Nationalism and Labor Movement

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O rd er N u m b er 9434333
N ation alism and th e labor m ovem ent in th e O ttom an Em pire,

1872-1914
Mentzel, Peter Carl, Ph.D.

University of Washington, 1994
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Aibor, MI 48106
Nationalism and the Labor Movement
in the Ottoman Empire, 1872-1914
by
Peter C. Mentzel
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Washington
1994
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Date March 18, 1994
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Abstract
Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Ottoman Empire,

1872-1914
by Peter C. Mentzel
Co-chairpersons of the Supervisory Committee:

Professor Emeritus Peter F. Sugar,
Professor Jere Bacharach.
Department of History.
Middle Eastern labor history has been concerned
principally with the position of workers in relation to the
state, their reactions to the absorption of the Middle East
into the world economic system, questions of work-place
organization, and the question of class-consciousness.
Within these broad categories, the subject of ethnicity
often appears but it is rarely the center of attention.
This dissertation examines the role of ethnicity and
national self-consciousness in the development of the labor
movement in the Ottoman Empire.
The main focus of this investigation is on Ottoman
Macedonia (especially the city of Salonika), Istanbul and
Izmir as areas which were relatively industrialized and
which were among the most ethnically heterogeneous of the
Empire. An examination of the conduct and demands of
striking workers, the activities of socialists of different
ethnic and national backgrounds, and the attitude of the
Ottoman Imperial Government and the Committee of Union and
Progress combine to form an impression of the role of ethnic
and national differences among Ottoman urban workers.
The dissertation concludes that workers of different
ethnic and national groups were often able to cooperate in
order to secure certain economic goals. However, despite
these examples of cooperation the labor movement in the
Empire was weakened by the growth of national self-
consciousness and ethnic tensions among Ottoman workers.
These tensions ultimately prevented the formation of a
unified, multi-ethnic labor movement for the whole Empire.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A Note on Transliterations andPlace Names ................ ii
Introduction ................................................1
Chapter I : The Ottoman Empire During the 18th

and Early 20th Centuries .................................. 22
Chapter II: Industrialization and the Beginning

of the Labor......... Movement .............................56
Chapter III: The Strike Wave of 1908 ................. 95
Chapter IV:Young Turks and Workers, 1908-1909 ......... 141
Chapter V: Nationalism, Socialism and the Committee

of Union and Progress, 1909-1914 ........................ 171
Chapter VI: Solidarity and Division in the Labor

Movement, 1908-1914 ...................................... 199
Conclusion ............................................... 225
Bibliography ............................................. 239
Appendix A: Greater Istanbul........... 249
Appendix B: Railroads in the Ottoman Empire ........ 250
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS AND PLACE NAMES
Ottoman Turkish was written with a modified form of the
Arabic alphabet. In transliterating Ottoman terms and names
I have used modern Turkish spelling instead of a
transliteration from the Arabic letters or a rendering into
English. Thus, "Mejdet Pasha" is written "Mecdet Pa§a."
Likewise, "vAbd al-Hamid" is "Abdiilhamit."
Modern Turkish pronunciation is similar to English with
the following exceptions:
'c' is like English 1j '
'g ' " 'ch'
" 'sh'
'I1 silent, lengthens preceeding vowel
1j ' as in French
'o' as in German
'U' as in German
The many different versions of the place names of the
Balkans and Near East also presents a problem. I have used
two different methods for writing place names. In cases
where thename of a city is well known to Englishspeakers,
I have usedthe English language name for the city. Hence,
Vienna, Damascus and Salonika instead of Wien, §am and
Selanik. In all other cases I have used the place name
which was in use at the time in which I have mentioned it.
For example, the city on the Bosphorus is called
ii
Constantinople before 1453 and Istanbul after that date.
The first time a place name is used, however, other versions
of the name will appear after it in parentheses. Thus,
"Uskiib (Skoplje, Skopje)" or "Filibe (Philipopolis,
Plovdiv).
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people assisted me with the research and writing
of this dissertation. In particular I want thank Dr. Peter
P. Sugar, Dr. Jere Bacharach, Dr. Re§>at Kasaba, Dr. James
Felak, and Dr. Ellis Goldberg for their encouragement,
guidance, and suggestions with this entire project. In
addition, Dr. Donald Quataert of the State University of New
York at Binghamton and Dr. Zafer Toprak of Bo§azi?i
University, Istanbul, assisted me with suggestions and
comments while I was conducting my research.
I want also to acknowledge the support I received from
a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Fellowship
which funded most of my dissertation research, and a Claude
R. Lambe Fellowship which allowed me to devote time to
evaluating my findings and writing the dissertation.
Finally, I am indebted to my wife, Tami Coleman, for
her ongoing support. Not only did she produce the maps for
this dissertation, but her constant encouragement and
assistance were essential for the completion of this
project.
iv
Introduction
I do not know any workers, nor any capitalists;

I think only of the happiness of my fatherland
(vatanim). For the good of my fatherland, my
dear fatherland, I work for the reconciliation of
capitalists and workers.1
These are the words of Ali Bey, Ottoman Deputy Minister
of Justice during the 1909 parliamentary debates on the
Ottoman strike law. This brief quote touches upon two of
the major features of late Ottoman history, the national
question and the socioeconomic transformation of Ottoman
society.
Ali Bey's use of the term "fatherland” is a good
example of the problem cf nationality during the late
Ottoman period. What did the term "fatherland" mean in the
context of a multi-national country such as the Ottoman
Empire?2 Indeed, the parliament which Ali Bey was
addressing was made up of representatives of many different
nationalities.3 This quote also hints at the growth of
labor unrest and the concept of a division of society along
1. Hakki Onur, "1908 I§gi hareketleri ve Jon Turkler" ("The

1908 Workers' movements and the Young Turks"), Yurt ve
Dunya, Mart 1977, p.293. Translation mine.
2. The Turkish word for "fatherland" is vatan, derived from
the Arabic watan. In its original sense it referred to a
person's place of birth or residence. During the 19th
century certain Ottoman writers began to use it as a synonym
for the French patrie. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of
Modern Turkey. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961),
p.328.
3. The 1908 Ottoman parliament had 288 members. Of these
147 were Turks, 60 were Arabs, 27 Albanian, 26 Greek, 14
Armenian, 10 Slavs and 4 Jews. Feroz Ahmad, The Young
Turks. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.155.
2
the lines of economics and class. The debates over a labor
law were in response to a wave of strikes which swept across
most Ottoman industries during the summer of 1908.
Thus, during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire's
existence, Ottoman urban workers were confronted with both
the growth of nationalism and a developing labor movement.
This dissertation will try to show that although Ottoman
workers were able generally to cooperate across national and
ethnic divisions, the growth of national self-consciousness
ultimately prevented the formation of a unified, multi
national labor movement for the whole Empire.
Ethnicity and Nationalism
There is an extremely rich literature dealing with
questions of ethnic identity, nationality and nationalism.
Generally, most of this literature is concerned with
developing workable and useful definitions for these
extremely elusive terms. Although there are numerous
variations among these definitions, most recent studies of
ethnic or national identity and nationalism agree that these
types of identity are characterized by a high degree of
subjectivity. Liah Greenfeld in her recent book Nationalism
phrases the concept this way: "An essential characteristic
of any identity is that it is necessarily the view the
concerned actor has of himself or herself."4 Similarly,
4. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.13.
3
Hugh Seton-Watson, in his classic study Nations and States
is led to the almost tautological conclusion: "All that I
can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant
number of people in a community consider themselves to form
a nation, or behave as if they formed one."5 More recently,
Benedict Anderson has formulated the idea of nations as
"imagined communities."6
Part of the process of the creation of an ethnic group
and/or a nationality is the adoption of some characteristic
or characteristics by which the members of the group
distinguish themselves from outsiders. Ethnic groups may
chose such markers as language, religion, dress, or color as
criteria to establish inclusion or exclusion from the
community.7 In addition to observable markers of identity
(such as some particular type of dress or language), ethnic
groups may also employ a subjective belief in descent from a
common ancestor.8
5. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1977), p. 5.
6. Bendedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. (London and
New York: Verso, 1991).
7. This conceptualization of ethnic identity is based
largely, though by no means exclusively, on George de Vos,
"Ethnic Pluralism," in George de Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross
(eds.), Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change
(Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975). Also
useful was Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and Nationalities,"
in Peter Sugar (ed.) Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in
Eastern Europe (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1980).
8. There are many variations of this concept. See
especially Max Weber, "Ethnic Groups," in Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich, eds., Max Weber. Economy and Society: An
Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster
Press, 1968), p.389.
4
The transformation of an "ethnic group" into a
nationality or nation is basically a process of intensified
group consciousness coupled with demands for political
rights for the members of the particular group. The
differences between different ethnic groups become more
accentuated during this process and markers such as language
or religion take on added significance as exclusionary
mechanisms. Most importantly, however, the emerging
national group will demand some actual political power or
territory.9 Hence, national identity is a sort of
hypertrophied and politicized form of ethnic identity.
The process by which nationality became the dominant
criteria for social boundary drawing has received as much
attention as efforts to define nationality or ethnicity. It
is significant for the purposes of this study that many
students of nationalism draw a causal link between the
changes underway in Europe during the 18th and 19th
centuries, such as urbanization and industrialization, and
the development of nationalism.10
One of the purposes of this dissertation is to explore
the relationship between nationalism and the economic
development of the Ottoman Empire, especially
industrialization. Scholars have long been interested in
the development of nationalism among the peoples of the
9. Brass, pp.7-9.
10. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.125. See also
Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication.
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).
5
Ottoman Empire, particularly the non-Muslims. Although much
of this scholarship is excellent, it generally concentrates
on the activities of intellectuals and political
activists.11 In other words, while the development of
nationalism has been examined from an intellectual or
political point of view its social ramifications, and the
extent to which non-elite groups identified themselves as
members of a particular nationality, still need to be
explored.
Labor and its organization
The labor movement in the Ottoman Empire developed
during the period in which the Ottoman Empire was being
absorbed into the capitalist world economy.12 Many scholars
have examined the development of organized labor in colonial
or semi-colonial economies in similar stages of
incorporation into the world economy. Of particular
importance for this dissertation is the growing body of
11. There are many fine works on the subject of nationalism

and national identity in the Ottoman Empire. For example,
W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald, (eds.) Nationalism in a Non-
National State. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1977). Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, feds.f Christians
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. 2 vols., (New York: Holmes
and Meirer) 1982. David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish
Nationalism. 1876-1908. (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.),
1977.
12. See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein and Re§at
Kasaba, "Incorporation into the world economy: Change in
the structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839," Jean-Louis
Bacque-Grammont and Paul Dumont, (eds). Economie et Societes
dans 1'empire Ottoman. (Paris: Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique, 1983).
6
literature on workers and the labor movement in the Middle
East.13
Often subsumed by the literature on Middle Eastern
workers are the studies of workers and their organizations
in the Ottoman Empire. Many of these studies implicitly or
explicitly see the labor movement and socialist movements as
being closely connected with one another and both acting as
anti-imperialist forces.14 There is another broad category
of literature which deals to some extent with the labor
movement which is influenced to a greater or lesser extent
by world systems theory. These studies examine urban
workers and their actions, often ignoring the activities of
socialist organizations, while exploring the ways in which
Ottoman workers were affected by the incorporation of the
13. Among those which concentrate on the Middle East are

Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile:
Nationalism. Communism. Islam and the Egyptian Working
Class. 1882-1954. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987) . Ellis Goldberg, Tinker. Tailor. Textile Worker.
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1986). Zachary Lockman, (ed)., Workers and Working Classes
in the Middle East: Struggles. Histories. Historiographies.
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1994).
Peter Sluglett, "Labor and National Liberation: The Trade
Union Movement in Iraq, 1920-1958," Arab Studies Quarterly
5, no.2 (1983), pp.139-154.
14. One of the pioneering works of this type is Hiiseyn Avni
Sanda, 1908'de Ecnebi Sermavesine Karsi Ilk Kalkinmalar (The
first uprisings against foreign capital in 1908), (Istanbul:
Akfam Matbaasi, 1935) . See also Lutfii Eroglu, Tiirkive'de
I^ci Sinifi Tarihi (History of the Working Class in Turkey)
(Istanbul: Kutulmus Basimevi, 1951). The first major study
of labor movement in the Ottoman Empire in a western
language is Stefan Velikov, "Sur le Mouvement Ouvrier et
Socialiste en Turquie apres la Revolution Jeune-Turque de
1908," fetudes Balkaniaues. I, 1964, pp.29-48. More recently
Paul Dumont has been one of the leaders in Ottoman labor
history.
7
Ottoman economy into the world capitalist system. The
Ottoman labor movement is described in terms of the reaction
to this overall incorporation.15 These works also place
industrial workers within the framework of the model of
nationalist, anti-colonial struggle. A closely related body
of literature studies the socialist movement within the
Empire. Most works of this type examine the activities of
journalists and intellectuals. These studies focus
generally on the newspapers which the socialists groups
published.16
Most of these studies concentrate on problems of work
place organization, the political activities of the workers
and the question of class consciousness. Within these broad
catagories, the subject of ethnicity often appears. Indeed,
the problems raised by the presence of a multi-ethnic work
force are certainly not unique to the Middle East. As Eric
Hobsbawm has pointed out, "practically all so-called
'national7 working classes consist of a jig-saw of
15. One of the best examples of this style is Donald

Quataert Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the
Ottoman Empire. 1881-1908 (New York: New York University
Press, 1983). Also important, though dealing only
peripherally with the labor movement, are Re§at Kasaba, The
Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1988) and §evket Pamuk,
Osmanli Ekonomisi ve Dunya Kanitalizmi (the Ottoman Economy
and World Capitalism) (Ankara: Yurt Yayincilik, 1984).
16. For example Mete Tungay's very important Tiirkive'de Sol
Akimlar (Leftist Movements in Turkey), (Ankara: Bilgi
Yayinevi, 1978) concentrates on the newspapers of socialist
organizations. See also Paul Dumont and George Haupt,
Osmanli Imparatorlucrunda Sosvalist Hdreketleri (Socialist
Movement in the Ottoman Empire) (Istanbul: Gozlem
Yayinlari, 1977).
8
heterogeneous groups."17 Much of the history of the labor
movement in the U.S.A. focuses, rightly, on the important
effects of an extremely diverse work force. Scholars of
American labor history have noted that "ethnic and racial
diversity placed many obstacles in the way of cooperative
action to solve common problems, and hindered the formation
of labor unions and the maintenance of class unity within
unions."18 Hence, ethnicity is usually described in terms
of its divisive effects among workers. Often the state is
charged with fostering these divisions as part of a divide-
and-rule strategy among the workers.
This general view of the role of ethnicity in the labor
movement is also present in studies of the labor movement in
non-Western countries. In the case of colonial or semi
colonial economies the problem of ethnicity is sometimes
exacerbated by an ethnic division of labor.19 In many of
these cases certain ethnic groups come to dominate
particular aspects of the economy. In some cases this is
the result of manipulation by a colonial power. In other
17. Eric Hobsbawm, Workers: Worlds of Labor. (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1984), p.52.
18. Robert Asher and Charles Stephenson, "American
Capitalism, Labor Organization, and the Racial/Ethnic
Factor: An Exploration," in Asher and Stephenson, (eds).,
Labor Divided: Race and Ethnicity in United States Labor
Struggles. 1835-1960. (New York: State University of New
York Press, 1990), p.6.
19. For an examination of this concept see Donald Horowitz,
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1985), p.108-113.
9
cases the ethnic division of labor result from deeply held
cultural values.20
These attitudes toward the roles and activities of
ethnicity and the state in a labor movement have a great
deal of validity and seem to describe acurately much of what
goes on in an ethnically fragmented work-force. However,
these studies sometimes seem to embody a hidden model which
describes the relationship between the state and workers on
the one hand and relationships between workers of different
ethnic groups on the other. Dipesh Chakrabarty explains in
a highly provocative article: "workers are 'agents,'
'actors,' 'subjects,'... when they protest against
exploiters, yet the moment they fight among themselves they
become...a collection of immensely gullible people who are
no longer 'subjects' in their own right but simply passive
victims of 'manipulation' and 'exploitation' from external
and interested quarters."21 Chakrabarty goes on to express
his disatisfaction with the simple dichotomy that often pits
the state against workers and creates an unbridgable gap
between ethnic consciousness and class consciousness. As
this dissertation will show, these stark distinctions did
not necessarily exist in the history of the Ottoman labor
20. Horowitz uses various examples, among them the

reluctance of Assamese in India to work on tea plantations
because they feel it beneath their dignity. Tea plantation
work is the domain of immigrants from other states, p.112-
113.
21. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Labor History and the Politics of
Theory: An Indian Angle on the Middle East," in Lockman,
Workers and Working Classes, p.326.
10
movement. The nuanced and complex relationships which did
emerge are much more interesting.
Nationalism, the Young Turks, and the Labor Movement

in the Ottoman Empire
As mentioned at the outset of this introduction, the
social history of the late Ottoman Empire was dominated by
the growth of nationalism and by the economic changes which
were occurring within the Empire. In political terms, one
of the most obvious manifestations of these changes was the
rise to power of the dominant Young Turk faction, the
Committee of Union and Progress. The precise role of the
C.U.P in the development of Turkish nationalism is a hotly
debated subject.22 Most examinations of the C.U.P's
attitudes toward nationalism indicate that the Committee
initially espoused the idea of "Ottomanism." This idea
postulated the existence of an "Ottoman nation" which
included all of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire,
regardless of ethnicity or religion. The C.U.P's members,
it is believed, gradually abandoned Ottomanism for Turkish
nationalism.
22. The classic work on the C.U.P is Feroz Ahmad, The Young
Turks. Also by Ahmad "Unionist Relations with the Greek,
Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Emprie, 1908-
1914," in Benjamin Braude (ed.), Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers,
Inc., 1982) vol. I, pp.401-437. For the development of the
C.U.P from 1889 to 1902 see §iikru Hanio^lu, Ittihat ve
Terakki Cemiveti ve Jon Tiirkliik (Committee of Union and
Progress and the Young Turks) (Istanbul: Iletisim
Yayinlari, 1985).
11
The role played by the C.U.P in relation to the labor
movement has also come under investigation. Many scholars
consider the C.U.P as initially assuming a leadership role
over the labor movement in an effort to use it against
foreign capital. Then, as labor became bolder and more
radical in its demands, the Committee adopted an overtly
hostile attitude to it.23 Other research has demonstrated
that the C.U.P had a hostile attitude toward organized labor
from 1908 onward.24 As this dissertation will show, the
attitudes of the C.U.P toward organized labor varied.
During the 1908 strikes, the C.U.P acted as mediator between
the strikers and employers (who were often non-Ottomans).
Even though the C.U.P subsequently adopted a more hostile
attitude toward workers, it was quick to use them to its own
advantage, as during the anti-Austrian boycott of 1908. By
1913, the C.U.P had moved to a position of actually aiding
Muslim workers in a strike in Izmir. With the important
exception of the 1908 anti-Austrian boycott the C.U.P was
generally unsuccessful in mobilizing workers for its own
political ends.
23. For example, Dogu Ergil, "A Reassessment: The Young

Turks, their Politics and Anti-colonial Struggle," Balkan
Studies. 16, 2, (1975) pp.26-72.
24. Onur, "1908 I§gi Hareketleri," Zafer Toprak, "Ilan-i
Hiirriyet ve Anadolu Osmanli Demiryolu Memurin ve
Miistahdemini Cemiyet-i Uhuwetkaranesi," (The Declaration of
Freedom and the Anatolian Railroad Employees' Association)
Tarih ve Toolum. 10 (57) 1988. Also, Yavuz Selim Karakisla,
"The 1908 Strike Wave in the Ottoman Empire," Turkish
Studies Association Bulletin. XVI, 2, (1992), pp.153-177.
12
The connection between the rise of nationalism and the
socioeconomic changes in the Ottoman Empire was especially
important.25 During the late 19th century industry in the
Empire was largely (thought not entirely) transformed from a
system characterized by workshops, artisans, and guilds to
one dominated by factory production and skilled or semi
skilled workers. I will have more to say about the guild
system in the following chapter, but here I want to explain
the distinction between these two forms of manufacturing.
The difference between an artisan-based manufacturing
sector and one based on the modern factory is largely a
difference in the social framework of each mode of
production. Artisans and the guild system were part of a
system of "social networks." They sold their products
directly to the community in which they lived. The bonds
between the artisans themselves and with their clients were
familial or quasi-familial. These bonds and relationships
do not exist in a modern factory system. The products
produced in such a system are marketed on a much wider basis
than those produced under an artisan-based system. The
"quasi-familial" bonds which held together (theoretically at
least) the artisans within the guild system did not exist
between the workers in a factory.26
25. Kemal Karpat has convincingly argued the importance of

this conection in his study An Inquiry into the Social
Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From
Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nations.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
26. This summary is based largely on Goldberg, Tinker.
Tailor, p.14.
13
Industrialization changed not only the means of
production but the economic relationships between the
different nationalities and classes of the Empire. Within
many industries established with European capital, different
aspects of production became the de facto domains of certain
ethnic groups. For example, the European carpet
manufacturing companies in areas around Kayseri and Kiitahya
employed Greek and Armenian women almost exclusively.27
Additionally, many foreign owned industries employed
foreign nationals in the upper echelon positions while using
Ottoman Christians for the mid-level jobs and Muslim workers
for the lower paying jobs.28
What, then, was the effect on the Ottoman labor
movement of the growth of nationalism among the Ottoman
subject peoples during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries? Did the divisions between the emerging
nationalities of the Empire translate into problems within
the labor movement? Did a decline in the traditional means
of production lead to increased self-identification in terms
of a nationality? To what extent was the economic
restructuring of the Empire during this period related to
the growth of nationalism?29
27. Donald Quataert, "Carpet industry in Western Anatolia."

Journal of Social History. IX, 3, 1986, p.479.
28. Donald Quataert, "Labor and Working Class History
during the Late Ottoman Period," Turkish Studies Association
Bulletin. XV, 2, (September 1991), p.360.
29. Donald Quataert in "Ottoman Handicrafts and Industry in
the Age of European Industrial Hegemony," Review. XI, 2,
1988, p.177 poses some of these questions without offering
any answers himself.
14
In an effort to address similar questions from American
labor history the social historian Herbert Gutman studied
the role of African American workers in the United Mine
Workers of America during the last decades of the 19th
century. He demonstrated that while African American
workers were often used as strike breakers by mine owners
and that while racial tensions between white and black
workers were serious, they did not always preclude
cooperation.30
Similarly, certain scholars of the Ottoman labor
movement contend that there was a high degree of co
operation among the workers of different nationalities in
the Empire. For example, one historian states that "In many
strikes, workers were able to rise above their national
differences...[and] struggle together unified against the
employers."31 Additionally, Donald Quataert makes the very
important point that students of Ottoman labor history need
to be careful not to overstate the degree of ethnic and
national tensions among workers. He also points to the
existence of many ethnically mixed unions.32
30. Herbert Gutman, "The Negro and the United Mine Workers
of America," Chapter 3 in Work. Culture, and Society in
Industrializing America; Essays in American Working-Class
and Social History. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).
31. §ehmus Guzel, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Ispgiler
Hareketleri ve Grevler" (Workers' Movements and Strikes from
the Tanzimat to the Republic), Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e
Tiirkive Ansiklooedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey from the
Tanzimat to the Republic), (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari,
1985), p.819. (Translation mine).
32. Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826-
1914," in Lockman, (ed)., Workers and Working Classes, p.26.
15
As this dissertation will show, it is in fact the case
that many of the strikes which occurred during the last
decade or so of the Ottoman Empire's existence demonstrated
a considerable degree of cooperation among the different
nationalities involved. The strikes were generally fought
over economic, rather than nationalist, grievances. There
are also some important examples of labor unions which
crossed ethnic and national boundaries. However, as Gutman
demonstrated, the existence of multi-racial labor unions in
late 19th century America was not enough evidence to prove
that racial tensions within the American labor movement did
not exist. Similarly, this dissertation will argue that
despite some evidence of labor solidarity among workers of
different national and ethnic groups, the labor movement in
the Empire was weakened by the growth of national self-
consciousness and ethnic tensions among these same workers.
Workers and, especially, socialist intellectuals of
different nationalities were generally unable to establish
multi-ethnic unions which lasted for any length of time.
Even in ostensibly multi-ethnic organizations, the majority
of the members and most of the important positions in the
organization's leadership, were in the hands of a single
ethnic group.
Sources and Organization
Since I am concerned with the relationship between the
growth of nationalism and the rise of the Ottoman labor
16
movement I limited my examination to the Ottoman period
rather than including the Republican era. The national
question was largely, though by no means completely, solved
by the disintegration of the multi-national Ottoman Empire
in 1918. The national/ethnic divisions within the labor
movement ceased to be a major issue with the establishment
of the Republic, due in large part to the Turco-Greek
exchange of populations in 1922. 1914 was a convenient
terminal year for several reasons. Most importantly, with
the entry of the Empire into World War One the economy, and
with it the workers, were put on a war footing and the
numbers of strikes dropped dramatically. Apparently,
between 1914 and 1918 there were only two strikes. The
Zonguldak coal miners struck in 1914 and the tobacco workers
in Izmir struck in 1915.33
The geographic scope of this dissertation is limited
mainly to the cities of Salonika, Istanbul and Izmir and
their hinterlands. I will mention other parts of the Empire
where relevant, but the bulk of my research dealt with these
three important cities. Salonika, Istanbul and Izmir were
not only economically the most advanced cities of the
Empire, but they were also the most nationally and
ethnically mixed. They differed, however, in the relative
numbers of the different nationalities. For example, Jews
were a plurality of the population of Salonika, Greeks were
most numerous in Izmir and Muslims dominated in Istanbul.
33. Guzel, p.818, table 5.
17
The study of labor movement in the Ottoman Empire is
complicated by the fact that the different unions which
emerged from time to time were generally ad hoc
organizations which existed only for the duration of a
particular strike. The one important exception to this
phenomenon was the Workers7 Federation of Salonika which was
active almost without an interval between 1908 and 1912.34
Since most of the unions had only a limited existence
outside of the strikes, the actions and demands of the
strikers themselves need to be scrutinized. For this
reason, I have concentrated most of my research efforts on
the conduct of strikes.
Source material for research in the field of Ottoman
labor history, as Donald Quataert has noted, presents some
serious problems.35 One of the most basic of these is that
workers rarely appeared in official documents unless they
were striking or otherwise disturbing the status quo. In
the case of the Ottoman Archives this problem is especially
vexing. Strikes which did not represent an immediate danger
to the Ottoman state seemed to be ignored most of the time
34. Because the Workers7 Federation of Salonika had such a

relatively stable existence, it has been the centerpiece in
much of the literature on the Ottoman labor movement. See
for example, Paul Dumont, "Une Organisation Socialiste
Ottomane: La Federation Ouvriere de Salonique (1908-1912),"
Etudes Balkaniaues. I, 1975. pp.76-88. See also Dumont and
Haupt, Sosvalist Hareketleri. Despite the title of this
latter work it concentrates almost exclusively on the
newspapers and official records of the Workers7 Federation
of Salonika.
35. Donald Quataert, "Working Class History," p.361.
18
by the Ottoman authorities, or at least those officials in
charge of record keeping.
The Ottoman archival material which I used was located
in the Ba^bakanlik Ars-sivi (Prime Minister's Archive) in
Istanbul. This archive contains the correspondence between
the Prime Minister's office and the various government
ministries. The different cabinet ministries submitted
detailed reports of their activities to the Prime Minister's
office. These reports would often request the opinion of.
the Prime Minister's office as to the actions which should
be undertaken. The Prime Minister's office then would send
a reply to the ministry's report. Thus, this archive
provides a record of the various activities of the Ottoman
government.36
I concentrated my efforts on the files of the Ministry of
Public Works. The ministry's records contained a
considerable amount of interesting information regarding the
Empire's ports, railroads, roads and so forth. There was
also considerable information on the crisis surrounding the
Oriental Railroad strike and the Anatolian Railroad strike,
both of 1908.
I found that the consular and embassy reports in the
archives of the United States of America (State Department
Archive), the United Kingdom (Public Records Office), and
36. For a detailed examination of the Ottoman archives of

Istanbul see Stanford J. Shaw, "Ottoman Archival Materials
for the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries: The
Archives of Istanbul," International Journal of Middle East
Studies, VI (1975), pp.94-114.
19
Austria-Hungary (Haus, Hof und Staats Archiv) were rich
sources of data. All three of these countries had
commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire and their
ambassadors and consuls had the responsibility of reporting
changes in the economic or social situation in which could
affect those commercial interests. Obviously, strikes and
labor disturbances in general were important in this regard.
Of these archives, the Foreign Office records in the
Public Records Office proved to be extremely rich. There
were detailed accounts of strikes as well as reports on
levels of wages and prices and conditions in industrial and
agricultural enterprises. The records of the Auswartiges
Amt of the H.H.St.A. also were very useful. While there, I
found an entire file dealing with strikes in the Ottoman
Empire. The Austro-Hungarian Archives also contained
considerable information on nationalist unrest in the
Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Ottoman Balkans. The
United States archives dealing with the Ottoman Empire were
mainly consular reports concerning requests for immigration
visas to the U.S.A. However, there were several extremely
detailed reports from the American consul in Izmir
concerning the strikes in that city during 1908. I suspect
these reports were due to the fact that an American company
had extensive interests in the licorice harvesting and
processing industry in and around Izmir.
Newspapers also proved to be a valuable source of
information, although pre-1908 Ottoman newspapers were
20
limited in what they could report because of strict
censorship. I concentrated my efforts on the two major
Ottoman language daily newspapers namely Tanin and Ikdam.
Tanin ("Echo") was generally supportive of the Committee of
Union and Progress (one of the most important of the
different "Young Turk" factions) while Ikdam
("Perseverance") often displayed a less friendly attitude.
Additionally, I consulted a British newspaper published in
Istanbul, The Levant Herald, as well as a German language
Istanbul paper, osmanischer Llovd. Both of these papers
were concerned mainly with the business climate in the
Empire and as such contained information on prices, wages
and strikes.
The dissertation is made up of six chapters, an
introduction and a conclusion. Chapters One and Five
contain some general information about the Ottoman Empire
during the time period covered by this study. I included
this information for the benefit of readers who may not have
an extensive knowledge of Ottoman History. Chapter Two
examines the growth of industry in the Empire during the
late 19th century and also outlines the position of urban
workers and the labor movement during the Hamidian period
(pre-1908). Chapter Three concerns the Young Turk
Revolution and the strike wave of 1908. The important
Strike and Associations Laws of 1909 are examined in Chapter
Four. Chapter Five examines the development of socialist
movements and nationalism between 1909 and 1914. Chapter
21
Six traces the developments in the labor movement between
1909 and the last months before the entry of the Empire into
World War One.
Although this dissertation will concentrate on labor
strikes and nationalism it is not meant to be strictly about
either of these topics. Rather, I want to examine the
relationship between nationalism and the labor unrest which
figured so prominently in the Ottoman Empire's last decades
of existence.
I believe that the results of my research indicate that
by the early 20th century the peoples of the Ottoman Empire
found themselves deeply divided along national and ethnic
lines. This does not mean, however, that these same people
found it impossible to co-operate. Indeed, the pages that
follow contain some stirring examples of cooperation among
workers of different nationalities. Yet, the steady growth
of national self-consciousness among the workers scuttled
the chances for a unified supra-national labor movement and,
probably, the chances for the continued existence of the
Ottoman Empire itself.
Chapter I: The Ottoman Empire During the 18th and Early
20th Centuries
The years of the late 18th through the early 20th
centuries were ones of great changes, even turmoil, in the
Ottoman Empire. Most of the political, economic and social
structures of the Ottoman "classical” period began to break
down during the 17th century and by the 18th century new
structures and relationships were crystalizing. Although a
review of the entire history of the Ottoman Empire is well
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to
have some basic information regarding the classical systems
of the Ottoman Empire and the changes which they underwent.
This chapter will show that the series of changes which
occurred in the Ottoman economy beginning in the 16th
century had destroyed the classical Ottoman systems by the
early 19th century. The breakdown of the classical order
and the increasing contacts with Europe led to the
development of new social classes which sought freedom from
the intrusion of the central government. Perhaps most
importantly, these changes encouraged the growth of
nationalism among the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire. The
19th century "reform" movements of the Tanzimat, the Young
Ottomans and the Young Turks represented efforts to reign in
the various centrifugal forces and increase the strength of
the central government.
23
The Millet System
In the Ottoman Empire "religion and nation, sect and
nationality were thoroughly confused and intertwined.1,1
This state of affairs, which was so important in the
development of the National Question in the Ottoman Empire,
was reflected in the system which the Empire evolved to
rule over its various ethnic and religious groups.
The majority of the Ottoman sultan's subjects until the
16th century were Christians and Jews rather than Muslims.
In fact, the Empire had a substantial non-Muslim population
until its demise during the 20th century.
The Muslim rulers of the Empire responded to this
situation in much the same way as the rulers of earlier
Muslim Empires. The non-Muslim population was allowed a
considerable degree of autonomy within their communities,
especially concerning aspects of personal and/or religious
law. The different non-Muslim confessional groups were also
generally free to practice their religions and to maintain
their languages and customs.2
During the middle of the 19th century the Ottoman state
formalized the various ad hoc agreements and traditions
which had allowed the different non-Muslim confessional
groups autonomy. This system which the Ottomans established
is known as the millet system. The word "millet" can be
1. Roderic Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and

the Ottoman Response," in Nationalism in a Non-National
State. W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald, (eds.) (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1977), p.33.
2. Lewis, Modern Turkey, p.13.
24
translated a number of ways. In this context the word
millet referred to a religious community. Each millet was
granted virtual autonomy regarding matters of personal or
canonical law, e.g. marriages, deaths, divorces, etc., as
well as intra-millet conflicts. The head of each millet
was, in turn, a high Ottoman official, responsible to the
Sultan for his millet's actions.3
One of the most important facts concerning the millet
system was that despite its religious foundations it
preserved the various languages and cultures of the Empire's
non-Muslim peoples. At the same time, however, members of
different ethno-linguistic groups found themselves together
in a single millet. For example, all Orthodox, whether they
spoke Greek, Slavic, Albanian or Arabic were members of the
Orthodox millet. The leader of this millet was the Orthodox
Patriarch in Istanbul. Similarly, the Armenian Patriarch
was responsible for all the non-Orthodox Christians of the
Empire (i.e., Nestorians and Monophysites as well as
Armenian Gregorians). The Chief Rabbi (Hahambasi) based in
Istanbul was also, theoretically, in charge of overseeing
3. Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire.

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.12-14.
According to tradition, the millet system was installed the
day after Mehmet the Conqueror occupied Constantinople.
This view seems increasingly unlikely in light of current
research. It is fairly clear that the entire set of complex
inter-communal relations was not systematized until the 19th
century. See Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the
Millet system," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis,
(eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society. (New York: Holmes and
Meirer, 1982), pp.69-83.
25
the different Jewish communities of the Empire although in
practice his authority did not extend much beyond the
Sephardic population of Istanbul.4
During the 19th century many members of the non-Muslim
confessional groups began to see themselves not only as
Orthodox, but as Greeks, Slavs, etc. With the growth of
nationalism problems developed not only between non-Muslims
and Muslims, but between non-Muslims within the different
millets. For example, many (though not all) Greeks tried to
use the Orthodox millet as a means of Hellenizing the non-
Greek speaking Orthodox population of the Empire. The
development of Greek nationalism in turn stimulated the
already growing national self-identities of other Orthodox
peoples, especially the Bulgars. The development of Bulgar
and Greek nationalism led to the bitter struggles which
culminated in the establishment of the Bulgarian Orthodox
"autocephalous" church in 1870 and the subsequent violence
between Bulgar and Greek nationalist bands in Macedonia.5
The unfortunate history of conflict between Greeks and
Bulgars during the late 19th and especially early 20th
centuries emphasizes certain important aspects of the millet
system and its impact on the growth of nationalism. While
the common millet ties of religion were not enough to unite
4. The Ashkenazi and Karaite Jewish communities did not

always accept the authority of the Hahambafi. Stanford
Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic. (New York: New York University Press, 1991).
pp.169-172.
5. Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History.
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983), pp.10-16.
26
the Orthodox of the Empire, the struggles between the Greeks
and Bulgars had a distinctly religious cast. In other
words, to belong to the Bulgarian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church was to be a Bulgar, while membership in the Greek
Orthodox church marked a person as being Greek. This close
relationship between religious and national identity, a
legacy of the millet system, was paralleled by the
importance of Islam in the development of the Turkish,
Kurdish and Arab nations.
Although membership in a particular religion was an
important element in national self-identification, there was
considerable disagreement within the different national
groups on any given course of action. For example, the
Greeks were divided among those who wanted some degree of
cooperation with the Ottoman State (such as the high clergy
and wealthy Greek families in Istanbul) and those who wanted
a great, independent Greek state or empire (intellectuals
and many of the politicians in the Greek Kingdom). There
were additional intra-millet problems as a result of
conflicts between secular elements and the old ruling
religious establishment. Lay assemblies formed within the
millet communities moved to take away the powers which had
been exercised by the millets' religious leaders. The
Armenian community even drafted a secular constitution for
itself.6
6. £erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,•1962),
p.19.
27
Ottoman Agriculture: Timers and 9iftliks
Well into the 20th century, most Ottoman subjects lived
in the countryside and were engaged in agriculture.
Accordingly, the structures of the rural economy constituted
an integral part of the overall state apparatus. The
changes which occurred within Ottoman agriculture beginning
with the late 16th century had far reaching consequences.
Patterns of Ottoman landholding and agriculture varied
from region to region. The following remarks will focus on
the situation in the Balkans. The Balkans were among the
most populated, fertile and important areas of the Empire.
The rural system in the Balkans during the classical period
was organized according to the so called "timar system.”7
The Ottoman timar system was a modification of systems
used by the Selguks, Arabs and Byzantines. The timar system
functioned as a means of central control of the countryside,
and of provisioning the heavily armed cavalry (the sipahis).
A timar was a grant by the sultan to a sipahi of the
usufruct of a particular area. The timar holder (timarli)
had the duty to collect the taxes from the peasants who
worked the timar. He was also responsible for maintaining
order in the area and for maintaining his armor and weapons.
7. For a discussion of the timar system in the Balkans see

Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule.
1354-1804. (Seattle and London: University of Washington
Press, 1977), pp.93-100.
28
Thus, the timar system allowed the state to supervise the
countryside and maintain a large number of cavalrymen.
There are two important points about the timar system.
The first is that the timarli was by no means the twin of
the medieval European feudal lord. The timar was not the
private property of the sipahi. The sipahi was, in fact,
merely the agent of the Ottoman central government. The
second, and related, point is that the timars themselves
produced mostly for the internal Ottoman market rather than
for export.
For a variety of reasons, this system began to break
down during the late 16th and especially during the 17th
centuries. Chief among these were a series of disastrous
(from the Ottoman perspective) wars which, while very
expensive, did not result in substantial territorial gain.
The wars devastated large areas of the countryside,
especially in the Balkans, which resulted in the dislocation
of peasant populations. Furthermore, changes in military
technology heralded the increasing irrelevance of the
armored sipahi cavalrymen, the backbone of the timar
administrative system.
With the breakdown of the timar system, the Ottoman
central government needed to find another means of
collecting revenue in the countryside. The government
turned to increased use of the iltizam (tax farm) by which
the right to tax collection in a certain area was auctioned
off to a private individual. By thus relinquishing one of
29
its former functions the state opened the way for the
formation of private agricultural estates.8 By the 18th
century many tax farmers fmultezims) had established
commercial farms (fiiftliks) in the Balkans. These farms
were increasingly devoted to the cultivation of cash crops
for the growing European market.9
The Guilds
While the classical Ottoman agricultural order was
organized according to the timar system, the manufacturing
and trading networks were regulated by the guilds(esnaf).10
Virtually all of artisans and craftsmen, as well as
merchants, were organized into guilds. The guilds in the
Ottoman Empire are of uncertain origin but probably had
their roots in the akhi fraternities common to most of
Anatolian society during Selguk and early Ottoman times.11
Ottoman guilds had similar functions and organizational
structures as the guilds of medieval Europe. Economically,
each guild functioned as a labor monopoly. It regulated the
entrance into the craft and circumscribed the actions of the
guild members. The guilds were made up of masters who owned
shops (ustas), masters who worked for another master
8. Wallerstein and Kasaba, "Incorporation into the World

Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empie,
1750-1839," p.340.
9. Ibid.
10. Gabriel Baer, "Administrative, economic and social
functions of the Turkish guilds," International Journal of
Middle East Studies. I, 1970.
11. Sugar, Southeastern Europe, p.12.
30
(kalfas), journeymen (cjediks), and apprentices (fiiraks).
The masters elected one an officer from their ranks as a
kethiida who functioned as the guilds agent in dealings with
other guilds, with the government, etc.12 Importantly, the
guilds were not organized along millet lines. In other
words, people who practiced the same craft would almost
always belong to the same guild, whether they were
Christians, Jews or Muslims.13
Besides these economic functions, guilds had important
social and religious functions as well. A sevh who usually
had some connection to a dervi§s order or akhi fraternity was
the technical leader of the guild.14 In their social role,
the guilds were important as mutual aid societies and
charities. For example, guilds would help members who had
fallen on hard times or who needed help paying their taxes.
The guilds financed these activities through donations and
dues paid by the membership as well as from the income of
land which the guild owned.15
As self-help organizations and as extensions or
partners of dervif orders the guilds functioned outside of
the realm of the state. However, the guilds played an
important role in the overall state apparatus nevertheless.
For example, one of their functions was the collection of
12. Ibid., p.79.

