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Team Code: TC-VGURC721

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC


OF EL DORADO
(Criminal Writ Petition No. 1/2020)

_______________________________________________________
Sebastian………...……………………........................... Petitioner
V.
Narcotics Control Bureau of San Lorenzo …………Respondent
El Dorado Ministry of Home Affairs…………...……. Respondent
________________________________________________________

ON SUBMISSION TO THE JUSTICE OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME


COURT

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

Memorial on Behalf of the Petitioner

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………….
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………...
TABLE OF CASES
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………...
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………...
ISSUES RAISED………………….……………………………………………………
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………….

ISSUE I ………………………………………………………………………………....
WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF EL DORADO IS
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
ISSUE II.…………………………………………………………………………………
WHETHER THE ISSUANCE OF LOOK OUT NOTICE BY THE EL DORADO
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION IS BAD IN THE EYES OF LAW AND VIOLATES
ARTICLE 21, 14 AND 19(d) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL
DORADO?
ISSUE III.…………………………………………………………………………………
WHETHER A STATEMENT AMOUNTING TO CONFESSION UNDER SECTION
67 OF THE NDPS ACT CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?

PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………

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LIST OF ABBRIEVATIONS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

¶ Paragraph

Hon’ble Honourable

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter

A.I.R. All India Reporter

& And

Sec. Section

Vol. Volume

FIR First Information Report

SC Supreme Court

Ed. Edition

Art. Article

HC High Court

p. Page

pp. Pages

Ors Others

v. Versus

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TABLE OF CASES
• Khalid Parvez v. Competent Authority,2014 SC 744
• Firstlin v. State of Madras, Crl O.P. Nos. 46 of 2017
• Sumer Singh Salkan v. Assistant Director & Others. WP(Crl) No. 1315/2008
• Gujarat Electricity Board v. Thakar Hasmukhhai Khelshankar, April 11, 2012
• Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd, AIR 2003 SC 2120
• M.G Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, SLP Nos. 24115 of 1996
• Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461
• Gopichand v. Delhi Administration,1959 AIR 609, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 87
• Kesar Enterprises v. State of U.P, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6896 OF 2002
• R. Sulochana Devi v. D.M Sujatha.,2004 Latest Caselaw 565 SC
• State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad,1961 AIR 293, 1961 SCR (1) 970
• Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer Government
of India, 1967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525
• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88
• R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530
• State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights CIVIL
APPEAL NOS.6249-6250 0F 2001
• Nirmal Singh Kehlon v. State of Punjab, CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6200-6201 OF 2008
• Kharak Singh v. State of UP, 1963 AIR 1295
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
• Toofan Singh v. State of T.N. (2013) 16 SCC 31
• Badaku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore (1966) 3 SCR 698
• Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828
• State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram AIR 1962 SC 276
• Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab (2008) SC 681
• Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1951 AIR 41
• Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 1975 AIR 1378
• Sumer Singh Salkan v. Ranjeet Narayan & Ors., CS (OS) No. 2315/2011

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• Azhar Alam v. Commissioner of Police & Anr., 1992 (1) ALT 480
• Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, Appeal (Crl.) 788 of 2005

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTORY COMPILATIONS
❖ CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
❖ CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
❖ NARCOTICS DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1985
❖ INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT. 1872
❖ THE PASSPORT ACT, 1967

BOOKS AND DIGESTS


❖ Dibyajyoti De, Guide to Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act (Ist edn.
Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, 2003)
❖ H.M Seervai. Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing Co.2010)
❖ M.P. Jain. Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn. LexisNexis, 2014)
❖ P.K Majumdar and R.P Kataria, Commentary on the Constitution of India (10th edn.
Orient Publishing Company, 2009)
❖ Ratanlal And Dhirajlal. The Law of Evidence (25th edition, LexisNexis, 2013)

WEB SOURCES
❖ www.scconline.com
❖ www.manupatrafast.com
❖ www.lexisnexisacademic.com
❖ www.judis.nic.in
❖ www.indiankanoon.com

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JURISDICTION

With regard to the circumstances that have been presented in the instant case, the petitioner
submits before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of El Dorado, that it has the inherent jurisdiction
to try, entertain and dispose conferring jurisdiction est potestas de public introduota, cum
necessitate juris dicendi1 in the present case by virtue of Article 32 of the Constitution of El
Dorado, 1950.

