e.
Worker preference (Article 110 of the Labor Code)
252.DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
ISSUE
Whether or not public
respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding
that Art. 110 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which
refers to worker preference in
case of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employer's
business is applicable to the
present case notwithstanding
the absence of any formal
declaration of bankruptcy or
judicial liquidation of TPWII.
RULING
Art. 110 should not be treated apart from other laws but applied in conjunction with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law to the extent that piece-meal distribution of
the assets of the debtor is avoided.
We interpreted this provision in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos to mean that —
. . . a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be present before the worker's preference may be enforced . Thus, Article 110 of the Labor Code and its implementing rule
cannot be invoked by the respondents in this case absent a formal declaration of bankruptcy or a liquidation order . . . .
The rationale is that to hold Art. 110 to be applicable also to extrajudicial proceedings would be putting the worker in a better position than the State which could only assert its own prior preference
in case of a judicial proceeding. Art. 110, which was amended by R.A. 6715 effective 21 March 1989, now reads:
Art. 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid
wages and other monetary claims, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government
and other creditors may be paid.
Obviously, the amendment expanded the concept of "worker preference" to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed
subordinate. The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 6715, approved 24 May 1989, also amended the corresponding implementing rule, and now reads:
Sec. 10. Payment of wages and other monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. — In case of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's business, the unpaid wages and other monetary claims
of the employees shall be given first preference and shall be paid in full before the claims of government and other creditors may be paid.
Although the terms "declaration" (of bankruptcy) or "judicial" (liquidation) have been notably eliminated, still in Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, this Court did not alter its original
position that the right to preference given to workers under Art. 110 cannot exist in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. In effect, we reiterated our
previous interpretation in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos where we said:
It (worker preference) will find application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in full before the "claims of the Government and other creditors" may
be paid. But, for an orderly settlement of a debtor's assets, all creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the preferences determined. In the
course of judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly
determination of preference of creditors' claims is assured (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, No. L-33929, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 476); the adjudication made will be binding on all
parties-in-interest since those proceedings are proceedings in rem; and the legal scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law, and
the Labor Code is preserved in harmony.
In ruling, as we did, in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, we took into account the following pronouncements:
In the event of insolvency, a principal objective should be to effect an equitable distribution of the insolvents property among his creditors. To accomplish this there must first be some
proceeding where notice to all of the insolvent's creditors may be given and where the claims of preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated. The rationale therefore has been
expressed in the recent case of DBP v. Secretary of Labor (G.R. No. 79351, 28 November 1989), which we quote:
A preference of credit bestows upon the preferred creditor an advantage of having his credit satisfied first ahead of other claims which may be established against the
debtor. Logically, it becomes material only when the properties and assets of the debtors are insufficient to pay his debts in full; for if the debtor is amply able to pay his various
creditors in full, how can the necessity exist to determine which of his creditors shall be paid first or whether they shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale (of) the debtor's
specific property. Indubitably, the preferential right of credit attains significance only after the properties of the debtor have been inventoried and liquidated, and the claims held
by his various creditors have been established.
In the present case, there is as yet no declaration of bankruptcy nor judicial liquidation of TPWII. Hence, it would be premature to enforce the worker's preference.
The additional ratiocination of public respondent that "under Article 110 of the Labor Code complainant enjoys a preference of credit over the properties of TPWII being held in possession by DBP," is

253.
ISSUE
f. Liability of Corporate Officers
254.MAM REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
ISSUE
When to hold a director or
officer of a corporation
solidarily obligated with the
latter for a corporate liability.
g. Prescription
255. VIRGILIO CALLANTA VS. CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC.
a dismal misconception of the nature of preference of credit, a subject matter which we have already discussed in clear and simple terms and even distinguished from a lien in Development Bank of
the Philippines v. NLRC—
. . . A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages
recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in application. It is
a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the
discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor . . . In the words of Republic v. Peralta, supra: Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees
for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of
specially preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code,except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241, number 6:
"claims for laborers: wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;" or by Article 2242, number 3, "claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the construction reconstruction
or repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and other works . . . . To the extent that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241, number 6,
and 22421 number 3, they would come within the ambit of the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244.
The DBP anchors its claim on a mortgage credit. A mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted (Article 2176, Civil Code). It creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. It is a lien on an identified immovable property, which a
preference is not. A recorded mortgage credit is a special preferred credit under Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The preference given by Article 1l0, when not falling within
Article 2241 (6) and Article 2242 (3), of the Civil Code and not attached to any specific property, is all ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to move it from second priority to first priority in
the order of preference established by Article 2244 of the Civil Code.
RULING
RULING
The NLRC erred in holding Centeno jointly and severally liable with MAM. A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by
them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when exceptional
circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation -
a. Vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation;
b. Act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
c. Are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other people.
2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection
thereto.
3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation.
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.
In labor cases, for instance, the Court has held corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with malice or in bad faith.
In the case at bench, there is nothing substantial on record that can justify, prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner Centeno's solidary liability with the corporation.
 ISSUE
Whether or not an action for
illegal dismissal prescribes in
three [3] years pursuant to
Articles 291 and 292 of the
Labor Code.
RULING
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not
amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by
statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. It is in this sense that a general penalty clause is provided under Article 289 of the Labor Code which
provides that "x x x any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] nor more than
Ten Thousand Pesos [P10,000.00], or imprisonment of not less than three [3] months nor more than three [3] years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court."
The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however
that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Articles 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities
under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.
Besides, the reliefs principally sought by an employee who was illegally dismissed from his employment are reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, if any,
backwages and damages, in case there is bad faith in his dismissal. As an affirmative relief, reinstatement may be ordered, with or without backwages. While ordinarily, reinstatement is a
concomitant of backwages, the two are not necessarily complements, nor is the award of one a condition precedent to an award of the other. And, in proper cases, backwages may be awarded
without ordering reinstatement. In either case, no penalty of fine nor imprisonment is imposed on the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. By the very nature of the reliefs sought,
therefore, an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally categorized as an "offense" as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which according to public respondent, must be brought within the
period of three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, the same is forever barred.
It is true that the "backwages" sought by an illegally dismissed employee may be considered, by reason of its practical effect, as a "money claim". However, it is not the principal cause of action in
an illegal dismissal case but the unlawful deprivation of one's employment committed by the employer in violation of the right of an employee. Backwages is merely one of the reliefs which an
illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer. The award thereof is not private
compensation or damages but is in furtherance and effectuation of the public objectives of the Labor Code. Even though the practical effect is the enrichment of the individual, the award of
backwages is not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.
The case of Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement, et. al., cited by petitioner, is applicable in the instant case insofar as it concerns the issue of prescription of actions. In said case, this Court had occasion
to hold that an action for damages involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within
four [4] years".
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, sustained the stand of the Solicitor General that the period of prescription mentioned under Article 281, now Article 292, of the Labor Code, refers to and
"is limited to money claims, all other cases of injury to rights of a workingman being governed by the Civil Code." Accordingly, this Court ruled that petitioner Marciana Santos, who sought
reinstatement, had four [4] years within which to file her complaint for the injury to her rights as provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Indeed there is merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, applies by way of supplement, in the instant case to wit:
"Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.
[1] Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.
As this Court stated in Bondoc vs. People's Bank and Trust Co., when a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood, hence, he should be protected against
any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job. Unemployment, said the Court in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, brings "untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage earners.
The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their
means of livelihood."
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right", and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and
unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff", as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.
In the instant case, the action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5, 1982, or three years, one [3][1] month and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on June
1, 1979 which is well within the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.
 Even on the assumption that an action for illegal dismissal falls under the category of "offenses" or "money claims" under Articles 291 and 292, Labor Code, which provide for a three-year prescriptive
period, still, a strict application of said provisions will not destroy the enforcement of fundamental rights of the employees. As a statutory provision on limitations of actions, Articles 291 and 292 go to
matters of remedy and not to the destruction of fundamental rights. As a general rule, a statute of limitation extinguishes the remedy only. Although the remedy to enforce a right may be barred, that
right may be enforced by some other available remedy which is not barred.