13. Ibid., p.78.
14. Ibid., pp.78-79. However, the guilds were first and
foremost economic organizations. This distinguishes them
from the akhi organizations which, although made up mostly
of craftsmen, were primarily mystical fraternities.
15. Baer, pp.44-45.
31
taxes from their members.16 The guilds also enforced the
laws concerning prices, trade, standards of goods, etc.
which had been set by the Ottoman government.17 Thus, like
the millets, the guilds were part of the overall social and
political system of the Empire. In other words, the guild
system served !,as an administrative link between the ruling
institution and the town population and as a means of
supervision and control of this population by the rulers.”18
Like the timar system, the guild organizations were
affected profoundly by the changes occurring within the
Empire during the 17th and 18th centuries. The Ottoman
state's economic exhaustion caused by the long wars of the
17th century as well as the inflation which resulted from
the influx of silver from the New World had serious
repercussions on the guilds, as did the increasing trade in
manufactured goods with western Europe.
The traditional view of these developments has been
that the power, wealth, and number of guilds declined.
These studies also usually point to the supposedly
corrupting effects of the infiltration of the guilds by the
janissaries beginning during the 17th century. More
recently, this interpretation has been challenged by the
view that while the guilds certainly changed during the 17th
century that it is wrong to think necessarily of this
16. Resat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy.
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 14.
17. Wallerstein and Kasaba, p.339.
18. Baer, "Turkish guilds" p.49.
32
transformation as a decline. As one scholar puts it, "when
the central authority, [of the Ottoman government] weakened,
guilds played a more important role in organizing and
maintaining political life and social stability.1,19 The
janissaries' "infiltration" and "corruption" of the guilds
was actually a "mutually advantageous alliance and protected
Ottoman urban workers of all kinds against the encroachments
of the state."20
Whether or not this interpretation of events is
correct, it is clear that after the destruction of the
janissaries in 1826 the power of the central government
mounted and the scope of workers' actions became more
limited. Guilds continued to exist, but they seem to have
become more and more subordinate to the central
government.21 The power and scope of the guilds activities
were also weakened by the increasing involvement with the
emerging world economy. For example, during the 18th
century certain merchants began to organize a kind of
"putting out" system which operated outside the guild
structures.22
Significantly, one of the developments which
accompanied the transformation of many guilds was a
splintering of membership along millet lines. As early as
19. Quataert in Lockman, (ed.), Workers and Working

Classes, p.21.
20. Donald Quataert, Workers. Peasants and Economic Change
in the Ottoman Empire: 173 0-1914. (Isis Press: Istanbul,
1993), p.202.
21. Quataert in Lockman, Workers and Working Classes, p.21.
22. Sugar, Southeastern Europe, p.227.
33
the late 17th century non-Muslim members of certain guilds
began to elect their own officers. By the late 18th century
they were holding separate guild social functions and were
organizing their own mutual aid systems.23 On the other
hand, as late as 1838 half of the guilds in Istanbul,
representing 28,000 workers, had both Muslim and non-Muslim
members.24
The Capitulations
The guilds, agricultural system and the millet system
set a foundation for the changes which occurred within the
Ottoman Empire during the 17th through the 20th centuries.
A final legacy of the Ottoman classical period were the so-
called Capitulations.
The Capitulations were originally a series of
agreements between the Ottoman Sultan and various foreign
merchants made during the mid-15th century. The
arrangements, which were originally seen as a manifestation
of Ottoman power, set up foreign merchants resident in the
Empire as a kind of millet. They were placed under the
jurisdiction of their own laws and courts, not Ottoman ones.
Additionally, they were allowed to import goods almost duty
free into the Empire.25 Besides these provisions, European
merchants could hire local Ottomans as interpreters and
23. Ibid.
24. Quataert in Lockman, Workers and Working Classes, p.25.
25. Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey, vol.I, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p.97.
34
middle-men for their dealings with other Ottoman subjects.
These local Ottomans, often Ottoman Christians, could come
under the jurisdiction of the European merchant's government
by the issue of a license (berat) to the Ottoman subject.
In this way, many Ottoman Christians became subjects of
European powers.
During the classical period the Capitulations did not
have a very great effect on the Ottoman economy or society.
Beginning with the 18th century, however, the Capitulatory
regime provided a way for European merchants to import
inexpensive European manufactured goods into the Empire at
extremely low duties, thus helping to undermine many of the
Ottoman craft guilds. The Ottoman State was, by this time,
too weak to abrogate the Capitulations. Much of the history
of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and 20th centuries
centers on the efforts of the Ottoman government to end the
Capitulations.
The First National Revolutions
As the preceding examination of the Ottoman agriculture
and manufacturing tried to show both the rural and urban
economies of the Ottoman Empire had changed dramatically by
the 18th century. The new rural and urban environments
contributed to the growth of nationalism among the non-
Muslims of the Ottoman Empire.
National consciousness and then nationalism had been
rising steadily both among Serbs and Greeks since the late
35
18th century. This growth was greatly stimulated by the
brisk trade carried on by both Serb and Greek merchants.
The Greeks had even established colonies of merchants in
various foreign cities, where they were immersed in the
nationalistic ferment of the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. Serb merchants traded in livestock and fruit
with the cities of central Europe. Many merchants and their
sons provided much of the inspiration and leadership for the
Serb and Greek revolutions.26
The first two nationalist uprisings, the Serbian
Revolution which began in 1804 and the Greek Revolution
which began in 1821, had their immediate causes in the new
system of rural administration in the Balkans. The
establishment of giftlik estates throughout the Balkans had
been accompanied by growing abuses of the peasants by the
landlords. These landlords often had private armies and
acted as independent rulers. The Ottoman central government
simply did not have the military resources to protect the
Balkan zimmis from the depredations of bandits and rapacious
local potentates. The. Serb and Greek peasants, therefore,
had to rely on themselves and their own local leaders. The
26. For example the Serbian Revolution was led by a

livestock merchant, Karadjordje Petrovic. The Greek
Revolution was begun by a secret society of Greek merchants,
the Philike Hetairia. Michael B. Petrovich, A History of
Modern Serbia. 1804-1918. vol.I. (New York and London:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), p.26. Charles and
Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National
States, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977),
p.39. See also Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire, pp.28-30.
36
revolts began as efforts by these people to protect
themselves from local threats.27
The essentially local genesis of these revolts is
characterized by the fact that neither the Serb nor Greek
uprisings involved the entire Serb and Greek populations of
the Empire. Only the Serbs in the Belgrade area and in the
V , ,
Sumadna (the densely forested area south of Belgrade) and
the Greeks of the Peloponnesus, parts of Rumeli and some of
the islands, were involved.28 Although these revolts began
as local uprisings they each rapidly took on the trappings
of national revolutions. During and after these revolts,
nationalism among the Serbs and Greeks began to play a
greater and greater role.
After the Serb and Greek revolutions had succeeded in
establishing an autonomous Serbian principality (in 1804)
and an independent Greek kingdom (in 1830) each of these new
states fostered the growth of nationalism among its new
citizens. Nationalism also provided, for each of these
states, a mission or reason for existence. Each state
conceived as its purpose the unification of the entire
nation. In the Greek case, this mission was known as the
Meaali Idea (the Great Idea). According to this idea, the
Kingdom of Greece was merely the nucleus of a much larger
Greek national state which would encompass what Greek
nationalists considered to be the "historic" borders of
27. Petrovich, pp.23-24, 27-34. Jelavich and Jelavich,

p.39.
28. Petrovich, p.26.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
37
Greece including much of the southern Balkans, western
Anatolia and Istanbul (a.k.a Constantinople). The Serbian
state, likewise, sought to expand its territory while at the
same time increasing its level of independence from the
Sultan.
The expansionist activities of the Serb and Greek
states and the adoption of nationalism by more and more of
the citizens of these states stimulated other Balkan peoples
to think likewise of themselves as "nations." The Bulgars,
for example, reacted to the growing nationalisms of Greeks
and Serbs by developing their own sense of national
identity. Nationalist intellectuals used rural unrest as a
vehicle for defusing the idea of nationalism among the
peasants. As the 19th century progressed, the Balkans
became a battle ground between the proponents of the
different newly "discovered" national groups as well as
between these nationalists and the Ottoman State.
It is important to stress, however, that the attraction
of the separatist nationalist movement was not universal.
During the Greek Revolution, as mentioned above, much of the
Ottoman Greek community remained ambivalent about the
prospect of an independent Greek state. For example, many
of the wealthy Istanbul Greeks, the so-called Phanariots.
were already well established within the Ottoman social and
economic fabric and had little to gain from the
establishment of an independent Greece. The Orthodox
patriarchate actively opposed the nationalist movement out
38
of fears that a Greek nation state would lessen its
influence and power.29
The Tanzimat Era
The Ottoman state was certainly not oblivious to the
monumental changes which had been going on since the 17th
century. Its reaction was to try to increase its control
over the new social forces which had emerged. Although some
reforms aimed at modernizing the army had begun as early as
the late 18th century, the Ottoman central government did
not succeed in most of its aims until the middle of the 19th
century during a period called the Tanzimat. or "re
ordering. "
The beginning of the Tanzimat is usually considered to
be 1839. In that year, the new Sultan Abdulmecit launched a
new series of reforms beginning with the Hatt-i §erif of
Gulhane, ("The Noble Rescript of the Rose Garden").30 This
document enunciated the principles of equality and security
which the Ottoman sultan would seek for all of his subjects,
regardless of their millet. Subsequent reform edicts
regularized the penal code, land ownership and even the
status of the millets.31
An alternate date for the beginning of the Tanzimat is
1826, the year of Mahmut II's destruction of the
29. Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, pp.30-31.

30. Davison, Reform, pp.36-57. See also Shaw and Shaw,
Modern Turkey, pp.59-67.
31. Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, pp.51-52.
39
janissaries. Using this periodization draws attention to
further moves by the Ottoman central government to abolish
monopolies on trading and manufacturing and to bring the
guilds under close supervision.32 The reforms also
reflected the increased trade with Europe. For example, in
1838 Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire negotiated a
commercial treaty which greatly facilitated the movement of
goods within the Ottoman Empire.33 The Tanzimat reforms
tried to reform and simplify the fiscal policy of the Empire
in order to increase the revenues of the central
government.34
Whichever periodization one prefers, they both reflect
the desire of the Ottoman central government to strengthen
itself in the face of competing sources of authority,
whether local potentates or independent minded guilds. In
this respect, the stimuli for the Tanzimat reforms came from
the internal developments in the the Empire rather than from
the pressure on the Sultan from European governments.35
The efforts of the reformers were to some extent
successful. For example, the power of most of the local
notables was curbed, usually by bringing these people within
the state administrative structure. Likewise, as seen
above, the janissary-guild alliance was shattered in 1826.
32. Quataert, Workers. Peasants and Economic Change, pp.175,

179.
33. See Orhan Kurmug, "The 1838 Treaty of Commerce Re
examined ," in Bacque-Grammont and Dumont, (eds.), Economie
et societies.
34. Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, p.50.
35. Ibid., pp.50-54.
40
Unfortunately for the Ottoman economy, however, the Tanzimat
reformers were faced with a number of problems with which
they were not prepared to cope and which continued to plague
the Empire through the early 20th century.
One of the most important was the labor shortage in the
Empire. The Ottoman Empire was one of the most sparsely
populated countries in the entire European/Mediterranean
world. This problem was exacerbated by the wars of the 19th
and early 20th centuries which took large numbers of able-
bodied men out of the workforce. These wars, in which the
Ottoman Empire was usually, though not always, the loser,
created two additional problems. The territories which the
Empire lost tended to be the most densely populated and
richest in the Empire. Furthermore, the wars created
millions of refugees for whom the Empire had to provide
somehow. Between 1856 and 1863 alone four million refugees
emigrated to the Empire. A final problem related to the
growth of the central government which took a growing
percentage of the Empire's revenue. For example, between
1800 and 1900 the civil service increased by 500,000 jobs.36
Probably the most important failure of the Tanzimat
reforms, however, was in trying to quench the growing spirit
of nationalism among the Empire's non-Muslim peoples. The
Tanzimat reformers were caught in this regard between two
irreconcilable demands from the Ottoman Christians. On the
one hand the Christian intelligentsia, influenced by
36. Quataert, Workers. Peasants and Economic Change, p.182.
41
European liberalism, grew increasingly vociferous in its
demands for equal rights for all of the Sultan's subjects.
At the same time, however, the Christians had no intention
of giving up privileges which were connected with the old
millet system. This contradictory state of affairs was
perhaps most evident in the several abortive attempts of the
Ottoman State to extend military service to the non-Muslims
of the Empire. In fact, national self-consciousness grew
steadily among the Christian population of the Empire,
particularly in the Balkans where the autonomous Serbian
principality and independent Greek kingdom sought to expand
their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The
most important manifestations of nationalism during the
1860's was the turmoil on the island of Crete where the
Christian population sought to unite with Greece. The
1860's also witnessed the growth of Bulgarian and Armenian
nationalism.
The Mew Ottomans, Ottomanism, and the First

Constitutional Period
The effects of the growing ties between Europe and the
Ottoman Empire not only influenced the Christian population
of the Empire, but also had an impact on Muslim intellectual
currents. The Tanzimat reforms had established western
style bureaucracies and had also established western style
schools to train bureaucrats. Of particular importance in
this respect was the Translation Bureau of the Ottoman
government. This bureau was itself a product of the
42
changing relationship of the Ottoman Empire with Europe and
its own subjects. The growing ties to Europe and the
establishment of formal embassies in European capitals
necessitated the establishment of the Translation Bureau to
handle the correspondence between these European governments
and the Ottoman government. The young officials at the
Translation Bureau were able to familiarize themselves with
the political and social ideas of Europe, especially
liberalism and nationalism.
The first group to emerge out of this background were
the New Ottomans.37 This group established itself in 1865
as a reaction against what it saw as the growing problems of
the Empire. Although the individual members of the New
Ottoman movement had rather different ideas and motivations,
they were all united in their dislike of two of the leading
figures in the Tanzimat, Ali Pa§a and Fuat Paâ, who had
alternated in the offices of Grand Vizier and Foreign
Minister for years. The New Ottomans believed that the
Tanzimat men were not upholding the Empire's interests and
that their policies were, in fact, leading the Empire to
ruin. The New Ottomans, furthermore, believed that a
representative, constitutional monarchy could save the
Empire from its precarious position.
37. These people are called in Turkish Yeni Osmanlilar which

can be translated as New or Young Ottomans. I prefer the
tern New Ottomans to avoid confusion with the term Young
Turks.
43
It would be wrong, however, to think that the New
Ottomans swallowed whole the political ideas of western
Liberalism. On the contrary, their political pedigree is
considerably more complex. In fact, one of the aspects of
the Tanzimat with which the New Ottomans were most disgusted
was the adoption of European mannerisms and mores by many of
the Tanzimat reformers. The New Ottomans believed that the
Tanzimat reformers were slowly destroying Ottoman culture
yet were not creating anything to take its place. Hence the
New Ottomans, especially Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi,
presented the seemingly contradictory position of defending
what seem like parochial values while at the same time
championing European ideas like Liberty and Patriotism.38
Indeed, the New Ottomans sought to anchor firmly the
European liberal concepts of Liberty and representative
government in an Ottoman and Islamic past.
The New Ottomans were not only interested in a marriage
between western Liberalism and what they interpreted as
Islam and Ottoman culture. They were also inspired, like
their counterparts the Ottoman Christian intellectuals, by
the European idea of nationalism. The most influential of
the New Ottomans in formulating a concept of an Ottoman
nation was Namik Kemal. While some of the other members of
the New Ottoman society were interested in the ideas of
nationalism as part of the overall intellectual exercise of
19th century European liberalism (notably Mustafa Fazil
38. Mardin, pp.116-117.
44
Paga), Namik Kemal was moved by the fiery, romantic
patriotism which was rapidly engulfing Europe. It was Namik
Kemal who popularized the term vatan as a synonym for the
French patrie.39
Despite Namik Kemal's aritcles and fiction works
(especially his famous play, Vatan vahut Silistre) glorified
the Fatherland, it is clear from his writings that he "was
not entirely clear as to what the fatherland consisted
of."40 For Namik Kemal the Ottoman Fatherland was an
Islamic, though not necessarily Turkish, entity. However,
the New Ottoman program calling for liberty and
constitutional government implied some sort of participation
in the life of the Empire by the non-Muslims. In Namik
Kemal's solution to this problem "...a union of populations
(all to be known as Ottomans) replaced the previous
conception of people living side by side in harmony but
still separated by religious barriers in the absence of a
feeling of nationality."41 This idea is usually referred to
as "Ottomanism." Ottomanism postulated the existence of a
single Ottoman nation which consisted of all of the
inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. The New Ottomans
believed that the different nationalities of the Empire
would willingly merge into a single Ottoman nation within
39. Ibid, p.326.

40. Ibid., p.328.
41. Ibid., p.330. Emphasis in original.
45
the political framework of a liberal, parliamentary
empire.42
While the New Ottomans sought a synthesis of European
liberalism and Islamic/Ottoman culture a group of
politicians and military men, chief among them Midhat Pa§a
the governor of the Danube province, were plotting the
overthrow of the reigning Sultan Abdiilaziz and his
replacement by his nephew Murat, a man of supposedly liberal
inclinations. These conspirators were appalled by the
dangerous situation into which the Empire had stumbled.
Abdiilaziz and his corrupt administration had bankrupted the
state and ignored the simmering nationalist unrest in the
Balkans. Namik Kemal was in touch with many of the
conspirators.
On 30 May 1876, the conspirators deposed Abdiilaziz and
brought Murat to the throne. Unfortunately, the excitement
of the coup, the outbreak of a full scale war in the Balkans
and the death of Abdiilaziz under suspicious circumstances
while he was under arrest, were enough to expose the mental
problems which afflicted the new sultan. Murat was himself
deposed on 31 August.43 Murat's brother, Abdiilhamit, became
the next sultan. In the mean time, preparations had begun
on writing a constitution and the election of a parliament.
42. Bernard Lewis. Modern Turkey, pp.327-333.

Interestingly, near the end of his life (he died in 1888)
Namik Kemal apparently despaired of maintaining the Empire
as a multi-religious entity and turned his attention toward
the Islamic parts of the Empire. Mardin, p.332.
43. Davison, Reform, pp.336, 354.
46
Two of the New Ottomans, Ziya Pa§sa and Namik Kemal, had
important positions in the constitutional committee which
was formed. After a considerable delay due to Abdiilhamit's
reluctance to accept any of the constitutional drafts, a
constitution was proclaimed on 3 December 1876 and a
parliament opened on 19 March 1877. The deputies were not
elected directly by the population but rather by the
provincial councils which had been set up as part of the
Tanzimat reforms. The parliament had 4 Jewish deputies, 44
Christian ones, and 71 Muslim deputies.44
The new constitution officially embraced Ottomanism.
Article 8 declared that "All subjects of the Empire are,
with distinction, called Ottomans whatever religion they
profess." Subsequent articles guaranteed the equality of
all Ottomans.45 However, the Constitution also enshrined
the millet system. Not only was the system continued, but
each millet was now bound to elect its own lay council to
act as a liaison between the millet and the government.46
The new constitutional regime faced both internal and
external problems. As Midhat Pa§sa and his allies the New
Ottomans had feared, Sultan Abdiilhamit had no intention of
complying with the constitution. In February 1877 both
Midhat Paâ and Namik Kemal were exiled. One by one the
other members of the New Ottoman society were exiled or
drifted into obscurity.
44. Shaw and Shaw, p.181.

45. Ibid., p.177.
46. Ibid., p.178.
47
In the meantime, the suppression of the Balkan rebels
led to war with Russia in April 1877. Despite some Ottoman
successes early in the war, notably the brave defense of
Plevna, the Russian armies soon gained the upper hand and
raced towards Istanbul. On 14 February 1878, as panic in
Istanbul and turmoil in the Chamber of Deputies increased,
Sultan Abdulhamit seized the opportunity to suspend the
Constitution, dismiss the Parliament and take full control
of the new Ottoman governmental system into his hands. The
new Ottoman government quickly made peace with Russia,
resulting in substantial territorial losses for the Empire.
Another of the more important results of the crisis of
the 1870's for the Ottoman Empire was the solution to the
Empire's financial instability. The orgy of borrowing in
which the Ottoman State had engaged beginning in the late
1850's quickly plunged the Empire deeply into debt. By 1875
the Empire, officially bankrupt, had to find the funds to
fight the rebels in the Balkans and then the Russian Empire.
The social and economic dislocations caused by the war
further eroded Ottoman financial stability.47
In November 1881 a deal between the Empire and most of
its creditors was finally worked out. The agreement created
an agency called the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.
This body was headed by a seven man council made up of
representatives of the countries which held Ottoman bonds.
47. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy. 1800-
1914. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1981), pp.108-110.
48
Most of the council members were appointed with the approval
of their respective governments. The P.D.A was given the
authority to collect the revenues from a wide variety of
government monopolies and tribute from certain provinces.
The P.D.A was to use these funds to pay the foreign
bondholders and to pay off the principal of the Ottoman
debt. Although the P.D.A did, in fact increase the
financial stability of the Ottoman Empire, it did so at the
cost of most of the Ottoman government's economic decision
making power. The government was unable to raise tariffs or
duties or amend the tax structure without the consent of the
P.D.A.48
The Hamidian Era
Although the Sultan had lost much of his financial
independence he still had to confront the centrifugal forces
which had led to the nationalist unrest of the 1860's and
1870's. Sultan Abdulhamit turned away from the
parliamentary and liberal tendencies of the New Ottomans and
instead concentrated on the strengthening of the Ottoman
central government. The Sultan was able to use much of the
administrative machinery which had been constructed during
the Tanzimat to control closely the course of the Empire.
Like the New Ottomans Abdulhamit realized that the
centrifugal forces operating on the Empire needed somehow to
be weakened. Rather than Ottomanism, however, Abdulhamit
48. Ibid., pp.192-193.
49
instead tried to use Islam as a unifying force for the
Empire.
Certainly the central figure in this movement was Jamal
ed-Din al-Afghani. Al-Afghani was central in the
development of the idea of Islamism or Pan-Islamism. This
ideology used Islam as a unifying force so that Muslims
could withstand the pressures, cultural, economic, and
military, of the West. Islamism was, therefore, somewhat
similar to the ideas of some of the New Ottomans (especially
Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi) who believed that Muslims should
be proud of their past history. On the other hand, Islamism
downplayed the differences between Muslims, unlike the New
Ottoman's glorification of the Ottoman Nation.
The period was ripe for such an ideology. During the
first decades of the 19th century the European powers took
over more and more Muslim territory in the Balkans, Asia and
Africa. Abdulhamit used the feelings of anger and
bitterness of many Muslims to foster the ideology of
Islamism within the Ottoman Empire. For example, the Sultan
was overt in his support of the ulema. Public observance of
Islamic holidays was encouraged. The state schools added
lessons in Arabic and Islam to the curriculum. The Sultan
favored Arabs as advisors and government officials. He also
emphasized his position as Caliph and sought out contacts
with Islamic intellectuals and ulema outside of the Ottoman
Empire.49 One of the most impressive projects inspired (at
49. Ibid., pp.259-260.
50
least in part) by Islamism was the Sultan's personal
sponsorship of the Hijaz Railway.
Despite the reactionary and pan-islamicist mood of the
Hamidian regime, or perhaps because of it, nationalist and
revolutionary groups continued to grow. Among the
minorities, the Armenians especially created a powerful and
well organized revolutionary society, the Dashnaksuthiun.50
Macedonia was the center of almost continuous unrest between
bands of Greek and Bulgar nationalists and Ottoman security
forces.
The Young Turks
As nationalism continued to grow among the Christians
of the Balkans and eastern Anatolia, an anti-Hamidian,
Muslim revolutionary movement also emerged. These
revolutionaries were collectively known as the "Young
Turks."51 The first Young Turk organization was formed by
four students at the military medical college in Istanbul in
50. Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement. (Los

Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp.151-161,
182. .
51. The Young Turk movement has been the subject of
numerous books and articles. Some of the most important are
Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: M. Siikru Hanio^lu, Bir Sivasal
Orqiit Olarak: Ittihat ve Terakki^Cemivetti ve 'Jon
Turkliik'. (Istanbul: Iletifim Yayinlari, 1985) ; by the same
author, "Genesis of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,"
Osmanli Aragtirmalari. Ill, 1982; Ernest Ramsaur, The Young
Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957); Ibrahim Temo, Ibrahim
Temo'nun Ittihad ve Terakki Anilari. (Istanbul: ARBA
Yayinlari, 1987).
51
1889.52 The students named the organization the "Ittihad-i
Osmani" (Ottoman Union).53
The same year as the formation of the Ittihad-i Osmani
in Istanbul another anti-Hamidian intellectual, Ahmet Riza
Bey, established an organization in Paris called the
"Osmanii Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti" (Ottoman Society of
Union and Progress).54 In 1895, the Istanbul group also
adopted that name.
The numbers of Young Turks grew rapidly during the late
19th century. The Young Turks had organizations in Paris,
and Geneva as well as in Egypt and Istanbul. These groups
successfully smuggled their radical newspapers into the
Empire where they attracted a growing readership among the
students at the new state schools.55
Although the different Young Turk groups had
disagreements and personality conflicts, they all were
dedicated to the restoration of a constitutional regime in
the Ottoman Empire and they all claimed a belief in the idea
of Ottomanism. In this respect, the Young Turks were the
heirs of the New Ottomans of the 1860's. The Young Turks,
however, were a very different group than their New Ottoman
52. Temo, pp.14-15.

53. Interestingly, although all of the students were
Muslims, none were ethnically Turkish. They were Ibrahim
Temo; an Albanian, Mehmet Refid; a Circassian, and Abdullah
Cevdet and Isak Siikuti; both Kurds. Lewis, The Emergence of
Modern Turkey, pp.193-194.
54. Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Tiirkiye'de Sivasal Partiler.
(Istanbul: Hiirriyet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1988), p.19.
55. Hanioglu, "Genesis of the Young Turk Revolution,"
Osmanli Arastirmalari. Ill, 1982, pp.283-284.
52
predecessors. While the latter had come from the old elite
families of the Empire, the Young Turks "belonged to the
newly emerging professional classes: lecturers in the
recently founded government colleges, lawyers trained in
western law, journalists, minor clerks in the bureaucracy,
and junior officers trained in western-style war
colleges.1,56
During the early 20th century three broad groupings
within the Young Turk movement emerged. The first of these
were the members of the "League for Political
Decentralization and Personal Initiative" and their allies.
This group, founded in Paris by Prince Sabahettin, aimed at
a reorganization of the Ottoman Empire along some sort of
federalist lines. Most of the non-Turkish nationalists in
the Empire (e.g. the Armenian parties) supported
Sabahettin's group.
The second important Young Turkish organization was the
Committee for Union and Progress. Its leader was Ahmet Riza
Bey. Ahmet Riza, and the C.U.P, were opposed to any moves
to weaken the central administration of the Empire. They
viewed Sabahettin's federalization scheme as a dangerous
policy, one which would cause the rapid disintegration of
the Empire. The C.U.P. believed that a united, centralized,
constitutionalist Empire based on the ideas of Ottomanism
would be strong enough to stick together and prosper.
56. Ahmad, The Young Turks, p.16.
53
A third group of Young Turks became, ultimately, the
most important. These were young army officers and lower
echelon civil servants who remained in the Empire rather
than went abroad. Although cells of these people were
scattered around the Empire, their real strength was in
Macedonia, especially Salonika. Although the Salonika group
called itself the Committee for Union and Progress it had
apparently only tenuous links to the similarly named
organization in Paris. These young officers and bureaucrats
were disgusted with the condition of the Empire. Like the
exiled groups they believed that a restoration of a
constitutionalist, Ottomanist regime in Istanbul would
revitalize the Empire. The steadily worsening political and
economic situation of the Empire finally gave the Young
Turks the opportunity to put their ideas into practice in
1908.
Conclusions
This chapter began with an examination of three of the
organizational structures of classical Ottoman society: the
Millet system, the Timar system, and the guilds. These
different systems were characterized by a high degree of
governmental supervision. The Millet officials were part of
the overall Ottoman state apparatus. The Timar system
prevented the development of large private estates which
could have served as alternate centers of power. The
guilds, although technically independent, relied on the
54
State tc enforce price controls and to supply raw materials.
The breakdown of these system was responsible for creating
the environment in which both nationalism and a labor
movement could grow during the 19th and 20th centuries.
The classical order in the Ottoman Empire was
challenged and ultimately transformed by the expansion of
Europe beginning during the 17th century. The long wars
weakened the Timar system and the guilds to such an extent
that they ceased to function as elements within the overall
structure of the Ottoman state. The breakdown of the Timar
system led to, among other things, the growth of commercial
agriculture for the European market. The weakened guilds
could not prevent non-guild producers from entering the
market. These changes led, during the 19th century, to the
incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy.
The Millet system and its organizational framework
based on the rule of the non-Muslim peoples by their clerics
also was challenged by the expansion of Europe. The
commercial integration of the Ottoman Empire into the
growing world economic system led to increased contacts
between Ottoman subjects and Europeans. The European
imports of nationalism and liberalism began to influence the
articulation of the demands of the Balkan Christian
peasants. The grievances which the Balkan Christian share
croppers bore against their Muslim landlords were
transformed by the Christian intellectuals into nationalist
claims and demands. Even as the Millet system was
55
officially organized during the Tanzimat it faced challenges
based on the principle of nationality.
Most of the efforts of the Ottoman state during the
19th century were aimed at restoring the control of the
central government over the periphery and holding the Empire
together. The reforms of the Tanzimat, the New Ottomans and
finally Sultan Abdulhamit were all motivated by this goal.
However, by the beginning of the 20th century the integrity
of the Empire was still challenged by the separatist
nationalism of its subjects. As this chapter concentrated
on the growth of nationalism and its repercussions up until
the early 20th century, the following chapter will focus on
the social and economic changes which were occurring during
the same period.
Chapter II: Industrialization and the Beginning of the
Labor Movement
The growth of nationalism among the peoples of the
Empire was paralleled by the development of industry.
Although the Ottoman economy remained primarily
agricultural, industrialization made impressive strides.
Industrialization and urbanization also resulted in the
first stirring of an Ottoman labor movement.
This chapter will examine the extent of
industrialization, the general conditions of the industrial
workforce, and the state of inter-ethnic relations among the
workers in the years preceding 1908. Three points are
especially important. The first is that the Ottoman economy
was experiencing a period of rapid change during the late
19th and early 20th century. As a result of the
incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy
many people, especially in the traditional crafts, lost
their jobs and had to find new work. As certain fields of
employment were vanishing the incorporation was creating new
job opportunities in manufacturing, services and
transportation.
A second important feature of this period was the
changing demographic landscape of the Empire. Partially as
a result of the economic changes, the rate of urbanization
increased steadily as people from the countryside sought
employment in the new urban manufacturing, service and
transportation industries. The cities were also growing as
57
a result of the influx of refugees from the expanding
Russian Empire in Transcaucasia as well as the shrinking
Ottoman borders in the Balkans. Many of these refugees
passed through Istanbul or Izmir on their way to
resettlement in Anatolia.
The third important point is the way in which these
factors contributed to both the rise of labor militancy as
well as the development of a national self-consciousness.
The refugees and migrants from the countryside encountered
an urban economic landscape which was dominated by
foreigners and Ottoman Christians. Ottoman Christians
frequently held the upper echelon positions in the new
industries which were often run by foreign business
interests. All of these factors promoted the development
both of national self-consciousness as well as labor
solidarity.
Ottoman industry
The Ottoman economy during the last decade of the 19th
century and the first decade of the 20th was primarily
agricultural. In 1907, for example, the total share of
industry, transportation and mines in the Ottoman G.N.P was
21% while agriculture contributed over 50%.1 Ottoman
agricultural output increased greatly during the first
decade of the 20th century. "Between 1899 and 1913, cotton
1. Paul Dumont, "A Propos de la "Classe Ouvriere" Ottomane

a la Veille de la Revolution Jeune-Turque," Turcica. 9
(1979), p.240.
58
production increased fourfold, tobacco by 320%, production
of raisins, hazel nuts and figs each about doubled."2
The growth in the agricultural sector was paralleled by
impressive expansion in Ottoman manufacturing, as well as in
the service and transportation industries. One view of 19th
and 20th century Ottoman economic history holds that the
Ottoman manufacturing and transportation sectors were
virtually destroyed by European competition. This
interpretation postulates that the influx of cheap
manufactured goods from Europe (especially Great Britain
after 1838) decimated the traditional forms of manufacturing
dominated by the craft guilds. Furthermore, according to
this picture, railroads and steamships eliminated the
caravans and sailing boats which had traditionally supplied
most of the Empire's transportation.
There is, indeed, considerable evidence to support the
claim that many areas of the Ottoman manufacturing economy
were damaged, if not destroyed, by the economic penetration
of the West. For example, 100,000 jobs were lost in cotton
textile production between 1820 and I860.3 There is other
evidence, however, which reveals a rather different picture.
Industry, rather than withering in the face of European
competition, continued to grow. Between 1901 and 1915,
entrepreneurs established 107 private manufacturing firms
2. Qa^lar Keyder, "Ottoman Economy and Finances," in Osman

Okyar and Halil Inalcik, eds., Tiirkive'nin Sosval ve
Ekonomik Tarihi. (Ankara, 1980). p.324.
3. Quataert, "Handicrafts and Industry,"_p.170.
59
employing 20 or more workers each. According to the 1915
Ottoman Industrial Census, the number of factories increased
by 14 between 1913 and 1915. Most of this growth occurred
in Istanbul and Izmir.4 During the three decades which
preceded 1914, Ottoman industry grew at a rate twice that of
G.D.P in general.5 Many of the urban jobs which were
created during the late 19th and early 20th centuries
centered on the transportation industries, especially ports
and railroads.
How can these two bodies of evidence be reconciled?
The traditional view of the decline of Ottoman industry in
the face of European competition ignores the simple fact
that while imports did indeed destroy some jobs they created
others. Furthermore, as Donald Quataert has pointed out,
"the prevailing assumption" is that the displaced workers
remained permanently unemployed.6 Obviously this was not
so. Many of the displaced workers seem to have found work
with the rapidly expanding transportation industry,
particularly on the railroads and in the ports, as well as
in manufacturing.
4. Giindiiz Okgiin, ed., Osmanli Sanavii: 1913-1915

Istatistikleri. (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1984), pp.20, 27.
5. Orhan Kurmus, "Some Aspects of Handicraft and Industrial
Production in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1915," Asian and
African Studies 15, (1981), pp.99-100.
6. Quataert, "Handicrafts and Industry," p.172.
60
The Beginnings of Industrialization
The first industrial enterprises in the Ottoman Empire
modeled after European factories were established during the
1830's and 1840's. Almost all of these enterprises were
established by and for the Ottoman State.7 For example,
during the 1830's the Ottoman government established several
factories near Istanbul to produce cloth, leather and
gunpowder for the military.8 The center piece of these
early, state-directed efforts at industrialization was a
giant industrial complex begun in 1842 between Kiiguk £ekmece
and the Yedi kule neighborhood of Istanbul, an expanse of
nine miles. The industrial park included a foundry and
machine shop, cotton and wool cloth production factories, a
gunpowder works and a boat yard for the production of small
steam ships. In 1843, the government established a second
industrial park near Izmit, about sixty miles east of
Istanbul. This enterprise centered on a woolen mill which,
using the most up to date machinery available, produced a
very high quality cloth.9 The 1840's witnessed the
establishment of other state industries as well. Among the
biggest were an iron foundry in the Besiktas area of
7. Charles Issawi, An Econoimc History of the Middle East

and North Africa. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1982), p.155.
8. Edward C. Clark, "The Ottoman Industrial Revolution,"
International Journal of Middle East Studies. 5 (1974),
p.66.
9. Ibid., pp.67-68.
61
Istanbul in 1844, a paper mill in Izmir in the same year,
and a tannery set up at Silivri in 1841.10
The workforce in these factories usually comprised a
relatively small number of foreign foremen and skilled
workers who supervised the Ottoman workforce of about
5,000.11 The skilled workers, who came from a number of
different European countries, were enticed by the prospect
of wages often double what they could make in their native
lands. The European workers found their Ottoman
subordinates to be inefficient and prone to absenteeism.
Indeed, there is evidence that the Ottoman workers were far
from enthusiastic about the prospects of factory work.
Forced labor was needed to build some of the factories and
there are reports of factory workers in fetters.12
Despite the efforts which the government put into the
establishment of the state factories, they were notoriously
inefficient and prone to bottlenecks in the production
process. By 1849 most of the state factories had been
abandoned. Additionally, during the Crimean War the
Imperial treasury began its descent into financial ruin and
the expensive industrial experiments had to be abandoned.13
10. Ibid., p.69.

