NS 24 - 271-314 - Jung's Annotations of N's Works... - P. Bishop

PAUL BISHOP
JUNGES ANNOTATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S WORKS:

AN ANALYSIS
The Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) was, throughout his
career (both intellectual and medical), deeply influenced by the thought of
Friedrich NietzschtCj and he made numerous references to him throughout his
voluminous writings1. Writing about the differences between his own psychol-
ogy and that of Freud and Adler, Jung drew a distinction between their intellec-
tual background and his: "Ich selber hatte den großen Vorteil gegenüber Freud
sowohl als Adler, nicht innerhalb der Neurosenpsychologie und deren Einseitig-
keiten heraufgewachsen zu sein, sondern ich kam von der Psychiatrie her, von
Nietzsche für moderne Psychologie wohlvorbereitet" (GW VII 199). Not only
did Jung mention Nietzsche at least once in every major work, but from 1934
to 1939 he devoted a weekly seminar to an archetypal analysis of Also sprach
Zarathttstra2. For many years confined to various international Jung Institutes,
where they were not available to the general public, the Seminar on Nietzsche
has recently been published. One part of the steadily growing interest in Jung's
work is the increasingly important question of his intellectual antecedents. This
article discusses some of the main conclusions about Jung and Nietzsche that
have resulted from my current doctoral research.
Although the impact of Nietzsche on Jung has frequently been acknowledged,

the extent and nature of this influence have rarely been examined. Only four
studies to my knowledge have specifically dealt with the relationship between
1
C G. Jung, Gesammelte Werkt, 19 vols (Ölten, 1971-1990) (the German-language edition still
lacks an Index, volume 20 in the English Colleäed Works). Henceforth cited in the text äs GW
followed by volume number and paragraph number (which corresponds to the volume and
patagraph of the English edition).
2
C G. Jung, Nietzsches Zarathustra Notes oftbe Seminar gven In 1954-1939, edited by James L. Jar-
rett, 2 vols (London, 1989). Henceforth cited in the text äs SNZ followed by volume number
and page number.
272 Paul Bishop
Nietzsche and Jung. First, Gerhard Wehr has Seen in Nietzsche a depth psycholo-
gist avantle /etire, and reproduced äs a small anthology those texts which he consid-
ered to be most suggestive of depth-psychological notions3. Second, Peggy Nill
has argued that the main conceptual affinity between the two men is the concept
of "self-becoming", with the following caveat: "Nur: Selbstwerdung bei Jung heißt
Ethos, bei Nietzsche Poiesis"4. Third, the editor of the Zarathustra Seminar, James
Jarrett, has placed Jung's reception of Nietzsche within the context of Analytical
Psychology and drawn attention to the theoretical and biographical paraUels be-
tween Jung and Nietzsche5. Finally, Patricia Dixon's work suggests that both men
advocate the attainment of wholeness through the union of opposites6. In addi-
tion, the Jungian scholar Liliane Frey-Rohn has provided a psycho-biography of
Nietzsche in terms of Analytical Psychology, though she never examines to what
extent both Jung and Nietzsche transcend the values of their era7,
A counterbalance to the sometimes uncritical scholarly efforts in this field
is provided by an analysis of the marginalia and inscriptions in Jung's own copy
of Nietzsche's Wirke. These provide us with much useful Information about
Jung's reception of Nietzsche. First, they help us to date Jung's acquisition of
certain texts; second, they show us which passages Jung read with particular
attention; and third, in the case ofA/so sprach Zarathustra, they enable us to look
at the same editions from which Jung gave his lectures in his Seminar on
Nietzsche (1934-1939). I am very grateful to Herr Franz Jung for his kindness
and generosity in allowing me to inspect these volumes in Jung's own library in
Küsnacht and to transcribe the material I found there.
Jung's edition of Nietzsche's Gesammelte Werke is the „Kleinoktav-Ausgabe",
published in 16 volumes in Leipzig by C. G. Naumann and Alfred Kröner between
1899 and 1911. The earlier volumes (I to VIII) display a book-plate with the
inscription "Post Tenebras Lux: Dr. C. G. Jung", while the later volumes (IX to
XVI) display a different bookplate with Jung's motto "Vocatus atque non, vocatus
deus aderit". It is clear from the dates of publication äs well äs from their general
condition that Jung acquired these volumes at different stages, and not all the vol-
umes contain annotations. Also sprach Zarathustra (KA VI) contains the inscription
"October 1901" on the page facing the inner fly-leaf, and the only other volume
3
Gerhard Wehr, Friedrich Nietzsche: Der Seelenerrater als Wegbereiter der Tiefenpsychologie (Freiburg,
1982).
4
êggy Nill, "Die Versuchung der Psyche: Selbstwerdung als schöpferisches Prinzip bei
Nietzsche und C. G. Jung", Niet%scbe-Stndien, 17 (1988), 250-279 (p. 252)!
5
James L. Jarrett, "Jung and Nietzsche", Harvest, 36 (1990), 139-148.
6
Patricia EUeen Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung: Wholeness through the Union of Opposites, Diss. Ph. D.
unpub. (The American University, Washington D. C.) (forthcoming in New York äs îet^sche
and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night).
7
Liliane Frey-Rohn, Jenseits der Werte seiner Zeit Friedrich Nietzsche im Spiegel seiner Werke (Zürich,
1984).
Jung's Annotations of Nietzsche's Works 273
of Jung's edition containing an inscription is Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (KA V), in

which the following is inscribed on the page facing^ the inner fly-leaf: "Meinem
lieben Carl Jung/Weihnachten 1901". According to Information provided by
Franz Jung, this latter inscription is in the band of Bertha Rauschenbach, Jung's
mother-in-law after his marriage to Emma Rauschenbach in 1903, and the book
must have been a Christmas present to her future son-in-law. Only the following
works of Nietzsche contain annotations or underlining: Die Geburt der Tragödie
(KA T) (heavy marking), Menschliches, Altywienschliches (KA II and III), Also sprach
Zarathustra (KA VI) (very heavy marking),/<?;;j?//.r von Gut und Böse (heavy marking)
and Zur Genealogie der Moral (both in KA VII), Der Fall Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung,
Nietzsche contra Wagner, Der Antichrist (all in KA VIII), and Ecce Homo (KA XV).
Jung's copies of Nietzsche's Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (KA II), Morgenröthe
(KA IX7), DiefröhlicheWissenschaft (KA V) and the unpublished writings, including
"Der Wille zur Macht" (KA IX-XVI) contain no markings at all.
The following five texts are annotated by Jung but never referred to in his
writings or letters: Der Fall Wagner, Göt-ên-Dämmerung, Nietzsche contra Wagner, Der
Antichrist (all in KA VIII) and Jenseits von Gut und Böse (in KA VII). However,
Jung does explicitly refer to the snift in Nietzsche's attitude towards Wagner on
at least three occasions, seeing k äs a classic example of "enantiodromia" (the
moment of reversal when something changes into its opposite) (GW VI 798/
GW VII 43/GW VIII 162/GW X 435). The virulent style of Der Anticbnst mxy
have led Jung to feel that it was unsuitable for quotation. And perhaps its
predominantly aphoristic form led Jung to associate Götzen-Dämmerung with
other collections, such äs Menschliches, Allsgmenschliches, which he described in
1921 äs influenced by French eighteenth-century intellectualism, äs opposed to
the dramatic style of the Dionysian-inspired Zarathustra (GW VI 225, 214).
On the face of it, there is a rough correspondence between the attention
Jung paid to a work (in terms of frequency of annotations) and the frequency
with which that particular text is referred to in his writings: Psychologische Typen
(1921) devotes a whole section to Nietzsche's notion of the Apollonian and the
Dionysian; Ecce Homo is referred to at least 7 times; and Also sprach Zarathustra
is mentioned on at least 87 occasions (apart from the two Seminar volumes).
However, Jung rarely mentioned either Jenseits von Gut und Bösey one of the most
densely marked and annotated texts, or Zur Genealogie der Moral.
As far äs the annotations themselves are concerned, they fall into five
groups. First, several marginal annotations show Jung engaged in a lively dia-
logue with Nietzsche, even if the general tenor of these observations is that of
a forceful rejoinder or a sarcastic remark. For example, when Nietzsche writes
in Jenseits von Gut und Böse about "die unvornehme Herkunft" of certain notions
(JGB 260, KGW VI 2 p. 220), Jung turns the comment back on its Speaker: "ja
und bei Dir, o Nietzsche?". Or again, in Götzen-Dämmerung where Nietzsche
274 Paul Bishop
proclaims that, if unable to live proudly, one should die proudly (GD Streifzüge
36, KGW VI 3 p. 128), Jung retorts in the margin: "ja, und wie gieng es?" Faced
with Nietzsche's jibe at Kant, "eines hinterlistigen Christen zu guter Letzt" (GD
"Vernunft" 6, KGW VI 3 p. 73), Jung threw the remark back, noting: 'Tu ipse".
And against Section 51, Jung wrote, parddying the end of the penultimate sec-
tion of Diefröhliche Wissenschaft ("der Zeiger rückt, die Tragödie beginnt..." [FW 5
382, KGW V 2 p. 319]), "incipit comoedie". Second, some of the marginal notes
give a brief psychological commentary on the text. For example, Jung notes
what he considers to be evidence of neurotic traits in Nietzsche's personality; is
alert to the possible presence of unconscious wishes in Nietzsche; and through-
out judges him to be an introverted personality. Third, äs far äs the annotations
and underlinings in Zarathustra are concerned, we can see Jung trying to develop
a thematic approach to the work äs a whole, äs he was later to do in his
Nietzsche Seminar. Fourth, since the outbreak of the Second World War pre-
vented Jung's Seminar from reaching the end of Zarathustra^ some of Jung's
pencilled comments permit a tentative reconstruction of what he might have
said. Finally, äs Jung admitted (see below), he also underlined and marked those
passages which he found defeating. 'Certain of Jung's own comments seem de-
void of determinate meaning, and some are trivial, even silly. This should alert
us to the danger of basing any arguments too heavily on these annotations,
whilst reminding us of their value in other respects. For in these marginal notes,
we are observing Jung's personal reading of Nietzsche, and hence become wit-
nesses to an experience which was of the highest significance to Jung. These
annotations help us critically to assess Jung's reception of Nietzsche, instead of
dismissing Jung's comments on Nietzsche or exaggerating Jung's debt to him.
And the annotations reveal that reception äs a process of reaction and response
on the part of Jung to a figure he found ceaselessly,, but worryingly, fascinating.
As well äs considering what the marginalia show us about possible sources for
some of Jung's psychoanalytical notions, I shall try and assess why jung did not
(consciously) notice some of the affinities between himself and Nietzsche, and in
particular why he hardly mentioned/^j-^/j* von Gut und Böse and Zur Genealogie der
Moral üi all in his published work when his own copies are so heavily, annotated.
This will help to determine the manner in which Jung incorporated (or did not)
elements of Nietzsche's philosophy into his own thought. Before that, I shall
briefly examine the intellectual-biographical background to Jung's reception in
general of Nietzsche, and relate the marginalia to his early reception in particular.
II
Although Jung himself never met Nietzsche, he grew up at a time when the
philosopher was still alive in a mental asylum and his popularity äs a writer was
growing8. A graph prepäred by Herbert Reichert and Karl Schlechta showing

