Aşköprüzāde

Journal of Islamic Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37
brill.com/jie
Ṭaşköprüzāde Ahmed Efendi’s Commentary

on the Ethical Philosophy of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī:
Theory and Praxis of Muslim Philosophical Ethics
in the Sixteenth Century
Feryal Salem
Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, American Islamic College,
Chicago, IL, USA
fsalem@aicusa.edu
Abstract
The ethical treatise of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya, is a
key work in the genre of Muslim philosophical ethics whose primary significance
includes the numerous lengthy commentaries extant until today, which depict the
ethical discourse over a long period of time from a wide range of Muslim settings.
As a prominent Ashʿarī and Shāfiʿī scholar of the Īlkhānid era, al-Ījī’s work played an
important role in the continuation of the intellectual genealogy of writers on ethical
philosophy, that includes Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037), Miskawayh (d. 421/1030),
al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). As al-Ījī’s ethics became prevalent
within the realm of Ottoman scholarship, the impact of this treatise moved beyond
Central Asia and Iran and into the Ottoman scholastic networks, where the commen-
taries on al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya were studied. This article demonstrates facets of ethi-
cal philosophy during the tenth/sixteenth century by examining the commentary of a
prominent Ottoman scholar of this era, namely Ṭaşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561), on al-Ījī’s
treatise on ethics.
Keywords
Islamic political philosophy – virtue – character – wisdom – courage – self-restraint –

chivalry – futuwwa – compound ignorance – simple ignorance – household
management – Nicomachean Ethics – al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya
© Feryal Salem, 2021 | doi:10.1163/24685542-12340065

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‫‪2‬‬ ‫‪Salem‬‬
‫شرح طاشكبري زاده أحمد أفندي على الفلسفة الأخلاقية لعضد‬

‫الدين الإ يجي‪ :‬الأخلاق الفلسفية الإسلامية تنظيرا وتطبيقا في‬
‫القرن العاشر الهجري‪/‬السادس عشر الميلادي‬
‫فر يال سالم‬

‫أستاذ مشارك بالجامعة الأمريكية الإسلامية‪ ،‬تخصص الدراسات العربية والإسلامية‪،‬‬
‫شيكاغو‪ ،‬الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية‬
‫الخلاصة‬
‫تشكل الرسالة الأخلاقية لعضد الدين الإ يجي (ت‪ ،)1355/756 .‬المعروفة بـ“الأخلاق العضدية”‪ ،‬عملا‬
‫محور يا ضمن مصنفات الأخلاق الفلسفية الإسلامية‪ .‬وتظهر أهمية هذا العمل من خلال كثرة الشروح‬
‫المطولة الموجودة بين أيدينا اليوم‪ ،‬والتي تجسد طبيعة الخطاب الأخلاقي عبر العصور وفي بيئات إسلامية‬
‫مختلفة‪ .‬وكعالم أشعري وشافعي بارز في عهد الدولة الإلخانية‪ ،‬فقد لعبت رسالة الإ يجي دور ًا مهم ًا في‬
‫استمرار ية سلسلة المؤلفين في الفلسفة الأخلاقية‪ ،‬والتي ضمت أمثال ابن سينا (ت‪ )1037/428 .‬ومسكو يه‬
‫(ت‪ )1030/421 .‬والغزالي (ت‪ )1111/505 .‬والطوسي (ت‪ .)1274/672 .‬ومع انتشار أخلاقيات الإ يجي في‬
‫الأوساط العلمية العثمانية‪ ،‬تجاوز تأثير هذه الرسالة حدود أواسط آسيا وبلاد فارس إلى دروس وحلقات‬
‫العلم العثمانية‪ ،‬حيث كانت تُدرس شروح “الأخلاق العضدية”‪ .‬يسلط هذا المقال الضوء على بعض جوانب‬
‫الفلسفة الأخلاقية خلال القرن العاشر الهجري‪/‬السادس عشر الميلادي‪ ،‬وذلك من خلال تحليل شرح‬
‫العالم العثماني البارز طاشكبري زاده (ت‪ )1561/968 .‬لرسالة الإ يجي في الأخلاق‪.‬‬
‫الكلمات المفتاحية‬
‫الفلسفة السياسية الإسلامية – الفضيلة – الشخصية – الحكمة – الشجاعة – ضبط النفس – الفتوة – الجهل‬
‫المركب – الجهل البسيط – التدبير المنزلي – الأخلاق النيقوماخية – الأخلاق العضدية‬
‫ ‬ ‫‪Introduction‬‬
‫‪By the end of the first millennium since the advent of Islam, Islamic philo-‬‬
‫‪sophical ethics had evolved through the accumulated contributions intro-‬‬
‫‪duced by the many major figures writing in this genre. Valuable studies by‬‬
‫‪10.1163/24685542-12340065 | Journal of Islamic‬‬ ‫‪Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37‬‬

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Theory and Praxis of Muslim Philosophical Ethics 3
Majid Fakhry, Constantine Zurayk, Anna Akasoy, D. M. Dunlop and many

others have helped us piece together the various aspects of the way Muslims
incorporated Aristotle’s (d. 322 BCE) Nicomachean Ethics into their own world-
view to develop a form philosophical ethics that was distinctly Islamic in its
outlook.1 An understudied piece that follows this genre is the ethical writings
of the Ottoman scholar, Ṭaşköprüzāde Ahmed Efendi (d. 968/1561).
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s ethical writings are significant in that they expand our
understanding of three aspects of the evolution of Muslim philosophical
ethics. First, Ṭaşköprüzāde’s extensive commentary on the brief treatise of
ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) on ethics is valuable not only for its contents,
which will be analyzed here, but also for its embodiment of the intellectual
history of Islamic ethics as manifested within the stream of thought that led
to Ṭaşköprüzāde’s work on al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya. Second, the contents of
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary on this text also reflect the way in which elements
of Islamic scripture and practice were integrated into the genre of Islamic phil-
osophical ethics from the time of Aḥmad al-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) through
the many renditions of Miskawayh’s original work in the following centuries
leading to Ṭaşköprüzāde’s time. Third, Ṭaşköprüzāde’s location as a prominent
scholar of the Ottoman era reveals a distinctive vision of Islamic ethics as it
evolved within Ottoman lands.
1 ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and His Works
Abū al-Faḍl ʿAḍud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥman b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār al-Ījī
(d. 756/1355) was born in the town of Īj near Shiraz around 680/1281 (Güngör
1988; Güngör 2017; Van Ess 1969; Van Ess 1988). His father was a respected
jurist (qāḍī) who came from a family that traced its lineage back to the sec-
ond Muslim caliph, Abū Bakr (d. 13/634). Al-Ījī was a well-known Ashʿarī and
Shāfiʿī scholar who studied with many of the prominent figures of his time.
Although he wrote in a range of fields which include Arabic grammar, philoso-
phy, Islamic law, and theology, he is arguably most renowned for his contribu-
tions to philosophy and theology.
One of the distinctions of al-Ījī’s scholarship is in his work of verification
or taḥqīq. Verification was a movement that developed among kalām schol-
ars who followed Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) model of revisiting older
texts on theology and reassessing their theological positions in light of the
1 Works by these scholars that examine the Nicomachean Ethics in Islamic contexts include:
Akasoy and Fidora 2005; Dunlop 1962; Fakhry 1991; and Miskawayh 2002, trans. Zurayk.
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methods philosophy and reason. Following Fakr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s school of late
Ashʿarism, al-Ījī’s scholarship in the kalām tradition laid the groundwork for
various commentaries that would be structured around his outline of Islamic
philosophical theology. His students Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) and
Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) were among the most well scholars of the-
ology during the post-classical period (muta‌ʾakhkhirīn) of Ashʿarī kalām that
was prevalent from al-Rāzī’s time through the Ottoman era. Their kalām texts
and commentaries were studied and discussed in learned circles throughout
the Ottoman lands from which Ṭaşköprūzāde’s work arose.
Al-Ījī’s treatise on ethics, known as al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya, is an under-
studied work in the academy despite the prominence it achieved through the
many lengthy commentaries that were written on it by key classical thinkers.
In recent years, a number of Turkish academics have produced valuable stud-
ies and critical editions of manuscripts related to al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya to
address the lacuna in studies of this aspect of Islamic ethics, thus making these
Turkish secondary sources indispensable to our study of al-Ījī’s ethics.2
While it may not be uncommon to overlook al-Ījī’s ethical treatise because it
restates much of what is found in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) Nasearean
Ethics in an abridged format, Mustakim Arıcı argues that it is in fact this abridged
presentation that is one of the most original aspects of al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya
(see Arıcı 2009, 141). The nature of the madrasa system of education that devel-
oped in Ottoman period as well as the “mobile schools” (madrasat al-sayyār)
that al-Ījī was a teacher in during the Īlkhānid era made abridged forms of
various key topics that can be easily carried as texts, memorized, and discussed
among teachers and students essential to standardizing education at this
time. These abridged texts were also intentionally brief in their presentation
to ensure proper student and teacher contact in the process of learning since
they could not easily be understood without extensive teacher commentaries.
This was intended to facilitate the objective of education becoming a spiritu-
ally formative process for students of Islamic knowledge.
Al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya was such a text that allowed for lengthy commentar-
ies to be composed by a range of scholars. The Nāṣirean Ethics upon which
al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya is derived, was heavily influenced by the ethics of
2 The first known publication of Ṭaşköprūzāde’s commentary on al-Ījī’s ethics from manu-
script form was Elzem İçöz in 2007 as a master’s thesis. This was followed by Mustakim Arıcı
who published al-Ījī’s treatise with an overview of some of the available commentaries in
2009. Derya Topalcık edited a manuscript of al-Kirmānī’s commentary for her master’s the-
sis. Kevser Kösem edited Istanbūlī’s commentary as her master’s thesis. For further reference
see: Arıcı 2009; İçöz 2007; Topalcık 2007; Ṭaşköprüzāde 2014.
10.1163/24685542-12340065 | Journal of Islamic Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37

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Miskawayh whose work in turn incorporated elements of the Nicomachean