11. Ibid., p.70.
12. Ibid., p.74.
13. Issawi, Economic History, p.155.
62
Railroads in the Ottoman Empire
Although factory manufacturing went into eclipse for
two decades after the 1850's, railroads in the Empire grew
at a rapid pace during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Between 1876 and 1908 total kilometers of
railroad tripled.14 At the end of the 19th century, the
Ottoman Empire had 4,500 km of railroad. By 1914 the total
kilometers had grown to 5,252.15
All of the railroads in the Empire (with the important
exception of the Hejaz Railroad) were built and operated by
foreign companies. Part of the capital for the construction
and maintenance of the different railroads was usually
provided by the Ottoman government in the form of a
"kilometric guarantee." The government would guarantee the
railroad a certain amount of capital for each kilometer of
line constructed. Although the kilometric guarantees
enticed foreign companies to build railroads in the Empire,
the system was sometimes abused as the construction of the
lines took needlessly circuitous routes.
Ottoman Anatolia's first railroads were the 610 km long
British Izmir-Aidin and the 707 km French operated Izmir-
Kasaba railroads, both opened in 1866. In 1888 the Ottoman
government arranged with a German group dominated by the
Deutsche Bank to form a company for the construction of
railroads in Anatolia. The resulting Anatolian Railway
14. Shaw and Shaw, pp.226-227.

15. Yaqub N. Karkar, Railway Development in the Ottoman
Empire. (New York: Vantage Press, 1972), pp.75-76.
63
Company (Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie) completed the
line from Istanbul to Ankara in 1893 and also built
extensions to Kayseri and Konya. In 1903 the same financial
interests formed the Baghdad Railway Company with the
purpose of extending the track from Konya to Basra. By 1914
the Anatolian Railway totaled 1,032km and the Baghdad
Railway 531.16
The only railroad in the Empire which was not
constructed by foreign owned companies was the famous Hejaz
Railroad (officially the "Hamidiye Hejaz Railroad"). An
amazing feat of engineering, the railroad stretched from
Damascus to Medina a distance of 1320km over some extremely
difficult terrain. Construction of the line, begun in 1903,
had a variety of motivations. Its stated purpose was to
assist Muslims making the pilgrimage (hacc) to Mecca. As
such, the railroad played a part in Sultan Abdulhamit's use
of Islamism to maintain his position as Caliph. In keeping
with this pan-Islamic inspiration, the railroad was financed
by contributions from Muslims all over the world and Muslim
Ottoman engineers were instrumental in its construction. On
another level, the railroad could be used to enforce Ottoman
control of Syria and the Hejaz by enabling Ottoman troops to
be rushed to any scene of unrest.
The railroads were among the biggest employers in the
Empire. In 1911, for example, the Oriental Railroad
16. Ibid. p.70. Charles Issawi. Economic History of the

Middle East and North Africa, pp.56-57.
64
employed 4,000 people, the Anatolian-Bagdad Railroad 3,000,
the Izmir-Aidin Railroad 1,600 and the Izmir-Kasaba R.R.
2,000.17 In 1912, the Hejaz Railway employed 3,800 workers.
Of these 2,654 were day laborers, 675 were salaried and 460
were paid by the month.18
Although the railroad companies were foreign owned,
many of their employees were Ottoman subjects. For example,
90% of the employees of the Anatolian Railroad were Ottoman
subjects.19 The ethnic breakdown of the Ottoman employees
is important. Most of the clerks, station masters,
machinists and some of the engineers appear to have been
non-Muslim Ottomans, (e.g. Greeks, Jews, Armenians), whereas
the construction and maintenance crews, as well as most of
the train crews, were Muslims.20 Foreigners were employed
in upper echelon positions, as foremen for example, but many
foreign workers, such as Italian stone masons, found work on
railroad construction projects.21
During the early 20th century most of the railroad
construction work in the Empire took place on the Anatolian-
Baghdad railroad and the Hejaz railroad. The construction
17. Vedat Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlucirunun Iktisadi Sartlari

Hakkinda bir Tektik (Ankara; Turkiye If Bankasi Kultiir
Yayinlari, 1970), p.208. Figures are rounded.
18. William Ochsenwald, The Hiiaz Railroad.
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1980),
p.93.
19. Donald Quataert, "A Provisional Report concerning the
Impact of European Capital on Ottoman Port and Railway
workers, 1888-1909," in Bacgue-Grammont, ed. tconomie et
Societes. p.467.
20. Ibid. See also British Foreign Office F.0.78/5449:49.
21. F.0.78/5449:13.
65
of the Anatolian-Baghdad line was carried out by
subcontractors who would oversee the construction of
sections of the line. These subcontractors were usually
Europeans, especially Swiss, Belgians or Italians.22
The Ports
The various ports of the Ottoman Empire during the late
19th and early 20th centuries were in many ways a microcosm
of the changing Ottoman urban society as a whole.
Technological advances in ship building and shipping led to
changes in the port work and management which threatened the
old port workers' guilds. At the same time, the growth of
nationalism began to play a role in the multi-ethnic
community of port workers.
Port workers were either porters, who transported goods
on the boats or in the warehouses, or boatmen, who
transported goods from ship to shore. Both the porters and
boatmen were divided into guilds based on their base of
operations and the specific sort of work which they
performed. For example, porters were divided into guilds
according to the part of the city in which they worked or
whether they worked in the warehouses, on the boats or at
the customs houses.23
The porters and boatmen in Istanbul were mostly
migrants from Anatolia who came to work in the ports to save
22. F.0.371/992/18149:316.
23. Quataert, Social Disintegration, p.100.
66
enough money to return to their home villages. The migrants
could join a guild by paying a substantial fee to the guild
steward. The portworkers then turned over their earnings to
the steward from which an insurance fund was maintained.
Some of these guild stewards had the reputation of being
corrupt and using their positions for personal enrichment.24
Although the operations of the port workers' guilds in
different port cities differed in some details, the overall
structure of the guilds in different cities was quite
similar. In Istanbul porters were organized into different
guilds according to what sorts of work they performed. For
example, certain porters carried goods on their backs while
others worked as teams and carried goods on long poles.
Similarly, the boatmen were also divided into guilds
determined by the type of craft each operated. For example,
caiques (kayiks) and sandals were small boats used to ferry
passengers. Lighters (mavunas) transported goods from ships
in the harbor to the docks. The guild members paid a sum of
their earnings into a communal pool which paid for accident
and sickness insurance and for burial expenses.25
The port workers' guilds faced greater and greater
challenges to their power during the late 19th century as
foreign companies modernized port facilities which enabled
ships to be unloaded directly onto the docks, thus reducing
the need for lightermen. Work on the first modern port in
24. Ibid., p.101.

25. Ibid.
67
the Empire was begun by a British company at Izmir in 1867
although the work was eventually completed, and the port
opened, by a French company in 1875. By unloading directly
onto the quay rather than being transported by lighters the
goods could be unloaded four to five time faster. In 1901
modern ports were constructed at both Istanbul and Salonika
and in 1902 the German dominated Anatolian Railway Company
built a modern port at its Haydarpasa train station.26
The ethnic composition of the Istanbul portworkers
varied over time. Before the anti-Armenian riots of 1895-96
the vast majority of the workers had been Armenians from
eastern Anatolia. Subsequently, Kurds (also from eastern
Anatolia) filled the ranks of the Istanbul porters.27 The
boatmen, while also from Anatolia, were more ethnically
mixed. Many were Greek or Laz from the Black Sea coast.
Jews dominated the passenger ferry boats on the Golden Horn.
Some others were Kurds or Turks.28
The ethnic composition of portworkers elsewhere varied
from that at Istanbul. For example, the portworkers at
Samsun remained primarily Armenian. At Izmir, Muslim
refugees from Macedonia and Crete made up a large percentage
of the portworkers. The portworkers at Salonika were almost
exclusively Jewish.29
26. Charles Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East and

North Africa, p.50.
27. Quataert, Social Disintegration, p. 98.
28. Ibid. p.99.
in the Ottoman Empire. 1730-1914. (Istanbul: Isis Press,
1993), p.159.
68
The Resurgence of Ottoman Industry
The boom in railroad construction and port
modernization was accompanied by a revival of
industrialization in the Empire. Unlike the brief
industrial experiments of the 1840's the new process was
driven mainly by private entrepreneurs, both foreign and
Ottoman. Greek and Armenian Ottoman subjects started many
of the new manufacturing enterprises although the largest of
them tended to be owned by foreigners.30 Also unlike the
state enterprises, the new factories produced not for the
palace or the military but for the growing Ottoman urban
market and for export. Accordingly, the new industrial
establishments were, for the most part, aimed at processing
agricultural produce. These processing industries were
helped greatly by the expanding railway network and by the
modernization of the three biggest ports in the Empire;
Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika.31
Izmir and its hinterland became the center of a number
of important new industries. The processing and packing of
figs and licorice became important export industries during
the late 19th century. Much of the licorice industry was
dominated by the American firm of MacAndrews and Forbes.
The company rented licorice fields and hired laborers to
collect the root in Izmir's hinterland. The licorice root
30. Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, p.210.

31. Karkar, Railway development, p.82.
69
was then shipped to Izmir where it was dried and baled for
shipment to the United States. The firm also operated a
processing plant which made licorice paste for shipment to
Europe. In 1912 the firm exported approximately $1 million
worth of licorice to the U.S.A.32
Another, rather different, industry which became very
important during the late 19th century was carpet making.
Six British merchant houses at Izmir organized a system
which bought, spun and died wool and then distributed the
yarn, along with instructions and patterns, to local
weavers. By the 1890's there were "at least" 1,000 looms
and 2,500 weavers producing carpets in the Izmir kaza and
another 1,000 looms at work in Izmir's hinterland. The
carpet making operations of the merchants were expanded
considerably when they merged to form the Amalgamated
Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, Ltd. in 1908. They
centralized most aspects of production, including the
preparation of the yarn and most of the weaving, in
seventeen workshops. By 1913, the company was producing one
million square meters of carpet compared to 3 67,000 square
meters produced in 1893 in all of western Anatolia.33 The
carpet industry in the Izmir area employed, according to one
32. John A . DeNovo, American interests and policies in the

Middle East. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1963), p.39. Licorice was used mainly in the production of
chewing tobacco and as a coloring agent in beer brewing.
33. Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, p.212.
70
estimate, approximately 60,000 people in the preparation of
the yarn and the actual weaving of the carpets.34
The industries which were established to cater to the
domestic Ottoman market were necessarily those which enjoyed
some sort of advantage over imported goods, since the low
external tariff (8% until 1907 and 11% thereafter) did not
provide Ottoman industry with any protection. However,
certain industries were able to carve out a share of the
market within the Empire. For example, the Ottoman Cloth
Company, founded at Izmir by five British merchants in 1910,
produced a cheap woollen cloth which filled a domestic
demand not met by European imports.35 Salonika and its
Macedonian hinterland was the center of the cotton spinning
industry in the Empire. By 1914 there were ten mills with
60,000 spindles in this area, three of which were in
Salonika itself. While Jewish entrepreneurs controled the
mills in Salonika, Greeks owned and operated the other
Macedonian mills located in Niausta, Karaferia (Verria), and
Vodena (Edessa).36
Finally, mining activities also expanded during this
period. Although many different minerals were mined
throughout the empire the most important, both in total
tonnage and in value, was coal. Although some coal was
mined around Erzerum and elsewhere for local use the largest
coal producing area was the Eregli-Zonguldak region on the
34. Ibid., p.211

35. Ibid.
36. Quataert, Workers and Peasants, p.162.
71
northwest coat of Anatolia. Until 1896, there were 124 coal
mining operations in the area, 64% of which were controlled
by non-Mulim Ottomans.37 Coal output from the Eregfli fields
increased steadily throughout the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. 98,000 tons were produced in 1881 climbing to
158,000 tons in 1886 and then to 827,000 tons in 1913.38
The Tobacco Industry
One of the most important of the agriculture based
industries which developed in the Ottoman Empire was the
tobacco industry. The processing of tobacco became
important not only for the numbers of people involved, but
also because the industry was controlled, after 1883 by a
semi-governmental monopoly company. The industry also was
the center of considerable labor activity.
Tobacco cultivation began in the Ottoman Empire during
the 16th century and it rapidly became an important crop.
In 1897, for example, tobacco exports were worth 24 million
Kuru| (compared to 19.4 million for dates and 14.8 million
for wheat).39 In 1912, the American Tobacco Company alone
spent $10 million on Ottoman tobacco.40 Not only was

38. Ibid., p.47 and Owen, Middle East, p.213. Compared to
other coal producing countries, however, Ottoman coal
production was very low. For example, in 1910 Anatolian
coal and lignite production (virutally all in the Empire)
amounted to just over 800,000 tons. German coal and lignite
production for 1900 was 150 million tons. Owen, p.213.
F.H.Hinsley, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History, vol.XI,
(Cambridege: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.58.
39. Shaw and Shaw, table 3.8, p.237.
40. DeNovo, p.39.
72
tobacco an important export crop, but domestic consumption
of tobacco was quite high. "Men, women and children alike
smoked and per capita estimates ranged from 937 to 1500
grams per year."41 The workers in the tobacco processing
industry broke apart the bales of tobacco delivered by the
growers and then sorted and packaged the tobacco according
to grade. Many women worked in the tobacco processing
industry. The workshops in the Kavalla area in Macedonia
employed both men and women in equal numbers whereas the
shops in Salonika employed women almost exclusively.42
The tobacco industry in the Ottoman Empire was
important not only because of its size, but because between
1883 and 1914 domestic tobacco production were controlled by
a European owned monopoly company, the Societe de la Regie
cointeressee des tabacs de 1/Empire Ottoman often shortened
to the Regie. The Regie was controlled by a consortium of
German and French banks. It paid a fixed annual sum of
£T750,000 plus a share of its profits to the Public Debt
Administration.
Although the upper echelons of the company were
dominated by Europeans most of the employees were Ottoman
subjects. Ottoman subjects found work in the Regie's
tobacco processing and cigarette manufacturing plants as
41. Quataert, Social Disintegration, p.15. By way of

comparison, Americans smoked 595 grams anually per capita in
1900. Nannie Tilley, The R.J.Reynolds Tobacco Co.. (Chapell
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p.156.
in the Ottoman Empire. 1730-1914. (Istanbul: Isis Press,
1993) , p.170.
73
well as in its administration. Thousands of Ottoman
subjects were employed as surveillance personnel to prevent
the pervasive smuggling of tobacco which grew as a reaction
to the Regie's monopoly. 96 percent of the Regie's
employee's in 1899 were Ottoman subjects. Of the 8,814
administrative and surveillance jobs in the Regie in that
same year 85 percent of the former and 99 percent of the
latter were Ottoman subjects.43
The Regie's tobacco processing factories in Istanbul,
Izmir, Samsun and Salonika were also major employers. For
example, the Samsun factory employed 500 workers besides 41
office workers and 25 surveillance personnel. In Izmir, 450
men and women worked in the Regie's tobacco factory.44
The Extent of Industrialization
Although the forgoing examples point to an expansion of
certain industries one of the most vexing problems
concerning the development of industry in late Ottoman
history is determining the number of industrial
establishments and estimating the number of workers employed
in them.
The Ottoman Empire's first industrial census was taken
in 1913.45 This census used a rather narrow definition of
what constituted an industrial enterprise. In order to be
43. Quataert, Social Disintegration, pp.16-17.

44. Ibid., p.18.
45. Gundiiz Okgiin, ed. Osmanli Sanavii: 1913-1915
Istatistikleri. (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1984).
74
counted a factory had to have capital assets worth at least
£T1,000, pay a total of at least 750 days wages per year and
use some kind of motive power of at least five horse power.
Hence, industries which used primarily hand powered
machinery, such as the extensive Izmir area carpet industry,
were automatically disqualified. Additionally, since the
census was taken in 1913 it naturally did not count workers
in Macedonia, one of the most industrialized areas of the
Ottoman Empire, which had been lost as a result of the
Balkan Wars. Nor does the census consider workers on the
railroads or ports as industrial workers. Hence, the figure
of 16,975 "industrial workers" probably undercounts the
total number of workers in some sort of manufacturing or
transportation industry before the loss of Macedonia in
1912.46 One scholar estimated that in 1910 there were
400,000 people engaged in some kind of manufacturing in all
of the provinces of the Empire.47 An estimate of the
numbers of industrial workers at the high end of the
spectrum is two million.48 Yet another estimate is that the
three most industrialized cities of the Empire, Istanbul,
Izmir and Salonika had only 100,000 workers between them.49
I am inclined to agree with Paul Dumont's estimate of
between 200,000 and 250,000 "industrial" workers during the
46. Ibid., table VI, p.31.

47. Eldem, p.287.
48. Stefan Velikov, "Sur le Mouvement Ouvrier et Socialiste
en Turquie apres la Revolution Jeune-Turque de 1908," Etudes
Balkaniques. I (1964), p.31.
49. Kemal Stilker 100 sorunda Tiirkive'de Isci Hareketleri
(Istanbul: n.p., 1976), p.12.
75
late 19th and early 20th centuries up until 1912.50 I
include in this figure workers on the railroads and in ports
and in the mines as well as those working in factories, both
privately and state owned. I have, however, drawn a
distinction between a workers in factories and those who
still worked in workshops within the guild system. As I
explained in the Introduction to this dissertation, the
differences between artisans and industrial workers have to
do with the kind of skills each possess and the sort of
social network in which each operates.51 The evidence from
recent research has shown that even artisans who worked in
guild-style workshops engaged in what can only be called
labor struggles against their masters.52 Never-the-less,
these workers deserve to be considered separately from those
who worked in factories or in the modern transportation
sector because of the different social milieu in which they
each operated.
Most industrial workers worked for small firms. In
1911, there were only thirteen companies in the Empire which
had over 1,000 employees. Some of the largest of these
50. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.240. The great

discrepancies in the figures is probably due to the
interpretation of the terms "industrial worker." The
Ottoman Industrial Census of 1913, for example, only
considered firms which employed 20 or more workers. The
larger estimates may have included artisans who worked in
small shops with no power machinery.
51. See also Goldberg, Tinker. Tailor, pp.14, 77.
52. See for example, Sherry Vatter, "Militant Journeymen in
Nineteenth-Century Damascus: Implications for the Middle
Eastern Labor History Agenda," in Lockman, ed., Workers and
Working Classes.
76
companies were engaged in the processing and marketing of
agricultural goods. In 1913, for example, the textile
industry employed a total of 7,765 workers. Of these,
almost half (3,648) were employed in the production of raw
silk and 2,402 worked at the production of wool yarn and
wool cloth.53 The next largest employer was the food and
tobacco processing industry, which employed 3,281 workers in
1913. The tobacco industry was by far the biggest employer
with 2,109 workers. Other employers were breweries, food
canneries, macaroni factories and sugar mills. The third
largest industrial category was the paper products industry,
which employed 1,897 workers. Of these 550 were employed in
the cigarette paper mills. Finally, there were workers in
the cement and porcelain industries (641 total) and in
leather processing (930) among others.54
Mines were also important employers. In 1910, for
example, the coal mining operations in the Eregli-Zonguldak
area employed around 10,000 people, both miners and surface
workers. The Ergani copper mines employed about 400 people,
while the borax mines in the Banderma area employed about
700.55 Finally, the state itself was a big employer of
53. These figures cover factory workers. The total number

of people engaged in some aspect of textile production was
certainly very much higher. For example, it is estimated
that in 1914 60,000 people were engaged in the manufacturing
of carpets. Much of this work went on in the home or in
small workshops. Donald Quataert, "Machine Breaking and the
Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia, 1860-1908,"
Journal of Social History. IX, 3, 1986, p.473.
54. Okgiin, p. 31, Table VI.
55. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.237.
77
industrial workers. In 1900 the Ottoman government employed
around 10,000 workers in its various munitions plants and in
the ship yards.56
Many of the workers in the factories seem to have been
women and children. For example, of 201 workers in an
Istanbul match factory, 121 were women and children. In the
Bakirkoy linen factory (outside of Istanbul) half of the
1,000 workers were children.57 The Oriental Carpet
Manufacturers, Ltd. employed Greek and Armenian women almost
exclusively in its factories in western Anatolia.58
The working conditions of Ottoman industrial workers
during most of the late 19th century do not seem to have
been significantly worse than those of workers in western
Europe. This is not, of course, to say that conditions were
good by modern standards. For example, the work day
averaged between 14 and 16 hours.59 Wage and price
information gives the impression of a steady rise in real
wages, with some fluctuations, during the late 19th
century.60
The workers in the urban industries were often people
from the countryside who came to the cities in order to
supplement their earnings from the land. The extra money
56. Ibid., pp.236-237,

57. Liitfu Erisgi Eroglu, Turkive'de Isci Sinifinin Tarihi.
(Istanbul: Kutulmus Basimevi, 1951), p.7
58. Quataert, "Carpet Industry," Journal of Social History,
p.482.
59. Velikov, p.40.
60. Charles Issawi, "Wages in Turkey, 1850-1914," in Okyar
and Inalcik, p.263.
78
which peasants earned from working on railway construction
projects, in industries or as an agricultural laborer on an
estate was important since the majority of agricultural
plots were of five hectares (12.5 acres) or less.61 The
railroad construction boom of the early 20th century
attracted many peasants, particularly from eastern Anatolia.
For example, the British consul in Adana reported in 1904
that "large numbers" of Turks, Armenians and Circassians had
come to the Adana area from considerable distances, for
example as far away as Erzerum, in order to find work as
laborers. The pay ranged from seven to 13 Kuru§ per day.62
Interestingly, the area around Erzerum contained the largest
number of small landholdings in Ottoman Anatolia; 85 percent
of the agricultural land was divided up into plots of five
hectares or less.63 These railroad construction workers in
Adana might well have been peasant small land-holders
seeking to augment their earnings from their plots.
Furthermore, the amount which peasants could earn in
industry or construction was more than the amounts paid for
agricultural labor. For example, in the Bitlis area (in
Eastern Anatolia) in 1901, agricultural laborers made only 3
Kuru^ per day. Even as late as 1908, agricultural laborers
in the Adana area made only seven Kuru^/day.64 In fact,
61. Owen, Middle East in the World Economy, p.208.

62. F.0.78/5449:13.
63. Owen, p.207.
64. Issawi, in Okyar & Inalcik, pp.269-270. Table II.
79
during the first decade of the 20th century, agricultural
laborers were among the lowest paid workers in the Empire.
The "transitional" character of many of these workers
is important. Many, if not most, of the workers in the
cities and on the railroads, came directly from their small
villages. These people expected to work for a time in the
cities and then return to their home villages.65
The transitional character of the Ottoman labor force
is well illustrated by the example of the coal mines at
Zonguldak. The coal companies recruited most of their
employees from the surrounding farms. These miner-farmers
worked for two to three weeks at a time.66 Likewise,
porters and boatmen in Istanbul (and presumably elsewhere)
were generally migrants from Anatolia. "These
workers...considered their residence and employment in the
capital as temporary and expected to remain in Istanbul only
until they had accumulated enough money to return to their
villages. They possessed strong bonds based on ethnicity
and village of origin."67 This mindset worked.against the
development of class consciousness among many Ottoman urban
workers and reinforced old social boundaries based on
religion and place of origin.68
65. This phenomenon existed elsewhere in the Balkans and

Middle East as well. See, for example, Peter F. Sugar,
Industrialization of Bosnia and Hercegovina, pp.169-170.
Joel Beinin, Workers on the Nile, pp.24-26. Goldberg,
Tinker. Tailor, pp.93-97.
67. Ibid., p.100.
68. Another example of the 'transitional' nature of Ottoman
industrial workers is that of textile mill workers in Adana.
80
Urbanization
The increased mobility brought on by railroad
construction and the job opportunities in the cities led to
a steady growth in urbanization during the 19th and early
20th centuries. Istanbul, especially, experienced a
tremendous growth in population. In 1844 Istanbul was home
to 391,000 people. Just four decades later in 1886 the
population had increased 100 percent to 851,527. By 1910
the population had reached 855,976 and in 1913 it had grown
to nearly one million. Much of this population increase,
especially after the 1870's, resulted from the influx of
refugees from the Balkans. Although the Ottoman government
tried to settle these people in Anatolia, one scholar has
estimated that at any given time there were as many as
200.000 refugees in Istanbul.69 Other cities in the Empire
grew as well. For example, Izmir's population expanded from
150.000 in 1860 to 300,000 in 1914.70 The population of
Salonika increased from 80,000 in c.1870 to 174,000 in
c.1910.71
Hiiseyin Avni Sanda, 1908'de Ecnebi sermayesine kargi ilk

kalkinmalar. (Istanbul: Akfam Matbaasi, 1935), pp.7-10.
69. Shaw and Shaw, pp.241-242.
70. Issawi, p.101.
71. Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central
Europe, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993),
p.96.
81
The Development of the Labor Movement before 1908
The industrialization of the Empire, beginning
especially with the 1870's, was accompanied by the first
signs of a labor movement. One of the earliest bits of
evidence which point to a growth in unrest among workers is
a police ordinance fPolis Nizamnamesi) issued by the
government in 1845 forbidding workers to form associations
or to engage in disruptive activities.72 During the
economic and political chaos of 1876 another law was passed
which again forbade workers' protests.73 During the
subsequent Hamidian period a law against labor organizations
was passed in 1889. The Hamidian censors even forbade use
of the word "strike" (grey) in the Ottoman press.74
Despite these legal restrictions, there is evidence
that workers in the new industries were organizing and
protesting. In all, between 1872 and 1906, there were at
least 23 strikes.75 The first recorded strikes in the
Ottoman Empire occurred in January and February 1872 among
the Beyoglu telegraph clerks and the Haskoy shipyard workers
of Istanbul over an arrears in pay. The shipyard workers
marched to the Ministry of the Navy in order to present a
72. Mesut Gulmez, "Tanzimat'tan Sonra I§gi Orgutlenmesi ve

£ali5j>ma Kosullari (1839-1919)," Tanzimat'tan Cumhurivet'te
Tiirkive Ansiklopedisi. pp.792-793. This regulation was
actually a direct translation of the French police law of 12
Messidor Year VIII (1 June 1800).
73. Sehmus Guzel, p.809.
74. Mesut Gulmez, Tiirkiye'de Calisma Iliskileri. (Ankara:
Seving Matbaasi, 1983), pp.390-391.
75. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.238. £ehmus Guzel says
that 50 strikes occurred during this period, p.805, Table
I.
82
petition to the Minister. Soldiers refused to disperse the
strikers, but the Minister managed to escape. The workers
then continued to the Grand Vezirate where they were refused
entrance. Finally they proceeded to the printing plant
owned by Ebiizziya, one of the New Ottomans, who agreed to
print and publish their petition in his newspaper, the
Hadika. The Ottoman authorities promptly suspended the
paper.76
Strikes continued in most branches of Ottoman industry
from 1872 until 1886 and then beginning again in 1902.77
There were strikes of railroad workers in 1872, 1876, and
1880. Besides the 1872 strike, shipyard workers struck in
1873, 1875, 1876, and 1879. Port workers struck in 1875 and
tailors in 1878. Construction workers struck in 1878 and
1879, workers of various shipping companies staged work
stoppages in 1879 and 1880. The Tobacco Regie suffered
strikes in 1905 and 1906.78
Although details about these activities unfortunately
are lacking, some interesting information can be culled from
the data. 62% of the strikes between 1872 and 1907 occurred
in Istanbul, which was to remain the center of most of
organized labor's activities.79 This situation was almost
76. Mardin, Young Ottoman Thought, p.65. Guzel, p.804.

Mesut Gulmez considers the strike of the Beyo^lu telegraph
workers to be the first in Ottoman history. Tanzimat'tan
Cumhurivet'e Tiirkive Ansiklooedesi. (Istabul: I let is im
Yayinlari, 1985), p.793. Calisma Iliskileri. p.392.
77. Giizel, table I, p.805.
79. Guzel, p.807, Table 2.
83
certainly the result of the great concentration of
industrial enterprises there, as well as because of the more
cosmopolitan population. The Beyoglu telegraph workers
mentioned above, for example, were probably largely foreign.
The strikers' demands centered on wage increases. Of
the 23 strikes which occurred before 1908, 21 had wage
issues as a centerpiece of the grievances. In several of
the cases (like the Haskoy shipyard workers) the strikers
were demanding back pay which was owed them. For example,
the 1873 strike of workers at another Istanbul shipyard in
Kasimpafa was caused because the workers had not been paid
in 11 months. At another shipyard workers' strike in 1875
the workers were protesting a 6 month delay in their
wages.80 A final interesting point about the strikes is
that most of them preceding their strikes by submitting, or
trying to submit, a list of their grievances the the
government.81
Furthermore, despite the relatively large numbers of
strikes, there is little evidence that they were accompanied
by any union forming activity. The strikes all seem to have
been spontaneous and carried out by ad hoc organizations
which did not survive beyond the duration of the strike.82
Although most of the strikes were not accompanied by
any lasting labor union formation, some workers did
establish organizations. These organizations were of two
80. Gulmez, Calisma Iliskileri. p.392.

81. Ibid.
82. Guzel, p.808. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.243.
84
main types. The first was similar, in some respects, to the
old Ottoman guilds. They functioned mainly as charities and
help to members who became unemployed or ill. One of the
most important of these was the Ameleperver Cemivet-i
("Worker's Benevolent Association") founded in Istanbul in
1871.83 Greek workers in Istanbul had their own charitable
organization, the Omonia ("Concord" or "Harmony") founded in
the 1860's.84 There were other urban charities based on
religious or ethnic affiliation as well.85
The second type of workers' organization were European
style labor unions, usually organized around a particular
industry rather than in individual craft. For example, in
1895 workers at the government armament factories founded
the Amele-i Osmani Cemiveti ("Ottoman Workers Society").
The union had 4,000 members.86 In 1904 Greek, Turkish and
Bulgarian tobacco workers in the Thracian town of Iskege
(Xanthi) organized separate Isciler Komiteleri ("Workers'
Committees"). In 1906 they merged into a single

• • 0 7 , ,
organization. In Salonika, Greek and Jewish workers in
the cigarette paper factory had separate organizations-88
A third type of organization which involved workers but
was not directly controlled by them was also evolving around
83. Eroglu, p.4. See also Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.244,

n.57. According to Guzel this organization was founded in
the 1860's, p.809.
84. Guzel, p.809. Translation mine.
86. Ibid., p.244-245. Giizel; p.810.
87. Guzel, p.809-810.
85
this time. These were retirement funds which were
administered by the employing organization but which were
paid into by the workers. These funds, first introduced
during the 1880's, existed mainly in state industries and
the transportation industry. For example, certain
shipyards, the post office and railroads operated such
funds.89
Labor unrest before the Young Turk Revolution
During the years immediately preceding the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908 the cost of living had been rising faster
than wages in many occupations. Particularly hard hit were
the industrial and other urban workers in.Istanbul, Izmir
and Salonika. According to a British consular report, the
cost of living in Istanbul had increased 30% between 1906
and 1908.90 For example, in March 1907 the price of meat
and legumes in Istanbul were double the normal cost and
other prices of other items such as firewood were as much as
250 per cent above normal levels.91 In Salonika the cost of
living had risen 50 percent between 1903 and 1908.92 The
Austro-Hungarian consul in Izmir reported that over the five
years preceding 1911 prices for food had increased 40-70%
and rents by 30-40%.93 The increase in the cost of living
89. Guzel, p.810.

90. F.O. 195/2280
92. Dumont, "Une Organisation Socialiste Ottomane: La
Federation Ouvriere de Saloniqe (1908-1912)," fitudes
Balkaniques. 1, 1975. p.78.
93. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F31/27/50179
86
was caused primarily by a series of bad harvests resulting
from harsh winters and dry summers beginning with the winter
of 1906-07.94
The sky rocketing cost of living was particularly hard
on urban workers. It is difficult to calculate precisely
what effects the rising costs had on workers because of a
lack of data on such matters as average family size, second
jobs of family members, etc. However, one scholar has
estimated that before the crisis of 1907-1908 a common
laborer with a wife and two children who was the sole wage
earner would have devoted approximately 40-60 per cent of
his earnings to pay for bread. By July 1908 that percentage
would have increased to 50-75 percent. Railroad workers at
the bottom of the pay scale in a similar domestic situation
would have spent 56-76 per cent of their wages on bread
before 1907-1908 and an unbelievable 72-100 per cent by the
summer of 1908.95
The poor economic conditions also damaged the morale of
the army, already low from years of fighting against Balkan
and Yemeni rebels. 4,000 conscripts pillaged the city of
94. F.O. 368/134/13387. The British consul reported from

Izmir (16 April 1907) that agricultural prices, including
those for meat and dairy products, were extremely high due
to a harsh winter and a cattle plague. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg.
F73/2/37711 gives the following figures for barley exports
from Izmir (in tons): 1906: 99,206; 1907: 63,594; 1908:
59,735 showing a decline in production. See also Donald
Quataert, "The Young Turk Revolution, Old and New
Approaches," MESA Bulletin. XIII, 1, 1979, p.26.
87
Izmir in 1902. Officers and enlisted men in Izmir mutinied
for back pay in 1906, in 1907 and again in March of 1908.96
This economic climate was also reflected in the rise of
strikes in the years before the Revolution. For example,
during 1902 and 1903 there had been only one strike each.
But there were five strikes each in 1904 and 1905 and 10 in
1906.97 Some of these strikes may have been motivated by
the wave of labor unrest which swept through most of the
world in 1905, but many seem to have been inspired by the
bleak situation in the Ottoman Empire. An examination of
two of these strikes, one in Ottoman Thrace and another in
western Anatolia, will help to get a better idea of the
situation in the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the Young Turk
Revolution.
One of the biggest strikes of this period took place in
and around the Thracian town of Kavalla during March of
1905.98 On 20 March at 7:00 am, between 5,000 and 6,000
workers of the various tobacco firms in and around Kavalla
struck. Specifically the struck firms were the Commercial
Company of Salonika, Herzog & Co. and Meyer & Co. The
British consul (Graves) reporting the strike mentions that
virtually all of the tobacco workers participated in the
strike. The immediate cause was the lowering of the wage by
four Kurus per day over the course of the year.99
96. Quataert, "The Young Turk Revolution," p.23.