the number of püblications on Nietzsche in varic>ijs languages from 1870 to
1970 gives an indication of the importance of Nietzsche at the turn of the
centur}'9. Between 1895 and 1900 - the years when Jung was at the University
of Basle — the global number of annual püblications on .Nietzsche reached a
peak of over 50; and over the same period the number of those written in
German nearly quadrupled. As Seth Taylor has observed: "by 1890, scarcely a
year after his own mental collapse, [Nietzsche] was rapidly on his way to becom-
ing nothing short of a cult figure in his homeland"10. Another researcher into
early Nietzsche reception, die late R. Hinton Thomas, is equally clear about the
turning-point in the popularity of Nietzsche: "The decisive change [in
Nietzsche's influence] took place at just about the time when Bismarck's period
of office ended [i. e. 20 March 1890]. It happened quickly and it happened
dramatically [.,.] If one had to settle for a single year from which to date this
transformation, 1890 would be the one to choose"11. In his article outlining the
initial development of the Nietzsche-vogue in Germany, R. A. Nicholls points
out however that much of the writing on Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth
Century was purely a product of the age in which it was produced and related,
in fact, only to that age: "the direction of Nietzsche criticism reflects the atmos-
phere of the time, the welter of ideas and problems with which the age was
struggling and in which Nietzsche's fame grew so lavishly"12. And Malcolm
Humble has gone even fiirther, stating: "It is soon apparent to any Student of
Nietzsche's readership that the response to his work depends to a higher degree
on the character of the thinker than is the case with most other thinkers, because
of the coundess contradictions and different perspectives in his work"13. Indeed,
even during his lifetime, Nietzsche himself had remarked on the broad extent
of his supposed influence in a letter to Franz Overbeck of 24 March 188714.
8
For a general ovcrview of Nietzsche reception, see Bruno HiHebrand (ed.), Nietzsche und die
deutsche Literatur, 2 vols (Munich, 1978); Alfredo Guzzoni (ed.), 90 Jahre philosophische Nietyche-
Rfêption (Königstein/Ts, 1979); Margot Fleischer, "Das Spektrum der Nietzsche-Rezeption im
geistigen Leben seit der Jahrhundertwende", Nietzsche-Studien, 20 (1991), 1-47; and Steven E.
Aschheim, Tbe Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1880-1990 (Berkeley, 1992).
9
Herbert W. Reichert and Karl Schlechta, International Nietzsche Bibliography (revised and expanded)
(North Carolina U P., 1968), graph facing title-page.
10
Seth Taylor, Left-Wing Nietycheans: The Polttlcs of German Expressionism 1910-1920 (Berlin/New
York, 1990), p. 18.
11
Richard Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890-1918 (Manchester, 1983),
p. 2.
12
R. A. Nicholls, ''Beginnmgs of the Nietzsche Vogue in Germany", Modem Philologe 56 (1958/
1959), 24-37 (p. 25).
13
Malcolm E. Humble, "Early Brirish Interest in Nietzsche", German Ufe and Leiters, 24
(1970-1971), 327-335 (p. 334).
14
"Anbei ein komisches Faktum, das mir mehr und mehr zum Bewußtsein gebracht wird. Ich
habe nachgerade einen "Einfluß", sehr unterirdisch, wie sich von selbst versteht. Bei allen
276 Paul Bishop
And according to another source, Duke Carl-August of Sachsen-Weimar 5s re-

portcd to have said to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche in the 1890s that it was
impossible to open a newspaper without seeing the name of Nietzsche, and that
this explained why he went to visit the sick philosopher15.
Furthermore, there were apparenfly connexions between Nietzsche and
Jung's friends and relatives. For example, Ludwig Binswanger (1881—1966), one
of Jung's assistants at the Burghölzli clinic who helped him carry out his experi-
ments on word-association, was the nephew of Otto Binswanger (1852-1929),
the Professor of Psychiatry and head of the psychiatric clinic at the University
of Jena (where he treated Nietzsche after his breakdown in 1889-1890). Franz
Jung has suggested that Jung's own parents, Johann Achilles Jung (1842--1896)
and Emilie Jung (nee Preiswerk) (1848—1923)/might even have been acquainted
with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, although I have äs yet found no documentary
evidence for such a connection. Jung's relationship with his fäther also bore a
large responsibility not only for his intellectual development äs a whole but also,
more specifically, for his early interest in Nietzsche. As a child, Jung was sensitive
to the crisis of faith that his fäther, a Protestant ministerj went through, and he
discussed this in detail in his autobiography. In his biography, Anthony Stevens
argues that Jung's early intellectual development was a form of "archetypal com-
pensation", i. e, a search for a valid authority to compensate for the lack of
authority on the part of his fäther in matters of religion. Hence, according to
Stevens, Jung's fascination with a thinker such äs Nietzsche who both heralded
the age of radical doubt which troubled Pastor Jung so much and dealt with the
contemporary crisis of faith with exemplary openriess and honesty16.
The catalogue of Jung's library iridicates that he also took an interest in the
secondary literature on Nietzsche17, and in fact, Jung's reading of Nietzsche .at
radikalen Parteien (Sociälisten, Nihilisten, Antisemiten, christlichen] Orthodoxen, Wagneria-