Ethics of Aristotle.3 The discussions regarding the various virtues, and their
extreme forms of excess or deficiency, is one of the most obvious influences of
the Nicomachean Ethics. As Islamic philosophical ethics evolved over the cen-
turies, Muslim scholars restructured, omitted, and made countless additions
to various aspects of ancient philosophy they inherited which included ethi-
cal philosophy. This study examines the way ethical philosophy manifested
in the sixteenth century Ottoman era through analyzing the commentary of
Ṭaşköprüzāde on al-Ījī’s al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya.
2 Ṭaşköprüzāde Ahmed Efendi (d. 968/1561)
Ṭaşköprüzāde Aḥmad Efendi was born in Bursa in 900/1495 to a family known

for its many prominent scholars (Fleming, Babinger, and Woodhead 1999; Yavuz
2011). This included his own father Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafā Efendi who served
as a preceptor to Sultan Selim I (r. 918–26/1512–20). Ṭaşköprüzāde’s access to
the leading scholars in the Ottoman era was significant to his formation as a
scholar of Islamic sciences. His autobiography in the Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda (“The
Key to Happiness”) indicates that he taught at various renowned Ottoman
madrasas of his time. He published extensively in the fields of philosophical
theology (kalām), philosophy, and Sufism. His most well-known contributions
are the al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmaniyya fī ʿUlamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya (“The
Red Anemones on the Scholars of the Ottoman Empire”) in which, following
the genre of biographical dictionary works, he lists the religious scholars of
the Ottoman era through his time. Another important work of Ṭaşköprüzāde
is al-Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda, which outlines the various fields of Islamic knowledge.
Additionally, Ṭaşköprüzāde was a prolific scholar who published various trea-
tises and texts in the fields of logic, Arabic language (ṣarf, naḥw, and balāgha),
history, philosophy, and theology. His prominence as a scholar provides an
understanding of Islamic religious thought in the Ottoman period.
3 Dunlop who was among the earliest to publish on the Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic argues
that one reference to Nicomachean by name is found in the works of al-Farābī. Manuscripts
of the Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic are also rare, indicating that Muslim ethical philoso-
phers were not relying directly on the Aristotelean text but rather on the subsequent rendi-
tions of it through the mediums of al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā and later Miskawayh and al-Ṭūṣī
(see Dunlop 1962; and Akasoy and Fidora 2005, 8–109).

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6 Salem
3 Situating Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Writings in the Broader Field

of Islamic Ethics
As previously mentioned, Islamic philosophical ethics owes much of its foun-

dations to the ethical text of Miskawayh, known as Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (“The
Refinement of Character”) in which he incorporated elements of Aristotelean
ethical works into a format that aligned with Muslim ideals of ethical behav-
ior derived from Muslim scripture and prophetic practice (Miskawayh 2002,
xv–xix; see also Fakhry 1991, 61–64). Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī followed Miskawayh in
composing his writings on ethics based upon Miskawayh’s philosophical model.
Thus, the Nāṣirean Ethics was heavily influenced by the ethics of Miskawayh
and like Miskawayh, utilized several concepts derived the Nicomachean Ethics
of Aristotle. Numerous texts on ethics that emerge after al-Ṭūsī either directly
or indirectly relied on al-Ṭūsī’s Nāṣirean Ethics in their own writings. As previ-
ously mentioned, al-Ījī’s al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya was such a text that restruc-
tured al-Ṭūsī’s ethics into a brief newly abridged format that gave it flexibility
in usage. Its brevity also provided its interpreters, such as Ṭaşköprüzāde, a sig-
nificant amount of latitude to make their own distinctive contributions based
upon their own understanding of ethics and virtues.
Al-Ījī composed his writings at a time which has been termed as a period of
simultaneous “confessional ambiguity and confessional polarization” between
Sunnīs and Shīʿīs during the Īlkhānid era.4 Unlike the ʿAbbāsids, the Īlkhānids
whose sovereigns initially converted to Sunnī Islam proved under the rule of
Ghāzān Khān (r. 694–703/1295–1304) to be highly sympathetic with protecting
the interests of descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad (ahl al-bayt). Ghāzān
Khan reversed much of the practices of hostility towards the ahl al-bayt by
many of the ʿAbbāsid rulers who were threatened by the potential power that
the descendants of the Prophet possessed in challenging the validity of their
claims to power based on the proximity of the ʿAbbāsid lineage to that of
the Prophet.
Among Ghāzān Khān’s innovations was to build dār al-siyādāt (house
of sayyids) in the major cities of the Īlkhānid state that would parallel other
established institutions such as madrasas (schools) and Sufi zāwiyas (monas-
teries) (Pfeiffer 2014, 146). These actions would have been regarded as recon-
ciliatory acts that would have likely facilitated exchanges between Sunnī and
Shīʿī scholars at the time. This “confessional ambiguity” prevalent during the
Īlkhānid period facilitated the overlapping influence of al-Ṭūsī’s writings to
both Sunnī and Shīʿī scholars of the region which included ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī.
4 This term is coined by Judith Pfeiffer (2014, 129–168).

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After the reign of Ghāzān Khān, the Īlkhānids shifted theological alliances
under the rule of Öljeitü (r. 704–716/1304–1316) who converted to Shīʿism.
Judith Pfeiffer describes the changes that occur under Öljeitü writing:
He made Twelver Shiʿism the state religion of the Ilkhanate by having

the khuṭba read in the Twelver Shiʿi way, putting the Shiʿi shahada on his
coins, and recruiting Shiʿi theologians from Iraq to his ambulant court,
ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, the son of one of the Shiʿi notables from Ḥilla who had
participated in one of the delegations to Hülegü during the Mongol con-
quest of Baghdad.
Pfeiffer 2014, 151
Al-Ījī who lived through this era would have also encountered the confes-
sional polarization that was prevalent during Öljeitü’s reign between Sunnīs
and Shīʿīs. Al-Ījī through his many writings that became foundational to
the later Sunnī theologians through the Ottoman era of scholarship used
the methodology of the late Ashʿarīs (muta‌ʾakhkhirīn) based in rational dis-
course, rather than polemics, to engage issues of both convergence and diver-
gence between Sunnī and Shīʿī thinkers. ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī was a key figure in
the Sunnī kalām tradition which after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī (d. 606/1210) com-
bined aspects of Avicennan philosophy and post-classical Ashʿarī theology
into a new school known as the “muta‌ʾakhkhirīn” or late Ashʿarī theological
school. His two most famed students, al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) and al-Jurjānī
(d. 816/1413), later ensured the continuation of this school through writing
lengthy commentaries on al-Ījī’s texts which were followed by further com-
mentaries. This school of rationalist Sunnī theology became established in
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Ottoman lands as immigrant scholars from former Īlkhānid
and Tīmūrid era learning centers found new support in Ottoman madrasas.
Abdurrahman Atcıl writes:
During the early fifteenth century, scholars from Iran such as

Burhaneddin Haydar Herevi (d. 1426–35), who studied under Sadeddin
Taftazani (d. 1390), as well as Seyyid Ali Acemi (d. 1455/56) and Fahreddin
Acemi (d. 1460/61 or 1468), who both were trained by Seyyid Şerif
Cürcani (d. 1413), agreed to teach in the Ottoman madrasas. Siraceddin
Halebi, who had been forced to leave Samarkand by Timur, left
Transoxiana for Ottoman lands; Murad II appointed him to his newly
built madrasa, which later became known as Halebi Madrasa after his
teacher…. During the fifteenth century, the presence of both immi-
grant scholars and those who had been educated in the more developed

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8 Salem
learning centers seems to have raised the level of learning in Anatolia and
Ottoman lands in general.
Atçıl 2017, 34–35
While the shift in scholastic centers from the Īlkhānid to the Ottoman era is
clearly prevalent in the genealogy of Sunnī philosophical kalām which appear
during this era, it appears that there is also an element of adherence to these
intellectual genealogies in the way texts of philosophical ethics were com-
posed. In other words, while the ambiguity during the Īlkhānid period allowed
for exchanges between Shīʿī ethical works like al-Ṭūsī’s to be utilized by Sunnī
scholars such al-Ījī, there appears to be a simultaneous attempt for later schol-
ars to give preference to an intellectual lineage of Sunnī scholars by choos-
ing to write commentaries on the shorter work of al-Ījī for example rather
than al-Ṭūsī.
It is difficult to ascertain whether this was an attitude of what was either
a polarization or a more friendly form of rivalry among Sunnī and Shīʿī phi-
losophers that evolved in the years which followed another important philo-
sophical and theological work of al-Ṭūsī known as the Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid (“The
Distillation of Principles”). Late Ashʿarī scholars who engaged Avicennan phi-
losophy in their new school of Sunnī philosophical theology (kalām) and Shīʿī
scholars used the Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid of al-Ṭūsī as a platform of both debate and
dialogue between what eventually formed the Sunnī Ottoman and the Shīʿī
Ṣafavid schools of philosophy. Hence, it appears that ethics that also incorpo-
rated philosophy, evolved after the thirteenth century along similar streams
of Sunnī and Shīʿī schools of philosophy which emerge in the centuries
after al-Ṭūsī.
This is evident in examining the way in which various Sunnī scholars selec-
tively rely upon the major Sunnī scholar al-Ījī to write commentaries on philo-
sophical ethics rather than al-Ṭūsī. This tendency to not rely on al-Ṭūsī without
an intermediary Sunnī scholar, seems to be established more firmly in the
Ottoman era. While there are certainly exceptions such the ethical treatise of
Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī (d. 908/1502, though not Ottoman), it appears that the exclu-
sively Sunnī interpreters of al-Ījī’s Akhlāq are doing so with preference to their
own intellectual genealogy of Sunnī philosophical theologians. Commentaries
on al-Ījī’s ethics which precede that of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s are by the following
writers: Shams al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 786/1384), Sayf al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Abharī
(d. 780/1397), and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāzarūnī (d. unknown).5 Additionally, the
5 For a detailed survey of the commentaries on al-Akhlāq alʿAḍudiyya see forthcoming chapter
Salem 2021.