More so, in the instant case, where the delay in filing the case was with justifiable cause. The threat to petitioner that he would be charged with estafa if he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
which private respondent did after all on June 22, 1981, justifies, the delayed filing of the action for illegal dismissal with the Regional office No. X, MOLE on July 5, 1982. Laches will not in that sense
strengthen the cause of public respondent. Besides, it is deemed waived as it was never alleged before the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC.

XI. JURISDICTION

1. Labor Arbiter
(Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code)

256. BEBIANO M. BAÑEZ VS. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA

ISSUE RULING

Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. --- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

xxx

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

xxx

There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private
respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first,
those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to petitioner's abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale
scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of private respondent's property and supplies which petitioner used in conducting his "business ".

Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale scheme
resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private respondent's property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal dismissal case, where private respondent brought up as a
defense the same allegations now embodied in his complaint, and presented evidence in support thereof. The Labor Arbiter, however, found to the contrary ---that no business losses may be
attributed to petitioner as in fact, it was by reason of petitioner's installment plan that the sales of the Iligan branch of private respondent (where petitioner was employed) reached its highest record
level to the extent that petitioner was awarded the 1989 Field Sales Achievement Award in recognition of his exceptional sales performance, and that the installment scheme was in fact with the
knowledge of the management of the Iligan branch of private respondent. In other words, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case, which is now final and executory.

Still on the prospect of re-opening factual issues already resolved by the labor court, it may help to refer to that period from 1979 to 1980 when jurisdiction over employment-predicated actions for
damages vacillated from labor tribunals to regular courts, and back to labor tribunals. In Ebon vs. de Guzman, 113 SCRA 52, this Court discussed:

The lawmakers in divesting the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of jurisdiction to award moral and other forms of damages in labor cases could have assumed that the Labor Arbiters'
position-paper procedure of ascertaining the facts in dispute might not be an adequate tool for arriving at a just and accurate assessment of damages, as distinguished from
backwages and separation pay, and that the trial procedure in the Court of First Instance would be a more effective means of determining such damages. xxx

Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup
would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.
 So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which substantially reenacted Article 217 in its original form) nullified Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations. xxx

Clearly, respondent court's taking jurisdiction over the instant case would bring about precisely the harm that the lawmakers sought to avoid in amending the Labor Code to restore jurisdiction over
claims for damages of this nature to the NLRC.

This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to
recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.

Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of the issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of the Labor Code or other labor laws, the
dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-
employee relations ---in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

Thus, it is obvious that private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision. Having lost the right
to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case stands as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of such lost appeal.

Respondent court clearly having no jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint for damages, we will no longer pass upon petitioner's other assignments of error.

2. National Labor Relations Commission

(Article 224 (b) and 229 of the Labor Code)

257. BAÑEZ VS. HON. VALDEVILLA

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the NLRC
committed grave abuse of
discretion when it took
cognizance of the appeal and
reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter despite the
failure of herein petitioners to
validly post the appeal bond,
the appellate court
responded in the affirmative,
set aside the assailed decision
of the NLRC and reinstated
that of the Labor Arbiter.
Private respondent would posit that the appeal of petitioners to the NLRC should be considered to have been made on 19 January 1999 (when petitioner submitted, pursuant to the NLRC order, a
statement under oath to the effect that the surety bond it had posted was genuine and confirmed it to be in effect until the final termination of the case) which was beyond the ten-day period for
perfecting an appeal.
The records before the Court would show, however, that an appeal bond was posted with the NLRC at the same time that the appeal memorandum of petitioners was filed on 16 October 1998. A
certified true copy of the appeal bond would indicate that it was received by the Commission on 16 October 1998, the date reflected by the stamp-mark thereon. The surety bond issued by the
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation bore the date of 14 October 1998 or two days before the appeal memorandum was seasonably filed on 16 October 1998. The Order, dated 11 November
1998, of the NLRC categorically stated that “records [would] disclose that the instant appeal [was] accompanied by a surety bond, as the Decision sought to be appealed involved a monetary award.”
The NLRC, in fact, ordered petitioner to submit an affidavit to confirm that its appeal bond was genuine and would be in force and effect until the final disposition of the case. The Commission’s
declaration that the appeal was accompanied by a surety bond indicated that there had been compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code.
An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant files the memorandum of appeal, pays the required appeal fee and, where an employer appeals and a monetary award is involved, the latter
posts an appeal bond or submits a surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company. In line with the desired objective of labor laws to have controversies promptly resolved on their merits, the
requirements for perfecting appeals are given liberal interpretation and construction.

258. NAVARRO VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)

ISSUE RULING

Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of appeal containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief
sought and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal bond. In case where the judgment involves a monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety

259. STAR ANGEL HANDICRAFT VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION)
ISSUE
Whether or not the NLRC
acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to
act on the motion to reduce
the appeal bond and when it
dismissed the appeal for
failure of petitioner to post
the appeal bond.
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC. The amount of the bond must be equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
The records indicate that private respondents received the copy of labor arbiter’s decision on April 3, 1992, hence, they had only until April 13, 1992 to perfect their appeal. While private respondents
filed their memorandum of appeal on time, they posted surety bond only on April 30, 1992, which is beyond the ten-day reglementary period, a procedural lapse admitted by private respondents.
Private respondents’ failure to post the required appeal bond within the prescribed period is inexcusable. Worse, the appeal bond was bogus having been issued by an officer no longer connected for
a long time with the bonding company. Unfortunately, this irregularity was not sufficiently explained by private respondents. For sure, they cannot avoid responsibility by disavowing any knowledge
of its fictitiousness for they were required to secure bond only from reputable companies. Corollary, they should have ensured that the bond is genuine, otherwise, the purpose of requiring the
posting of bond, that is, to guarantee the payment of valid and legal claims against the employer, would not be served.
We are mindful of the fact that this Court, in a number of cases,has relaxed this requirement on grounds of substantial justice and special circumstances of the case. However, we find no cogent
reason to apply this same liberal interpretation herein when the bond posted was not genuine. In this case, there is really no bond posted since a fake or expired bond is in legal contemplation
merely a scrap of paper. It should be stressed that the intention of lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the
provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The word ‘only’ makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash
or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.
As the appeal filed by private respondents was not perfected within the reglementary period, the running of the prescriptive period for perfecting an appeal was not tolled. Consequently, the decision
of the labor arbiter became final and executory upon the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt of the decision. Hence, the decision became immutable and it can no longer be amended nor altered
by the labor tribunal. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely posting of appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law, the NLRC has no authority to
entertain the appeal, much less to set aside the decision of the labor arbiter in this case. Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
RULING
There is a clear distinction between the filing of an appeal within the reglementary period and its perfection. The latter may transpire after the end of the reglementary period for filing the appeal.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal to the NLRC from the decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter must be made "within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards or orders." Under Section 3(a) of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the appeal fees must be paid and the memorandum of appeal must be filed within the ten-day
reglementary period.
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond.
The NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the reglementary period for
appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case
until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
An analogous procedure is the extension of time to file a record on appeal, provided the motion for such extension is filed before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing said record on
appeal. If the order of the trial court granting the motion is issued only after the expiration of the original period, the appeal may still be perfected within the period extended. Likewise, the appeal is
deemed perfected only after the approval of the record on appeal and not upon the filing of said record on appeal.
We have, heretofore, relaxed the requirement of the posting of an appeal bond as a condition for perfecting an appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code. In Erectors, Incorporated v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we nullified an order of the NLRC which required the appellant to post a bond of P575,222.00 within ten days from receipt of the order or suffer the dismissal of the appeal. The
bond therein required was based on the award which was erroneously computed based on the salary which the employee was no longer receiving at the time of his separation and "which even
included in the computation the award of P400,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages."
In Blancaflor v. National Labor Relations Commission, Rada v. National Labor Relations Commission, and Your Bus Line v. National Labor Relations Commission, we cautioned the NLRC to give Article
223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions on requiring a bond on appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the
merits.
 260.