nern) genieße ich eines wunderlichen und fast mysteriösen Ansehens. Die extreme Lauterkeit
der Atmosphäre, in die ich mich gestellt habe, verführt ..." (KGB III 5 p. 48).
15
Max Kruse, Erinnerungen an Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, unpub. ms., Kosen, 7 April 1918; quoted
in: H. F. Peters, Zarathustra's S/s/er: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche (New York, 1977),
pp. 169, 238.
16
Anthony Stevens, On Jung (London, 1990), pp. 141-142.
17
C. G. Jung-Bibliothek-Katahg (Küsnacht-Zürich, 1967), p. 14. Jung's library contains the following
works" on Nietzsche: Carl Albrecht Bernoulli, Fran% Qverbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine
Freundschaft, 2 vols (Jena, 1908) (this editiori contains passages bläcked out for legal reasons);
Ernst Horneffer, Nietzsches Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft und deren bisherige Veröffentlichung (Leip-
zig, 1900) (inscribed "Erhalten in Dec 1899 yon Frau Dr. E. Förster-Nietzsche"), and this book
is probably the gift for which Jung thanked Elisabeth in his letter of 11 December 1899. In his
Gesammelte Werke Jung makes very little reference to the notion of the Eternal Recurrence, but
on the most important occasions when he does (in 1935 and 1939), he also refers to Horneffer
(GW 14© 148, n. 336 and GW 9® 210, n. 5; SNZ I p. 191 and SNZII pp 1044, 1263)); Hans
Landsberg, Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur (Leipzig, 19'02); Richard M. Meyer, Nietzsche.:
Sein Leben und seine Werke (Munich, 1913); Paul Julius Möbius, Über das Pathologische bei Nietzsche*
(Wiesbaden, 1902); Edward J. O*Brian, San of the Morning: A Portrait of Friedrich Nietzsche (London,
university (1895-1900) coincided with the first boom in critical commentary on

Nietzsche. At university and during bis early years äs a psychoanalyst, Jung was
acquainted with three people who had known Nietzsche. The first of these was
Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), the Swiss cultural critic and historian who was
a professor at Basle fröm 1858 to 189318 and had been^both a friend and
Professional colleague of Nietzsche, Jung's library contains all Burckhardt's ma-
jor works, and in bis autobiographical work Erinnerungen, Träume) Gedanken he
menrions that during bis time at the Gymnasium he used to see Burckhardt
(and Bachofen) on the streets of Basle19. More significantly, Jung quotes Burck-
hardt äs an important authority on Nietzsche by virtue of bis personal acquaint-
ance with him, and bis critical views were, according to Jung, widespread in
university circles at that time. It is likely that Burckhardt's views were mediated
by a mutual acquaintance, namely Burckhardt's great-nephew, Albert Oeri
(1875-1950), a student-colleague and life-long friend of Jung20. Second, Johann
Jakob Bachofen (1815—1887), the historian of law and religion who taught at
Basle and was one of Nietzsche's colleagues there, is an important link between
Nietzsche's and Jung's interest in antiquity, even though there is no information
about any personal contact with Bachofen. Nietzsche read bis Versuch über die
Gräbersymbolik (1859) whilst he was working on Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872),
and Jung's library contains several works by Bachofen, including the Gräbersym-
bolik. And later on, it is likely that Jung met Lou Andreas-Salome (1861-1937)
and possibly discussed the case of Nietzsche with her, either at the Third In-
ternational Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar (1911) or the Fourth Interna-
1932); Edgar Salin, (Jakob Burckhardt und Nietzsche (Basle, 1938) (Jung's interest in this book
must have been great, for bis edition äs I found it in bis personal library contained a letter
from Salin of 11 April 1938, replying to a letter of Jung's and apologizing for the late delivery
of bis book!); Wilhelm Schacht, Nietzsche: Eine psychiatrisch-phihsopijische Untersuchung (Berne,
1901); Franz Unger, Friedrich Nietzsches Träumen und Sterben (Munich, 1900).
18
On Nietzsche and Burckhardt, see: Charles Andler, Nietzsche und Jakob Burckfjardt (Basle/Stras-
bourg, n. d.); Alfred von Martin, Nietzsche und Burckf)ardt (Munich, 1942); Erich Heller, "Burck-
hardt and Nietzsche", in: The Disinherited Aiind (London, 1952), pp. 59-77; Edgar Salin, Jafrob
Burckhardt und Nietzsche (Basle, 1938) (see note 17). On Jung and Burckhardt, see Philipp Wolff-
Windegg, "C G. Jung-Bachofen, Burckhardt, and Basle", Spring, 1976, pp. 137-147. A fuller
account of intcllectual life in late nineteenth-century Basle is provided by Lionel Gossman in
"Orpheus philokgus: Bachofen versus Mommsen on the Stuaj ofAntiquirj* (Philadelphia, 1983 [Transac-
iions of the American Pbilosophical Society, vol. 73, pt 5]), "Basle, Bachofen and the Cridque of
Modernity in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld
Institutes, 47 (1984), 136-185, and "Antimodernism in Nineteenth-Century Basle: Franz Over-
beck's Anritheology and J.J. Bachofen's Antiphilology", Interpretation* 16 (1989), 359-389.
19
CG. Jung, Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, edited by Aniela Jaffe (Zürich/Stuttgart, 1962),
pp. 103, 118-119).
a>
See Albert Oeri, "Ein paar Erinnerungen", in: Die kulturelle Bedeutung der komplexen Psycfjo/ogie
(Berlin, 1935), pp. 524-528. It may also have been becausc of Oeri that the early Jungian
concept of the "Urbild" is attributed to Burckhardt. See Werner Kaegi, Jacob Burckhardt: Kine
Biographie, l vols (Basic/Stuttgart, 1947-1982), IV, p. 464, footnote 121.
278 Paul Bishop
tional Psychoanalyttc Congress In Munich (1913). Once a very clöse friend of

Nietzsche, she became interested in psychoanalysis in the period before thc First
World War and became one of the most prominent members of Freud's circle.
An astute reader of Nietzschc's work, she had published the first serious book
on his thought, Friedrich Nietzsche in seihen Werken (1894). Certainly, Jung knew
her background, for, in a letter to Freud of 2 January 1912, he referred to her
in a way which emphasizes her relationship with Nietzsche, albeit in a highly
exploitative manner21.
III
On 18 May 1895, Jung became a rhember of the Zofingiaverein, the Swiss