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Ottoman scholar Müneccimbaşı Derviş Ahmed Dede (d. 1113/1702), who writes
much later than Ṭaşköprüzāde has what is by far the lengthiest commentary
on the ethics of al-Ījī that incorporates some elements of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s com-
mentary while making significant new contributions.
In addition to the commentaries on al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya which preceded
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary, Ṭaşköprüzāde is writing within a genre of other
ethics texts that predate his work. Among the most well-known works in
philosophical ethics during the Ottoman era was the Akhlāq al-Jalālī by Jalāl
al-Dīn al-Davānī. Davānī’s ethics drew upon the Nāṣirean Ethics to create a
new rendition of this work at the bequest of the Akkoyunlu ruler Uzun Ḥasan
(r. 856–82/1452–78). As Christopher Markiewicz highlights, Davānī’s ver-
sion of ethics has two important divergences from the Nāṣirean Ethics which
reflect the political and scholastic orientation of Davānī’s fourteenth century
(Markiewicz 2019, 248).
The first is the extent to which the ideal ruler is highlighted in terms of his
just and ethical conduct. Markiewicz argues that this political emphasis, which
was notably a lesser focus of al-Ṭūsī, highlights the political realities of his time
in which various sultanates were vying for legitimacy and stability after the
abolishment of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. The second divergence of Davānī’s writ-
ings according to Markiewicz, is the theosophical Sufism that is manifested in
the language of Davānī’s ethics. This entailed restructuring al-Ṭūsī’s framing of
human purpose to be one in which the human is the center of cosmology that
is centered on service to God (Markiewicz 2019, 249).
This is significant to our study of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s work because the Jalālean
Ethics of Davānī was highly respected in the Ottoman court as demonstrated
in the Ottoman library records (Yılmaz 2019, 1: 510–518). This would have most
likely meant that Ṭaşköprüzāde had been influenced by this predecessor in
his own ethical writings intended for the Ottoman court. Indeed, as our close
study of the contents of Ṭaşköprüzāde commentary on al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya
below highlight, this text has a parallel focus on ideal leadership qualities for
Ottoman heads of state. Additionally, we see that for Ṭaşköprüzāde, Sufism is
infused with his ethical philosophy, as is evident throughout his text.
Other writings that predate Ṭaşköprüzāde’s ethical writings include,
Akhlāq-i-Jamālī by Jamāl al-Dīn Aksarayī (d. 791/1389), Akhlāq-i-Muḥsinī by
Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-Kāshifī (d. 910/1504), and Akhlāq-i-Manṣūrī by Ghiyāth al-Dīn
Manṣūr b. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 948/1541). Kınalızāde Aḥmed Efendi
(d. 979/1572) is a contemporary of Ṭaşköprüzāde who also composes another
famous work on Muslim philosophical ethics in Ottoman Turkish known as
Akhlāq-i ʿAlāʾī. One shared aspect of all of these ethical works is that they are
composed in either Persian or Ottoman Turkish.

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While Persian was easily understood as it was a court language even among
Turkic rulers, al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya and its commentaries distinguish them-
selves by being in the Arabic language. This distinction is significant in that
by presenting Islamic moral philosophy in the language of religious learning,
al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya reorients the primary readership of Muslim philosophi-
cal ethics from circles of court elites, who may have read philosophical ethics
as literature, to the mainstream religious audiences for whom Arabic is the lan-
guage of religious learning. As already mentioned, the conciseness of al-Akhlāq
al-ʿAḍudiyya gives it a flexibility that allows it to be used in madrasa networks,
many of which were mobile during the Īlkhānid era. Finally, the short struc-
ture of al-Ījī’s ethics allows for an extensive amount of autonomy in the way
that commentators on the text find meaning in Muslim philosophical ethics.
This is evident in the richness of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s extensive commentary that is
approximately more than ten times the length of al-Ījī’s original text.
4 Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Ethical Praxis of al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya
The following analysis of the contents of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s writings outlines

his chapter on the theoretical framework for Islamic ethics followed by an
examination of the way Ṭaşköprüzāde envisioned the al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya
should be applied in practice. Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary follows the familiar
Nāṣerean structure in its division of the text into a section on theoretical ethics
(akhlāq al-naẓarī) followed by a section on the methods of cultivation of the
virtues highlighted in the first section. The third and fourth sections discuss
household management and politics, respectively. In the first two sections of
this text, we not only find extensive overlap with the skeletal structure of the
Nicomachean view of virtues in terms of excess and deficiency, but we also see
that for Ṭaşköprüzāde many concepts which originated in Aristotle’s writings
are now fully incorporated into the fold of Islamic ethical thought and praxis
based upon Ṭaşköprüzāde’s own Islamic framework.
While some may argue that this is evidence that Islamic philosophical ethics
had been Hellenized by Ṭaşköprüzāde’s era, a consideration that the same peo-
ples and lands in parts of the Middle East and Central Asia for whom Aristotle’s
writings were known overlapped with the same peoples who converted to
Islam would allow for a more nuanced interpretation. From this perspective,
the engagement of ancient philosophy and Islamic thought was a foreseeable
outcome of this environment. The dominance of Islamic scriptures and values
of chivalry ( futuwwa) often attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and other Muslim
figures throughout this text, as well as the adaptation of the virtues of Aristotle

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to an Islamic framework, appears to indicate that it was a selection of ethical

theories from within the Hellenic tradition that became Islamized in the east,
rather than Islamic ethics being Hellenized through its use of Aristotelean
concepts. This will be analyzed in more depth in the next section examining
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary.
In addition to freely using ideas from ancient philosophy to form elements
of Muslim ethical theories, we find that this work by a Sunnī scholar also sub-
stantially relies on the status of ʿAlī and the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt)
as a source for virtuous conduct. Ṭaşköprüzāde’s work is demonstrative of a
dominant view among Sunnī pious figures that reverence for ʿAlī and the fam-
ily of the Prophet was an element of devotional practice. In contrast to the
Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphates whose claim to power included claims of
proximity to the lineage of the Prophet and were therefore threatened by the
more direct descendants of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt), Sunnī sovereigns such
as the Īlkhānids and Ottomans regard the protection and favor of the ahl al-
bayt as not only a form of piety aligned with Sunnī piety, but also a politically
expedient method of legitimacy among the Sunnī masses who revered the
ahl al-bayt. Vefa Erginbaş writes of the Ottoman era in which Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
scholarship is rooted saying:
A little recognized fact about Sunnism, at least as the Ottomans had

experienced it, was the strong ahl al-baytist bent it incorporated. Ahl
al-baytism is defined as reverence among Sunnis towards the family of
Muhammad and his descendants, including the Twelve Imams…. The
ahl al-baytist individual would continue to revere the first three caliphs,
and would not necessarily accept various notions tied to the Shiite ver-
sion of the imamate. Revering Ali has been integral to Sunni Islam as Ali
was the legitimately recognized fourth caliph, however, with the impact
of cross-sectarian fertilization in the Islamic world that came after the
Mongol invasions and the increasing role of Alid Sufism, ahl al-baytism
made great strides in Sunni communities. This tradition which openly
venerates ahl al-bayt, first manifested itself in the futuwwah networks
and various Sufi groups.
Erginbaş 2019, 72–73
In addition to the theoretical framework that comprised Muslim philosophi-

cal ethics during Ṭaşköprüzāde’s time, his commentary reveals significant
information about the political thought and social order of his Ottoman era.
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s ethics demonstrates that like the commentaries by those who
preceded him such as Dawwānī who was writing for the Akkoyunlu sovereigns,

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12 Salem
he too utilizes Sufism and spirituality to highlight the elements of ideal leader-
ship in the context of Ottoman rulers. This will be discussed at length below.
Finally, we also find the social structures of Ottoman society and the expecta-
tions for each of the societal roles in Ṭaşköprüzāde’s era. This too will be ana-
lyzed below.
5 Ethıcal Theory (Akhlāq al-Naẓarī)
5.1 Can Character Change?

In his introduction to the treatise, al-Ījī writes that he has divided his trea-
tise into four segments (maqālāt). The first segment (maqāla) as the author
states is based on ethical theory. The treatise begins by examining the question
of whether character can change. Al-Ījī begins by saying that it is known that
character changes based on evidence from experience, religious scripture, and
logic. Character (al-khuluq) is is defined as being behaviors that a person is
inclined towards with ease. Ṭaşköprüzāde begins his commentary on al-Ījī’s
statement by comparing the ability to reform character to the ability to to
improve one’s handwriting. He writes that even though beautiful handwrit-
ing comes more naturally for some than others, it can be improved over time
with persistence and practice. In this way, character can also be improved with
persistence and practice.6
Ṭaşköprüzāde engages what he describes as views of differing philosphers
on the capacity of character to change by arguing that children and youth are
corrected for poor behavior that exhibits bad character and encouraged to
exhibit good character precisely because character has the capacity to change
in the first place. He attributes this to experiental knowledge of seeing children
universally guided to character improvement by parents and teachers. He pro-
ceeds further to quote ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) saying, “The hearts of youth
resemble an open field that accepts whatever is planted in it. So discipline the
heart before it grows hard or distracted with other matters.” He follows this
up with a well known ḥadīth, “Each person is born upon a primordial nature
( fiṭra). Then his mother and father make him a Christian, Jew, or a Magian.”
6 Mustakim Arıcı writes that Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (d. 260/873) translated the Greek term etikos as
“ḥāl,” “istiʿdād,” and “hayʾat al-nafs” which may be translated into English as disposition. Ibn
Sīnā preferred the word “malaka” instead which implies the capacity to easily acquire a vir-
tue. Al-Ghazālī adopted the Avicennan concept of the acquisition of virtue. Arıcı argues that
al-Ṭūṣī followed the Avicennan and Ghazālian model in his view of character and disposition
(see Arıcı 2016a, 36–68; Arıcı 2016d, 39–41).

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Ṭaşköprüzāde addresses the scriptural evidence for the ability to change

character with highlighting the many verses that urge humans to abandon
character flaws and sinful action. He links these categories of verses to another
one in which God tells humanity that He does not burden a people with more
than they can handle (see Q 2:286). The commentator then reasons that the
combination of these Qurʾānic verses indicate that character can be changed
since the scriptural injunctions urging good character would contradict the
principle laid out in other parts of the Qurʾān promising that God does not
burden humans with more than they can bear, and therefore changing bad
character into good must be possible.
Ṭaşköprüzāde engages this further through citing al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt
al-Anwār (“Niche of Lights”) in which al-Ghazālī cites the “sophistry of fools”
(mughālaṭat al-ḥamqā) who claim that they are born with vile character traits
they cannot change. Al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt is distinguished by its engagement of
philosphy and mysticism in its discussions on the human soul. Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
use of this Ghazālian text to expound upon al-Ījī’s ethics is reflective of the
literature that was prevalent in Ottoman thought.
Ṭaşköprüzāde concludes his extensive commentary on whether character
can change through providing the central role that education and selectivity
in choosing mentors for children to indicate logical evidence for this. If it were
not possible for individuals to change or improve their character, it would not
make a difference where children went to school and who became their tutors.
This serves as a segue to the essence of al-Ījī’s discussion of human virtues.
Al-Ījī writes that the human soul (nafs) has three capacities which are, reason-
ing (nuṭq), anger (ghaḍab), and physical desire (shahwa). He writes that each of
these capacities can develop into virtues when they are moderated within the
human being. Alternatively, their excesses or their deficiencies yield human
vices that must be avoided. Ṭaşköprüzāde comments that humans share the
capacities of anger and desire with animals while the capacity of reasoning is
distinctive only to humans. He writes that the ability to reason is the essence
( jawhar) of the human soul (rūḥ) and as a result is referred to as the rational
animal (nafs al-nāṭiqa) whose quality is to reason (naẓar) through the ability
to know intelligibles (maʿqūlāt).
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that there are three parts to the soul that correlate to
each of these three capacities. The part of the soul which reasons and con-
ceptualizes the world around them is said to originate in the brain and it is
labeled as the “sovereign soul” or al-nafs al-malakī. This characterization sup-
ports Ṭaşköprüzāde’s statements regarding the primacy of reason to elevating
humans above other animals. When an individual is pushed to self-defense
emanating from the capacity to anger, this part of the soul is known as the