“Article 32- Right to Constitutional Remedies:

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part


(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of
its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause
(2)
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution

1
Meaning: jurisdiction is the power introduced for the public good, on the account of the necessity of expounding
the law.

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FACTS
• The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 is an act of the parliament
of the Republic of El Dorado. The Act under its ambit prohibits a person from
production, cultivation, sale, possession, transportation and consumption of any
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance.
• The case is based on the information received after the arrest of Nick Adams and Sir
Anthony Absolute on 31.12.2019 by the NCB of San Lorenzo. Based on the reply
tendered by Nick Adams under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, the involvement of Harry
Angstrom, Dr. Aziz, Lady Brett Ashley and Jake Barnes in illicit trafficking of drugs
also comes to light.
• In his reply under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, Nick Adams also disclosed that Harry
Angstrom of San Lorenzo, was involved in illicit trafficking of the drugs seized from
him and his role was limited to pay the amount against the consignment in Bitcoin, a
cryptocurrency, for purchasing the drugs.
• Subsequently, Harry Angstrom is served a notice to appear before the Investigating
Officer, and on such appearance on 30.01.2020, he makes his statement and is released
without being made an accused. As per the information available with the NCB of San
Lorenzo, Harry Angstrom deposited cash through the Cash deposit machine at the Olive
Club Branch of the Swiss bank account of Dr. Aziz to procure drugs.
• In a reply to a notice under Section 67 of the NDPS Act served to Dr Aziz, he deposed
his voluntary statement wherein he confessed to providing the seized drugs to Harry
Angstrom through his friend Sebastian (the petitioner). He also revealed that Sebastian
procured the drugs in question to Harry Angstrom from one his vendors at San Marcos,
who shipped it directly to Angstrom in San Lorenzo through a Heaven Courier Service.
• On a subsequent enquiry at the Heaven Courier office, San Lorenzo branch, it is
revealed that three consignments were delivered to Harry Angstrom out of which one
was returned after his arrest. The consignor was found to be Nick Carter and with
further search at his premised by the NCB of San Lorenzo and San Marcos, drugs were
seized and he confessed to procuring drugs from foreign countries and supplying to
people in El Dorado including Harry Angstrom of San Lorenzo.
• Nick Carter also confessed to being a drug vendor of an illicit online drug market which
he accessed with the help of a mobile application named “Drug-Pleasure” and procured

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drugs from there. He also revealed that he supplied drugs to Harry Angstrom on the
instructions of Sebastian, who made payments to him in Bitcoin.
• On 30.04.2020, an arrest warrant was issued against the petitioner, Sebastian by Ld.
Special Judge, NDPS Court, San Lorenzo in the NDPS Case No. 001/2020 under the
provision of section 8 (c) r/w 29, 22a, 22c and 27 of the NDPS Act.
• On 01.05.2021, the Officers of NCB of San Lorenzo forwarded a request to issue a
Look Out Circular in the name of the Petitioner and accordingly El Dorado Ministry of
Home Affairs opened a Look Out Circular No. 54321/2021.
• After the issuance of Look-Out Circular on 01.05.2021, a notice was issued to the
Petitioner to appear before the IO on 30.05.2021 at the NCB of San Lorenzo and the
same was served to his brother-in-law, Mr. Martin on 20.05.2021.
• The petitioner had shifted to the Republic of Florin with his family and was not in
contact with his relatives in San Lorenzo, Republic of El Dorado, he got to know about
the Look-Out Circular issued against him when after a few days his brother -in-law
managed to contact him. Hence, aggrieved by the order dated 01.05.2021 passed by the
El Dorado Ministry of Home Affairs, he filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court
of the Republic of El Dorado under Article 32 of its constitution for adjudication of
issues related to protection of his fundamental rights under article 14, 19 (b) and 21
enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of El Dorado.

