April 26, 1993

3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Betsy Ranslow, M.S.
Director of Investigations
Office of Ethics
American Psychological Association
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002-4242

RE: ETHICS INVESTIGATION COMPLAINT CONCERNING WILLIAM D. BROWN

Dear Ms. Ranslow:

Enclosed is a completed Ethics Complaint Form together with a detailed statement and
attachments concerning possible violations by William D. Brown, Ph.D. of the American
Psychological Association's Ethical Principles for Psychologists, as amended June 2, 1989.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

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 RE: ETHICS INVESTIGATION COMPLAINT CONCERNING WILLIAM D. BROWN

Brief Summary

During the period May 29, 1991 to October 8, 1991 I had 20 weekly psychotherapy sessions
with William D. Brown, Ph.D. Dr. Brown’s handling of my case suggests one of two conclusions,
either of which raise the possibility of a breach by Dr. Brown of the American Psychological
Association’s (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists, as amended June 2, 1989. Dr. Brown’s
handling of my case suggests that he breached APA Ethical Principle 2 re: Competence in that
he failed to recognize the boundaries of his competence and the limitations of his techniques
by continuing to treat a patient with apparently delusional (paranoid) ideation who might have
been more appropriately treated by a psychiatrist. In the alternative, Dr. Brown’s handling of
my case suggests that he breached APA Ethical Principle 5 re: Confidentiality in that he engaged
in repeated nonconsensual communications with my employer during the course of therapy
upon which he concluded that my seemingly persecutory ideation was in fact not delusional
and which communications were the basis of his decision not to recommend that I undergo a
psychiatric evaluation. Any nonconsentual communications with my employer would also have
violated the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act and would subject Dr. Brown to
possible criminal prosecution for the commission of a misdemeanor.

Detailed Statement of Facts

A. INTRODUCTION

At an early point in my therapy with Dr. Brown, in about early June 1991, I formed the belief
that Dr. Brown was engaged in nonconsentual communications with my employer during which
he disclosed confidential mental health information derived from my consultations. Dr. Brown
denied that he was in communication with my employer and attributed my belief to a lack of
trust. During the course of the therapy, I advised Dr. Brown of other beliefs I held, which like
the belief that he was in communication with my employer, lacked a firm evidentiary base and
which might be termed persecutory. Dr. Brown continued the therapy despite the fact that my
belief system would suggest that I suffered from a delusional (paranoid) disorder for which
medication might be indicated. Dr. Brown did not recommend that I undergo a psychiatric
examination or enter therapy with a psychiatrist.

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B. BACKGROUND FACTS

1. I, Gary Freedman, am a 39-year-old male, and reside at 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Apartment 136, Washington, DC 20008.

2. In late May 1991 I sought from Ms. Judy Peres, LCSW of Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources
(202 429-1950), my employer’s Employee Assistance Program provider, a referral to a
hypnotherapist. Ms. Peres recommended that I contact the American Hypnosis Training
Academy located at 8750 Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring, Maryland. The American Hypnosis
Training Academy provided me the names and telephone numbers of a number of local
hypnotherapists, including that of Dr. William D. Brown, a Ph.D. psychologist and
hypnotherapist.

3. During the period May 29, 1991 until October 8, 1991 I had twenty (20) psychotherapy
sessions with Dr. William Brown, whose office is located at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite
217, Washington, DC 20036 (202 833-8792) (See Attachment A).

4. During the period of my psychotherapy with Dr. Brown I was employed at the law firm of
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (“Akin Gump,” “firm,” or “employer”) in the capacity of a
legal assistant. The firm’s address is 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington,
DC 20036.

5. Prior to my psychotherapy with Dr. Brown I had consulted or had been in therapy with a
number of mental health professionals (See Attachment B).

C. FACTS MATERIAL TO A DETERMINATION THAT DR. BROWN VIOLATED APA ETHICAL

PRINCIPAL 2 RE: COMPETENCE

6. Sometime early in the period of my therapy I advised Dr. Brown that I believed that he was in
communication with my employer. I told him that I had formed the belief that he spoke with a
manager or managers of my employer after each consultation and advised the managers(s) of
the content of the consultation. I told Dr. Brown that my belief was based on my perception
that my supervisor, Christine Robertson, and co-workers appeared to use words and phrases
that I had used with him during the consultations. Dr. Brown vehemently denied that he was in
communication with my employer and stated that he did not even know the identity of my
employer.

7. During the period of my therapy, I told Dr. Brown that I felt I was harassed by co-workers at
Akin Gump. I further stated I felt that Akin Gump management was aware of the harassment
(although I had not complained to management about the harassment), and that management
was engaged in attempts to investigate the harassment. I advised Dr. Brown that I felt his

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communications with my employer were part of my employer’s attempt to investigate the
harassment.