97. Guzel, Table I, p.805.
98. Guzel seems to place this strike as occuring in 1904.
Table I, p.805
99. F.O.78/5393:29.
88
The strikers vented their anger at the tobacco
companies by smashing the doors and windows of the tobacco
storehouses. Significantly, they also attacked the office
of a certain Mr. Wix, the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul.100
The firms of Herzog and Meyer were Austro-Hungarian.
The local head of the Ottoman Gendarmerie, a European
officer named Martyn, "explained to [the strikers] that he
would see a deputation of different nationalities from each
firm."101 Graves was not clear as to whether the strikers
sent a delegation to Martyn or not. The report does state
that the Gendarmerie officer accompanied by "the priests,
metropolitan and hakim," addressed the strikers in front of
the tobacco warehouses "telling them to disperse and their
grievances would be attended to."102 The strikers, however,
refused to leave.
100. "Mr. Wix" is probably the same person as "Herr von

Wichs" mentioned in a dispatch dated 11 April 1911 from the
Austro-Hungarian consul in Salonika. H.H.St.A. Aus. Amt.
F31/27/25548.
101. Ibid.
102. It is not entirely clear to whom the consul refers when
he speaks of the religious figures who addressed the
strikers. The metropolitan is clearly a Christian figure,
although he could be either Greek or Bulgarian. The
"priests" and "hakim" present a more difficult problem. It
is rather unlikely (though not impossible) that the "hakim"
was actually an Islamic judge. The "hakim" might actually
be a "hahem" or rabbi. It is also possible that the "hakim"
could have been some other sort of Muslim religiousor
judicial figure. The priests also present a problem. They
might be Bulgarian or Greek, but the consul could also have
mistakenly refered to ulema as priests. The important point
is that there seems to have been an effort to confront the
strikers with a delegation of religious figures who
represented the makeup of the workforce.
89
Finally, about noon, British gendarmerie officers and
"Turkish officials" [sic] succeeded in peacefully dispersing
the crowd of strikers. Although the Vali had sent
gendarmerie troops to restore order, it is significant that
the end of the strike was not accompanied by any violence
toward the strikers.103
A second important labor action occurred in the western
Anatolian town of Ugak, near Izmir, in March of 1908, only
four months before the Young Turk Revolution.104 The riots
in Usak were directed at the offices of the Oriental Carpet
Manufacturers, an Izmir firm run by British subjects. The
firm had been established in January 1908 to centralize its
carpet manufacturing operations which included home-based
work in the town of Ugak. In the following months the firms
established several factories in western Anatolia where it
employed mostly Greek and Armenian women. The factories
used only yarn produced and dyed in the companies yarn
producing factories in Izmir and Banderma. This eliminated
the spinning and dying jobs which had been carried out in
Ugak.105 The women carpet makers in Ugak (who were mostly
Turkish speaking Muslims) reacted to the loss of their jobs
by attacking and partially destroying the company's
buildings in Ugak. The local Ottoman administrative and
103. Ibid. Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal exactly

how this strike ended.
104. Quataert, "Carpet Industry," p.481-482. This article
presents an exhaustive treatment of the carpet industry in
western Anatolia.
105. For more on the carpet industry, see p.71.
90
police authorities were sympathetic to the women's demands
and recommended to the central government that the company
not be allowed to use yarn from its factories and that the
women's other grievances be addressed.106
Conclusion
The growth of national self-consciousness during the
19th and early 20th centuries which was examined in Chapter
One was paralleled by increased industrialization and the
beginnings of an Ottoman labor movement.
After the attempts at state-directed industrialization
during the 1840's were abandoned private industrial
enterprises began to grow during the 1870's. The
industrialization of the late 19th century involved mostly
the processing of agricultural produce for the domestic
Ottoman market, although certain of these products, such as
tobacco and licorice, were processed for export. This
industrialization worked in conjunction with a modernization
of transportation technology. Railroads and improved ports
made it easier to move agricultural goods to the urban areas
where they could be processed.
The resurgence of Ottoman industry, like the growth of
nationalism, had much to do with the continued close
interactions with Europe. Many of the largest manufacturing
firms and all but one of the railroads were partially or
106. Quataert, ’’Carpet Industry,” p.483. It is not clear

what, if anything, these riots achieved for the workers.
91
entirely owned by Europeans. During the same period
Europeans established the Ottoman Public Debt Administration
and its related agency the Regie. The P.D.A, although able
to restore the Imperial finances to some semblance of
solvency, deprived the Ottoman state of its ability to set
its own economic policy.
The effects of these economic changes upon the subjects
of the Ottoman Empire is rather mixed. While the
incorporation into the world economy destroyed certain
manufacturing industries which had been based on the guilds
other opportunities were created. Certain guilds, such as
the port workers, were actually able to adapt to the new
economic situation and remain fairly powerful. On the other
hand, it seems safe to assume that many workers in the new
industries were not happy with the new situation and saw the
European capitalists at least partially responsible for
their troubles. Hence, for example, in the case of the
Kavalla tobacco workers' strike against Austro-Hungarian
tobacco companies, at least some of the strikers attacked
the house of the Austro-Hungarian consul in addition to the
company warehouses.
Although it is clear that the workers in Kavalla and
Usak, and probably elsewhere, had little love for their
European employer, the relationships between Ottoman workers
of different religions and ethnic groups are harder to
gauge. There are indications that there was some
cooperation among workers of different groups. For example,
92
the workers in the Kavalla strike, although clearly
belonging to different ethnic groups, were able to cooperate
during the strike. On the other hand, it is equally clear
that workers saw themselves as belonging to different groups
based on their ethnicity. For example, the workers' mutual
aid societies seem to have been largely based on ethnic or
religious affiliation. Workers of different ethnic or
religious groups in the same industry were not always united
in the same organization. Perhaps most ominously of all,
the changes in the industrial landscape brought about by the
penetration.of European capital had changed the relationship
of different ethnic groups to different kinds of work. For
example, during the early 20th century carpet making, which
had been an almost exclusively Muslim craft, was gradually
taken over by Greek and Armenian workers in European owned
carpet factories. Similarly, many of the new industries
were owned by Ottoman non-Muslim subjects or employed non-
Muslims in administrative roles. The economic conflicts
between different groups also had a potentially ethnic
dimension as well.
The attitude of the Ottoman government toward the
strikers was also related to the importance of European
capital in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government
seemed remarkably lenient toward the workers involved in
strikes despite the official hostility toward strikes and
labor organization in general. In the case of the Kavalla
strike, for example, although the Vali called out Ottoman
93
troops he did not use them against the strikers even though
the latter were wrecking property belong to the tobacco
companies.
It may be tempting to infer from this information that
the Hamidian regime was using worker unrest as a weapon
against foreign capitalist. It may likewise be tempting to
interpret the strikes as being manifestations of anti
foreigner sentiment or Ottomanist patriotism. Neither of
these possibilities bears up under closer scrutiny, however.
First of all, there is no evidence that the Ottoman central
government in any way encouraged any of the strikes. The
government's role as mediator usually concentrated on
calming the workers rather than inciting them to further
acts against the industrialists. This, and the readiness of
workers to appeal to the government and its agents for help
are perhaps reflections of the paternalistic role of the
Ottoman State during the classical period.
However, workers also struck against Ottoman government
industries and those owned by other Ottoman subjects, not
only against foreign owned enterprises. Thus, at least nine
of the strikes during the 1872-1907 period were at
government shipyards. One of the several 1906 strikes in
Salonika was against the glass and cement factories owned by
the Allatini family of that city.107 Furthermore, the
demands of strikers almost always centered first and
foremost on wage increases rather than, say, increased
107. Guzel, Table I, p.805.
94
representation of Ottoman subjects in the company
administration.
While the Hamidian administration may have had a
sympathetic, though guarded, attitude toward the workers,
the Young Turk movement seems to have tried to forge links
with some of the discontented workers of the Empire or at
least with some of the workers' organizations. Thus there
seems to have been some contact between Young Turk exiles in
Europe and the Osmanli Amele Cemiyeti in Istanbul.108 The
involvement of a Young Turk agent in the Ugak riots of 1908
is one of the few concrete examples which exist to show that
the Young Turks were indeed active in worker unrest during
this period. The agent, Ishak Tevfik Efendi, was a
government bureaucrat of medium rank, like many of the Young
Turks. During the riots he encouraged the workers to sack
the factories and buildings of the carpet company.109
Whatever the actual extent of Young Turkish
infiltration of the budding workers' movement was, it is
nevertheless the case that the unrest of the workers was
motivated by the deteriorating economic situation in the
Empire, especially after 1903. The unrest among the urban
workers and conscripted peasants produced an atmosphere in
which the Young Turks could stage their coup in July 1908.
108. Ibid., p.810. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.245.

Neither source provides specific information about these
contacts.
109. Quataert, "Carpet Industry," p.483.
Chapter III: The Strike Wave of 1908
The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 was followed by
a wave of strikes which swept through virtually every
industry in all corners of the Empire. What caused this
outbreak? How were the strikes conducted? How did the
ethnic differences within the Ottoman work force affect the
conduct of the strikes? Finally, how did the government
react to the strike wave?
This chapter will concentrate on three main points.
First, the strikes of 1908 were motivated largely by the
grim economic conditions which had been growing in the
Empire for several years. As the previous chapter tried to
show labor unrest had been growing steadily in the years
before the Young Turk Revolution. The explosion of strikes
after the Revolution occurred because workers felt that the
new constitutional regime would be more sympathetic to their
demands.
Secondly, the main Young Turk faction, the Committee of
Union and Progress remained very interested in the
developing labor movement. The Committee took an active
role in mediating the strikes and, generally, behaved with
remarkable restraint in the face of such wide-spread labor
unrest. The general attitude of the C.U.P toward labor's
demands was one of sympathy.
The government, and especially the Committee of Union
and Progress (C.U.P), played a major role in the strikes.
C.U.P agents often negotiated on behalf of strikers. The
96
attitude of the government and the C.U.P toward the strikes
eventually hardened, however. Near the end of the strike
wave (September and early October) the government was using
force to intimidate strikers.
Thirdly, the events during the strikes of 1908 reflect
the continued cooperation of workers of different ethnic and
religious groups while at the same time providing
indications that this solidarity was unstable at best. The
potential for splits within the ranks of urban workers along
ethnic lines was very great.
In general, workers of different nationalities and
ethnic groups seemed to cooperate during the strikes, and
the largely ephemeral labor unions which appeared during the
strikes usually contained members of different
nationalities. However, the leadership of these different
unions was usually in the hands of non-Muslims. This fact
led to friction within the different unions on a number of
occasions.
This chapter will begin with an examination of the
events of the Young Turk Revolution. It will then
investigate most of the major strikes which occurred between
late July and early October 1908. Finally, the chapter's
conclusion will analyze the strikes.
The Young Turk Revolution
As the previous chapter noted, between around 1903 and
1908 a series of crop failures contributed to a
97
deterioration of the economic situation in the Empire. The
worsening economic conditions contributed to the
revolutionary situation which was developing in Macedonia
and elsewhere in the Empire.1 During the spring of 1908
Sultan Abdiilhamit's agents were closing in on the dominant
"Young Turk" faction, the Committee of Union and Progress
(C.U.P.), based in Salonika. The Committee's leaders,
desperate, decided to take drastic measures against the
Sultan's government in June or July. In the meantime, the
Sultan's agents were getting ready to take action against an
army officer, Major Niyazi Bey, stationed in the Macedonian
town of Resne. Niyazi Bey was one of the many officers of
the Third Army Corp in Macedonia who had connections to the
C.U.P. Fearing that he was about to be arrested, Niyazi
organized a group of about 200 regular soldiers and took to
the hills around Resne on 3 July. They were joined by about
the same number of civilians and irregular troops. Many
other junior officers followed Niyzai's example and soon the
isolated mutinies took on the character of a military
insurrection. The C.U.P leadership, although caught off
guard by the military rising, quickly asserted its
leadership of the emerging revolution.
Soon all of Macedonia was in the hands of the
revolutionaries who showered the Palace with telegrams
1. An exhaustive account of the Young Turk Revolution is

outside the scope of this study. The very compressed
account of the Young Turk Revolution which I have included
here is based largely on Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, pp.l-
13.
98
demanding the restoration of the 1876 constitution. 18,000
troops sent from Anatolia to Macedonia to suppress the
rising were infiltrated by C.U.P agents and refused to fire
on the mutinous Macedonian soldiers. The Sultan, realizing
that further resistance was futile, announced the
restoration of the 1876 Constitution on 23 July 1908.
The Constitution's re-enactment led to a tremendous
outburst of popular demonstrations and expressions of joy.
The following passage gives a colorful picture of the
prevailing mood:
At Serres the president of the Bulgarian Com

mittee embraced the Greek Archbishop; at
Drama the revolutionary officers imprisoned
a Turk for insulting a Christian...at Samsun
the Turks saluted the beard of a Greek prelate;
at Tripoli Turks and Arabs joined in Thanks
giving Services. The Bulgarian bands surrendered
and the brigand Sandanski was received like
the prodigal son.2
Such optimism was possible only because the various
Muslim and non-Muslim revolutionary organizations which had
cooperated under the C.U.P's leadership all believed that
their programs would now be satisfied. The C.U.P., for its
part, had no real political or social program except for the
restoration of the Constitution and the vague, supra
national ideas of Ottomanism.3 Especially significant from
the point of view of the growing numbers of urban workers is
2. Miller, The Ottoman Empire, p.476.

2. Ahmad, p.16. Ahmad further states that at the time of
the Revolution the C.U.P "...had no guiding principle for
future action save an opaque notion of constitution-alism."
p.158. The C.U.P's platform is printed in transliteration
in Tunaya, pp.50-58.
99
that the C.U.P members "were by and large conservative in
outlook with little or no interest in promoting social
change."4
The members of the Committee of Union and Progress did
not take direct control of the government after the
Revolution. In the first Ottoman cabinets there was not a
single C.U.P member. Instead, the Committee sought to
retain influence over the Ottoman State through parliament,
which it quickly came to dominate, and through the continued
existence of its secret society. For this reason, the
actions of the Ottoman government and of the C.U.P were not
always complementary, at least until 1913. This potentially
adversarial relationship manifested itself to some extent
during the strikes of 1908. For example, many of the
strikes, particularly those on the railroads, were against
the interests of the Ottoman government since the government
subsidized the foreign owned railroad companies through the
system of kilometric guarantees. The C.U.P, on the other
hand, often seemed to take an active role in the strikes.
The committee men could well have seen the strikes as a
potential weapon against the foreign financial interests
which controlled much of the Empire's economy.
The Strike Wave of 1908: An Overview
The Revolution raised expectations among most segments
of society and there is no reason to think that the urban
4. Ahmad, p.15.
100
workers were any exception. Indeed, the workers were
probably heartened by the Young Turk's slogan of "liberty,
equality, fraternity and prosperity." Some of the workers
may also have had contact with members of the C.U.P or other
Young Turk factions immediately before the 1908 revolution.5
As the previous chapter demonstrated, there had been a
steadily rising number of strikes in the Empire in the years
before 1908. The workers probably believed, correctly as it
turned out, that the chaos and uncertainty brought about by
the Revolution created a situation in which their demands
had a good chance of success.6
The numbers of strikes and their geographic extent were
unparalleled in the history of the Empire. The most
important strikes occurred on the Empire's four major
railroads (The Aidin, Anatolian, Oriental and Kasaba),
though not, interestingly, on the Hejaz R.R. In the cities
of Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika virtually all industries and
services experienced strikes. Over approximately seventy
days, tens of thousands of workers participated in 111
different strikes.7
5. See Chapter II.

6. Onur, p.277. For several different explanations of the
1908 strike wave see Quatciert "The 1908 Young Turk
Revolution: Old and New Approaches," pp.22-29.
7. Onur, p.277. See also Guzel, pp.811, 815. In the 30
strikes for which the relevant data exist, a total of 42,728
workers struck. The total number of strikers is not known
and is difficult to estimate. My own estimate is between
50,000 and 60,000, i.e. approximately 25% of the urban
workers of the Empire.
101
The strikes were all fought over economic, rather than
political, grievances. In other words, the strikers'
demands centered around pay increases and shortened work
days rather than substantial changes to the government or to
the economic and political systems of the Empire. Strikers
also frequently demanded the abolition of female and child
labor.8
By and large, workers of different nationalities seemed
to cooperate. Never-the-less, there were indications of
significant cleavages among workers in the same industry
along national/ethnic lines. Although these divisions did
not cause a substantial breach among workers (in most cases)
during the 1908 strikes, they were an indication of the
potential for national conflict among urban workers in the
future.
Strikes in Izmir
The strikes of 1908 began in Izmir on the 28th of July
with a strike among the porters, lightermen and stevedores
of the port of Izmir. The men demanded shorter hours and a
pay raise.9 The shipping companies tried to reroute their
ships to Istanbul and Salonika but the port workers in those
cities soon followed the example of the Izmir workers and
struck. The strike spread to the workers of the Carmando
8. Guzel, p.817.
9. Alkiviades Panayotopolous, "The Hellenic Contribution to
the Ottoman Labor and Socialist Movement after 1908," Etudes
Balkaniaues (1) 1980, p.39.
102
Carpet Factory on the 8th of August, followed two days later
by the workers at the fig packing crate manufacturing
plant.10 By the 18th of August the port workers had settled
their strike against the shipping companies. The workers
received a 20% pay raise and double pay for night work. The
shipping firms also agreed to pay the workers directly,
rather than pay the lead porter of each gang. The gang-
leaders were notorious for deducting part of the pay for
themselves.11
Only ten days after the port workers' settlement, the
workers of the Izmir Aidin Railroad issued a set of demands
(printed in Greek) including a pay raise, a shortening of
the work day, and the establishment of a pension fund. They
also wanted Sunday recognized as a day off from work.12
They began their strike on the 31st of August. Most of the
strikers returned to work on the 3rd of September on the
basis of salary increases of 10 to 15 percent and a
shortening of the work day to eight to ten hours, depending
on the type of work.13 The machine-shop workers, who had
refused to work more than eight hours a day, began their own
strike on the 11th and were soon joined by the other
railroad workers, thus restarting the strike. The workers
10. Onur, p.278.

11. F.O. 195/2300:89.
12. F.O. 371/549/33229. Sami Ozkara, Tiirkische
Arbeiterbewecruncr 1908 im Osmanischen Reich im Spiegel der
Botschaftsberichte. der volkswirtschaftlichen und
politischen Entwicklungen. (Frankfurt/Main: Verlag Peter
Lang GmbH, 1985), p.107.
13. U.S. National Archives, Micro. 862, Roll 935, 15736/33.
103
and the company reached an agreement on 13 September. The
earlier pay raises were confirmed and the length of the work
day was fixed at eight hours for clerks, nine and one half
hours for train crews and ten hours for the workers in the
machine shops, who apparently were unsuccessful in their
demand for an eight hour day.14
Meanwhile, the workers of the Izmir-Goztepe tram line
struck on the 5th. On the 9th they ended their strike.
They received a 15% pay raise, a reduction of the work day
to ten hours and provisions for overtime pay.15
The Aidin Railroad workers struck yet a third time on
the 26th of September. The strikers demanded the dismissal
of the entire management of the railroad, including Mr.
Barfield (the General Manager) , a further pay raise of 30%
and the rehiring of all discharged workers. The British
consul reported that the strikers prevented other company
employees from working.16
By this time the constant unrest among the railroad
workers had begun to affect the local economy. The manager
of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company which operated a licorice
processing factory in Izmir complained to the American
consul there that the factory would have to close due to
lack of licorice. On the 29th of September, 5,000 fig
packers had to quit work due to the unavailability of fresh
14. U.S. National Archives, Microcopy 862, Roll 935,

15736/38, 45.
15. Onur, p.284.
16. F.O. 371/549/31233.
104
figs.17 The fig processing companies had to rely on camels
to transport the fruit to Izmir. The fig packers finally
pressured the provincial administration into doing something
to halt the strike. The Vali called in local police forces
to protect railroad company property and intimidate the
strikers.18
The strikers, however, were not cowed by the show of
force. In fact, they were considerably more aggressive than
they had been in earlier strikes. For example, on the 3 0th
a group of strikers led by a certain Kotzamanis, the editor
of the socialist paper Eraati. occupied a railroad station.
Elsewhere on the line, near Develikoy, the strikers derailed
a train. Despite these actions, the police took no active
steps against the strikers who took advantage of the
former's inaction to seize the railroad itself. The
strikers operated the four o'clock train to Aidin that
afternoon, waving strike banners and firing their pistols
into the air in celebration.19
The increased violence of the strike and the virtual
takeover of the entire railroad by the strikers raised the
possibility of British intervention. The railroad company
warned the British consul that it would have to request a
British gun boat be sent to Izmir if "a sufficient number of
Turkish [sic] troops are not forth-coming.”20 The dangerous
17. U.S.National Archives, Micro.862, Roll 935, 15736/45.

18. Szkara, p.108.
19. U.S.National Archives, Micro.862, Roll 935, 15736/45.
20. F.O.371/549/33613.
105
turn of events prompted Kamil Pasa, the Grand Vezir, to
telegraph the Vali of Izmir that the strike had to be ended.
On 1 October a detachment of soldiers was ordered to evict
the strikers from the railroad station and trains.
Apparently, a striker fired on the soldiers and a general
melee ensued. In the confusion one striker was killed and
several injured.21 The strikers responded with the
destruction of railroad company property. For example,
strikers burned railroad company buildings and derailed
trains.22 The C.U.P. agent for Izmir tried in vain to
settle the strike and the Vali finally called upon the
central government to take some sort of action. The
government responded by sending an armored cruiser to Izmir
harbor and ordering a battalion of soldiers from the
neighboring town of Bornova to occupy Izmir. The strike
leaders and many of the workers were arrested and the strike
was successfully broken.23
The strike was finally settled on the 6th of October.
Despite the fact that the strike had been crushed, the
company apparently felt that it had to offer the workers
some concessions. Although the strikers did not succeed in
their demand that all discharged workers be rehired the
company made some concessions regarding pay and hours of
work. Men who had made less than 500 Kurug/month were
21. The Levant Herald and Eastern Express. 3 Oct., 1908,

p.371. Ozkara, p.109.
22. Ozkara, p.109. Onur, p.291.
23. Ozkara, p.109, Onur, p.292.
106
granted a 15% raise. Those who had made over 500 received a
10% raise. The working day was fixed at ten hours except
for the winter months during which the day was shortened to
nine and one half hours. Day laborer were to be considered
monthly workers after "five years of good service.” This
last provision was clearly a demand of the predominantly
Muslim porters, who were mostly day laborers.24 The
economic concessions of the railroad company reportedly cost
it between T£ 11,000 and T£ 14,000 (approximately 10,000-
13,000 ESterling) per year.25
On 15 September, during the brief pause between the
second and third strike on the Aidin Railroad, the workers
of Izmir's other railroad, the French owned Izmir-Kasaba
Railroad, went on strike. Their demands were similar to
those of the workers on the Aidin Railroad, namely a pay
raise and a shortening of the work day. They settled with
the company on the 18th, apparently winning their demands.26
Strikes in Istanbul
The strikes in Istanbul, as the Izmir strikes,
demonstrate the importance of economic grievances among the
workers as well as the generally high level of cooperation
among workers of different ethnic groups. The Istanbul
strikes, like those in Izmir, also give evidence of the
24. F.O. 195/2300:97. See also U.S. National Archives,

Micro.862, Roll 935, 15736/52.
25. Panayotopolous, n.27, p.42.
26. Onur, p.292.
107
important role played by the Committee of Union and Progress
as a mediator between the strikers and their employers.
Among the first strikes in Istanbul was the action
against the Regie's tobacco factory in the Cibali
neighborhood.27 After about one week, the strikers returned
to work on the 12th of August on the basis of a 50% pay
raise. Some of the strike leaders, however, continued to
issue demands including further pay raises, pensions and the
provision of tobacco to workers for their personal use. The
Regie responded with a lockout on the 13th. Riza Bey, a
C.U.P representative, persuaded the strikers to return to
work on the 15th.28
As in Izmir, the port workers in Istanbul, especially
the porters (hamals) struck in early August. The action of
the Istanbul hamals and other port workers differed in some
ways from the strike in Izmir. The porters' strike in
Istanbul was directed against the Istanbul Quay Company, a
French owned company which was responsible for running
Istanbul's harbor. The porters and the Quay Company had
been on bad terms virtually since the beginning of the
Company's operations in 1894. The complaints of the port
workers, especially the powerful porters' guilds, had less
to do with pay rates than the issue of control of port
operations. During the Hamidian period, the porters had
relied on the Sultan's government to negotiate with the Quay
27. For a description of the Regie, see Chapter II.

28. F.O. 195/2280:38.
108
Company on their behalf. Many of the guild stewards were,
in fact, appointed by the Sultan.29 By 1907, however, the
Sultan's government had been forced to concede a large
degree of control over the Istanbul port operations to the
Quay Company.30
The porters and other port workers took advantage of
the Revolution of 1908 to try to regain some of their
autonomy which had been lost to the Quay Company in 1907.
Porters who had lost their jobs due to the Company's
restructuring of port operations "forcibly" reclaimed them.
The lightermen insiisted that merchants use their services to
unload cargo from the ships instead of using the Company's
floating docks. Finally, on the 13th of August, the
Istanbul waterfront was shut down by a massive strike of the
port workers.31 The porters had relied on help from the
Sultan's government in past disputes with the Company, but
in this case the porters' guilds struck the company. On the
13th thousands of port workers, led by the porters, went on
strike.32 Additionally, about 200 porters, many of them
Dalmatians (i.e. Austrian subjects), protested in front of
the Austro-Hungarian consulate and demanded the release of a
detained comrade.33

30. Quataert examines the disputes between the port workers
guilds, the Ottoman government and the Quay Company in his
Social Disintegration, pp.95-120.
31. Ibid., p.114.
32. Ibid.
33. H.H.St.A. P.A.XI1/196:274.
109
The strike put the C.U.P and the Ottoman government
into a difficult position. On the one hand, the government
had been traditionally sympathetic to the port workers. On
the other hand, neither the government nor the Committee
could sanction the closure of the port which would virtually
cut the capital off from supplies. Accordingly, Dr. Riza
Bey, a C.U.P member, was sent with a detachment of cavalry
and amid threats but no actual violence, dispersed the
workers who returned to their jobs.34 The unrest among the
portworkers continued throughout September and was subsumed
in the anti-Austrian boycott of October 1908.35
On the same day that the portworkers were striking
against the Quay Company in European Istanbul the hamals at
the Haidar Pa§a railroad station, the starting point of the
Anatolian Railroad, on the Asian side struck. The railroad
company, which also owned the port, approached the C.U.P
which convinced the porters to return to work. The hamals
in Kuleli, in Asian Istanbul, had ended a short strike on
the 18th of August on the basis of a pay raise which gave
them a daily wage of 18 to 40 Kurujs, based on a rate of 2
1/2 Kuru| per ton moved.36
34. Ibid. Quataert, Social Disintegration, p.115. The Dr.

Riza Bey mentioned in this dispatch is no doubt the same
individual mentioned with regard to the Cibali tobacco
strike namely Dr. Riza Tevfik Bey, sometimes called "Filozof
Riza Tevfik," who later took the name Boliikbafi. He was a
doctor at the Istanbul customs house who took a very active
part in politics, first with the C.U.P and later with the
Hiirriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi (Tunaya, p.264.).
35. The Boycott, the role of the portworkers and the C.U.P
will be examinied in the following chapter.
36. F.O. 195/2280:38. Ozkara, p.140.
110
While the port workers in Istanbul struck, unrest grew
among the thousands of bakers in Istanbul. On the 22nd of
August a delegation of 150 secured the help of the C.U.P in
order to get a wage increase from the bakery owners.
Although the C.U.P argued that a higher wage for the bakers
would translate into a higher price for bread, its
representatives nevertheless mediated a pay raise agreement
between the bakers, the bakery owners' association (Hibazan
Cemiyeti), and the Istanbul Municipal government. The
bakery employees received pay raises of up to 100%. For
example, Master Bakers' pay increased from 11 to 20
Kurus/day. Journeymen Bakers received a pay increase of 5
Kuru§s/day to 12 Kuruf. Apprentices' pay increased from 4 to
8 Kuru^/day. The Hibazan Cemiyeti, however, soon reneged on
the agreement. The employers reduced the pay increases for
the Masters and Journeymen to only 4 Kuru^/day and 3
Kuru§/day respectively.37 In response the bakers organized
a strike. On 16 September more than 400 bakers demonstrated
in front of the Istanbul municipal offices. The strikers
met with the official in charge of weights and measures,
Osman Bey, and demanded a restoration of the previous wage
agreement and the recognition of their newly founded union,
the Ekmekgi ve Amele Cemiyeti. The bakery owners quickly
agreed to the unions' demands.38
37. Ozkara, p.131.

38. F.O.195/2280:64. Onur, p.280. Ozkara, p.133.
Ill
Another serious strike occurred among the employees of
the Aksaray-Sifli-Befikta§ tramway. On 11 August a
committee of tramway workers submitted a list of demands to
the tram company and a copy to the local branch of the
C.U.P. Along with the usual demands for a pay raise and
shortened work day, the workers also demanded the dismissal
of the general director of the company, a certain
Perdikaris. The company refused the workers' demands and
the strike broke out on 12 August.
The strikers staged a large public protest which
prompted the C.U.P to offer mediation and promise the
strikers that their demands would be met. Accordingly, the
strikers returned to work on the following day only to
strike again on 23 August because of the lack of progress on
their demands. The strike dragged on until 15 September
when the strikers demonstrated in front of the tram depot in
§i§li. The government called out the gendarmerie and the
Beyoglu police. The gendarmerie commander, Hussein Hilmi
Pa§a, ordered the strikers to return to work immediately.
The workers, however, refused and the security forces were
apparently unwilling to use force to disperse them.
Representatives from the C.U.P once again intervened and
succeeded in brokering a deal between the workers and the
company.39 The following day the strikers finally settled
39. Ozkara, p.124.
112
with the company. Although they failed to receive their pay
raise General Director Perdikaris was dismissed.40
Besides the major strikes of the porters and bakery
workers other industries and services were paralyzed with
strikes all over Istanbul. For example, on the 11th of
August the workers at the Pa§abahge glass works struck. On
the 17th the workers at the Uskiidar-Kadikoy Water Company
went on strike. That same week the typesetters of most of
the Istanbul newspapers formed a union and the workers at
foreign language papers based in Galata (among them the
Levant Herald) struck for higher wages.41 Other major
Istanbul papers, such as Stamboul. Turauie. and Moniteur
Oriental, responded with a lockout.42 During the end of
September and beginning of October workers at the Istanbul
department stores the "Bon Marche" and the "Lion" went on
strike, as did the waiters at the "Londra" and "Yani" pubs
and the workers at the famous Pera Palas Hotel.43
Strikes in Salonika
As in Izmir, the first to strike in Salonika were the
port workers. The strike of approximately 800 dock workers
broke out on 13 August. The striking Salonika dock workers
40. Onur, p.284.

41. ibid., p.279. See also Levant Herald. Aug.22, 1908,
p.323. The Printers at the L.H. struck for four days.
42. F.O. 195/2280:38.
43. Onur, p.282. Unfortunately, I could not find detailed
information about these strikes.
113
refused to unload ships which came to Salonika from Izmir.44
The strikers received a flat daily raise of 3 Kuru^.45
The most important labor activity in Salonika, and in
Ottoman Macedonia in general, centered around the tobacco
industry. Shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, the
tobacco workers in the Salonika area formed a union. The
union was divided into four branches, with one each in
Gevgeli (on the railroad line at the modern Greek-Macedonian
border) and Kuku§ (Kilkis, Kukus) and two in Salonika. The
union had approximately 3,200 members of which about 2,000
were Jews, 500 Greeks, 400 Turks, and 200 Bulgars. The
tobacco workers' union was the first workers' organization
in Salonika to represent all workers of a particular
industry, regardless of their nationality.46 During the
first week of September the Regie workers in Salonika struck
for higher wages. The strike was settled on 11 September.
Workers gained pay raises of from 10% to 30%.47 Only three
days later, however, 14,000 Regie workers struck in the
towns of Kavala and Drama, in Salonika's hinterland. The
workers presented a long list of demands. Among them was a
demand for a pay raise (to 18 Kuru^/day) but working
conditions were also an important factor. The strikers
demanded a nine hour work day for summer and eight hours for
44. Onur, p.278.

45. Ozkara, p.141.
in Turquie apres la Revolution Jeune-Turque de 1908," fitudes
Balkaniaues. (1) 1964, p.31.
47. Onur, p.281.
114
the winter. They also demanded the provision of clean
drinking water and the provision and daily cleaning of
modern toilets. The C.U.P mediated the strike, which ended
on 16 September. The company promised that it would grant
the employees' demands.48
In late August, as the Istanbul bakers were negotiating
pay raises, the bakers in Salonika followed their example.
They demanded rates of pay similar to those demanded by
their colleagues in Istanbul. For example, Masters demanded
18 Kuru^/day, Journeymen 16 and Apprentices 13. As the
bakery owners refused the demands, the bakers struck on 9
September. Over 1,000 bakers participated. As in Istanbul,
the C.U.P took an active role in mediating the labor
dispute. In this case, Osman Adil Bey, a Committee member,
negotiated with the strikers and bakery owners. The
strikers received their pay increases and returned to work
on the 11th.49
There were other strikes in Salonika as well about
which, unfortunately, little detailed information is
available. On 22 August 100 workers struck at the Alatini
flour mill. By early September the telegraph operators were
on strike as were 120 workers at the Olympos Brewery, 500 at
the soap factory and 500 at a Regie cigarette factory.50
The tramway employees settled a short strike on 11 September
48. ibid., p.281. Ozkara, p.119.

49. Ozkara, p.132.
50. Velikov, p.42.
115
on the basis of a 2 Kurug per day raise and a 10 hour work
day.51
As had occurred in Istanbul, service workers quickly
joined the striking industrial workers. A strike on the 9th
September of the workers at the "Errera" department store
was followed the next day by the strike of most of the
waiters and hotel employees of the city.52
The strikes within the city of Salonika soon spread to
the other towns of Macedonia. During the month of
September, 150 textile workers in Gevgeli, 52 bakers in
Manastir (Bitolj) and the employees of the Singer Sewing
Machine Company in Usktib (Skopje) went on strike.53
Strikes in other parts of the Empire
Most of the strikes were concentrated in Istanbul,
Izmir, Salonika and their environs. These were by no means,
however, all of the strikes which occurred in the empire in
1908. Most of these other strikes involved port or railroad
workers, or the tobacco industry. In Beirut, for example,
the port workers struck in early September and the gas
company workers in mid-October. The gas company workers
settled after only three days and received a 30% pay
raise.54 The workers on the Beirut-Damascus-Hama Railroad,
51. Onur, p.284.

52. Onur, p.282.
53. Velikov, p.43.
54. Onur, p.287.
116
a French company, struck on 18 September. In early October
the strike ended and the employees received a 50% raise.55
Miners also went on strike. The coal miners in the
important Zonguldak coal mines presented a demand for a pay
raise to the French-dominated mining company in late
September. Not only did the company's leaders ignore the
demand, but the Ottoman government dispatched a gun-boat to
Zonguldak to intimidate the workers. Undeterred, the miners
struck on 24 September and on the two following days they
marched through the town of Zonguldak. The company backed
down and promised to grant the workers' demands.56
The Ergani copper miners struck at approximately the
same time as the Zonguldak coal miners. This strike was
particularly interesting because of the divisions which
developed among the workers along ethnic lines. Although
the workforce was predominantly Kurdish, only the Turkish
and Armenian workers struck. The Kurdish workers remained
deaf to the pleas by their Armenian and Turkish coworkers to
join the strike. Furthermore, the mining company replaced
the strikers with more Kurdish workers. The strikers
responded by attacking the Kurdish workers. After an
Italian machinist was wounded, government troops succeeded
in ending the fighting between the workers. Although the
strike was thus broken the company rehired the strikers.57
55. Onur, p.292. See also Tanin 17 Eyliil 1324.

56. ibid., p.279.
57. ibid., p.280. See also Ozkara, p.121.
117
The cotton industry in Adana was virtually shut down by
a strike aimed at the town's largest cotton mill, owned by
the Deutschen Levantinischen Baumwoll-gesellschaft.
Information on the strike is very scarce. Apparently, the
strike during late September and early October ended with
the workers winning a pay increase.58
One of the most important of the strikes outside of the
three major western regions was the turmoil among the
tobacco workers in Samsun, on the Black Sea. During mid-
August workers of the various tobacco companies were on
strike. The workers established a 12 member "executive
committee" (vonetim kurulu) to negotiate with the companies.
The strike's main accomplishment was the establishment of a
"closed shop" system in which only union members could work.
This seems to have been the first of its kind in the Empire.
Unrest among the tobacco workers in the Samsun region
resumed in the Fall of 1908. On 5 October about 600
workers, dominated by tobacco pickers, demonstrated in front
of the Regie's offices. They demanded a 25% pay raise. The
Regie's director in Samsun, a certain Wroblewski, agreed to
confer with "6 to 8" representatives from the strikers and
allowed the delegates into the building. Once inside,
however, the doors were shut and the directors guards began
to beat the delegates so severely that the crowd outside
could hear their screams. This naturally angered the
strikers and they began to attack the building, throwing
58. §anda, Ilk Kalkinmalar. Also Ozkara, p.150.
118
stones and breaking down the fences. The Regie guards fired
upon the crowd wounding seven men. The strikers then
stormed and looted the building. Wroblewski escaped to his
own house and soldiers arrived and dispersed the crowd with
no further reported casualties.59
The next day, however, the strikers returned to the
building with firearms. A gun battle ensued between Regie
guards and the strikers in the course of which ten people
were wounded, two of them seriously. The local authorities
called out a battalion of soldiers which, after a short
skirmish, dispersed the strikers and captured several of the
strike leaders. Despite the fact that the strike was
broken, the Regie quickly granted the workers pay increases
of 20%-25%, "according to efficiency and ability" fehlivet
ve kabilivetine gore).60
Oriental Railroad Company Strike
The Oriental Railroad Company (officially, the Companie
Generale pour 1'Exploitation des Chemins de Fer en Turquie
d'Europe) was established by the Austrian entrepreneur Baron
Hirsch in 1870 based on an Ottoman concession aimed at
building a rail network in the Ottoman Balkans which could
then link the Ottoman Empire to western Europe. By the mid-
1870's the Company's lines joined Istanbul to Bellovo (near
Sofia) and to Dedeagag (Alexandropolis). In August 1888 the
59. F.O. 371/560/37116:676.

60. Onur, p.284.
119
first through train from Vienna reached Istanbul. In 1890
Hirsch sold his shares in the company to a consortium
dominated by the Deutsche Bank and the Wiener Bankverein.61
By 1908, the O.R.R operated four branch lines in
addition to its mainline. The railroad's mainline, made
famous by the "Orient Express," ran from Istanbul to Filibe
(Plovdiv, Philipopolis) and from there continued out of
Ottoman territory. The branch lines connected Istanbul to
Salonika (via Dedeagag), and Salonika to Uskiip (Skopje), and
Monastir (Bitolj). Another line ran north from Uskiip to
Mitroviga (Mitrovice, Kosovska Mitrovica).
An examination of the strike against the company is
complicated by the fact that the railroad workers on
different lines struck at different times. The first strike
against the company began on 23 August when about 60 brake
guards (workers on the trains who oversaw the brake system)
on the Salonika-Uskiip demanded a pay raise. The company
agreed and the workers on the Uskiip line returned to work on
the 26th, but they rapidly came to the conclusion that the
company had no intention of fulfilling its promises.
Accordingly, they resumed their strike on the 28th.62 The
Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in tiskiib reported that strikers
were preventing other workers from working.63 By the 31st
the strike had spread to the Salonika-Monastir and the
61. Crampton, p.244. Karkar, p.68.

62. H.H.St.A Adm. Reg. F 31/8/71898, quoting information in
newspaper Le Proares de Saloniaue. Also Ozkara, p.100.
63. H.H.St.A. Adm.Reg.F 31/8/69700
120
Salonika-Dedeagag lines as well.64 Meanwhile, on 28 August
about 200 workers in the company's machine shops in the
Sirkeci and Yedikule areas of Istanbul struck for higher
wages. The strike was suppressed by Gendarmerie troops
within 24 hours.65
By the 6th September about 400 delegates representing
Oriental Railroad workers from Salonika, Filibe and Istanbul
had convened in Istanbul to formulate a comprehensive list
of demands to present to the company officials there.66 The
strike committee based in Istanbul was made up of workers of
many nationalities. The president was named Yagligiyan
(Yaglitzian), the bursar Aidonides, vice-president Rotnagel,
secretaries Melirytos, Lupovitz and Diner. Names of the
other members of the committee were Gibbon, Hatzopoulos,
Eliades, Yeser, Gerke, Yovantsos, Paravantsos, Hussein,
Romanos, and Blau.67 The predominance of Greek and
especially foreign names, and the presence of only one
Muslim one, is noteworthy.
The strike committee quickly prepared a list of demands
and presented it to the company director in Istanbul, Herr
Gross. First on the list was a pay raise of 30 to 40
percent. The other 12 demands on the list centered on
improving the overall working conditions. For example, the
64. H.H.St.A. Adm.Reg.F 31/8/69442. Ozkara, p.100.