Student fraternity, and was elected Chairman of the Basle section during the
Winter Term of 1897/189822, The Zofmgia Lectures (delivered in German but
to date published only in English translation) offer an insight into Jung's earliest
intellectual preoccupations — those of a medical Student whoy äs he himself
admitted, was concerned with "theological issues"23. Because some of these
Lectures pre-date Jung's first reading of Nietzsche at üniversity, his post-1900
work Stands in the shadow of Nietzsche to an extent that these Lectures do
not. However, a careful reading of these Lectures suggests both personal and
intellectual reasons why Jung began to show an interest in Nietzsche during his
time at Basle.
According to Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, jung was also reading Kant and
Schopenhauer ät üniversity äs well äs Nietzsche. However, by examining the
number of times which Jung cited Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche (and also
Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906)) in the Zofmgia Lectures, a slightly different
picture of Jung's opinions and his early reaction to Nietzsche emerges. From
such an analysis it becomes clear that, between 1896 and 1899, Jung became
very interested in Kant, particularly the pre-critical philosophy, and that he süb-
sequently moved away from him. Jung not only refers to arid quotes ffom Kant
less and less often in the Zofingia Lectures, but the earlier, malnly positive
references to him are superseded by references which are iricreasingly negative.
As part of his developing interest in Nietzsche, Jung drew on material mainly
from the early writings (e. g. Menschliches, Alltymenschliches and the Unzeitgemäße
21
Sigmund Freud/C. G. Jung, Briefwechsel^ edited by William McGuire and Wolfgang Sauerländer
(Frankfurt/Main, 1974), p. 258.
22
For more Information on the history of the Zofingiavemn^ see Werner Kundert, Abriss der Ge-
schiehfe des schweizerischen Zoßngervereins (Lausanne, 1961) and Charles Gilliard, La Soctete de Zoftngtte
1819-1919 (Lausanne, 1919).
23
C. G. Jung, The Zoftngia Lectures, translated by Jan van Heurick (London, 1983),rpara. 237/p. 91.
Betrachtungen). This bears out what Jung wrote in bis letters and autobiography
about which works by Nietzsche he read at university24. But the Lectures also
show that real background to Jung's interest in Nietzsche was his involvement
with Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Between 1896 and 1898, L e. in the
period from the first to the last of the lectures, Jung moved from a pro-Kantian
(more precisely, a highly unconventional would-be Kantian) position to one
which denied the basic tenets of the critical philosophy and even rejected the
critical project äs a whole. However, by failing to appreciate to what extent
Nietzsche's philosophy was a post-Kantian, not to say an anti-Kantian philoso-
phy, Jung may also have missed the chance to examine more carefully his own
precarious use of Kant. For both Nietzsche and Jung, the quintessential neo-
Kantian issues of value and of method were of paramount importance, although
never specifically foregrounded by Jung (see below). Jung's fifth lecture is a
violent rejection of the "Systematic Theology" of Albrecht Ritschi
(l 822-1889)25, and its whole tone, including its criticism of Ritschl's style, is
reminiscent of Nietzsche's attack on David Friedrich Strauß in the first of the
Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (1873). The defence of Christianity which Jung
mounted here strongly suggests either that he was not yet familiär with
Nietzsche's critique of religion or, more likely, that he was reacting against what
he knew of it. According to Walter Kaufmann, it was probably reading
Nietzsche that "put an end to Jung's Christianity - or drove it Underground -
24
In a letter of 5 January 1961 to the Rev. Arthur W Rudolph, Jung wrote: "As a matter of fact,
living in the same town where Nietzsche spent his life äs a professor of philosophy, I grew up
in an atrnosphere still vibrating from the impact of his teachings, although it was chiefly resis-
tance which met his onslaught [...] The fact that impressed me the most was his encounter
with Zarathustra and then his "religious" critique, which gjves a legitimate place in philosophy
to passion äs the very real motive of phüosophizing. The Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen were to me
an eye-opener, less so the Genealogy ofMorak or his idea of the "Eternal Return" of all things"
(C G. Jung, Ijetters, edited by Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe, 2 vols (Princeton, 1973), JI,
pp. 621-622). And according to Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken^ he first read Nietzsche whilst
still a Student at Basle University (L e. between 1895 and 1900), starting with the unzeitgemäße
Betrachtungen and going on to Zarathustra (pp. 108-110). Jung recounts that reading Zarathustra
was "ein stärkstes Erlebnis" (p. 109).
25
Albrecht Ritschi studied theology in Tübingen amongst other places, and he was Professor of
Theology at Bonn from 1859 to 1864 and at Göttingen from 1864 until his death. In his
lectures on Systemaric Theology, Ritsch! argued against the reduction of religion to experiencc
and insisted that £ahh rested not on the intellect, but on the creation of "Werturteile". Accord-
ingly, the Incarnation is not a historical fact but the expression of the "Offenbarungswert" of
God. Ritschi ;s foüowers stressed the importance of Community ethics and diminished the im-
portance of metaphysics and religious experience (see The Oxford Dictionary ofthe Christian Church%
edited by F. L. Cross (Oxford, 1974), p. 1189). The impact of RitschTs teaching on the populär
concepdons of theolog)' of his time is comparable to that today of the German theologian
Eugen Drewermann - who bases himsdf in part on ideas derived from Jung!
280 Paul Bishöp
and made him rcady to embrace Freud"26. And according to his autobiography,
Jung's early relationship to Nietzsche was characterized by a considerable degtee
of ambivalence27.
IV
Despite this ambivalence, Jung did not hesitate to correspond directly with
Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche when he wanted to verify his theory concerning the
origin of an episode in Zarathustra. In his MD dissertation at the University of
Zürich entitled Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter occulter Phänomene (1902)
(GW l 1—150), Jung discovered that Nietzscfie provided him with an exarnple
of how the mind can automatically and unconscioüsly recall large amounts of
Information with incredible accuracy, i. e. cryptomnesia28. He pointed out a
remarkable similarity between a passage in Von großen Ereignissen in Part II of
Also sprach Zarathustra and an account of an incident originally reported in a
ship's log for 1686 and reprinted in the Blätter aus Prevorst (1831—1837), a collec-
tion of reports of occult and unexplained phenomena put together by the Swab-
ian physician and Romantic writer Justinus Kerner (1786-^1862). Jung was so
struck by the close similarity of these passages that he maintained that Nietzsche
must have read this account and then reproduced it almost word for word many
years later, without knowing that he was doing so. Jung argued that this was a
classic case of cryptomnesia and, äs he relates in his dissertation, he even went
so far äs to contact Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, asking her if
she could provide any explanation for this coincidence29.
In his letter to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche of 26 October 1899, Jung's page
reference to Zarathustra is to the first edition of 1883 (published in Leipzig).
This is not the edition of 1901 published in Leipzig by C. G. Naumann which
is in Jung's library and is inscribed with the date "October 1901". So Jung
probably did not possess his own copy of Zarathustra until after writing the letter
26
Walter Kaufmann, Freud, Adler, and Jung (New York, 1980), p. 426.
27
"Nietzsche hatte schon für einige Zeit auf dem Programm gestanden, aber ich zögerte mit der
Lektüre, da ich mich ungenügend vorbereitet fühlte [...] Ich fürchtete mich vor der möglichen
Erkenntnis, daß ich wie Nietzsche "Auch Einer" war [...] es war eine geheime Angst, ich könne
ihm vielleicht ähnlich sein, wenigstens in dem Punkte des "Geheimnisses", das ihn in seiner
Umwelt isolierte" (Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, pp. 108-109).
28
"Man versteht darunter das Bewußtwerden seines Gedächtnisbildes, welches aber nicht primär
als solches erkannt wird, sondern eventuell erst sekundär auf dem Wege der nachträglichen
Wiedererkennung oder des abstrakten Räsonnements. Charakteristisch für die "Kryptomnesie
ist, daß das auftauchende Bild nicht die Merkmale des Gedächtnisbildes an sich trägt, d. h. nicht
mit dem betreffenden oberbewußten Ich-Komplex verknüpft ist" (GW l 138).
29
See my article "The Jung/Förster-Nietzsche Correspondence", GermanUfe andLetters> 46 (1993),
319-330.
Juhg's Annotations of Nietzsche's Works 281
to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, which suggests that his interest in Nietzsche

may well have increased äs a reslilt of his corresponcience with Elisabeth.
In a footnote to his dissertation, Jung quoted from Nietzsche's account in
Ecce Homo of the inspirational mood in which he wrote Zarathustra (GW l 139,
n. 121). However, although the manuscript for Ecce Homo was written in 1888,
this work was not published until 1908 in a limited edition, and a generally
available edition did not appear until 1911. The most likely source for Jung's
knowledge of Ecce Homo at such an early date is Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's
contribution to the Nachberichte in the 1901 edition of Also sprach Zarathustra
(published in Leipzig by C. G. Naumann), which Jung obtained in October 1901
(the second contribution, "Einführung in den Gedankenkreis von 'Also sprach
Zarathustra'", was written by Peter Gast). In "Die Entstehung von 'Also sprach
Zarathustra'" (written in 1899), Elisabeth quotes in extenso one passage from
the "autobiographischen Skizzen", Ecce Homo, which begins with Nietzsche's
rhetorical question "— Hat Jemand, Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, einen
deutlichen Begriff davon, was Dichter starker Zeitalter Inspiration nannten?"
(KA VI 482). This passage, which is marked with pencil in the margins of Jung's
own edition, is precisely the one which Jung cites at similar length in the foot-
notes to his doctoral dissertation, and must therefore have provided the source
for his quotation.
On the death of Nietzsche, Elisabeth included Jung in the list of invitees to
the funeral. There is, however, no evidence to show that Jung accepted and
attended.
If, äs Kaufmann has suggested, Nietzsche's critique of Christianity drove

Jung into the hands of Freud (and Jung may already have been familiär with Zur
Genealogie der Moral by the time he began his correspondence with Freud in
1906), then it was a highly ironic means of conversion. For not only was Jung's
discovery of mythology closely linked with his reading of Nietzsche, äs the
Freud/Jung correspondence shows, but, less than a year before his final break
with Freud in January 1913, Jung quoted a lengthy passage from Zarathustra in
a letter of 3 March 1912 äs a warning to Freud about what was going to happen:
Ich lasse 'Zarathustra' für mich reden:
"Man vergilt einem Lehrer schlecht, wenn man immer nur der Schüler bleibt
[...]-
Solches haben Sie mir durch die gelehrt Als einer, der Ihnen wirklich folgt,
muß ich wohl tapfer [sein], nicht zum mindesten Ihnen gegenüber.30
30
Freud/Jung, pp. 544-545.
282 Paul Bishop
In a letter foreshadowing the major theoretical differences between himself and