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ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE-I

WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER


BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL
DORADO IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

ISSUE-II

WHETHER THE ISSUANCE OF LOOK-OUT NOTICE BY THE EL DORADO


BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION IS BAD IN THE EYES OF LAW AND VIOLATED
ARTICLE 21, 14 AND 19(D) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
EL DORADO?

ISSUE-III

WHETHER A STATEMENT AMOUNTING TO CONFESSION UNDER


SECTION 67 OF THE NDPS ACT CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I
Whether the present Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of El Dorado is maintainable or not?
The counsel humbly submits that the writ petition is maintainable under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of the Republic of El Dorado. The Public Interest Litigation under Art.32 can be
invoked when there is an infringement of a fundamental right. Art.32 is an important and
integral part of the constitution of the Republic of El Dorado. Also, Art.32 is the provision that
helps the citizens to approach the S.C. for relief and remedy. The PIL is filed for the benefit of
the public whenever a fundamental right is violated. The petition in its broader sense also seeks
to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens against the coercive and arbitrary actions of the
state. Right to Equality before law and equal protection of the laws is governed under Art. 14.
Right to freedom of movement is governed under Art. 19(d). Right to life and liberty is
governed under Art. 21. This Writ petition is filed to protect these rights to the petitioner.
Therefore, the PIL is maintainable.

ISSUE II
Whether the issuance of Look-out notice by the El Dorado Bureau of Immigration is bad
in the eyes of law and violates Article 21, 14 and 19(d) of the constitution of the republic
of El Dorado?
The equality clause of the constitution does not speak of mere formal equality before law but
embodies the real concept of real and substantive equality, strikes at these inequalities. In the
present case the petitioners feel that the act is violating article 14. Art. 14 ensures to all citizens
equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and requires the due procedure of the
law to be followed. The absence of proper procedure shall lead to such action be deemed as
arbitrary and in contravention of the law. In the present case, the issuance of an arrest warrant
and a Look-out notice before a summons to the petitioner is unreasonable and in deviation from
the procedure established by law. Art.19(d) provides to all citizens the freedom to move within
the territory of the Republic of El Dorado. The issuance of a Look Out Circular in the name of
the petitioner under Sec. 10B of the Passport Act, 1967, unreasonably restricts the petitioner’s
right to move within the territory of El Dorado. Art. 21 secures to all citizens the right to life
and personal liberty. No one can be deprived of this right except for the procedure established
by law, as abovementioned, the procedure followed is faulty as it is important to issue summons

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to the person before issuing a look out circular in his name. In the present case, an arrest warrant
and look out circular precede the summons; thus, the issue of the lookout circular is
unreasonable and arbitrary.

ISSUE III
Whether a statement amounting to confession under S. 67 of the NDPS Act is
constitutionally admissible in evidence?
It is humbly submitted before the hon'ble Supreme court of El Dorado that a statement
amounting to confession under S.67 of the NDPS Act. 1985 is constitutionally inadmissible in
evidence. It is argued that, in any case, confessional statement recorded. in absence of a
magistrate is as the excise official recording the statement is to be treated as "police officer"
and thus, the evidential value of the statement recorded before him is hit by the provisions of
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act which is exactly the situation in the pertinent case.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE:1