VIRGILIO M. CAÑETE, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION) AND VICENTE TING / V.T. MARKETING, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS Petitioner VIRGILIO M. CAÑETE assails the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated September 20, 1993 and December 20, 1993, respectively, as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims he was illegally dismissed from service. His employer, however, private respondent VICENTE TING/V.T. MARKETING, maintains petitioner
abandoned his job.

In a Decision, dated March 8, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ray Alan T. Drilon ruled that petitioner did not abandon his job but was illegally dismissed from service. Petitioner was awarded backwages,
separation pay and attorney's fees. He was also given wage differentials due to a finding of underpayment of wages.

As per the return of service, Atty. Enrique Chua, private respondent's counsel, received a copy of the Decision of the labor arbiter on March 15, 1993. However, private respondent's appeal to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was filed only on March 26, 1993, or a day after the lapse of the ten day period prescribed by law. Initially, the NLRC dismissed his appeal.

Private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of his appeal. He explained that the copy of the labor arbiter's Decision, which was sent by registered mail to his lawyer, Atty. Enrique
Chua, was received by one NENETTE VASQUEZ, a person not under the employ of his lawyer. Vasquez was a sales representative of United System, an office which adjoins Chua's law office. Attached
to the Motion was the Affidavit of Vasquez where she deposed that she received a copy of said Decision on March 15, 1993, at about 8:20 a.m. On said date and time, she was resting at the well-
ventilated premises of Atty. Chua's office which was then still closed. She was still resting when the postman who regularly delivered mail in said building, asked her if she could receive the mail
intended for Atty. Chua as the latter's office was still closed. She acceded and signed the registry return card.

Vasquez stayed on the premises of Atty. Chua's office for about 15-20 minutes. Thereafter, she left to see a prospective client and inadvertently brought with her the mail intended for Atty. Chua.
She was able to give the mail to Anelyn Cadiz, Chua's clerk, only the following day, March 16, 1993. However, she failed to inform Cadiz that she actually received the mail the day before. Cadiz
thus presumed that the mail was delivered only on said date. Consequently, Atty. Chua reckoned the period of appeal from March 16, 1993 and actually filed respondent's appeal ten (10) days
thereafter, or on March 26, 1993. Vasquez' account of the incident was corroborated by the postman, Roque S. Tubungbanua and Chua's clerk, Anelyn Cadiz.

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration. He alleged that service of the copy of the labor arbiter's Decision to Vasquez on March 15, 1993 should be deemed as proper service to
respondent's counsel. Petitioner also objected to the documents submitted by respondent to the NLRC for the first time on appeal, viz: (a) petitioner's daily time record and payroll for the months of
August and December 1989 and April 1990 attached to respondent's Notice and Memorandum on Appeal; (b) Certification of the Postmaster of Bacolod City, dated May 11, 1993, that he was not able
to effect delivery of the notice of abandonment for petitioner was unknown at the given address. Petitioner charged that he was denied due process when these documents were presented only at
such late stage and was not adduced at the hearing before the labor arbiter.

In its Decision, dated September 20, 1993, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but abandoned his work. Nonetheless, in view of the
willingness of the employer to pay separation pay, the NLRC awarded to petitioner the amount of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P9,715.80) as separation pay.
Petitioner's claims for underpayment of wages and damages were found unmeritorious and were likewise dismissed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the private
respondent failed to make a
timely appeal of the Decision
of the labor arbiter to the
NLRC.
Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 4. Personal service. — Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the
evening, at the party's or attorney's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient discretion to receive the same."

We have ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is invalid. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
Nenette Vasquez, the person who received a copy of the labor arbiter's Decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Chua, respondent's counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty. Chua's office. Hence, her
receipt of said Decision on March 15, 1993 cannot be considered as notice to Atty. Chua . Since a copy of the Decision was actually delivered by Vasquez to Atty. Chua's clerk only on March 16, 1993,
it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of respondent's appeal commenced to run.

Thus, respondent's March 26, 1993 appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.

261.
JESUS B. DIAMONON, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, AS THE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR; MANASES T. CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE MED-ARBITER; ATTY. ZOILO DE
LA CRUZ, JR., AND MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) AND PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORLER’S UNION (PACIWU),
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS Petitioner served as the National Executive Vice President of the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP) and Vice President for Luzon of the Philippine
Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU).

In a letter, petitioner learned of his removal from the positions he held in both unions in a resolution approved during a meeting of the National Executive Boards of both unions.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his removal. At the same time, he initiated a complaint (FIRST) before the DOLE against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private
respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal from the positions he held in the two
unions.
While the FIRST case was pending with the Med-Arbiter, petitioner filed a second complaint (SECOND) against private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the National Treasurer of NACUSIP
and PACIWU, Sofia P. Mana-ay. He accused them of three (3) offenses, namely: (a) wanton violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of both organizations, NACUSIP and PACIWU; (b) unauthorized and
illegal disbursement of union funds of both organizations; (c) and abuse of authority as national officers of both organizations.

An Order was issued in the FIRST case declaring that petitioner’s removal from the positions he held is null and void. Private respondents appealed this decision to the public respondent DOLE.

In view of the pendency of their appeal in the FIRST case, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in the SECOND case. In an Order, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the SECOND case on the ground of
lack of personality of petitioner to file the complaint in view of his removal from the offices he held.

Public respondent Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of DOLE, decided on the FIRST case on appeal and issued a Resolution which affirmed the assailed Order declaring as null and void
petitioner’s removal from the positions he held.

In view of the adverse Order dismissing the SECOND case, petitioner appealed to the public respondent DOLE. Public respondent Laguesma, issued the assailed Order holding that petitioner’s failure to
show in his complaint that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution and by-laws of both unions, have been exhausted or such remedies are not available, was fatal to petitioner’s
cause. Resultantly, he affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Order. However, the public respondent in his Order denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the appellate
court may pass upon errors
not assigned.
Generally, an appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned. However, this rule is not without exceptions. In the following instances, the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court is accorded
a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned:
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

There is no reason why this rule should not apply to administrative bodies as well, like the case before us, for the instant controversy falls squarely under the exceptions to the general rule.