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“predatory soul” or al-nafs al-sabuʿiyya which Ṭaşköprüzāde says is rooted in

the heart. Finally, when an individual is drawn to physical benefits then this is
derived from the capacity of physical desire and this type of soul is categorized
by Ṭaşköprüzāde as the “bestial soul” or al-nafs al-bahīmī.
These examples used by Ṭaşköprüzāde indicate his incorporation of the
Neoplatonic image of the tripartite soul into what will be seen to be a distinctly
Islamic worldview. Rather than an uncritical use of concepts first appearing in
Greek philosophy, Ṭaşköprüzāde’s grasp of these concepts and the way in which
he interweaves them with Qurʾān, ḥadīths, reports attributed to early pious fig-
ures, and references to other Islamic works such as that of the Ghazālian tradi-
tion are evident that ethical philosophy developed into its own independent
model through its encounter with the Islamic intellectual tradition. Ancient
philosphy was an integral element of this Islamic intellectual tradition just as
ancient philosophy continued to evolve through its encounter with Islam.
5.2 Moderation and Virtues

The three capacities of the nafs of reason, anger, and desire are used by al-Ījī as
a foundation for discussion in the rest of the section on virtues and vices. The
balanced state of the capacity to reason is described as wisdom (ḥikma). Its
excess is deceitfulness or sneakiness ( jarbaza) while its deficiency is dimwit-
tedness (ghabāwa). Ṭaşköprüzāde’s references in his discussion in this section
include verses from the Qurʾān, several references to ḥadīth and the sayings of
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib as well as a quote from al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (“Revival
of the Religious Sciences”).
Al-Ījī proceeds by saying that balance in the capacity of anger leads to cour-
age (shajāʿa). The connection between courage and anger as its driving force
is worthy of note. An excess of anger is said to lead to recklessness (tahawwur)
while its deficiency leads to cawardice (al-jubn). Ṭaşköprüzāde engages each
of these three character traits at length using a similar format as mentioned
above. After citing Qurʾānic references, he quotes a ḥadīth stating “God loves
courage, even if it is in killing a scorpion” followed by a quote of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib
saying, “Who sets forth quickly conquers and who hesitates is conquered.”
Recklessness is described as thoughtlessly exerting oneself in situations that
require restraint such as entering a war when one is outnumbered. Cowardice
on the other hand, is the opposite situation in which one does not set forth
in times that need one to take clear and decisive action. The verse from the
Qurʾān, “Do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength
would depart, (Q 8:46)” is cited in support. This is followed by three sayings of
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib related to courage juxtaposed with a similar quote attributed to
the Umayyad caliph Muʿāwiya (r. 41–60/661–80).

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The moderation of the capacity for physical desire is said to lead to self-
restraint (ʿiffa). Ṭaşköprüzāde describes the ability to exhibit self-restraint as
a form of freedom, as one is not bound by their desires. He cites a Qurʾānic
verse, a ḥadīth, and a saying of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib saying that the “Ornament of
the believer is humility and their beauty lies in self-restraint.” The excess of
the capacity of desire is debauchery ( fujūr) and its deficiency manifests in the
form of apathy ( jumūd). The commonly cited verse, “Eat and drink but not to
excess,” (Q 7:31) is referenced here. Ṭaşköprüzāde remarks that a human who
lacks desire to eat, drink, and procreate is at the level of vegetation and inferior
to the rank of animals. This interpretation is indicative of a hiearchical view,
on the part of Ṭaşköprüzade, of living beings.
Thus according to al-Ījī’s ethics, the foundational virtues are three. They
are wisdom, courage, and self-restraint. Two vices are at the two extremes of
each of the three virtues, making the total of six human vices. Deceitfulness
and dimwitedness are extremes related to the moderate virtue of wisdom.
Recklessness and cowardice are extremes related to the balanced virtue of
courage. Debauchery and apathy are two extremes related to the moderate vir-
tue of self-restraint.
5.3 Subcategories of the Three Virtues of Wisdom, Courage,

and Self-Restraint
Each of these three virtues is divided into further subcategories. Wisdom has
seven subcategories of virtues. They are clarity of thought (ṣafāʾ al-dhihn),
excellence in comprehension ( jawdat al-fahm), intelligence (dhakāʾ), good
conceptualization (ḥusn al-taṣawwur), ease in learning (suhūlat al-taʿallum),
capacity to memorize (ḥifẓ), strong memory (dhukr). Ṭaşköprüzāde comments
briefly on each of these sub-virtues in order to expound upon these single
terms listed by al-Ījī in his treatise. He cites Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s distinction
between thought (dhihn) and intellect (ʿaql) stating that the dhihn is a capac-
ity that possesses the ability to reflect on both what is inward and outward.
Whereas the ʿaql is what distinguishes good and bad.
Ṭaşköprüzāde refers to al-Jurjānī simply as the “pillar” or al-sanad without
specifying his name. Ṭaşköprüzāde’s affirmation of al-Jurjānī’s views on the
preeminence of the intellect in identifying good and bad is indicative of the
shift in Ashʿarī and Māturidī theology that occurs by Ṭaşköprüzāde’s period.
By this time in Ottoman kalām tradition, many of the arguments between the
peripatetic philosophers and the theological philosophers (mutakallimūn)
become far less divisive as many of the issues of debate become reconciled
with common denominators that bring these intellectual streams closer to one
another. What we see in Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary seem indicative of this.

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The extensive use of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib’s sayings to support various aspects of
virtue are worthy of note. They not only demonstrate the reverence that the
Sunnī intellectual tradition also possessed for ʿAlī as an exemplar of piety and
chivalry ( futuwwa), but that by Ṭaşköprüzāde’s era there appears to be con-
fidence in using ʿAlī as a prototype of piety by Sunnī scholars affiliated with
a Sunnī sovereign under the Ottomans. Additionally, Ṭaşköprüzāde’s schol-
arship reflects an evolution in the sophistication of Muslim philosophy and
the engagement of philosophers by the mutakallimūn that takes shape in the
post-Rāzī lineage of al-Ījī and his most prominent students, al-Jurjānī, and
al-Taftāzānī. The thinking of these three philosophical theologians becomes
the framework from which Islamic thought in the Ottoman era is built upon
and from which Ṭaşköprüzāde operates. This is evident throughout his com-
mentary on the ethics of al-Ījī.
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s discussion of the sub-virtues derived from wisdom also
reveals his dependence on a Ghazalian framework of ethics exhibited in the
Mishkāt al-Anwār. The Mishkāt utilizes the verse known as the “light verse”
which reads, “God is the light of the heavens and the earth, (Q 24:35)” to
examine concepts of God’s illumination of the human soul. The relationship
between the mind (dhihn) and the intellect (ʿaql) is also reflective of this world-
view which regards the illumination of the heart to correlate to the illumina-
tion of the mind. This means that according to Ṭaşköprüzāde’s discussion of
the various virtues that derive from wisdom, is an element that is a reflection
of divine light and an element that comes from personal striving to achieve
certain virtues.
This is reminiscent of another poetic verse attributed to al-Shāfiʿī in which
he states, “I complained to Wakīʿ about my poor memory: ‘Give up your sins!’
was his advice to me; ‘For knowledge is a light from Divinity, and the Light of
God is veiled by iniquity’.”7 The contextual background of this worldview in
which knowledge is said to be light (al-ʿilm nūr) and that this light is intrin-
sically linked to spirituality, upright conduct, and God’s light outlined in the
“light verse” is essential to understand the foundations of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s per-
spective which informs his commentary.
The eleven sub-virtues under courage are the following; vast heartedness
(kibar al-nafs), high aspiration (ʿiẓam al-himma), perseverance (ṣabr), to
be unflinching during danger (najda), forbearance (ḥilm), serenity (sukūn),
7 The original source of this translation could not be found. This rhyming English translation
has become ubiquitously used, as it reflects the poetic tone of the Arabic verses from which
it is derived.

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humility (tawāḍuʿ), swiftness to do good (shahāma), endurance (iḥtimāl),

enthusiasm (ḥamiyya), and softness of heart (riqqa). Ṭaşköprüzāde adds a
twelfth virtue to al-Ījī’s list which is the forgiveness of others when one is capa-
ble of revenge.
The first sub-virtue of vast heartedness is elaborated by Ṭaşköprüzāde as
meaning the state of having poverty and wealth be of the same value for one.
The connection to courage lies in the absence of fear of poverty. When one
acquires the absence of this type of fear it is a form of courage that prevents an
individual from making moral compromises out fear of poverty or desire for
wealth. This is in turn regarded as an element of virtue and spiritual chivalry
( futuwwa).
Similar to the example above, Ṭaşköprüzāde demonstrates the way in which
each of the eleven sub-virtues of courage relate to its root virtue. The ability to
maintain high aspirations despite setbacks, perseverance with those setbacks,
to have serenity, and forbearance with hardships along one’s path all require
elements of courage. Similarly, to be swift in doing good actions that might
entail danger or hardship while maintaining humility and gentleness of spirit
also require an element of courage. Ṭaşköprüzāde provides relatively brief
explanations to each of these types of sub-virtues of courage.
After courage, Ṭaşköprüzāde elaborates on eleven sub-virtues of self-
restraint (ʿiffa). These eleven sub-virtues are: shyness (ḥayāʾ), perseverance
(ṣabr), composure (daʿʿa), integrity (nazāha), contentment (qanāʿa), dignity
(waqār), gentleness (rifq), good course of action (ḥusn al-samt), scrupulous-
ness (waraʿ), good management (intiẓām), and being bountiful (sakhāʾ).
Shyness is defined by Ṭaşköprüzāde in his commentary as to feel shame to
partake in actions that are deemed sinful or unethical. He cites a ḥadīth of the
Prophet stating that “shyness (ḥayāʾ) is an element of faith” as well as a say-
ing attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib stating, “Who is clothed with the garment of
shyness, is veiled from others seeing his flaws.” Ṭaşköprüzāde comments that
shyness (ḥayāʾ) also has two extremes of excess and deficiency. Its excess leads
to fearfulness and cowardice while its deficiency leads to a loss of self-respect
and dignity.
The rest of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary on the other sub-virtues of self-
restraint follow this same model. He refers to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib as a source for
two types of perseverance (ṣabr). Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that based upon ʿAlī’s
interpretation, the first form of perseverance falls under courage because it
requires conquering one’s fear of pain and harm. This may also be categorized
as perseverance in acts of worship and good conduct. The second form of per-
severance is a category under the virtue of self-restraint because it is patience