➢ WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER


BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL
DORADO IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
➢ It is the humble contention of the council that the Writ Petition under Art. 32 2 is
maintainable in this Hon’ble court. A person, whose Fundamental Right is affected has
standing to file petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The impugned order of the
Eldorado Ministry of Home Affairs dated 1.05.2021 to issue a Look Out Circular in the
name of the petitioner is unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of the Fundamental Rights
of the petitioner under Art.14, 19(d) and 21. The petitioner also has a Locus Standi as he is
subject to the above Fundamental Rights which are enforceable.
➢ It is submitted that the act of issuing a look out circular against the petitioner before issuing
him a summons is in contravention of the principle of natural justice. The aim of the rule
of natural justice is to secure or prevent miscarriage of justice. “Audi alterum partem” or
listening to the other side is a vital aspect of the principle of natural justice. In the present
case, the petitioner has not been given affair chance to participate in the inquiry unlike the
other accused and has not been allowed to elicit a response under Art. 67 of the NDPS Act.
➢ It is clearly held in the case of Khalid Parvez v. Competent Authority3 that where a
statutory provision does not exclude the principle of natural justice, the right to be heard
can be assumed and that the orders of any competent authority will be illegal if they are
made without providing the affected person an opportunity to being heard.
➢ In addition to the abovementioned, it is concluded in Firstlin v. State of Madras. 4, that
where a look-out circular was issued against the plaintiff without any summons, such Look-
out circular against the petitioner was ordered to be withdrawn.
➢ The act of summoning the plaintiff on 30.5.2021, a month after the look-out circular is
issued in his name on 1.05.2021 show that he has not been afforded a fair opportunity to be
heard and his right to be heard under the principle of natural justice is violated.

2
Constitution of India
3
Khalid Parvez v. Competent Authority,2014 SC 744
4
Firstlin v. State of Madras, Crl O.P. Nos. 46 of 2017

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➢ The judgement in the case of Firstlin v. State of Madras5 also points towards a grave
procedural error in the enquiry and the subsequent issue of the lookout circular. The look-
out circular has been issued in a premature haste. In Sumer Singh Salkan v. Assistant
Director & Others.6, the Delhi High Court held that recourse to a look-out circular should
only be taken by an investigating agency in case of cognizable offences under IPC or other
penal laws where the accused was deliberately evading arrest or not appearing in trial court
despite a non-bailable warrant and other coercive measures and there was a likelihood of
the accused leaving the country to evade trial or arrest.
➢ The principles laid down in the above judgement have also been incorporated into the
Office Memorandum No. 250/6/31/2010 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
the Republic of El Dorado dated 27.10.2010 that laid down the principles to issue Look-
out notice. As per the guidelines laid down in the abovementioned office memorandum, the
condition precedent for issuance of a look-out circular was an attempt to evade arrest. In
the present case, it counsel for the petitioner contends that there is no basis to show that the
petitioner was intentionally evading arrest. Mere absence from the state of San Lorenzo
cannot alone be considered as grounds for a guilty mind and subsequent evasion from
arrest. It is also submitted that the issuance of a look-out notice is amenable to judicial
review under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India and that such issuance is not equivalent
to the decision of a tribunal or a judicial authority.
➢ Blackstone’s theory of natural rights cannot be rejected as totally irrelevant If we have
advanced today towards higher civilization and in a more enlightened era, we cannot lag
behind what, at any rate, was the meaning given to ’personal. liberty’ long ago by
Blackstone. Both the rights of personal security and personal liberty recognised by what
Blackstone termed ’natural law’ are embodied in Act. 21 of the Constitution.
➢ On the basis of the arguments put forth above, the counsel for the petitioner contends that
there exists a grave procedural error on part of the respondents and that the principles of
the natural justice have been violated. Relying upon the decisions in Gujarat Electricity
Board v. Thakar Hasmukhhai Khelshankar7, where a petition to rectify a grave procedural
error was held to be maintainable and in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd8, where

5
Ibid
6
Sumer Singh Salkan v. Assistant Director & Others. WP(Crl) No. 1315/2008
7
Gujarat Electricity Board v. Thakar Hasmukhhai Khelshankar, April 11, 2012
8
Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd, AIR 2003 SC 2120

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the hon’ble court held that the petition where the petitioner seeks enforcement of a
fundamental right or where principles of natural justice have been violated is maintainable,
the counsel humbly pray that this writ petition is maintainable.