In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended but also the record reveals that
neither did he exhaust the remedies set forth by the Constitution and by-laws of both unions. In the National Convention of PACIWU and NACUSIP held on August 10 and 11, 1991, respectively,
nothing was heard of petitioner’s complaint against private respondents on the latter’s alleged unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds. In fact, what the National Convention resolved
was to approve and adopt the resolution of the National Executive Board removing petitioner from the positions he held. His failure to seek recourse before the National convention on his complaint
against private respondents taints his action with prematurity.
 When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner’s complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of
unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals’ body of the union the
opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The
underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to
pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. Petitioner’s premature invocation of public respondent’s intervention is fatal to his cause of action.
Evidently, when petitioner brought before the DOLE his complaint charging private respondents with unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds, he overlooked or deliberately ignored the
fact that the same is clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, public respondent Bienvenido E. Laguesma, in dismissing petitioner’s complaint, committed no grave
abuse of discretion.

262. DE OCAMPO VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not respondent Anent the contention that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the presentation of additional evidence to prove the loss suffered by the company despite the fact
NLRC acted correctly in that they were mere afterthoughts and just concocted by the company, time and again, We emphasize that "technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every
allowing respondent company and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
to submit additional evidence
in support of its Motion for
Reconsideration and in giving
credence to the said evidence
despite the fact that the same
were not newly-discovered
evidence as defined under the
Rules of Court."

3. Court of Appeals
263. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, RESPONDENTS.

ISSUE RULING

Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides
that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

 (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice."

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A.
No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting
the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now
been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the
quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet,
under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the
Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used
for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on
Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with
which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; ] whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No.
1495.

264. REBECCA R. VELOSO, PETITIONER, VS. CHINA AIRLINES, LTD., K.Y. CHANG AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE
265.
ISSUE
Whether or not the NLRC
committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing and
setting aside the labor
arbiter's decision finding
private respondent's dismissal
to be valid and for just cause.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition
upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
RULING
This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we have consistently held
in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be
had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. In this case, the plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned
resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this case is patently violative of prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without undue
damage to the fundamental doctrine that undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.
Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, an order, decision or resolution of the NLRC, becomes final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Hence, the resolution of the NLRC had become final and executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is concerned, because she
admits under oath having received notice thereof on January 7, 1992. The merits of her case may no longer be reviewed to determine if the public respondent might be faulted for grave abuse of
discretion, as alleged in her petition dated March 14, 1992. Thus, the court has no recourse but to sustain the respondent's position on jurisdictional and other grounds, that the petition ought not be
given due course and the case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
RULING
To begin with, we reiterate the rule that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, this Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and public respondent
NLRC based their decisions. Our query is limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed decisions. But when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, must of necessity review the records of the case to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts, as in this case.
The core of petitioner's evidence against private respondent is the incident report of Vicente and the written explanation of Pelayo. Unfortunately, Vicente's report was not accorded probative value
by the public respondent on the ground that Vicente appears to be the real and actual culprit. Similarly, Pelayo's statement was not given credence on the belief that it was biased. We think, public
respondent gravely erred on this point.
It is erroneous to discredit the statement of Vicente just because he appears guilty too. Rather, Vicente's declaration must be weighed side by side the testimonies of other witnesses regarding the
incident. As to Pelayo's statement, it should not be considered biased in the absence of proof showing that the declarant was actuated by ill motive. Save for his bare denials, private respondent did
 not give any plausible reason, much less presented evidence, to show that his co-workers were moved by ill will in testifying against him. Verily, the testimonies of persons not shown to be harboring
any motive to depose falsely against an employee must be given due credence, particularly where no rational motive is shown why the employer would single out private respondent for dismissal
unless the latter were truly guilty of serious offense.

That the statements of Vicente and Pelayo are credible is shown by the fact that these are replete with essential details, which interlock with the declarations of other witnesses. Thus, Sgt. Tompong
declared that at around 5 p.m. private respondent retrieved from him the money earlier given by Vicente because a problem cropped up. Next, another PAL employee, Irene Cancio in her sworn
statement, asserted that private respondent ordered the alterations in the flight coupons so as to reflect the true charges on excess baggage of Cominero. Then, Condez averred that Vicente paid the
excess baggage fee of Cominero long after the aircraft had departed, after which, private respondent ordered Vicente to photocopy the excess baggage receipt and send a copy to Cebu via flight PR
839.

In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence showing that private respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage. First, private respondent urged Pelayo to check-in Cominero
by proxy. Failing to convince Pelayo, he chided the latter by saying "Pare ang laki naman yata ng daga mo sa dibdib", and then called Vicente who in turn willingly cooperated in checking-in Cominero.
Second, when the anomaly was uncovered, private respondent approached Sgt. Tompong and said, "Sarge, pakibalik mo na lang ang pera dahil mayroon itong problema". Third, private respondent
handed the money amounting to P1,000.00 to Vicente, which the latter used to pay the excess baggage fee. Fourth, private respondent instructed Vicente to call a fellow load controller in Mactan
airport to intercept Cominero and fix the matter. Fifth, private respondent did not report the matter to his supervisors although it is the practice whenever one is confronted with situation of the same
nature.

Surely, had the irregularity not been accidentally discovered, private respondent would have enriched himself at the expense of petitioner. Worth mentioning at this point is the failure of the private
respondent to refute the oral testimony of Vicente during the clarificatory hearing on March 25, 1993, conducted by the Administrative Panel, which convincingly shows the actual participation of the
private respondent in the commission of fraud against the petitioner.

266. MC ENGINEERING, INC., AND HANIL DEVELOPMENT CORP., LTD., PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ARISTOTLE BALDAMECA, RESPONDENTS.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not a certification The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in original cases filed before the Court of Appeals and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto is found in
signed by one but not all of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said section, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
the parties in a petition
constitutes substantial "Rule 46, Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. -
compliance with the
requirements regarding the XXX
certification of non-forum
shopping. The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

XXX

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition."

In the case at bar, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals contains a certification against forum shopping. However, the said certification was signed only by the
corporate secretary of petitioner MCEI. No representative of petitioner Hanil signed the said certification.

The rule quoted above requires that in all cases filed in the Court of Appeals, as with all initiatory pleadings before any tribunal, a certification of non-forum shopping signed by the petitioner must be
filed together with the petition. The failure of a petitioner to comply with this requirement constitutes sufficient ground for the dismissal of his petition. Thus, the Court has previously held that a
certification not attached to the complaint or petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement which can result in the
dismissal of the complaint or petition.

