Theories of Intelligence Peter Gill

Theories of Intelligence
Peter Gill
The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence
Edited by Loch K. Johnson
Print Publication Date: Mar 2010 Subject: Political Science, International Relations
Online Publication Date: Sep 2010 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.003.0003
Abstract and Keywords
The discipline of intelligence studies to date has spent relatively little time on theorizing.
In the practice of intelligence, theories are crucial in creating applications that address
the agencies's core mandate: the protection of national security. This article discusses
theories of intelligence, its structures and process, and its failures and successes. It iden
tifies the key features of the current context for intelligence, determine some of the con
tributions of theory to the analysis of intelligence and its place within the contemporary
government, specifically, what is required if intelligence is to facilitate rather than dam
age democracy. Apart from providing practical applications for the betterment of safe
guarding national security, theories of intelligence have a crucial contribution to public
education. There is a danger that people may come to believe that failures are not only in
evitable but a permanent condition, hence, there is an indispensable obligation to eluci
date complex matters in such a way that reason does not submit to security panics. For
most of history, intelligence has been used to oppress, and in many parts of the world, it
still is used in this way. Those who live in liberal democratic regimes with advanced intel
ligence systems, it is their obligation to ensure those systems catch up with the changing
face of intelligence governance as well as in informing developments in nonliberal sys
tems so that intelligence will provide security without sacrificing hard-won rights.
Keywords: intelligence studies, theories, theories of intelligence, contributions of theory, analysis of intelligence,
intelligence
1. Introduction
The discipline of intelligence studies to date has spent relatively little time on theorizing.
Within the practice of intelligence, considerable use has been made of theory in order to
develop practical applications that contribute to agencies' core mandate: the protection
of national security. This chapter concentrates, rather, on theories of intelligence: the is
sue of how the social sciences have sought to explain intelligence phenomena—its struc
tures and processes, its successes and failures. This discussion will identify the key fea
tures of the current context for intelligence, set out some contributions of theory to the
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analysis of intelligence and its place within contemporary governance, specifically, what
is required if intelligence is to facilitate rather than damage democracy.
The study of intelligence has increased significantly in the past twenty years for two main
reasons. As long as the Cold War lasted, states sought to keep intelligence secrets very
close; consequently much of the literature of intelligence examined the earlier hot wars of
the twentieth century and, mainly in the United States, contemplated intelligence struc
tures including their impact on domestic civil liberties. But once the Cold War ended, the
western powers became somewhat more relaxed with open discussion of intelligence and
the democratization of regimes in the former Soviet bloc, along with similar develop
ments in Latin America since the 1980s, was accompanied by the publication of much
more official material, often in the context of inquiries into the rights abuses of former
regimes. Second, interest in and the literature of intelligence has increased significantly
since 9/11 not just because of that attack on the United States but also the (p. 44) contro
versial measures taken in response. The intelligence “failures” represented by 9/11 itself
and then the intelligence fiasco around the invasion of Iraq have been picked over in
much detail by various legislative and judicial inquiries. The resulting mountain of docu
mentation, and accompanying journalistic and academic commentary, has provided an
enormous opportunity for scholars and researchers but its excavation has not been
matched by conceptual developments in intelligence studies.
2. Why Do We Need Theory?

We need to be explicit about our theoretical assumptions because we cannot select areas
for research or determine the relevance of material, let alone organize it, without some
theoretical framework.1 If we do not consider this explicitly, our implicit assumptions will
color our work, whether we like it or not, and we shall confuse ourselves and our readers.
Then, we want to be able to explain why intelligence works (or not) as it does, and gener
alize beyond the particular in order to have something useful to offer about future policy
and practice.2 As we do so, we must remember the profound ethical implications of what
we say—intelligence is capable of producing both benefits and harms. Given the secrecy,
uncertainty and complexity that characterize the field of intelligence, prediction is impos
sible; therefore, recommendations must be advanced modestly in the full knowledge of
the likelihood of unintended outcomes. Intelligence is replete with paradoxes.
Mark Phythian and I have suggested a “critical realist” approach that examines causation
through the interaction between actors (agency) and structures (Gill and Phythian 2006,
20–38). Historical accounts are the bedrock for our work but much of the intelligence
process cannot be observed—especially not through the prism of official documents—and
thus we must also develop speculative hypotheses3 that can be tested against the evi
dence rather as doctors do as they test out different diagnoses. In this process of “abduc
tion,” “by applying alternative theories and models in order to discern connections that
were not evident, what intelligence scholars are doing is what good intelligence analysts
do—but in doing so neither group is merely describing reality as if through clear glass.
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They are seeking to make sense of and thus actively ‘create’ the worlds of intelligence
and government” (Gill 2009, 212; cf. Fry and Hochstein 1993, 25).
(p. 45) 3. Defining the Field: Knowledge and Power