ISSUE:2

➢ WHETHER THE ISSUANCE OF LOOK-OUT NOTICE BY THE EL DORADO


BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION IS BAD IN THE EYES OF LAW AND VIOLATED
ARTICLE 21, 14 AND 19(D) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
EL DORADO?
➢ Art. 14 secures to the citizens of the Republic of El Dorado Equality before law where the
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws
within the territory of India. The state shall not deny to any person equality before law or
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
➢ The object of equality before law is to ensure that all persons are treated on equal footing
by the state and that there is no discrimination as to detriment of one as against another.
➢ Equality is the basic feature of the constitution of India and treatment of equals unequally
will be violation of the basic structure of the constitution of India as held in M.G
Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka9. Even a constitutional amendment which offends
basic features of the constitution is declared invalid. As held in the landmark case of
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela.10, neither Parliament nor any State legislature can
transgress the principle of Equality. The equality clause under Art.14 of the constitution
does not speak of mere formal equality before law but embodies the real concept of real
and substantive equality, strikes at inequalities.
➢ Equal protection of laws would mean that in equal circumstances, persons are entitled to
equal treatment under the law and the law should be equally administered to them.
➢ In the present case where the other accused have been allowed to participate in the enquiry
and be heard and subsequently tender replies under Sec. 67 of the NDPS Act, the petitioner
hasn’t been subject to the same and has an arbitrary arrest warrant and lookout notice issued
against him arbitrarily and unreasonably with a summons only served to him one month
after the issue of the abovementioned look-out notice. The counsel for the petitioner

9
M.G Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, SLP Nos. 24115 of 1996
10
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

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contends the issuance of the look-out notice as being arbitrary and issued in premature
haste.
➢ The Office Memorandum no. 25016/31/2010 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of the Republic of El Dorado, dated 27.10.2010 states that a request for issuance of a look-
out notice would necessarily have to contain reasons for such a request.
➢ The counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgement in the case of Silent Valley v. State
of Andhra Pradesh., further submits that an order if passed without recording of reasons
would be arbitrary. If a state action is challenged on the grounds of arbitrariness, mere
existence of power is not sufficient to answer. The agency would have to satisfy that the
action was taken after considering all relevant factors.
➢ The look-out circular issued by the respondent is not immune from judicial review and (as
held in Gopichand v. Delhi Administration11) administrative action which violates equality
that may be based on a statute or may purely be an executive action of non-statutory nature,
in either case, a statutory or non-statutory order of the executive which is arbitrary can be
set aside.
➢ The arbitrary actions of the respondent vis a vis the issuance of the look-out notice also
violate the principle of natural justice as it is under the onus of the principle of natural
justice to keep in check the arbitrary exercise of power by the state or its functionaries as
held in Kesar Enterprises v. State of U. P12.
➢ It is also submitted that the petitioner was not given reasonable notice with regards to the
actions taken against him in the investigation especially that of the issuance of the arrest
warrant and look-out circular before the issue of summons to him. The abovementioned
aberrations on part of the respondent also indicate a grave procedural error. The counsel
for the petitioner here relies on the decision in the case of R. Sulochana Devi v. D.M
Sujatha.13, wherein it was held that an order passed by an authority which is not in
accordance with law and no notice was communicated to the party, it would be a nullity
and need not be challenged in a court of law.
➢ In this prayer for withdrawal of the look-out notice issued against the petitioner on
01.05.2021, the counsel also submits that equality before law and equal protection of the
laws is not merely limited in its application to the jurisdiction of executive action but it is

11
Gopichand v. Delhi Administration,1959 AIR 609, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 87
12
Kesar Enterprises v. State of U.P, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6896 OF 2002
13
R. Sulochana Devi v. D.M Sujatha.,2004 Latest Caselaw 565 SC

