This article was downloaded by: [Stony Brook University]

On: 30 October 2014, At: 13:26

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The European Legacy: Toward New

Paradigms
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cele20

“Boundless Compassion”: The

Contemporary Relevance of
Schopenhauer's Ethics
a
Michael Allen Fox
a
School of Social Science , University of New England , Armidale,
NSW 2351, Australia E-mail:
Published online: 17 Jul 2006.

To cite this article: Michael Allen Fox (2006) “Boundless Compassion”: The Contemporary
Relevance of Schopenhauer's Ethics, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 11:4, 369-387

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770600766086

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
 The European Legacy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 369–387, 2006

‘‘Boundless Compassion’’: The Contemporary

Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics

Michael Allen Fox

Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

Abstract Schopenhauer had important things to say about ethics in both normative and meta-ethical
senses, but his impact on the evolution of moral theory has been minimized by the unfortunate neglect of
his philosophy in general. A contemporary assessment of his ethical views reveals that they are both imaginative
and interesting, not least because they challenge assumptions held by more canonical figures in the history of
philosophy, both before and after his time. Since the roots of ethics are currently being vigorously re-examined,
it is regrettable that Schopenhauer’s ideas have been omitted from mainstream discussion in the field. I attempt
to remedy this lack by investigating how his ethics of compassion contributes to the following areas: reconciling
ethics with strict determinism; naturalizing ethics; developing the philosophy of education; seeking inner peace
and world peace; re-visioning our relationship with non-human animals and the environment. As this list
indicates, Schopenhauer’s moral theory has relevance for a much wider audience, beyond the limited sphere of
professional philosophy. And because the world is in dire need of moral rejuvenation, any inspiration provided
by a major thinker such as Schopenhauer should be heartily welcomed. While certain internal problems are
posed by his metaphysical and epistemological doctrines, we can see past these in order to appropriate the living
insights still to be found in Schopenhauer’s ethical thought.

Preliminaries
Schopenhauer’s ethical significance for the present day, I suggest, lies chiefly in the
following areas: (1) critique of Kantian ethics; (2) reconciliation of ethics with strict
determinism; (3) naturalizing ethics; (4) philosophy of education; (5) the quest for inner
peace and world peace; and (6) re-envisioning our relationship with non-human animals
and the environment. Some of these areas are obviously more closely bound up with
the concerns of contemporary professional philosophy (1 and 3), whereas others have
considerable relevance for society as a whole (2, 4, 5, and 6). Schopenhauer’s rigorous

School of Social Science, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia. Email: mfox3@une.edu.au

ISSN 1084-8770 print/ISSN 1470-1316 online/06/040369–19 ß 2006 International Society for the Study of European Ideas
DOI: 10.1080/10848770600766086
 370 Michael Allen Fox

examination of Kant contains or previews a great many of the critical perspectives

on deontological ethics that have been aired since his time. This topic has been
thoroughly probed elsewhere,1 so I shall concentrate here on items (2)–(6). With respect
to (1), suffice it to say that Schopenhauer mounted strong arguments against an a priori,
rationalistic approach to ethics and drew attention to many (real or apparent)
inconsistencies in Kant’s theory. Most importantly, perhaps, he holds that Kant
incorrectly identified the ‘‘moral incentive’’ to which alone it makes sense to appeal
in ethical theorizing. (I shall consider later, in the section on ‘‘naturalizing ethics,’’
Schopenhauer’s perspective on the fundamental moral incentive.)
Before we look at his contribution to ethics from a contemporary perspective,
however, we might as well be upfront about the fact that Schopenhauer is a rather
peculiar figure from whom to seek any kind of leadership in this arena. He was a very
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

flawed individual, and prima facie a poor exemplar of moral behaviour. He could be
mean-spirited in the extreme, and was misanthropic, misogynistic, anti-Semitic, and
vengeful; he engaged in slanderous verbal assaults on other philosophers and, on one
occasion, a physical assault on his rooming house neighbour brought a court settlement
against him for disabling her. So the question arises: why should we (or anyone) listen
to what Schopenhauer has to say about ethics? He evidently didn’t practice what he
preached, and wouldn’t it be better for us to spend our precious time listening instead
to someone who does? This issue needs to be addressed, and several things can be said
in defence of taking Schopenhauer seriously.
To start with, if we begin probing the biographies of famous people in any field,
skeletons pour forth from many closets and a wealth of unsavoury deeds and personalities
parades before us. We then have to make a choice whether to assess each accomplishment
in its own right or deny its value and importance because we disapprove of, or are offended
by, facts about the life of the one who produced it. As a matter of fact, most of us do not
dismiss Descartes because he tortured animals in experiments; Hemingway because he was
a philanderer and committed suicide; Wagner for being viciously anti-Semitic; Picasso on
account of his misogyny and admiration for Stalin; Janis Joplin because she was an alcoholic
and drug addict; Heidegger because of his Nazism; or Sartre for his communism.2 We don’t
necessarily consider Camus a greater thinker than Heidegger or Sartre because he didn’t
share their extreme politics, or Wilde, who endured sensational trials and a prison sentence
for his homosexuality, a greater writer than Proust, who didn’t, for his. What a creative
individual leaves to the world gets judged on its merits. In the case of philosophy, which is
based on arguments, this legacy either convinces or fails to convince according to criteria
that are more or less identifiable and agreed upon.
Normative ethical theorizing seems to be unique, however, in that it is about
conduct, and that tends to make us feel that the proponent should behave consistently
with what he or she propounds. Here we are confronted by Schopenhauer’s famous
remark that
it is . . . just as little necessary for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher
to be a saint; just as it is not necessary for a perfectly beautiful person to be a great
sculptor, or for a great sculptor to be himself a beautiful person. In general, it is a
strange demand on a moralist that he should commend no other virtue than that which
he himself possesses.3
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 371

This is true, and we have all learned what we know of right and wrong as children
from those who are far from being morally unblemished. But of course Schopenhauer
thought of himself as a reformer, in the twin senses that he was self-consciously
overhauling normative ethical theory and asserting a moral position that goes against
the grain of prevailing social practices. Anyone who wishes to adopt this kind of stance
surely needs to attain credibility in the eyes of others, and it may be argued that doing so
requires a fairly strict correspondence between word and deed. Elizabeth Telfer has
correctly observed, however, that ‘‘since most people fail to live up to their principles
some of the time, it is not clear how an accusation of inconsistency [between one’s
views and actions] counts against any doctrine in general.’’4 But we need not get into
a protracted discussion of whether Schopenhauer acted according to his espoused ideals
most of the time, only some of the time or never; it is better to concede the point that
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

he fell short of providing a good model of ethical conduct in his own life and proceed
from there.