The discipline of intelligence studies has no need to re-invent the wheel: there are numer
ous theoretical approaches within social science that can be deployed to increase our un
derstanding of intelligence. At the most general level, intelligence can be viewed as a
subset of surveillance: a ubiquitous social practice, combining processes of knowledge
and power and lying at the heart of all risk management. Specifically, intelligence is
“mainly secret activities—targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action—in
tended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning
of threats and opportunities” (Gill 2009, 214). In order to distinguish intelligence from a
myriad of other “knowledge management” practices, note that its object is security, some
element of it will be conducted in secrecy and, because it is always relative to others, it
will provoke resistance.
Defensive surveillance is most commonly described in terms of “risk” whereas intelli

gence contemplates “threats”; this reflects the former's concern with the unintended
harmful consequences of otherwise beneficial human activities rather than intentionally
harmful activities such as terrorism. The growing complexity that has reduced the possi
bilities of traditional actuarial calculations of risk has resulted in the development of the
precautionary principle, especially in environment and health matters. However, the caus
es and consequences of serious political violence may display the same attributes of com
plexity and uncertainty exhibited by problems to which the precautionary principle is ap
plicable and it has now become “fully politicized,” as seen in the lead up to the Iraq inva
sion (Heng 2006, 56).
In determining what is to be done about these risks/threats, four broad types of knowl
edge/power relationship can be identified:
In the case of (a decision under) certainty we know the outcomes of different

choices and the only challenge is to be clear about one's preferences. In the case
of risk we know the outcomes (benefits and adverse effects) and the probability of
various outcomes. In the case of uncertainty we know the possible outcomes but
have no objective ground to estimate their probability. In the case of ignorance we
do not even know what adverse effects to anticipate or we don't know their magni
tude or relevance and have no clue of their probability. (COMEST 2005, 29)
In the first case there is no need for “intelligence” as such; in the other three intelligence
becomes increasingly significant—and difficult.
For example, the shift from “risk” to “uncertainty,” if not actually “ignorance,” can be il
lustrated by comparing the official U.K. perception of the threat posed by the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) with that since 9/11. PIRA was a tightly run, hierarchical
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organization which, as we now know, was penetrated at a high level (Gill and Phythian
2006, 68–70) and was estimated to have about 10,000 sympathizers in Northern Ireland
in the early 1980s, 1,200 of whom would support “around 600 active
terrorists” (Hennessy 2007, 17). Now, while “(t)errorism is the (p. 46) politics of
uncertainty” (Ericson 2007, 36, emphasis in original), the relative certainty with which
government calculated the numbers and identities of PIRA activists has been replaced by
glorified “guesstimates” of al Qaeda in terms of its nature, form and strength. For exam
ple, Hennessy reports that by late spring 2005 there were estimated to be two thousand
“serious sympathizers” of whom two hundred might be prepared to carry out a terrorist
attack (2007, 37). In December 2007, Jonathan Evans, Director General of MI5, spoke of
two thousand known to be involved in terrorist activity in the United Kingdom, and, cru
cially, referred to the probability of as many again who were unknown (Evans 2007).
Similarly, Michael Warner has drawn on the literature of risk and uncertainty to illumi
nate the link between knowledge and power. He characterizes “intelligence as risk shift
ing,” showing how “sovereignties” seek to distribute their risk and uncertainty outward,
some of it by sharing with allies in increased cooperation (see further below) but also by
imposing it on adversaries: “To put this in modern management terms, spies help a sover
eign to shift uncertainty into risk, to assess and manage probabilities, and to mitigate
hazards” (Warner 2009a, 22). But when uncertainty darkens toward ignorance, this
process may simply collapse knowledge into power. Ron Suskind reports the White House
meeting in November 2001 that discussed the possibility of al Qaeda obtaining a nuclear
weapon from Pakistan at which the Vice President proposed: “If there's a one percent
chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon,
we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. . . . It's not about our analysis,
or finding a preponderance of evidence, it's about our response” (cited in Suskind 2007,
62). In other words, what became known as the “Cheney Doctrine” proposed that a condi
tion of almost perfect ignorance—one percent of “knowledge”—would be the basis for ac
tion. As the basis for security policy, this is highly problematic since it is likely to com
pound the problem. As argued by Ulrich Beck, examining the broadest impact of risks:
“The very power and characteristics that are supposed to create a new quality of security
and certainty simultaneously determine the extent of absolute uncontrollability that ex
ists. The more efficiently and comprehensively the anticipation of consequences is inte
grated into technical systems, the more evidently and conclusively we lose control. All at
tempts at minimising or eliminating risk technologically simply multiply the uncertainty
into which we are plunging the world” (2005, 102 emphasis in original).
Therefore, work is required to evaluate post-9/11 legislation, policies and practices—pro