65. Onur, p.288. Guzel, 813, Table 3.
66. Ozkara, p.101. F.O. 371/552/35322:82. The British
consul in Filibe reported that the four chief delegates from
that town (an Austrian, an Ottoman Armenian and two
Bulgarians) all "professed the socialistic doctrine."
67. Panayotopoulos, p.46.
121
fifth point on the list demanded a reorganization of the
company's medical services. The workers also wanted a
reorganization of the company's retirement system, a
shortening of the work day and a 50 percent bonus for work
on Sundays and holidays. The strike committee informed the
company that it had until the 15th to accept the demands.68
Despite the fact that the strike committee claimed to
speak for all of the strikers on the various Company lines,
the strikers on the Salonika-Dedeagag line settled with the
Company on 14 September on the basis of a 40 per cent pay
raise. The strike committee in Istanbul reacted angrily to
the settlement, stressing the need for solidarity and for
the Company to accept the demands in full.69 Strikers on
the Salonika-Monastir and Salonika-Uskiip lines did not
settle with the Company, however, and the Company did not
accept the list of demands. The workers on the Istanbul-
Filibe line began their strike on 18 September at 6:00 AM.70
More than 3,000 workers were involved. 600 workers on the
Bulgarian State Railways (B.D.Zh) struck in sympathy.71
Freight and passenger traffic, including the Orient Express,
was halted.
The strike had some very serious consequences. The
Oriental Railroad headquarters in Vienna asked the Bulgarian
68. Ozkara, pp.101-102. This list is almost identical to

the one prepared earlier by the strikers in Salonika.
H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F 31/8/71898.
69. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F 31/8/71880. Ozkara, p.103.
70. F.O. 371/552/35322, H.H.St.A. Adm.Reg.F 31/8/7081, 7082,
74301.
71. Velikov, p.41.
122
government to intervene in the strike on the part of the
railroad which ran through Eastern Rumelia (which Bulgaria
had annexed in 1885) in order to safeguard the running of
trains.72 The Bulgarian government, which had long sought
to break its tenuous links to the Empire, and smarting over
the "Gesov Incident,"73 was only too happy to oblige the
O.R.R directors and took over those parts of the railroad
which ran through its territory on the 19th. The Bulgarian
government had, in fact, long sought some way to take over
the O.R.R lines and bring them under control of the
Bulgarian State Railway.74
The Austro-Hungarian government was especially worried
about the strike since many of the stockholders of the
O.R.R. Company were Austrians and Hungarians. On the 19th
of September the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul,
Markgraf Pallavicini, met with the Ottoman ministers of the
interior and foreign affairs and asked them to intervene to
end the strike. He mentioned that Muslim workers should
have nothing to do with a strike engineered by Bulgarian
socialists.75
72. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F 31/8/68385.

73. Gesov was Bulgaria's representative to the Imperial
Ottoman Government. Since Bulgaria was still a de jure
vassal of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government did not
consider Gesov to be a representative of an independent
state. Accordingly, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs
did not invite Gesov to an official banquet for foreign
diplomats in Istanbul on 30 August 1908. Gesov, furious,
returned to Sofia where the Bulgarian government,
apparently, began its preparations for a declaration of
independence. Crampton, p .310.
74. Crampton, p.311.
75. H.H.St.A. Adm.Reg.F 31/8/75381.
123
The Ottoman government hardly needed any urging,
however. The ministers of the interior, public works and
foreign affairs appealed to the workers to end the strike.
They claimed that the strike threatened the interests of the
Empire.76 The occupation of the O.R.R. lines in Eastern
Rumelia by the Bulgarian government finally spurred the
Ottoman government to take strong action against the
strikers. Sami Pasa, the Gendarmerie Minister, announced
that Ottoman troops would begin to occupy the lines
remaining in Ottoman territory on 21 September. Unwilling
to confront the possibility of armed conflict, the strike
committee agreed to resume work on the basis of a 40% wage
increase alone, the same terms as those accepted by the
strikers on the Salonika-Dedeagag line on the 14th.77
The settlement of the strike, however, did not end the
crisis for the Ottoman government. The Bulgarian government
had no intention of relinquishing control of the railroad in
East Rumelia to the O.R.R. Co. Bulgarian popular opinion
was strongly against returning control of the line to the
Company. Moreover, the takeover also strengthened the ties
between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia (which had only been
joined to it in 1885). The Bulgarian government also
complained that it could not allow a strike on its own
territory directed from Istanbul. Lastly, the Bulgarian
76. Onur, pp.288-289. Panayotopoulos, p.46.

77. Ozkara, pp.104-105. Panayotopoulos claims the strike
ended on 8 September, the date according to the Julian
calendar then in use.
124
possession of the lines gave the Bulgarian government added
leverage for its negotiations for full independence from its
nominal suzerain the Sultan.78 Accordingly, the Bulgarian
government announced its formal acquisition of the O.R.R
lines in Eastern Rumelia on 24 September.79 On 5 October,
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed his country's full
independence from the Ottoman Empire and took the title
Tsar.80
The fact that the strike was used as a pretext by the
Bulgarian government to declare independence, caused the
British consuls to believe that the Bulgarians had actually
engineered the strike in order to initiate a crisis which
they could then use for their quest for complete
independence from the Empire.81 The Austro-Hungarian
diplomats were equally convinced that the entire strike had
been engineered by Bulgarian socialists or nationalists.
While it is certainly clear that Prince Ferdinand and the
Bulgarian government used the crisis caused by the strike
for their own purposes, there is little, if any, real
evidence to support the suspicions of the British and
Austro-Hungarian consuls. None of the demands of the
workers have anything to do with Bulgarian independence or
the Bulgarian annexation of the O.R.R. lines in Eastern
Rumelia. The sympathy strike of the workers on the B.D.Zh
78. Crampton, pp.311-312.

79. Ozkara, p.105.
80. Crampton, p.312.
81. See, for example, F.O. 195/2280:48 and
F.0.371/550/34248.
125
may, however, have been motivated as much out of a sense of
national as labor solidarity.
While there is little hard evidence to support a claim
that the Bulgarian strikers were motivated by any national
feeling, certain Greek workers were closely tied to
nationalist organizations. Indeed, the bursar of the strike
committee, Aidonides, belonged to a secret Greek nationalist
group, the "Constantinople Organization" which, in turn, had
ties to the Panhellenic Organization based in Athens.
Aidonides supplied the Organization with maps and other
information about the O.R.R. lines in Thrace.82 The Greek
language paper Proodos. which was very supportive of the
strikers in general, was unhappy with the outbreak of the
sympathy strike in Bulgaria and was very opposed to the
Bulgarian take over of the O.R.R. lines in Eastern
Rumelia.83 Both positions were characteristic of a
nationalistic Greek perspective which was unsympathetic to
any developments which could strengthen Bulgaria.
The Strike on the Anatolian-Baghdad Railroad
The Oriental Railway Company strike was rivalled in its
importance and complexity only by the strike of the
employees of the Anatolian Railroad fChemins de fer Ottoman
d'Anatolie or C.F.O.A) and its sister line, the Baghdad

83. Ibid.
126
Railroad.84 This strike also makes very clear the important
divisions which were already present in the labor movement
along ethnic-national lines.
The Anatolian-Baghdad Railroad, financed largely with
German capital, was the most important and longest of all of
the Ottoman railways. In 1895 the line stretched from
Istanbul to Konya via Eski§ehir with a branch line to
Ankara. In 1903, the Baghdad Railway Company was formed.
"Nominally two companies, the Anatolian and Baghdad lines
were an integrated system, financed and managed by separate
but virtually identical groups."85 The Baghdad line, by
1914, stretched eastward from Konya.
Like the other urban workers of the Empire, the workers
on the C.F.O.A were hard hit by the steep climb in prices
during the years immediately preceding and following the
Young Turk revolution, and like most other Ottoman urban
workers, the railroad workers struck to increase their
wages. The strike of the workers of the C.F.O.A differed
from the other strikes, however, in that the C.F.O.A workers
built a relatively sophisticated union apparatus before the
strike, not during it. On 13 August 1908 the workers formed
84. The Anatolian R.R workers' strike is the most studied of

all the strikes of the Ottoman period. Particularly
valuable is Donald Quataert, "Working on the Anatolian
Railway," in his Social Disintegration and Popular
Resistance in the Ottoman Empire (New York: New York
University Press, 1983) . Also very important is Zafer
Toprak, "Ilan-i Hiirriyet ve Anadolu Osmanli Demiryolu
Memurin ve Miistahdemini Cemiyet-i Uhuvvetkaranesi," Tarih ve
Toplum. 10 (57) 1988, pp.45-50.
85. Quatert, p.72.
127
the "Anatolian Ottoman Railroad Employees' and Laborers'
Fraternal Society" (Artadolu Osmanli Demirvolu Memurin ve
Miistahdemini Cemivet-i Uhuwetkaranesi ). As the name of the
union indicates, the organization was an "industrial" rather
than "craft" union. That is, all employees of the railroad,
whether clerks, machinists, engineers or track workers,
belonged to the union. Nor was the union divided along
national/ethnic lines. Non-Muslim Ottomans and foreigners
(who held most of the technical and upper echelon jobs) and
Muslims (who actually worked on the trains and tracks) were
in the same organization. The formation of the union was a
bold attempt at creating one of the first truly "ottoman"
labor organizations in the Empire.
The union was, in fact, largely the creation of a Greek
medical doctor, with the dramatic name Archangelos Gabriel,
employed by the railroad. Of the 37 elected officers of the
union only five were Turkish.86 However, a Turkish attorney
and C.U.P member, Adil Bey, worked closely with the Union
leadership, particularly during negotiations.87 On 17
August, the Union officials requested a "substantial" raise.
Although the union was careful to the point of
obsequiousness about not frightening the company or
government, the railroad company, and much of the foreign
community, were horrified and angered by the formation of
86. ibid., p.82.

87. This Adil Bey may be the same person as Osman Adil Bey,
a C.U.P member who negotiated with the Salonika bakers. See
above.
128
the union and the demand for a wage increase. The
company's director, Huguenin, was especially unyielding and
forceful in his opposition to the union and tried, along
with the German Ambassador, to influence the Ottoman
government.
The aggressive attitude of Huguenin radicalized the
previously timid union. At a union meeting on 27 August the
dismissal of Huguenin was adopted as the principal demand of
the workers. However, the union, in a telegram to the Grand
Vizier, also stressed that the workers regarded it as their
"patriotic duty" to continue working on the railroad and
that they would not damage railroad property.88 As
negotiations between the Company and the Union, attended by
a member of the C.U.P and the Minister of Public Works,
continued, the union clarified its demands for wage
increases. It also demanded union recognition and other
benefits.89
On 27 August, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior,
Hakki Bey discussed the situation with the German Ambassador
and director Huguenin.90 Shortly thereafter, on the 29th,
the Ottoman Ministers of the Interior and Gendarmerie (Sami
Pasa) and representatives from Deutsche Bank met to discuss
the workers' demands for wage increases.91 On 13 September
the company responded that it would grant a flat 10% bonus
88. Quatert, p.84.

89. ibid., p.86. Toprak, pp.48-49.
90. Ibid., p.85.
91. Toprak, p.45.
129
as well as an average wage increase of 10%, but nothing
more, and this only if the workers agreed not to strike.92
The workers, unsatisfied, struck on 14 September.93
Even before the outbreak of the strike, however, splits
within the union ranks were becoming apparent. The salaried
employees, most of whom were non-Muslim Ottomans and
foreigners, wanted to make some sort of deal with the
Company as quickly as possible, while most of the workers
who were paid by the day, primarily Muslims, wanted to hold
out until a total victory was reached. The Company was,
apparently, aware of this split, On the 15th it announced
that it would grant salaried workers pay increases of 20% as
well as a one time bonus.94 .That same evening, the
president of the union, accompanied by Adil Bey, met with
the Grand Vizier and stated that the Union was ready to make
a deal with the company. The president was acting, however,
without the consent or even knowledge of the union rank-and-
file.95
The president's unilateral action finally caused the
already divided union to collapse which effectively ended
the strike on the 16th.96 Government forces occupied
telegraph offices, warehouses and the stations without
resistance. The union and the company, with mediation from
the Ottoman government finally agreed upon wage increases of
92. Quataert, p.87.

93. B.B.A/B.E.O 254550.
94. Quataert, p.88.
95. ibid., p.89.
96. B.B.A./B.E.O. 256032.
130
200 and 250 Kurus per month for employees who had been with
the company for five to ten and ten to 15 years,
respectively. The director reneged on his earlier promise
of bonuses, however. The Minister of Police, Sami Paâ,
appealed to the Muslim workers especially to accept the
decision and to return to work for the good of the Empire.97
The Strikes of 1908: Conclusions
The strike wave of August through October 1908 was
certainly the most spectacular moment in Ottoman labor
history. Indeed, the number and extent of the strikes is
reminiscent of the strike wave of 1905 in the Russian Empire
which constituted a virtual revolution. Moreover, the
majority of the 1908 strikes were successful, at least in
part.98 In cases where the result of the strike was rather
uncertain, such as the Anatolian Railroad strike, the
workers succeeded in gaining a pay raise. Even at the
height of its power in September 1908, however, the Ottoman
labor movement revealed several important weaknesses.
The most important of these weaknesses were the
movement's multi-national and multi-ethnic character. The
ethnic differences among the workers did not preclude
cooperation during strikes. Indeed, most of the strikes
examined in this chapter were examples of inter-ethnic labor
solidarity. However, many of the strikes also provided
97. Quataert. pp.89-90.

98. F.O. 371/560/37320.
131
evidence of the ethnic tensions which existed beneath the
veneer of labor solidarity. These tensions were sometimes
exacerbated by actual job divisions among the workers. For
example, on the railroads most clerical workers were non-
Muslim Ottomans or foreigners while most track crews were
made up of Muslim Ottomans. Similar parallels seem to have
existed in different industries. Thus, the different
outlooks and goals of the different classes of workers were
intensified by national-ethnic differences.
There are many examples of the national and ethnic
differences among the workers. The national-ethnic make-up
of the Oriental R.R strike committee had already been
mentioned. The Anatolian R.R. workers' union was largely
the work of Dr. Gabriel. The leaders of the tobacco
workers' union based in Salonika were all Jews, as were the
leaders of the strike in the Regie's Cibali plant." In
several strikes, including the strike of the C.F.O.A workers
and the employees of the Bon Marche and Lion Department
stores in Istanbul, one of the strikers' demands was for
Sunday off.100 Muslim and Jewish workers would (presumably)
rather have had Friday or Saturday as the day of rest. The
British consul in Macedonia, in a dispatch of December 1908,
mentions the hatred between Greek and Bulgar tobacco workers
at Xanthi.101
99. F.O. 195/2280:38

100. Onur, p.287. Toprak, p.49.
101. F.O. 371/561/45088.
132
The strikes in Izmir, especially, illustrate the
tension between the ideas of nationalism and labor
solidarity. The port workers' strike of July was led by two
Greeks, Neratzoulis and Koufanastasopoulos. One of the
leaders of the railroad strike was a certain Solomonidis,
the editor of the Greek nationalist newspaper Amaltheia.102
The important "socialist" newspaper Eraati was edited by a
Greek named Kotzamanis, one of the leaders of the Aidin R.R.
strike. After the strikes, the paper became increasingly
nationalist, rather than socialist, in tone.103 There is
also evidence that Kotzamanis, like the bursar of the
Oriental Railroad strike committee Aidonides, was linked to
the Panhellenic Organization.104 Another example of the co
existence of nationalist feeling and labor discontent can be
found in a report from the American consul at Izmir who
noted that Greek and Armenian flags, as well as Ottoman
ones, were present during workers' demonstrations. In the
consul's description, the red flag of socialist labor
solidarity is conspicuous by its absence.105

103. Ibid., pp.43-45. The only two copies of Ergatis still
in existence are the issues of 1 and 8 February 1909. These
issues contain articles highly critical of the C.U.P as well
as Greek nationalist imagery and language.
104. Ibid., p.45. On 28 May 1909 Kotzamanis wrote a letter
to S. Gonatas the secretary in charge of weapons for the
Panhellenic Organization. The tone of the letter (part of
which is reproduced by Panayotopoulos) is very
nationalistic.
105. U.S. Consular Reports. No.25, 14 August 1908, p.2. The
British Consul at Izmir also noted in a report of 11 August
1908 the presence of Greek flags during parades and
demonstrations. F.O. 195/2300:86. Interestingly, in all of
133
On other occasions, the conditions during strikes
exacerbated tensions which already may have been present.
For example, during the strike on the C.F.O.A, as noted
above, a serious rift developed between the better skilled
non-Muslim and the lower skilled Muslim workers. As in
other cases, the different economic and social outlooks of
the various elements within the workforce reinforced
national and ethnic differences. The last few days of the
Aidin Railway strike were accompanied by a rise in ethnic
tensions. Both the British and American consuls in Izmir
reported that during the first week in October Muslims were
arming themselves. The American consul reported that during
the first ten days of October "Turks" bought 5,000 small
arms from local shops. The British consul said that Muslims
were buying revolvers because they were afraid of the unruly
behavior of the Italian and Greek strikers.106
Besides non-Muslim Ottomans, foreigners often played an
extremely important part in the strikes. As noted earlier,
foreign nationals were heavily represented in many areas of
Ottoman industry, not only in clerical and managerial
positions but as machinists, engineers and even laborers.107
Greek, Italian and Austrian nationals were very important in
the strikes in Izmir.108 The machine shop workers who
the reports of strikes which I examined, not one mentioned

red flags.
106. F.O. 371/549/36114. U.S. National Archives, Micro.862,
Roll 935, 15736/54.
107. See Chapter II.
108. F.O. 195/2300:182.
134
continued, and actually restarted, the Aidin R.R. strike in
mid-September were probably foreigners and Ottoman
Christians, since these were most often employed as
machinists. The importance of foreigners in the Oriental
Railroad strike, especially Bulgarians, has been noted
above. Foreigners were by no means always the most radical
of strikers, however. During the strike of the C.F.O.A
workers, for example, the Muslim workers were more dedicated
to the strike than were the non-Muslim Ottoman and foreign
workers. During the first day of the Oriental Railroad
strike, a German foreman named Burger in the Yedikule
machine ship threatened the strikers with a pistol, with
little effect however.109
The European consuls were keenly aware of the
influences of foreigners on the Ottoman workers. The
British ambassador noted in a dispatch from 23 October 1908
that "revolutionaries of every description and shade of
opinion, socialists, Russian and Italian anarchists" had
been arriving in Istanbul.110 Although some of these
reports were certainly exaggerated by the prevalent fears
and conspiracy theories fashionable among European diplomats
at the time, it also seems clear that foreign workers, who
would have had some knowledge and/or experience in labor
actions, played important roles in the strikes.
109. Onur, p.288.

110. F.O. 371/560/37320.
135
Besides the divisions along national lines among the
workers the lack of any real organization among them is
conspicuous. Except for the Anatolian and Oriental R.R
workers' unions, the Istanbul bakers' union and the tobacco
workers' union of Salonika, the "unions" which sprang up
during the strikes were ad hoc affairs which disintegrated
as soon as the strike was over.111 Except for the port
workers, there is little evidence that the different workers
tried to co-ordinate their actions.
For example, the tobacco workers in Salonika, Istanbul
and Samsun all began and settled their strikes at different
times, even though they were all striking against the Regie.
Likewise, although the railroad strikes overlapped to some
extent, they were not coordinated to begin on the same day,
which would have strengthened each individual strike. Nor
can this lack of coordination be explained entirely by poor
communications between the various urban centers. Even in
Izmir the strikes of the Aidin and Kasaba railroad workers
occurred at different times. There also is no evidence of
workers in one trade striking in support of other workers.
Lists of workers' demands always include a pay raise and
other similar demands, such as reduced hours, but never
mention strikers in other industries.
The final point of interest about the 1908 strikes is
the very unusual relationship between the strikers, the
C.U.P and the Ottoman government. In most of the strikes
136
examined in this chapter, the workers sought some contact
with the C.U.P or the Ottoman government or both. The
Committee, in turn, often acted as a mediator between the
strikers and the employers. Committee members were active
in mediating the portworkers' and bakers' strikes in
Istanbul, the bakers' strike in Salonika, and the railroad
strikes all over the Empire. During the Aidin Railroad and
Anatolian Railroad strikes, especially, the C.U.P played a
very active role as mediator.
For example, during the first of the Aidin R.R. strikes
(31st August-3rd September) the C.U.P. agents in Izmir
negotiated alongside the Company with the strikers. For
example, the C.U.P.'s "acting director of Political Affairs”
in Izmir, Mehmet Mecet Bey, whom the British consul
described as a "rabid socialist," played an important part
in the strike although his exact role is uncertain.112
While Mecet Bey seems to have championed the cause of the
strikers, another C.U.P. agent, Moammer Bey (also apparently
a Muslim, judging by his name), acted as a mediator between
the strikers and the management of the railroad. He played
a considerable role in persuading the strikers to return to
work.113 Mecet Bey was also the publisher of the newspaper
Erqatis during the period of the strike.114 At some point
112. Panayotopoulos, p.43 and Velikov, p.39 both call him

"Mezdet" while the British Consul in Izmir refers to him as
"Medjet." F.O. 195/2300:97.
113. F.O. 195/2300:97.
114. Ibid. The report calls the newspaper The Workingman,
the English translation of Erqatis. Khalis Okan, "Usloviya,
Poyva i Razvitie na Rabotnicheskoto i Sotsialisticheskoto
137
between the time of the strikes and the February 1909 issues
of the newspaper Mecet apparently quit, perhaps over the
paper's shift toward Greek nationalism, and Kotzamanis took
over.115
The Committee, and the Ottoman government, found
themselves in awkward positions in regard to the strikes.
Both wanted to restore law and order after the 1908
revolution. In several instances, the strikes threatened to
have serious repercussions. For example, the bakers'
strikes in Istanbul and Salonika could have led to bread
shortages. The strikes of port and railroad workers could
likewise have led to problems of provisioning the big
cities. Hence, the C.U.P and the government both wanted to
see the strikes ended as soon as possible.
The government, and to some extent the Committee, also
found itself in a difficult situation in regard to the
strikes because of the importance of foreign capital. The
strikes against the railroads, especially, because of their
disruptive effects on industries risked inviting
intervention by the European powers. Likewise, the Ottoman
government stood to lose money in the case of the railroad
strikes because of the kilometric guarantees.116 The-
workers, moreover, often seemed aware of this awkward
Dvizhenie v Turtsiya," Istoricheski Prealed. XVI, 4, 1960.

Okan incorrectly calls "Mehmet" the editor of Erqatis. p.95
116. Toprak, "Ilan-i Huriyet," pp.45-46.
138
situation and would make it clear to the government that
they did not wish to harm the Ottoman state.117
While helping to negotiate strikes, the C.U.P agents took
a generally favorable position toward the workers' requests.
For example, the C.U.P agents negotiating with the Anatolian
Railroad workers agreed that their wages were too low. An
article sympathetic to strikers in general appeared in the
pro-C.U.P newspaper Tanin.118 Furthermore, Enver Pa§a
himself visited Izmir near the end of the Aidin Railroad
strike. On 1 October he made a speech to the workers in
which he promised that the officer responsible for ordering
the soldiers to fire on the strikers would be demoted.119
Another very intriguing possibility is that the
Committee saw the workers as possible allies in its efforts
to increase the Empire's independence from foreign capital
and European control. Lowther, the British consul in
Istanbul, reported that "certain very patriotic and extreme
Young Turks thought they might seize the opportunity [of the
Anatolian Railroad strike] to jockey the Germans out of the
Railway."120 Despite this statement, I could find no
evidence to support this diplomat's allegation. In the
Anatolian Railway strike, as in the other strikes in the
Empire, the Committee and the government seemed interested
117. Onur, p.288.

118. Tanin. 21 Eylul 1324, p.6
119. Guzel, p.814.
120. F.O. 371/548/34309.
139
in settling the strike quickly and to the benefit of the
workers if possible.
The Austro-Hungarian consul in Izmir reported that due
to pressure from the Committee the Muslim port workers also
received a guarantee from the shipping agents that they
would hire half of their workers from among Muslims.121 If
this is true, it means that while the official program of
the C.U.P. supported Ottomanism (as did, apparently, Mecet
and Moammar Beys) some circles in government were already
thinking in proto-Turkish nationalist, or at least in
Islamicist (i.e. non-Ottomanist), terms.
While the C.U.P. seemed generally to have a rather pro
labor attitude it was clear that the Committee was not about
to side with the workers under all circumstances. Even as
early as the end of July, the C.U.P was coming out against
the strikers in Izmir. The Committee firmly maintained that
the strikers could not impede anyone who wished to work from
doing so. It also put troops on alert "to restore order in
case of violence.1,122 The experience of the 1908 strikes
left the C.U.P, not to mention the more conservative members
of the government, profoundly shaken. The strikes,
especially those of the railroad workers, were potentially
damaging to the economic well being of the Empire and risked
inviting foreign intervention. Accordingly, one of the
first major parliamentary debates of the Young Turk period
121. H.H.St.A. Adm.Reg.F31/27/66086

140
surrounded the promulgation of strike and labor union
legislation. The debate and eventual enactment of these
laws is the subject of the following chapter.
Chapter IV: Young Turks and Workers; the Boycott of 1908
and the Strike and Association Laws of 1908
The strikes of August through October 1908 were a
profound shock to both the Ottoman government and the
Committee of Union and Progress. As the previous chapter
tried to demonstrate, although the strikes represented a
danger to the Ottoman state, the government, and especially
the committee, generally seemed reluctant to take harsh
action against the strikers. Never-the-less, by the end of
the strike wave, the government concluded that the dangers
of future strikes were simply too great to be allowed.
Accordingly, an anti-strike law was one of the first pieces
of legislation enacted by the new government.
The attitude of the Committee remained ambiguous. It
is certain that the strike law could not have passed in the
C.U.P dominated parliament without at least the tacit
approval of the Committee. As has already been mentioned,
the C.U.P did not, at this time, have a well developed
social or economic program. The Committee's major goals
were to strengthen the Empire and to stay in power. The
strikes were dangerous in that they weakened the Empire
economically and could provide the pretext for foreign
intervention. Following this reasoning, the Committee's
attitude toward strikes began to harden.
It is important to remember that during the first few
months after the Revolution (that is, during the strike
wave) the C.U.P and the government confronted other
142
challenges to the stability, even continued existence, of
the Empire. In October of 1908 Austria-Hungary, which had
been in military occupation of the Ottoman province of
Bosnia-Hercegovina since 1878, declared the annexation of
the province. Within days Bulgaria declared its
independence and the island of Crete proclaimed its union
with Greece. Each of these actions violated the Treaty of
Berlin but the Great Powers took no actions to enforce the
articles in question. In response, the C.U.P helped to
organize a boycott of Austrian (and to some extent, Greek)
goods. The port workers of Istanbul played a key role in
this boycott.
The next crisis which confronted the Committee was the
counter revolution of 13-25 April 1909 which threatened
seriously not only the C.U.P but the entire constitutional
order. The events of April, in turn, encouraged the
government to pass a number of laws during the summer of
1909 among them the anti-strike law and a law regulating
associations.
If these events are examined in context the passage of
the restrictive anti-strike law and the associations law of
1909 can be seen as the conclusion of a series of events in
which the stability of the Empire and the preeminent
position of the C.U.P were threatened. After 1909 the
Committee adopted an increasingly harsh attitude toward any
movement which could weaken the Empire or its own power.
This attitude was most obvious in regard to the actions of
143
separatist nationalist organizations but also applied to
labor unions and socialist clubs.
This chapter will examine the events between October of
1908 and the Summer of 1909. Of particular importance
during these months were the anti-Austrian boycott (October
1908-February 1909) the counter revolution of April 1909 and
the passage of the strike and association laws in August of
that same year. The boycott and the counter revolution had
serious social and political repercussions and led the
Committee and the government to adopt a more authoritarian
posture.
The Boycott of 19081
As the strike wave of 1908 was cresting, the Empire
confronted challenges of another sort. On 5 October
Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-
Hercegovia which it had occupied and administered since
1878. This unilateral move by the Habsburgs was in direct
violation of the Treaty of Berlin and the Ottoman government
waited in vain for the other signatories to the treaty to
act. Bulgaria took advantage of the Austro-Hngarian
annexation of Bosnia (as well, it will be remembered, of the
1. The 1908 Boycott has been the subject of several

excellent studies. See especially Quataert, Popular
Resistance and Social Disintegration: Roderic Davison, "The
Ottoman Boycott of Austrian Goods in 1908-09 as a Diplomatic
Question," Third Congress on the Social and Economic History
of Turkey (Washington, DC: Institute of Turkish Studies,
1990); and Erdal Yavuz, "1908 Boykotu," Tiirkive Iktisat
Tarihi Uzerine Arastirmalar (Ankara: Middle East Technical
University, 1978).
144
strike on the Oriental Railroad) to declare its own complete
independence from the Sultan. Finally, Greece annexed the
island of Crete.2
These moves came as a tremendous blow to the Committee
of Union and Progress. The failure of the Great Powers to
prevent the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina was a great disappointment for the Committee
which had expected an outpouring of European goodwill and
assistance to follow the restoration of the Ottoman
Constitution.
The Empire was in no position to oppose the Austrian
move by force and as a result the Empire limited itself to
diplomatic protests to the Austro-Hungarian government and
efforts to convince the European powers to put pressure on
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister and
the ambassador at Istanbul, Markgraf Pallavicini, expected
the Ottoman government to acquiesce quickly to the
annexation.
However, soon after news of the annexation was
announced protest meetings sprang up in most of the cities
of the Empire. These meetings were almost all organized by
C.U.P members and concentrated on sending telegrams to the
government protesting the annexation.
2. Although the Powers did not prevent the annexation or

Bulgaria's declaration of independence, these actions did
spark a diplomatic crisis in Europe because of the
disruption of the balance of power which they created. See
especially Bernadotte Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia
(Cambridge, 1937), M.S.Anderson, The Eastern Question. New
York: St.Martin's Press, 1966), pp.278-286.
145
The boycott of Austrian goods began soon after the
initial protest meetings. It is not clear who first
proposed a boycott. On 7 October an article calling for a
boycott of Austrian products appeared in the journal Servet-
i Fiinun. Although the article was signed with the pen-name
"Khurassani" there is reason to believe that the author was
really Dr. Riza Tevfik, the C.U.P member who had been active
during the strike wave as a mediator.3 The next day,
posters appeared on walls in Istanbul declaring "Do not buy
Austrian wares."4 On the 9th Tanin. the C.U.P newspaper,
published an editorial by Hiiseyin Cahit, a C.U.P member. In
it, he called for a boycott of all Austrian goods writing,
"...whatever comes from Austria, fabric, clothes, socks,
handkerchiefs, underwear, do not pay one Ottoman para for
any of them."5
The first week of the boycott was characterized by
protests, demonstrations in front of Austrian stores, and
public destruction of goods imported from Austria,
especially fezes.6 On the 8th, the first day of the
boycott, thousands of Ottoman subjects, led by theological
students and C.U.P members, demonstrated in front of the
3. Davison, "Boycott," p.5.

4. ibid., p.6.
5. Yavuz, p.164.
6. One unintended effect of the boycott was a change in
fashion. Although some fezzes were manufactured in Hereke,
most were imported from Austria-Hungary. As a result,
locally made wool kalpaks, previously worn mainly by poor
men, became fashionable headgear. Davison, p.7. Yavuz,
p .166.
146
Ministry of War. Many carried Ottoman or Greek flags.7 On
the 13th a crowd of between 40 and 50 thousand marched from
Sultanahmet to Beyoglu to protest the annexation and in
support of the boycott.8 Furthermore, the porters and
lightermen in Istanbul and Salonika refused to unload
Austrian ships.9
During the first two weeks of the boycott there was no
central direction of leadership of the anti-Austrian
activities. Although the C.U.P played a prominent role,
members of the Ulema and theological students, army officers
and others also addressed crowds of protesters and wrote
articles for the newspapers.10 By early November, however,
the C.U.P had managed to gain control of the boycott
movement. On 3 November a boycott syndicate had been
founded in Istanbul to coordinate and enforce the boycott.
The syndicate was headquartered in a metal goods shop of
Kibarzade Sarim, a C.U.P member and probably a donme.11
While the C.U.P played an important role in organizing the
boycott syndicate, the "muscle" for the boycott was provided
by the porters and lightermen of the port of Istanbul.
The Ottoman government, led by the veteran anglo-phile
politician Kamil Pafa, tried to walk a very fine diplomatic
line throughout the boycott. Kamil's government adopted a
scrupulously legalistic line of conduct with the Austro-
7. Quataert, Popular Resistance, p.125.

8. Yavuz, p.165.
9. Quataert, Popular Resistance, p.125. Davison, p.7.
11. Ibid., p.127.
147
Hungarian government. The Ottoman reaction against the
annexation was justified because the Austrian annexation of
Bosnia-Hercegovina had been illegal. Furthermore, the
Ottoman government contended, it could not legally force its
subjects to purchase Austrian goods. However, it did
undertake to act against the boycott whenever laws were
broken.12
This position forced the Ottoman government into
conflict with the Istanbul port workers since, as the
Austrians pointed out, the port workers were obliged by law
to unload all ships without regard to nationality.13 The
confrontational relationship between the government and the
port workers further strengthened the relationship between
the latter with the C.U.P who mistrusted Kamil Pa§sa at any
rate. The C.U.P subsequently used the boycott as both a
force against the Austrians and Kamil Papa's administration.
The conduct of the boycott was characterized not only
by the conflict between the Committee and the Government,
but between the different nationalities as well. For
example, most Muslim merchants enthusiastically supported
the boycott from the start. Many of Istanbul's foreign and
non-Muslim merchants, however, did not join the boycott
until late November.14 Many of the Greek merchants in Izmir
were reluctant to cooperate with the boycott.15
12. Davison, p.18.

14. Ibid., p.128.
15. Ibid., p.134.
148
There were other examples of the potential of fissures
in the boycott movement along ethnic lines. For example,
while the C.U.P phrased most of its boycott language in
terms of Ottoman patriotism, the Muslim Kurdish port workers
of Istanbul began to cast Austria in the role of an "enemy
of religion."16 In late November, some of the Istanbul
lightermen who were Ottoman Greeks broke ranks with the
Muslim dockworkers and began to unload passengers and mail.
The other dock workers quickly pressured them into halting
these activities.17
At this point mention should be made of another
boycott, this one directed against Greek goods and commerce.
In December 1908 Muslim refugees from Crete, who were
already spearheading the anti-Austrian boycott, tried to
start a boycott of goods and shipping from the Greek
kingdom. By January, however, the local anti-Austrian
boycott committee (which, presumably, like the Istanbul
committee maintained close ties to the C.U.P) intervened and
helped to end the anti-Greek boycott.18 Although the
boycott appears to have ended in January 1909 a British
consular dispatch from Izmir on 18 August 1909 reports an
anti-Greek boycott in progress.19
By December 1908, both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
governments were anxious for the boycott to end. Serious
16. Davison, p.20.

18. Ibid., p.137.
19. F.O. 371/778/32542:679.
149
negotiations began based on some sort of Austro-Hungarian
financial compensation to the Ottoman Empire. By 20 January
1909 the text of the proposed Ottoman/Austro-Hungarian
agreement appeared in the newspapers. The agreement was
based on the withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian troops from the
Sancak of Novi Pazar (also occupied since 1878) and the
payment of an indemnity to the Ottoman Empire of
T£2,500,000.20 Kamil Papa's government urged the lightermen
and porters to commence work loading and unloading Austrian
ships and asked the boycott syndicate to proclaim the end of
the anti-Austrian actions. The boycotters replied that they
would end the boycott only after the proposal was ratified
by the Ottoman parliament.
On 26 February 1909 the Ottoman/Austro-Hungarian
protocol was finally signed. The next day Dr. Riza Tevfik
Bey addressed a meeting of porters in Istanbul and urged
them to end the boycott.21 In the meantime, however, the
boycott against Austrian ships in the port of Istanbul had
developed into a labor action by the porters and lightermen
with aims besides those of boycott syndicate. These
additional aims included better rates of pay and the removal
of foreign (especially Dalmatian) workers from the port.22
As early as 28 December one of the porters' guilds
petitioned Kamil Paâ to reinstate 42 of their members whom
the Quay Company had fired in June 1907. They threatened a
20. Ibid., p.131. Davison, p.25.

21. Yavuz, p.171. Quataert, Popular Resistance, pp.131-132.
150
strike if their demands were refused.23 In mid-January the
Grand Vezir and the Company worked out an agreement and the
porters were reinstated.24 However, the porters' guilds did
not end their boycott of Austrian shipping until 27
February. Although the porters returned to work, the
lightermen refused to unload any Austrian ships until their
demands were met. Finally, on 13 March the lightermen
returned to work. They did not receive their pay raise, but
they did succeed in banishing the Dalmatians from the
port.25 This, together with the reaction against the Greek
lightermen, made the lightermens' guild the almost exclusive
preserve of Muslim Kurds.
The '31st Mart Incident'
The anti-Austrian boycott erupted as the strike wave
was dissipating. During both episodes the C.U.P tried to
harness the feelings of workers to consolidate its own
position as the chief power in the Ottoman government. At
the same time, the government, while generally sympathetic
to the workers, found its actions circumscribed by the close
connections between itself and foreign capitalists, backed
by their own governments.
The first eight months of the constitutional order had
been rather mixed for the C.U.P despite its efforts during
the strikes and the boycott. The parliamentary elections of
23. B.B.A./B.E.O. 260923.