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18 Salem
with refraining from pleasures and joys that are deemed sinful or unethical.
This might be exercising self-restraint in harming one who has harmed oneself
or self-restraint required to abstain from food and drink during the month of
fasting. The extreme of excess in perseverance is labeled by Ṭaşköprüzāde as
being monasticism while its deficiency is gluttony.
The other sub-virtues of composure (daʿʿa) is self-restraint from reacting
when triggered and integrity (nazāha) is elaborated upon by Ṭaşköprüzāde to
mean maintaining self-restraint from opportunities in which one’s integrity
is compromised for worldly gain such as the unlawful acquisition of wealth.
Similarly, contentment (qanāʿa) is self-restraint from desiring things which
one does not possess and thus being satisfied with one’s present condition.
Dignity (waqār) comes from exercising self-restraint from acting thought-
lessly or being reactionary to one’s environment. The act of slowing down and
responding to matters in ways they are due also requires this other form of
self-restraint from indulging in desires to act on whims.
Flexibility and gentleness (rifq) requires self-restraint from the desire to
respond with harshness when gentleness is a wiser response. Good course
of action or good direction (ḥusn al-samt) manifests when one exercises self-
restraint from a spontaneous or desired action for that which is appropriate
and polite. Scrupulousness (waraʿ) is a form of self-restraint from matters
whose permissibility is unclear in order to avoid falling into wrongdoing. The
ambiguity involved in the permissibility of matters one is avoiding creates a
need for even more self-restraint than avoiding actions that are deemed explic-
itly sinful. Finally, both good management (intiẓām) whether it is of one’s time
or priorities as well as being bountiful (sakhāʾ) require self-restraint to control
how one spends their time and self-restraint from the desire to keep goods
for oneself.
Thus, Ṭaşköprüzāde discusses each of the above sub-virtues in relatively
brief explanatory statements that make references to verses from the Qurʾān,
ḥadīths of the Prophet, and sayings of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Al-Ījī concludes this
first segment of his text by writing that the combination of all three foun-
dational virtues of wisdom, courage, and self-restraint is the greater virtue
of justice. From justice is derived the fourteen sub-virtues of, friendship
(ṣadāqa), harmony (ulfa), loyalty (wafāʾ), affection (tawaddud), reciprocation
(mukāfa‌ʾa), good partnership (ḥusn al-shirka), goodness in recompense (ḥusn
al-qaḍāʾ), maintaining bonds of kinship (ṣilat al-raḥim), empathy (shafaqa),
resolving conflicts (iṣlāḥ), reliance on God (tawakkul), submission (taslīm),
serenity (riḍā), and servitude (ʿibāda). Ṭaşköprüzāde provides explanations
for each of these sub-virtues along the same blueprint as the previous sec-
tions mentioned.

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6 Applied Ethics
6.1 How Virtues Are Acquired and Maintained

The section of al-Ījī’s ethical treatise discusses how the virtues elaborated upon
from a theoretical perspective in the first section can be applied and main-
tained from a practical perspective. For this reason, it can be said that the first
two sections of this work complement one another whereas the third and
fourth sections may be considered addendums as will be seen later.
Just as al-Ījī explored the question of whether character can change in his
first section, the author begins by asking another question that will lead to the
discussions in this second section. He asks now that we know what ethical
virtues are, how does an individual who has them maintain them and how
does one who does not possess these virtues acquire them? Al-Ījī asserts that
good character is possessed through one of two ways. Either it is a part of their
natural disposition or it is gained through personal effort. In both cases, one
must work to either preserve good character or acquire it.
Al-Ījī lists four ways in which individuals who possess virtues can preserve
them. The first is to keep the company of individuals who also possess these
virtues and to remain distant from individuals of bad character. Ṭaşköprüzāde
comments on this by expounding upon the powerful impact of relationships
on an individual’s character. He writes that companions who share ethical val-
ues support each other in maintaining these values.
Al-Ījī writes that bad influences similarly come from three types of individu-
als: those who waste time on empty matters, those who spend their time in jest
and satisfying whims, and those who engage in empty debate and polemics.
Ṭaşköprüzāde warns that if these individuals can lead a person of sound char-
acter and learning away from their traits of virtue, then keeping bad company
is an even greater danger to a novice or student of spirituality.
The second way in which good character is preserved is said through the
preoccupation of oneself with intellectual pursuits and learning. Taşköprüzāde
warns of the danger of intellectual pride that can result in this type of exer-
cise. On the other hand, when one finds study challenging, he writes that one
should remind oneself of the esteem which knowledge possesses, its continu-
ity beyond the time it takes to learn, and the clarity of the soul that results from
learning. The centrality of the role of the mind and intellect to the purity of
the soul and refinement of character is reflective of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s intellectual
period in which the mind is considered to play an important role in the refine-
ment of character. Ṭaşköprüzāde is not merely focusing on acts of worship or
asceticism as a source of character development, but also learning and exercis-
ing the intellect.

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The third form of the preservation of virtue is said to be found in seeking

out friends and enemies who will reveal one’s own flaws. If a friend is reluctant
to bring up an individual’s faults out of fear of offense, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes
that one must chastise this friend until they are willing to openly reveal one’s
shortcomings. Finally, when one becomes aware that one is starting to neglect
in one’s adherence to the virtues one already possesses, al-Ījī writes that they
must recalibrate themselves through spiritual discipline.
The antidote to spiritual ailments and character flaws follows a similar for-
mulaic outline. If one finds that they possess certain character flaws or vices,
then they must do the opposite of what they are inclined to do from among
the virtues. Al-Ījī writes that if this is not a sufficient cure, then one must
do the opposite vice. Ṭaşköprüzāde gives the example that if one has the char-
acter flaw of stinginess and they are unable to cure it with generosity, then
they should do the opposite in terms of spending excessively in order to
train the self to give more freely. The fourth resolution of spiritual ailments,
if these three fail, is said to happen by undergoing harsh spiritual discipline.
6.2 Three Root Faculties from Which Spiritual Ailments Arise

After these initial discussions, Ṭaşköprüzāde adds an extensive analysis of
al-Ījī’s three foundational faculties from which other vices arise. This appears
to be the author’s attempt to format the second section of this treatise on
applied ethics to include information that mirrors the structure of the first sec-
tion. Al-Ījī writes that all spiritual ailments arise from the faculty of reason
(quwwat al-naẓariyya), the faculty of defense (quwwat al-dafʿiyya), or the fac-
ulty of attraction (quwwat al-jadhbiyya).
Ṭaşköprüzāde expands upon this by writing that there are three vices that
are rooted in the faculty of reason. The first is confusion (ḥayra). This arises
when an individual is exposed to an abundance of information with differ-
ent claims that contradict each other. The result is an inability to think clearly
because one is unable to discern between conflicting views. This in turn mani-
fests in a state of confusion in an individual. The cure to this spiritual ailment
is said to be in practicing logic and debate (manṭiq wa-munāẓara) and other
fields rooted in the study of reason. Sharpening one’s ability to think is said to
cure confusion through enabling one to critically analyze the information they
have at hand and assess what is true and what is false.
The next vice that arises from the faculty of reason is that of simple igno-
rance ( jahl basīṭ). Simple ignorance is defined as a lack of knowledge and edu-
cation. Ṭaşköprüzāde expands on this by claiming that the cause of this type of
ignorance is an excessive attachment to worldly pleasures and comforts that
makes one apathetic to the rigors necessitated by the pursuit of knowledge.

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Ṭaşköprüzāde references relevant sections of the Qurʾān such as, “The worst
creatures in God’s eyes are those who are [willfully] deaf and dumb, who
do not reason, (Q 8:22).” He then uses this supporting scriptural evidence to
remind the reader of the philosophical assertion that that which distinguishes
humanity from other animals is their ability to reason.
Compound ignorance ( jahl murakkab) is the third vice that al-Ījī claims
is rooted in the faculty of reason. Whereas simple ignorance is easy to cure
through education, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that compound ignorance is virtually
impossible to alleviate because the individual believes that they are knowl-
edgeable and are thus blinded to their ignorance. It is worthy of note that
Ṭaşköprüzāde lists engaging in mathematics as a possible cure for compound
ignorance. The rootedness of ancient philosophy in the ethical philosophy
of Ottoman period is reflected in this discussion. Ṭaşköprüzāde reminds the
reader that the word for mathematics in Arabic is riyāḍiyyāt which means
“exercise” because it exercises the mind. He writes that ancient philosophers
used to study mathematics before other fields in order to exercise their intel-
lects to recognize objective facts since mathematics is far easier to resolve in
terms of objective truth and falsehood.
From the faculty of defense (quwwat al-dafʿiyya) arise three vices. Al-Ījī lists
these as anger (ghaḍab), cowardice ( jubn), and fear (khawf). Ṭaşköprüzāde
writes that anger is among the most dangerous of vices because it leads to a
loss of temper and this leads to destruction that often cannot be mended once
anger is unleashed. He cites a ḥadīth from the Prophet saying, “The worst of you
are those who are angered most quickly and calm down slowly” (Ṭaşköprüzāde
2014, 127). Ṭaşköprüzāde compares one who gets caught up in anger like one
who gets caught in a tide that rises higher and higher.
To avoid the dangers of excess anger, al-Ījī lists ten causes of anger that must
be avoided. They are vanity (ʿujb), arrogance (takabbur), showing off (iftikhār),
altercation (marāʾ), prestige ( jāh), joking (mizāḥ), mockery (istihzāʾ), deceit
(ghadr), harm (ḍaym), and vying in valuables (ṭalab mā yatanāfas fīhi min
al-jawāhir). Ṭaşköprüzāde follows the model of what came earlier to provide
further explanatory discussion to each of these vices rooted in anger. One note-
worthy cure to the ailments of arrogance was to travel to places where one is
unknown and will not be treated with any distinction. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes
that travel and obscurity are antidotes for much of the aspects of vanity, arro-
gance, and desire for prestige that leads to anger with those who violate these
instincts rooted in vice.
Fear (khawf ) is said to be the third vice that arises from the faculty of defense.
Ṭaşköprüzāde comments on this by defining fear as a state of apprehension
about the future and the unknown. He writes that fear can be paralyzing to