posed on the grounds that they would improve intelligence and the ability to prevent fu
ture attacks—in terms of their actual consequences on the effectiveness or otherwise of
intelligence as well as the threat itself. There is a lethal combination of uncertainty and
governments' urge to act that appears to require steady increments of law—the United
Kingdom is a prime example—as any further attack apparently demonstrates the failure
of previous measures. Given the catastrophes envisaged, and the inevitability of failures
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of intelligence, there is almost no limit to the measures envisaged and no real evaluation
of the actual outcomes of previous policies.
(p. 47) 4. A Suggested Agenda for Research

In the limited space available, six crucial areas for intelligence research can be identified:
governance, process, structures, cooperation, actors/ethics and oversight.4
4.1. Governance
Even its most passive actions implicate intelligence in governance; therefore it is never
enough to view intelligence as just a form of “staff” to ministers and governments (but
note Sims's counterargument 2009, 159–60). Consequently, intelligence studies must
make as much use of theories of power as of theories of knowledge and risk. There are
two broad “streams” of power theories: the mainstream view of power as zero sum, or
“sovereign” and the nonzero-sum view of power as “facilitative” (Scott 2001). Both types
of power are inherent in intelligence though the balance between them will vary with cir
cumstances. Indeed, intelligence has the potential to be a form of governance: we are fa
miliar with this in “counterintelligence states” (Dziak 1988), but it may come to pass else
where whenever security fears combined with governments' attempts to provide reassur
ance (cf. Edelman 1964) dominate politics. We should recall Berki's “security para
dox” (1986): the more powerful states become in their effort to guarantee security, the
more they become a threat to that security. Important work needs to be done by analysts
of intelligence to describe and explain the impact of the “war on terror” on governance
more generally. Jonathan Simon has charted “how the war on crime transformed Ameri
can democracy and created a culture of fear” (the subtitle of Simon 2007) and argues that
the “war on terror” confirms his thesis of the impact metaphoric “wars” and “night
mares” can have on the construction of new forms and strategies of governance (2007,
260–61). Similarly, Laura Donohue's detailed comparison of counterterrorism law and pol
icy in the United States and United Kingdom provides a solid basis for this work (2008).
Since security institutions in general and intelligence in particular have such a “peculiar
ly intimate relationship with political power” (Cawthra and Luckham 2003, 305), we need
to specify how that relationship defines the state in general. As we have seen, a broad dis
tinction has often been drawn between “counterintelligence states” in authoritarian
regimes and those in democracies, but a more nuanced approach is required. For some
time we have sought to distinguish states broadly in terms of the degree of influence or
control in politics enjoyed by those in security roles. As this increases then we have been
more likely to talk about “(national) security” or “garrison” states (cf. Tapia-Valdes 1982).
Seeking to apply (p. 48) this more directly to security intelligence agencies and develop
ing Keller's (1989) work, this author suggested that by using the two variables of autono
my—the independence of agencies from oversight by other political actors—and penetra
tion—the extent to which agencies are able to gather information and act—we can identi
fy different “ideal types” of security agencies from the “domestic intelligence bureau”
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through “political police” to “independent security state” (Gill 1994, 79–82). Other au
thors have made use of and developed this typology (Dombrowski 2007, 241–68; Williams
and Delantant 2001). While some have argued that the impact of 9/11 can be seen as
shifting the balance toward the security or surveillance state (Haggerty and Ericson 2006;
Loader and Walker 2007 provide excellent coverage of these themes), others have taken a
more benign view and characterized the situation, at least in the United Kingdom, as a
“protective state” on the grounds that, while it may have accumulated more security pow
ers, it has done so with a greater degree of openness than during the Cold War (Hennessy
2007).
A major development in the last twenty years is the networking between state agencies
and the interpenetration of community, corporate and state intelligence structures. We
need to consider how this affects the governance of intelligence and how we might deal
with any problems it raises. How should we characterize state-corporate links, as net
works (Gill 2006) as nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), as symbiosis
(O'Reilly, forthcoming) as corporatism (Klein 2007, 18–20; Thompson 2003, 155–56, 187)
or as a return to feudalism (Cerny 2000)? (See further discussion below.)
4.2. Process
The intelligence process or “cycle” is a commonly deployed device that describes the vari
ous stages in the development of intelligence, though it must be remembered that it is
used for its heuristic value rather than as an accurate model of what actually happens. As
such, it is part of the conceptual language used in developing theoretical approaches to
intelligence. Part of its utility is that it can be applied to whatever “level” of intelligence—
individual, organizational, national, or transnational—is being studied (Gill and Phythian
2006, 35–38) and it facilitates comparative research (Gill 2007, 82–90).
One area of intelligence where theory is relatively well-developed is in seeking to explain