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also available in respect of proceedings before the courts and tribunals where law is applied
in the interest of administration of justice. (Amita Kushwaha v. Pushp Sudan)
➢ Art.19(d) guarantees to a citizen the right to move freely throughout the territory of India.
The right to move means the right of locomotion and the qualifying adverb ‘freely’
connotes that the freedom to move is without a restriction and absolute, i.e., to move
wherever one likes, wherever one likes and however one likes, subject to valid laws enacted
under clause (5).
➢ Externment or internment orders like such in the present case would undoubtedly curtail
the freedom guaranteed in clause (1)(d). The restriction on movement put up through the
look-out notice in the present case in no way is struck by the reasonable restrictions in the
interest of the general public or for the protection of the interest of the Scheduled Tribes as
provided under clause (5).
➢ It is submitted that in an order passed by this hon’ble court in State of M.P. v. Baldeo
Prasad14, setting aside an externment order against the petitioner it held that where there
was a statute empowering the authorities to take preventive action against the citizens, it
was essential that it should expressly make the duty of the authorities to satisfy themselves
of the existence of conditions precedent to the exercise of the power.
➢ In the present case, no grounds or reasons for issuance of the look-out circular or an arrest
warrant preceding a summons have been recorded by the respondents, who in the
contention of the counsel for the petitioner, have acted unreasonably and in premature
haste.
➢ An order impounding a passport must be made quasi judicially. This was not done in the
present case. It cannot be said that a good enough reason has been shown to exist for
impounding the passport of the petitioner. The petitioner had no opportunity of showing
that the ground for impounding it given in this Court either does not exist or has no bearing
on public interest or that the public interest can be better served in some other manner. The
order should be quashed and the respondent should be directed to give an opportunity to
the petitioner to show cause against any proposed action on such grounds as may be
available.
➢ Even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves any
deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens must take care to see
that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed

14
State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad,1961 AIR 293, 1961 SCR (1) 970

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in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or
unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the
requirements of natural justice
➢ As held in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer
Government of India15, it was held that personal liberty, which occurs in Art.21 of the
Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and that no person can be deprived of that
right except according to the procedure established by law. The Passports Act which was
enacted by the Parliament in 1967 in order to comply with that decision prescribes the
procedure including the grounds for impounding of a passport but the mere prescription of
some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Art.21. The procedure established
by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.
➢ Even the fullest compliance with the requirements of Art. 21 is not the journey’s end
because, a law which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away
the personal liberty guaranteed by Art.21 has to meet a possible challenge under other
provisions of the constitution like Articles 14 and 19. If the holding in A.K. Gopalan v.
State of Madras16 that the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution are mutually exclusive
were still good law, then the right to travel abroad which is part of the right to personal
liberty under Art.21 could only be found and located in that article and no other. But in
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India17., (Bank Nationalisation case) the majority held that the
assumptions in A.K. Gopalan that certain articles of the constitution exclusively deal with
specific matters cannot be accepted as correct. Though the Bank Nationalisation case was
concerned with the inter-relationship of Articles 31 and 19 and not of Articles 21 and 19,
the basic approach adopted therein as regards the construction of fundamental rights
guaranteed in the different provisions of the constitution categorically disregarded the
major premise of the majority judgement in A.K. Gopalan as incorrect. Thus, the inquiry
whether the right to travel abroad forms a part of any of the freedoms mentioned in
Art.19(1) is not to be shut out at the threshold merely because that right is a part of
guarantee of personal liberty under Art.21.
➢ Justice Bhagwati observed that “The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled
that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a

15
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer Government of India, 1967 AIR 1836,
1967 SCR (2) 525
16
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88
17
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530

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procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and there is consequently no
infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law, insofar as it
abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the
challenge of that article.
➢ It is also submitted that the arbitrary actions of the respondents violate the provision in
Article 13 of the UDHR, which read as follows:
“Article 13:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.”

➢ Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of El Dorado guarantees to its citizen the
right to life and personal liberty. Right to life is a fundamental aspect of life without which
we cannot live as a human being and it includes all those aspects of life which go to make
a human being’s life meaningful, complete, and worth living. It is only the article in the
constitution that has received the widest possible interpretation.
➢ This particular fundamental right enables to live with human dignity and the same has been
held by a bench of this hon’ble court in State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection
of Democratic Rights18 that all those aspects of life which enable a person to live with
human dignity are included within the word ‘life’.
➢ As per this provision, no person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty as
per the procedure established by law. The expression ‘procedure established by law’ in
Art.21 has been judicially construed as to mean a procedure which is reasonable, fair and
just.
➢ The look-out circular issued against the petitioner implies a guilty mind on his part to
deliberately evade from arrest. It is further contended that while the petitioner is deemed to
be absconding arrest by the respondents, mere absence from the place of enquiry does not
mean evasion from arrest. The word ‘Abscond’ in the ordinary sense means to hide himself.
Abscond does not necessarily imply leaving of a place by the person in which he is residing.
It is contended that the look-out circular was issues in premature haste by the respondent