25. Ibid., p.134.
151
December 1908 returned an overwhelming majority of deputies
who were either C.U.P members or who were endorsed by the
Committee.26 On 17 December the Sultan formally opened the
new parliament which represented the fulfillment of the most
basic wish of the different Young Turk factions. However,
the Empire had lost Bosnia-Hercegovina, Crete and Bulgaria.
The outpouring of European goodwill, accompanied by
financial largess and the ending of the capitulations, had
not materialized.
The chaos which had accompanied the Young Turk
revolution, the loss of territory and the Committee's
program began to alienate many Muslim Ottomans. For
example, many members of the lower echelon ulema were
unhappy with the European manners and tastes of the
Committee men. The medrese students (softas) were angered
by the Committee's moves to make it more difficult for them
to evade military service. Some soldiers and officers in
the Ottoman army, especially the Alavli officers who had
risen through the ranks, resented the increased prominence
of the Mektebli officers who had graduated from the military
academies and who were usually sympathetic to the C.U.P, if
not actually members. Other Muslim Ottomans were unhappy
with the new prominence of non-Muslim Ottomans in public
affairs and in the government. Moreover, other factions
26. C.U.P sponsored candidates won all the 288 seats but one
which went to an Ahrar candidate from Ankara. Of these
seats, 147 went to Turks, 60 to Arabs, 27 to Albanians, 26
to Greeks, 14 to Armenians, 10 to Slavs and 4 to Jews. Shaw
and Shaw, p.278.
152
within the "Young Turk" movement, especially the so-called
"liberals" of the Ahrar party, were increasingly alarmed at
what they saw as the Committee's efforts to secure a
monopoly of political power for itself.
Even the urban workers may have been rather cool toward
the C.U.P. While the C.U.P acted as a mediator during the
strikes, was not, as has been shown, an enthusiastic
supporter of the workers and generally tried to get them to .
end their strikes as quickly as possible. The urban workers
also may have felt betrayed by the C.U.P after the passage
of the provisional strike law on 10 October 1908.27
Anti-C.U.P sentiment was apparent from as early as
October 1908 on the eve of the anti-Austrian boycott. On 7
October, during the month of Ramazan, an blind alim named
Hoca Ali Efendi, nicknamed Blind Ali (Kor Ali), led a
demonstration of "several dozen" supporters to the Yildiz
Palace. The Hoca and his group were also joined by a number
of coffee house and restaurant owners who had nothing to do
during the day because of the Ramazan fasting. Hoca Ali was
a muezzin in one of Istanbul's mosques and had delivered a
sermon at the Fatih Mosque against the constitution.
Having arrived at the Palace Sultan Abdulhamit came to
the window to hear what they wanted. The Hoca declared that
27. David Fahri, "The £eriat as a Political Slogan-or the

'Incident of the 31st Mart'," Middle Eastern Studies. VII,
3, 1971. Among the groups unhappy with the policies of the
C.U.P Fahri cites "...owners of the popular coffee houses,
the Kurdish and Albanian porters...the peasants streaming
into the capital..." p.281.
153
he and his followers did not want the constitution.
Furthermore, he said that "public houses must be closed.
Moslem [sic] women must not be allowed to walk about the
streets unveiled. Photographing must be prohibited. The
theaters must be closed..."28 Although the Sultan gave a
conciliatory, if noncommittal, answer to Hoca Ali Efendi the
Ottoman government arrested him. On the same day, the Imam
of the New Mosque of Uskiidar organized several followers to
attack theaters. On 10 October the police arrested Murat
Bey, the editor of the newspaper Mizan which had carried on
a campaign against the Committee using religious language.29
The growing tensions were not confined to Istanbul. In
Izmir during the first two weeks of October (immediately
after the end of the Aidin Railroad strike) there was a
considerable growth of anti-Greek feeling and hostility
toward the constitution.30 The American consul in Izmir
reported that on 9 October an unspecified number of Imams
used the occasion of Friday prayers to speak against the
Constitution. The Imams complained that "the Constitution
was causing harm, for not only were the Christians (meaning
the Greek Orthodox Ottoman subjects) obtaining the upper
hand, but through it Bulgaria, Herzogovina [sic], Bosnia and
28. Ibid., p.282. The 'public houses' to which Kor Ali

refers could be bars and pubs (as in the British usage of
the term) or brothels. The Turkish word for brothel is
umumhane which can be translated as 'public house.'
29. Ibid., p.283.
30. See Chap. Ill, p.137. The American and British consuls
reported that the Muslim population of Izmir was arming
itself.
154
Crete had been lost to the Turkish [sic] Empire. They
therefore demanded the reinstatement of the old regime."31
The unnamed Imams and members of their congregations
reportedly began to organize a demonstration against the
Greek Bishop of Izmir and a panic ensued in which Greek
shopkeepers near the St. Fotini Church (the Bishop's
residence) closed and barricaded their shops. The Izmir
"authorities" called out troops to patrol the streets and
prevent any demonstrations.32
The anti-C.U.P movement gained momentum in November
1908 after the foundation of the newspaper Volkan
("volcano") by Hafiz Dervif Vahdeti and his subsequent
establishment of an organization called the Society of
Muslim Unity (Ittihad-i Muhammedi Cemiveti).33 The Society
espoused a kind of Islamic militancy, influenced by pan-
Islamism and the popular Islam of the dervif orders. Among
the Society's other stated goals were the elevation of the
moral level of the Muslims of the Empire, the maintenance
and glorification of the Quran and the feriat, the
31. U.S. National Archives, Micro.862, Roll 935, 15736/54.

32. Ibid.
33. Shaw and Shaw, p.280. The Society transformed itself
into a political party, the Firka-i Muhammedive. on 5 April
1909 (23 Mart 1325 A.R.) Tunaya, Sivasal Partiler. p.183.
Not a great deal is known of Hafiz Dervif Vahdeti's early
years. He was apparently born on Cyprus and he was a member
of either the Bektafi or Nakfibendi Order. "Dervif" was his
first name and not a religious title of any kind. Fahri,
p.283 and ff.34.
155
strengthening of the principle consultation fmesveret) and
the protection of Muslims world-wide.34
The society quickly attracted support from many of the
discontented Muslim elements in the Empire, especially those
who felt threatened by the C.U.P. For example, imams,
dervifes, mosque functionaries and rural notables (esraf)
from parts of Anatolia. However, "senior ulema were
conspicuous by their absence." Importantly, there were also
alavli officers in the Society.35 The Society actively
courted these officers as well as the soldiers of the First
Army Corp, stationed in Istanbul. The troops of the Corp's
Second Division were especially important. They were made
up mainly of Albanians and Syrians and were stationed in the
vicinity of the Yildiz Palace. These soldiers were selected
by the Sultan's agents on the basis of their loyalty to the
Sultan-Caliph and their dislike of liberalism. They were
answerable directly to the Sultan, not to the Minister of
War.36 The mektebli officers of the C.U.P disliked and
mistrusted the soldiers and officers of the First Army Corp.
They transferred the control of the Corp to the Ministry of
34. Fahri, p.284. The society's regulations (nizamnamesi)

are reprinted in Tunaya, Sivasal Partiler. pp.200-203.
35. Fahri, p.285. One of the leaders of the Society was
Bediiizzaman Said-i Kiirdi ibn Mirza. He was subsequently
known as Said Nursi and promoted a quasi-mystical Islamic
political movement called Nurculuk. He died in 1961.
Tunaya, p.182. Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power. (New York:
Vintage Books, 1982), p.152.
36. Fahri, p.281.
156
War, sent the soldiers out on maneuvers and replaced many of
the ayali with mektebli officers.37
The Society of Muslim Unity continued to build up its
strength among these discontented elements while the C.U.P
sought to consolidate its own power base during the anti-
Austrian boycott. On 13 February 1909 the Committee had
succeeded in removing Kamil Paâ through a no-confidence
vote in parliament and replaced him with Hiiseyin Hilmi Pa|a,
also an older statesman from the Hamidian period, but more
sympathetic to the Committee.38
Ironically, although the Committee had thus installed a
Grand Vezir more to its liking and although it had also been
able to organize a boycott against Austria-Hungary, its
demonstrations of power and its successes alarmed the
opposition. The Committee's two biggest political
opponents, the "liberals” of the Ahrar Party and the Society
of Muslim Union, began to make contact with one another.39
Interestingly, the Society also seems to have tried to reach
out to urban workers, especially in Istanbul, who were
sympathetic to the kind of militant Islam it represented.
The Society advocated, through the pages of Vokan. the
establishment of commercial and economic enterprises which
would observe Islamic mores. For example, the 4 Mart 1325
(A.R.) issue of Volkan called for the establishment of an
Islamic shipping company, the Ittihad-i Muhammedi Cemiveti
37. Ibid., p.287.

38. Ergil, p.30.
39. Shaw and Shaw, p.280. Tunaya, p.148.
157
îrket-i Bahrivesi. which would be operated to “serve the
Muslim world."40 This particular proposal could well have
been aimed at the Kurdish port workers of Istanbul who had
recently been motivated, at least in part, by a feeling of
Islamic solidarity against Austria, the "enemy of religion."
The growing movement against the Committee finally
exploded on the morning of 13 April 1909 (or 31 Mart 1325
according to the Gregorian calendar). The soldiers of the
First Army Corp mutinied, arresting their (new mektebli)
officers and killing several of them. The soldiers then
marched to the At Meydani, near Sultanahmet Square and the
Ottoman parliament building. There they were joined by
members of the Society for Muslim Union, especially softas,
and surrounded parliament. A group of soldiers headed by a
hoca from the Bayezit Mosque stormed into the parliament
building looking for C.U.P members. Two deputies were
killed, evidently in the mistaken belief that they were
Ahmet Riza and Hiiseyin Cahit, two prominent C.U.P members.
Many of the Committee men had, in fact, fled in panic. The
mob ransacked and set fire to the offices of the C.U.P's
newspapers Tanin and Sura-vi iimmet.41
The mutinous soldiers and their supporters submitted a
list of demands to the government including the dismissal of
many prominent members of the C.U.P, the Grand Vezir and
Minister of War. They also wanted the mektebli officers
40. "...bu îrket alem-i islamiyete pek buyiik hizmet

edecektir." Tunaya, p.188.
41. Fahri, p.275. Shaw and Shaw, p.280.
158
dismissed and the alayli officers of the First Army Corp
reinstated. The also called for the "full implementation of
the §eriat."42 Whether or not the Sultan had played any
role in fomenting the revolt, he now took advantage of the
situation by accepting the demands of the mutineers and
moving to reestablish his absolute control. The Society of
Muslim Union and the Ahrar supported the revolt with their
newspapers and members of the Ahrar secured positions in the
parliament.
Soon after the revolt, army officers of the Third Army
Corp in Macedonia, not necessarily all C.U.P members,
organized the "Operation" or "Action" Army (Hareket Ordusuf
with the aim of putting down the revolt.43 The Operation
Army began to move on the capital. When news of the
Operation Army reached Istanbul, the Society of Muslim Union
and the Ahrar began to lose heart. For example, on 18 April
Said-i Kiirdi demanded that the soldiers stop mistreating the
mektebli officers. On the same day, in a dramatic departure
from his earlier stance, Vehdeti suggested in a speech that
the C.U.P and the Society of Muslim Union join forces for
the good of the Empire. On 20 April, as the Operations Army
was nearing the suburbs of Istanbul, the Society of Muslim
Union dissolved itself.44 On the morning of 24 April the
Operations Army arrived at the Istanbul train station in the
42. Fahri, p.276.

43. The actual organization of the force was the
responsibility of a young officer named Mustafa Kemal. Shaw
and Shaw, p.281.
44. Fahri, p.290.
159
Sirkeci neighborhood and began to occupy the city. Although
the Sultan ordered the mutineers not to resist the
Operations Army there was scattered fighting near the
Sublime Port and at the Taksim and Uskiidar barracks. By the
end of the day the counter-revolution had been crushed and
the Mahmut §evket Pa§a, the commander of the Operations
Army, declared the city under martial law.45 Three days
later, the parliament secured a fetva against the Sultan and
declared him deposed. His brother, Mehmet V Regat, became
the next sultan.46
Although neither Mahmut §evket Pa§a nor the new Grand
Vezir, Sait Pa§a, were members of the C.U.P the success of
the Operations Army was never-the-less important for the
Committee. The Ahrar had been implicated in the counter
revolution and most of its sympathizers were expelled from
parliament and/or exiled. The Society for Muslim Union had
dissolved itself. This left the C.U.P in a dominant
position in the parliament. Furthermore, the dominance of
the mektebli officers of the Third Army Corp, which were
generally sympathetic to the C.U.P if not actually members,
was assured.
By the first anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution
the Empire had been convulsed by the strike wave of 1908,
the loss of territory in the Balkans and the Aegean, the
anti-Austrian boycott and the counter revolution of April
45. Shaw and Shaw, p.281.

46. Ibid., p.282. Fahri, p.293.
160
1909. There had been scarcely a month when the Government
was not facing some new challenge. The Committee of Union
and Progress, for its part, had also changed a great deal
since July 1908. In November 1909 it had formed a public
political party, although it also maintained a secret
central committee. After almost loosing power during the
counter revolution it had emerged by the end of April 1909
as the largest force in parliament, its political enemies
eliminated for the moment.
One of the Committee's main goals from its inception
had been the strengthening of the Empire. However, since
virtually the beginning of the Constitutional order during
the summer of 1908 the Empire had been beset by problems
which threatened to tear it apart or to invite foreign
intervention. Accordingly the government, with the aid of
the C.U.P deputies in parliament, passed several laws during
the summer of 1909 aimed at strengthening the powers of the
central government to maintain order.
The Strike Law
As early as 8 October 1908 (12 Ramazan 1326/25 Eyliil
1324) the government had passed a provisional strike law
(Tatil-i Esqal Cemivetleri Hakkinda Kanun-i Muvakkati).47
The law was quite explicitly intended to prevent strikes
47. For a translitterated text of the law see Giidiiz Okgiin,

Ta'atil-i Esqal Kanunu. 1909: Belgeler-Yorumlar (Ankara:
Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakiiltesi Yayinlari,
1982). p.2-4. The Ottoman text is in Dustur. II, 1, pp.88-
90.
161
mainly on railroads, tramways, ports and other enterprises
which the law defines as 'public services' fumuma muteallik
hidemat).48 It is no coincidence that it was precisely in
these areas that the largest strikes of 1908 occurred. It
is also no coincidence that foreign capital was most heavily
represented in these areas. The Ottoman government risked
confrontations with different European governments due to
the strikes on the Aidin and Anatolian railroads and at the
port of Istanbul. The strike of the workers of the Oriental
Railroad was used by the Bulgarian government as a pretext
to declare independence. Hence, the government must have
concluded that these areas of the economy were simply too
important to risk being struck.
For example, paragraph eight of the law states that
•’any person employed in a public service who... organizes a
strike committee, or brings about a strike, or serves in a
strike committee or who prevents others from working [will
be punished by] imprisonment for one month to one year and a
fine of one to fifty liras."49 Paragraph nine went on to
set the punishment for participation in a strike against a
public service with imprisonment for 24 hours to one week
and to a fine of 25 to 100 Kuru|.
Other paragraphs of the law are clearly a reflection of
some of the demands of workers during the strikes against
48. These areas are singled out by name in the first

paragraph of the law.
49. A lira was a gold coin equal to aproximately 100 Kurus.
F.O. 368/471/3401.
162
the Aidin and Anatolian Railways. For example, paragraph
two prohibits workers from interfering in the organization
of a company or its directors. This seems to be a direct
reaction to the demands of the strikers on both the Aidin
and Anatolian Railways for the resignation of most of the
companies" directors. Paragraph six forbids strikers to
prevent others from working. This may have been in reaction
to events during the Aidin Railroad strike.
The debate over a new strike law, modeled very closely
on the provisional strike law, began 7 April 1909 (barely a
week before the counter-revolution broke out in Istanbul).
The proponents of the bill argued that strikes, while
possible in some European countries, were simply too
dangerous to be allowed in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the
Interior Minister pointed out that the Oriental Railroad
strike was used by the Bulgarian principality as the pretext
for its declaration of full independence.50 The deputies
who favored the bill also took the (rather dubious) position
that the strikers were, in any case, foreigners rather than
Ottoman subjects.51
The opposition to the law was led by Hristo Dalcev,
a.k.a. Dalgef Efendi, (from Serez) and Artas Efendi from
Salonika. Vartkes Efendi, deputy from Erzerum and Boso
Efendi, deputy from Sirkeci (Istanbul) were also opposed.
50. Okgtin, p.38.

51. Ibid., p.39. Talat Bey, at the time the deputy from
Ankara, argued that the strikes were caused by foreign
workers.
163
The arguments of all of the opposition members were
virtually the same. They argued that the law would
effectively protect the interests of foreign capitalists at
the expense of Ottoman subjects.52 A glance at the names of
the deputies opposed to the law also shows clearly the
ethnic split over the law. Virtually all of the Christian
(Greek, Macedo-Bulgar and Armenian) deputies in parliament
voted against the strike law. Despite their arguments based
on Ottoman patriotism, the motives of these deputies may
have been rather different. Several of them were
socialists. Vartkes, for example, was a member of the
Armenian Social Democratic Party (the Dashnaksuthiun).
Dalgef, along with Vlahof Efendi (Dimitar Vlakhov), belonged
to Sandanski's Macedonian socialist "Popular Party."
The debate thus revealed an interesting situation.
Both sides couched their arguments in terms of threats to
the Empire and to Ottoman workers. The deputies in favor of
the bill felt that strikes constituted a threat to the
Empire from foreign radical workers and from governments
which might use strikes as a pretext for intervention into
the Empire's affairs. Those opposed to the bill argued that
an anti-strike law would leave Ottoman workers at the mercy
of foreign owned companies.
The strike law, which did not differ significantly from
the provisional version, was passed on 8 August 1909 (22
52. Ibid., pp.24, 99.
164
Rebeb 1327/27 Temuz 1325).53 The law, while not forbidding
strikes outright, made it difficult for workers to strike
legally. For example, paragraph six tacitly accepted the
right of workers to strike after mediation efforts had
failed. The same paragraph, however, strongly prohibited
the impairment of business or the organization of
demonstrations. Like the provisional law, the new strike
law was directed mainly at workers in ports and on railroads
and other public services. For example, paragraphs eight
and nine specified harsh punishments against workers who
organized unions or participated in strikes against public
services. The punishments for workers who organized strikes
or served on strike committees was set at one week to six
months imprisonment and a fine of one to 25 liras (less than
in the provisional law) unless violence or threat of
violence was used in which case the penalties were the same
as in the provisional law, i.e. imprisonment for one month
to one year and a fine of one to 50 liras.54 Paragraph nine
set the punishment for strikers in general as 24 hours to
one week in jail and a fine of 25-100 Kuru^, the same as the
provisional law. Another important paragraph, virtually
identical to the provisional law, was paragraph ten which
declared that in the event of war or threat of war the
government would suspend the consideration of any grievances
which workers might present.
53 Okgun, pp.133-135.
19. Dustur Tertib-i Sani, I (Istanbul, 1329), p.434.
165
The Law on Associations
Shortly after the passage of the strike law, the
parliament passed a "Law on Associations" on 15 August 1909
(29 Receb 1327/3 Agustos 1325).55 This law, while directed
primarily against para-military nationalist organizations,
was certainly applicable to labor unions as well. Of the 19
articles of the law, four especially are important to the
labor movement.
Article III stated that it was forbidden to establish
organizations which had as their goal the "upsetting the
peace of the country," the "damaging of the integrity of the
Empire," the "alteration of the present form of government,"
or the separation of the various elements of Ottoman
society.
Clearly, the article was aimed at separatist political
organizations and armed nationalist groups. However, the
wording is so vague that labor unions, particularly those
which might be influenced by socialist ideology, could also
be prohibited.
Article VI prohibited the formation of secret
societies. This article, which ironically made the secret
Committee of Union and Progress illegal, could also be used
against workers' or socialist organizations which wanted to
remain clandestine.
55. Diistur Tertib-i Sani, I (Istanbul, 1329), pp.604-608.
166
Article V prescribed 20 years of age as the minimum for
membership in an organization. The Austro-Hungarian consul
in Salonika, however, mentioned in 1911 that the tobacco
workers' union was able to get around this proscription
easily by enrolling members under 20 years of age as
"sympathizers.11 He reported that approximately 2,500 such
young members were enroled.56
Overall, one of the most interesting aspects of the Law
on Associations was Article IV which prohibited the
formation of political societies based on "nationality or
race" fkavmiet ve cinsiet). This article was clearly in
response to the continued rise of nationalist feeling in the
Empire.
Conclusion
The months between the Fall of 1908 and the Summer of
1909 were very important for both the labor movement and the
future of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. The months were
also significant ones for the Committee for Union and
Progress. The events of these months convinced the
Committee that it could not allow the political unity and
material progress of the Empire to be jeopardized by
strikes, "reactionary" political organizations or separatist
nationalist groups. The laws passed with the assistance of
the C.U.P during the Summer of 1909 expressed these views.
56. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F31/27/41401.
167
Some scholars have pointed to the passage of the strike
and association laws of the Summer of 1909 to demonstrate
that the Committee was a "bourgeois" organization which was
hostile to any real social change.57 Others have postulated
that the C.U.P was, indeed, interested in the well-being of
working people and only shifted its position to support the
anti-strike law due to the extreme pressure of foreign
capital.58
Both of these positions have a certain amount of
validity, but both of them miss the really salient feature
of C.U.P-Worker relations. The C.U.P was not necessarily
hostile to the demands of workers. During the strike wave
of 1908 the Committee certainly distinguished itself by
trying to mediate disputes peacefully.59 It is also true
that the effects of foreign penetration into the Ottoman
economy put the C.U.P, and the Ottoman government, into a
potentially dangerous situation when strikes threatened
railroads or other enterprises which were owned by foreign
capitalists. On the other hand, the C.U.P demonstrated that
it was not afraid to use workers in limited actions against
foreign threats, as in the case of the anti-Austrian
boycott. The main point to keep in mind is that the C.U.P
at this time had no really coherent policy regarding
57. See especially Yuriy Petrosyan, S o w e t Goziivle Jon

Tiirkler (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1974) .
58. For the latter position, see Ozkara, p.153.
59. This is in marked contrast to labor policy in much of
Europe and, especially, North America during this same
period where state directed violence continued to be used
against strikers.
168
workers. The C.U.P's political platform adopted in October
1908 contained just one paragraph (out of 21) which
concerned workers.60
On the other hand, the C.U.P was very clear that it
wanted to preserve the Empire by strengthening the power of
the central government and, of course, its own power as
well. Strikes and organized labor were not necessarily
hostile to these ends. However, the C.U.P did not want to
risk weakening the central government as a result of strikes
or union formation, especially the latter. In fact, as
early as May 1909 the government brought the porters' guilds
in Istanbul under its control. All of the porters who
handled international goods (most of them) were made
employees of the custom service directly. The customs
officers took over the role of the guild stewards in such
matters of regulating the numbers of porters who would work
and what they would be paid.61 It is also interesting to
note that customs house officials were precisely the type of
government bureaucrats which were heavily represented in the
C.U.P. For example, Dr. Riza Tevfik, it will be remembered,
was a doctor in the customs service.62
The events of October 1908 through August 1909 were
important ones in the development of the national question
60. "Paragraph 13: Laws will be suggested to regulate the

mutual responsibilities between workers and employers."
Tunaya, p.66
62. For other examples, see Quataert, Popular Resistance.
note 114, p.181.
169
in the Empire as well. Far from alleviating national
tensions, the restoration of the constitution and the
C.U.P's policies led to new outbreaks of violence. During
the April 1909 counter-revolution, for example, fighting
between Muslims and Christians (mostly Armenians) in Adana
left as many as 30,000 people dead and much of the city
destroyed.63 Even more ominously, the C.U.P's efforts to
centralize the administration meant that many communities
found their ancient status threatened by the government.
For example, several tribes of Albanian mountaineers, who
long enjoyed a privileged position in the Empire, revolted
in 1909 partially in reaction to move by the central
government to confiscate their weapons and subject them to
new taxes.64 These revolts rapidly took on the trappings of
a nationalist uprising.
The conduct of the anti-Austrian boycott also gave
indications of the faltering brotherhood of "Ottomans."
Although there was some grudging support among Christian
merchants the boycott was sustained by the actions of the
Muslim port workers in Istanbul. Significantly, the boycott
in Izmir, which had a large Greek population, was a relative
failure.
63. Richard Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to

Independence. (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967), p.268. Shaw and Shaw, p.281.
64. Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening. 1878-
1912, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967),
pp.393-401.
170
The events of 1908 and 1909 set the tone for the
subsequent development of the labor movement in the Empire
and for the relationship of the different subject peoples.
The years from 1909 up until 1914 are characterized by the
increasing efforts of the C.U.P to maintain its dominant
position in the Ottoman state and its growing hostility to
forces which it perceived as hostile and/or dangerous.
Chief among these were developing socialist organizations
and the growing nationalist movements.
Chapter V: Nationalism/ Socialism and the Committee of
Union and Progress, 1909-1914
The previous chapter examined the way in which the
anti-Austrian boycott and the 'counter-revolution' of spring
1909 affected the development of the labor movement in the
Ottoman Empire. Particularly important were the
relationships between the labor movement, the growing spirit
of nationalism, and the Committee of Union and Progress.
This chapter will examine the complex relationship between
the C.U.P., socialists, and nationalist groups. The ways in
which these different groups developed are important in
understanding the growth of the labor movement during the
period between 1909 and 1914.
A particularly notable aspect of this period was the
failure of the socialists to build a unified movement which
represented workers of different ethnic groups and
nationalities of the Empire. In fact, the reverse was true.
Many of the major figures in the socialist movement also
played important roles in the nationalist parties. While
outwardly speaking the language of supra-national labor
solidarity (and often supra-national Ottomanism as well) the
socialist movement was deeply fractured along national and
ethnic lines.
Similarly, the Committee of Union and Progress
gradually abandoned the supra-national idea of Ottomanism
and began to espouse various interpretations of Turkish
nationalism. The relationship between the C.U.P. and the
172
socialist groups was generally cool, if not outright
hostile. In opposition to socialism certain members of the
Committee (as well as other Turkish-speaking Ottomans)
became interested in corporatism and similar socio-economic
theories. These ideas combined with the C.U.P.'s growing
support of Turkish nationalism produced plans for a
"National Economy" fMilli Iktisat) program which it began to
implement in 1913. These developments took place against a
backdrop of internal and external violence and political
turmoil which was in turn related to the continued growth of
nationalism among the Ottoman subject peoples.
The Growth of Nationalism
The growth of nationalism among the Christian
minorities manifested itself primarily in the increasingly
vociferous calls for a federalized Empire in which the
predominantly Christian areas would have a substantial
degree of autonomy. The political parties and clubs which
favored a federalization of the Empire, as opposed to the
centralizing policies of the C.U.P., drew much of their
strength from the non-Turkish members of parliament.1 For
example, most Armenian nationalists called for an autonomous
Armenia made up of six of the vilayets of Ottoman eastern
Anatolia.2 Many of the Greek members of the Ottoman
parliament concentrated on amending the new conscription
1. Shaw and Shaw, p.283. Tunaya, pp.275, 504.

2. Hovannisian, Armenia, pp.32-34. Tunaya, pp.574-577.
173
rules (under which Christians and Jews were obliged to serve
in the army) so as to create separate Greek units, commanded
by Greek officers, within the Ottoman army.3
While the Greek and Armenian members of parliament
tried to use political maneuvering to secure greater
autonomy and privileges for their co-nationals, other Greeks
and Armenians returned to the methods of armed struggle
which had characterized the nationalist movement before
1908. Especially in Macedonia the brief truce among the
komitaci bands which followed the Young Turk Revolution had
evaporated by 1910 and rival bands of Greek, Macedo-Slav,
Bulgarian and Serb nationalists resumed their attacks upon
one another and upon the Muslim population.4
Nationalism among the different peoples of the Empire
was also stimulated by the growth of nationalism among the
Turks themselves. The Ottomanist ideas of the C.U.P had
always betrayed a nascent Turkism. By the end of the first
decade of the 20th century, however, many of the C.U.P's
policies showed clear signs of a developing Turkish
nationalism.5
One of the pioneers of Turkism was the famous
sociologist Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924), himself of a mixed
3. Shaw and Shaw, p.287. Levant Herald. March 12, 1910,

p. 84.
4. Tunaya, pp.505, 521-522. Crampton, Bulgaria, p.322.
5. M. Siikrii Hanioglu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs Before
the Revolution of 1908," in Rashid Khalidi, et. al. (eds.),
The Origins of Arab Nationalism. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), p.31. See also, David Kushner, The
Rise of Turkish Nationalism. 1876-1908. (London: Frank Cass
& Co. Ltd., 1977), p.101.
174
Kurdish-Turkish background. In the first years of the 20th
century Gokalp brought together the various strands of
Turkist thought and wove them into a more-or-less
comprehensive ideology. Gokalp laid great stress on
learning about the "uncorrupted" Anatolian peasantry and in
simplifying the cumbersome written Ottoman Turkish
language.6
Gokalp, while emphasizing the importance of the Turkish
element in Ottoman society, remained convinced of the
importance of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman orientation of Gokalp and his followers was not
shared by another pioneer of Turkish nationalism, Yusuf
Akgura (1876-1935). Akgura was a Tatar, a refugee from the
Russian Empire who had settled in Istanbul. There he became
an early exponent of a kind of Turkism or Turanism which
viewed all Turkic speaking peoples in the world as belonging
to a single "Turanian” nation. As early as 1904 in his
article "tig Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three Kinds of Policies) Akgura
urged the abandonment of both "Tanzimatism" (i.e. the aping
of Western culture) and Ottomanism in favor of Turkism or
Turanism.7
After the Young Turk Revolution, Turkish-speaking
intellectuals began to explore Turkist ideas within the
framework of several different organizations. The first of
these was the Turk Derneai (Turkish Society) founded 18
6. Kushner, Turkish Nationalism, p.100.

7. Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era.
(Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1992), p. 4.
175
January 1908 by a group of Ottoman and Caucasian Turks and
Tatars including Yusuf Akgura. The society's members were
mostly members of the growing Turkish intelligentsia. The
Turk Derneai was committed to the preservation of the
Ottoman Empire and it focused on the Ottoman Turks.
However, the emphasis on Turkism within the Society's
publications did not necessarily prejudice it against the
idea of Ottomanism.8
In 1910, Akgura was among the founders of another
organization, Tiirk Yurdu ("Turkish Home") which was more
explicitly Turkist than the Ottoman-centered Turk Derneai.
The new organization devoted itself to the study of all
Turks, not only those living in the Ottoman Empire.9
In 1912 Turkish students in the military medical
academy founded another organization, the Tiirk Ocaai
(Turkish Hearth). Many of the most important figures of
early Turkish nationalism, such as Akgura and Gokalp,
subsequently joined the organization. The Tiirk Ocaai was
aimed at providing lectures, seminars, reading rooms, etc.
for the common people with the aim of improving their
intellectual and material conditions, and incidentally,
acquainting them with Turkish nationalist ideas.10
8. Tunaya, pp.414-415.
9. Ibid., pp.415-416.
10. Ibid., pp.432-435. Kushner, p.99.
176
The Balkan Ware and the Refugee Crisis
The growth of nationalism among the different Ottoman
peoples was paralleled by the nationalistic and expansionist
policies of the newly independent states in the Balkans.
While the Ottoman armies had been busy with a rebellion
among the Albanians and with the Italian invasion of Libya
(September 1911-October 1912) the Balkan states had
concluded an alliance against the Ottoman Empire.
Montenegro invaded Ottoman territory on 8 October 1912
followed by Serbian and Greek attacks on Macedonia and a
Bulgarians advance into Thrace. The Ottoman forces were
exhausted, poorly led and greatly outnumbered. The Ottoman
forces totalled barely 300,000 against almost 500,000 for
the Balkan allies.11
Against such odds the Ottoman forces could put up only
the most rudimentary resistance and the Empire was forced to
sue for peace. As a result of the First and Second Balkan
Wars the Empire lost virtually all of its possessions in
11. Kemal Soyupak and Husein Kabasakal, "The Turkish Army in

the First Balkan War," in Bela Kiraly and Dimitrije
Djordjevic eds. East Central European Society and the Balkan
Wars, vol.XVIII of War and Society in East Central Europe.
(Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987), p.159.
Fahri Belen. 20nci Yuzvilda Osmanli Devleti. (The Ottoman
Empire in the 20th Century), (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi,
1973), p.138, claims the Balkan forces totalled 800,000 men.
Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the
Balkan National States. 1804-1920. vol.VIII of Peter F.
Sugar and Donald Treadgold eds., A History of East Central
Europe. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977),
p.218, give "over 700,000 men" as the strength of the
Balkan allies and 320,000 as the number of Ottoman troops.
177
Europe except Eastern Thrace, including the city of
Edirne.12
As the Empire confronted disasters on the battlefield
the C.U.P. fought to maintain its hold on the Ottoman
government despite increasing opposition from other
political parties. Although a group of anti-C.U.P. officers
(the ''Group of Savior Officers") forced the Committee out of
power in the summer of 1912, the C.U.P. staged a coup in
January 1913 (the infamous 'Raid on the Sublime Porte') in
the midst of the First Balkan War. A small band of men, led
by Enver Paâ, burst into a cabinet meeting, shot the
Minister of War and forced the Grand Vezir, the veteran
statesman Kamil Pa|a, to resign. The C.U.P. subsequently
took direct control of the government.
Despite retaking much of Thrace during the Second
Balkan War, the Ottomans had lost 83% of their European
territory and 69% of their European population as a result
of that conflict.13 The Empire also lost the Aegean islands
and the island of Crete, which had a substantial Muslim
population.14 Muslim refugees flooded into the remaining
12. Although the Second Balkan War ended in August, the

Ottoman Empire did not sign peace treaties with the Balkan
states until the following dates: Bulgaria, 29 September
1913; Serbia, 14 November 1913; Greece, 14 March 1914. Shaw
and Shaw, p.298.
13. Ibid. The total Ottoman population fell from 20,897,617
in 1906 to 18,520,016 in 1914. Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman
Census System and Population, 1831-1914." International
Journal of Middle East Studies. 9 (1978) p.337.
14. Crete, which had been an autonomous province of the
Ottoman Empire since 1898, had declared its union with
Greece in October 1908. The union was, however, vetoed by
178
Ottoman lands, particularly from the Balkans and Crete.
Between 1911 and 1923 approximately 3,000 Muslim Cretans
(out of 27,852) emigrated.15
As early as January 1913 there were at least 6,000
Muslim Macedonian refugees in Izmir. According to a
newspaper report, each new ship from Salonika brought
another 1,200-1,500 refugees.16 During February 1913 one
ship, the Bahri Ahmar. brought over 2,000 refugees to Izmir
from Salonika on one trip.17 Although the Ottoman
government tried to resettle the refugees in the interior of
Anatolia, thousands languished in Izmir and Istanbul. In
July the Izmir provincial government begged the Austro-
Hungarian consul to exert pressure on the ships of the
Austrian Lloyd not to bring any more refugees to Izmir,
which already had 60,000 for whom to care.18 The years of
war and the loss of the European territories dislocated the
economy which only worsened the plight of the refugees.
the European Great Powers. Jelavich and Jelavich, Balkan

National States, pp.175-176.
15. F. Giese, "Crete," The Encyclopedia of Islam. 1911 ed.,
p.879. Raoul Blanchard,_"The Exchange of Populations
between Greece and Turkey," The Geographical Review. 15
(1925) p.449 claims that at the time of the forced Turco-
Hellenic population exchange in 1923 there were c.25,000
Muslims on Crete. A different source, D. Pentzopoulos, The
Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece (The
Hague, 1962), p.129, gives the number of "Turks" [sic] which
left Crete in 1923 as 23,500. This would mean that4,352
Muslims left Crete between 1911 and 1923.
16. Osmanischer Llovd v.6, no.8, 10 January 1913.
17. Ibid., v.6, no.53, 27 February 1913.
18. H.H.St.A., G.A. Konstantinopel 405 Smyrna. 9 July 1913.
179
The National Economy Program
The continued growth of nationalism among the Christian
peoples of the Empire, as well as the effects of the Balkan
Wars, stimulated the growth of nationalism among the Turks.
One of the manifestations of this growth was the plan for a
"national economy," (Milli Iktisat) a series of corporatist
programs which aimed to create a modern industrial economy
controlled by Turks. The prime architect of the national
economy program was Moise Cohen, better known as Munis
Tekinalp. Tekinalp was an extremely prolific and
influential writer on political and economic subjects. He
based his formulation of a national economy on the concepts
of the German nationalist economist Friedrich List. The
national economy program aimed to achieve an atmosphere of
cooperation between government, industry and labor.19
Tekinalp's ideas for a national economy were seized
upon by his contemporary and fellow nationalist ideologue,
Ziya Gokalp. Tekinalp, Gdkalp and their followers believed
that as long as the Turks were underrepresented in the
trades and commerce, they could never become a modern
nation. In the year before World War I, they and their
disciples (enamored of the state-directed successes of the
German economy) persuaded the government to adopt certain
corporatist economic policies.20
19. J.M.Landau, "Munis Tekinalp's Economic Views Regarding

the Ottoman Empire and Turkey," Osmanistische Studien zur
Wirtschafts und Sozialaeschichte In memoriam Vanco Boskov.
(Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1986), pp.95-96.
20. Zafer Toprak, Tiirkive'de Milli Iktisat. pp. 32-33.
180
Generally, the national economy program stressed
protective tariffs and cooperation between government,
industry and labor to create a strong, independent economy.
In the Ottoman case, however, List's theories had other
implications. For, as the program developed, it became
quite clear that the government was interested in assisting
the economic development of the Turkish nationality, rather
than the "Ottoman Nation." In other words, "[c]reation of a
'national merchant class' or a 'national bourgeois class'
... ultimately came to mean creation of a national
industrial bourgeoisie. Objectively, this meant the
collaboration of the nationalistic bureaucracy [most of
which were sympathetic to, if not members of, the C.U.P.]
with a national commercial bourgeoisie to expropriate and
replace Levantine and minority mercantile group, and then to
help a very subordinate industrial bourgeoisie into
dominance through state protection, franchises and
credits."21
Gokalp's formulation of the national economy philosophy
was explicitly anti-socialist. Gokalp was hostile to the
idea of class struggle because it divided the nation while
his entire philosophy was based on the idea of unifying the
Turkish nation. Accordingly, Gokalp formulated the concept
of "solidarism" (tesanutciiluk^ as the social counterpart to
the economic policies of the national economy program. The
21. Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziva

Gokalp. 1876-1924. (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1985), p.110.
181
program of solidarism was supposed to create a community of
interests among all members of the nation, regardless of
their class. While not socialist, the philosophy of
solidarism was extremely communitarian and resembled in many
ways the corporatist ideas developing in Italy and
elsewhere.22
Besides its hostility to socialism, the ideology of
solidarism also had important implications within the
context of the growing national unrest within the Empire.
Gokalp was quite explicit that the nation which he hoped
would embrace solidarism was the Turkish one. It was not at
all clear what place, if any, non-Turkish Ottoman subjects
would have in a solidarist society. The connections between
the national economy policies and the growth of Turkism
intensified after the founding (in 1912) of the Milli
Me^rutiyet Firkasi (National Constitutional Party). One of
the party's founders was Yusuf Akgura. The party espoused a
frankly etatist, nationalistic economic policy which
included a boycott of all foreign made goods. The party was
also the first openly "Turkish" (as opposed to Ottoman)
political party in the Empire.23
The proponents of a national economy program received
encouragement and support from the famous Russian socialist
Alexander Israel Helphand (a.k.a. Parvus) who had arrived in
22. Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The

Life and Teachings of Ziva Gokalp. (London: Luzac & Co.
Ltd, 1950), pp.140-146.
23. Tunaya, pp.351-361.
182
Istanbul in early November 1910.24 While in Istanbul
Helphand remained in close contact with his comrades in
Central Europe (among them Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg) and
also got to know some of the Balkan socialists, notably the
Romanian Christo Rakovsky and the Macedonian Dimitar
Vlakhov.25 He also spent a great deal of time involved in
various business ventures by which he managed to amass a
fortune by 1912. Around the same time, Helphand became an
enthusiastic supporter of a national economy program. After
1912 he was the economics editor of the newspaper Turk Yurdu
and he also wrote for Tanin (a pro-C.U.P. newspaper),
Tasvir-i Efkar. and Jeune Turc.26 His main contribution was
to add weight to the growing calls for a national economy
policy by arguing that only through such a program could the
Ottoman Empire resist the encroachments of 'economic
imperialism./27
24. Z.A.B. Zeman and W.B. Scharlau, The Merchant of

Revolution; The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus') .
1867-1924. (London; Oxford University Press, 1965), p.126.
25. Ibid., pp.126-127. Rakovsky, (a.k.a. Christian
Racovski) established the Social Democratic Party in
Bucharest in 1910. Barbara Jelavich, History of the
Balkans, vol.II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p.138. For more on Vlakhov, see below.
26. Ibid., p.128. Tungay, p.67.
27. Mete Tungay, Tiirkive'de Sol Akimlar. 1908-1925. (Leftist
Movements in Turkey), (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1978),
p.67. Upon the outbreak of World War I, Helphand became an
outspoken advocate of an Ottoman-German alliance directed
against Russia.
183
The Socialist Parties
Helphand was not, of course, the only socialist in the
Ottoman Empire. Indeed, while the growth of nationalism
among the different peoples of the Empire offered one
alternative to the supra-national ideal of Ottomanism based
on the different Ottoman nationalities, the development of
socialist parties and clubs in the Ottoman Empire between
1908 and 1914 presented a different vision. Although the
socialists necessarily viewed class as the most important
dividing mechanism in society they were by no means
indifferent to or uninterested in the importance of
nationalism. The different Ottoman socialists, in fact,
occupied a very broad spectrum of positions on the national
issue. Some socialist groups in the Empire sought the
Empire's disintegration but most seemed to favor its
maintenance as some sort of federal entity. More
importantly, while all of the different socialist groups in
the Empire professed a supra-national ideology which
theoretically cuts across national and ethnic divisions, the
socialist groups were themselves divided along national
lines and instances of cooperation between them were rare.
Two of the oldest socialist organizations in the Empire
were the two biggest Armenian political parties, the
"Hunchaks" and the "Dashnaks." The Hunchak party (named
after their newspaper Hunchak or "Bell"), was founded in

OQ
Geneva m 1886 by Armenian students from Transcaucasia. °
28. Nalbandian, pp. 108-114. Tunaya, p.568.
184
The "Dashnaks" (short for Dashnaksuthiun or "Federation”),
was established in Tiflis (Tblisi) in 1890.29 Of these two,
the Hunchaks were by far more radical whereas the Dashnaks,
by 1908, closely resembled a European style social
democratic party and even cooperated with the C.U.P. For
example, many of the Armenian members of the Ottoman
parliament sat as members of both the Dashnaksuthiun and the
C.U.P.-30 Although they professed socialist economic
platforms, they were basically nationalist parties. Even
the Hunchakists admitted that they were struggling for an
independent or autonomous socialist Armenia, not a socialist
Ottoman Empire.31
The first socialist organization in the Ottoman Empire
not overtly connected to a nationalist program was founded
in 1908 by a young Sephardic Jew, Abraham Benaroya, who had
arrived in Salonika from Bulgaria on the eve of the Young
Turk Revolution.32 Benaroya, a printer, was a member of the
29. Nalbandian, pp. 151-161. Tunaya, p.569.