intelligence “failures” (cf. Betts 1978) though explaining “successes” has been less dis
cussed (Wirtz 2003). The former are far more likely to be visible than the latter and may
be very costly in terms of human and social damage. It is suggested that explaining fail
ure is a key task for intelligence theory (Phythian 2009, 67–68). Even measuring success
is problematic since its manifestation may be that nothing happens (Betts 2007, 187–90;
Gill and Phythian 2006, 16–18). Explaining failures is an example of the need to examine
the interaction of actors and structures, for example, Amy Zegart criticizes the “finger
pointing fallacy” in her analysis of 9/11 and argues for the superiority of analysis of orga
nizations' failure to adapt (2007). Butler's (2004) examination of the failure of the U.K.
agencies to identify the (p. 49) lack of WMD in Iraq is concerned similarly with the struc
tures and processes by which the intelligence was developed and promulgated rather
than identifying blameworthy individuals.
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4.3. Structures
The basic architecture for intelligence is still set at national level and is established by
states according to some combination of their historical development and perception of
need in the face of security threats. This domination of the national level and state sector
of intelligence is clear from even a cursory glance at intelligence literature. How does
theory account for the creation and persistence of state intelligence agencies? Mark
Phythian (2009, 57–61) has argued that structural realism can best explain this for “great
powers” based on assumptions of an anarchic world system within which states have
some offensive capacity, are uncertain as to the intentions of other states and are rational
actors. Intelligence is the means by which states seek to reduce the uncertainty and se
crecy characterizes their efforts to maintain their survival.
Jennifer Sims provides a critique of this in her advocacy of “adaptive realism” (2009, 151–
65) but a more thoroughgoing theoretical challenge to realism comes from those who ar
gue that the driving notion of “national security” must be replaced by a broader concept
of “human security” (e.g., Sheptycki 2009). The evidence for this is the growing interde
pendence of states and the observation that states may well enhance their security and
stability through cooperation with others that actually enhances (collective) sovereignty
although it diminishes national autonomy (Beck 2005, 91). Thus Beck argues for a rejec
tion of “methodological nationalism”—“zombie science”—that fails to recognize or re
search the extent to which transnational factors “determine” relations within and be
tween states (Beck 2005, 23–24). For students of intelligence the hard case, of course, is
whether the intelligence hegemon—the United States—is best described in these terms or
in those of realism.
The persistence of intelligence structures may also be accounted for by other mid-level
explanations such as bureaucratic politics; for example Glenn Hastedt and Douglas B.
Skelley (2009) discuss the possibilities and problems of organizational reform. The United
States has shown a particular obsession with “fixing” (Hulnick 1999; Odom 2003) its intel
ligence structure. Amy Zegart notes the six classified and dozen major unclassified stud
ies in the 1990s, the latter making over three hundred recommendations targeted at CIA,
FBI or elsewhere in the intelligence structure of which only 10 percent had been imple
mented by 9/11 (2007, 5). Since 9/11 the major innovation has been to establish the Of
fice of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate federal intelligence (what
the Director of Central Intelligence was established to do in 1947 but never quite man
aged . . . ) but doubts remain as to whether this will resolve the competing pressures to
centralize or decentralize (e.g., Betts 2007, 142–58). Contemplating the possibility of re
forming the large and fragmented U.S. intelligence “community” reminds one of the hiker
(p. 50) who asked a farmer the way to her destination. After a pause, the local replied “If I
were you, I wouldn't start from here.”
It follows from 4.1 above that there is an urgent need for comparative research to exam
ine the mushrooming intelligence activities at sub-state and transnational levels and the
growing significance of nonstate intelligence actors in the corporate and what we might
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call the “community” sector. Since security is the bottom line for any structure of political
power (Cerny 2000, 172), can we explain the growth of intelligence within these sectors
in realist terms? Not entirely, because beyond survival in the marketplace, corporate in
telligence aims at profitability—itself usually analyzed through the prism of rational ac
tion—but a key difference is that markets operate within structures of rules and regula
tion (however lax they may be sometimes.) Avant (2005), Donald (2008), Dover (2007),
O'Reilly and Ellison (2006), and Shorrock (2008) all provide interesting discussions of pri
vate-sector intelligence. For “community” intelligence actors, family and tribal loyalties,
ideological motivations or messianic beliefs render the resort to assumptions of rational
choice problematic although the context within which they operate (Bozeman 1992)—the
absence of an effective state—means their motivations for intelligence may be more state-
like.
4.4. Cooperation
Cooperation between intelligence agencies is not new, is potentially highly productive