18
State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6249-6250 0F
2001

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following a faulty procedure which violate the fundamental right and protection guaranteed
under Art. 21 as fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of
fundamental rights of the accused under Art.21 of the constitution. (Nirmal Singh Kehlon
v. State of Punjab19).
➢ The fundamental right to life and personal liberty has received the widest possible
interpretation from this hon’ble court.
➢ As held by this hon’ble court in the case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP20., Art. 21 as a
right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether
those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by
calculated measures.
➢ It is contended relying on the above judgment that the issuance of the look-out notice
restricts the petitioner from entering and freely moving around the territory of the Republic
of El Dorado. It is further submitted that the due procedure of law has been ignored by the
respondents in their encroachment of Art.21 of the constitution.
➢ In the landmark case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.21, this hon’ble court overturned
the concept of not considering the ‘procedure established by law’ in consonance with the
‘due procedure of law’ as held in A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras22. The hon’ble court, in
the former case, also set a new precedent broadening the vision of these two concepts.
➢ Where the ‘procedure established by law’ is defined as a law that is duly enacted by the
legislature to be held valid and be mandated to be followed, provided if it affirms correct
procedure. This doctrine has the power to withdraw from any person of his life or personal
liberty according to the procedure established by law.
➢ In short, it means that any law duly enacted is valid even if it is contrary to the principles
of justice and equity.
➢ ‘Due process of law’, on the other hand, is a doctrine that is required to check the efficiency
of the procedure established by law as well as its fairness and non-arbitrariness. Apex court
can declare any law null and void if it is not just, fair and arbitrary. This doctrine safeguards
all kinds of individual rights.

19
Nirmal Singh Kehlon v. State of Punjab, CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6200-6201 OF 2008
20
Kharak Singh v. State of UP, 1963 AIR 1295

21
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
22
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88

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➢ It was also held that “The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are
not distinctive nor mutually exclusive.” Any law depriving a person of his personal liberty
has to stand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19.
When referring to Article 14, “ex-hypothesi” must be tested. The concept of reasonableness
must be projected in the procedure. The laws passed by the state shall also stand the test of
the provisions in Art. 14, 19 and 21. Unrestricted powers to the authorities on the ground
of “in the interests of the general public” is not vague and undefined, it is rather protected
as well as restricted by Art. 19.
➢ It is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff on basis of the above observations of this
hon’ble court that the doctrine of due process of law must be invoked in order to rectify the
arbitrary and unreasonable procedure followed by the respondents in curtailing the
petitioner’s fundamental rights.

ISSUE:3

➢ WHETHER A STATEMENT AMOUNTING TO CONFESSION UNDER SECTION


67 OF THE NDPS ACT CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
➢ It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme court of El Dorado that a statement
amounting to confession under S.67 of the NDPS Act. 1985 is constitutionally inadmissible
in evidence. It is argued that, in any case, confessional statement recorded in absence of a
magistrate is as the excise official recording the statement is to be treated as "police officer"
and thus, the evidential value of the statement recorded before him is hit by the provisions
of S.25 of the Evidence Act23.
➢ The term police officer has not been defined in the Evidence Act and therefore, the meaning
ought to be assessed not by equating the powers of the officer sought to be equated with a
police officer but from the power he possesses from the perception of common public to
assess his capacity to influence, pressure or coercion on persons who are searched, detained
or arrested. The influence exercised has to be assessed from the consequences that a person
is likely to suffer in view of the provisions of the Act under which he is being looked.
➢ In the pertinent case, it was the police officers who introduced themselves as the NCB
Officers hence the confession made in front of them shall not be regarded as substantive
evidence. In Toofan Singh v State of Tamil Nadu24 it was contended that there is no power