30. Tunaya, pp.572-573.
31. Nalbandian,_p.182.
32. Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria:
Origins and Development. 1883-1936. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), p.213. Most of the secondary
sources claim that Benaroya was born in Vidin, Bulgaria, in
1887. He himself states, however, that he was a "native of
Saloniki [sic]" but moved to Bulgaria at some (unspecified)
point during his youth. He became a socialist in Bulgaria.
See his "A Note on 'the Socialist Federation of Saloniki',"
Jewish Social Studies XI, (1949) pp.69-72. Benaroya died in
Israel in 1976. For a brief biographical sketch see George
Haupt and Paul Dumont, Osmanli Imoaratorlu&unda Sosvalist
Hareketler ("Socialist Movements in the Ottoman Empire")
(Istanbul: Gozlem Yayinlari, 1977), pp. 281-282.
185
"Broad" Socialist Party in Bulgaria.33 Although Benaroya's
group was originally composed almost exclusively of Jews, on
2 October 1908 his club merged with a group of Bulgarian
socialists in Salonika and formed the "Socialist Club." In
mid-March 1909 the club changed its name to the "Salonika
Socialist Workers' Federation.1,34 By late 1909, the
Federation controlled several unions in Salonika with a
combined membership of about six thousand workers.35 In
August 1909 it began publication of a newspaper, the Aroele
Gazetesi (Workers' Newspaper). The newspaper was published
in four languages; Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian and Ladino.
33. Rothschild, p.213. The Bulgarian Social Democratic

Labor Party had split in 1903 into two factions, the
"Narrow," led by Dimitar Blagoev, and the "Broad," led by
Ianko Sakazov. The split was the result of ideological and
strategic disagreements. Blagoev's "Narrows" were against
any collaboration at all with "liberal," or "progressive
bourgeois" parties or with peasants. Sakazov's "Broads"
pursued these policies and also concentrated on ameliorating
the immediate hardships of Bulgaria's working people rather
than pursuing overtly revolutionary goals. Rothschild,
pp.21-33. Benaroya himself claimed to have been a member of
the "liberal wing" of the "Narrows." Although this fact
seems to contradict Rothschild's assertion that he was a
member of the "Broads" it nevertheless still places Benaroya
in the liberal socialist camp which was opposed to Blagoev's
ultra-radical stance. Benaroya, p.71.
34. George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey.
(Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), p.17. See also
Velikov, pp.35-36.
35. The total membership claimed by the Federation varied
between six and ten thousand workers. Dumont, "La Federation
Ouvriere de Salonique," p.81. Another writer estimates that
by "...1912 [the Federation] had been instrumental in
organizing unions comprising close to 5,000 workers."
Starr, "Federation," p.327. Although the Federation was at
this time made up of members of different nationalities, the
constituent unions of the Federation were based on
nationality as well as trade. For example, there were
separate unions for both Greek and Jewish cigarette paper
workers, type-setters, soap makers, etc. Dumont, "La
Federation," p.81, note 21.
186
After only four issues, however, the Greek and Turkish
editions were stopped and the paper was suspended after the
ninth issue due to lack of funds. The Federation then began
to print another paper, published only in Ladino, La
Solidaridad Ouvradera (Workers' Solidarity).36 Despite the
title of Benaroya's Ladino language newspaper, however, the
Federation was always dominated by its Jewish members and
the Jewish Tobacco Workers' Society was the Federation's
strongest single supporter.37 The domination of the
Federation by Jews began to disturb many of the Bulgarian
and Greek members.
Another factor which led to disputes within the
Federation was the warm relationship between its leaders
Benaroya, Josef Hazan and Alberto Arditti, and the C.U.P
with its Ottomanist ideology.38 For example, Benaroya
joined the Hareket Ordusu as a volunteer in April 1909. 3
The Federation also organized pro-C.U.P demonstrations in
Salonika to celebrate the first anniversary of the Young
Turk Revolution.40 The Federation's pro-C.U.P. attitude
angered many of the non-Jewish members of the Federation,
particularly the Bulgarian and Greek elements. In November
1909 most of the Bulgars in the Federation left to form
36. Harris, p.18.

37. Rothschild, p.214. See also Walter Laqueur, Communism
and Nationalism in the Middle East. (New York: Praeger,
1955), p.207.
38. Dumont, "Federation," p.80.
39. Benaroya, "A Note," p.72.
40. Dumont, "Federation," p.83.
187
their own organization.41 At around the same time relations
between the Federation and the C.U.P soured due to the
passage of the strike and association laws by the Ottoman
parliament.42
The new socialist organization in Salonika formed after
the schism within the Federation was, like socialist groups
elsewhere in Macedonia outside of Salonika, dominated by
Macedonian Slavs with close connections to Bulgarian
socialists, particularly the "Narrows.1,43 Narrow Socialists
from Bulgaria such as N. Russev, N. Kasabov, J. Pockov and
D. Toshev were the major organizers of Macedonian Slavic
workers.44 One of the most important figures in socialist
and labor circles in xiacedonia was Vasil Glavinov, a
personal disciple of the Narrow socialist leader Blagoev.45
Glavinov bitterly attacked Benaroya and the Federation
(which he referred to as the "Jewish Committee") as "petite-
bourgeois" tools of the C.U.P. Interestingly, one of
Glavinov's main complaints was that the Federation worked
with the different ethnically based unions thereby, in his
opinion, fostering the "bourgeois" idea of nationality.46
It is ironic that Glavinov's dispute with the Federation
41. Harris, p.18. A handful of Bulgar socialists, such as

the journalist A. Tomov, remained in the Federation. Joshua
Starr, "The Socialist Federation of Saloniki," Jewish Social
Studies. vol. VII (1945), p.326.
42. Ibid., p.84.
43. Velikov, pp.40, 48. Velikov refers to the "Narrows" as
socialistes de gauche.
44. Ibid., p.35.
45. Ibid., p.37.
4 6. Dumont, "Federation," p .82.
188
actually led to a further fragmentation of the labor
movement along national lines by depriving the Federation of
most of its Bulgarian members.
The new Macedo-Bulgar socialist organization in
Salonika was much smaller than Benaroya's. Immediately
after the split, it had only 25 members, all of whom were
Macedo-Bulgars except for one Greek and one Vlakh. The
Narrow socialists also established a socialist organization
in Uskiib (Skopje). 120 workers celebrated May Day 1909 in
that city.47 The Macedo-Bulgarian socialists subsequently
had little to do with the Socialist Federation of
Salonika.48
The small Turkish element of Benaroya's federation also
gradually melted away. The most important Turkish member of
the Salonika Socialist Federation, the poet Rasim Hasmet,
was attracted by the dynamic proto-nationalist ideas of Ziya
Gokalp who was also based in Salonika.49
Besides the links between the socialists of Bulgaria
and the Macedo-slav socialists and workers in Macedonia,
there were interesting links between Macedonian nationalist
organizations and local socialist groups. A Macedonian
nationalist revolutionary organization had been in existence
since the 1890's. Its many factions fell into two broad
groups. The first (called the 'supreme' or 'external'
organization) wanted to detach Macedonia (and, incidentally,
47. Velikov, p.38.

48. Ibid., p.37.
49. Harris., p.19.
189
Thrace as well) from the Ottoman Empire and unite them with
an independent Bulgaria. The other faction (known as the
'internal' organization) wanted an independent or autonomous
Macedonia within some sort of Balkan federation. By 1905
the split between the two had deepened and the internal
organization, led by Yane Sandanski, renamed itself the
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (I.M.R.O).50
Sandanski and his lieutenants, among them Todor Panitza
and Dimitar Vlakhov, welcomed the Young Turk Revolution as
an opportunity to put their plans for an autonomous
Macedonia within a Balkan federation into practice.
Accordingly, they formed the Peoples' Federal Party and won
four seats in the new Ottoman Parliament.51 I.M.R.O had
close ties to the Bulgarian socialists. The Narrow
Socialist leader Blagoev, himself a Macedonian, was very
sympathetic towards the aims of the group. Nikola Harlakov,
a Narrow Socialist whom Blagoev had expelled from his
organization in 1905, helped Sandanski devise the group's
program for the 1908 Ottoman parliamentary elections.52
Vlakhov (a.k.a. Vlahof Efendi), who served as a deputy in
the Ottoman Parliament, was extremely influential in the
socialist and labor movements of Ottoman Macedonia and
eventually joined Benaroya's federation.53
50. Crampton, Bulgaria, p.292.

51. Rothschild, p.172. Tunaya, pp.518-519.
52. Rothschild, p.173.
53. Tungay, p.52. For a brief biographical portrait of
Dimitar Vlakhov, (a.k.a. Vlahof Effendi) (1874-1954) see
Dumont and Haupt, p.241-243. See also Vlakhov's memoirs,
190
Vlakhov was an important example of the melding of
socialist and nationalist ideas which characterized many
socialists of this period.54 Vlakhov stressed the point
that both Ottomanism and Socialism were supra-national
ideologies which were not, in his opinion, mutually
exclusive.55 At the same time he was an outspoken advocate
of an autonomous Macedonia, albeit within some sort of
Balkan federation which would, presumably, include the rest
of the Ottoman Empire.56
Thus, the socialist groups in Ottoman Macedonia were
intertwined with the various nationalist movements.
Vlakhov's participation in Benaroya's Socialist Federation
seems to have been a notable exception to the overall
division of the Macedonian socialist movement between the
largely Jewish Socialist Federation of Salonika and the
Bulgarian or Macedo-slav organizations which dominated the
(largely Slavic speaking) Macedonian hinterland.
While the socialists in Macedonia tried and failed to
achieve unity, a small group of socialists in Istanbul were
also establishing an organization. On May Day 1909, 11
socialists, mostly Greeks and Armenians, established the
Memoari na Dimitar Vlakhov. (Skopje: Nova Makedonia, 1970),

especially pp.100-198.
54. The relationship between socialism, nationalism and
national self-determination was one of the major points of
debate within the Second International, particularly during
the 1910 meeting in Copenhagen. J.Lenz, The Rise and Fall
of the Second International. (New York: International
Publishers, 1932), pp.104-107.
55. H.H.St.A. F31/27/41401.
56. H.H.St.A. P.A.XII/205:68C
191
"Socialist Center."57 It maintained contacts with the
Jewish and Bulgarian socialist groups in Macedonia as well
as with the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels. The
head of the center was a certain N. Giannos. He was a
staunch enemy of Benaroya, who called him a
"conservative.1,58 Benaroya claimed that Giannos "never
forgave me for my independent attitude or my insistence on
taking ethnic differences into consideration."59

The center's main activity seemed to have been
publishing newspapers. Giannos, published the Greek paper 0
Erqatis (The Worker). The Hunchakist leader, Kozikian,
published an Armenian paper Nor Hossana (New Current), and
G. Constantinides edited a Turkish paper Igciler Gazetesi
(Workers' Newspaper).60 In December 1910 the Ottoman
government deported Giannios to Greece and the group
dissolved. Giannios, once in Greece laced his socialism
with increasing doses of Greek nationalism, calling, for
example, for the partition of the European parts of the
Ottoman Empire. He also published several anti-semitic
attacks on the Greek Jewish socialists.61
57. Harris, p.20. Panayotopolous, p.55, mentions the

founding date of the Center as 29 August 1910.
58. Starr, p.329. It seems unlikely that Giannos was
actually a member of the conservative wing of the Bulgarian
socialist Narrow faction. Benaroya probably used the term
conservative to describe Giannos' general interpretation of
socialist ideology (which was much different than his own).
59. Benaroya, "A Note," p.71. Emphasis mine.
60. Harris, p.20.
61. Panayotopoulos, p.57. Starr, p.333.
192
The socialists of the Empire made another attempt to
establish a supra-national party in September 1910 with the
formation of the Ottoman Socialist Party.62 Despite its
name, the party was not "Ottoman" at all, but was an
embryonic Turkish socialist party. Its founder and guiding
spirit was Hiissein Hilmi, the editor of the Turkish language
socialist newspaper Istirak (Collectivity). The party's
other founders were all Muslims and/or Turks: Refik Nevzat,
Namik Hasan (the editor of the newspaper Sosyalist), and
Ismail Faik (editor of the newspaper Insaniyet).63 The
Party had some limited success organizing workers on, for
example, the tramlines, ferry boats and among some of the
workers of the Anatolian Railway. However, the Party was
never able to succeed in its ambition to be a major union
organizer. This may have been due to the strictly economic
(rather than ideological or revolutionary) interests of the
workers.64
An attempt in December 1910 to create a unified Social
Democratic Party for the entire Ottoman Empire failed,
largely due to the enmity between the Macedo-Bulgarians and
Benaroya's Socialist Federation.65 There were also
conflicts between Hilmi's group in Istanbul and other
socialists, especially with Vlahof Efendi.66 In general,
socialist clubs and parties in the different parts of the
62. Velikov, p.47. Tungay, pp.29-30.

63. Tunaya, p.247.
64. Guzel, p.821.
65. Velikov, p.40.
66. Tunaya, p.251.
193
Empire had little to do with each other and concentrated on
their own particular regions. The Socialist Workers'
Federation of Salonika did not exercise any control outside
of Salonika and its hinterland. Similarly, the Ottoman
Socialist Party's activities were limited to the Istanbul
area.67
The bickering among the different socialist clubs of
the Empire left them weak and unable to withstand the
growing hostility of the Ottoman government. In October
1910 the government closed most of the non-Turkish socialist
clubs (which, in effect, meant virtually all of them) in
Macedonia and Istanbul. It also cracked down on the
socialist press. Hilmi was eventually exiled to

68
Kastamonu. ° In the summer of 1911, on the eve of the
Sultan's visit to Salonika, Benaroya was arrested on the
pretext of plotting the Sultan's assassination, and deported
to Serbia.69
By the summer of 1911 the Ottoman government had
completed its actions against the organized socialist
movement in the Empire. The socialists had one last
opportunity to participate openly in the Empire's political
life for a brief period beginning in mid-1912 after the
ouster of the C.U.P. Hussein Hilmi returned from exile and
resumed publication of Istirak on 20 June 1912.70
67. Guzel, p.822. Dumont, "Classe Ouvriere," p.243.

68. Tungay, pp.27-28. Velikov, p.47.
69. Harris, p.27.
70. Tungay, p.58
194
Benaroya's group in Salonika revived and the Social
Democratic Party, having changed its name to "the Group for
the Study of the Social Sciences," reopened offices in
Istanbul. The socialists were able to observe openly May
Day 1912.
The socialist groups had by that time, however,
succumbed to the lures of nationalism. On the eve of the
Balkan Wars, the non-Turkish Ottoman socialists issued a
proclamation which condemned not only "European capitalists"
but also the "religious fanaticism and Mohammedan [sic]
chauvinism" of the Ottoman Government. At the same time,
however, Istirak "...became increasingly caught up in the
wave of Turkish patriotism... "71
The socialists' new found freedom was short lived.
After the January 1913 coup, and especially after June of
that year, the C.U.P resumed its anti-socialist policies.
The socialist organizations were shut down and Hussein
Hilmi, Pertev Tevfik and Gumiilcinli Ismail were exiled to
Sinop.72
Conclusion
The period between 1909 and 1914 was a crucial in the
ideological and political development of the Empire. The
Committee of Union and Progress, after several reverses, had
a virtual monopoly on political power after January, 1913.
71. Harris, pp.29-30. Tungay, p.58.

72. Tungay, p.66.
195
During the same period, however, the ideology of the C.U.P.
had slowly changed. Mirroring the transformation among many
Ottoman Turkish intellectuals, the Committee began to move
slowly away from the ideas of Ottomanism and toward some
sort of Turkish nationalism. One example of this
development is the change in the economic policies of the
Committee, particularly in the growing interest in a
"national economy." The increased interest on the part of
the C.U.P. and other members of the growing Turkish
intelligentsia stimulated or accelerated the development of
national self-consciousness among the other peoples of the
Empire.
The period between 1909 and 1911 also witnessed the
development of a lively, if small, socialist movement in the
Empire. The socialist clubs, despite their ostensible
belief in the importance of solidarity, remained divided
along ethnic and national lines. For example, the Armenian
social democrats of the Dashnaksuthiun did not merge with
the Muslim dominated Ottoman Socialist Party. Ideological
schisms tended to reinforce national divisions. In another
case, Abraham Benaroya, coming from the Broad socialist
faction, could hardly have much sympathy with the Narrows,
most of whom happened to be Bulgarians or Macedonians. Some
of the programs espoused by the socialists had distinctly
nationalist elements. The socialist Armenian Hunchaks' and
Dashnaks' goal of an autonomous (perhaps ultimately
independent) Armenia is another example. Along these same
196
lines, Vlahof Efendi was a champion of socialism and an
outspoken advocate of Ottomanism. But, as Dimitar Vlakhov,
he was a Macedonian nationalist and a member of I.M.R.O.
The Ottoman government's attitude toward the growing
socialist movement was one of suspicion and hostility.
Initially, many socialists (especially the Jewish leadership
of the Salonika Socialist Workers' Federation) regarded the
C.U.P. with considerable sympathy. Moreover, the Committee
and the Ottoman government were slow to move against the
socialist groups although they could have used the
Associations Law of 1909 to do so. However, by 1911 the
Ottoman government had turned against the socialists. The
socialist clubs and parties, divided by ethnic differences
and weakened by ideological squabbling, could not resist the
government crackdown against them.
The developments within the nationalist movements,
among the socialists, and within the C.U.P. illustrate an
interesting trend which was emerging during this period.
All of these organizations (with the possible exception of
some of the socialists) espoused policies which accentuated
the differences between the various national groups in the
Empire. Even though the socialist parties were not usually
overtly nationalistic, they were generally divided along
national lines never-the-less.
In spite of the growth of national self-consciousness,
if not outright nationalism, it is interesting that very few
of these same organizations called openly for the actual
197
dismemberment of the Empire. Indeed, the Greek and Armenian
parliamentarians, and even some of the Macedonian ones (such
as Vlahof Efendi) limited their nationalistic demands to the
reorganization of the Empire along federal lines. In this
demand they cooperated with Muslim members of parliament who
also wanted a federalized Empire. For example, the Freedom
and Accord Party (Hurrivet ve Itilaf Firkasil had both
Muslim and Christian members.73 Furthermore, although the
socialist parties and clubs were divided along national
lines there were occasional examples of cooperation. For
example, the Socialist Workers' Federation in Salonika
served as a multi-national umbrella group to many of that
city's unions.
The pro-Ottoman attitude of the Sultan's Jewish
subjects was even more striking. Many Ottoman Jews, for
example Moise Cohen (a.k.a Munis Tekinalp), identified their
interests, at least partially, with that of the Muslim
Turkish element of the Empire. Even the Jewish members of
the Socialist Federation of Salonika were enthusiastic
supporters of the maintenance of the Empire. The Jews might
have reckoned (correctly as it turned out) that their
interests were better served by remaining within the multi
national Ottoman Empire than by becoming citizens of a Greek
or Slavic successor state.74
73. Tunaya, p.275.

74. For an exhaustive examination of the attitude of Ottoman
Jews toward the Empire and the nationalism of the non-Muslim
peoples, see Stanford J. Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman
198
Of course, movements among many of the Empire’s subject
nationalities for full independence from the Empire also
existed, particularly in Macedonia. It certainly might also
have been true, as some C.U.P. members claimed, that the
calls by the Christian nationalities for a federalized
Empire were a mere prelude to demands for independence.75
After all, autonomy had been the first step on the road to
independence for Serbia and Bulgaria. Yet, taken at face
value, the development of the national movements in the
Empire during the period of 1909 up to 1914 indicates that
something additional was going on. Even though the national
self-consciousness of the different Ottoman subject peoples
grew, they still found it possible to cooperate occasionally
with one another within certain parameters. As the
following chapter will show, the phenomenon of separate,
nationally self-consciouss groups working together in order
to secure certain narrowly defined goals is the best
description of the labor movement up through 1913.
Furthermore, it is perhaps ironic that while the socialist
intellectuals who professed to speak for the Ottoman workers
were weakened by ideological and national divisions the
workers themselves were usually able to cooperate in order
to improve their economic circumstances.
Empire and the Turkish Republic. (New York: New York

University Press, 1991), pp.187-228.
75. For example, Ahmed Riza, an important member of the
C.U.P. and president of the Ottoman Senate, said "Autonomy
is treason; it means separation." Quoted in Hovannisian,
Armenia. p.29.
Chapter VI: Solidarity and Division in the Labor Movement,
1909-1914
The political and ideological changes, examined in the
preceding chapter, which occurred in the Ottoman Empire
between 1909 and 1914 had repercussions in the developing
labor movement. Of particular importance were the growing
divisions among the Empire's subjects based on national
self-identification. The socialists, as has been shown,
were not very successful in their efforts to forge a unified
movement which would unite the Empire's working people.
Similarly, the C.U.P. and many members of the Ottoman
Turkish intelligentsia began to abandon the ideas of
Ottomanism for various interpretations of Turkish
nationalism. This shift was certainly encouraged by the
warfare and nationalist uprisings which wracked the Empire
after 1911. These events contributed to the growth of
nationalism among the Empire's peoples. The flood of
destitute and frightened Muslim refugees which deluged the
Empire after the Balkan Wars also helped to strain the
already troubled relationship between the Empire's Muslim
and Christian subjects. This growing animosity was
strengthened and channeled by the C.U.P., especially after
1913, in order to encourage its policy of Turkish
nationalism.
In the midst of these developments Ottoman workers
maintained generally the same attitude which they had
demonstrated during the strike wave of 1908. That is to
200
say, workers frequently cooperated with one another across
ethnic and national divisions. At the same time, however,
workers acted as members of different national or ethnic
groups. However, during the strikes of 1908 there were some
examples of latent tensions between workers of different
ethnic backgrounds. During the period between the anti-
Austrian boycott and the outbreak of World War I there is
evidence that this trend among workers to be divided along
national or ethnic lines increased at the expense of labor
solidarity.
Union Formation and Strikes: An Overview
The passage of the Strike and Associations laws in 1909
helped to shape the subsequent development of the Ottoman
labor movement. As the principle targets of the strike law,
the railroad and port workers remained fairly quiet during
most of the period between 1909 and 1913. For example, one
source counts only four strikes each against railroad
companies and in ports during the entire period, whereas in
1908 alone there had been twenty three railroad strikes and
ten port workers' strikes.1 Other areas of the economy
however, especially the tobacco industry, continued to be
targets of worker unrest. Tobacco workers organized seven
strikes between 1909 and 1913 (as opposed to ten strikes in
1908).2
1. Guzel, pp.816, 819.

2. Ibid.
201
Although the strikes between 1909 and 1913 were not
nearly as dramatic as those during 1908 other developments
in the labor movement made this an important period. The
labor unions which were formed during this period were more
stable than the ad hoc organizations which sprang up during
the strike wave of 1908. There is evidence that some of the
unions cooperated with one another against particular
industries.
Workers were busy forming unions from 1909 until about
1912. One source estimates the total number of unionized
workers in the empire (in 1910) at between 125,000 and
150,000.3 The Balkan Wars disrupted seriously the economy
and had repercussion for the labor movement. The
territories which were lost were some of the wealthiest of
the Empire. Significantly, the European areas were also the
home of most of the Empire's Christian and Jewish
population, and the center of most socialist and organized
labor activity. The numbers of industrial and urban workers
3. Abraham Benaroya, "Die Tiirkische Gewerkschaftsbewegung,"

Sozialistische Monatshefte. vol.XVI, Aug., 1910, p.1081. On
the other hand, Dimitar Vlahov in his memoirs estimated that
Istanbul alone had over 40,000 industrial workers in 1911 as
well as c. 5,000 working in the ports, and 4,000 to 5,000
working for the Regie. Memoari. p.126. Vlahov's estimates
make sense if the total number of industrial workers
(including ports, transportation, etc.) in the Empire was
indeed c.250,000 (as calculated earlier). In this case,
however, Benaroya's estimate of the number of unionized
workers seems much too high. Benaroya could have double
counted workers in certain industries or companies. For
example, workers on the Oriental Railroad could have been
counted being both from Salonika and Istanbul. Also, some
of the "unions" included in the figure could have been
committees which existed only for the duration of a
particular strike.
202
in the Empire dropped precipitously. For example, the 1913
industrial census reported 2,109 workers in the tobacco
industry in the entire Empire.4 However, in 1908 there had
been at least 3,200 tobacco workers in the Salonika area
alone.5
Despite these changes, and partially because of them,
labor's overall position, especially in terms of bargaining
power, did not decline greatly during the years immediately
before World War I. Wages continued to increase. The rise
in wages "exceeded that in prices, at least in the most
developed parts of the country."6
As in 1908 Istanbul, Izmir and, especially, Salonika
remained the centers of labor unrest. About 30 per cent of
the strikes which took place between 1909 and 1915 occurred
in Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace while approximately 35 per
cent took place there in 1908.7
Salonika was the most important center of labor union
activity.8 According to a detailed report from the Austro-
Hungarian Consul in Salonika from 1911 Salonika had about
4. Okgvin, p.31, table VI.

5. Velikov, p.31.
6. Issawi, Economic History of Turkey, p.38.
7. Ibid.
8. Salonika was the most important city in Macedonia and a
center of commerce and industry. The ethnic makeup of the
city is also important. Salonika was the only city in the
Ottoman Empire to have a Jewish majority. In 1905 the kaza
of Salonika (greater Salonika) had a population of 164,000
of which: c.60,000 Jews, 40,000 Greeks, 35,000 "Osmanlis,"
and 22,000 "Macedoslavs." Most of the rest of the
population were Gypsies. Statistische Paten iiber
Nationalitaten und Reliaionen in Makedonien (Wien: K.u.K.
Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1905).
203
10,500 organized workers in 13 different unions. Workers in
the tobacco industry in particular were well organized.
Over half of the unionized workers in Salonika in 1910
(approximately 6,000 out of 10,500 workers) were members of
the tobacco workers' union. Other unions active in Salonika
were the metal workers', the brewery workers', marble and
stone cutters', textile workers', porters', and
lightermens'. Some of these unions, notably the tobacco
workers', were members of the Socialist Workers' Federation
of Salonika.9
Workers in most of the other large cities of the Empire
were also building unions. In 1910 the workers of the
various railroad companies (e.g. the Anatolian, the Aidin,
the Oriental), the tobacco workers (i.e. employees of the
R6gie) and the tailors were unionized in Istanbul and
Izmir.10 The Istanbul union of Regie workers had about 800
members.11 In Istanbul the woodworkers, cotton spinners and
waiters were either in unions or were forming unions.
Additionally, in Istanbul the bakers, tram workers, arsenal
workers, and printers were forming unions. In Izmir the
shoemakers and porters were unionized.12
9. H.H.St.A. F31/27/41401. If these figures are correct

they indicate that there were a substantial number of
organized workers in Salonika which were not members of the
Federation. The total membership in the Federation varied
between six and ten thousand workers. See above, p.190.
10. Benaroya, "Gewerkschaftsbewegung," p.1081.
en Turquie apres la Revolution Jeune-Turque de 1908," Etudes
Balkaniaues. I, 1964, p.34.
12. Benaroya, "Gewerkschaftsbewegung," p.1081.
204
Workers in smaller Ottoman cities were also forming
unions. There was a silk workers' union in Bursa and a
miners' union in Zonguldak. The tobacco workers of the
Macedonian and Thracian towns of Drama, Kavalla, Xanthe,
Gvimiilcine (Komotini) and Gevgeli were unionized. The metal
workers of Ada Kapi and the cotton spinners in Vodina and
Karaferia were forming unions.13 In 1911 the tailors in
Kavalla and Kumanovo as well as the shoemakers in Kumanovo
formed unions.14
Despite the Associations Law, it does not seem as
though the Ottoman government prevented any of these unions
from establishing themselves. The only case which I found
of the authorities hindering the formation of a union
concerned the Hejaz Railroad. During the summer of 1913,
the employees of the Hejaz Railroad tried to establish a
union. In August, however, the Ottoman government ordered
the authorities in Haifa (and other cities) to suppress the
newly established association. The American consul at
Beirut reported that the orders were carried out.15
The surge in union formation was accompanied by a
series of strikes. Between 1909 and 1913 there were 36
strikes which involved a total of about 25,000 workers.16
Although there were not as many strikes as during the strike
wave of 1908, the post-1909 strikes were significant in
13. ibid.
14. Velikov, p.34.
15. U.S.National Archives Micro 862, Roll 935, 867.5043.
16. Guzel, p.818, Table 5.
205
other ways. The strikers showed a greater degree of
sophistication in their demands and organization. May Day
celebrations in 1911 took place in many Ottoman cities, for
example Uskiib (Skopje) , Salonika, Istanbul, Kumanovo, Veles
and Edirne. 2,282 workers took part in May Day ceremonies
in Salonika alone.17 Another important development was the
organization by some of the unions of treasuries to be used
in case of strikes.. For example, the male members of the
tobacco workers' union in Salonika contributed 2 Kurus

*
each
week to the union's strike fund, while female workers paid 1
Kuru§.18
Developments in the labor movement during this period
also reflected the growth of nationalism among the peoples
of the Empire. Although there are still examples of supra
national labor solidarity among the workers during the post-
1908 period it seems that national tensions were working to
divide the Ottoman workers never-the-less. The different
labor unions, which in theory were made up of workers of all
nationalities, were in many cases "nationality specific."
For example, in Salonika in 1909 there were different Greek
and Jewish unions for cigarette paper makers, soap makers,
and carpenters. The Jews dominated the porters' union.19
The Greek workers in Salonika, moreover, seemed to have
17. Velikov, p.47. Of the 2,282 which participated, 520

were tobacco workers, 238 were portworkers, 172 were
carpenters, 148 were typesetters and 104 were "members of
the social-democratic organization."
18. H.H.St.A. F31/27/41401.
206
little interest in joining forces with that city's
predominantly Jewish and Macedo-Slav unions. Far from being
imbued with a sense of class solidarity, the Greeks in
Salonika seemed more interested in pursuing a nationalist
agenda. The Greek unions of bakers, tailors and shoemakers
were, in fact, closely connected to Greek nationalist
groups.20 The attitudes of the Greek workers of Salonika
were closely mirrored by Salonika's Greek population in
general, which was after all a minority in the city. The
Greeks considered themselves "...underprivileged and until
1912 the Greek workers consequently regarded the
nationalistic struggle against the Turks as a more vital
cause than the development of a labor party in which they
would have been outnumbered by Ladino speaking Jews."21
Another example of a socialist workers' organization based
on nationality was the Dersaadet Tetebbuat-i Ictimaiye
Cemiyeti (the Istanbul Social Studies Society). It was made
up mainly of Greeks and concentrated its efforts on the
Greek workers of the Anatolian Railway.22 Besides the
ethnic divisions, many occupations were also divided along
regional lines. The preponderance of eastern Anatolians
among the porters in Istanbul has already been noted. Three
fifths of the bakers in Istanbul were from Safranbolou and
Kastamonou. Most construction workers came from Kayseri.23
20. Haupt and Dumont, Sosvalist Hareketler. p.88.

21. Starr, "The Socialist Federation of Salonika" Jewish
Social Studies VII, 1945, p.335.
22. Guzel, p.820.
207
The strikes of this period provide further evidence
which demonstrates the growth of national self-consciousness
among the Empire's urban workers. Although the demands of
the strikers were seldom overtly nationalist in themselves,
the conduct of the strikes shows the growing rifts among the
workers along national lines. On more than one occasion,
employers faced with strikes hired strike breakers from
among workers of ethnic backgrounds different than the
strikers'. It should come as no surprise that these rifts
were especially prominent in Macedonia which was the center
of the most violent national schisms in the Empire.
The Tobacco Workers' Strikes of 1911
During March and April 1911 strikes shut down most of
the tobacco firms in Macedonia as well as the Regie's
factory in the Cibali neighborhood in Istanbul. These
strikes were important because of their long duration and
the careful organization of the workers compared to the
earlier strikes against tobacco firms and the Regie in 1905
and 1908.
The strikes began in Istanbul on the 18th of March.
Workers at the Regie's factory in Cibali demanded a pay
raise of six Kuru| per day.24 The factory management
responded with a lock-out. The factory opened again on 4
April but out of the 3,000 strikers only forty returned to
work in exchange for a payment equal to three days of
24. Ikdam, 2 April 1911, p.5.
208
wages.25 The remaining strikers supported themselves by
drawing on a strike fund.26
The strike against the Regie's operations in Istanbul
had aroused the interest of Regie employees in other parts
of the Empire. By the 8th of April, Regie workers from
Salonika, Xanthi, Drama, Kavalla, Izmir, Samsun, Tokat and
Beirut had all contacted the Istabul workers asking for
information about the progress of the strike.27 The tobacco
workers of Macedonia had in fact already begun a series of
strikes directed not only against the Regie but against the
other tobacco companies as well.
On 26 March about 500 tobacco workers in Salonika began
a strike against the Regie. They demanded a recognition of
their union, shorter hours and a pay raise.28 Several days
later, on 3 April, a delegation of workers from both the
Salonika and Drama affiliates of the tobacco firmHerzog &
Co. met with the company directors. Theirprinciple demand
was that the company dismiss its female employees and
replace them with male ones. Shortly afterward the
company's employees in Kavalla made a similar demand. The
workers also demanded a pay raise and a shortened work day.
Herzog refused the workers' demands and the strike began on
8 April. Moreover, the other large tobacco- firms of
Macedonia, namely The Commercial, Hassan Akif, Kasim Emin,
25. Ibid., 5 April 1911, p.4.

26. Ibid., 8 April 1911, p.5.
27. Ibid.
28. H.H.St.A. F31/27/36539.
209
Muratti, and Nahmias closed ranks behind Herzog & Co. and
began a lock-out.29
As part of its overall strategy, the union initially
directed the strike only against Herzog & Co. because it was
the biggest and most powerful of all the Macedonian tobacco
companies. The labor leaders, especially Benaroya,
calculated that if they could defeat Herzog, the smaller
tobacco companies would give in to their demands.30 By 11
April there were approximately 10,000 workers on strike in
Kavalla alone. As was the case during the 1905 strike
soldiers were called out but there was no violence between
them or the strikers.31
The union eventually formulated a comprehensive outline
for an agreement with the tobacco firms, something which did
not happen during the 1905 or 1908 strikes. The union made
the following demands on the tobacco firms: that the union
be recognized and that the firms employ only union members,
that the workers receive a flat raise of 1 Kurus per day,
that the length of the working year should be raised to ten
months from eight months and that the firms employ men
instead of women for the job of sorting the tobacco leaves.
In return, the union promised not to strike.32
The attitude of the Ottoman government during the
strike reflected the cautious policies adopted by the
29. H.H.St.A. F31/27/25548. Ikdam, 10 April 1911, p.4.

30. H.H.St.A. F31/27/25548.
31. Ikdam. 13 April 1911, p.5.
32. Ibid.
210
government during the 1908 strikes. The use of troops to
keep order in Macedonia during earlier strikes has already
been noted. However, as early as 3 April the Ottoman
Minister for Public Works said that the Regie workers were
not employed in the Public Sector (a rather questionable
point since the Regie was, in fact, closely connected to the
Ottoman government), thus exempting them from the provisions
of the strike law.33 Later, Nuri Bey the local Regie
commissioner tried in vain to secure the intervention of the
Government on the side of the Regie. He appealed to the
Sublime Port on 12 April and then to the Ministry of the
Interior on the 14th in order to get help from the
Government. He was unsuccessful in both cases.34
Despite the establishment of strike funds by the
workers in both Salonika and Istanbul the financial burden
on the strikers eventually proved too great. By 15 April
about one hundred workers, all Muslims, returned to work at
the Cibali plant.35 The rest of the strikers had returned
to work by early June. The strikers in Macedonia held out
longer but their strike finally ended during the first week
in August. The strikers, beaten, returned to work
unconditionally.36 The strike seems to have collapsed due
to the financial exhaustion of the union's strike fund. As
early as late May the Austro-Hungarian consul in Salonika
33. Ibid., 3April, p.3.