However, with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the

There is no written
explanation why the service of
the pleading was not done
personally (Section 3, Rule 46
and Section 11, Rule 13, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure).
certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not
thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that petitioner Hanil is being sued by private respondent in its capacity as the foreign principal of petitioner
MCEI. It was petitioner MCEI, as the local private employment agency, who entered into contracts with potential overseas workers on behalf of petitioner Hanil.
It must be borne in mind that local private employment agencies, before they can commence recruiting workers for their foreign principal, must submit with the POEA a formal appointment or agency
contract executed by the foreign based employer empowering the local agent to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and contract of employment. Considering that the local private employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of its contractual undertakings
submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why the said agency cannot likewise sign or execute a certification of non-forum shopping for its own purposes and/or on behalf of its foreign principal.
It must likewise be stressed that the rationale behind the requirement that the petitioners or parties to the action themselves must execute the certification of non-forum shopping is that the said
petitioners or parties are in the best position to know of the matters required by the Rules of Court in the said certification. Such requirement is not circumvented and is substantially complied with
when, as in this case, the local private employment agency signs the said certification alone. It is the local private employment agency, in this case petitioner MCEI, who is in the best position to know
of the matters required in a certification of non-forum shopping.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this rule may be
cause to consider the paper as not filed."
Pursuant to this section, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. If they are made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a
written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioners' Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals did not contain an explanation why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition
to the parties concerned. In the exercise of its discretion granted under Section 11 of Rule 13, the Court of Appeals considered the same as not having been filed and dismissed the petition
outright.
In the case at bar, there was no substantial compliance made by petitioners of the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The utter disregard of the rules made by
petitioners cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction and substantial compliance.
The fact that an affidavit of service accompanied their petition does not amount to a substantial compliance with the requirement of an explanation why other modes of service other than personal
service were resorted to. An affidavit of service, under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is required merely as proof that service has been made to the other parties in a case.
Thus, it is a requirement totally different from the requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not resorted to. In fact, a cursory reading of the affidavit of service
attached by petitioners in their petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it merely states that a certain Rogelio Mindol served copies of the pleading to the counsel of private respondent, the
NLRC, and the Solicitor-General by registered mail. There is not even a hint of an explanation why such mode of service was resorted to.
With respect to petitioners' reliance on the much-abused doctrine laid down in the case of Alonso vs. Villamor and other analogous cases, we adhere to our pronouncement in the case of Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.
"To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonso vs. Villamor
and other analogous cases, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated."
We are aware that in the cited case, the violation of Section 11, Rule 13 committed by the party therein was eventually condoned and the pleading was allowed to remain in the records. However,
such action by the Court was premised on the fact that counsel therein may not have been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of the said provision as the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
had only been in effect for a few months. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar considering that it has been years since the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,
our decision in the Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. case contained a directive that, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month
from the promulgation of the said decision. Petitioners thus have no excuse for their non-compliance with the requirements embodied therein.
4. Supreme Court
267. RUFINA TANCINCO, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

ISSUE RULING

The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed. Under section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal from a decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of dismissal two hundred thirty one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said resolution final and executory. The gap
of more than seven (7) months is too large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality in the application of
procedural rules to at least explain his non-compliance therewith. We have held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but more importantly, it is jurisdictional. Even we cannot ignore the
immutable character of a final judgment.

268. JANE C. ABALOS, BERNARDO A. BAMBICO, MANUEL G. MALAG, WILFREDO R. SOTELO, PERCIVAL B. AGRITO, RICHARD M. BALAN-EG, AND EDGARDO S. NILLO PETITIONERS, VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT.

ISSUE RULING

Petitioners aver that when the March 5, 1994 order directing their reinstatement became final and executory, Arbitrator Valdez no longer had jurisdiction to modify the same. According to them, an
order that has become final and executory can no longer be modified or altered.

Petitioners further insist that Philex failed to sufficiently establish (1) that there were supervening events which rendered enforcement of the final order unjust, and (2) that the positions vacated by
them no longer existed and there were no similar positions available for them. Petitioners point out that Philex did not conduct any investigation as to the manner and purpose of the abolition of their
former positions. They also assert that Philex subcontracted to outsiders the work previously performed by the retrenched employees, which proved that there was no need to abolish their positions.

As to the alleged strained relations between the parties, petitioners maintain that this was also not proven adequately. Petitioners submit that for this doctrine to apply, it must be shown that the
affected employees occupied positions of trust and confidence, or that the employees’ differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. Petitioners argue
that neither of these conditions is present in this case.

For its part, respondent contends that it presented evidence showing the impossibility and inappropriateness of reinstatement, which justify the modification of the March 5, 1994 arbitration order.
Arbitrator Valdez found proof of this fact and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared said finding as sufficiently supported by evidence. Invoking the principle embodied in Compania Maritima,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, respondent avers that this factual finding must be accorded great weight, in the absence of any showing that it is whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary.

A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case of
David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:

One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or reason which renders
the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory.
In David, we held also that “where an execution order [which] has been issued is still pending, all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.” As such, modification of the
execution of such judgment is allowed.

In Torres vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 SCRA 311 (2000), this Court ruled that:

Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that
when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be
refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired
after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because

269. RUFINA TANCINCO, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE
5. Regional Director
(Article 129 of the Labor Code)
270. MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, REPRESENTED BY ANTERA L. DORADO, PRESIDENT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X, RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Regional
Director had jurisdiction over
the case and if so, the extent
of coverage of any award that
should be forthcoming,
arising from his visitorial and
enforcement powers under
Article 128 of the Labor Code.
even with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we held that “jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.” The
power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of its execution and to consider whatever supervening events transpire during
execution. Therefore, we are in agreement with the appellate court that a voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of executing an award if and when the case merits such
amendment.
RULING
The public respondent gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the petitioners. Its refusal is based on the general rule that "after a decision has become final,
the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution, that it becomes merely the ministerial duty of the court to issue the execution." The general rule, however, cannot be applied
where the writ of execution is assailed as having varied the decision.
In the case at bar, petitioners have vigorously assailed the correctness of the computation of arbiter Reyes. They also alleged it has materially altered the decision of arbiter Tumanon. Among others,
petitioners contend that: 1) the salary rate for the computation of the three (3) years backwages should be the last salary rate received; and (2) the award of 200% monthly basic pay for every year of
service is not within the purview of the judgment sought to be executed. If petitioners are correct, they are entitled to the remedy of appeal to the NLRC.
In Bliss Development Corporation v. NLRC, we held that "the NLRC is vested with authority to look into the correctness of the execution of the decision and to consider supervening events that may
affect such execution." We explained the rational for the remedy in Matriguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA, viz: "... where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life
and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law."
RULING
The present petition questions the authority of the Regional Director to issue the Order, dated August 4, 3986, on the basis of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 (formerly Article
127) of the present Labor Code. It is contended that based on the rulings in the Ong vs. Parel (supra) and the Zambales Base Metals, Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor (supra) cases, a Regional Director is
precluded from adjudicating money claims on the ground that this is an exclusive function of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the present Code.
On August 4, 1986, when the order was issued, Article 128(b) read as follows:
"(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards
provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues which cannot be
resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection."
On the other hand, Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. 1691, effective May 1,1980; Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, effective August 21, 1981; and Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, effective June 1,
1982, inter alia, provides:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working
days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
 "2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

"3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non¬payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

"4. Cases involving household services; and

"5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts." (Italics supplied)

The Ong and Zambales cases involved workers who were still connected with the company. However, in the Ong case, the employer disputed the adequacy of the evidentiary foundation (employees'
affidavits) of the findings of the labor standards inspectors while in the Zambales case, the money claims which arose from alleged violations of labor standards provisions were not discovered in the
course of normal inspection. Thus, the provisions of MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, (Distribution of Jurisdiction Over Labor Cases) and 37 (Assignment of Cases to Labor Arbiters) giving Regional
Directors adjudicatory powers over uncontested money claims discovered in the course of normal inspection, provided an employer-employee relationship still exists, are inapplicable.

In the present case, petitioner admitted the charge of underpayment of wages to workers still in its employ; in fact, it pleaded for time to raise funds to satisfy its obligation. There was thus no contest
against the findings of the labor inspectors.

