Jamaican Maroon Political Organization - The Effects of The Treaties

JAMAICAN MAROON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: THE EFFECTS OF THE TREATIES
Author(s): Barbara Klamon Kopytoff

Source: Social and Economic Studies , JUNE 1976, Vol. 25, No. 2 (JUNE 1976), pp. 87-105
Published by: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of
the West Indies
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27861598
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87
JAMAICAN MAROON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:

THE EFFECTS OF THE TREATIES1
By
Barbara Klamon Kopytoff
In 1739, the colonial government of Jamaica signed treaties with two groups of
Maroons, escaped slaves and their descendants who had formed societies in the interior
of the island during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. The treaties, which put an
end to some 80-odd years of intermittent warfare, have often been spoken of as the
means by which the Maroons 'preserved' their societies. By the treaties, the British did
recognize the free and separate existence of the Maroon communities and, in theory,
they left the management of all internal affairs to the Maroons, reserving only the
death penalty to the Crown. Maroon chiefs and their officers were to carry on as
before, in the same way that had made them such efficient and disciplined guerilla
fighters against the English. But, as we shall see, the treaties did not so much preserve
as transform the Maroon societies. They undermined the existing authority relation
ships within the Maroon communities, which were thereafter plagued by an era of
disruptive factionalism. In this paper, we shall describe briefly the pre-treaty political
organization of Jamaican Maroon societies; document the political disturbances that
erupted in the post-treaty Maroon government; and, finally, develop the argument that
it was the treaties themselves that undermined the traditional Maroon political or
ganization and the authority of the chiefs, and promoted the disturbances. The process
was similar to the undermining of traditional chiefs under 'Indirect Rule' widely noted
in 20th century British Colonial Africa.
THE PRE-TREATY MAROON POLITIES

Maroons had been collecting in the interior of Jamaica since the Spanish gave the
island over to the English in 1660; in fact, the first Jamaican Maroons were former
slaves the Spaniards left behind. Their numbers were soon increased by escapees from
the new English plantations, some of whom joined them, but most of whom set up
their own communities. In the early period of English occupation, there were a
number of separate Maroon communities of varying size and ethnic identity in the
bush; there, they were continuously forming, growing, fighting and merging. By the
early 18th century, they had coalesced into two large polities, the Windward Maroons
in the eastern mountains, and the Leeward Maroons in the western interior. These
polities were separated by an area of English settlement across the centre of the island.2
The merging of many independent groups into larger units was the outcome of a
period of active feuding among Maroons of different ethnic groups. An 18th century
writer [1] related,
...these small bodies were composed of negroes of different country s & of different
manners and customs in Guinea and often verry opposite and att great variance with one

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88 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
another and when in times afterwards they became numerous (for all of these companies
endeavoured to corrupt and enveigle from the plantations and were ready to receive their
respective countrymen) they had many bloody battles with one another.
The battles resulted in the emergence of the two polities, each composed of a number
of smaller, ethnically diverse populations.3
The Leeward Maroons, in the western interior of the island on the edges of the
inhospitable Cockpit Country, comprised two major settlements, Cudjoe's Town,
northwest of the Cockpits, and Accompong's Town, to the southwest. Over these
settlements, and over all other Maroons in the west, Cudjoe ruled with an iron hand.
John Guthrie, the militia officer who signed the treaty with him, was much impressed
with his power and his integrity.
Cudjoe [seems] to be a person of much Humanity & I really Beleive [sic] will punctually
observe on his part those terms of Peace that he Submitts himself to, as to his Captains, they
pay him the greatest Defference imagineable, they are entirely under his Subjection, And his
Word is a Law to them.4
Cudjoe commanded a sophisticated military organization; he

... Occasionally appointed as many as were necessary, of the Ablest under him as Captains
& divided the rest into Companies, & gave each Captain, such a Number as he thought was
proportionable to the merit he was possessed of... The Chief Employment of these
Captains was to Exercise their respective men in the Use of the Lance, & small arms after
the manner of the Negroes on the Coast of Guinea, To Conduct the Bold & active in
Robbing the Planta, of Slaves, Arms, Ammunition &ct. Hunting wild hogs, & to direct the
rest with the Women in Planting Provisions - & Managing Domestic affairs.5
He maintained a policy of non-provocation of whites. He insisted that when his men

raided the plantations for supplies or people they should avoid killing whites, and he
had put to death several men who had disobeyed him on this score [Knight 14 p. 97].
Furthermore, Cudjoe would not allow into his territory any Maroons over whom he
did not exercise control. When a group of Windward Maroons applied to settle in the
west in the 1730s, he refused them on the grounds that, "... as He had an absolute
command over His People, He was unwilling to receive another Body, who were
Independent of Him, and Subject only to their own chiefs, who would not Submit to
Him." [Knight 14 p. 97].
In enforcing his rule in the west, Cudjoe relied on a kinship-based network of
support. Several of the chief captains were his 'brothers', all presumably members of
the same band of Coromantee Maroons that had been the victor in the 'bloody battles'
among Maroons in the west.6 But while the political control was concentrated in the
hands of one of the constituent ethnic groups in the Leeward Maroon polity, an effort
was made to blur the lines, to integrate the Maroons and to prevent rivalries among the
different ethnic groups. Cudjoe tried to do this by restricting the use of African
languages, "... having Experienced that the Divisions and Quarells which had hapned
[sic] amongst Themselves, were owing to their different Countries and Customs,
which created Jealousies and uneasiness; He prohibited any other language being
spoken among Them, but English." [Knight 14 p. 95]. By such means, Cudjoe