Compatibilism
A problem that is more philosophically vexing than the foregoing is Schopenhauer’s
endorsement of determinism in his Essay on Freedom of the Will.5 In this work he argues
that everyone’s basic (‘‘intelligible’’) character is fixed for life, and that, this being
the case, nobody can will to do otherwise than he or she does. This would seem to
pronounce a death sentence upon ethics if we grant the Kantian precept that ‘‘ought’’
implies ‘‘can.’’ If there is no ‘‘can’’ (no real choice among alternative courses of action)
then neither can there be an ‘‘ought’’ (a meaningful moral imperative, an injunction to
do this or that). Having moral obligations depends upon possessing moral responsibility,
understood as the capacity to make meaningful and significant choices with respect
to actions that are subject to either praise or blame. Moral responsibility, in turn, seems
predicated upon ‘‘avoidability’’—the ability to choose among alternatives given the
same set of initial conditions (or circumstances), which traditional libertarians have
equated with the ability to act freely. This classical analysis of free action would
appear to deal a fatal blow to Schopenhauer’s ethics. But so too would it nullify any
ethical doctrine that does not endorse the suspect notion of avoidability.6 And this
cannot be an automatic reason for rejecting them. We cannot resolve the perennial
question of free will and determinism here, and while there are obvious self-imposed
limits on what Schopenhauer can assert about the moral evaluation of human actions,
his ethics can nevertheless be seen to make sense and to be defensible within
a deterministic outlook.
Let us begin by noting that Schopenhauer opposes prescriptive ethics, observing that
‘‘virtue is as little taught as is genius.’’ He also puts us on notice that in his works, ‘‘no
precepts, no doctrine of duty are to be expected; still less will there be set forth a universal
moral principle, a universal recipe, so to speak, for producing all virtues.’’7 It follows that,
for the purpose of producing good people or good acts, both moral teaching and moral
exhortation are useless, as is enunciation of a supreme moral principle or propounding
a set of specific principles. Schopenhauer maintains that ‘‘we are as little able to produce
a virtuous person by ethical discourses or sermons as all the systems of aesthetics
 372 Michael Allen Fox

from Aristotle’s downwards have ever been able to produce a poet.’’8 The reason for this
is that (he believes) character cannot be changed from the outside or the inside, and
insofar as motives conform to character, appeals to alter them are pointless.
Yet there is room for a constructive ethics even within Schopenhauer’s restrictive
conceptual framework. First of all, even if ‘‘real moral reform is not at all possible,
but only determent from the deed,’’9 those who engage in wrongdoing can correct their
behaviour out of fear of punishment. This is not the best way to shape human conduct,
admittedly, but there is no doubt that it works some of the time at least. Second, and
more important, behaviour may be perceived by an agent as inconsistent with the
values he or she fundamentally holds and that are most in conformity with his or her
character. Such an individual can then decide or be led to act differently as a result.
This constitutes a direct application of Schopenhauer’s notion that while we cannot
change our character, we can ‘‘acquire’’ it through increased insight and self-knowledge.
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

As John Atwell indicates, a development of the foregoing sort ‘‘can often change
[a person’s] external behaviour tremendously, but . . . cannot make his or her actions
internally different’’ on Schopenhauer’s assumptions.10 The underlying idea here is the
same as that by which reformative and deterrent effects of punishment are usually justified
within a deterministic world-view: one can be influenced by the introduction of
information that plays a causal role in his or her subsequent behaviour formations. As is so
often the case, Schopenhauer captures this truth in a succinct formula: ‘‘Motivation is
causality seen from within.’’ And, he affirms, one always chooses in accordance with the
‘‘principle of sufficient reason of acting,’’ that is, as determined by a motive.11
Nevertheless, one’s deeds only spring from one’s own agency, and although motives may
be causes that occasion one’s actions, one is still the unique author of this conduct, which
may unfold in either ignorance or insight as to its origins in character and circumstance,
as F. C. White explains.12
Schopenhauer believed that freedom could be attained by the acquisition of a
different kind of insight: this is new information of a philosophical sort, which he claims to
be supplying, namely, the knowledge that the world is will and that we are all co-sufferers
on an equal par with one another. The wisdom so gained renders pointless certain kinds
of acts, for example, those whose purpose it is to alleviate my own suffering by making
others suffer more, or suffer in my place. In addition, coming to understand that
character is fixed, one might be expected to see that attempting to change oneself
radically or to manipulate others in certain ways will be futile. On a more positive note,
insight into the world as will promotes good conduct—actions that are morally
praiseworthy—because it arouses our sense of kinship with other sentient beings, and this
in turn taps into our feelings of sympathy with them. Therefore, as Schopenhauer
observes, ‘‘virtue does indeed result from knowledge.’’13 Elsewhere, he asserts even more
emphatically that ‘‘to be just, noble, and benevolent is nothing but to translate my
metaphysics into actions.’’14 The bottom line, then, is that new information or
knowledge is causally efficacious and can change the direction of people’s behaviour,
including our own. We might start, then, by noting that one pillar on which rests the
matter of Schopenhauer’s relevance for today is his view of the compatibility of ethics and
determinism.
But a new question arises from within this nexus of ideas: why can’t moral
exhortation or advocating adherence to moral principles be causally efficacious too?
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 373

Couldn’t they be fit into the category of ‘‘new information,’’ at least in certain
circumstances? Or even if they cannot, is it impossible to imagine browbeating,
intimidation, judgmental remarks, and the like as causally efficacious? Schopenhauer
would concede the latter, but would hastily add that inputs perceived as threatening
to the self are effective merely because they appeal to one’s sense of self-protection—to
one’s egoism (or pure self-interest); therefore, in his view, they don’t really change
behaviour in a morally relevant way. For the same reason, moral exhortation often cannot
count as the introduction of new information at all. If and when it does count, this is only
because the exhortation corresponds to core values that the individual holds, but to which
he or she acknowledges being unfaithful. The same applies to moral principles.
Schopenhauer does not deny—indeed he affirms—that principles are ‘‘indispensable to a
moral course of life’’; this is because they are place markers that call us back to the original
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

feelings which are the source of morality and which insulate us from the intrusion
of counter-affects.15 Hence, as reminders and prompts, they do not constitute pieces of
new information any more than do the propositions that we call moral exhortations.
Appeals to principles, then, do not make anything happen; they simply reinforce good
habits of virtuous behaviour (much as Aristotle reasoned).
It may be argued, against Schopenhauer, that whether one is receptive to inputs
that are designed to change moral behaviour is, like one’s basic character, not a matter
of choice. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of various potential influences is simply
outside of one’s control. This is not a fatal objection. It may be the bitter pill that a
compatibilist theory of ethics has to swallow, but one can still affirm that, since we don’t
know a priori who can be changed and who cannot, or what combination of
circumstances will bring about an effect on anyone, it is always worthwhile to try
influencing people for the better, because we shall sometimes succeed.
I noted earlier that Schopenhauer’s ethics is self-limiting, and the more serious
problems we are left with stem from the conflict between his theory of action, on the
one hand, and his epistemology and metaphysics, on the other. Even if determinism and
ethics can be reconciled, there still remains the issue of whether the idea of moral
change is truly compatible with his odd thesis of our unalterable intelligible character. It
would seem that each of us can potentially come to terms with the basic givens in our
lives, learn how to express ourselves most effectively, and how to avoid self-frustrating
behaviour. But these things, important though they are as general lessons in living,
clearly fall rather short of what is usually envisioned as moral change, since this is taken
to include altering one’s character, which Schopenhauer repeatedly tells us is an
impossibility. Furthermore, given that intelligible character is noumenal, there is a
puzzle as to how its permanence can allow for our subjective experience of observing
changes unfold in ourselves over time. I think that this latter problem is not open
to resolution. For, just as the relationship between the metaphysical will and individual
manifestations of the will (whether human or non-human) within the empirical world
is a mystery (according to Schopenhauer), so too must be the relationship between one’s
intelligible character and phenomenal expressions of it.16 This does not really help
advance the goals of Schopenhauer’s ethics as a theory of human action—in fact,
it detracts from them. But that, unfortunately, is another part of the price to be paid for
the inflexibility built into his metaphysical system.
 374 Michael Allen Fox