through “sharing” risk but also creates new dangers. The intelligence relationship be
tween the United Kingdom and the United States of America (“UKUSA”) is the best and
most formal example of transnational cooperation that dates from 1947 (Richelson and
Ball 1990) but the need for broader cooperation between countries with divergent laws,
cultures and practices has been much emphasized since 9/11, as even the hegemonic
United States appreciated its dependence on others in key intelligence areas. Yet, for the
United States, the problem started at home and the 9/11 Commission exposed the dys
functionality of the fragmented national intelligence “system.” Though the purported aim
of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act has been to rectify this,
early signs are that the situation may actually have been compounded, not just because of
the understandable failure to coordinate the sprawling national system discussed above
but also because the concept of “homeland security” has brought even more state and lo
cal agencies into the intelligence network. Elsewhere, the problem of fragmentation ex
ists but to a lesser extent because no other country has the wealth to support so many
state-sector intelligence agencies and the corporate sector is less extensive (so far) than
in the United States.
Cooperation beyond the state sector is facilitated from both sides: on the one hand pre
ventive, risk-based, techniques have long characterized private policing, while, on the
other, states have extended the traditional techniques of “high policing” into general
policing as well as “outsourcing.” There are tensions and conflicts between corporate and
state security actors, for example, private personnel are responsible to (p. 51) boards of
directors and thus to shareholders, not accountable to elected bodies, but no “immutable
contradictions” (Johnston and Shearing 2003, 144–48).
The task of theory is to seek explanation for the conditions under which agencies will and
will not cooperate, especially under the conditions of globalization (Aldrich forthcoming).
Where the relations between agencies are not as tightly bound as envisaged above in cor
poratism, there are various possibilities. State agencies may contract others with better
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access to the relevant territory or population but there is a danger that, feeling re
strained by laws and oversight, they will “subcontract” unlawful operations to corporate
or “community” allies. Such seems to have been the case in Northern Ireland where there
is strong evidence that intelligence agencies “colluded” in the murder of suspected Re
publicans by Loyalist paramilitaries (Cory 2004; Stevens 2003) and the use by the CIA of
“black sites” in Poland and Romania was based similarly on a desire for deniability (Marty
2007). Where there is greater independence between agencies, trust and reciprocity are
crucial—game theory is a useful way of theorizing these relations (cf. Thompson 2003,
161–67; Wetzling 2008). However, the rational assumptions of this approach may be unre
alistic when we contemplate the murky depths of intelligence collaboration resting on
complex (and perhaps toxic) mixes of political, financial and ideological motivations.
4.5. Actors and Ethics
So far our agenda consists of macro and structural issues; clearly, we need to consider ac
tors also—what is the contribution to intelligence of the people working within it, individ
ually and in small groups? How are they recruited, what are the consequences of vetting,
how are they trained and managed? How do they deal with colleagues from other agen
cies—reluctantly and on the basis of “need-to-know” or willingly and on the basis of
“need-to-share” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.3)? Theory can contribute here in a number
of ways: again, research into failures has shown the most common forms of cognitive
pathologies to which individuals may be prone—mirror-imaging, group-think, etc. (e.g.
Betts 2007, 19–52; Mandel 1987). In addition to structures, therefore, we must pay atten
tion to the impact of organizational cultures on intelligence agencies (Farson 1991).
One specific aspect of this question is “politicization.” Those working within intelligence
in authoritarian regimes are driven by the domestic political requirements of the powers-
that-be rather than, say, genuine national requirements for security intelligence and a key
element in the democratization of these agencies is to establish an ethic of professional
ism in which officials may speak “truth unto power.” However, recent events have cast a
shadow over the older democracies implicit claim of the inherent professionalism of their
services. The controversy about the extent to which analysis of Iraqi WMD was influenced
by politicians (as well as being “cherry-picked”) or subject to self-censorship by analysts
who knew which way the wind blew on Iraq, presented an unflattering portrait of the
power of professionals to resist political pressure, certainly in the United States and to
some extent in the United Kingdom (Gill and Phythian 2006, 131–41).
(p. 52)
As we move from analysis to action in conditions of uncertainty or even ignorance, the

dangers of overreaction increase steadily. The application of the precautionary principle
to terrorism by means of prevention and pre-emption must be carried out carefully and
not degenerate into Cheney's “one percent doctrine,” kidnapping, and torture. Notwith
standing assertions that “coercive interrogation” produced information that led to lifesav
ing actions, these practices have so damaged the legitimacy of the U.S. cause that it has
Page 9 of 18