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JAMAICAN MAROON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 89
managed to achieve a working integration among members of ethnically diverse origin

in his strongly centralized polity.
Aside from the headman, there was in the west an important obeah man, a
supernatural practitioner who acted as a public adviser. He was "greatly revered, his
Words Carried the Force of an Oracle with them, being Consulted on every Occa
sion .. r1
The organization of the Windward Maroons, in the eastern mountains of
Jamaica, is somewhat less clear, and the evidence sparser, but we can still get some idea
of the main features of the Windward polity. It also comprised several settlements:
before 1734 there was a complex of villages called Nanny Town and a smaller settle
ment, Guy's Town, that cooperated closely. After repeated attacks by the English,
these were finally abandoned and two new settlements formed, New Nanny Town and
Charles Town.8
While we can find no headman comparable to Cudjoe, the Windward Maroons

also had a strict military discipline and an impressive organization. An escaped slave,
who was recaptured by the English, told them that "... the rebels have one head
man who orders everything, and if a man committs any crime he is instantly shott to
death . . . ".9 But the headman was not himself above the same treatment. The
captured slave continued: "... if the head man should be guilty of any great crime,
his soldiers (as they are call'd) shoot him, and appoint another in his place".10 The
headman in that report was Cuffee, but it was another Maroon, Scipio, who com
manded the well coordinated military effort at Hobby's, a plantation attacked by the
Maroons.
There were at Hobby's 2 gangs of 100 men in each and several women which they had
brought to heip carry off the spoil. They left one gang in the Negro Town to guard the
women and children;. . . they had determined on hearing the partys coming to ambush
them in the river's course, that a gang of 100 was to lay on Carrion'Crow Hill and 100 more
Hobby's way, that a drum was to be placed on the ridge over the town to view the partys
and the women in the town to burn the houses in case the party should be too strong, if not
the three gangs to surround them on the beat of drum, all under the command of Scipio.11
And it was yet another Maroon, Quao, who signed the treaty on behalf of the Wind
ward Maroons. If the personnel was more varied and the leadership less clear, the
requirements of war forced the Windward Maroons also to impose harsh discipline and
a rigid military organization. Yet it seems that their organization was less centralized
than that in the west, where Cudjoe and his family developed their hegemony, and
there is no single headman who held control over the entire eastern interior.
The one truly outstanding figure among the Windward Maroons was not a head
man, but an obeah woman, the famous Nanny. Two successive settlements were
named after this formidable woman, and while she did not displace the headman in her
settlements, she held considerable political influence. Present-day Windward Maroons
still tell of Nanny's supernatural feats in battle, and she holds a position in Maroon
oral tradition comparable to that of Cudjoe in the west. An Englishman who was sent
to make a treaty with the Windward Maroons describes an obeah woman who must

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have been Nanny. "The old Hagg ... had a girdle round her waste, with (I speak
within compass) nine or ten different knives hanging in sheaths to it, many of which I
have no doubt, had been plunged in human flesh and blood;.. ". [Thicknesse 21,
Vol. 1 p. 121]. On her wrists and ankles she wore bracelets made from the teeth of
English soldiers slain by the Maroons, some of them captives whom she herself had
killed. It was on Nanny's advice that one of the first Englishmen to reach the Wind
ward Maroons with an offer of terms was killed, for she believed the whites could not
be trusted.12 Nanny stayed in the background at the time of the treaty, but her
importance was recorded shortly thereafter when the grant of land for New Nanny
Town, one of the two official Maroon settlements in the east, was deeded to her.13
To summarize some of the major characteristics of the pre-treaty Maroon so

cieties by the early 18th century, a number of ethnically diverse groups of Maroons
had drawn together into two polities in the eastern and western interior of the island.
The fact that their societies were at war with colonial Jamaica led both groups of
Maroons to impose a harsh discipline, in which the headmen applied the death penalty
freely when they were disobeyed. Both maintained an impressive and well coordinated
military organization which engaged in raiding as well as defense. Among both sets of
Maroons the headmen, who were political and military leaders, were complemented by
obeah men and women. In the west, where Cudjoe concentrated power firmly in his
own hands, the one obeah man we find mentioned does not rival him in importance.
In the east, however, the obeah woman Nanny is the single outstanding figure, over
shadowing the headmen. This difference between the polities, however, disappeared
shortly after the treaties in the transformations that effected both polities.
"DISORDERS, TUMULTS AND DISTURBANCES"

AMONG THE POST-TREATY MAROONS
The first of the two Maroon treaties was signed by Cudjoe on 1 March 1739, on
behalf of the Leeward Maroons of his town (renamed Trelawny Town after the then
Governor of Jamaica) and Accompong's Town [JHA 10, Vol. 3 pp. 457-8] . Quao
signed the second a few months later on behalf of the Windward Maroons of his town
(called Crawford's Town) and New Nanny Town [Ms. 12, Vol. 24 p. 287].14 The
main points of Cudjoe's treaty were: that the Maroons were recognized as free and
were given a grant of land on which they were all to live; that they were to aid in the
defense of the island, to hunt down other Maroons who did not agree to the same
terms, and to return runaways who might in the future fall into their hands; that the
Maroon headmen who were to have life tenure, were allowed to administer any punish
ment but death for crimes whose definition was itself left to the Maroons; that they
might sell their produce in the island markets; that white men were to live in the
Maroon settlement to facilitate relations with' the colonial government [JHA 10, Vol.
3 p. 458]. The treaty signed with Quao was essentially the same in all these respects.
There were, however, several additional clauses that the Governor insisted on before
ratification, and one of these organized the Maroon men into companies headed by
whites for the purpose of tracking runaway slaves. Its importance for Maroon political
organization will be discussed later [Ms. 12, Vol. 24 p. 291].