8. I advised Dr. Brown that I felt Akin Gump management, as part of its attempt to investigate
the harassment, had an informal arrangement with the then manager of my apartment building
(3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW), Ms. Elaine Wranik, whereby the manager inspected my
apartment daily without my consent and reported her findings back to Akin Gump
management. I told Dr. Brown that I had no hard evidence that this activity was in fact going
on, but that I based my belief on words and phrases used by my co-workers and supervisor that
suggested that these employees were aware of the contents and condition of my apartment on
a day-by-day basis. On one occasion, Dr. Brown, referring to my suspicions about the manager
of my apartment building, stated: “What do you think she does when she goes in your
apartment, lay in your bed?”

9. I advised Dr. Brown that I felt that Akin Gump management, as part of its attempt to
investigate the harassment, had regular and frequent communications with my sister, Mrs.
Estelle Jacobson (609 727-3295). My sister denies that she has had communications of any kind
with my employer. Again, my belief that Akin Gump management was in communication with
my sister was based on my perception that my co-workers and supervisor used words and
phrases relating to my conversations with my sister or to personal facts, knowledge of which
could only have been derived from communications between my sister and Akin Gump
management.

10. The various beliefs that I stated to Dr. Brown concerning the actions of my employer were
systematic, seemingly delusional, and persecutory. These beliefs should have suggested to Dr.
Brown that I might suffer from a delusional (paranoid) disorder, DSM-III diagnosis: 297.10, a
serious mental disorder more appropriately treated by a psychiatrist than by a psychologist.
Despite the seemingly paranoid nature of my belief system, Dr. Brown did not question the
advisability of my remaining in therapy with him rather than my being evaluated by or entering
therapy with a psychiatrist, a mental health professional who might determine the indications
for and prescribe appropriate medication. The decision to terminate my therapy with Dr. Brown
on October 8, 1991 was my own; Dr. Brown did not recommend that I terminate the therapy.

11. Dr. Brown is also a hypnotherapist and during one of my psychotherapy sessions he
attempted to induce hypnosis. Experts universally concur that hypnosis should never be
attempted in an individual who is suspected of being paranoid; the induction of hypnosis in a
paranoiac may lead to psychotic decompensation. The various seemingly paranoid beliefs that I
related to Dr. Brown should have alerted him to question the advisability of attempting
hypnosis in my case.

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12. On October 24, 1991, about three weeks after I terminated my therapy with Dr. Brown, I
complained to two members of Akin Gump management, Dennis M. Race and Malcolm
Lassman, that I was a victim of harassment by coworkers, supervisory personnel, and attorneys
(See Attachments C and D). My complaint of harassment was limited to a narration of incidents
involving firm personnel exclusively. I did not communicate to Akin Gump management my
belief that it had been in communication with Dr. Brown, my sister, and the manager of my
apartment building. On October 29, 1991 I was terminated by Akin Gump. Dennis M. Race (202
887 4028), an attorney manager of the firm, advised me that he was unable to substantiate my
allegations of harassment and that there appeared to be a lack of fit between me and other
firm personnel. I was advised that two supervisory employees, Maggie Sinnott and John D.
Neary, stated that they found me difficult to work with, that they could not work with me, and
that they were afraid of me.

Mr. Race had determined, in consultation with two mental health professionals (whose
identities have not been disclosed), including a psychiatrist, that my allegations of harassment
were based on paranoid “ideas of reference” and that I was potentially violent (See Attachment
C). Mr. Race determined that allowing me to remain on the firm’s premises might constitute
negligence (See Attachment E).

On February 4, 1992 I filed a Complaint with the District of Columbia Department of Human
Rights (DOHR) alleging that Akin Gump’s decision to terminate my employment was unlawfully
based on the perception that I was homosexual in violation of the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act of 1977 (See Attachment F). DOHR’s investigation of the complaint [Docket No. 92-
087-P(N)] is pending.

Akin Gump was extended an opportunity to mediate the Complaint by DOHR; the offer to
mediate is continuing in nature. To date, Akin Gump has refused to mediate the Complaint,
which suggests that the firm continues to believe that its decision to terminate was justified
and that I continue to suffer from a serious mental disorder. Akin Gump’s Response to the
DOHR Complaint, dated May 22, 1992, characterizes my mental state as paranoid and terms my
behavior as bizarre, violent, and disruptive (See Attachment C). The description of my mental
state contained in the Response suggests a diagnosis of delusional (paranoid) disorder: DSM-III
297.10, a psychotic condition. The Response states that firm personnel were afraid of me, that I
had difficulty communicating with peers and that I demanded to work in total isolation.