probably actually exacerbated the risk (Guillaume 2008, 411). These issues go to the
heart of the intelligence enterprise and have sparked not only great public controversy
but much consideration in the literature of both state (Erskine 2004; Goldman 2006; Her
man 2004; Quinlan 2007) and corporate intelligence (Frost 2008; Runzo 2008).
4.6. Oversight
This takes us, finally, to the crucial question of how oversight—internal and external—is
conducted in order to maximize the probability that intelligence is both effective and con
ducted properly. The search for the roots of success and failure relate directly to what
might be described as the “efficacy” of intelligence but a concomitant concern, at least in
countries with pretensions to being democratic, is that intelligence is also conducted
properly or with “propriety.” Since practitioners, and those inside governments whose
policy making requires interaction with intelligence, are naturally more concerned with
effective intelligence than whether it is carried out properly, systems of review or over
sight are required. In the context of a democratization of intelligence, not only in former
authoritarian regimes in Asia, Europe, and Latin America but also in older democracies
where agencies were created by executive decree, therefore, there is now a sizeable liter
ature addressing the conditions for effective oversight (cf. Born and Leigh 2005; Johnson
2007b). An important aspect of this issue is the oft-heard concept of “balance” that im
plies some trade-off between the demands of effectiveness and propriety or security and
rights. This is a dangerous notion though borne from the accurate observation that intelli
gence scandals have given rise to reform aimed at increasing propriety, while failures
have given rise to more concern with effectiveness. The danger lies in the idea that there
is some way of trading off effective intelligence against human rights; those agencies with
the poorest human rights records are usually also ineffective and inefficient except in
their ability to act repressively.
Since the business of intelligence is gathering information that targets would prefer to
keep private, it would be idle to propose that there can be no limitations of rights in the
interests of security; the point is that infringements must be carried out proportionately
and subject to clear rules and procedures (cf. Betts 2007, 159–77; McDonald 1981, 407–
11). However, in common with regulation theory in general, we must beware that over
sight “theory” can amount to little more than series of platitudes that are often mutually
contradictory (Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001, 180–81). Certainly, it is part of the job
of oversight committees to make post hoc (p. 53) criticisms of failures by intelligence
agencies but they should also contribute to the central debate of how agencies are to
minimize the dangers of making both Type I and Type II errors, that is, avoiding excessive
surveillance of those who mean no harm and thus damaging their rights and the inade
quate surveillance of those who do plan to cause harm.