Freud, Jung had declared the following aim for the pirogramme of psychoanaly-
sis: "den Kultus und den heiligen Mythos zu dem zu machen, was sie waren,
nämlich zum trunkenen Freudenfeste, wo der Mensch in Ethos und Heiligkeit
Tier sein darf'*31. Such a project would reverse the process of devitalization
strikingly described by Nietzsche in Zur Genealogie der Moral m a passage which
Jung marked: "Auf dem Wege zum 'Engel? [...] hat sich der Mensch jenen
verdorbenen Magen und jene belegte Zunge angezüchtet, durch die ihm nicht
nur die Freude und Unschuld des Thiers widerlich, sondern das Leben selbst
unschmackhaft geworden ist" (GM II 7, KGW VI 2 pp. 318-319). Jung never
abandoned his essentially religious conceptipn of psychoanalysis, äs his star-
tlingly bold remark in 'Sigmund Freud als kulturhistorische Erscheinung* (1932)
about the ultimate agenda of psychotherapy rriade clear: "Die psychoanalytische
Theorie hat aber geheimerweise gar nicht die Absicht, als wissenschaftliche
Wahrheit zu gelten, sondern sie strebt nach Wirkung auf ein breites Publikum"
(GW 15 56).
Furthermore, Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (1911/1912)32, the work
which sealed the split with Freud, offered a highly un-Freudiari Interpretation
of the regression of libido, whose exclusively sexual Status was one of the Freud-
ian tenets which Jung had refused to accept Whereas Freud saw regression äs
nothing more than a return to infantilism, Jung argued instead that the regres-
sion of libido (äs in cases of schizophrenia) represented a reculerpour mieitx sanier^
and his key notions of the archetypes and of the Collective Unconscious were
clearly in the process of formation, And whereas Freud saw the son's attraction
to his mother äs the expression of a biological and physical desire, and hence
maintained that the libido was sexual in nature, Jung argued that the incest-
taboo was a warning of the dangers in a return to the collective psychic mother
and saw the incest-motif äs an expression of symbölic and Spiritual desire, ac-
cordingly redefming libido äs psychic energy. In Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido
Jung quoted extensiyely from Nietzsche (over 22 times), particularly from the
Dionysos-Dithyramben, and explained his frequent use of Nietzsche äs follows:
"Was bei Nietzsche wie dichterische Redefigur anmutet, ist eigentlich urälter
Mythus. -Es ist, wie wenn dem Dichter noch die Ahnung oder die Fähigkeit
gegeben wäre, unter den Worten unserer heutigen Sprache und in den Bildern,
die sich seiner Phantasie aufdrängten, jene unvergänglichen Schatten längst ver-
gangener Geisteswelten zu fühlen und wieder wirklich zu machen" (WSL:
31
Freud/Jung, p. 323.
32
The original Version of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido ,(not the revised version which is printed
in GW 5 äs Symbole der Wandhingen} has recendy been reissüed in German. See C. G. Jung~*.
Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido: Beträge %ttf Entwicklungsgeschichte des Den&ns Frankfurt/Main,
1991). Henceforth cited in the text äs WSL fpllowed by page number.
p. 293). He even ca$t the central message of his work in Nietzschean terms: "Es
gibt nichts anderes, als daß der Mensch mit diesemi Willen zusammengehe, was
uns Nietzsches Zairathustra eindringlich lehrt" (WSL: p. 72).
Inasmuch äs Wandlungen und Symbole der LJbido amounts to an explicit rejec-
rion of Freud's Interpretation of the Oedipus legend, Jung was also influenced
by Nietzsche's hint in Die Geburt der Tragödie that the main message of that
legend (and others like it) was about a violation of the natural laws, a transgres-
sion which was analogous to but not necessarily identical with the act of incest.
In the copy of his edition Jung marked the following highly relevant passage:
Oedipus der Mörder seines Vaters, der Gatte seiner Mutter, Oedipus der
Räthsellöser der Sphinx! Was sagt uns die geheimnisvolle Dreiheit dieser
Schicksalsthaten? 'Es giebt einen uralten, besonders persischen Volksglauben,
dass ein weiser Magier nur aus Incest geboren werden könne: was wir uns, im
Hinblick auf den räthsellösenden und seine Mutter freienden Oedipus, sofort
zu interpretieren haben, daß dort, wo durch weissagende und magische Kräfte
der Bann von Gegenwart und Zukunft, das starre Gesetz der Individuation
und überhaupt der eigentliche Zauber der Natur gebrochen ist, eine ungeheure
Naturwidrigkeit - wie dort der Incest - als Ursache vorausgegangen sein muss;
denn wie könnte man die Natur zum Preisgeben ihrer Geheimnisse zwingen,
wenn nicht dadurch, dass man ihr siegreich widerstrebt, d. h. durch das Un-
natürliche? Diese Erkenntnis sehe ich in jener entsetzlichen Dreiheit der Oedi-
pusschicksale ausgeprägt: derselbe, der das Räthsel der Natur - jener doppel-
gearteten Sphinx — löst, muss auch als Mörder des Vaters und Gatte der Mutter
die heiligsten Naturordnungen zerbrechen (GT 9, KGW III l pp. 62-63).
Furthermore, Jung used the image of sunrise and sunset äs a metaphor for the
psychological processes of regression and progression: "unsere libido will es
selber, daß sie den Sonnenlauf vollbringe, daß sie vom Morgen zum Mittag
emporsteige und, den Mittag überschreitend, dem Abend zueile, nicht mit sich
selber uneins, sondern den Abstieg und das Ende sich wollend" (WSL: p. 362).
Bearing in mind his acquaintance with Nietzsche's writings (particularly
those of the so-called "Middle Period", i. e. from 1878-1880), Jung's new theory
of regression can be seen to have owed much to two Nietzschean passages. First,
in the secrion entitled "Am Mittag" in volume II of Menschliches, Allûmenscbliches,
Nietzsche had used the very phrase "den Mittag des Lebens" and lyrically
evoked such a moment of extreme personal transition:
Wem ein thätiger und stürmereicher Morgen des Lebens beschieden war, des-
sen Seele überfallt um den Mittag des Lebens eine seltsame Ruhesucht, die
Monden und Jahre lang dauern kann [...] Da endlich erhebt sich der Wind in
den Bäumen, Mittag ist vorbei, das Leben reisst ihn wieder an sich, das Leben
mit blinden Augen, hinter dem seine Gefolge herstürmt: Wunsch, Trug,
Vergessen, Geniessen, Vernichten, Vergänglichkeit. Und so kommt der Abend
herauf, stürmereicher und thatenvoller, als selbst der Morgen war (MA II
WS 308, KGW IV 3 p. 328).
284 Paul Bishop
Sccond, in a passage of Menschliches^ Altyunenschliches which Jung marked in thc