The conclusions of Akin Gump management, based on interviews of co-workers and supervisors
and on consultations with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, are at
marked variance with Dr. Brown’s handling of my case. Indeed, the conclusions reached by Akin
Gump management that I was paranoid and potentially violent (or violent) suggest that Dr.
Brown failed to recognize and respond appropriately to the seemingly paranoid beliefs I had
stated to him and in so doing failed to recognize the boundaries of his competence and the

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limitations of his techniques in violation of APA Ethical Principle 2 re: Competence.

D. FACTS MATERIAL TO A DETERMINATION THAT DR. BROWN VIOLATED APA ETHICAL

PRINCIPAL 5: CONFIDENTIALITY

In order to conclude that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent, it must be inferred
that Dr. Brown determined that the various seemingly delusional beliefs I stated to him were in
fact accurate representations of reality. In order for Dr. Brown to have determined that I was
not delusional he would have had to have substantiated my belief that Akin Gump
management was in communication with my sister and the manager of my apartment building,
and have been apprised that Akin Gump management also suspected that I was a victim of
harassment by co-workers. Communications with Akin Gump management are the only means
by which Dr. Brown could have substantiated my beliefs and have determined that I was not
paranoid and that his handling of my case was therefore appropriate. A finding that Dr. Brown’s
therapeutic handling of my case was appropriate and therefore not in violation APA Ethical
Principal 2 re: Competence requires a conclusion that Dr. Brown violated APA Ethical Principle 5
re: Confidentiality by having nonconsentual communications with Akin Gump management, a
finding that would also subject Dr. Brown to possible criminal prosecution for violation of the
District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act.

13. At no time during my therapy with Dr. Brown did I provide oral or written consent
authorizing Dr. Brown to communicate with my employer or any third party.

In connection with DOHR Complaint Docket No. 92-087-P(N) I did execute and mail to Dr.
Brown, on January 14, 1992, a notarized release authorizing Dr. Brown to communicate with
representatives of the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights (See Attachment G).

14. My Reply filed with DOHR in connection with Complaint No. 92-087-P(N) refutes Akin
Gump’s assertion that it had a good faith belief that I suffered from a serious mental disorder
that necessitated my termination (See Attachment D). The facts alleged in the Reply are
consistent with a determination that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent. But, as
noted above, a finding that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent is relevant to a
finding that Dr. Brown violated APA Ethical Principle 5 re: Confidentiality.

15. During my employment with Akin Gump I was a beneficiary of the firm’s long-term disability
income plan. At the time of my termination, I was not advised of my rights under the Plan, and
in fact did not file for benefits under the plan. The termination decision, ostensibly based on
Akin Gump management’s finding that I suffered from a severe mental disturbance which
would otherwise have qualified me for benefits under the plan, precluded me from filing for
benefits. Akin Gump management’s termination decision may therefore have violated
applicable provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) that

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prohibit an employer from terminating an employee to prevent his obtaining a benefit under
ERISA. Relevant facts pertaining to Akin Gump’s possible violation of ERISA are currently being
reviewed by the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor
(See Attachment H).

Akin Gump’s possible violation of ERISA is relevant to a finding that its decision to terminate
was unlawful, malicious, and discriminatory and that the firm did not have a good faith belief
that I suffered from a severe mental disturbance. Whether I suffered from a severe mental
disturbance is relevant to a finding that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent. But, as
noted above, a finding that Dr. Brown's handling of my case was competent is relevant to a
finding that Dr. Brown violated APA Ethical Principle 5 re: Confidentiality.

16. In April 1992 a former co-worker at Akin Gump, Patricia McNeil, was unlawfully terminated
by my former supervisor, Christine Robertson. In March 1993, Ms. McNeil filed an action in U.S.
District Court, styled McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, alleging that her termination
by Christine Robertson was discriminatory in violation of Title VII (See Attachment I).

I believe that my former supervisor, Christine Robertson, was engaged in a pattern of

harassment against me and that Akin Gump’s decision to terminate my employment was based
in part on false and retaliatory statements that Ms. Robertson made to members of
management immediately following my complaint of harassment (See Attachment D).

Facts relating to the unlawful conduct of Christine Robertson in relation to a former co-worker
are relevant to a finding that the termination decision in my case was unlawful, malicious, and
discriminatory, and not based on Akin Gump management’s good faith belief that I suffered
from a severe mental disorder. Whether I suffered from a severe mental disturbance is relevant
to a finding that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent. But, as noted above, a finding
that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case was competent is relevant to a finding that Dr. Brown
violated APA Ethical Principle 5 re: Confidentiality.