Naturalizing Ethics
As we have seen, Schopenhauer does not think ethics is about prescribing how we ought
to act. What is it about, then? He says it should be concerned with ‘‘how people actually
behave,’’ adding that ‘‘the purpose of ethics is to indicate, explain, and trace to its ultimate
ground the extremely varied behaviour of men from a moral point of view.’’
The expression ‘‘from a moral point of view’’ does not have the a priori or theoretical
sense that it does for non-naturalists, such as Plato, Kant and Moore. Schopenhauer
would regard their pronouncements as ‘‘news from nowhere,’’ to use a popular
philosophical phrase of our time. The method for accomplishing the purpose of ethics
just stated is and must be ‘‘empirical,’’ and its specific aim is ‘‘to investigate whether there
are generally any actions to which we must attribute genuine moral worth.’’17 Like other
advocates of a naturalistic approach to ethics, Schopenhauer does not think he encounters
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

an insurmountable problem in crossing the boundary between observational and

normative claims. ‘‘Actions of voluntary justice, pure philanthropy, and real
magnanimity’’ are the ones that possess genuine moral worth, in his view, which
means that they spring from a motive or ‘‘incentive’’ (Antrieb) other than egoism or
malice. Since, as he holds, all actions stem from either egoism, malice or compassion
(though one may give way to another), the only choice left for a causal explanation and
origin of morally praiseworthy behaviour is compassion. This brings us to the heart of the
matter: malice (aimed at causing injury) clearly cannot produce actions of genuine moral
worth; egoism (aimed purely at self-gain) clearly cannot take the good of others seriously
as an end-in-itself and, as we learn from experience, can only produce social good
fortuitously. (‘‘Egoism is colossal; it towers above the world’’; it is a constant impediment
to moral choice.18) Therefore only compassion, which does aim at realizing the good of
others, can yield actions of genuine moral worth. But Schopenhauer’s argument does not
depend simply on a process of elimination. He realizes that in order to make good on his
claim to defend a naturalistic ethics he must show that actions of genuine moral worth are
indeed occasioned solely by compassion, because it is these, and these alone, that
contribute to improving the general quality of life and social togetherness.
When Schopenhauer asserts that he is following an empirical method, or announces
an empirical result, he is not referring to things known by science, experimentally or
otherwise, but rather to things known by careful observation. Whose observation? In the
first instance, of course, his own; but he also trusts that we will concur, drawing upon our
own personal life experience. As he remarks (rather like the phenomenologists a century
or more later),
Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is present and at hand; it
can never do more than bring to the distinct, abstract knowledge of the faculty
of reason the inner nature of the world which expresses itself intelligibly to everyone
in the concrete, that is, as feeling. It does this, however, in every possible relation and
connexion and from every point of view.19

Beyond this appeal to shared experience, however, Schopenhauer supports his claims
about human nature by reference to a very broad range of writers from ancient Greece
and Rome up to the time he wrote, in the West, and to canonical texts from the Hindu
and Buddhist traditions, in the East. So by ‘‘empirical’’ he means that which can be
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 375

(and has been) verified by perceptual means and that has also been repeatedly confirmed
at different times and places, across a spectrum of cultures. Some might be inclined
to dismiss such observations as ‘‘folk psychology’’ or as the product of selective attention.
As far as the first charge is concerned, we are not engaged here with theories of how
the mind works, so whether it is apposite is doubtful; in any event, although the
philosophical fashion of the moment may be to disdain non-scientific observation,
far more has been learned about human behaviour and motivation from intuitive
psychologists like Schopenhauer than from experimental psychologists who (like Freud,
in the case of Schopenhauer20) occasionally confess that their work merely confirms and
extends the insights of creative thinkers and writers who’ve gone before. The second
charge is more serious in relation to Schopenhauer, especially when he alleges he is
licensed to draw pessimistic conclusions from empirical data. But I think that at the level
of the ethical analysis before us, the problem of selectivity need not be a concern. The
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

reason is that Schopenhauer is not doing metaphysics or passing sweeping judgments on

the world here. What he is doing may be better described as blending conceptual analysis
and observation so as to isolate the factor that animates behaviour we commonly identify
as morally praiseworthy.
One may be suspicious that Schopenhauer is begging the question here in favour
of other-regarding acts and against self-regarding ones, so far as his attribution of genuine
moral worth is concerned. But in spite of his loud denunciations of egocentrism, I think
he possesses a more subtle understanding of moral motivation. Morally praiseworthy
behaviour is not necessarily altruistic, in the sense of being self-denying or self-sacrificing.
In fact, at a certain level such behaviour is importantly self-referring, if only because it
presupposes the ability to connect with another’s suffering and become personally
involved with it. Hence, although he withholds moral praise from actions springing solely
from egocentric concerns, a self-referential standpoint seems inevitably entailed by the
manner in which we relate to the welfare of others. (I shall return to this point later.)
Furthermore, when he says that we normally do not attach judgments of moral worth
to actions that are self-interested, but reserve them to those that are unambiguously
other-regarding,21 Schopenhauer is not making an unsubstantiated assertion, but is
instead advancing an empirical claim, albeit one based on linguistic usage. The
accompanying conceptual point is that the phrase ‘‘genuine moral worth’’ applies to
actions that are performed as ends in themselves, in order either to alleviate suffering in,
avoid causing harm to, or benefit, someone else. Actions of these kinds treat others as
persons on an equal plane with oneself and, it might be argued, are therefore intrinsically
caring, respectful and inclined toward being just. So the argument that runs along these
lines is not merely one about the ethical judgments people make (which are fallible), but
about their reasons for making them, as grounded in the meaning and consistency of
moral discourse.
It remains to be asked why Schopenhauer fastened onto compassion as the
empirically discoverable wellspring of ethical conduct. In this he was not alone, as the
example of Buddhism indicates. There is no denying that his view of the world as a vale
of tears, or an arena of suffering—again resonating with Buddhism—shaped his outlook.
This makes it pertinent to inquire (as I shall do in the concluding section below) whether
compassion yields a complete basis for ethics. Leaving this issue aside for the moment,
we can say that Schopenhauer’s argument is that in many and diverse ways, compassion
 376 Michael Allen Fox

is what kindles fellow-feeling in everyday life, and what makes the difference in cases
where sympathy, mercy, forgiveness, and altruism are exhibited. This claim can be
evaluated by each of us, and Schopenhauer is confident that we will each come to the
same conclusions as he. Aside from the fact that we all can understand what
compassionate behaviour is, and see that even the most warped personalities can
sometimes manifest it, Schopenhauer contends that a ‘‘natural compassion which is
inborn and indestructible in everyone’’ is the most reasonable hypothesis for explaining
moral conduct.22 For, if what is called for is an explanation of our ability to transcend our
preoccupation with self-advancement in order to engage in other-directed behaviour,
then we need to look at competing explanations and select the most plausible one.
Schopenhauer suggests that: (a) the many lines by which behaviour of genuine moral
worth can be traced back to compassion, and (b) the relative weakness of rival theories,
compels the inference that his view is the true one.23
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