margin of his cdition, Nietzsche wrote of the need, once religion and supersti-
tion had been disposed of, to overcome metaphysics by "stepping down a rung"
("einige Sprossen rückwärts steigen") in prder to understand the historical and
psychological necessity of Man's previous beliefs:
Die eine, gewiss sehr hohe Stufe der Bildung ist erreicht, wenn der Mensch
über abergläubische und religiöse Begriffe und Aengste hinauskommt und zum
Beispiel nicht mehr an die lieben Englein oder die Erbsünde glaubt, auch vom
Heil der Seelen zu reden verlernt hat: ist er auf dieser Stufe der Befreiung, so
hat er auch noch mit höchster Anspannung seiner Besonnenheit die Metaphy-
sik zu überwinden. Dann aber ist eine rückläufige Bewegung nöthig: er muss die
historische Berechtigung, ebenso die psychologische in solchen Vorstellungen
begreifen, er muss erkennen, wie die grösste Förderung der Menschheit von
dorther gekommen sei und wie man sich, ohne seine solche rückläufige Bewe-
gung, der besten Ergebnisse der bisherigen Menschheit berauben würde (MA
I 20, KGW IV 2 pp. 37-38).
This Substitution of belief by understanding (the reversal of Kant's move in the
preface to the second edition of Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft) is also the message
of Jung's exercise in cross-cultural readings in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido,
äs he made explicitly clear: "Ich denkej der Glaube sollte durch das Verstehen ersetzt
werden^ so behalten wir die Schönheit des Symbols und sind doch frei von den
niederdrückenden Folgen der Unterwerfung im Glauben" (WSL: p, 232). What
Jung called "die psychoanalytische Heilung des Glaubens und des Unglaubens"
(his defence of myth and the Symbol, which he held to be ^psychologisch wahr")
against the attacks of rationalism, materialism and Freudian reductionism can
be read äs a response to Nietzsche's analysis of the decline of religion, ättributed
in Die Geburt der Tragödie to the gradual replacement of vital myth with abstract
dogma. Jung marked the following passage:
Denn dies ist die Art, wie Religionen abzusterben pflegen: wenn nämlich die
mythischen Voraussetzungen einer Religion unter den strengen, verstan-
desmässigen Augen eines rechtgläubigen Dogmatismus als eine fertige Summe
von historischen Ereignissen systematisirt werden und man anfangt, ängstlich
die Glaubwürdigkeit der Mythen zu vertheidigen, aber gegen jedes natürliche
Weiterleben und Weiterwuchern derselben sich zu sträuben, - wenn also das
•Gefühl für den Mythus abstirbt und an seine Stelle der Anspruch der Religion
auf historische Grundlagen tritt (GT 10, KGW l p. 70).
Moreover, the motifs of sunrise and sunset, midday and midnight (of which
Wandlungen und Symbole derIJbido made extensive use) recur frequently throughout
Zarathustray and Jung appf opfiated them äs a useful image, perhaps without being
fully sensitive to what Karl Löwith has shown is at stake in this imaigery33. In his
essay of 1930, "Die Lebenswende", Jung retained the content of Nietzsche's apho-
33
Karl Löwith, Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen (Hamburg, 1978).
Jung's Annotations of Nietzsche's Works " 285
risfns from Menschliches, Aüûmmschticlm and combined it with the imagery of the
sun's daily pattern, transforming it into a principle of \qdividual psycho-biography.
He also employed the Nietzschean formula of the Revaluation of all Values (in a
very slightly adapted form) at the conclusion of this highly pictorial and allusive
passage:
Denken Sie sich eine Sonne, von menschlichem Gefühl und menschlichem
Augenblicksbewußtsein beseelt. Am Morgen entsteht sie aus dem nächtlichen
Meere der Unbewußtheit und erblickt nun die weite, bunte Welt in immer
weiterer Erstreckung, je höher sie sich am Firmament erhebt. In dieser Erwei-
terung ihres Wirkungskreises, die durch das Aufsteigen verursacht ist, wird die
Sonne ihre Bedeutung erkennen und ihr höchstes Ziel in größtmöglicher Höhe
und damit auch in größtmöglicher Erstreckung ihres Segens erblicken. Mit
dieser Überzeugung erreicht die Sonne die unvorhergesehene Mittagshöhe —
unvorhergesehen, weil ihre einmalige individuelle Existenz ihren Kulminations-
punkt nicht vorher wissen konnte. Um zwölf Uhr mittags beginnt der Unter-
gang. Und der Untergang ist die Umkehrung aller Werte und Ideale des Mor-
gens. Die Sonne wird inkonsequent. Es ist, wie wenn sie ihre Strahlen einzöge.
Licht und Wärme nehmen ab bis zum schließlichen Erlöschen (GW 8 778).
And the notion of an "Umwertung" or an "Umkehrung aller Werte" ultimately
derives from the principle of enantiodromia expounded by Heraclitus, a philo-
sopher whom both Nietzsche and Jung claimed äs their own34.
Following the (at that time commonly-held) belief that ontogeny (the devel-
opment of the individual) repeats phylogeny (the development of the species),
Jung supported this view (upon which his theory of the "Urbild", later the
archetype, was based) with a major reference to Nietzsche, quoting extensively
from the secdons Traum und Cultur and Logik des Traumes of Volume I of
Menschliches, Altymenschliches (MA 112, 13, KGW IV 2 p. 27-31):
Nietzsche nimmt in dieser Hinsicht einen sehr weitgehenden, aber bemerkens-
werten Standpunkt ein: "... im Schlaf und Traum machen wir das Pensum
früheren Menschentums durch." "Ich meine: Wie jetzt noch der Mensch im
Traume schließt, schloß die Menschheit auch im Wachen viele Jahrtausende
hindurch: Die erste causa, die dem Geiste einfiel, um irgend etwas, das der
Erklärung bedurfte, zu erklären, genügte ihm und galt als Wahrheit .*. .* Im
Traum übt sich dieses uralte Stück Menschtum in uns fort, denn es ist die
Grundlage, auf der die höhere Vernunft sich entwickelte und in jedem
Menschen sich noch entwickelt: Der Traum bringt uns in ferne Zustände der
menschlichen Kultur wieder zurück und gbt ein Mittel an die Hand, sie besser %u
verstehen. Das Traumdenken wird uns jetzt so leicht, weil wir in ungeheuren
Entwicklungsstrecken der Menschheit gerade auf diese Form des phantas-
tischen und wohlfeilen Erklarens aus dem ersten beliebigen Einfalle heraus so
34
See: Garfield Tourney, "Empedocles and Freud, Heraclitus and Jung", Bulletin of the History of
Mediane, 30 (1956), 109-123; Jackson P. Hershbell and Stephen A. Nimis, "Nietzsche and Hcr-
aditus", Niet%ube-Stu£en, 8 (1979), 17-38; R. G Bodlander, "Herakiit und Jung", Analytische
Psychologe, 21, no. 2 (June 1990), 142-149.
286 Paul Bishop
gut eingedrillt worden sind. Insofern ist der Traum eine Erholung für das
.Gehirn, welches am Tage den strengeren Anforderungen an das Denken zu
genügen hat, wie sie von der höheren Kultur gestellt werden." (WSL: pp. 37—38
IJung's italics]).
Jung had marked these passages in the margin of his copy, and he also noted a
further remark of Nietzsche's in Logik des Traumes, which he did not however quote:
"Wir können aus diesen Vorgängen entnehmen, wie spät das schärfere logische
Denken, das Strengnehmen von Ursache und Wirkung entwickelt worden ist,
wenn unsere Vernunft- und Verstandes Funktionen jet^t noch unwillkürlich nach
jenen primitiven Formen des Schliessens zurückgreifen und wir ziemlich die
Hälfte unseres Lebens in diesem Zustande leben" (MA 113, KGW IV 2 p. 30).
Like Nietzsche in these passages, Jung distifiguished in the first chapter of
Wandlungen und Symbole der Ubido ("Über die zwei Arten des Denkens") between
two types of thinking which he defined äs "das gerichtete oder das logische Den-
ken [...] das heißt ein Denken, das sich der Wirklichkeit anpaßt [...] so daß sich
die Bilder in unserem Kopfe in derselben streng kausalen Reihe folgen wie die
historischen Ereignisse außerhalb unseres Kopfes" and "das Träumen oder Phanta-
sieren* (WSL: pp. 25,32). Moreover, in Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche attributed
a quasi-archetypal or "typische Idealität'" to such figures of ancient Greek drama
äs Prometheus and Ödipus who were all, in the words which Jung marked, "nur
Masken jenes ursprünglichen Helden Dionysus" (GT 10, KGW l p. 67).
The aphorism entitled Die gute Freundschaft'in Volume of Menschliches, All%u-
menschliches reads like an ironic commentary on the relationship between Freud
and Jung; and perhaps that is why Jung put a line beside it in the margin of his
copy. For even if neither Jung (who signed hirnseif äs "Ihr treu ergebener", "Ihr
herzlich ergebener" and "Ihr ganz ergebener Jung") nor Freud (who addressed
his "Kronprinz" äs "Lieber Freund" and signed himself äs "Ihr getreuer") went
quite so far äs to use the informal second personal pronoun, the mixture of
personal Investment and professional ambition had proved too much to bear
the publication of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido^ which owed so much to a
figure whom Freud would never even admit to having read.
Die gute Freundschaft entsteht, wenn man den anderen sehr achtet, und zwar
mehr als sich selbst, wenn man ebenfalls ihn liebt, jedoch nicht so sehr als
sich, und wenn man endlich, zur Erleichterung des Verkehrs, den zarten An-
strich und Flaum der Intimität hinzuzutun versteht, zugleich aber sich der wirk-
lichen und eigentlichen Intimität und der Verwechslung Von Ich und Du weis-
lich enthält (MA II VM 241, KGW IV 3 p. 123).
VI
In September 1913, Jung gave a paper to the Psychoanalytic Congress in

