification the rest of the decision sought to be reconsidered
shall stand."[11]
RULING
A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and
employees.
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was
clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of
Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
 The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which
even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.

Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements.

As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day
strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory.

Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:

"(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization x x x to declare a strike x x x without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without
the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry."

In explaining the above provision, we said:

"In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the
MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and
their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of
the state."

From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.

The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.

A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other
workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.

In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after
they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the company.

What these remaining Are they entitled, as they claim, to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages?
strikers, considering the
circumstances of the case, Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when he is unjustly dismissed.
are entitled to receive Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given
under the law, if any. to an illegally dismissed employee.
Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to strained relations between employer and employee.

It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses,
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is
prohibited by law.
Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with
the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must
undergo before locating a replacement job.

Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to separation pay. Well-settled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.

It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and
backwages may be granted. And in cases where reinstatement is not possible or when dismissal is due to valid causes, separation pay may be granted.

Private respondents contend that they were terminated for failure to submit to the controversial "screening" requirement.

Public respondent Commission took the opposite view and held:

"As the evidence on record will show, respondents were not actually terminated from the service. They were merely made to submit to a screening committee
as a prerequisite for readmission to work. While this condition was found not wholly justified, the fact remains that respondents who are resistant to such
procedure are partly responsible for the delay in their readmission back to work. Thus, We find justifiable basis in further modifying our resolution of January 14,
1991 in accordance with the equities of the case.

We shall therefore recall the award for backwages for lack of factual and legal basis. The award for separation pay shall likewise (be) reasonably reduced.
Normally, severance benefit is granted as an alternative remedy to reinstatement. And since there is no dismissal to speak of, there is no basis for awarding
reinstatement as a legal remedy. In lieu thereof, We shall grant herein respondents separation pay as and by way of financial assistance in the nature of an
equitable relief.'"[33]

We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to accept them back to work after the former refused to submit to the "screening" process.

Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union members and the union officers among private respondents in
granting the reliefs prayed for.

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during
a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they
cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal.

However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more
practical and appropriate.

No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even
after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award.

The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For
knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment. [34]

Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed
the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
 participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. [35]

Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of
the sanctions prescribed by law.

The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot be effected in view of a manifestation filed by INPORT dated May 15, 1987. [36] In said
Manifestation, it attached a Certification by the President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the private respondents/ remaining strikers have ceased to
be members of said union. The MLU-FFW had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT containing a union security clause. Article 1, Section 2 (b) of the CBA
provides:

"The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or terminate any employee who may be a member of the Union but loses his good standing with the Union and or
corporation, upon proper notice of such fact made by the latter; provided, however, x x x after they shall have received the regular appointment as a condition
for his continued employment with the corporation. x x x"[37]

Since private respondents (union members) are no longer members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. In lieu of reinstatement, which was a proper remedy before May
1987 when they were dismissed from the union, we award them separation pay. We find that to award one month salary for every year of service until 1985, after April of which
year they no longer formed part of INPORT's productive work force partly through their own fault, is a fair settlement.

164. Lapanday Workers Union vs. NLRC

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are located in Davao City.

On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is
affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all members of the Union.

The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A
few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.

First, on August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises located in
Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees
and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also
accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members.

Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-
and-filers, to promote their social education and economic growth. Among the topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company, corporate values,
and the Philippine political spectrum. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.

These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. The labor group was represented by the Union, through its President, petitioner
Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel. After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and?
filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the Union, led
by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.

Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices
consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting. [2] These were the same issues raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-
management meeting.

On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following agreement:

(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB
would attend the HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; and

(2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1988, to establish guidelines governing the guards.

The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they reiterated their demand for the deletion of
the discussion pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO.

With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.

An unfortunate event broke the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house
in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.

On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply
with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent
(30%). Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.

On September 14, 1988, private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for
injunction. These cases were docketed as Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-888 and RAB No. 11-09-00613-88 before Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva.

On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988,petitioners did not
report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the ouster of
certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.

In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened. Dialogues were held on September 27 and 29, 1988 at the
City Mayor's Office. Again, the dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents refused to withdraw the cases they earlier filed with public respondent.

On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of
the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Union staged an illegal strike. The dispositive portion of the Decision, dated December 12,
1988, states:

"CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the strike staged by respondents (petitioners) to be illegal;

b) Declaring the employees listed as respondents in the complaint and those mentioned in page 21 to have lost their employment status with complainants
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and Cadeco Agro Development Philippines, Inc.; and

c) Ordering respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an illegal strike."

Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.

It also appears that on December 6, 1988, or before the promulgation of the decision of Arbiter Villanueva, the Union, together with Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal suspension against LADECO. The case was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00780-88. On even date, another complaint for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. This was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00779-88.
These two (2) cases were heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho.

Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88. Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision
in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private respondents LADECO and CADECO (Case Nos. RAB-11-12-00779-88 and RAB-11-12-00780-88). The Sancho decision, dated
October 18, 1989, declared LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private
respondents, with backwages and other benefits. Significantly, the Sancho decision considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on September 9, 1988, justified by
the circumstance then prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on September 8, 1988.

Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter Sancho erred in passing upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since
said issue had already been passed upon by the Regional Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the NLRC.

Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the same set of facts and involved substantially the same issues, the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated
on August 29, 1990, upholding the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88. The dispositive portion of the assailed NLRC decision states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is entered in the four consolidated and above-captioned cases as follows:

"1. The strike staged by the Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union is hereby declared to be (sic) illegal;

"2. As a consequence thereof, the following employees-union officers are declared to have lost their employment status with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, to wit: Arquilao Bacolod, Jose Erad, Fernando Hernando, Eldie Estrella, Cerelo Dayag,
Lucino Magadan, Rene Arao, Eduardo Poquita, Juanito Gahum, Emiliano Magno, Perlito Lisondra, Gregorio Albaron, Abraham Baylon, Dionosio Trocio, Tomas
Basco and Rosario Sinday;

"3. However, the individual respondents (union members), being merely rank-and-file employees and who merely joined the strike declared as illegal, are
ordered reinstated but without backwages, the period they were out of work is deemed the penalty for the illegal strike they staged;

"4. Ordering Lapanday Workers' Union, its leaders and members, to desist from further committing an illegal strike; and

"5. Dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal filed by the Lapanday Workers Union (LWU)-ANGLO and its
members, for lack of merit.
 "SO ORDERED."

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE RULING

Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike
activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal.

The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated
December 24, 1986.[3]

Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

"(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout
with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of
dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the
existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

xxx xxx xxx

"(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the
dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling?off period herein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:

"Art. 264. Prohibited activities.-(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance
with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

"... Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike." (Italics ours)

A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute." [4] It is the most preeminent of the economic
weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise
within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest.
Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They provide for the
procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike — filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and
Employment. In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al.,[5] we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character, thus:

"If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically
prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . .

xxx xxx xxx

"So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General —
`... The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the
members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.'

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur
of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of
labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or
destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest
on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should
not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it
is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence,
with better chance to succeed. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC,[6] we held:

xxx xxx xxx

"The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by
management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising
the threat to strike as their reaction to employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it
must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful
consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the
legal requirements and strictures, xxx, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.

"Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules for the benefit of all concerned."

Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period
provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying
whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need
not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of
the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.

We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike, especially the officers of the union who served as its
major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which
ironically was cast to promote their interest.

We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their
leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these
 reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

165. Ilaw at Buklod vs. SMC

ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), HON. CARMEN TALUSAN AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

FACTS The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727,
otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.

Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" -- said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation,
more or less, “working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" -- presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the
"significant distortion in ** (the workers) wages." In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727 which reads as follows:

Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an
establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall
be finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the
workplace.

But the Union claims that that "demand" was ignored:

"The ** COMPANY ignored said demand by offering a measly across-the-board wage increase of P7.00 per day, per employee, as against the proposal of the UNION of
P25.00 per day, per employee. Later, the UNION reduced its proposal to P15.00 per day, per employee by way of amicable settlement.

When the ** COMPANY rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION, the members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime services, most especially
at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting October 16, 1989."

In this connection, the workers involved issued a joint notice reading as follows:

"SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG: KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY
NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG
TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION."