Barely less than a month after the promulgation on November 26, 1986 of the Zambales Base Metals case, Executive Order No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986, [5] amending Article 128(b) of the
Labor Code, to read as follows:

"(b) THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF THIS CODE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING AND IN CASES WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STILL EXISTS, the
Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor
standards provisions of this Code AND OTHER LABOR LEGISLATION based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection,
and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection." (Italics supplied)

As seen from the foregoing, EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an employer with labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our considered
opinion however, that the inclusion of the phrase, "The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists "x x
x in Article 128(b), as amended, above-cited, merely confirms/reiterates the enforcement/adjudication authority of the Regional Director over uncontested money claims in cases where an employer-
employee relationship still exists.[6]
Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that it has always been the intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers
immediate access (when still feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still exists) to their rights and benefits, without being inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes that prove
to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run.
Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating that the transfer of labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system is

"xxx to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him under labor standard laws, without having to go through arbitration, xxx"
so that

"xxx the workers would not litigate to get what legally belongs to him xxx ensuring delivery xxx free of charge."

Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits
received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice.
This view is in consonance with the present "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the Regional Offices" issued by the Secretary of Labor, Franklin M. Drilon on September 16, 1987.

Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection," provide as follows:

"Section 2. Complaint inspection. — All such complaints shall immediately be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall refer the case to the appropriate unit in the Regional
Office for assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO) for field inspection. When the field inspection does not produce the desired results, the Regional Director
shall summon the parties for summary investigation to expedite the disposition of the case, x x x

"Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. — Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already
been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters, x x x" (Italics supplied)

271. SSK PARTS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. TEODORICO CAMAS AND SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Regional
Director has no jurisdiction
over its employees’ claims.
Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 to amounts not exceeding P100,000.00 has been dispensed with, in view of the following provisions of pars, (b)
and (c), Section 7 on "Restitution," the same Rules, thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00). xxx.
"(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned amount shall be effected at the Regional Office or at the worksite subject to the prior approval of the Regional Director."
which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money claims in excess of P100,000.00; provided of course the employer does not contest the findings made, based on the
provisions of Section 8 thereof:
"Section 8. Compromise agreement. —Should the parties arrive at an agreement as to the whole or part of the dispute, said agreement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the
parties in the presence of the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative."
E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decision upholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on
September 24,1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128-b) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos. 6
and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great
respect. As held in Progressive Workers' Union, et al. vs. F.P. Aguas, et al., G.R. No. 59711-12, May 29, 1985, 150 SCRA 429:
"x x x The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. We see no reason to detract from this rudimentary rule in
administrative law, particularly when later events have proved said interpretation to be in accord with the legislative intent, x x x"
The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce, be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b) as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986, this executive order "to be considered in
the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application." (Progressive Workers' Union, et al. vs. Hon. FP Aguas, et al. (supra); M. Garcia vs. Judge A. Martinez, et al., G.R. No. L-47629, May 28,
1979, 90 SCRA 331).
RULING
The jurisdiction of the Regional Director over claims for violation of labor standards is conferred by Article 128-B of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111 of March 26, 1987 which
provides that:
"(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this
Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to
the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot
be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspections."
The jurisdiction of the Regional Director over employees' claims for wages and other monetary benefits not exceeding P5,000 has been affirmed by Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 129 of the
Labor Code as follows:
"Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment
or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper
under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, that such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That the aggregate money
claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty
(30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same."

272. ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. DE LA SERNA
ISSUE
Whether or not the Order
dated March 20, 1987 is
contrary to law and that
respondent Luna C. Piezas
acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction;
Whether or not the Orders
dated March 23, 1988 and
March 13, 1989, affirming and
modifying the Order dated
March 20, 1987 are contrary
to law and that respondent
Dionisio C. De la Serna acted
with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Being a curative statute, Republic Act No. 6715 may be given retroactive effect if, as in this case, no vested rights would be impaired.
Under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, the Regional Director may not be divested of his jurisdiction over these claims, unless three (3) elements concur, namely: (a) that the
petitioner (employer) contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues thereon; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that
such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
In this case, although the petitioner contested the Regional Director's finding of violations of labor standards committed by the petitioner, that issue was resolved by an examination of evidentiary
matters which were verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection. Hence, there was no need to indorse the case to the appropriate arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for adjudication (Sec. 2, Rules Implementing Executive Order 111).
The petitioner's allegation that it was denied due process is not well taken. The petitioner actively participated in the proceedings a quo by filing its answer to the complaint, presenting a position
paper to the Regional Director, submitting evidence in support of its claim, and appealing the decision of the Regional Director to the Secretary of Labor. Each of those steps was a part and parcel of its
right to due process. As the petitioner had all those opportunities to be heard, it may not complain that it was denied due process (People vs. Retamia, 95 SCRA 201; Divine Word High School vs. NLRC,
143 SCRA 346; Municipality of Daet vs. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., 138 SCRA 265).
RULING
The petitioner is estopped from questioning the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private respondents' claims. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director by taking part in the hearings before him and by submitting a position paper. When the Regional Director issued his March 20, 1987 order requiring petitioner to pay the private respondents
the benefits they were claiming, petitioner was silent. Only the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. It was only after the Undersecretary modified the order of the Regional Director
on March 23, 1988 that the petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the jurisdiction of the public respondents to hear and decide the case. The principle of jurisdiction by estoppel bars it
from doing this. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, we held:
"It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rules, it was further said that the question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
"Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty."
Sibonghanoy was reiterated in Crisostomo vs. C.A., 32 SCRA 54; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Capilitan vs. De la Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; and PNB vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 299.
The fact is, the Regional Director and the Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint which was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code).
Only later did the guards ask for backwages on account of their alleged "constructive dismissal" (p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy was decided (Lee vs.
MTC, 145 SCRA 408; Abadilla vs. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92; andPucan vs. Bengzon, 155 SCRA 692).
The jurisdiction of public respondents over the complaints is clear from a reading of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:
"(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution
to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which
cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection."
In Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Hon. Dionisio De la Serna, G.R. No. 82805, June 29, 1989, we clarified the amendment when we ruled, thus:
"To recapitulate, under EO 111, the Regional Directors, in representation of the Secretary of Labor — and notwithstanding the grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to Labor
Arbiters by Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended — have power to hear cases involving violations of labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other legislation discovered
 in the course of normal inspection, and order compliance therewith, provided that:
“1) the alleged violations of the employer involve persons who are still his employees, i.e., not dismissed; and
“2) the employer does not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer or raise issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters
that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection."

The ruling in Briad Agro was reiterated in Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 78909, June 30, 1989:

"x x x Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money
claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office isnot contested by the employer concerned."

6. Secretary of Labor
Article 128, 278 (g) of the Labor Code)

273. TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE RULING

We take this occasion to emphasize that the office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields.
Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter
coincide, as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-
calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.

Although we have ruled against the reliability of position papers in disposing of labor cases, in the cases of Batongbacal v. Associated Bank and Progress Homes v. NLRC, this was due to certain patent
matters that should have been tried by the administrative agency concerned, such as certain factual circumstances which, however, are unavailing in the case at bar.

In Batongbacal, we withheld judgment on the case due to the absence of a definitive factual determination of the status of petitioner therein as an assistant vice-president of therein respondent
Bank. It has not been established by the Labor Arbiter whether the petitioner therein was a managerial or a rank-and-file employee, noting that there are different causes of termination for both the
managerial and rank-and-file employees. Thus, the need to remand the case was necessary.