Ethics is naturalized, then, in that convergent observations and lines of investigation

point toward compassion, a component of our psychological make-up and the key moral
emotion, as the source of behaviour that is universally understood to be ethically
commendable. Moral principles are merely reminders to redirect our attention to this
source. This is obviously a radical suggestion that even some ethical naturalists would
want to reject. But to maintain that moral principles are mere reminders that serve a
reinforcing function is consistent with Schopenhauer’s basic beliefs that morality cannot
be taught, and that when compassion is unclouded by other concerns, it will aim us in the
right direction.
Before we leave this subject, we have to address an objection raised by Atwell.
Atwell queries whether acts of compassion are even possible on Schopenhauer’s account,
given that they are (he suggests) inconsistent with the philosopher’s basic theory of the
will. The argument goes like this:24 for Schopenhauer, all acts of the will serve the body
and indeed are nothing more than expressions of the body in pursuit of egoistic ends.
If so, then either: (a) compassion is not an act of the will (since it does not appear to serve
bodily needs in any way); or (b) compassion is not possible. Moreover, if (a) is the case,
then Schopenhauer’s ethics cannot be naturalistic, as acts of compassion will become
‘‘as non-natural and as super-sensuous as an act of virtue for Kant.’’25 Obviously,
something has to give. I think that the way out, for Schopenhauer, is to propose that
compassionate acts, which by definition are not egoistic, are nonetheless self-referential.
As we know, they involve a measure of identification with, or participation in, another’s
suffering; but Schopenhauer is careful to tell us that when compassionate feelings for
someone are aroused,
at every moment we remain clearly conscious that he is the sufferer, not we; and it is
precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the suffering, to our grief and sorrow.
We suffer with him and hence in him; we feel his pain as his, and do not imagine that it
is ours.26

Schopenhauer is providing here an acute phenomenological description of something

that is quite complicated and difficult for anyone to get right. But the upshot of his
remarks seems to be that acts of compassion, while transcending the bounds of egoistic
self-concern, are not ‘‘performed by an agent who somehow gets free from his body (his
individuality, his subjectivity),’’ as Atwell contends.27 On the contrary, the compassionate
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 377

agent is not in any doubt as to his or her own identity, or about whose suffering calls
for sympathy; nor is the compassionate agent incapable of discerning that the sympathetic
feeling he or she experiences resonates with, but is not the same as, the pain of the
sufferer. To make the point even more compelling, Schopenhauer adds: ‘‘In fact, the
happier our state, and hence the more the consciousness of it is contrasted with the other
man’s fate, the more susceptible we are to compassion.’’ He does admit that ‘‘the
explanation of the possibility of this highly important phenomenon [compassion] is not
so easy; nor can it be reached on the purely psychological path. . . . [but] can be arrived
at only metaphysically’’;28 however, this does not amount to conceding that his account
must be non-naturalistic. For here, he is referring to a complete theory of compassion, not
just the description of it as the ultimate moral incentive, which alone is the concern
of ethics. I conclude, therefore, that the naturalistic view of ethics advanced by
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

Schopenhauer remains intact. (The metaphysical basis of compassion will be taken up in

the section on ‘‘inner peace and world peace’’ below.)
No doubt many problems confront any version of ethics that strives for a naturalistic
foundation. (For example: are moral judgments really understandable without appeal
to any a priori ethical principles? If there are moral facts or properties of the world, are
they just like other empirically discoverable ones? Can naturalism equally explain both
normative claims and moral motives?) Schopenhauer does not offer a definitive solution
to any of these and, as we have seen, his view struggles against certain metaphysical and
epistemological tenets of his own devising. However, what we do gain from studying
Schopenhauer’s ethics is an encounter with an imaginative way of attempting to ground
right conduct in the universal potential for compassion and moral sense that he holds
to be part of human nature.

Education
Schopenhauer’s comments on the compatibility of ethics and determinism and
on naturalizing ethics lead directly to conclusions that are of practical application
to educational philosophy. Let us assume (ex hypothesi), with our philosopher, that
heredity determines educability. This view is pertinent in two closely related ways: the
degree to which a person is educable is fixed by heredity; and whether he or she is open
to being influenced by new information or inputs is likewise. Even so, the possibility
remains for environmental (or external) factors to shape the course of learning and
behaviour formation.29 Indeed, within a deterministic framework, that is precisely the
function of every sort of education: parental and familial guidance, peer pressure,
schooling, and life experience. In each case, certain conditions or circumstances help turn
one’s conduct in a particular direction. And here we encounter the ethical core of
educational theory. For the question now is: which direction of development is it best to
encourage in young people? For Schopenhauer, there is no need to hesitate, searching for
an answer. As we have already seen, there are only three possible motivating incentives in
human life.30 Egoism cannot improve anybody or make the world a better place; it can
only focus the individual inwardly in a more intense way, thus promoting self-
centredness and selfishness. Malice yields acts of cruelty and degrades the web of
relationships upon which society and civilization depend. Compassion, however,
 378 Michael Allen Fox

motivates acts of ‘‘loving-kindness’’ (or philanthropy) and of justice (or fair and respectful
treatment of others). Furthermore, Schopenhauer reinforces the point by urging that
compassion alone calls forth behaviour that is of genuine moral worth, as he appeals to
our moral intuition that these kinds of acts are indisputably deserving of praise. The
reason is that they help others and thereby improve the world. It follows from the
foregoing that education should stress compassion in all its forms, in order to promote a
caring and benevolent cultural ethos. The global ramifications of such an approach are
emphasized today by the advocates of humane education, among others.31