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the person who possesses this state. Ṭaşköprüzāde comments that fear is of
two types of things. That which one has control over and that which one does
not have control over. If it is something that one can impact with their own
actions, then al-Ījī writes that one must remove the causes of fear. If it is a mat-
ter which the individual has no control over Ṭaşköprüzāde elaborates saying
that one must focus their trust on God in whose power is all affairs.
Al-Ījī lists three vices that arise from the faculty of attraction (quwwat al-
jadhb). These are greed (ḥirṣ), laziness (baṭāla), and sadness (ḥuzn). Greed
is defined by Ṭaşköprüzāde to entail gluttony in worldly desires related to
food, drink, and intimacy. He writes that one who is overcome with glut-
tony becomes debased through having low aspirations and high anxieties.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that such an individual spends the entirety of their time
scheming about how they will satisfy their desires, making them even lower
than animals in rank. He makes a comparison of a gluttonous person to a pig
or an elephant. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that such an individual can be cured by
reflection on how little one benefits from a life consumed by gluttony as well as
how the pleasures of this world are only temporary and passing.
Ṭaşköprüzāde continues his commentary on the three vices derived from
the faculty of attraction by referring to the verse, “Did you think We had cre-
ated you in vain, and that you would not be brought back to Us?” (Q 23:115) to
elaborate on the vice of laziness. Laziness is related to the faculty of attraction
because it entails attraction to sleep and comfort that “pulls” and individual
away from productivity. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that when individuals are over-
come by a state of lethargy, they are not doing what the Qurʾān says that they
were created to do, namely to live a life that exhibits servitude to the divine.
Ṭaşköprüzāde says that laziness prevents an individual from attaining the
thing that grants a person the most joy in life, i.e. a relationship with God. He
also writes that a lazy person is hindered by their lethargy from doing the types
of good actions in the world that will result in reward in the afterlife.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that the antidote to this spiritual ailment is to keep
company with those who are energetic and productive to train oneself to be
active. Additionally, he recommends that such a person think about the ben-
efits of being active and listen to the success stories of people who have strived
in their lives. Along with this, he also writes that one should think about the
cases of people who were similarly lazy in their lives and look at the negative
impacts of this mindset.
Finally, the third spiritual ailment derived from the faculty of attraction is
sadness. Ṭaşköprüzāde explains the connection between the two by defining
sadness as pain felt because of losing that which is desired and not acquiring
things one wishes to have. Thus, desire for what is gained or lost is rooted in

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a form of attraction to them. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that the best way to over-
come sadness is by devoting oneself to doing good in the world. He reasons
that that this is because good works and service to others are actions that have
permanence and will not be lost, as they are recorded by God as a testament
to a person’s life. Serving others and doing good will thus create a shift in one’s
attachment to things that are permanent rather than the objects of this world
which they have lost due to their impermanence.
7 Household Management (Tadbīr al-Manzil)
The first two sections of the ethics of al-Ījī along with their commentaries
are arguably the most significant part of this text. It is also the section of the
text that has drawn from the Aristotelean tradition in its earliest form and has
evolved and changed along with the many thinkers who have reinterpreted
this philosophical ethics. The section on politics and household management
were added later to the philosophy of ethics as an addendum. This format can
be found in the Nāṣearean Ethics of al-Ṭūsī from which al-Ījī draws his own
treatise. The tone and style of the third section demonstrates a discernible
shift in tone and style as it moves from discussion of virtues on both a theo-
retical and applied level to practical matters that deal with household man-
agement. Ṭaşköprūzāde’s commentary is extensive in this section. Although
it has less relevance to philosophy or mysticism, it reveals the social fabric of
Ottoman society that was heavily stratified and segregated by gender. Much
of the discussions of Ṭaşköprüzāde on relationships between husbands and
wives would be considered outdated in a contemporary context as would the
discussion on the section on slaves and household servants. Since a study of
the history of gender relations, societal structure, slavery, and the sociology
of Ottoman society are all topics which are beyond the scope of this paper, a
brief overview of the section will be provided without delving into extensive
discussion on these subjects.
7.1 Wealth Management

The basis of household management (tadbīr al-manzil) is introduced by al-Ījī
as being wealth management which is necessary to hold all members of the
household together. Al-Ījī writes that wealth can be examined from three
aspects, its accumulation, its preservation, and its spending. In his subsequent
commentary on the accumulation of wealth, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that there
are four ways in which money is earned. They are trade, farming, animal hus-
bandry, and artisanship. According to Ṭaşköprüzāde, farming is the form of

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work which requires extensive effort with little profits in return. He writes that
trade is the opposite of this. Animal husbandry is said to be in between the two
while artisanship is a continuous source of income with little loss, even when
profits are low.
Ṭaşköprüzāde reveals the societal composition of his contemporary
Ottoman period in his extrapolation on what he categorizes as three classes of
careers. The first class is made up of three other subcategories. The first subcat-
egory is made of good rulers and government officials whose intellect is used
to manage society. The second subcategory is composed of the likes of scribes,
doctors, and astronomers. The third subcategory includes guards, soldiers, and
other types of work that use strength to protect society. This organization of
the first class is reminiscent of the organization of the ideal city (al-madīna
al-fāḍila) or written about by al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) based on the works of
Plato (d. c. 349 BCE). The inclusion of this framework within Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
commentary on the stratifications of Ottoman society is indicative of the
integral role that Muslim societies played in building upon and expanding on
the thinking of ancient philosophers through their own paradigms of societal
organization and virtue.
The second class of work is said to be “common” work that is not highly
respected. This includes singing, sorcery, black market dealing as well as licit
tasks which are deemed repulsive such as leather tanning. Ṭaşköprüzāde com-
ments that because the last profession is one which is necessary, it is not pos-
sible to consider it as “ugly” (qabīḥ) due to its need by society. The third class
of work is considered to be trade and artisanship that is deemed necessary
without being repulsive. This includes professions such as blacksmiths and by
extension woodwork. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that the most beneficial of the third
class of work to society is farming. The detailed descriptions in Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
commentary reflect a class-oriented society of the premodern era in which
individuals were categorized based on their professions.
After a relatively brief discussion on saving wealth which includes diversify-
ing investments and budgeting, Ṭaşköprüzāde segues into a lengthy discussion
regarding four ways in which wealth is spent. The first way is spending “in the
path of God.” After highlighting Qurʾānic references encouraging spending in
charity for the sake of religious benefit, Ṭaşköprüzāde delves into a discussion
that is reminiscent of the ādāb or spiritual etiquettes of worship reminiscent
of the Ghazālian model in his Iḥyāʾ. Ṭaşköprüzāde mentions the verse regard-
ing refraining from harm and reminding the recipient of charity of one’s favors
(see Q 2:264) and writes that keeping this type of inward ethical practice of
humility in giving is conditional for the virtue of that action in the scale of
the Divine.

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Additionally, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that one should seek out those who are in
need but hide their poverty citing the following verse, “[Give] to those needy
who are wholly occupied in God’s way and cannot travel in the land [for trade].
The unknowing might think them rich because of their self-restraint, but you
will recognize them by their characteristic of not begging persistently. God is
well aware of any good you give, (Q 2:273).” Ṭaşköprüzāde couples this with
another verse, “and do not repel the one who asks for help (Q 93:10),” to tell the
reader that they must not neglect those who seek help either.
Al-Ījī lists a number of other conditions for the soundness of acts of charity.
These include keeping it secret so as to avoid the spiritual sin of vanity as well
as giving quickly before one loses their resolve. This section and its subsequent
discussions appear to adapt the Ghazālian model of examining the spiritual
dimensions of good actions.
7.2 Members of the Household

The remainder of the text covers what is deemed as proper management
of three groups within the household, that of spouses, children, and servants.
This division from the outset depicts the audience for the advice in this
section to be those with means to have servants in their homes. This is
despite the fact that household help was far more common in the premodern
era of the region than it is in contemporary contexts. The discussions regard-
ing relationships among husbands and wives is also one which is centered
from a male perspective and addressing a male audience of the sixteenth
century. When addressing topics that are not as abstract and universal as in
the virtues covered in the first two sections, it comes as no surprise that the
social structures of the time will become more prevalent in the text. These
sections on family life provide a picture of personal life in Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
and al-Ījī’s world.
Al-Ījī begins this section of the treatise by writing that the purpose of mar-
riage is beyond simply satisfying one’s desires for companionship but rather
also to perpetuate one’s progeny and to partake in the benefits of a family
structure. He then adds that the three most important traits that a woman
should have is intellect (ʿaql), self-restraint (ʿiffa), and modesty (ḥayāʾ). He also
warns against marrying a woman of extreme beauty or wealth. Ṭaşköprüzāde
comments saying that a woman who is excessively beautiful tends to have a lot
of admirers and suitors which can result in her being either less intelligent or
disloyal to her husband. He also comments that a woman who is excessively
wealthy may see herself as superior to her husband and thus negatively impact
the dynamics of their relationship in which the man is expected to be the head
of the household.