In Progress Homes, on the other hand, we found that despite the absence of any evidence to establish and support therein private respondents' claim that the petitioners therein were their
immediate employers, the Labor Arbiter forthwith concluded the illegal dismissal of the private respondents. Also, there was the apparent failure of the Labor Arbiter to justify why the private
petitioner therein should be held solidarily liable with Progress Homes. There was a clear absence of evidence to show that petitioner therein had engaged the services of private respondents therein
and that petitioner therein had acted maliciously and in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents.

The herein petitioners dismally failed to show that there really existed certain issues which would necessitate the remand of this case at bar, or that the appellate court misapprehended certain
facts when it dismissed their petition for certiorari.

The need to determine the individual liabilities of the striking workers, the union officers and members alike, was correctly dispensed with by the Secretary of Labor after he gave sufficient opportunity
to the striking workers to cease and desist from continuing with their picket. Ensconced in the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is the rule that:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.

xxxxxxxxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one had already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work. The mere
issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.
However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers
to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly
provides that:

Article 264. Prohibited Activities.

(a) x x x

No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

x x x. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike. We have held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed
jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.
Furthermore, the claim of petitioners that the assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor were allegedly inadequately served upon them is untenable in the light of what
have already been clearly established in this case, to wit:

x x x, the reports of the DOLE process server, shows that the Notice of Order of 8 September 1995 was actually served on the Union President. The latter, however, refused to
acknowledge receipt of the same on two separate occasions (on 8 September 1995 at 7:15 p.m. and on 11 September 1995 at 9:30 a.m.). The Union's counsel of record, Atty. Allan
Montano, similarly refused to acknowledge receipt of the 8 September 1995 Order on 9 September 1995 at 1:25 p.m.

Records also show that the Order of 16 September 1995 was served at the strike area with copies left with the striking workers, per the process server's return, although a
certain Virgie Cardenas also refused to acknowledge receipt. The Federation of Free Workers officially received a copy as acknowledged by a certain Lourdes at 3:40 p.m. of 18
September 1995.

The foregoing clearly negate the Union's contention of inadequate service of the Orders dated 8 and 16 September 1995 of Acting Secretary Brillantes. Furthermore, the DOLE
process server's discharge of his function is an official act carrying the presumption of regularity in its performance which the Union has not disproved, much less disputed with clear
and convincing evidence.

Likewise, it would be stretching the limits of credibility if We were to believe that the Union was unaware of the said Orders during all the conciliation conferences conducted by the
NCMB-DOLE. Specifically, in the conciliation meetings after the issuance of the Order of 8 September 1995 to settle the unresolved CBA issues and after the issuance of the Order of
16 September 1995 to establish the mechanics for a smooth implementation of this Office's return-to-work directive, the Union - with its officers and members in attendance - never
questioned the propriety or adequacy by which these Orders were served upon them.

We are not unaware of the difficulty of serving assumption and return-to-work orders on striking unions and their members who invariably view the DOLE's process servers with
suspicion and hostility. The refusal to receive such orders and other processes is, as described by the Supreme Court in an analogous case, "an apparent attempt to frustrate the
ends of justice." (Navale, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 705)

Such being the case, We cannot allow the Union to thwart the efficacy of the assumption and return to work orders, issued in the national interest, through the simple expediency of
refusing to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove discussed, it necessarily follows that the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been
staged in open and knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence thereof are also detailed by the Supreme Court in its various
rulings. In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Brillantes (254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no uncertain terms that -

Whether or not a resolution
of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court should include the
correction of the Secretary of
Labor's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings
thereon pursuant to the
doctrine laid down in Meralco
v. The Honorable Secretary of
Labor Leonardo A.
Quisumbing.
"by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to work, having
abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced."
Again, in Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC (258 SCRA 724), the Supreme Court ruled that:
"xxx. However, private respondents failed to take into consideration the cases recently decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict adherence to the rule
that defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor would constitute a valid ground for dismissal. The respective liabilities of striking union officers
and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any
declaration of a strike or lock out after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act.
Therefore, any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost his
employment status."
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, We have no alternative but to confirm the loss of employment status of all those who participated in the strike in defiance of the assumption
order dated 8 September 1995 and did not report back to work as directed in the Order of 16 September 1995.
To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment which
provides that:
Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served. - Writ of Execution shall be served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, between the hours of eight in the morning and five in
the afternoon. x x x
However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as Sections 1 [44] and 4,[45] Rule III of the same NLRC Manual provide that such "Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or
order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding." The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the
immediately cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. As pointed out by the Secretary of Labor in his Decision, petitioners
cannot now feign ignorance of his official intervention, to wit:
The admissibility of the evidence presented by the Company, however, has been questioned. The Union's arguments are less than convincing. The numerous publications of the
subject DOLE Orders in various newspapers, tabloids, radio and television cannot be considered hearsay and subject to authentication considering that the subject thereof were the
lawful Orders of a competent government authority. In the case of the announcements posted on the Union's bulletin board, pictures of which were presented by the Company in
evidence, suffice it for us to state that the bulletin board belonged to the Union. Since the veracity of the contents of the announcements on the bulletin board were never denied by
the Union except to claim that these were "self-serving, unverified/unverifiable and thus utterly inadmissible," We cannot but admit the same for the purpose for which it was
presented.
That contention is misplaced. In that case, we ruled that:
"The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretary's exercise of his statutory
powers. This Court is entitled to, and must - in the exercise of its judicial power - review the substance of the Secretary's award when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in
the award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented."
However, this Court's "review (of) the substance" does not mean a re-calibration of the evidence presented before the DOLE but only a determination of whether the Secretary of Labor's award
passed the test of reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions made thereon. Thus, we declared in Meralco, that:
"In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard and one does not require a constitutional interpretation--is simply the standard of reasonableness. In
layman's terms, reasonableness implies the absence of arbitrariness; in legal parlance, this translates into the exercise of proper discretion and to the observance of due process.
Thus, the question we have to answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretary's actions have been reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they
presented.”
Thus, notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion, unless it can be amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award did not pass the test of reasonableness, his
conclusions thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the case at bar.
The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. However, for this Court to properly exercise the power of judicial review over a decision of an administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must first be shown that the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In the absence of any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, judicial review may not be had over an administrative agency's
 decision. We have gone over the records of the case at bar and we see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion.

274. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES AND PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS.

ISSUE RULING

Whether or not the public Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:
respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion "(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
amounting to lack or excess of Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration x x x."
jurisdiction in assuming
jurisdiction over subject labor "The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest. Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor
dispute. that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry." This power, however, is not without any limitation. In upholding the
constitutionality of B.P. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, it stressed in the case of Free telephone Workers Union vs. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, et al., the
limitation set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus:

"Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest."

In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public respondent draws the labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the Secretary's prerogative, to wit:
"While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization of cases imbued with "national interest", this office believes that the obtaining circumstances
warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended."

The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can
scarcely be considered as an industry "indispensable to the national interest" as it cannot be in the same category as "generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals,
and export-oriented industries." Yet, the public respondent assumed jurisdiction thereover, ratiocinating as follows:

"For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not only the protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those directly and indirectly dependent upon
the unhampered and continued operations of the Company for their means of livelihood and existence. In addition, the entire community where the plant is situated has also been
placed in jeopardy. If the dispute at the Company remains unabated, possible loss of employment, not to mention consequent social problems, might result thereby compounding the
unemployment problem of the country."