Inner Peace and World Peace

Inner peace has been and remains much sought after, from the ataraxia that was the goal
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

of ancient Hellenistic philosophers to the pages of New Age self-help manuals and the
highest reaches of yoga, meditation and other spiritual practices of our time. I take inner
peace to be a combination of freedom from anxiety, calmness, ability to focus one’s
energy, full participation in the moment, and contentment. It is true that Schopenhauer’s
most evolved human being is an ascetic who has defeated all willing and desire within,
and achieves a kind of meta-empirical, trans-cognitive union with the cosmos. Nor does
he affirm that such an individual’s life would acquire additional value if he or she became
a bodhisattva—one who eschews nirvana, choosing rather to remain in contact with
others in order to help them achieve enlightenment too. Nevertheless, it may be argued
that Schopenhauer portrays a state of inner peace when he expounds and recommends
compassionate behaviour. This is because compassion, ‘‘the great mystery of ethics,’’
melts the barrier between self and other that normally prevails, and encourages
abandonment of the narrowing covetousness that generally governs our lives.32 By acting
out of empathy for another and in sympathy with him or her, one engages fully with
the present. There is a spontaneous response, a doing of what needs to be done.
Finally, when one acts in a way that is ‘‘free from all egoistic motives,’’ this ‘‘awaken[s] in
us that inward contentment called the good, satisfied, approving conscience.’’33
Schopenhauer is not merely saying the obvious—that one often feels good when
doing good—but that compassionate acts create an inner state of harmony and
equilibrium within the psyche, because these acts are in tune with the deepest
metaphysical truth about the world, namely, that we are fundamentally connected to one
another, not antagonistic and unrelated atoms of ego. Compassionate feelings confirm
who we are and what we are made of: ‘‘it is one and the same essence that manifests itself
in all living things . . . [and] compassion is the proper expression of that view.’’34
We see here that compassion, for Schopenhauer, arises from the deepest roots of our
being: the unity we share in the metaphysical will that is the source of all things.
Compassion is the intuitive sense that the differences between us are illusory; egoism
and also malice are grounded in the deceitfulness of the principium individuationis
(the principle of individualization, by means of which the will to live is manifested
in particular phenomena). But compassion is much more than simply learning to care
about others, or even to care about others as one does for oneself. Its motivating power
is not merely owing to intellectual or didactic exercises, though Schopenhauer does
tend to regard doing the right thing as coincidentally engaging in what we might
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 379

call ‘‘applied metaphysics.’’ It follows that Schopenhauer’s empirical basis for ethics is just
the beginning of the full story. Some will demur at this point, being unable or unwilling
to accept either his metaphysics or its denial of the ultimate reality of individuation.35
The burden of proof is on our philosopher, of course; but at least he does try to find
an explanation of why we feel compassion other than by appeal to a nebulous sense
of ‘‘common humanity.’’
Returning to the theme of peace, as Gandhi would argue, drawing on the great
wisdom traditions of both East and West, there can be no world peace without inner
peace.36 What does this mean? We can find the answer by comparing two different
approaches to world peace. One approach starts from the pursuit of non-violent means
for settling inter- and intra-national problems, works its way down to non-violent social
life, and then addresses individuals’ psychological quality of life. The other approach
begins with the individual’s mental outlook and works outward, and is expressed by the
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

slogan: ‘‘Peace begins with me.’’ That is, we all need to get our own personal house
in order so that the larger contexts of human affairs will be affected positively as a result.
While there are many advocates of both positions, they should not be seen as mutually
exclusive choices, and indeed are equally indispensable and complementary.37 But as our
concern here is with Schopenhauer’s references to inner peace, the relationship between
it and the larger picture must receive emphasis.
A world in which compassionate behaviour became the norm would be one in
which human beings had risen above the narrow confines of egoism and, a fortiori, had
given up malice as a motive for interactions with others. It would be a world in which the
foundations had been laid for unity, generosity, tolerance, and non-violent coexistence.
Seeing the other—however externally different—as internally identical, we would be
much more inclined to give mutual assistance and to work together toward common
ends. If loving-kindness and justice were to prevail in our dealings with others, it is
difficult to see how world peace could be far behind. There would be not only a cessation
of violent conflict but also of destructive and abusive relationships of all sorts, including
institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of genocide, torture, enslavement,
bullying, intimidation, forced deprivation and impoverishment, and succeeding at others’
expense. All of these (and many more) kinds of corrosive, anti-life and anti-human
behaviours are simply incompatible with a compassionate outlook and are unsustainable
in its light. While Schopenhauer did not envision such an outcome of his philosophy,
so far as one can tell, his thoughts seem to point strongly in this direction.
But can we hope for a compassionate world of this type to emerge if the bogy of
Schopenhauer’s determinism of character continues to haunt us? In other words, is it
possible that an appeal to the compassionate side of our nature can have any practical
effects? It would appear that those who are born compassionate will have a good chance
of remaining so, if not thwarted; but it seems equally clear that those who aren’t, have
little or no prospect in this regard. The latter might, in unusual situations, show a glimmer
of sympathy, but not much else. As far as truly malicious souls are concerned, hope
for compassionate behaviour does indeed strike one as misplaced. However, the same
cannot be said for those whose conduct is governed by egoism (i.e. most of us, most of
the time). The reason is that compassion can be shown to be in one’s best interest. Not
only does it sometimes lead to the reward of reciprocal assistance, it also makes the world
a better place in which to live, and thus improves the overall quality of life for everyone.
 380 Michael Allen Fox

An individual can of course take a conniving view of all this and feign compassion
in order to achieve personal benefits from so doing. But while it is certainly in the spirit
of Schopenhauer to maintain that being a compassionate person is in one’s self-interest,
this expression of self-interest need not be construed as superficial or viewed in a purely
instrumental way. And this is where we discover the possibility of a deeper connection
between egoism and compassion. Instruction in the ways of compassion (in short, an
ethical education) may serve as the introduction of new information that makes a
difference and hence shapes how character manifests itself. Such an education would
include reinforcement of kindness shown toward animals and other humans, learning
about the theory and practice of inner peace, studying the arts of negotiation and
compromise, and the like. The educative process so described is compatible with
determinism and fixed character formation, and other-regarding behaviour can become
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

equally second nature, through repetition, in the egoistic person as in the compassionate
one. I would even argue (although Schopenhauer doesn’t himself do so) that compassion
can override self-regard in the egocentric individual; for, if malice can overwhelm egoistic
self-interest, so that one can sacrifice one’s own weal in order to do evil to another,38
then the transcendence I am suggesting ought to be possible as well. Furthermore,
inasmuch as all three moral incentives are present to some degree in everybody,39 there is
something to build upon when conditioning people to be more compassionate. The
conclusion to be drawn is that many—perhaps most—of us can behave compassionately,
or more compassionately than we do. And it may even be the case as well that the actions
of those who are irrevocably malicious can be neutralized to some extent, if people
who are capable of acting compassionately toward them do so, notwithstanding their
evil deeds.
Now even though there are ways in which compassionate behaviour can be made
appealing to self-centred or even selfish persons, I think that Schopenhauer would rightly
insist that compassion embraced for its own sake is much more likely to produce a better
world; that compassionate individuals are a better bet for securing the future of humanity
than egoistic ones. This is, of course, a hypothesis that needs to be tested in experience.
But in view of the present agonized state of affairs on almost every level of human
interaction with other humans and with nature, a shift to compassion certainly seems long
overdue and a venture that could promise great rewards.
Finally, while I have tried to remain within Schopenhauer’s theoretical framework
in order to discuss his relevance for today, the alternative is always open to us of rejecting
his strict determinism. But even if we do this, we will still find that his ethics carries
an important message for those who quest after inner peace and world peace.