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JAMAICAN MAROON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 9?
By these treaties, the British had planned to leave the management of Maroon
internal affairs to Maroons, to the institutions that had proved so effective in waging a
guerilla war against them. But to their dismay they found that the post-treaty Maroon
governments did not provide the controls and leadership needed for the Maroons' new
role as an efficient and disciplined slave-tracking force. The preamble of a law passed
in 1744 sets out what had already, at that early date, begun to emerge as a central
problem in the Maroon settlements and was to become a chronic one: "... Disorders
frequently happen in the several Negroe Towns, for Want of Authority in the Chiefs or
Commanding Officers of the Negroes to keep a proper Command over the rest;. . .".
[Acts 9 Vol. 1, p. 322].15 A 'proper Command' meant to the British that "... an
exact Discipline be observed, that all Disorders, Tumults, and Disturbances amongst
them be suppressed on their first Appearances, and the Authors and Abetters of them
brought to speedy Punishment. . ." [Acts 9 Vol. 1, p. 322]. Among the pre-treaty
Maroons a strict discipline had prevailed; indeed, it had been necessary to their survival
as societies at war. Why was it, then, that the Maroon chiefs and officers who had in
the past been such effective leaders of military forces did not, in post-treaty times,
have the authority to keep a 'proper Command'?
Some of the 'disturbances' that the British deplored in the post-treaty Maroon
settlements were doubtless the simple expression of a different style of life, and not
evidence of any real disorder. Thus when the British, in 1744, complained of
. . . disturbances .. . lately raised by some turbulent and disorderly negroes in Crawford and
Nanny Towns, who had received and entertained a Negro belonging to Accompong's Town
and in a Riotous manner detained and protected the said Negro in manifest contempt of His
Excellency the Governor's orders_[Laws 11, Vol. 3 p. 163]
we suspect that it was the Maroons' exuberant celebrations, rather than any serious
threat to the peace of the island, that disturbed the British. But there is no question
that there were serious divisions among the Maroons, and they expressed themselves
both in minor quarrels and in major upheavals. Factionalism flourished in the post
treaty Maroon towns, and within the first 30 years had disrupted every settlement.
The first instance of serious factionalism occurred in 1742 among the Leeward
Maroons. Cudjoe and Accompong discovered that some of their men, who were Coro
mantees, had entered into a conspiracy with Coromantee slaves on nearby plantations.
Dissatisfied with the treaty agreement, these Maroons, together with the slaves,
planned "to cut off all those that were born in the woods, or come from other
countries", and establish their own Coromantee society in the interior [JHA 10, Vol. 3
p. 594] .16 The rebellion had just begun, the slaves having run off with the arms and
ammunition, when Cudjoe and Accompong
... armed a sufficient number of the most faithful of their people, attacked the rebels,
killed some, took others, and chased the rest home to their plantations; those they took
they delivered up to justice as likewise such of their own people as they found concerned in
the said rebellion [JHA 10, Vol. 3 p. 594].
In pre-treaty times, Cudjoe doubtless would have killed the conspirators, but according
to the treaty he could not impose the death penalty. If he judged a crime to be

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punishable by death, he was to refer the case to the island authorities, and this he did.
The conspirators were tried and found guilty; two were sentenced to die and two to be
sent off the island and sold. But the Governor, pleased with Cudjoe's fidelity to the
treaty, pardoned all four in an act of mercy and confidence in the Maroons, and
returned the convicted Maroons to Cudjoe. Unwilling to welcome back the conspira
tors, who were, in addition, the leaders of an ethnic faction, Cudjoe took it upon
himself to carry out their sentences. He hanged the two condemned to die and re
turned to the Governor the two sentenced to transportation.17 Thus Cudjoe managed
to suppress a dangerous faction and eliminate its leaders, though the power to do so
was now formally denied him. it was only his personal skill as a strategist that allowed
him to exercise the same forceful control over his people as he had in pre-treaty times.
As we shall see, other Maroon leaders were not so adroit.
The second major split arose in Crawford Town (Quao's Town) and led to the
formation of a splinter settlement in 1749. Following 'a dissention' at Crawford Town,
26 of the Maroons there petitioned the Governor to be allowed to live at Scotts Hall,
north of Kingston. The House of Assembly, seeing an advantage to having a settlement
of Maroons in that part of the island, assented to the move [JHA 10, Vol. 4 p. 288 But
even after the exodus of the dissenters, Quao's control of his settlement was not
secure, and further divisions appeared in the course of a rebellion against the British
some five years later.
In 1754, a group of Crawford Town Maroons, including the headman Quao, killed
Edward Crawford, one of the white officers who led their tracking parties, seized all
arms, and set fire to the town.18 But Quao could not command the support of all the
Maroons of the settlement, and those who would not join him in rebellion were
initially held captive, along with three other white men who lived there. Troops were
ordered to Crawford Town, and with them the Maroons of Nanny Town and Scotts Hall,
the other two Maroon settlements in the eastern part of the island. The Maroons in
rebellion would not come to terms, but they were persuaded to release their captives,
who promptly turned around and joined the fight against them. After a number of the
rebels were taken, and several killed and wounded, the remaining few must have realized
that all was lost. They begged the Governor's forgiveness through the leaders of the other
eastern towns, and it was quickly granted.19 These incidents show that Quao's position
was considerably weaker than Cudjoe's. Maroons from his owii settlement, as well as the
Scotts Hall Maroons who had earlier formed a dissenting group in Crawford Town, and
the Nanny Town Maroons, who had in pre-treaty times been part of the same larger polity
as Quao, had all joined with the British in helping to defeat him. It is open to question
whether Quao could have held on to his office this long without British support; we do
not know whether he continued to be headman of Crawford Town after 1754.
The fourth major dissension occurred some fifteen years after the treaties and
resulted in a new settlement splintering off from Trelawny Town. Edward Long [18>
Vol. 2 p. 346] reports the circumstances that gave rise to Furry's Town in the mid
1750s:
Some years afterwards [after the treaty], upon some differences arising among the Negroes
at Trelawny, as I have heard, concerning the right of command, a fray ensued. The town

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divided into two factions; one of which adhered to a new chief, named Furry, and removed
with him to another spot, where they formed a new town, called after his name.
When the man on whose property the Maroons of this new town were squatting
complained to the House of Assembly, the band under Furry was ordered to move
back inside the Trelawny Town boundaries, [JHA 10, Vol. 5 pp. 66, 77] but it did not
integrate with the old settlement. Instead, Furry's Maroons set up a 'New Town' a
short distance from the other Maroons, whose settlement became known as Old
Town' [Dallas 5, Vol. 1 p. 95]. A dispute over the 'right of command' had led to the
attempt to establish a separate settlement. It may be that by this time Cudjoe had
died, and that his Government-appointed successor could not command the kind of
support that Cudjoe had among the Trelawny Town Maroons. Whoever was then chief,
whether an ageing Cudjoe or a successor, he either could not or did not care to compel
the Maroons under Furry to remain within the bounds of the settlement.
Nanny Town, which was renamed Moore Town,20 showed the same pattern of
factionalism and fission as had the other Maroon towns. In the early 1760s, the
Governor gave permission to Clash, a Moore Town Maroon, to leave the town and go
to live near Bath, in the southeast of the island across the mountains from Moore
Town.21 The stated reason for Clash's departure was his health [8], but there was
more to it than that. Clash had been named in the treaty as the last of four successors
to Quao's position as commander of the Windward polity, but it appears that he was
never appointed as headman to any of the Windward towns. Failing this, he tried to
start his own settlement, gathering his supporters around him near Bath. But he
continued to maintain his connections with Moore Town, returning there from time to
time and causing dissension, in one case taking away the badge of a Moore Town
captain. Clearly, he still contested the right of command in Moore Town, even while
he had his own settlement. In 1767, the new acting Governor, Roger Hope Elletson,
reviewed the case and proposed a drastic solution: that Clash leave the eastern end of
the island entirely. In a letter to the white superintendent of Moore Town, Elletson's
secretary wrote:
In regard to Captain Clash, whose behavior you complain of for taking away Capt. Sambo's
Badge, and of the iU consequences that will attend his exercising any Command in the
Town; as also of his being permitted to reside at the Place which you call his Abodement
near Bath, as several People are thereby enticed from the Town, by which means all Author
ity is destroyed. I have proposed to him (Clash as he is desirous of leaving Moore Town) that
he quits that part of the island entirely and resides elsewhere: .. . you may give him leave so
to do, if you apprehend it will be the means of quieting the People's Minds, and putting an
end to their quarrels.22
Had Clash stayed in Moore Town with his followers, as leader of a rival faction, there
might have been more serious disruptions, for even when Clash lived at Bath, his
occasional visits to Moore Town resulted in 'many quarrels and disturbances'23.
This survey of divisions and disruptions in the Maroon Towns of the post-treaty
era shows no town free from serious conflict, within the first 30 years, major factional
disruptions had torn three of the original four Maroon settlements, Trelawny Town.
Accompong Town, and Crawford Town, and there were serious divisions in the fourth,