Although in the last quarter of a century congressional, parliamentary, and other review
bodies have been securing a toehold on oversight of state agencies, events since 9/11
have exposed shortcomings in their arrangements as significant as they have for intelli
gence itself. For example, the 9/11 Commission described the U.S. system as “too com
Page 10 of 18

plex and secret” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.2) and the congressional oversight system
as “dysfunctional” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.4; also Johnson 2007a). In the United
Kingdom most assessments of the Intelligence and Security Committee's first decade con
cluded that it had performed creditably in general but poorly over the issue of Iraq (Gill
forthcoming). But we have hardly contemplated how to oversee corporate agencies where
“commercial confidentiality” rather than state secrecy is a central obstacle. Corporate so
cial responsibility has some potential for the internal oversight of private security activi
ties (Kinsey 2008) but external oversight will require action from the state sector. There
fore, theories of oversight—crucial to ideas of democratic intelligence—must move be
yond their present concern with states to encompass the implications of intelligence gov
ernance that is multi-sectoral and transnational.
It is possible to provide only a few indications here of the work that is needed. First, there
is a need for reviewers to network within the state sector. Justice O'Connor has provided
an excellent start in this respect with the policy proposals emanating from his enquiry in
to the rendition of Maher Arar to Syria. Rather than creating a single overseer for all
Canadian agencies with intelligence functions, O'Connor proposes that agency-specific
review bodies deploy “statutory gateways” so that they can share information and inves
tigative duties where their enquiries concern the agencies acting as an intelligence net
work in terms of information sharing or joint operations (Commission of Inquiry 2006).
Second, and yet more difficult, is how oversight might be maintained over state-corporate
cooperation. We can identify a number of general mechanisms with potential in network
accountability including legal, financial, technological, reputational, and market-based
(Benner et al. 2005) but academics have only just started to consider how these might
work in the case of intelligence (e.g., Forcese 2008; Leigh 2008; Wright 2008). Third,
equally difficult, is to oversee transnational intelligence collaboration. National reviewers
must develop the concept of “dual function” (Slaughter 2005) and see themselves as re
sponsive to national and international constituencies. For example, the existing biennial
International Review Agencies Conference could be developed into a more systematic
sharing of information, best practice, and, ultimately, joint investigations. National re
viewers could seek to insert acknowledgements that information sharing would be sub
ject to review into memoranda of understanding between agencies (Forcese 2008; Wright
2008; more generally, Aldrich 2009).
(p. 54) 5. Conclusion