Non-human Animals and the Environment

In many ways, Schopenhauer’s ethical ideas about non-human animals were remarkably
ahead of his time. Because all living things manifest an identical underlying metaphysical
will, the same ‘‘eternal essence,’’ the similarity between animals and humans
‘‘is incomparably greater, both psychically and somatically,’’ than the differences; the
latter are owing simply to relative brain size and brain development.40 Many creatures,
besides humans, not only experience pain but are also capable of suffering.
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 381

A compassionate response from us is called forth by these particulars: because suffering is

universal, compassion must be directed toward sentient beings regardless of their species
membership, as Bentham had argued half a century before Schopenhauer.41
Schopenhauer was rightly disgusted by what he called ‘‘European systems of morality’’
(and sometimes summarily referred to as ‘‘Christian morality’’), which he brands as
‘‘revoltingly crude’’ in relation to animals, denying, as they do, that animals have rights or
that humans have direct duties to them.42 To these defective moralities, he juxtaposed
a radically different view of animals, embodied in the proposition (which he saw as an
obvious truth) that animals possess a morally significant status. He wrote vigorously
against the misuse of animals for ‘‘vivisection, hunting, coursing, bullfights, and horse
racing,’’ as well as the abuse of beasts of burden, and asserted that ‘‘whoever is cruel to
animals cannot be a good man.’’43 Schopenhauer considered that his discovery of the
genuine moral incentive is ‘‘further confirmed by the fact that the animals are also taken
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

under its protection.’’44

We see here that Schopenhauer believed non-human animals, as co-sufferers on this
planet, merited moral consideration of the same general sort as humans. Like Bentham,
he held that suffering matters in and of itself, and irrespective of the kind of being it
affects. We should do what we can to prevent or alleviate it. Schopenhauer’s dual ethical
principles, repeated many times, are: ‘‘Injure no one and help everyone as much as you
can.’’45 By extending the moral incentive of compassion to animals, Schopenhauer also
extends to them the principles of non-maleficence and benevolence. Yet it seems clear
that he would today be classified as an animal welfarist and not as an animal liberationist.
My basis for saying so is that, in the end, he resorts to a facile utilitarian argument
in order to justify meat eating and the use of work animals. To begin with, Schopenhauer
claims that animals have lower intelligence than humans, and, since suffering is a function
of intelligence, animals have a lesser capacity for suffering than humans.46 Therefore,
we may with a clear conscience eat them or give them burdens to bear, and this, for two
reasons: (1) non-human animals suffer less when used in these ways than humans would
by depriving themselves of their use; and (2) animal slaughter can in principle be made
painless, while putting them to work can be governed by prohibitions against cruelty.47
This is not the place to take issue with these claims;48 suffice it to say that, in addition to
containing some dubious assumptions, they would be strongly disputed by those who
follow an animal rights approach, toward which it seemed Schopenhauer had been
leaning. Not only this, but many would argue against (1)—also on utilitarian grounds—
that the optional (human) gustatory pleasure derived from eating meat does not outweigh
the (animal) pleasure thereby denied, plus the suffering caused by factory farming and
mechanized slaughter, or even that which is caused by ‘‘humane’’ animal husbandry and
slaughter. In any event, it does ring hollow for Schopenhauer first to condemn other
moralities that condone certain despicable animal-use practices, and then proceed to
justify others in the most shamelessly self-serving manner.
Beyond the application of Schopenhauer’s ethics to our treatment of animals, there
lies his theory’s potential for generating an environmental ethic. This territory has been
explored only slightly,49 and may have further promise. The essential starting point is
Schopenhauer’s conviction that everything that exists is a manifestation of the same
underlying source of energy and generation—the will. This includes both organic and
inorganic components of nature. Because all parts of nature (and at least some wholes,
 382 Michael Allen Fox

like species) have a common origin and are interdependent, they form a system upon
whose preservation all the parts are contingent. All living things, as phenomenal
manifestations of the one will, assert their will to live and are engaged in the continuous
struggle to survive and reproduce. Because this struggle is the cause of suffering, which is
the lot of all sentient life forms, the morality of compassion comes into play: our
obligation is to prevent suffering (within reason; we are not obliged to be the policemen
of nature, or to seek far and wide, with crusading zeal, for animals in need of assistance).
And a compassionate existence will be one that is guided by the principles of non-
maleficence and benevolence, as established earlier. This entails that, while nature is
rightly appropriated for our use (i.e. is of instrumental value), care must be taken to avoid
needlessly destructive behaviour that will endanger non-human animal species’ habitats
and that will have a deleterious impact on the needs of present and future human persons.
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

In short, the watchword for our own species is: secure the necessities of life, but do as
little harm along the way as possible, and do good when possible. In short: foreclose as
few options as possible, and be a good citizen of the environment. Doing good, from an
ecological perspective, would involve being willing to sacrifice non-basic human interests
if and when they: (a) come into conflict with the more basic interests of members of other
species; and (b) would be the cause of preventable suffering.50
We have here a plausible sketch of the direction in which an environmental ethic
that draws on Schopenhauer’s ideas might develop. Of course, many issues would be
encountered along the way, such as Schopenhauer’s advocacy of meat eating (which I
believe is inconsistent for any environmental ethicist51); whether there are any grounds
for ascribing intrinsic as well as instrumental value to nature; what counts as basic and
non-basic interests; and so on. These problems are not unique to Schopenhauerian
environmental ethics; indeed, they face every theory in the field. What is important here
is merely to appreciate that there is a viable and attractive version of environmental ethics
that derives from his approach. This outlook has special strengths because we can extract
from Schopenhauer’s ethical principles the following general directives: (1) form a
compassionate kinship with other sentient beings; (2) take on the role of benevolent
stewards of nature; and (3) choose lifestyles that cause minimal harm to fellow humans,
non-humans and the planet. The difficulties of implementing an environmental ethic that
is not merely an extension of traditional moral theory cannot be overestimated, but the
direction Schopenhauer sketches out for us embraces what’s best in animal rights/intrinsic
value views (in 1 and 3) and those that centre on anthropocentric concerns/instrumental
value (in 2 and 3).