Munich entitled "Zur Frage der psychologischen Typen" (GW 6 931-50), which
Jung's Annotatiöns of Nietzsche's Works 287
included a discussion of the Apollo-Dionysos anrinomy and involved several

specific references to Die Geburt der Tragödie. He deßned the Dionysian äs the
Investment of libido in äs many objects in the world outside the seif äs possible,
or "das [...] von sich selber befreite Streben nach der Vielheit der Objekte"
(GW 6 946). As a result, he had taken the destruction of the pnncipium individua-
tionis to mean the dissolution of the individual äs the ego dissolves itself amongst
a multiplicity of objects: "das entfesselte Hinausströmen der Libido in die
Dinge" (GW 6 946). In support of this Interpretation, Jung quoted the passage
from Die Geburt der Tragödie where the Dionysian is described äs the "Evangelium
der Weltenharmonie [...] als ob der Schleier der Maja zerrisssen wäre und nur
noch in Fetzen vor dem geheimnisvollen Ur-Einen herumflatterte" (GT l,
KGW III l 25-26), a passage which he had marked in the margin of his copy,
possibly at the same time äs his more detailed rereading of Zaratbustra^'. It is
therefore likely that the annotations of both Die Geburt der Tragödie and Zara-
tbustra were made in roughly the same period, i. e. 1913-15. These years stand
at the beginning of a period of immense significance in Jung's life and work.
For in 1913—1919 Jung underwent a series of remarkable experiences, which are
often described äs a period of intense Introversion or (in his autobiography) äs
his "Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unbewußten". These years saw a period of
enantiodromia not only in international affairs (the First World War broke out in
1914), but in Jung's personal and professional affairs, too. There had been the
Sabina Spielrein affair36; 1911 and 1912 had seen the publication of Wandlungen
und Symbole derIJbido\ in 1913 the final break with Freud had taken place; in the
same year he resigned his lectureship at Zürich University; in 1914 he resigned
äs President of the International Psychoanalytic Association; and apparently
there were also problems with his marriage. To use Jungian terminology, he was
experiencing his "mid-life crisis". But, if we are to believe what he says in his
Seminar, this was also the time of his real "Auseinandersetzung" with Nietzsche.
In his Seminar, Jung played down the specific intellectual significance of his
first reading of Nietzsche at university: "When I read Zarathustra for the first
time äs a Student of twenty-three [i. e. 1898], of course l did not understanä it
all, but I got a tremendous Impression" (SNZ I p. 544). Instead, Jung claimed
that he had seriously tadded Nietzsche's key work only much later: "I read
Zarathustra for the first time with consciousness in the first year of the war, in
November 1914, twenty years ago; then suddenly the spirit seized me and car-
35
Although Jung conduded that "diese Auffassung bedarf keines weiteren Kommentars", he was
wrong, for there is a clear contradiction between the meaning which this passage has in its
original context and the one which Jung attributed to it. Where Jung had equated the Dionysian
with the striving for a multiplicity of objects, the passage from Nietzsche quoted above actually
says the opposite: namdy, that a mystic unity is revealed to the ecstatic reveller.
36
See: Aldo Carotenuto, A Secrei Sjmmetiy: Sabina Spielnin between Jung and Frtud (New York, 1984).
288 Paul Bishop
ried me to a desert coüntry in which I read Zarathustra. I did not widerstand

really, but I made [...] marks in my German edition, and invariably I havc found
that these placcs are things that grate, that don't go down really" (SNZ I p. 259).
And again, on 20 February 1935, he remarked: "[...] l read Zafathustra for the
first time when I was only twenty-three, and then later, in the winter of 1914-15,
I studied it very carefully and made a lot of annotations. I was already interested
in the concept of the seif, but l was not clear how I should understand it. I
made my marks, however, when I came across these passages, and they seemed
very important to me" (SNZ I p. 391). These "marks" are the annotaüons and
underlinings which are still legible in his copy of Nietzsche's Werke, and Jung
himself attached importance to these "grating" passages: "I myself often feit
that when I was ploughing through the text that it had disagreeable effects upon
me. There are passages which I intensely dislike and they really are irritating.
But when you plough through your own psychology you also come across cer-
tain irritating places. So when I am kritated in those places in Zarathustra I say,
well, here is a sore spot or an open wound" (SNZ II p. 895). Jung's marginal
notes are thus a confessional document, revealing not only those passages with
which he agreed or disagreed but also the aporias in his reading.
1916 represented a "Schlüsseljahr" both in terms of Jung's period of Intro-
version and his intellectual development äs a whole. Iri that year he wrote "Die
transzendente Funktion" (the manuscript of which lay in his flies until 1953 and
was not published until 1957), in which he cited Nietzsche's Zarathustra^ the
intensive study of which he had just completed, äs an example of the suppres-
sion of the unconscious regulating influence. According to Jung, the discovery
in Zarathustra of "der höhere Mensch" and "der hässlichste Mensch" expresses
this regulating influence, which the moral conviction of Zarathustra is said to
suppress:
[...] die "höheren'* Menschen wollen Zarathustra in die Sphäre der Durch-
schnittsmenschheit, wie sie von jeher war, herunterziehen, und der "häßlichste"
Mensch ist sogar die Personifikation der Gegenwirkung selber. Aber der "mo-
ralische Löwe" Zarathustras "brüllt" alle diese Einflüße, vor allem aber das
Mitleid, wieder in die Hohle des Unbewußten zurück. Damit ist^der regulie-
rende Einfluß unterdrückt [...] (GW 8 162).
This is a problematic Statement, äs Jung is here conflating several images from
Zarathustra. Is the "moralische Löwe" the Hon from Von den drei Verwandlungen
des Geistes (Za Reden l, KGW VI l p. 25-27) or one of Zarathustra's animals
(Za IV 20, KGW VI l pp. 401-403) of the lion in "Die Wüste wächst: weh
dem, der Wüsten birgt!"? What kind of morality does the lion represent? And
can one so easily equate Zarathustra's cave with the Unconscious? A clue for
dealing with these difficulties is provided by Jung's margiriäl annotations on the
last page of his edition of Zarathustra. There he wrote: "Moral} Der Löwe
schreckt das Menschliche wieder weg" and added:
Junges Annotations of Nietzsche's Works 289
Eigentlich um nun die gewonnene Einsicht in die menschliche Natur wirklich