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Nanny Town (Moore Town). Factionalism led on several occasions to attempts to

form new settlements or to take control of existing ones. To understand this prolifera
tion of quarrels and conflicts, let us look at the organization and administration of the
post-treaty settlements.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE

POST-TREATY TOWNS
Both before and after the treaties were signed, when the British spoke of a
Maroon 'town' they meant, variously, a village, settlement, developed area, reservation
and jurisdiction, the meaning usually evident from the context. At the time of the
signing, the exact number and location of the permanent Maroon settlements must
have been unclear to the British, but it appears they initially meant to establish only
one reservation and one jurisdiction in each end of the island; there is reference to just
one 'town' in each treaty, and the Maroons of each of the two 'towns' were to be given
land on which they were all to live in subjection to one chief [JHA 10, Vol. 3, p.
458]. Within the year, the number of settlements was acknowledged to be four,
Trelawny Town and Accompong Town in the west, and Crawford Town and New
Nanny Town in the east; a fifth was added in 1751 when the new settlement at Scotts
Hall was approved.24 Almost from the beginning each of the five settlements was
treated as a separate jurisdiction; the British dealt with each separately, presumably for
convenience sake, through its Government-appointed Maroon officers and the white
men stationed to live in it.25 And as the land was actually granted, over the next 20
years, each settlement became a separate reservation as well.26 Maroons within each of
the former polities still had close contacts and must, on occasion, have gathered for
religious and social purposes. But the glue that had bound each polity as a political
unit was fast dissolving, and shortly after the treaties the organization of the two
pre-treaty Maroon polities changed: both gave way to individual village authorities,
and laws passed by the British established identical structures for enforcing civil and
military regulations in each of the five villages.
Civil Authority
In theory, the treaties left matters of internal government entirely to the
Maroons, with two explicit exceptions. First, the Maroon chief could not inflict the
death penalty; if he thought a crime serious enough to warrant death, he was to turn
the accused over to the island authorities to be tried [JHA 10, Vol. 3 p. 458]. The
second right the British reserved for themselves was the appointment of the Maroon
headmen. The final article of Cudjoe's treaty read
That captain Cudjoe shall, during his life, be chief commander in Trelawney-Town; after his
decease, the command to devolve on his brother captain Accompong; and, in case of his
decease, on his next brother captain Johnny; and, failing him, captain Cuffee shall succeed;
who is to be succeeded by captain Quaco; and, after all their demises, the governor ...?. shall
appoint, from time to time, whom he thinks fit [JHA 10, Vol. 3 p. 458].
The treaty with the Windward Maroons specified much the same terms, and the line of
succession in the east was to pass from Quao to Thomboy, Apong, Blackwell, and

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finally, to Clash [JAH 10, Vol. 3 p. 505]. In addition, the Ufe tenure of the chief was
recognized in both treaties. While this may not have been meant to interfere with
Maroon internal affairs, British support for life tenure was a matter of no small
importance in the politics of the post-treaty towns.
The British quickly overstepped their rights of intervention, first, in the exercise of
powers explicitly theirs by the treaties, and second, in the creation of new powers for
themselves by subsequent legislation. In the first place, succession did not proceed
exactly as laid out in the treaties. This was due in part to a change in the political
organization of the Maroons and in part to British action in naming headmen. The
succession designated in the treaties was to the headship of the Windward and Leeward
polities, and these no longer existed; there were now only headmen of the five in
dividual towns. Cudjoehad been head both of the Leeward polity and of his own town
(Trelawny Town), but only the latter office remained to be passed on after the
treaties. But attached to Cudjoe's office in post-treaty times was a vestige of his former
broader position, a rank and a badge that singled him out as the most important
Maroon leader in the west, and indeed, in the entire island. Cudjoe alone was given the
rank of colonel; all the other Maroon headmen were captains. Accompong had been
designated by the treaty to succeed Cudjoe as leader of the Leeward polity. Yet, it
seems natural enough that when Cudjoe died, a resident of Trelawny Town should
have succeeded him as headman there, rather than Accompong, who had his own
settlement to manage. But apparently Accompong wanted to succeed Cudjoe as
Colonel, as the most important Maroon leader in the west, if not as headman of
Trelawny Town, and to this end he took Cudjoe's badge. The British, either missing
the point or refusing to acknowledge it, made him return it to the new headman of
Trelawny Town, Colonel Lewis, who was awarded Cudjoe's rank, and thus stood above
Accompong, though Lewis had not been mentioned in the treaty.27 A more clear-cut
example of British intervention was in the case of Clash, who was not appointed
headman of any of the Windward towns, even though he was named in the line of
succession to Quao's position by treaty.
In two laws, passed in 1744, the British gave to themselves more say in the internal
affairs of the Maroon settlements than the treaties, signed just five years earlier, had
allowed them. By 1744 it was evident to the British that things were not going as
smoothly as they wished in the Maroon towns, and they tried to introduce more order
by establishing a new civil and military bureaucracy in the settlements. The acts were
entitled "An act for the better order and government of the negroes belonging to the
several negro-towns..." and "An act for raising companies in the several negro
towns ..." [JHA 10, Vol. 3 pp. 645, 647, 666] ,28
The "Act for. . .. better order and government_" attempted to extend the
powers of the whites stationed in the Maroon Towns to fill the gap left by the chiefs
failure to exercise a 'proper Command' over his people. The treaties had specified that
white men live in the Maroon settlements "in order to maintain a friendly correspon
dence with the inhabitants of this island" [JHA 10, Vol. 3 p. 458]. Strictly speaking,
they had no authority over the Maroons. This was acknowledged in the preamble to
the new act which stated not only, as quoted above, that the Maroon chiefs lack