17. Akin Gump based its decision to terminate my employment in part on representations
regarding my mental status it obtained from two mental health professionals (See Attachment
C). In addition to soliciting a representation from a psychiatrist, Dennis Race sought and
obtained a representation regarding my mental status from the firm’s Employee Assistance
Program Provider, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources. Akin Gump has not disclosed the name
of the Sheppard Pratt mental health professional with whom it consulted. (On January 11, 1993
I spoke by telephone with Judy Peres, a senior mental health counselor at Sheppard Pratt (See
Attachment J). Ms. Peres stated that she did not recall ever having spoken to Mr. Race and
denied having any knowledge of his identity; she also stated that she did not recall who I was.
She stated that the providing of a representation regarding an employee’s mental status to his
employer would be a highly unusual occurrence that she would likely recall.)

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On three occasions during my employment, I consulted with mental health counselors at
Sheppard Pratt, including Judy Peres (See Attachment B). Any disclosure of Confidential mental
health information to Akin Gump by a mental health counselor employed by Sheppard Pratt
would be in violation of the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec.
6-2002 (Disclosures prohibited; exceptions) and would subject the offending mental health
counselor and Sheppard Pratt to criminal prosecution for the commission of a misdemeanor.
Further, Akin Gump’s actions in seeking a representation from a mental health counselor at
Sheppard Pratt raise the possibility of a violation by Akin Gump’s managers of D.C. Code Sec. 6-
2062 (Criminal penalties for violation of the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act)
as well as certain criminal statutes including D.C. Code Sec. 22-105a (Conspiracy to commit
crime) and D.C. Code Sec. 22-105 (Persons advising, inciting or conniving at criminal offense to
be charged as principals.)

Akin Gump management’s actions in seeking a representation regarding my mental status from
Sheppard Pratt, a mental health facility with which I had a confidential relationship, and its
possible attempts to solicit confidential mental health information from Sheppard Pratt, may
indicate Akin Gump’s propensity to solicit, unlawfully, confidential mental health information
from mental health professionals. Such a propensity is material on the issue of whether Akin
Gump may have solicited confidential mental health information from Dr. Brown during the
period of my therapy with him.

In the alternative, if Akin Gump’s assertion that it sought a representation from Sheppard Pratt
is a willful misstatement -- that is, if Akin Gump never in fact sought or obtained a
representation from Sheppard Pratt (which is consistent with the comments of Judy Peres on
January 11, 1993, as stated above) -- that possible willful misstatement is relevant to a finding
that Akin Gump did not form a good faith belief that I suffered from a serious mental disorder
Whether I suffered from a severe mental disturbance is relevant to a finding that Dr. Brown’s
handling of my case was competent. But, as noted above, a finding that Dr. Brown’s handling of
my case was competent is relevant to a finding that Dr Brown violated APA Ethical Principle 5
re: Confidentiality.

E. RELEVANT FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO DR. BROWN’S POSSIBLE ETHICAL VIOLATIONS

18. In September 1992, about one year after my job termination on October 29, 1991, I
underwent a two-hour evaluation with Dr Napoleon Cuenco, a psychiatrist at the Department
of Psychiatry, George Washington University Medical Center. During the course of the
evaluation I restated the various systematic and unsubstantiated beliefs I had formed regarding
the actions of Akin Gump management, including my belief that Akin Gump had been in
communication with the various mental health professionals I had consulted. At the conclusion
of the first evaluation session on September 1, 1992, Dr. Cuenco deferred the diagnosis (See
Attachment K). At the conclusion of the second evaluation session on September 8, 1992, Dr.

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Cuenco assigned the diagnosis bi-polar disorder (See Attachment K).

19. I am currently in therapy with Dr. Suzanne M. Pitts, a psychiatrist at the Department of
Psychiatry, George Washington University Medical Center. I began weekly consultations with
Dr. Pitts on October 26, 1992; twice weekly consultations were initiated in late January 1993.

20. On April 20, 1993 I filed with the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) a claim for
disability benefits on the basis that my former employer, Akin Gump, determined in
consultation with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I suffered from
a debilitating mental disorder. A copy of a statement I submitted to SSA in support of the
disability insurance claim is attached herewith (See Attachment L).

___________________________

In view of the foregoing statement of facts and the logical implications of those facts, I request
that the Ethics Office of the American Psychological Association conduct an investigation into
the conduct of Dr. William D. Brown relating to (1) his possible failure to recognize the
boundaries of his competence and the limitations of his techniques or (2) his willful and
repeated breaches of a confidential psychotherapeutic relationship during the period May 29,
1991 through October 8, 1991, and possibly extending to undetermined times thereafter.

/s/
_____________________
Gary Freedman
April 26, 1993