The Union's position (set out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers' refusal "to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16,
1989" as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to
newly-hired employees." That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant's
production line (of San Miguel Corporation [hereafter, simply SMC]), joined by others at statistical quality control and warehouse, all members of ** IBM **." There ensued
thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e., "ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten
(10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays **; (and on) Saturdays, ** eight (8) hours for both shifts" -- a work schedule which, SMC says, the
workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income," and pursuant to which it (SMC)
"planned its production targets and budgets."
This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. Its claim is that there ensued
"from 16 October 1989 to 30 November 1989 alone ** work disruption and lower efficiency ** (resulting in turn, in) lost production of 2,004,105 cases of beer ** ; that (i)n
"money terms, SMC lost P174,657,598 in sales and P48,904,311 in revenues ** (and the) Government lost excise tax revenue of P42 Million, computed at the rate of P21 per
case collectible at the plant." These losses occurred despite such measures taken by SMC as organizing "a third shift composed of regular employees and some contractuals," and
appeals "to the Union members, through letters and memoranda and dialogues with their plant delegates and shop stewards," to adhere to the existing work schedule.
Thereafter, on October 18, 1989, SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare
the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards.
Then on December 8, 1989, on the claim that its action in the Arbitration Branch had as yet "yielded no relief," SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members
thereof, this time directly with the National Labor Relations Commission, "to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for the issuance of a cease-and-
desist and temporary restraining order." Before acting on the application for restraining order, the NLRC's First Division first directed SMC to present evidence in support of the
application before a commissioner, Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan. On December 19, 1989, said First Division promulgated a Resolution on the basis of "the allegations of the
petitioner (SMC) and the evidence adduced ex parte in support of their petition." The Resolution -

1) authorized the issuance of "a Temporary Restraining Order for a period of twenty (20) days ** upon ** a cash or surety bond in the amount of P50,000.00
** DIRECTING the respondents to CEASE and DESIST from further committing the acts complained about particularly their not complying with the work schedule
established and implemented by the company through the years or at the least since 1984, which schedule appears to have been adhered to by the respondents
until October 16, 1989 ** ;"
2) "set the incident on injunction for hearing before Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan on 27 December 1989 **."

The Labor Arbiter accordingly scheduled the incident for hearing on various dates: December 27 and 29, 1989, January 8, 11, 16, and 19, 1990. The first two settings were
cancelled on account of the unavailability of the Union's counsel. The hearing on January 8, 1990 was postponed also at the instance of said counsel who declared that the
Union refused to recognize the NLRC's jurisdiction. The hearings set on January 11, 16 and 19, 1990 were taken up with the cross-examination of SMC's witness on the basis of
his affidavit and supplemental affidavits. The Union thereafter asked the Hearing Officer to schedule other hearings. SMC objected. The Hearing Officer announced she would
submit a report to the Commission relative to the extension of the temporary restraining order of December 9, 1989, supra, prayed for by SMC. Here the matter rested until
February 14, 1990, when the Union filed the petition which commenced the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar.[9]
In its petition, the Union asserted that:
1) the "central issue ** is the application of the Eight-Hour Labor Law ** (i.e.) (m)ay an employer force an employee to work everyday beyond eight hours a
day?"
2) although the work schedule adopted by SMC with built-in "automatic overtime," [10] "tremendously increased its production of beer at lesser cost," SMC had
been paying its workers “wages far below the productivity per employee," and turning a deaf ear to the Union's demands for wage increases;
3) the NLRC had issued the temporary restraining order of December 19, 1989 "with indecent haste, based on ex parte evidence of SMC; and such an order
had the effect of "forcing the workers to work beyond eight (8) hours a day, everyday !!"
4) the members of the NLRC had no authority to act as Commissioners because their appointments had not been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment; and
5) even assuming the contrary, the NLRC, as an essentially appellate body, had no jurisdiction to act on the plea for injunction in the first instance.
The petition thus prayed:
1) for judgment (a) annulling the Resolution of December 19, 1990; (b) declaring mandatory the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of National Labor Relations Commissioners; and (c) ordering the removal "from the 201 files of employees any and all memoranda or disciplinary
action issued/imposed to the latter by reason of their refusal to render overtime work;" and
2) pending such judgment, restraining (a) the NLR Commissioners "from discharging their power and authority under R.A. 6715 prior to their re-appointment
and/or confirmation;" as well as (b) Arbiter Talusan and the Commission from acing on the matter or rendering a decision or issuing a permanent injunction
therein, or otherwise implementing said Resolution of December 19, 1989.
In traverse of the petition, SMC filed a pleading entitled "Comment with Motion to Admit Comment as Counter-Petition," in which it contended that:
1) the workers' abandonment of the regular work schedule and their deliberate and wilful reduction of the Polo plant's production efficiency is a slowdown,
which is an illegal and unprotected concerted activity;
2) against such a slowdown, the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in the first instance;
3) indeed, the NLRC has "the positive legal duty and statutory obligation to enjoin the slowdown complained of and to compel the parties to arbitrate **,
(and) to effectuate the important national policy of peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration;" accordingly, said NLRC "had no legal choice but to
issue injunction to enforce the reciprocal no lockout-no slowdown and mandatory arbitration agreement of the parties;" and
4) the NLRC "gravely abused its discretion when it refused to decide the application for injunction within the twenty day period of its temporary restraining