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authority, but also that "the White Men who reside amongst them are not vested with
legal Power to punish them;..." [Acts 9, p. 332]. And although it was contrary to
the treaty agreement, the new law tried to remedy the lack of command by establish
ing a new authority. A court was to be set up in each town, manned by Maroons but
presided over by the white superintendent.
... every Negroe being resident in, or belonging to any of the Negroe Towns, who shall
disobey his Excellency the Governor's Orders or excite others to do the same; or shall
excite, cause, or join in any Disorder, Tumult, or Disturbance, tending to break the Peace
and good Order of the said Towns.... shall suffer such Punishment as shall be inflicted by
the White Men residing in the Town to which the Offender belongs, and Four of the Negroes
of the said Town, of which the Chief or Commanding Officer shall be one, not extending to
Life [Acts 9, p. 332].
The Governor was, by this act, empowered to grant commissions to the whites
and Maroons for trying and punishing offenders. But the courts, though the majority
of members were Maroons, were not Maroon courts. They were established by the
British and appointed by the Governor in order to enforce British regulations in the
towns. It is no wonder they did not solve the problems of Maroon government.
The other act passed in 1744, the one forming Maroons into military companies,
also tried to introduce more controls into the Maroon towns; it did so by enlisting the
Maroons in a military organization it created, thereby bringing them under island
military regulations.
Military Organization
The British were well acquainted with the superb military skills of the Maroons
and wished to use them on their own behalf now that they were no longer their
victims. By the treaty with Cudjoe, the Leeward Maroons agreed to aid the British in
repelling foreign invaders and in bringing to terms other Maroons then at large. The
Governor was also interested in using the Maroons as an active tracking force for
runaways, and Cudjoe, in preHminary negotiations, agreed to this,29 but no clause to
that effect was written into his treaty. The treaty with Quao, signed a few months
later, did include it as part of the Maroons' duties [JHA 10, Vol. 3 p. 506].
The Maroons already possessed an elaborate military organization, one whose

major function no longer existed now that peace with the British was assured. Had
they been left on their own in preparing for their new military duties, they might have
made use of their organization of pre-treaty days; but this possibility was precluded by
the Governor, who insisted that an article be added to Quao's treaty forming the
Maroons into companies under white officers. It was partly because they feared the
Maroons as formidable opponents that the British established these companies " .. . of
the most able and Active of the Rebells... .who if not employed by the Publick may
employ themselves to its prejudice ..." [Laws 11, Vol. 4].
But of course the British also looked to the more obvious benefits of an island
free from new outlaw Maroon groups. In this they were not disappointed; the Maroons
proved very effective against new runaways and rebels.30 The willingness of Maroons

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to serve as trackers for slaves trying to escape the plantations looks very ironic from a
modern perspective, but it would require a study in itself to understand the pheno
menon in its own terms, that is, to explore the complexities of Maroon identification
with, and opposition to, other groups in 18th century Jamaica. Suffice it to say here
that the fact is so startling to the modern reader that it does call for exploration.31
The organization of the new Maroon companies was elaborated in the law passed
in 1744 specifically for that purpose. The white superintendent of each of the towns
was to raise a party of 12 Maroon men, under a Maroon officer, and each party was to
be commanded by a white man appointed by the Governor. There was a provision for
enlarging the number of Maroons and parties when it became necessary. Individual
Maroons could on their own take up runaway slaves and return them for a reward, as
they had been doing for five years since the treaties were signed, but the greater
prestige, as well as financial rewards, went to the party Maroons. They received daily
pay while on duty, while also getting the usual bounty for returning runaways, and the
officers among them were commissioned by the Governor. Furthermore, both enlisted
Maroons and their officers were to be subject to the military discipline of the colony
rather than to their own rules and regulations, developed in pre-treaty times [Laws 11,
Vol. 4]. Maroons, including officers, who ran afoul of these regulations were subject
to-court martial; the court was to be conducted according to the same British code of
military discipline. Like the civil court, it was headed by the white superintendent and
composed of Maroons appointed by the Governor, among them the headman of the
village in which it was held [Laws 11, Vol. 4]. In fact it seems quite likely that the
same Maroons sat on both courts, the Governor thereby saving himself the trouble of
commissioning two separate bodies, each composed of Maroon officers.
The new companies established by this act bore a superficial resemblance to the
Maroons' pre-treaty military organization; men in bands spent much of their time
scouring the woods, occasionally engaging in active skirmishes. But there were several
critical differences. The coordination of military activities was no longer the head
man's responsibility; that was now handled by the superintendent. Maroon officers
had to answer ultimately not to their own headman, but to the whites that stood
above him. It was not the headman who could commission officers and break them.
Nor could the Maroon men break him, as they could in the pre-treaty Windward
polity. This fell ultimately to the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the
whites in the towns and on the results of the courts he had commissioned. The
headman was still the official Maroon head of the town, but any order of his could be
countermanded from above, and he himself had to defer to the superintendent. In
both civil and military courts it was the white superintendent who presided and who
was in a position to direct the activities of the court.
We mentioned that one reason the British passed the law forming the Maroons
into companies was to keep them from other activities that might be detrimental to
the colony. But a more general reason for both the 1744 laws, which resulted in an
increased number of whites living among the Maroons and in the extension of British
civil and military authority into their towns, was simply to introduce more controls
into the Maroon settlements. The degree of discipline exercised by the chiefs seemed

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to the British inadequate either for the exercise of the Maroons' new duties or for the
peace of their settlements. Hence whatever the terms of the treaties, British in
terference in Maroon internal affairs was inevitable if the aims of the treaties, as the
British saw them, were to be achieved.
DISCUSSION
The effects of the treaties on Maroon political organization were far greater than
either side anticipated and they profoundly and permanently altered authority rela
tions within the old Maroon polities. The British had expected to rely on the old
structures to provide order and discipline in the Maroon towns, but they unwittingly
undermined these structures. The result was the factionalism and 'disorders' that
plagued the Maroon towns in the post-treaty era.
The ways in which the treaties, and the subsequent legislation passed in 1744
altered Maroon political structures and processes were numerous; here we shall explore
what seem to be the major ones contributing to the political disturbances described
earlier. They are:
First, the simple cessation of war.