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The treatise also lists a number of behaviors expected of a husband who

treats his wife well. Al-Ījī writes that a man should overlook his wife’s flaws and
give her freedom in order to maintain his dignity in her eyes. Ṭaşköprüzāde
comments that when a husband maintains respect within a relationship, a
wife will be more inclined to make him happy. He writes that a husband must
also dress and ornament his wife in a way that is befitting of her rank and sta-
tus in her community. He has a responsibility to ensure that her appearance
and clothing is beautiful.
Ṭaşköprüzāde also writes that while a man should not consult with his
wife about major decisions in the outside world, he should consult with her
in matters related to the home and family life as well as give her the freedom
to comfortably make decisions on her own on matters related to the house-
hold. Ṭaşköprüzāde argues that if a husband does not consult with his wife on
such matters that it will be a cause of tension and division in the family. He
writes that in matters related to spending on household goods, he should strive
to keep his wife happy and make her feel powerful in the home. He reasons
that women are most knowledgeable about matters related to the best way to
spend on the household and should thus be allowed to do so freely.
Al-Ījī writes that a husband should be generous and kind to the relatives of
his wife and pay them regular visits. Ṭaşköprüzāde explains that not only is
this an act of chivalry (murūʾa) on the part of men, but also a way to gain the
affection and loyalty of his wife. He warns that not honoring her relatives can
become a source of indifference in his wife’s feelings for him.
Ṭaşköprüzāde asserts that a man must never make his wife jealous by pre-
ferring another woman to her, even if the other woman has qualities superior
to those of his wife. He also writes apart from kings and their like, men do not
have a dispensation for the allowance of polygamy. He writes that Arabs call
a second wife a “ḍarra,” which means harm, because of the harm and misfor-
tunes a man with two wives encounters. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that a man with
three wives is like a cauldron with three legs. It keeps boiling forever while
standing on three legs. Finally, he writes that a man with four wives is like
someone who has all harm unleashed towards him, and that they will make
him sick and age before his time.
The next section discusses servants (khadam). Al-Ījī writes that the ser-
vants in a household are like limbs that ensure everything in a household gets
done. Ṭaşköprüzāde adds that without servants, much of the manual tasks of
the home would fall upon the shoulders of the male head of the household
making him excessively busy and lose standing in his home. The remainder
of this section discusses appropriate behavior towards those working for the
household. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that each person must be given tasks that

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are appropriate to their abilities and skills. The head of the household must
monitor each of the needs of the servants and help them in any financial dif-
ficulty or other problem that can be solved through the means possessed by
the head of the household. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that servants must be treated
with kindness and that any mistake on their part must be met with forgive-
ness and flexibility. If there is a need to be firm, he must be careful not to be
oppressive. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that errors must be responded to without any
form of harsh punishment, humiliation, beating, or breaking the dignity of the
servants. He writes that this is not only antithetical to chivalry (murūʾa) but
also against Islamic injunctions. He adds that the head of the household must
abstain from any form of tough behavior towards people who work for the
home in order to maintain his respect in their eyes and maintain his dignity
along with the God’s pleasure with him.
This is followed by a discussion on slaves. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that slaves
are preferred to free servants because they are less likely to leave after a short
period. He writes that slaves have seven rights over their owners. They are that
the master feeds him from the same food he eats, dresses him from the same
quality of clothes he wears, does not overburden him with more work than
he can handle, teaches him the basics of religion, once his daytime work has
ended he does not burden him with further nighttime work, he does not see
him as inferior, and he does not require tasks of him that would entail the slave
missing time bound religious obligations (such as the ritual prayer or breaking
the Ramadan fast). Ṭaşköprüzāde also adds that a master should be flexible
and forgiving in matters that do not lead to shortcomings in religious prac-
tice. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that if slaves were to be categorized based on their
origins, they would be Arabs, Iranians (ʿAjam), Europeans (Rūm), and Indians.
The final major group discussed in this third section of the treatise on
household management is that of children. Al-Ījī begins this section by stating
that among the first things a parent must do for his child is give them a good
name and assign them to a milk mother who has good character and ethics.
Ṭaşköprüzāde comments that a beautiful name entails one which is appropri-
ate to time and place. He writes that this is significant for the character devel-
opment of children in that they grow up to reflect the meanings of their names.
Ṭaşköprüzāde presents the view that appeared in the first section of the
treatise that children are born without major character flaws and that virtue
and vice can be imparted easily when people are younger. He writes that if a
parent finds a negative character trait in one of his children, one should use
the methods outlined in the second section of the treatise to “cure” these flaws.
Some of the tips that Ṭaşköprüzāde gives the reader for child rearing are, make
them used to coarse food, don’t let them eat too much before sleeping so that

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they do not become lazy, lessen the amount of meat they eat to cultivate intel-
ligence and alertness, limit the amount of sugar they consume, and keep them
far from intoxicants.
Other parenting advice provided by Ṭaşköprüzāde includes, to make sure
children have good friends and avoid bad company that will influence them
negatively. Keep them away from luxury and excess sleep that will weaken
their resolve. Give them tiring chores and hobbies that will make their bod-
ies and minds strong. In school, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that children should be
put in classes with other children who are their peers in intellect so that they
are challenged appropriately without being overwhelmed or losing self-esteem
due to slow performance. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that children should be encour-
aged to take up an art. He reminds the reader that because not everyone is
skilled at every hobby or art form, a parent should strive to facilitate finding
what their child enjoys and is talented in. Then parents should support them
in excelling in this art form. He writes that parents should encourage children
to complete art projects they start so that children can train themselves in dis-
cipline and the perfection of projects. Additionally, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that
having a skill will enable children to earn money with this talent in the future
if they wish.
8 Political Philosophy (al-Ḥikma al-Madaniyya)
8.1 Why Do Political Communities Exist?

Once again, a significant shift in tone is apparent in this fourth section of the
treatise. Whereas the first two sections discussed the philosophy of virtue and
the third section highlighted day to day family management advice through
the lens of sixteenth century Ottoman society, it can be said that this fourth
section shifts once more to a philosophical tone in its discussion of good
governance. Furthermore, this section has much more commentary from
Ṭaşköprüzāde with far less structure from al-Ījī.
Ṭaşköprüzāde begins by referring to this section as political philosophy
or al-ḥikma al-madaniyya, thereby implying that his thoughts are within the
framework of a preceding tradition of political thought. He begins by exam-
ining the nature of communities themselves. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that com-
munities expand from circles of communal dependence. The first circle is the
household, then the neighborhood, then the city (madīna), then the Muslim
community (umma), and finally the world. Al-Ījī writes that city life is derived
from the need for individuals to cooperate with one another in order to sur-
vive. Ṭaşköprüzāde expands upon this saying that humans have different skills

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and different levels of wealth in order that each person within a community
system can help one another through a process of mutual of interdependence.
Ṭaşköprüzāde continues by separating communities into those which
are natural and unnatural. He writes that naturally arising communities are
bound by the foundation of love. This means that no power or force is needed
to maintain ties among members of the community. Ṭaşköprüzāde sees love
as extending from a top down hierarchical model in which he begins by cit-
ing God’s love for humanity as the first binding community. Through this love
individuals are bound to God and to each other. However, what is worthy of
note here is the theocentric worldview through which this is presented. God
binds individuals to Himself through God’s love for humanity. Thus, through
God’s love for humanity, humans sharing in the recognition of this divine love
are also bound to each other.
This perspective is then mirrored in the following examples of natural com-
munities in which a teacher loves his students, a father loves his children, and a
benefactor feels loyalty towards those he benefits. In love, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes
that with the exception of love that humans have towards God, no other form
of love is superior to the love that a student has towards his teacher. He writes
that this is because this love is a source of a person’s spiritual maturity and his
individual perfection (takmīl al-dhāt) and spiritual discipline (tarbiyat al-nafs)
that will grant him permanence (baqāʾ). He writes that the teacher is the sec-
ondary cause of one’s spiritual existence as the father is the secondary cause
of one’s physical existence apart from God who is of course the primary cause
that brings both into being. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that as long as the spirit is
superior to the body then the love for the teacher is superior to the love for
one’s father.
This framing of relationships is distinctive from what has appeared in
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary in the previous treatises. In other treatises the
source of the acquisition of virtues lied with the individual who had the capac-
ity to work towards refining one’s own character. Here we find a distinctive
emphasis on not only the role of a spiritual mentor that guides one through
love (maḥabba) but also the distinctive status that the spiritual mentor has by
virtue of their role in refining the human spirit. Such a description on the part
of Ṭaşköprüzāde appears to reflect concepts derived from Islamic spirituality,
Sufism, and mysticism.
Next, Ṭaşköprüzāde describes unnatural communities as two types. Those
which are virtuous and those which are corrupt. The community based on vir-
tue is known as the “virtuous city” or al-madīna al-fāḍila. This is a clear reference
to al-Fārābī’s political philosophy. The virtuous city is composed of individu-
als who seek only to do good and abstain from evil. Ṭaşköprüzāde frames this

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virtuous city originally outlined by al-Fārābī as deriving their common virtue

from their universal belief in the creation and the resurrection (al-mabda‌ʾ
wa-l-maʿād) and their communal focus on achieving perfection despite their
being scattered into various communities. Ṭaşköprüzāde compares these indi-
viduals of the virtuous city to the Muslim community mentioned in the ḥadīth
of the Prophet, “Believers are like one body” (al-Bukhārī 2002, Bāb al-Adab, 27;
Ṭaşköprüzāde 2014, 225). This framing of the virtuous city by Ṭaşköprüzāde on
his own terms demonstrates the way in which concepts from ancient philoso-
phy such as those in Plato’s Republic not only evolved into new forms with the
thought of al-Fārābī or Ibn Sīnā, but rather philosophy continued to develop
through the works of various Muslim thinkers well into Ṭaşköprüzāde’s time.
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s virtuous city is composed of five groups. The first are the
managers (mudabbira) who have knowledge (ʿārifīn) of the “true nature”
(ḥaqāʾiq) of things. The second are those who call the common folk (ʿawāmm)
to the goals of the select (khawāṣṣ) through their words such the legal scholars
( fuqahāʾ), preachers, and scribes. The third group ensure the benefit of soci-
ety and maintain justice through their roles as doctors, market watchers who
make sure that weights are used fairly. The fourth are soldiers who protect the
virtous city. The fifth are those that enable food production and provisions
through their work in trade or agriculture.
This division above appears to incorporate elements of philosophical mys-
ticism in which the elite of the community are not the philosophers but the
“ʿārifīn” which in Arabic implies those with a special spiritual or gnostic knowl-
edge of God. Ṭaşköprüzāde distinguishes them from the second group of reli-
gious scholars who are knowledgeable about the outward forms of religion and
call on the common masses to maintain basic religious practice.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that this type of a city has four forms of governance.
The first is centered around a ruler who is distinctive in his wisdom and intel-
lect (al-ḥikma ʿilman wa-naqlan), uniquely skilled in leadership, and the capac-
ity to fight in battle. The second form is a leader in virtue who lacks all of the
skills mentioned in the first, but has the capacity to unite those who do have
these virtues under his leadership. The third is political power inherited from
tradition such as dynastic rule. The fourth is a traditional form of rule such
as tribal power that does not designate which individual comes to power, only
that they do so according to traditional standards.
8.2 Characteristics of Good Leaders

Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that there are seven characteristics of good leadership.
The first is that of integrity (aṣāla) and honor so that people are freely inclined
to follow him. The second is to abstain from repulsive matters that would cause