34. Ibid. 13 April 1911, p.5, 15 April 1911,p.4.
35. Ibid. 15April 1911, p.4.
36. H.H.St.A. F31/27/59657.
211
speculated that the strikers were running low on money and
would have to settle with the tobacco companies. At the
same time, however, Benaroya claimed that the union had
enough funds to continue the strike for many more months.37
It is also very possible that the arrest of Benaroya and his
two closest aids and their exile to Serbia in June 1911
broke the morale and organization of the strikers.
Port Workers' Strikes in Salonika and Istanbul
As the tobacco workers' strike was in progress, the
porters who loaded and unloaded ships in Salonika harbor
struck on 18 June. According to the Austro-Hungarian consul
in Salonika the strikers were "under the influence" of the
"socialist workers' organization" (presumably the Socialist
Workers' Federation).38 The strikers demanded a raise in
the base tonnage rate which they received from .60
Francs/ton to .70 Francs/ton. The workers also demanded
double pay for work from sundown to midnight and quadruple
pay for midnight to dawn work.
The shipping companies responded by hiring replacement
workers who were mostly Greeks and Gypsies. The striking
port workers were almost all Jews. The striking workers
tried to use force against the strike breakers in an effort
to discourage them from loading and unloading the ships, but
37. H.H.St.A. F31/27/36539.

38. H.H.St.A. F31/27/50322. The relationship between the
porters and the Federation is also probable given that most
of the Salonika porters were Jews.
212
the local police prevented any violence against them.39 By
3 August the strikers had settled with the shipping
companies. By the terms of the agreement they would receive
.67 Francs per ton of cargo moved. However, they were not
successful in their other demands.40
While the Salonika port workers achieved only partial
success in their strike, the porters in Istanbul were
negotiating a new contract during August 1911. The port
workers' demands during the strikes of 1908 and 1909 had
focused on increasing the strength of the porters' guilds
and banishing the Dalmatian workers from the port. In the
August 1911 contract, however, the emphasis was on wage
increases and work practices. For example, porters were to
receive 20 Kuruji for day work and double pay for night work.
The workday was set at 10 hours with half-hour breaks in the
morning and at noon. The workers could take Sundays off if
they wished.41
Railroad Strikes
There were at least three railroad strikes during 1910
and 1911. All of them seem to have been of short duration
and information about them is very sketchy. The first of
the railroad strikes of this period occurred among
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. H.H.St.A. F31/27/57231.
213
construction crews working on the Baghdad Railroad- During
the summer of 1910 a dispute developed between the
contractors, the majority of whom were Swiss, Belgian or
Italian, and the workers. The contractors were each
responsible for the construction of a short (five to ten
kilometer) section of the line.42
The contractors had agreed to pay the workmen 15 Kuru§
per day but had in fact only been paying about eight. By
late July 1910 "a great many" of the workers in the Adana
area had struck. Due to a general shortage of labor in the
area work came to a standstill.43 Various gangs of workers
were still striking as late as September. The British
consul in Adana reported that the contractors had been
importing workers from outside the area. One contractor, a
British subject named Mr. Christian, had brought 500 workers
from Cyprus (under British occupation since 1878).
Additionally, 250 workers each from Rhodes and Istanbul came
to the area to work on the railroad.44 Although the sources
are silent as to the ethnicity of these strikebreakers it is
worth noting that Cyprus, Rhodes and Istanbul all had large
Greek populations. By the end of October "at least" 4,000
men were at work on the railroad.45
The summer of 1911 witnessed strikes on two of the
Empire's most important railroad networks. During June 1911
42. F.O. 371/992/18149:316.

43. F.O.371/992/28550:34
44. F.O. 371/992/33845:648
45. Unfortunately, the sources are completely silent as to
when and how the strike ended.
214
the Oriental Railway Company workers went on strike to press
their demand for a pay increase.46 Meanwhile, the workers
on the Izmir-Aidin and Kasaba Railroads were also demanding
pay increases. As early as 11 June the clerks and employees
of the Kasaba Railroad were demanding increases to their
salaries and wages.47 Within a month the workers on the
Izmir-Aidin-Afyonkarahisar Railroad were also threatening to
strike.48 The workers demanded pay raises of between 20 and
30 percent and the establishment of a pension fund.49
The strike threatened to cause serious disruptions in
the economic life of Izmir and the various commercial
interests in the city were upset at the prospect of a
railroad strike.50 Never the less, the Austro-Hungarian
consul in Izmir commented that public opinion was squarely
behind the workers, despite the economic problems which
would be caused by the strike. The consul pointed out that
rental rates had risen 30-40 percent and food prices 40-70
percent over the previous five years and that the railroad
workers were justified in demanding pay raises.51
The strike finally broke out on 22 July. As many as
1,500 workers were eventually involved. The Railroad
company managers complained to the Ottoman government about
the actions of "several1' Greek workers who were inciting the
46. Ikdam. 25 May 1911, p.2. Giizel, Table 5, p.818. The

duration and outcome of this strike are not known.
47. Ikdam, 11 June 1911, p.4.
48. Ibid., 2 August 1911, p.4.
49. H.H.St.A. F31/27/50179
50. Ikdam. 2 August 1911, p.4.
51. H.H.St.A. F31/27/50179
215
strike.52 The army threatened the strikers with violence,
although it does not seem to have actually used any.53
Perhaps as a result of the threats, however, the strikers
returned to work on 27 July. They did not receive their pay
raises, but the railroad company did agree to establish an
accident and life insurance fund for the workers.54
The Izmir Strikes of 1913
The strikes which shut down Izmir's port and railroad
in 1911 were repeated two years later. On 3 September 1913
a delegation of stevedores, consisting of two Muslim and two
Greek workers, presented a petition to the Vali (Governor)
of Izmir. The workers apparently hoped that the Vali would
put pressure on the shipping agents on their behalf. The
workers demanded an increase in pay from 22 Kuru§ (five
Francs) per day to 3 6 Kuru§ (eight Francs) per day with
double pay for night work and for work on Sunday. They also
demanded that workers engaged for part of a day should be
paid for a full day's work.55
The shipping agents claimed that the Izmir port
workers' wages had been raised after the 1908 strike and
that, as a result, they were the best paid port workers in
the Empire. The port workers in Istanbul, for example, made
52. Ikdam. 2 August 1911, p.4. The newspaper report calls

these Greeks Yunanli instead of Rum. In other words, they
were subjects of the Kingdom of Greece and not Greek
subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
53. H.H.St.A. F31/27/50179.
54. H.H.St.A. F31/27/50937
55. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg.F31/8/67438.
216
only the equivalent of four Francs per day and even the port
workers at Marseille made just five Francs per day. The
strikers replied that the increase in the cost of living had
outstripped the wage increase in 1908.56 Although the
economic dislocations brought about by the Italian and
Balkan wars, as well as the influx of refugees, must have
damaged the economy of Izmir, the available figures show
that the port workers were in fact relatively well paid.
For example, the Empire-wide average daily wage for factory
workers was 12-14 Kuru§/day.57 Factory workers in Izmir
made 12.4 Kuruf/day.58 Prices in Izmir must have been high
due to the influx of refugees and the effects of the war.
However, the wages of the port workers were significantly
higher than the other workers in Izmir.
Despite the arguments of the shipping agents 500 port
workers including stevedores and lightermen began the strike
on 5 September at six o'clock in the evening. On the 8th
they were joined by porters working for the Aidin Railroad.
September was the busiest month for the fig and raisin
processors and the strike caused them considerable
distress.59 Ships in Izmir's harbor continued to load
produce using their own crews but the work proceeded very
slowly. By 9 September only 2,000 tons of produce of
various kinds had been shipped instead of the 24,000 tons
56. F.0.368/875/42969
57. Okgiin, p.35.
58. Issawi, Economic History of Turkey. Table,_p.42.
59. Ikdam. 16 Sept 1913, p.4. H.H.St.A.F31/8/67438.
F.0.368/875/42969.
217
which would have ordinarily been loaded.60 By 10 September
about 170 coal unloaders at the port had also gone on
strike. They demanded a raise in their pay rate per ton of
coal moved.61 After the beginning of the strike, the port
workers demanded, in addition to their other points, the
establishment of an accident and sickness fund.
The entire strike was complicated by tensions between
the Muslim and Christian workers which was exacerbated by
the presence in Izmir of thousands of Muslim refugees from
Macedonia and the Aegean islands. As early as 1908 the
C.U.P. and the shipping agents in Izmir had reached an
agreement that at least 50 percent of the port workers hired
by the agents would be Muslims.62 However, as a result of
the continued turmoil in the Balkans, and the resulting
emigration of Muslims, the Muslim population of Izmir
continued to grow. Although the strikers did not make any
overt demands regarding the refugee problem, the presence of
the refugees was central to the strike. For example, the
strike was organized by an association of Cretan Muslim
refugees called the "Workmens' Club" or the "Cretan Club."63
More evidence which points to the importance of the
Muslim refugees in the strike is found in a letter dated 9
September 1913, from a delegation of shipping agents to the
Vali. In it, the shipping agents address most of the
60. U^S. National Archives, 867.5045.

61. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F/31/27/67438.
62. F.O. 368/875/42969:79. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg.
F/31/27/67438.
63. F.O.368/875/42969
218
demands mads by the strikers, in an apparent effort to get
support from the Vali. One of the points which they make is
that they have examined the question of the emigrants [sic]
in good faith, and that this question has been of interest
to the government.64 There is also evidence that the Muslim
refugees might have felt some sense of solidarity. Despite
the thousands of refugees in Izmir, most of whom must have
been enduring great hardships, only 100 Macedonian Muslim
refugees acted as strike breakers during the strike.65 The
sympathy strike among the porters of the Aidin Railroad is
another example of the possible cooperation, or at least
solidarity, between the Muslim workers. As shown
previously, low echelon jobs such as porters were held
overwhelmingly by Muslims. On the other hand, during the
1913 strike there were no reports of the upper level
railroad workers, who were mostly Ottoman Christians and
foreigners, going on strike.
As in past instances the C.U.P. and the local
authorities tried to negotiate an end to the strike. In
this case, Cemal Bey the Chief of Police and Agiah Bey the
Director of Customs, as well as a C.U.P. agent named Fikri
Bey, served as intermediaries between the strikers and the
shipping agents. At the same time, however, Cemal Bey and
the Vali invoked Article X of the 1909 Strike Law which
64. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F31/8/67438. "Les Agents ont

examine avec bienveillance la question des Emigres qui
semble preoccuper le Gouvernment."
65. F.O.368/875/44042
219
prohibited strikes on railroads and in ports during times of
war or danger of war. The Ottoman Empire was still
technically at war with the Balkan states during September
1913.66 The British consul in Izmir reported that the
police made a "large display of force" and that they made 80
"preventive arrests."67 Although the police had orders to
use their firearms in case of disturbances there was no
reported violence.68
While the Izmir authorities were concerned with ending
the strike and maintaining order the C.U.P. seemed to be
engaged actively in the conduct of the strike. The Cretan
Club, for example, reportedly had close ties with the

AQ
C.U.P. Furthermore, the role of the C.U.P. agent Fikri
Bey went beyond the activities of the C.U.P. in previous
strikes. Rather than being simply a mediator or advocate
for the workers, as previous C.U.P. agents had been, Fikri
Bey is described as the workers' representative or
delegate.70
On the eve of the 13th of September, the negotiations
with the shipping agents had concluded and the strikers
agreed to return to work. The strikers were successful in
most of their demands. The working day was fixed at nine
hours, workers would receive double pay for Sunday and night
work, and those working only part of a day would receive a
66. Diistur tertib-i sani, I (Istanbul, 1329) p.435.

67. F.O.368/875/42969:79, F.O.368/875/44042
68. F.O.368/875/44178:82.
69. F.O.368/875/42969:79.
70. F.O.368/875/44178:22, H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F31/27/67438.
220
full day's pay. The workers did not, however, receive their
wage increase.71 The accident insurance fund was also
established. It was to be subscribed on the basis of one
Franc per man per day and was placed under the control of
the Cretan Club and the local branch of the C.U.P.72 A
Turkish newspaper article, while commenting favorably on the
outcome of the strike, spoke very harshly against "certain
Muslims" and "others under the police officials" who had
been hostile to the striking workers, apparently a reference
to Cemal Bey.73
Conclusions
The developments within the labor movement during the
period between 1909 and 1914 illustrate the continued
importance of both the idea of labor solidarity and of
national self-consciousness. As during the strike wave of
1908, workers were willing to work together to secure
economic goals such as pay increases. On the other hand,
efforts to establish labor unions or workers' federations
which were truly representative of the different national
groups in the Empire met with limited success. The most
successful effort to establish a supra-national labor union
organization was the formation of the Socialist Workers
Federation of Salonika. However, after a brief initial
period many of the non-Jewish unions which made up the
71. ibid.
72. H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F31/27/69129, F.O.368/875/44042
73. Ikdam 17 September 1913, p.4.
221
Federation left. Furthermore, many of the unions which
remained in the Federation were organized along national or
ethnic lines.
Despite the continued strains caused by national self-
consciousness the labor movement grew during this period.
Workers formed unions which were more organized than the ad
hoc strike committees formed during the strike wave of 1908
and there was more communication between workers in
different parts of the Empire than there had been earlier.
On the other hand, the strikes during the period of 1909-
1913 were not nearly as successful as those of 1908.
Workers rarely achieved all of their aims, although they
usually gained something. For example, the port workers in
Salonika and Izmir as well as the Izmir-Aidin railroad
workers were partially successful in their strikes.
Another interesting aspect of the labor movement during
this period was its relationship with the Ottoman government
and the Committee of Union and Progress. The anti-labor
legislation which had been passed with the support of the
C.U.P. during the summer of 1909 seemed to have limited
success in cowing workers into submission. Although the
strike law was clear in its prohibition of strikes among
port and railroad workers this did not stop strikes in those
occupations during 1910, 1911 and 1913. Furthermore, the
harsh penalties set out in the law do not seem to have been
invoked against the leaders of the strikes. Furthermore, in
the case of the Regie workers' strike of 1911, the Ministry
222
of Public Works declined to classify the Regie as a Public
Work (like ports or railroads) and thus released the workers
from the regulations of the 1909 strike law. This was in
spite of the appeals of the R§gie company and also in spite
of the fact that the Regie could very easily have been
considered a Public Work.
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the labor
movement in the Ottoman Empire during the period between
1909 and 1913 was not developing in a social or ideological
vacuum. The effects of the momentous changes of those years
on the labor movement can be seen in the September 1913
strike in Izmir among the stevedores and lightermen in the
port and the porters on the Aidin Railroad. In contrast to
previous strikes, Muslim workers played the major role in
this strike and the economic demands of the strikers were
intertwined with the ethnic tensions caused by the refugee
crisis and the Balkan Wars. The experiences of the refugees
may have made them more hostile toward non-Muslims than the
native born Izmir Muslims. These Muslims, furthermore, were
almost certainly impressed by the sad plight of their Balkan
and Cretan brethren. The sympathy strike among the Muslim
workers on the Aidin Railroad seems to have been a
manifestation of this.
The 1913 strike in Izmir was not the first time that
the Cretan refugees in that city had been involved in anti-
Greek activities. As early as December 1908 Cretan Muslim
refugees in Izmir had agitated for a boycott of Greek
223
products (in protest of the union of Crete with the Kingdom
of Greece) to be observed along with the anti-Austrian
boycott. The Izmir boycott committee, concerned as it was
with the anti-Austrian boycott, refused to sanction the
boycott against Greece.74 However, a boycott does seem to
have occurred never-the-less. A dispatch by the British
consul in Izmir from August 1909 mentions a boycott of Greek
commerce brought on by the "Cretan Question."75 The boycott
seems to have continued with varying degrees of intensity
through 1914. The Austro-Hungarian consul in Izmir reported
in October 1910 that the continuing boycott of Greek
products and commerce was leading to tensions between the
Muslim and Greek inhabitants of that city.76 In March 1914
the Austro-Hungarian consul in Izmir reported on the Greek
boycott and the growth of anti-Greek feeling.77
This continuing boycott of Greek commerce complemented
the development of Turkish nationalism and especially the
idea of a national economy program. As the boycott
continued, the C.U.P. took an increasingly hostile attitude
toward the Ottoman Greeks in Western Anatolia, especially in
the Izmir area. For example, the C.U.P. dominated
government put pressure on the foreign firms in Izmir to
fire their Greek employees and replace them with Turks. The
Committee made efforts to establish corporations and

75. F.O. 371/778/32542:679.
76. H.H.St.A. Konsulararchiv 405 (Smyrna) 72.
77 H.H.St.A. Adm. Reg. F34/71/23225, H.H.St.A. PA XIII/207
224
cooperatives among the Muslim population in the Izmir area.
It seems that the Committee also sanctioned actual acts of
violence against certain wealthy members of the Greek Izmir
community. As a result of the officially sanctioned anti-
Greek measures approximately 130,000 Greeks from the Greater
Izmir area left for Greece or the Aegean islands during
1914.78
It is in this context of growing anti-Greek feeling in
the Izmir area that the strike in that city in 1913 must be
understood. While the strike was fought over issues of pay
rates and length of the work day, the participation of the
Cretan Club and its ally the C.U.P. suggest that the ethnic
tensions which had been growing in Izmir since 1908 played a
role in the conduct of the strike.
78. Do#u Ergil, pp.62-63. See also Justin McCarthy, Muslims

and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the
End of the Empire. (New York: New York University Press,
1983), pp.130-131.
Conclusion
"If it is wrong to assume that workers have no country
then it is equally misleading to assume that they have only
one and that we know what it is."1 Those words by a
prominent historian of both labor and nationalism certainly
apply to the study of the labor movement in the Ottoman
Empire. Indeed it might be impossible, based on the data
currently available, to determine of which 'countries'
different Ottoman workers felt themselves to be members.
Although it may be impossible (for the time being) to
know exactly how the workers identified themselves the
information in this dissertation does allow the formation of
some (tentative) conclusions about worker self-identity
based on their actions and behavior, especially during
strikes.
The workers studied in this dissertation clearly
thought of themselves in overlapping, sometimes
contradictory, terms. For example, workers of different
nationalities were often able to cooperate, sometimes even
act together in a single union, in order to carry out a
strike. However, there is also evidence to show that the
relationships between the workers of different ethnic groups
and nationalities were far from trouble-free.
During the decades covered in this dissertation the
peoples of the Ottoman Empire confronted the challenges of
industrialization and nationalism. Both of these phenomena
1. Hobsbawm, Workers. p.49.
226
prompted Ottoman subjects to re-examine their traditional
self identities. The old social boundaries, drawn mainly
according to the religious criteria of the millet system,
were rapidly becoming irrelevant. The old guild system,
which by the 17th century was beginning to splinter along
the lines of the millet system, had itself been weakened and
transformed by the early 20th century. What new sorts of
social boundaries did Ottoman subjects draw for themselves?
Did the growth of industry result in the development of
class consciousness among the urban workers? Or did people
identify with particular nationalities? Or some combination
of both?
One view of how workers identified themselves is that
•'[m]ost [workers] still had their roots in the countryside
and others tended to be more artisans than workers...Their
loyalty was to their craft rather than their class, to their
neighborhood, and to their shaykh and the sufi order to
which he belonged."2 There is considerable evidence that
elements of this statement are probably true. For example,
Istanbul porters and Zonguldak coal miners were by no means
divorced from their peasant backgrounds. Many of them seem
to have looked upon their tenure as urban workers as a
temporary interlude. However, it is interesting that the
conduct of the strikes and the (limited) information
available about unions provide no evidence to support the
2. Feroz Ahmad, "The Development of Working-Class

Consciousness in Turkey," in Lockman (ed.), Workers and
Working Classes, p.134.
227
claim that ties to the village or to a sufi order were
particularly important, at least as far as labor matters
were concerned. Indeed, the demands of strikers reflected
the same sort of basic economic demands which have
characterized labor movements in other countries before and
since.
If the ties which Ottoman workers maintained to their
villages were not terribly important in the development of
the labor movement, then can it be said that Ottoman workers
were class consciouss? This is an important question and a
difficult one to answer. Ottoman workers clearly had some
sense that they shared certain interests which were
different than those of their employers and they were quite
able to mobilize during strikes to achieve their ends.
However, this is not to say that they were "class conscious"
in a classical Marxian sense of being a "class for itself."
Indeed, Ottoman urban workers did not seem to regard
themselves in this way at all. For example, while there is
some evidence that workers in different parts of the Empire
were aware of one another's activities (as during the 1911
tobacco strikes) this did not lead to the formation of
Empire-wide unions or union federations, even within the
same industry or craft. Similarly, there is very little
evidence that workers ever struck in sympathy or as a sign
of solidarity with other workers.
Thus, some sort of class-consciousness among workers
clearly existed, albeit to a limited extent. On other
228
occasions, however, the bond between workers seems to have
had other foundations. For example, the Muslim porters on
the docks of Istanbul during the 1908 boycott and the
subsequent strike against certain foreign shipping
companies, displayed a truly impressive degree of
solidarity. However, this bond was based, apparently, on a
shared religion (Islam), area of origin (eastern Anatolia)
and, perhaps, language (Kurdish). The lack of what we would
called "labor solidarity" or "class consciousness" is
evident by the hesitant cooperation by the Greek porters and
the Kurdish porters' resulting reaction. Similarly, the
union of the Cretan stevedores during the 1913 Izmir strike
was apparently based as much on their common occupation as
on their shared experiences as refugees.
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that Ottoman
workers were completely devoted to their ethnic, national or
religious, groups. The fact that much of the industry in
Salonika (including the Commercial Company of Salonika) was
owned by the Jewish Arditti family certainly did not prevent
strikes by Jewish workers against those enterprises.
The issue of worker self-identification and its impact
on labor solidarity was complicated by the existence of a
partial "ethnic division of labor," especially within those
industries founded and/or administered by foreigners. For
example, railroad workers of different ethnic backgrounds
performed different jobs. As shown earlier, most skilled
and middle echelon jobs (hence the relatively higher paid
229
ones) usually went to Ottoman Christian subjects. Ottoman
Muslims usually took the lower paying, less skilled
positions. These intra-industrial distinctions reinforced
ethnic ones and could cause serious rifts in worker
solidarity during times of stress, such as strikes. During
both the Anatolian Railroad and Oriental Railroad strikes of
1908 the different economic goals of the different strata of
workers exacerbated the corresponding ethnic tensions.
It should be noted, however, that in the other
industries examined in this study, there seems to have been
relatively little distinction in job levels among Ottoman
subjects within a given industry. For example, there were
Muslim and Christian dock workers, tobacco workers, shoe
makers, printers, etc. One sociological model of this kind
of situation, in which different ethnic groups are more-or-
less evenly represented throughout the economic spectrum
postulates that there will be "a strong tendency to reject
class conflict, for it would require either interethnic
class-based alliances or intraethnic class antagonisms,
either of which would detract from the ethnic solidarity
that unranked ethnic conflict requires."3 The actions of
the Greek workers of Salonika provide a good example of what
sort of behavior might be predicted by such a model. The
Salonika Greek workers were more concerned with the
Hellenization of their city than with cooperation with
3. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, p.32. Horowitz refers to this

situation as an "unranked system."
230
Jewish, Slav or Muslim workers. For example, many of the
unions in Salonika were based on ethnicity as much as
occupation.
Although this model is somewhat useful, it is not
complex enough to describe what was actually going on in a
place like Salonika. For example, while many Greek workers
had their own unions separate from the city's Jewish and
Macedo-Slav workers, these different unions do in fact seem
to have cooperated at least occasionally. Additionally,
since most of the industry outside of the city of Salonika
was dominated by Greeks and Macedonian Slavs, workers must
have been striking against enterprises owned or administered
by co-nationals.
The intertwined process of Imperial decline and the
creation of masses of destitute refugees affected the
development of nationalism among Muslim Ottomans but also
had an impact on the development of the labor movement.
After all, the Empire's borders were shrinking and Muslim
refugees were streaming into the remaining Ottoman areas
largely due to the effects of nationalism in the Balkans.
Under these conditions, it is perhaps no wonder that Ottoman
workers found it difficult to build lasting organizations
which united workers of different nationalities. It is also
understandable that it was only the Jewish workers of
Salonika who really demonstrated a sense of labor solidarity
and even Ottoman patriotism. Without a state of their own
in the Balkans the interests of the Salonika Jews were
231
clearly with the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, in some
form, as well as with the fostering of good relations
between the different nationalities of the Empire.
This dissertation began with a review of some of the
theories of nationalism, national self-consciousness and
ethnicity. These theories all agreed, basically, that
national and ethnic identities are in some sense and to some
extent "manufactured" or "created." If this is the case
(and I think it is) then who created the ethnic identities
of the workers and what, exactly were these identities? A
detailed answer to these questions is outside the scope of
this dissertation. However, some of the information
presented in this study does provide some clues for the way
in which nationalism among the Muslim population of the
Empire was developing.
The development of national self-consciousness among
the different Muslims of the Empire is an important field of
study in which research is still being conducted. My
thoughts on this matter are based on observations of the
conduct of Muslim workers during the strikes which I have
examined. The idea of some kind of Turkish nationalism was
being explored by various Muslim intellectuals since around
1908 (or even earlier). Most students of Turkish
nationalism conclude, however, that the concept of Turkish
(and for that matter, Arabic, and Kurdish) nationalism, if
not national self-consciousness, seems to have been hazy at
232
best among most Muslims (outside of intellectual circles) in
the Empire until the eve of World War I or even later.4
The, admittedly limited, evidence presented in this
dissertation seems to support this view. For example, the
actions of Ottoman Muslim workers often betrayed a feeling
of Muslim, as much as labor, solidarity. The Istanbul port
workers strike of 1908-1909 and the overlapping anti-
Austrian boycott demonstrate the degree to which Muslim
Ottomans considered Islam to be important for their
identity. Similarly, as late as the 1913 strikes in Izmir
the C.U.P., which by that time was actively encouraging the
idea of a Turkish nation, seemed to assist actively the
Muslim Cretan refugees who apparently did not even speak
Turkish.
While national self-consciousness among Ottoman workers
was fostered by the activities of intellectuals and the
results of the contraction of the Empire's borders, was
class-consciousness encouraged by the socialist
organizations which began to establish themselves in 1908?
The actions of the socialist parties and clubs in the Empire
are indicative of the power of nationalism, even among
people for whom it theoretically held no attraction.
Indeed, the socialists of the Empire provided a poor example
of inter-ethnic cooperation for the workers who were, after
4. A good example of some of the recent work on this subject

is Khalidi, et. al., Arab Nationalism. Also good is Robert
Olsun, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism. 1880-1925.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).
233
all, able to cooperate most of the time. Far from working
to alleviate the growing national tensions which threatened
to divide Ottoman workers, the socialist clubs with their
incessant bickering and their ties to nationalist
organizations helped to poison the inter-ethnic relations of
the Ottoman subject peoples.
In this, however, the Ottoman socialists were behaving
like other socialist organizations during the period of the
ill-fated Second International. For example, although
German and Czech workers were organized in multi-ethnic
unions, the Austro-Hungarian Social Democratic party, which
presumed to speak for the workers of the Empire, was
weakened by the nationalistic predilections of its officers.
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were both multi
national Empires which experienced the dislocations brought
about by industrialization and the rise of nationalism.
Although the Austro-Hungarian industrial labor force was
much larger than in the Ottoman Empire, it resembled it in
other respects. The numbers of organized industrial workers
in Austria-Hungary were high: more than 400,000 (20% of the
industrial labor force) in the Austrian half of the Monarchy
and 100,000 (10% of the industrial workers) in the Hungarian
half.5 The most important similarity between the two was
5. T. Erenyi, "Die Frage der Revolution und der Reform in

der Abeiterbewegung Osterreich-Ungarns urn die
Jahrhundertwende." Etudes Historiaues Honaroises 1975,
Congres International des Sciences Historiques par la
Commission Nationale des Historiens Hongrois. Budapest:
Akademiai Kiado, 1975. p.54.
234
the fact that each was made up of individuals of many
different nationalities. In Austria-Hungary, the repeated
attempts by the socialist leaders (most of whom were Austro-
Germans) to create a single unified labor organization for
the whole empire resulted in failure. "By 1897 there was
'no longer a common Austrian Social Democratic Party..."6
Another interesting feature of the socialist movement
in the Ottoman Empire was that it emerged on the heels of
the strike wave of 1908 and tried subsequently to dominate
the growing labor movement. In this effort the socialists
faced the same paradox which confronted the members of the
Second International (and other socialists for that matter).
That is, much of the work of "any effective union, the
defense and improvement of its members' conditions...goes on
under any government, and cannot but be concerned primarily
with improvements now, whatever its hopes for the
future...[Even a Marxist union leader] must spend most of
his or her time on activities which could equally well be
conducted... by someone uninterested in replacing
capitalism."7
In other words Ottoman workers, even those in Salonika,
seem to have been profoundly uninterested in overthrowing
capitalism, or building socialism, or in engaging in Marxist
6. Helmut Konrad, "Between 'Little International' and Great

Power Politics: Austro-Marxism and Stalinism on the
National Question." Nationalism and Empire: The Habsbura
Empire and the Soviet Union. Richard L. Rudolph and David F.
Good, (eds.), p.275.
7. Hobsbawm, Workers. p.275. Emphasis in original.
235
exegesis. Hussein Hilmi tried in vain to establish strong
connections with workers. Altough Abraham Benaroya had
better success in organizing workers within the framework of
the Socialist Workers Federation, the actions in which the
workers subsequently engaged centered on bread-and-butter
issues ("the daily work of any effective union") rather than
anything which was remotely political or revolutionary. The
Federation's officers themselves complained that the workers
were indifferent to "social and economic questions."8
If the socialist were unable to mobilize the workers
for political purposes then the nationalist and other
parties (including the C.U.P.) did little better. The
sources provide no evidence at all of strikes which had
political demands. For example, strikers did not call for
the establishment of an Ottoman Federation, nor for the
resignation of governments or bureaucrats.9 The C.U.P. had
some limited success in mobilizing workers, the best example
being the anti-Austrian boycott. Even in this example,
however, the actual control of the port workers by the
C.U.P. was very limited and the subsequent strike by the
workers had no connections with the C.U.P. at all. The
Committee seems also to have been involved with the Izmir
strikes in 1913. Although these strikes were related to the
ethnic tensions in Izmir caused in part by the influx of
8. Dumont> "Classe Ouvriere," pp.245-246.

9. In this the strikers behaved much differently than the
guild-janissary coalitions of the 18th and early 19th
centuries. See, for example, Quataert, Workers. Peasants
and Economic Chance, pp.200-203.
236
refugees, the demands of the strikers did not reflect any
political program designed to deal with the tensions.
Perhaps, however, the labor movement in the Empire was
part of a broader anti-colonial or anti-imperial struggle
being waged by all Ottoman workers against foreign (mostly
European) capitalists. Indeed, the calls for a federation
of Balkan states (including, presumably, the Ottoman Empire)
made by Dimitar Vlakhov were framed in exactly these terms.
Vlakhov contended that the peoples of the Balkans had a
common interest in fighting the encroachments of economic
imperialism and that a federation would be the most
effective means to that end. Similarly, the plans of
Turkish nationalists for a national economy program (aided
by the socialist Helphand) were also conceived as part of
the overall effort to free the Ottoman Empire from western
economic domination. It is also true that most of the
railroads and ports, which were almost all foreign owned,
were the sites of some of the most important strikes. Were
these strikes part of an anti-colonial or anti-imperialist
struggle by the workers?
Given what is known about these strikes, this seems
unlikely. It is true that the strikers' demands sometimes
included the resignation of the (foreign) company
administrators. For example, the strikers of 1908 on the
Anatolian and Izmir Railroads demanded the resignations of
Directors Hugenin and Barfield, respectively. On the other
hand, these demands for resignations were not paired with
237
demands that Ottoman subjects be hired their stead. In
other words, the demands for the resignation of foreign
administrators is more reflective of "the tendency among
workers...to hold those in power personally accountable."10
A final point which I want to explore is related to the
views of Dinesh Chakrabarty which appeared in the
Introduction. Chakrabarty challenged the way in which labor
historians have traditionally drawn strict dichotomies
between the state and the working-class and between ethnic
consciousness and class consciousness among workers. My
work has, I think, provided some evidence to support
Chakrabarty's position.
For example, the attitude of the C.U.P. and of the
Ottoman government after 1908 was not consistently hostile
to workers. The C.U.P. continued to engage in settling
worker-management disputes right up through 1913.
Furthermore, the Committee often took the side of the
workers in such disputes. It is also interesting that the
C.U.P. and the Ottoman government never tried to weaken the
potential strength of Ottoman workers by exploiting ethnic
tensions, although foreign-owned companies tried often to do
so. Indeed, a sharp division among workers between their
ethnic and class self-perceptions also seems to have been
largely absent. Workers had both some sort of class-
consciousness as well as an at least rudimentary sense of
ethnic or national identity. Although this tension usually
10. Quataert, Working Classes, p.35.
238
prevented the workers from forming large multi-ethnic
unions, the two co-existing forms of self-consciousness do
not seem to have been mutually exclusive.
Just as it make little sense to separate completely the
role of the Ottoman state from the labor movement, so too it
is counterproductive to separate the growth of nationalism
and the development of a labor movement. The changes within
the Ottoman state, the rise of the C.U.P., the development
of nationalism and a labor movement among the Ottoman
subject peoples were all manifestations of the social and
economic changes which shook the foundation of the Ottoman
Empire from the 17th through the 19th centuries. Only by
examining such phenomena as nationalism, workers' self-
consciousness and economic changes together rather than as
separate categories can we begin to understand the reasons
for the ultimate disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
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NEWSPAPERS
Tanin (Echo)
Ikdam (Perseverance)
Levant Herald
Osmanischer Llovd.
Appendix A: Greater Istanbul
GREATER ISTANBUL
L \ gtfittbrict
Appendix B
Railroads in the Ottoman Empire,
1908
Oriental Railway
Anatolian Railway
French-owned lines
British-owned lines
Hejaz Railway
Baghdad Railway
Sources:
Leon Ponrnrim, "Railroads in nnfcuy" Bulletin of the
American Geographic Society. XLVH, 12, 1915, p. 934 - 944.
Psul Robert M igocn, Historical Arias of Bast Central Europe.
(Seattle: Umvnrity of Wadrington Press, 1993), p. 91.
Peter Mentzel
P.O.Box 45204
Seattle, WA 98145-0204
EDUCATION:
Ph.D. University of Washington, 1994.

M.A. University of Washington, 1988.
B.A. University of Connecticut, 1985.
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:
History of the Middle East.

History of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.
History of the Balkans.
History of East Central Europe.
PUBLICATIONS/DISSERTATION:
Book Review, Andreas Kappeler, et. a l . Die Muslime in

der Sowietunion und in Jucroslawien. in
Nationalities Papers (forthcoming).
Book Review, M. Siikrii Hanioglu, Bir Sivasal Orcrtit
Olarak 'Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiveti1
ve 'Jon Turkliik' (1889-1902) in Turkish Studies
Association Bulletin. XV, 1, (March 1991).
Article, "The German Minority in Interwar Yugoslavia,"
in Nationalities Papers. XXI, 2, (Fall 1993) .
PAPERS PRESENTED/LECTURES GIVEN:
"The National Question in the Muslim post-Soviet

Republics." April 17, 1993. Lecture for "World
Issues in the News" workshop for western
Washington secondary school social studies
teachers.
"Islam and Secularism: The Case of Turkey." March 15,
1993. Lecture for the Womens' University Club,
Seattle, WA.
"Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Ottoman
Empire." October 30, 1992. Middle East Studies
Association conference, Portland, OR.
"Defusing the East European Time Bomb." July 18, 1991.
Lecture for summer interns at the Cato Institute,
Washington, DC.
FELLOWSHIPS/SCHOLARSHIPS:
Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research

Fellowship, 9/90-6/91.
Claude R. Lambe Fellowship; 9/89-6/90, 9/91-6/92.
National Resource Fellowship (FLAS) ,- Summer 1987, 9/88-
6/89, Summer 1990.

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N ation alism and th e labor m ovem ent in th e O ttom an Em pire,

Mentzel, Peter Carl, Ph.D.

in the Ottoman Empire, 1872-1914

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

Date March 18, 1994

Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Ottoman Empire,

Co-chairpersons of the Supervisory Committee:

Middle Eastern labor history has been concerned

principally with the position of workers in relation to the

state, their reactions to the absorption of the Middle East

into the world economic system, questions of work-place

organization, and the question of class-consciousness.

Within these broad categories, the subject of ethnicity

often appears but it is rarely the center of attention.

This dissertation examines the role of ethnicity and

national self-consciousness in the development of the labor

movement in the Ottoman Empire.

The main focus of this investigation is on Ottoman

Macedonia (especially the city of Salonika), Istanbul and

Izmir as areas which were relatively industrialized and

which were among the most ethnically heterogeneous of the

Empire. An examination of the conduct and demands of

striking workers, the activities of socialists of different

ethnic and national backgrounds, and the attitude of the

Ottoman Imperial Government and the Committee of Union and

and national differences among Ottoman urban workers.

The dissertation concludes that workers of different

ethnic and national groups were often able to cooperate in

order to secure certain economic goals. However, despite

these examples of cooperation the labor movement in the

Empire was weakened by the growth of national self-

consciousness and ethnic tensions among Ottoman workers.

These tensions ultimately prevented the formation of a

unified, multi-ethnic labor movement for the whole Empire.

A Note on Transliterations andPlace Names ................ ii

Chapter I : The Ottoman Empire During the 18th

Chapter II: Industrialization and the Beginning

Chapter III: The Strike Wave of 1908 ................. 95

Chapter IV:Young Turks and Workers, 1908-1909 ......... 141

Chapter V: Nationalism, Socialism and the Committee

Chapter VI: Solidarity and Division in the Labor

Conclusion ............................................... 225

Bibliography ............................................. 239

Appendix A: Greater Istanbul........... 249

Appendix B: Railroads in the Ottoman Empire ........ 250

Ottoman Turkish was written with a modified form of the

Arabic alphabet. In transliterating Ottoman terms and names

I have used modern Turkish spelling instead of a

transliteration from the Arabic letters or a rendering into

English. Thus, "Mejdet Pasha" is written "Mecdet Pa§a."

Likewise, "vAbd al-Hamid" is "Abdiilhamit."

Modern Turkish pronunciation is similar to English with

the following exceptions:

'c' is like English 1j '

'g ' " 'ch'

'I1 silent, lengthens preceeding vowel

The many different versions of the place names of the

Balkans and Near East also presents a problem. I have used

two different methods for writing place names. In cases

ultimately prevented the formation of a unified, multi