Second, reserving of the death penalty to the Crown.
Third, the assurance of life tenure for the chiefs.
Fourth, British control of the appointment of the chiefs and all officers in the
Maroon settlement.
Fifth, the placing of whites in charge of the Maroon towns and parties.
Sixth, the confinement to reservations.
Two other factors, whose effects were not to enhance factionalism and disrup
tions, but which nonetheless altered the political balance in the towns will also be
discussed: the failure of the British to give any position to non-military (primarily
ritual) leaders, and closing the membership of the Maroon settlements.
To deal with the first point ? the cessation of war ? the initial article of both
treaties, "that all hostilities shall cease on both sides for ever" [JHA 10, Vol. 3 pp.
458, 505] brought a great change in Maroon life. Ever since their inception, the
Maroon societies had been at war with the whites. During the 80-odd years of this
intermittent warfare, they had been forced to subordinate other interests to military
effectiveness and submit themselves to the harsh discipline necessary to their survival.
Ethnic rivalries and personal competition had to be held in check in the interests of
security. But once peace had been made with the whites, internal dissension no longer
threatened survival. It is not surprising then that the orders of chiefs and officers were
no longer carried out with willing despatch, and that factions of all sorts were freer to
flourish. It would take some time for the Maroons to develop social controls that were
well adapted to an era of peace, and in the period under consideration such controls
are not yet evident.

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Secondly, when the British by treaty took away from the Maroon headman the
right to impose the death penalty, they seriously undercut his power. In pre-treaty
times, the death penalty was used by headmen in both Windward and Leeward polities
to deal with challenges to their authority. The treaties specified that serious crimes had
to be referred to the Jamaican courts, but the British were hardly likely to sentence a
Maroon to death for challenging the authority of his chief, that is, for 'political crimes'
within the settlement, unless his actions were punishable by death under British law.
In the one case in which internal factionalism combined with an attempted slave
rebellion, so that a conviction took place (following the 1742 conspiracy), the Gover
nor pardoned the Maroon conspirators ? apparently assuming that leniency toward
any Maroons would win favour with all. Symbolically as well as practically, the reser
vation of the death penalty must have undercut the chiefs power. Violent death was a
common risk facing Maroon warriors both in their encounters with the British and, in
post-treaty times, on party duty. These were military societies in which killing and
being killed was commonplace, and in such societies the ultimate sanction of force
must have been important in symbolic terms as well. A chief without that power must
have seemed to his men something less than a whole chief.
Thirdly, the treaties interfered with Maroon political processes by insuring the
life tenure of the very headman they had thus weakened. In the old Windward polity,
a headman who committed 'great crime' was shot by his men and another appointed in
his place. This meant, in effect, that only so long as a man could command strong
support did he rule. Not only 'criminals' but otherwise ineffective, ageing, or invalided
leaders might also be replaced by a man whose character and strength commanded
respect. But after the treaties, Quao, who had lost considerable power if we may judge
by the internal dissension in his town in the 1750s, continued as headman; he might
well have lost the position were it not for British support. Among the Leeward
Maroons both Cudjoe and his father before him had succeeded in holding on to the
position for a long time, but that pattern might have lapsed once the chief was
weakened by the loss of the power of life and death over his men. Now, in both the
east and the west, the treaties made it impossible to replace the weakened headmen
until they died or were dismissed by the Governor. And if a weakened chief held on to
his official position, with its privileges, while other Maroon leaders with strong support
were relegated to lesser positions, the setting was ripe for factionalism such as occurred
in Crawford Town under Quao's rule or in Trelawny Town when Furry and his
followers broke off from it.
Fourthly, British appointment of all Maroon officers, including the chiefs,

further undermined the authority structure of the polities. Clash was an important
leader among the Windward Maroons, but without government support he could not
exercise the command that was promised him in the treaty. He tried to deny Sambo
legitimacy by taking his badge, a sign of the importance attached to this symbol of
Government recognition. Since there was no legitimate way for him to exercise his
authority, he exercised it in ways the British considered illegitimate, by 'causing
dissension' in Moore Town. In the pre-treaty Maroon polities, chiefs and officers were
men with a solid base of support among their people; after 1739, they were men

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whose primary appeal was not to the Maroons, but to the Governor who granted the
commissions and to the superintendents who recommended them for office. And
while the superintendents might recommend Maroons who appeared to have natural
authority, they would not favour someone independent enough to be 'troublesome'
such as Clash; nor were they likely to attach great importance to the kinship connec
tions that bound some of the Leeward officers to one another and to their people.
Neither natural leadership, nor breadth of support, nor relations with other officers,
nor kinship, nor ethnic heritage ? none of these ? was enough to bring a Maroon a
commission if he did not seem 'suitable' in the eyes of the British. And suitability in
their eyes was doubtless somewhat different from suitability in the eyes of the
Maroons. It is not so surprising then that the Maroon headmen often failed to exercise
a firm command over those in their towns. Furthermore, the fact that the British dealt
with each of the towns individually, through their appointees, encouraged the disin
tegration of the larger pre-treaty polities. And in an era of peace, there was no military
need to maintain the former unity.
Fifthly, the subordination of Maroon leaders to white superintendents and party
officers could not have increased their stature in the eyes of their people. Both in the
towns and on party duty, it was now the whites whose orders were to be followed, by
officers and ordinary Maroons alike. The Maroons did not always respect these out
siders, and for Maroon officers to have to bend to whites of whom other Maroons had
a low opinion must have inhibited the development of authority of even the most
natural leaders.
The sixth way in which the treaties and subsequent legislation encouraged
political instability among the post-treaty Maroons was in restricting them to small
reservations granted by the Government. The Maroons now had legal claim to their
lands, that is, claim recognized by the British, but the extent of their lands was
drastically reduced. Before 1739, they had had the run of the interior, building where
they pleased and changing the location of their settlements as the soil was exhausted,
or as their old haunts became known to the enemy, or when a village quarrelled and
split into factions. After the treaties the largest settlement, Trelawny Town, was
allowed only 1500 acres [JHA 10, Vol. 3, p. 458] and the others were given less. White
settlers immediately pressed in to occupy the formerly dangerous areas adjacent to the
Maroon towns, and the Maroons were increasingly restricted to land that was over
worked. The Maroons were completely dependent on the British Government for
relief; technically, they could not live outside the reservations. Thus, the factions that
arose in the post-treaty towns could not break off and establish new Maroon villages
outside the reservations without Government approval. And when they were unable to
obtain permission, feuding factions were forced to live side by side, confined to small
territories. Scotts Hall was the only splinter settlement that was accorded such recogni
tion and given separate lands. Furry's Town and Clash's settlement near Bath were not.
The return of Maroons from these splinter settlements to the towns they had left
cannot have encouraged domestic harmony in the Maroon settlements.
There are two other ways in which the treaties altered the political balance of
the Maroon polities that we should like to mention, though their effects were not