Conclusion
If the case I have tried to make for the contemporary relevance of Schopenhauer’s ethics
is convincing, it may seem that his influence on the field could be quite comprehensive.
And this possibility raises a final issue: can a complete ethic be based on compassion?
This is a very large question which I cannot hope to settle here, but a few observations are
in order.
First, I would like to address Schopenhauer’s contention that women are more
likely to exhibit loving-kindness in their behaviour, men more likely to show justice.
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 383

These judgments, as one might anticipate, are buttressed by stereotypes of female and
male psychology (women are intuitive, men rational; men follow principles, women act
from the heart; and so on), and by gratuitously insulting remarks directed against women
(e.g. ‘‘The very thought of women administering justice raises a laugh’’). But then,
immediately after, he surprises us with the assertion that ‘‘the sisters of mercy surpass even
the brothers of charity.’’52 What is going on here? Consider the two following
arguments, drawn from On the Basis of Morality (section numbers indicated in
parentheses):
1. One must be able to conceptualize or think abstractly in order to adhere to
principles. (17)
2. One must adhere to principles in order to be able to administer justice. (17)
3. Men can, women cannot, conceptualize or think abstractly. (17)
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

4. Therefore, men can, women cannot, adhere to principles. (17)

5. Therefore, men can, women cannot, administer justice. (17)
But (second argument):
1. Justice and philanthropy (loving-kindness) are ‘‘cardinal virtues, since from them all
the others follow practically, and may be derived theoretically.’’ (17)53
2. ‘‘Compassion . . . is the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness.’’
(16; emphasis in original)
3. Women are ‘‘decidedly more easily susceptible’’ to compassionate feelings. (17)
4. Therefore, women are more directly connected to the natural fountainhead of all
virtues, ‘‘the original source or first foundation of morality.’’ (17)
Granted, I have supplied the conclusion of the second argument (all other premises and
conclusions in both arguments, however, come directly from Schopenhauer); yet it seems
clear that this is where the logic of the philosopher’s thought-process leads us.
If, as Schopenhauer claims, ‘‘injustice is the fundamental failing of the female
character,’’54 then surely cruelty (lack of compassion) must be the characteristic male
failing. Which is worse, it is hard to say. (Arguably cruelty is, because it affects all sentient
life forms.) My view is that Schopenhauer (rightly or wrongly) perceives women as more
compassionate and more concerned with others’ welfare than men and is struggling in
his ethical writings with his own inner conflict over the opposite sex. This interpretation
is strengthened by the observation that in an early writing, he refers to his own work as
a foetus gestating in its mother’s body, and to himself as giving birth to a beloved
child55—in effect (like many other male writers) stealing pregnancy and childbirth from
women. And even though women are allegedly inferior to men in rationality, he
nonetheless offers a telling example of how the basic moral incentive can act as a restraint:
‘‘compassion will prevent me [notice: me] from seeking to satisfy my desires at the
expense of women’s happiness.’’56 Oddly, feminist scholarship has not yet analysed
Schopenhauer’s ambivalence toward women as it has, say, Hegel’s or Nietzsche’s. What
he really thought of women, and whether the topic of compassion needs to be treated
differently for women than for men, then, remain open questions for Schopenhauer
enthusiasts.
On the larger question raised above, I tentatively endorse the position
that compassion is sufficient as a foundation for ethics because it leads to the principles
 384 Michael Allen Fox

of non-maleficence and benevolence (or beneficence), as Schopenhauer rightly notes.

It also undergirds acts of loving-kindness and justice, as again he correctly perceives.
What more could be required of us in order to achieve a positive moral order in the
world? As a guide to behaviour toward others (both human and non-human) and
in general, compassion seems to be a sufficient ethic, particularly for those who have
attained a high level of moral and spiritual maturity, or who simply have a
‘‘compassionate nature.’’ For as Schopenhauer states, ‘‘Boundless compassion for all
living beings is the finest and surest guarantee of pure moral conduct, and needs no
casuistry.’’57 We are not all fully realized Buddhas; however, as noted earlier,
Schopenhauer maintains that we each have some element of compassion within us,
and moral principles exist to help keep us on the right track. The problem is not so much
whether compassion can thrive, or produces good results when acted upon; rather, it is
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

whether the kinds of situations a normative ethical theory must range over are all capable
of being dealt with by compassionate acts.
This again is a big topic, which cannot be fully explored here. Many obvious
examples spring to mind where ethical conduct is required, and where compassion
(viewed as grounded in co-suffering) does not seem relevant: deciding how to treat one’s
children equitably; telling the truth, when the only suffering that is likely to result is one’s
own; keeping a promise made to a person now dead; and so on. Richard Taylor, in
Good and Evil: A New Direction, has proposed a voluntaristic theory of morality, indebted
to Schopenhauer’s insight that humans are primarily desiring rather than rational beings.58
Indeed, Taylor goes so far as to claim that no purely rational approach can kindle in
anyone a sense of moral obligation—even (or especially) toward those who are destitute:
‘‘One will search in vain for any reason why I should have more concern for a starving
million than for a bit of jam to add to my bread.’’59 We either resonate with the plight of
others or we simply don’t care enough to help them. If the former, we may dress up our
concern in the garb of rational discourse, but what really grabs us and motivates our
behaviour is an affective, not a rational appeal.
While giving generous recognition to the scope of compassion, Taylor nonetheless
argues that there is a need to go beyond it:
If moral goodness could shine forth only in the presence of suffering, it would be
limited indeed and be essentially negative. One would, therefore, expect there to be a
more positive impulse of love, a type of loving kindness not virtually wrenched from
one by a pathetic spectacle, but one that can add its warmth to a scene already filled
with sweetness and really needing nothing more.60

He then classifies compassion as a kind of love (‘‘commiseratio, misericordia’’), adding that it

is appropriately supplemented by three other forms of love that round out a more
complete picture of this most important moral emotion: ‘‘philia,’’ ‘‘eros/amor’’ and ‘‘agapé/
caritas’’ (friendship, sexual love and selfless love, respectively). Taylor has made a
significant contribution to ethics with this theory, which breaks away from the
rationalistic tradition, and interprets love as a moral incentive rather than as a virtue.
He also performs a service to scholarship by harvesting good ideas from Schopenhauer,
while eschewing that philosopher’s negativism and world-weariness. The latter are
products of Schopenhauer’s tendency to dwell on the negative, and even to enshrine this
in his metaphysics of the will, doctrine of intelligible character, reflections on human
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 385

nature, and psychology of human motivation. We can’t easily disregard any of these and
still preserve what is distinctive about Schopenhauer’s thought. But we can try, as I have
done, to focus on the more constructive elements of his teachings, and hope to achieve
thereby some important insights that we can make use of in philosophy and in life.
In line with these observations, it might be argued that compassion is not simply
responding to the sufferings of others (human or non-human), not just having ‘‘loving
kindness . . . wrenched from one by a pathetic spectacle.’’ What more is it? We could
regard compassion as a model for feeling that is directed toward the other; that embraces
him, her or it; that marks the other as a morally significant being deserving of our
attention, caring concern and effort.61 We’re all in the same boat; that is the first precept
of caring concern, and it’s best brought home to us through compassionate feeling.
Love, as a physical and psychological bond with those who feed us, nurture us and make
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

us feel secure and loved, may be our initial emotion in life, but compassion, according to
the account I am suggesting, is our original moral emotion. The other forms of love that
Taylor identifies become shaped and enriched by compassion in their mature state.
Perhaps, then, compassion is not a complete ethic but is instead the cornerstone of one.
Schopenhauer draws our attention to this possibility and awakens interest in it, and this is
arguably his most lasting contribution to ethics.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his great appreciation to the anonymous reviewer for
The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, whose generous and constructive comments
have been enormously helpful in revising this essay for publication.