ISSUE
It is SMC's submittal that
the coordinated reduction
by the Union's members
of the work time
theretofore willingly and
consistently observed by
them, thereby causing
financial losses to the
employer in order to
compel it to yield to the
demand for correction of
"wage distortions," is an
illegal and "unprotected"
activity. It is, SMC argues,
contrary to the law and to
the collective bargaining
agreement between it and
the Union.
order, in violation of its own rules and the repeated decisions of this ** Court."
RULING
The argument is correct and will be sustained.
Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, ** (w)orkers shall have the right to engage
in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and
protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers.
The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes -- the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute;
picketing -- the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute; and boycotts -- the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity
that management may licitly undertake is the lockout -- the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute. In this connection, the same Article 263 provides
that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and
respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.
It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure
within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a
specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as a modes of
settlement of the issue. The provision states that?
" ** the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance
procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in
writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary arbitration or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was
referred to voluntary arbitration.
In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any
dispute arising therefrom shall be settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of
conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct
continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration.
The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the
provisions of law or Wage Order.
*****."
The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted
activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted
by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter's demurring to the
accuracy of the quotation, also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally,
said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and
ultimately by arbitration. The provisions are as follows:

"Section 1. Any and all disputes, disagreements and controversies of any kind between the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to
wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations arising during the effectivity of this Agreement or any renewal thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article. No dispute, disagreement or controversy which may be submitted to the
grievance procedure in Article IX shall be presented for arbitration unless all the steps of the grievance procedure are exhausted" (Article V - Arbitration).

"Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any
merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during
the terms of this agreement" (Article VI).

The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of
wage distortions, or for that matter, any other issue "involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations." The partial
strike or concerted refusal by the Union members to follow the five-year-old work schedule which they had theretofore been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing
correction of "wage distortions," was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on this account, illegal.

Awareness by the Union of the proscribed character of its members' collective activities, is clearly connoted by its attempt to justify those activities as a means of protesting and
obtaining redress against said members working overtime every day from Monday to Friday (on an average of 12 hours), and every Saturday (on 8-hour shifts), rather than as a
measure to bring about rectification of the wage distortions caused by RA 6727 -- which was the real cause of its differences with SMC. By concealing the real cause of their
dispute with management (alleged failure of correction of wage distortion), and trying to make it appear that the controversy involved application of the eight-hour labor law,
they obviously hoped to remove their case from the operation of the rules implementing RA 6727 that " Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike /
lockout." The stratagem cannot succeed.

In the first place, that it was indeed the wage distortion issue that principally motivated the Union's partial or limited strike is clear from the facts. The work schedule (with
"built-in overtime") had not been forced upon the workers; it had been agreed upon between SMC and its workers at the Polo Plant and indeed, had been religiously followed
with mutually beneficial results for the past five (5) years. Hence, it could not be considered a matter of such great prejudice to the workers as to give rise to a controversy
between them and management. Furthermore, the workers never asked, nor were there ever any negotiations at their instance, for a change in that work schedule prior to the
strike. What really bothered them, and was in fact the subject of talks between their representatives and management, was the “wage distortion” question, a fact made even
more apparent by the joint notice circulated by them prior to the strike, i.e., that they would adopt the eight-hour work shift in the meantime pending correction by
management of the wage distortion (IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG
WAGE DISTORTION").

In the second place, even if there were no such legal prohibition, and even assuming the controversy really did not involve the wage distortions caused by RA 6727, the
concerted activity in question would still be illicit because contrary to the workers' explicit contractual commitment "that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or
slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other
interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of ** (their collective bargaining) agreement."

What has just been said makes unnecessary resolution of SMC's argument that the workers' concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force for the last several years,
is a slowdown, an inherently illegal activity essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or rule. The Court is in
substantial agreement with the petitioner's concept of a slowdown as a "strike on the installment plan;" as a wilfulreduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers
for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production
or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned as inherently
illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees "continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time "select what
part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other work;" in other words, they "work on
their own terms." But whether or not the workers' activity in question -- their concerted adoption of a different work schedule than that prescribed by management and adhered
to for several years -- constitutes a slowdown need not, as already stated, be gone into. Suffice it to say that that activity is contrary to the law, RA 6727, and the parties'
 collective bargaining agreement.

2. Strikes