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necessarily to enhance discord; in fact, one of them may have eased it. The first deals
with the balance of power between military and other types of leaders, primarily ritual
or religious leaders. Among the Windward Maroons there was no headman comparable
to Cudjoe. The obeah woman Nanny was the most impressive figure among the Wind
ward Maroons, standing out above all the headmen. The fact that the British recog
nized only the headmen and not her or others like her must have altered the balance of
power between different types of leaders in the east. Nanny's personal prestige was
acknowledged by the British in a 1740 grant of land made explicitly to her and her
followers, but this grant was in recognition of her position among the pre-treaty
Maroons. She was given no role in the post-treaty organization with which the British
dealt. It was the headman to whom they looked, and they may have expected him to
perform duties that in the past fell to her. The fact that the British did not recognize a
religious leader may be the reason that none ever again rose to Nanny's prominence
and power.
The second point concerns the composition of the post-treaty Maroon popula
tions. Throughout their history until the treaties, the Maroon bands had been absorb
ing new members, escapees from the plantations. While new members brought with
them fresh ideas and a renewed contact with the African heritage, groups of them,
particularly ones who came from the same plantation or shared an African ethnic
identity, constituted a challenge to the political balance of the Maroon band they
joined. After the treaties the Maroons were to have no more recruits. Their member
ship was frozen and might now grow only by natural increase. The lack of new
members meant that a fresh African influence was no longer coming into the Maroon
towns, but this must have made for a greater political cohesiveness of their communi
ties. The ethnic factionalism present among the pre-treaty Maroons, and evident after
the treaties in the 1742 conspiracy of Coromantee Maroons, waned after the first
generation. Indeed, serious political disturbances of any kind occurred less often after
the first generation, and we suggest that the increasing homogeneity of the Maroon
population was an important factor. As the century wore on, a larger and larger
percentage were born Maroons, and identification with various African or Creole
groups was replaced by Maroon identity per se, with its own special African heritage
and its unique position in 18th century Jamaica.
CONCLUSION
Let us now return to the broad question of factionalism and discord in the
post-treaty Maroon settlements. In pre-treaty times, challenges to leadership and
factional quarrels took place ? ethnic factionalism was particularly prevalent ? but
there were means of resolving the disputes. If a faction were strong enough, it could
take over the leadership of the group, or separate from it. If it were unsuccessful, it
could be driven out or suppressed by force, its leaders executed. After 1739, the means
of resolving such conflicts were weakened. Reservation of the death penalty to the
Crown meant that a headman no longer had a free hand in suppressing rivals; but at the
same time, the Government's support of the chief and all other officers meant that
their incumbency per se was not threatened. In addition, the confinement to small

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land reserves meant that no group of Maroons could break off and form another
settlement. Except for one, splinter groups were forced to return to their old reserva
tions, there to live side by side with those they had tried to leave, in a state of tension
that might break into open conflict, into 'Disorders, Tumults, and Disturbances', at
any time. Thus the treaties, while making internal dissension less dangerous by bring
ing peace, simultaneously lessened the penalties on unsuccessful factions, made it
impossible for a faction to be entirely successful, and insured that factions had to
continue living side by side. Given the heterogeneous composition of the Maroons of
that time, the divisions between Creoles and Africans and among Africans of different
ethnic backgrounds, one could scarcely have planned a structure more conducive to
periodic disruptions and disturbances.
The British interfered with Maroon political processes and organization by the
treaties, and when they found the result not to their liking, they tried to erect a
substitute system, a group of Government-appointed Maroon officers, supervised by
whites, complete with commissions and badges to legitimize them, and courts
appointed by the British. The structure lacked any basis in Maroon political interests
and because of that it lacked conviction. The 'Disorders, Tumults, and Disturbances'
continued in force until the ethnically diverse population was replaced by a more
homogeneous one. Then the ethnic differences and internal discord faded at the same
time as a new population began to develop social controls more suited to the peaceful
era in which they found themselves. But while the ethnic differences completely
disappeared in time, the tensions surrounding the office of the chief persisted and
resulted in open quarrels and factions from time to time: for the structures that both
encouraged such quarrels and prevented their simple resolution had been built into the
Maroon polities by the treaties.32
Entering into a political agreement with the occupying colonial power has
changed authority relations within many a formerly independent society. Most often
the change has been in the direction of undermining the indigenous structures; and this
frequently has happened contrary to the plans of the colonial government, which
hoped to use the indigenous authority to enforce its rule locally, and was sometimes
puzzled by its inability to do so. This pattern has been especially well documented for
Africa.33 Similarly, Jamaican Maroon societies were not just preserved but were trans
formed by their treaties. Rather than simply insure their autonomous existence, the
new relationship with colonial Jamaica altered and undermined authority relations
within their polities, and changed the polities themselves into smaller village units
administered by agents of the island government.
In addition, Maroons, after 1739, had a special problem to face. Conceived

and formed as outlaw societies, at war from their very inception, Maroon so
cieties were at their core military; central to their organization were procedures
and practices adapted to societies at war, but hard to tolerate in an era of peace.
The Maroons had major readjustments to make not only because the colonial power
interfered with their indigenous structures, but also because the previously hostile
environment that had supported those structures was banished by the peace the
treaties ensured.