Notes
1. Julian Young, ‘‘Schopenhauer’s Critique of Kantian Ethics,’’ Kant-Studien 75 (1984):
191–212; John E. Atwell, Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought (Dordrecht: Nijhoff,
1986); Hermann Schweppenhauser, ‘‘Schopenhauers Kritik der Kantischen Moralphiloso-
phie,’’ Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 69 (1988): 409–16; David E. Cartwright, ‘‘Schopenhauer’s
Narrower Sense of Morality,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, ed. Christopher
Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 252–92.
2. Admittedly, in the case of Descartes, Heidegger and Sartre, in particular, there are those who
believe that the philosophy and the biography have a close connection, so not all of these
examples may be equally persuasive.
3. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (1819; 2nd edn, 1844), trans.
E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), vol. 1, bk. 4, sec. 68.
4. Elizabeth Telfer, Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food (London: Routledge, 1996), 80.
5. Arthur Schopenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will (1841), trans. Konstantin Kolenda
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts, 1960).
6. The notion of avoidability is suspect because it suggests that actions flowing from free choices
are either arbitrary (unintelligible), uncaused or both.
7. Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, bk. 4, sec. 53.
8. Ibid., sec. 66.
9. Ibid., vol. 2, suppl. chap. 47, 597.
10. John E. Atwell, Schopenhauer: The Human Character (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1990), 73.
 386 Michael Allen Fox

11. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1847), trans.
E. F. J. Payne (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), chap. 6, sec. 43 (emphasis in original).
(Schopenhauer’s doctoral dissertation, 1813.)
12. F. C. White, On Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1992), 132.
13. Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, bk. 4, sec. 66.
14. Ibid., vol. 2, suppl. chap. 47, 600.
15. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality (1841), trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), sec. 17.
16. Schopenhauer maintains, toward the end of World as Will and Representation, that with
ultimate metaphysical insight there may come about ‘‘an entire suppression of the [intelligible]
character,’’ not as a result of personal choice, but more as an ‘‘effect of grace’’ or a ‘‘new birth’’
(vol. 1, sec. 70; emphasis in original). This most obscure sense of freedom is connected with
his eschatological doctrine of ‘‘renunciation of the will,’’ which we needn’t investigate here.
17. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 13 (emphasis in original).
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

18. Ibid., sec. 14.

19. Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, bk. 4, sec. 53.
20. Sigmund Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, in Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of
Psycho-Analysis, 1966–74), trans. and ed. James Strachey et al., vols. 14, 15–16; Sigmund
Freud, ‘‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis,’’ in Complete Works, 17, 143–44;
Sigmund Freud, ‘‘An Autobiographical Study,’’ in Complete Works, 20, 59–60.
21. I believe that this is a mistake. Utilitarianism, for example, is a universalistic moral theory
according to which everyone counts equally. This means that while my interests are of no
greater importance than anyone else’s, they are of no lesser importance either.
22. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 22.
23. Ibid., sec. 19, no. 1.
24. Atwell, Schopenhauer, 140–42, 213–14.
25. Ibid., 141.
26. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 16 (emphasis in original).
27. Atwell, Schopenhauer, 213.
28. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 16.
29. For the purpose of this discussion, we shall set aside the anomalies in Schopenhauer’s
extreme doctrine of intelligible character, which he describes, variously, as: ‘‘an act of
will outside time’’ (World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, sec. 55), ‘‘innate and ineradicable’’
and ‘‘the essential constitution’’ of the empirical or phenomenal self (On the Basis of Morality,
sec. 20).
30. Atwell suggests that asceticism might be added to the list (Schopenhauer, 92); Richard Taylor
proposes that we add self-hatred (Good and Evil: A New Direction [Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1984], 201–4).
31. David Selby, EarthKind: A Teacher’s Handbook on Humane Education (Stoke-on-Trent, UK:
Trentham Books, 1995).
32. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 16.
33. Ibid., sec. 18.
34. Ibid., sec. 22.
35. That Schopenhauer regards individuals as empirically real but transcendentally ideal only
compounds the problem of understanding his ethics and rendering it internally consistent
(see World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, suppl. chap. 1).
36. Gandhi on Non-Violence: Selected Texts from Mohandas K. Gandhi’s Non-Violence in Peace and
War, ed. Thomas Merton (New York: New Directions, 1965).
37. Michael Allen Fox, ‘‘Peace,’’ Darshana International 31 (1991): 48–56.
38. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 20.
39. Ibid., secs. 14, 20.
40. Ibid., sec. 8; sec. 19, no. 7.
 The Contemporary Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 387

41. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: T. Payne,
1789), chap. 19, sec. 1.
42. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 19, no. 7.
43. Ibid., sec. 8; sec. 19, no. 7.
44. Ibid., sec. 19, no. 7 (emphasis in original).
45. Ibid., sec. 16.
46. Ibid., sec. 19, no. 7; sec. 20.
47. Ibid., sec. 19, no. 7; Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, bk. 4, sec. 66,
n. 53.
48. For a detailed statement of the case against meat eating, see Michael Allen Fox, Deep
Vegetarianism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1999), especially chaps. 5–7.
49. Hans-Martin Sass, ‘‘Mensch und Umwelt,’’ Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 61 (1980): 1–13;
Gary E. Varner, ‘‘The Schopenhauerian Challenge in Environmental Ethics,’’ Environmental
Ethics 7 (1985): 209–30; David E. Cartwright, ‘‘Varner’s Challenge to Environmental Ethics,’’
Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 189–90.
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 13:26 30 October 2014

50. The basic/non-basic distinction has been developed in considerable detail (using
the terminology of needs rather than interests) by Paul W. Taylor in his classic work
Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986).
51. See Michael Allen Fox, ‘‘Environmental Ethics and the Ideology of Meat Eating,’’ Between the
Species 9 (1993): 121–32, where this issue is considered; see also Fox, Deep Vegetarianism,
chap. 8, for discussion of the limits to the obligation to be a vegetarian.
52. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 17.
53. Elsewhere, Schopenhauer states, inconsistently, that ‘‘justice . . . is the first and really cardinal
virtue’’ (Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 14 [emphasis in original]; and repeated
in sec. 18).
54. Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays (1852), trans.
E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), vol. 2, no. 27, 617 (emphasis in original).
55. Arthur Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes, trans. E. F. J. Payne, ed.
Arthur Hübscher (Oxford: Berg, 1988), vol. 1, para. 92.
56. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, sec. 17.
57. Ibid., sec. 19, no. 4.
58. See above, note 30.
59. Taylor, Good and Evil, 221 (emphasis in original).
60. Ibid., 224.
61. Michael Allen Fox, ‘‘Compassion as an Antidote to Cruelty,’’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29
(2006), in press.