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his followers to feel revulsion in following him and maintain high standards of
behavior. The third is to have a clear vision in order to not shake the founda-
tional structure of his society or its organizational shape. The fourth is to be
decisive in his decision making. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that this fourth trait is
especially important for a ruler to maintain the support and confidence of his
followers. The fifth is that a ruler must have perseverance through ease and
hardship. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that rulers will often encounters challenges and
disappointments and that they must be prepared to be patient through them
and stay the course. The sixth trait of a good leader is flexibility. Ṭaşköprüzāde
writes that flexibility engenders good fortune and wealth production. Finally,
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that a good leader must have a resourceful set of allies to
advise him and support his work.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that one does not deserve kingship unless they are inti-
mately familiar with the nature of the people they will rule. This is because
the nature of society is that it is a community of individuals who are bound
together by common perspectives and worldviews. If he is not familiar with
this or if he attempts to uproot this worldview, he will destroy the stability of
his society. Additionally, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that to maintain harmony in a
society the ruler must keep peace with allies and destroy its enemies. This is
achieved through looking out for the greater good of the people and avoiding
actions that will violate justice within his society.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that there are three classes within a society that the
ruler must balance relations with. They are administrators and religious lead-
ers such as judges, jurists, doctors, and astronomers as well as soldiers and mer-
chants. The ruler must give each group their due without appearing to favor
one group over another. This will in turn create division and thus instability in
his community.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that the ruler who benefits his people is like a rare
jewel. The judges who are in a position to advise the ruler must maintain their
integrity through being a practitioner of their religious knowledge, maintain-
ing the utmost amount of self-restraint (ʿiffa), have virtuous character and fol-
low the Companions of the Prophet (ṣaḥāba) and their followers (tābiʿīn) in
their way of life. Furthermore, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that it is their responsi-
bility to speak truth to power when they see the rulers straying from justice
(Ṭaşköprüzāde 2014, 237). He writes that they are bound to this by virtue of
their position as judges (qāḍīs).
8.3 Ten Virtues of the Successful Ruler According to People of Piety

Ṭaşköprüzāde writes some of the people of virtue ( fuḍalāʾ) have mentioned
ten behaviors of the ruler as a condition to their success as rulers. The first

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32 Salem
is that the ruler must see himself as one among his own people. This is to
the point where there would be nothing that he would want for himself that
he would not also want for his own citizens. Second, a virtuous ruler must
regard fulfilling the needs of Muslims as among the utmost act of worship.
Ṭaşköprüzāde quotes a saying, “Bringing happiness to the heart of one believer
is the equivalent of all the [good] works of humans and jinn.”8 The third is that
the ruler must follow in the footsteps of the four rightly guided caliphs by not
being extravagant in his food or drink. Fourth is that the leader must smile
in the faces of those he is responsible for and not show them any harshness
without due cause. He should not tire of listening to the needs of the people
nor should he avoid speaking to the weak and the poor. The fifth attribute of
a virtuous leader is that he is careful to avoid conflict of interest when he is
making decisions by looking for personal gain in them. He should also not be
neglectful of his responsibilities in order to please some people nor should he
go against religious injunctions.
The sixth is that he must not be neglectful of his responsibilities. He must
not lose sight of the seriousness of his role in leadership. Ṭaşköprüzāde
writes that the ruler must remember that his actions will one day be counted
for him or against him. He writes that a leader must not allow the neglect
of his responsibilities in this kingdom to be the cause of his loss of the
next kingdom.
The seventh attribute of a virtuous ruler is that he seeks out the pious folk
and religious scholars to visit them and sit in their presence – even though
according to Ṭaşköprüzāde they are rare in his time. If a ruler is able to find
such people, Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that he should consider this as a privilege
of his time as ruler. Similarly, he must be wary and keep far from “anti-Christ-
like figures” (Dajjāl) who wear cloaks of the pious in order to gain benefit from
the ruler.
The eighth advice to rulers is to not repel one’s citizens through authori-
tarianism and arrogance. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes, on the contrary, a ruler must
endear himself to people through his justice and compassion towards the weak
and the common citizens. He cites a ḥadīth from the Prophet saying, “The best
of your leaders is one who loves you and whom you love. The worst of your
leaders is the one who hates you and whom you hate” (Ṭaşköprüzāde 2014, 252;
Muslim 1954, Bāb al-Imāra, 17).
8 Ṭaşköprüzāde does not attribute this saying to any particular individual. It seems to be a
common idiom of his time.

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The ninth element of good leadership is to hold accountable those officials

who have betrayed their positions or have been unjust to people. Ṭaşköprüzāde
writes that if a ruler is not vigilant about upholding justice and accountability,
then these types of individuals will become rampant in the community and
eventually cause it to unravel. The tenth aspect of a good leader is to examine
matters that come to him with insight and to consider all of its angles. The
word used here is firāsa which has a distinct meaning from within the field of
Sufi literature in which the firāsa or spiritual insight of the believer enables
one to discern right from wrong.
This section of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s political philosophy has a distinctly mystical
element rooted in principles of spirituality within Sufism. The advice appears
to be from the pious strata of society to rulers. The type of advice that is given
here is distinct from the model that may be found in the mirrors for princes
or the Kalīla wa-Dimna. This a perspective that brings a spiritual dimension
to leadership and a sense of accountability of the powerful to God. This list of
virtues begins with the importance of humility and regarding oneself as one
of the people and proceeds with numerous references to loving the poor and
being accessible to the weak as a form of servant leadership that sees itself
as being derived from the Muḥammadan model. The concept of the bless-
ings gained from rulers seeking out and sitting at the feet of the pious scholars
while the warning against those who manifest false piety and seek out rulers
is another trope from within Islamic spirituality that has permeated Ottoman
thought and practice during Ṭaşköprüzāde’s time.
8.4 The Rights of Citizens over Their Governments

Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that some of the rights of Muslims over their governments
include, that the rulers and governors behave with humility towards their citi-
zens and do not become arrogant over the ruled because of their authority.
Government authorities should not listen to accusations against other citizens
without investigating and verifying the veracity of accusations. To delay pun-
ishments and to show justice to all inhabitants under a government’s author-
ity. Ṭaşköprüzāde adds that political authorities must not distinguish between
Muslims and non-Muslims in implementing justice because the “Sultan is
shadow of God.”
Another right that citizens have over political authorities is that the govern-
ment does not spy on them or seek out their private affairs. Political authorities
must also show reverence to the elderly and compassion towards the youth.
Additionally, they must keep their promises and not exhibit harshness towards
the ruled. They should also abstain from seeking out the faults of others or

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34 Salem
exposing them to the public. According to Ṭaşköprüzāde, those in positions of

authority should also avoid doing ethically dubious actions that will put their
moral authority into question among the masses.
Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that those in public service must also maintain close
ties with the pious (ṣāliḥīn), people of God (ahl Allāh), and the poor. He writes
that he must polish the mirror of his heart with their advice and religious guid-
ance. Ṭaşköprüzāde writes that those in political authority should prefer the
company of the poor to those of the rich and powerful.
Ṭaşköprüzāde also adds that those with political authority should anticipate
the needs of the widows, the weak, the poor, and the orphans. They should
support them financially and keep in mind the day that wealth will be of no
avail.9 He writes that political authorities should also keep an eye on areas that
are devoid of heavy settlement to ensure the safety of those areas from crime
and roadway robbers. Ṭaşköpüzāde writes that the rights of citizens upon
those in public service also includes their building bridges and rest areas for
those passing through in trade and travel. They should also construct mosques
and ensure that the Imam and the one who calls to prayer is well paid so that
they do not neglect their responsibilities in the process of earning a livelihood.
The final right of citizens toward the rulers is that those in authority continue
to command good and prevent harm to greater society.
Conclusion
Al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya is a short treatise, covering theoretical and practical

ethics, household management, and political philosophy, whose influence in
Muslim societies is demonstrated through the numerous extensive commen-
taries written on it. The brevity of the treatise itself is one of the unique aspects
of the work which has enabled it to manifest in different forms throughout
various renditions of its commentaries. Ṭaşköpüzāde’s commentary on the
al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya is one such work that is both lengthy and rich in its
portrayal of how sixteenth century Muslims in predominantly Ottoman lands
conceived of virtue, chivalry ( futuwwa), ethics, societal structure, and poli-
tics. Although some of the highlights of the commentary has been outlined
in this study. There is much more that can be further explored in regards to
Ṭaşköprüzāde’s commentary on al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya.
9 This a reference Q 26:88: “The Day when neither wealth nor children can help.”

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Journal of Islamic Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37

Ṭaşköprüzāde Ahmed Efendi’s Commentary

Islamic political philosophy – virtue – character – wisdom – courage – self-restraint –

© Feryal Salem, 2021 | doi:10.1163/24685542-12340065

‫شرح طاشكبري زاده أحمد أفندي على الفلسفة الأخلاقية لعضد‬

‫فر يال سالم‬

‫‪10.1163/24685542-12340065 | Journal of Islamic‬‬ ‫‪Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37‬‬

Majid Fakhry, Constantine Zurayk, Anna Akasoy, D. M. Dunlop and many

1 ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and His Works

Journal of Islamic Ethics 5 (2021) 1–37 | 10.1163/24685542-12340065

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Miskawayh whose work in turn incorporated elements of the Nicomachean

2 Ṭaşköprüzāde Ahmed Efendi (d. 968/1561)

Ṭaşköprüzāde Aḥmad Efendi was born in Bursa in 900/1495 to a family known

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3 Situating Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Writings in the Broader Field

As previously mentioned, Islamic philosophical ethics owes much of its foun-

4 This term is coined by Judith Pfeiffer (2014, 129–168).

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He made Twelver Shiʿism the state religion of the Ilkhanate by having

During the early fifteenth century, scholars from Iran such as

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4 Ṭaşköprüzāde’s Ethical Praxis of al-Akhlāq al-ʿAḍudiyya

The following analysis of the contents of Ṭaşköprüzāde’s writings outlines

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to an Islamic framework, appears to indicate that it was a selection of ethical

A little recognized fact about Sunnism, at least as the Ottomans had

In addition to the theoretical framework that comprised Muslim philosophi-

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5 Ethıcal Theory (Akhlāq al-Naẓarī)

5.1 Can Character Change?

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Ṭaşköprüzāde addresses the scriptural evidence for the ability to change

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“predatory soul” or al-nafs al-sabuʿiyya which Ṭaşköprüzāde says is rooted in

5.2 Moderation and Virtues

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5.3 Subcategories of the Three Virtues of Wisdom, Courage,

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humility (tawāḍuʿ), swiftness to do good (shahāma), endurance (iḥtimāl),

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6.1 How Virtues Are Acquired and Maintained

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The third form of the preservation of virtue is said to be found in seeking

6.2 Three Root Faculties from Which Spiritual Ailments Arise

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7 Household Management (Tadbīr al-Manzil)

7.1 Wealth Management

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7.2 Members of the Household

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The treatise also lists a number of behaviors expected of a husband who

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8 Political Philosophy (al-Ḥikma al-Madaniyya)

8.1 Why Do Political Communities Exist?