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FOOTNOTES
1The research on which this article was based was made possible in part by a Predoctoral
Research Grant from the National Institute of Health, No. 12282-01.
2For the formation of the two Maroon polities see Patterson [19] ; Kopytoff [15] Ch. 2.
3For the ethnic diversity of the pre-treaty Maroons, see Kopytoff [16].
4Guthrie/Gregory, 21 Feb. 1739, CO. Add. MS. 12431.
5Anon./Knight, n.d. CO. Add. MS. 12431.
6Cudjoe's father had led the band of Coromantee slaves who had escaped from Sutton's
Plantation in 1690, and who came to dominate the western interior. Cudjoe succeeded him as
leader in the west, and Accompong and Johnny, captains under him, were referred to in the treaty
as Cudjoe's "brothers" and listed as his successors. Anon [1] ; JHA [10] Vol. 3, p. 458.
7Lewis/Knight, 20 Dec. 1743, CO. Add. MS. 12431.
8See Kopytoff [15] Chapter Two for a reconstruction of the movements of the Windward
Maroons.
9"Further Examination of Sarra ..." end. in Hunter/Newcastle 13 October 1733, CSP [4]
Vol. 40 p. 215. The man is variously called Sarra, Sara, Seyrus, Cyrus.
10Ibid.
11 "Confession by Seyrus", end. in Hunter/Bd. of Trade, 25 August 1733, CSP [4] Vol. 40,
p. 173.
12 [21] ; "Examination of an Ebo Boy_", end. in Ayscough/Newcastle, 27 Feb. 1735,
CO. 137/55.
13Patents, Vol. 22, p. 16, Records Office, Spanish Town, Jamaica.
14The date of Quao's treaty was 23 June 1739 but it was not brought before the House of
Assembly for ratification until the following year. Thus the date is sometimes given as 1740.
15 The reference is to a later version of the act, which had very minor changes.
16Those "born in the woods" are Creole Maroons, born of Maroon mothers; these "from
other countries" are non-Coromantee Africans.
17CO. Add. MS. 12431, p. 95.

18Knowles/Board of Trade, 12 March 1754 CO. 137/27; Gentleman's Magazine, June 1754;
JHA [10] Vol. 4, pp. 507-8.
19Knowles/Board of Trade, 12 March 1754, CO. 137/27. Crawford Town later became
Charles Town.
20New Nanny Town had been renamed Moore Town by the mid-1760s. Presumably this
occurred after the death of Nanny, and in honour of Henry Moore who served as acting Governor
of Jamaica from 1756 to 1762 (with a brief interruption in 1759).
21RR/Swigle, 19 March 1767 in Jacobs [8] p. 95.
22i8] 3 May 1767, p. 106.
23 [8] p. 92.19 March 1767. Maroons never completely lost interest in the area around Bath.
A settlement of Maroons at Hayfield was instrumental in suppressing the 1865 rebellion, and it is
still there today.
24The laws ratifying Cudjoe's and Quao's treaties, in 1739 and 1740 respectively, made
reference to the four Maroon settlements. For the Scotts Hall settlement, see JHA [10] Vol. 4, p.
288.

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25 Tracking parties of Maroons sometimes included members of more than one Windward
town. See JHA [10] Vol. 5, pp. 226-227.
26 See Kopytoff [15 ] Chapter Six for a discussion of Maroon land acquisition.
27RR/James, 28 March 1767 in Jacobs [8] p. 97.
28 Both laws had short life-spans written into them, and they were re-enacted every few
years, sometimes with minor changes.
29Guthrie/Trelawny, 18 Feb 1739, MS. [12] Vol. 22.
30See Beckford/Knight, 11 Oct. 1740, Add. MS. 12431; Long [18] Vol. 1, p. 447.
31 Treaty Maroons cooperated in hunting down runaways elsewhere in the New World as
well. See Price [20] p. 22.
The subsequent history of quarrels and tensions around the office of the Maroon headman
appears in Kopytoff [15] Ch. 9 and 16.
33See, for example: Busia [3] Fallers [6] Gluckman et al, [7] ; Kuper [17] ; Khama [13] ;
Paula Brown gives a general discussion of the problem, focusing on the Pacific, but using materials
from Africa as well [2].
REFERENCES
[ 1 ] ANON, "History of the Revolted Negroes in Jamaica", Add. Ms. 12431.

?21 BROWN, Paula, "From Anarchy to Satrapy", American Anthropologist Vol.
65, 1963.
[3] BUSIA, Kofi, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of the
Ashanti, Oxford University Press, 1963.
[4] CALENDAR of State Papers, Colonial Office, America and the West Indies.
[5] DALLAS, Robert Charles, The History of the Maroons... ,2 Vols. T.N. Long
man and O. Rees, London 1803.
[6] FALLERS, Lloyd, Bantu Bureaucracy, Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons,
Cambridge, 1956.
[7] GLUCKMAN, Max, J.C. MITCHELL and J.A. BARNES, "The Village Head
man in British Central Africa", Africa, Vol. 19, 1949.
[81 JACOBS, H.P. (ed.), "Roger Hope Elletson's Letter Book", Jamaican Historical
Review, Vol. 2, 1949.
[9] JAMAICA: Acts of Assembly, (from 1681 to 1769 incl.) 2 Vols. St. Jago de la
Vega 1769-71.
[ 10] _: Journals of the House of Assembly.

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[11] _, MS. Laws of Jamaica, Spanish Town Record Office, Jamaica.

[12] -: Manuscript Minutes of Council, Spanish Town Archives, Jamaica.
[13] KHAMA, Tschekedi, ''Chieftainship under Indirect Rule", Journal of the
Royal African Institute, Noi. 35, 1936.
[14] KNIGHT, James, The Natural Moral and Political History of Jamaica to the
year 1742... CO. Add. Ms. 12418,12419.
[15] KOPYTOFF, Barbara Klamon, The Maroons of Jamaica, Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania 1973, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
[16] _, "The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity", Caribbean
Quarterly, in press (1976).
[17] KUPER, Adam, "Gluckman's Village Headman", American Anthropologist,
Vol. 72, 1970.
[18] LONG, Edward, The History of Jamaica, 3 Vols. T. Lowndes, London, 1774.
[19] PATTERSON, Orlando, "Slavery and Slave Revolts; a socio-historical analysis
of the First Maroon War, Jamaica, 1655-1740", Social and Economic
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1970.
[20] PRICE, Richard (ed.), Maroon Societies, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Anchor, 1973.
[21 ] THICKNESSE, Philip, Memoirs and Anecdotes of Philip Thicknesse... 3 vols.
Printed for the Author, London 1788-1791.

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Jamaican Maroon Political Organization - The Effects of The Treaties

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Author(s): Barbara Klamon Kopytoff

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