Thus we cannot be unmindful of the possible dire consequences that might ensue if the present dispute is allowed to remain unresolved, particularly when an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism obtains to dispose of the differences between the parties herein.
It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged "obtaining circumstances" and not on a determination that the industry involved in the
labor dispute is one indispensable to the "national interest", the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the
action of the public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the
community, or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the Secretary's power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor
to intervene in any Labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law. For "when an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its
meaning as the law itself is disregarded"

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent gravely abused his discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute sued upon in the case.

275. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) VS. LAGUESMA

ISSUE RULING

Instead, we will take this opportunity to lay the rules on the procedure for review of decisions or rulings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
(P.D. No. 442 as amended)
The course taken by decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are tangent, but all are within the umbra of the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing
rules.

We have always emphatically asserted our power to pass the decisions and discretionary acts of the NLRC well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the contention that no judicial review is provided
by the Labor Code. We stated in San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor thus:

xxx. It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decision (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec, 165). It is
part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, where the legislative history of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of cases decided under the Labor
Code was traced, leading to and supporting the thesis that "since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decision of the NLRC" and consequently "all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65."

Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, St
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC concluded and directed that all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.

In the original rendering of the Labor Code, Art. 222 thereof provided that the decisions of the NLRC are appealable to the Secretary of Labor on specified grounds. The decisions of the Secretary of
Labor may be appealed to the President of the Philippines subject to such conditions or limitations as the president may direct.

Thus under the state of the law then, this Court had ruled that original actions for certiorari and prohibition file with this Court against the decision of the Secretary of Labor passing upon the decision
of the NLRC were unavailing for mere error of judgment as there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which was an appeal to the President. We said in the 1975
case, Scott v. Inciong, quoting Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Acgoaili: "It is also a matter of significance that there was an appeal to the President. So it is explicitly provided by the Decree. That
was a remedy both adequate and appropriate. It was in line with the executive determination, after the proclamation of martial law, to leave the solution of labor disputes as much as possible to
administrative agencies and correspondingly to limit judicial participation."

Significantly, we also asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while appeal did not lie, the corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari was available whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess thereof, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor.

P.D. No. 1367 amending certain provisions of the Labor Code eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national
interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No. 1391, enacted "to ensure speedy labor justice and further stabilize industrial peace", further eliminated appeals form the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor but
the President still continued to exercise his power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases.

Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated, presently there are several instances in the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules where an appeal can be filed
with the Office of the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Labor issues a ruling, to wit:

(1) Under the Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Placement Agencies for Local Employment dated June 5, 1997 superseding certain provisions of Book I (Pre-
employment) of the implementing rules, the decision of the Regional Director on complaints against agencies is appealable to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) working days
from receipt of a copy of the order, on specified grounds, whose decision shall be final and inappelable.

(2) Art. 128 of the Labor Code provides that an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor in standards cases pursuant to his visitorial and
enforcement power under said article may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Section 2 in relation to Section 3 (a), Rule X, Book III (Conditions of Employment) of the implementing rules gives the Regional Director the power to order and administer
compliance with the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. Section 4 gives the Secretary the power to review the order of the Regional Director, and
 the Secretary's decision shall be final and executory.

Section 1, Rule IV (Appeals) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices dated September 16, 1987 [15]provides that the order of the Regional
Director in labor standards cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Section 5, Rule V (Execution) provides that the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall become final and executory after then (10)
calendar days from receipt of the case records. The filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the order or decision unless the
aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of finality of the order or decision or posts a supersedeas
bond.
Section 6 of Rule VI (Health and Safety Cases) provides that the Secretary of Labor at his own initiative or upon the request of the employer and/or employee may review the
order of the Regional Director in occupational health and safety cases. The Secretary's order shall be final and executory.

(3) Art. 236 provides that the decision of the Labor Relations Division in the regional office denying an applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers'
application for registration may be appealed by the applicant union to the Bureau of Labor Relations within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V (Labor Relations), as amended by Department Order No. 9 dated May 1, 1997 [16] provides that the decision of the Regional Office denying the application
for registration of a workers association whose place of operation is confined to one regional jurisdiction, or the Bureau of Labor Relations denying the registration of a federation,
national or industry union or trade union center may be appealed to the Bureau or the Secretary as the case may be who shall decide the appeal within twenty (20) calendar days
from receipt of the records of the case.

(4) Art. 238 provides that the certificate of registration of any legitimate organization shall be cancelled by the Bureau of Labor Relations if it has reason to believe, after due hearing,
that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements prescribed by law.
Section 4, Rule VIII, Book V provides that the decision of the Regional office or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the aggrieved party to the Director of the Bureau or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, whose decision shall be final and executory.

Art. 259 provides that any party to a certification election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor who
shall decide the same within fifteen (15) calendar days.

Section 12, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the petition for certification election may be appealed to the Secretary.

Section 15, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on an appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification election shall be final
and executory. The implementation of the decision of the Secretary affirming the decision to conduct a certification election shall not be stayed unless restrained by the
appropriate court.

Section 15, Rule XII, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the results of the certification election may be appealed to the Secretary within ten (10) days from
receipt by the parties of a copy thereof, whose decision shall be final and executory.

Section 7, Rule XVIII (Administration of Trade Union Funds and actions Arising Therefrom), Book V provides that the decision of the Bureau in complaints filed directly with said
office pertaining to administration of trade union funds may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) days from receipt of the parties of a copy thereof.

Section 1, Rule XXIV (Execution of Decisions, Awards, or Orders), Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties unless otherwise specifically provided for in Book V.

(5) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the labor dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from the date of the assumption of
jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.

From the foregoing we see that the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules generally do not provide for any mode for reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is further generally
provided that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet, like decisions of the NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final
after ten (10) days, decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing rules but
within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, in M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor, assailed was respondent's order affirming
the Regional Director's having taken cognizance of a case filed pursuant to his visitorial powers under Art. 128 (a) of the Labor Code; In Samahang Mangagawa sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor,
assailed was respondent's order setting aside the Med-Arbiter's dismissal a petition for certification election; Samahan ng mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, assailed was respondent's order
 affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision on the results of a certification election; in Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor, assailed was respondent's order issued under Art. 263 certifying a labor dispute to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

In two instances, however, there is specific mention of a remedy from the decision of the Secretary of Labor, thus:

(1) Section 15, Rule XI, book V of the amended implementing rules provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification
election shall be final and executory, but that the implementation of the Secretary's decision affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision to conduct a certification election "shall not be stayed
unless restrained by the appropriate court."
(2) Section 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices provides that "the filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall
not stay the execution of the [appealed] order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court."

We perceive no conflict with our pronouncements on the proper remedy which is Rule 65 and which should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts. Accordingly, we read "the appropriate court" in Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the implementing Rules to refer to the Court of Appeals.

Section 5, Rule V of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices specifying the Supreme Court as the forum for filing the petition for certiorari is not infirm in like manner
or similarly as is the statute involved in Fabian v. Desierto. And Section 5 cannot be read to mean that the petition for certiorari can only be filed exclusively and solely with this Court, as the provision
must invariably be read in relation to the pertinent laws on the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals in Rule 65 petitions.

In fine, we find that it is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code and its
implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, emphasized in St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction."

7. Bureau of Labor Relations

Article 232 of the Labor Code
276.

ISSUE RULING

277.

ISSUE RULING

8. Grievance Machinery
Article 273 of the Labor Code
278.

FACTS

ISSUE RULING
 279.

FACTS

ISSUE RULING

9. Voluntary Arbitration
Article 273 - 277 of the Labor Code
280.

FACTS

ISSUE RULING

281.

FACTS

ISSUE RULING