There is another crucial reason for deploying theory and this is its contribution to sorely
needed public education. The shocks of the last few years came hard on the heels of the
first stirrings of serious public knowledge of intelligence as the secrecy of the Cold War
period was relaxed. But if the public started to see that James Bond was not an accurate
portrait of the intelligence officer, it has suffered even greater disillusionment after 9/11
and Iraq. There is a danger that people may come to believe not just that failures are in
evitable but that it is a permanent condition. Academics will not be invited to give public
lectures on theories of intelligence but, whenever possible, we have an obligation to try to
Page 11 of 18

explain and elucidate complex matters in such a way that reason does not submit to secu
rity panics. Our contributions must be informed by more than just an ability to provide
historical parallels and “thick description”; we must develop useful generalizations that
assist understanding.
Michael Warner warns that, for most of history, intelligence has been used to oppress
(2009, 29) and in many parts of the world it still is. Those of us fortunate to live in liberal
democratic regimes with relatively advanced systems of intelligence oversight must not
only ensure that those systems catch up with the rapidly changing face of intelligence
governance but also inform developments in nonliberal systems so that intelligence pro
vides increased security without sacrificing hard-won rights.
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The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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London: Routledge.
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Notes:
(1) Gill (2009) discusses “where we are” with respect to intelligence theory of which this
section is a summary. The book provides a fuller survey of past and current theorizing.
Page 17 of 18

(2) This possibility would be rejected by postmodernism, as discussed briefly in Gill and
Phythian (2006, 23–25).
(3) Johnson (2009) advances some propositions that might be used in this way.
(4) There is a good deal of overlap between this discussion and Michael Warner's propos
al that strategy, regime, and technology are the three key independent variables in ex
plaining the main similarities and differences between “intelligence systems”—our depen
dent variable (Warner 2009b).
Peter Gill
Peter Gill is a research professor in intelligence studies, University of Salford, and

has recently co-authored Intelligence in an Insecure World and co-edited Intelligence
Theory.
Page 18 of 18

Theories of Intelligence Peter Gill

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Theories of Intelligence

Abstract and Keywords

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

2. Why Do We Need Theory?

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

(p. 45) 3. Defining the Field: Knowledge and Power

Defensive surveillance is most commonly described in terms of “risk” whereas intelli­

In the case of (a decision under) certainty we know the outcomes of different

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Therefore, work is required to evaluate post-9/11 legislation, policies and practices—pro­

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

(p. 47) 4. A Suggested Agenda for Research

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

One area of intelligence where theory is relatively well-developed is in seeking to explain

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

were you, I wouldn't start from here.”

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Cooperation between intelligence agencies is not new, is potentially highly productive

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

4.5. Actors and Ethics

As we move from analysis to action in conditions of uncertainty or even ignorance, the

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

(p. 54) 5. Conclusion

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Bozeman, A. B. 1992. Knowledge and Method in Comparative Intelligence Studies. In

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Butler, R. 2004. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Report of a Com­

Dombrowski, K. R. 2007. Transforming Intelligence in South Africa. In Reforming Intelli­

Ericson, R. 2007. Crime in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity.

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Gill, P. 1994. Policing Politics: Security Intelligence in the Liberal Democratic

State. London: Frank Cass.

———, and M. Phythian, 2006. Intelligence in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity.

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Johnson, L. K. 2007a. A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence. In

Mandel, R. 1987. Distortions in the Intelligence Decision-Making Process. In Intelligence

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

McDonald, D. C. 1981. Commission of Enquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the

O'Reilly, C. Forthcoming. The Transnational Security Consultancy Industry: A Case of

Phythian, M. 2009. Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared

Quinlan, M. 2007. Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory. Intelligence and

Scott, J. 2001. Power. Cambridge: Polity.

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Slaughter, A-M. 2005. Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of

Stevens, J. 2003. Stevens Enquiry: Overview and Recommendations. London, Stationery

Tapia-Valdes, J. A. 1982. A Typology of National Security Policies. Yale Journal of World

Network Forms of Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2009b. Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems. In National Intelligence Sys­

Wetzling, T. 2008. European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons. In PSI Handbook of

Wirtz, J. 2003. Theory of Surprise. In Paradoxes of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

Peter Gill is a research professor in intelligence studies, University of Salford, and

Subscriber: Goldsmiths College, University of London; date: 10 December 2019

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