23
Toofan Singh v. State of T.N. (2013) 16 SCC 31
24
Ibid

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under S.67 of the NDPS Act to either record confessions or substantive evidence which can
form the basis for conviction of an accused.
➢ The power under S. 6725 has been conferred upon an officer under S.4226 so that such officer
can effectively perform his functions. The power under S.67 is incidental to and intended
to enable an officer under S.42 to effectively exercise his powers of entry. search, seizure
or arrest which is provided under S.42 of the Act. The powers under S.67 are powers to
"call for information" which information can thereafter form the basis for satisfaction of
"reasons to believe by personal knowledge or information" appearing in S.42 and which is
a jurisdictional basis and a precondition to exercise powers under S.42 of the Act. Absence
of reasons to believe or information would render the exercise under S.42 of the Act bad in
law and hence in order to derive the said information power has been conferred under S.67
to an officer empowered under S.42. This statement is, therefore, merely "information"
subject to investigation and cannot be treated as substantive evidence.
➢ In the present case, the officers recording the statement were police officers and, therefore,
such a statement is hit by S.2527 of the Indian Evidence Act. An officer empowered under
S.42 of the Act has been conferred with substantive powers which are powers available to
a police officer for detection and prevention of crime.
➢ Relying upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Badaku Joti Svant
v. State of Mysore28, which accepted a broader view, as laid down in Raja Ram Jaiswal v.
State of Bihar29 and State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram30, it is submitted that the officers
empowered under S.42 and conferred with powers to enter, search, seize or arrest are
"police officers" properly so-called and hence statements made to such officers would be
hit by the provisions of S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. In any case such officers would
come within the meaning of term "person in authority" and hence the statements recorded
by such officers would be hit by the provisions of S.24 of the Indian Evidence Act.
➢ In Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab31 where the court, has after considering the entire scheme
of the Customs Act, has held that the officer under S.53 of the customs Act is a police

25
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985, S.67
26
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985, S.42
27
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S.25
28
Badaku Joti Svant v. State of Mysore (1966) 3 SCR 698
29
Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828
30
State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram AIR 1962 SC 276
31
Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab (2008) SC 681

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officer and would, therefore, attract the provisions of S.25 of the Indian Evidence Act. No
doubt, the case of Noor Aga was under the Customs Act. But the reasons for holding a
custom officer as police officer would have significant bearing even when we consider the
issue in the context of NDPS Act as well.
➢ The persons categorised as "police officers" can do all the activities and the statute gives
them the power to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently. Of the various duties
mentioned in S.23 of the Police Act, 1861, is to prevent the commission of offences and
public nuisances and to detect and bring offenders to justice. A comparison to the powers
of the officers under the provisions of the NDPS Act makes it clear that the duties and
responsibilities of the officers empowered under the Act are comparable to those of the
police officers and, therefore, they ought to be construed as such. It is submitted that the
primary objective of an NDPS Officer is to detect and prevent crime defined under the
provisions of the Act and thereafter the procedure has been prescribed to bring the offenders
to justice. Thus, the officers under the Act are "police officers" and statements made to such
officers are inadmissible in evidence.
➢ Therefore, the confessions given by Dr. Aziz and Nick Carter to the investigating officers
should not be admissible and are not supported by any substantial evidence. The petitioner
had no information had no information regarding the notice under 67 of the NDPS, neither
did he had any regarding the arrest warrant as he had shifted to Republic of El Florin.

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER Page 22


____________________________________________ _____________________________

PRAYER

________________________________________________________________________

Wherefore in the lights of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it is most
humbly and respectfully prayed before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge
and declare:

• To entertain the Writ petition


• To dismiss the lookout circular

And pass any order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the given case and thus render justice.

The counsel pleads before this Hon’ble Court to bind “Sacramentum habet in se tres comites,
veritatem, justitiam et judicium; veritas habenda est in jurato, justitia et judicium in judice”.

And for this act of kindness and justice the petitioner shall be duty bound and forever pray.

All of which is submitted by

(Counsels for the Petitioner)

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER Page 23

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