zu leben und nicht bloß zu denken. Daraus würde ein Kampf mit dem Löwen
entstehen und aus seiner Überwindung würdi *der. puer aeternus, eben das
Kind entstehen. Das fallt aber schon in die Krankheit.
These pencilled annotations seem to suggest that, for Jung, Nietzsche's struggle
with bis own human nature kept separate those antinomies of existence
("leben"/"denken") which die Jungian union of opposites would overcome; and
since die concomitant psychological rebirth (symbolized by the "puer aeter-
nus"37 had been excluded äs a possibility, then Nietzsche's "Krankheit" - not
bis sjrphilis, but bis final mental breakdown - was inevitable.
It has been argued that diese theoretical texts provide a key to understanding
an important treatise Jung also wrote in 1916. Written in a pseudo-Gnostic style
and attributed to the second-century Gnostic thinker Basilides, Jung's Septem
sermones ad niortuos has been said to contain "much to invite comparison with
the style of Nietzsche's ZarathustrcT^\ Whereas Nietzsche turned to the Bible
and Luther for sources of authority to mock and parody39, Jung chose the
mystical vocabulary of Gnosticism with which to cast bis psychological theory
into poetic form.
In 1918, Jung published a controversial essay in two sections of the periodi-
cal Schmiêrland: Monatshefte ßir Schweizer Art und Kunst. "Über das Unbewußte"
contains one notorious passage which, so Jung was to claim in the Thirties, had
predicted the rise of Fascism. Here, Jung described the christianizatdon of the
Germanic barbarians in terms of a repressive domestication:
Das Christentum zerteilte den germanischen Barbaren in seine untere und
obere Hälfte, und so gelang es ihm - nämlich durch Verdrängung der dunklen
Seite — die helle Seite zu domestizieren und für die Kultur geschickt zu
machen. Die untere Hälfte aber harrt der Erlösung und einer zweiten Domesti-
kation. Bis dahin bleibt sie assoziiert mit den Resten der Vorzeit, mit dem
kollektiven Unbewußten, was eine eigentümliche und steigende Belebung des
kollektiven Unbewußten bedeuten muß. Je mehr die unbedingte Autorität der
christlichen Weltanschauung sich verliert, desto vernehmlicher wird sich die
"blonde Bestie" in ihrem unterirdischen Gefängnis umdrehen und uns 'mit
einem Ausbruch mit verheerenden Folgen bedrohen. Diese Erscheinung findet
als psychologische Revolution statt, wie sie auch als soziales Phänomen
auftreten kann (GW 10 17).
37
"Jung saw the puer aeternus äs referring to the child archetype and speculated that its recurring
fascination springs from man's projection of his inability to renew himself (...] Puer pathology
can be described äs excessively daring, over-optimistic, given to flights of Imagination and
idealism, and excessively spiritualised" (A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis, edited by Andrew
Samuels, Bani Shorter, and Fred Plaut (London and New York, 1986), pp. 125 and 137.
38
See: James Heisig, 'The VII Smaontr. Play and Theory", Spring 1972, 206-218 (p. 208).
yt
For a detailed list of the stylistic parallels between Zaratbustra and the Bible, see Karl Löwith,
pp. 189-190.
290 Paul Bishop
In later years, Jung was to attach particular importance to the passage from
"Über das Unbewußte" quoted above, both during his Tavistock Lectuces of
1935 (GW 18(i) 371), and in a talk on the BBCs Third Programme of 3 Novem-
ber 1946 (GW 10 247) where he claimed that, in this passage, he had been
giving advance warning of the National Socialists' rise to power in Germany
and the Second World War. However, given the original date of publicatiön of
"Über das Unbewußte", its first readers must surely have taken it äs a reference
to the First World War rather than äs a Statement of things to come. More
importantly, the language here is highly reminiscent of Nietzsche and the whole
passage sounds like a conflation of two extracts from Nietzsche's Zur Genealogie
der Moral. First: "Alle Instinkte, welche sich nicht nach Aussen entladen, wenden
sich nach Innen — dies ist das, was ich die Verinnerlichung des Menschen nenne"
(GM II16, KGW VI 2 p. 338). And second: "Auf dem Grunde aller dieser
vornehmen Rassen ist das Raubthier, die prachtvolle nach Beute üfid Sieg lüstern
schweifende blonde Bestie nicht zu verkennen; es bedarf für diesen verborgenen
Grund von Zeit zu Zeit der Entladung, das Thier muss wieder heraus, mu$s
wieder in die Wildniss zurück" (GM 111, KGW VI 2 p. 289). Indeed, Jung had
highlighted the first passage in the margin of his personal edition of Nietzsche,
and noted, in the back of his copy, the page reference to the "blonde Bestie"40.
Furthermore, in "Über das Unbewußte" Jung drew a (scandalous) distinc-
tion between the psychology of the Aryan European and that of the Jew (GW 10
18), locating the root of his theoretical differences with Freud and Adler in
racial difference.
Der Jude lebt in der Regel in freundlicher Nachbarschaft des Irdischen, ohne
jedoch die Macht des Erdhaften zu empfinden. Es scheint mit der Zeit etwas
schwach geworden zu sein. Aus diesem Umstand dürfte sich das spezifisch
jüdische Bedürfnis ergeben, alles auf seine materiellen Anfänge zu reduzieren:
Der Jude bedarf des Anfanglichen, Ursprünglichen als eines Gegengewichtes
gegen das gefährliche Übergewicht seiner zwei Kulturen. Etwas mehr Primiti-
vität schadet ihm nicht, im Gegenteil: ich begreife vollkommen, daß Freuds
und Adlers Reduktionen auf primitive Sexualwünsche und auf primitive Macht-
absichten für den Juden etwas Wohltätiges und Befriedigendes,* weil Verein-
fachendes an sich haben, weshalb sich Freud mit einer gewissen Berechtigung
jneinen Einwänden gegenüber verschließt. Für die germanische Mentalität sind
aber diese spezifisch jüdischen Doktrinen durchaus unbefriedigend, denn wir
Germanen haben noch einen echten Barbaren in uns, der nicht mit sich spas-
sen läßt und dessen Erscheinen für uns keine Erleichterung und keinen ange-
nehmen Zeitvertreib bedeutet (GW 10 19).
40
Nietzsche's image of the .blond beast, far from being an image consonant with Nazi racist
ideology (although National Socialism did appropriate it), refers in faqt to the class of aristocratic
nobles äs a beast of prey.
Jung's mixture of pride and embarrassment when he talks about "einen echten
Barbaren in uns [Germanen]" teils us a lot about his <j^vn personal psychology41.
The tone may again be due in part to Nietzsche, who had singled out the Jews
äs a special race in Zur Genealogie der Moral and in Jenseits von Gut und Böse (e. g.
JGB 251, KGW VI2 pp. 200-203). Jung would not have been alone of course
in deriving a negative image of the Jews from Nietzsche's writings, and the
Nazis made notorious misuse of his remarks in their anti-semitic propaganda
campaigns. Writing in 1940, Crane Brinton pointed out that there was much in
Nietzsche which easily lent itself to use by the National Socialists and that there
is "a good deal of material suitable for anti-Semitic use" in particular42. Bearing
in mind both his and Freud's awareness of their Christian and Jewish back-
grounds, it is likely that Jung was struck by Nietzsche's many comments on the
Jews, several of which seem to invite misunderstanding43. For example,
Nietzsche made certain notoriously essentialist references to the difference be-
41
For a further discussion of Jung's attitude towards National Socialism, see the articles collected
in JJngring Shadows: Jungians, Freudiansf and Anti-Semitism, edited by Aryeh Maidenbaum and Ste-
phan A. Martin (Boston/London, 1991). As Andrew Samuels has pointed out, Freud had been
prepared to differentiate between *3ewish" and "Aryan" psychologies ('Nationale Psychologie,
Nationalsozialismus and Analytische Psychologie', Analytische Psychologie, 23 (1992), 41-94). For
example, in a letter of 3 May 1908 to Karl Abraham, Freud wrote: "Seien Sie tolerant und
vergessen Sie nicht, daß Sie es eigentlich leichter als Jung haben, meinen Gedanken zu folgen,
denn erstens sind Sie völlig unabhängig, und dann stehen Sie meiner intellektuellen Konstitution
durch Rassenverwandtschaft näher, während er als Christ und Pastorssohn nur gegen große
innere Widerstände den Weg zu mir findet Um so wertvoller ist dann sein Anschluß. Ich hätte
beinahe gesagt, daß erst sein Auftreten die Psychoanalyse der Gefahr entzogen hat, eine jüdisch
nationale Angelegenheit zu werden" (Sigmund Freud/Karl Abraham, Briefe 1907-1926, edited
by Hilda C Abraham and Ernst L. Freud (Frankfurt/Main, 1965), p. 47). And in a letter of 13
August 1908 to Jung, Freud referred to Jung's ethnic Status äs enabling him to act äs more
effective ambassador for psychoanalysis: "[...] als starke, unabhängige Persönlichkeit, als Ger-
mane, der leichter die Sympathien der Mitwelt kommandiert" (Freud/Jung, p. 186). However,
äs Tilman Evers has rightly pointed out, what might have been permissible for Freud äs a Jew
to say in Austria before 1933 was not permissible for a non-Jew to publish in Germany after
1933 (Mjthos and Emanzipation: Eine kritische Annäherung an C. G. Jung (Hamburg, 1987), p. 141).
The renegade Hungaro-American psychologist Thomas Szasz comments on this aspect o/ the
Freud/Jung dispute in the following words: "Freud and the Freudians have deprived Jung of
many of his best ideas and, to boot, have defamed him äs an anti-Semite. Actually, Jung was
far more candid and correct than Freud in identifying psychotherapy äs an ethical rather than
technical enterprise; and Freud was far more anti-Christian than Jung was anti-Semitic" (Heresies
(New York, 1976), p. 139).
42
Crane Brinton, "The National Socialists' Use of Nietzsche", Journal of the History of Ideas, \
(1940), 131-150 (p. 137).
43
For a further discussion of this aspect of Nietzsche, see: Jacob Golomb, "Nietzsche on Jews
and Judaism", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 67 (1985), 139-161; Arnold M. Eisen,
"Nietzsche and the Jews Reconsidered", Jewish Soda/ Studies, 48 (1986), 1-14; Michael F. Duffy
and Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude towards \he]ews", Journal off he History of Ideas, 49
(1988), 301-318 (which suggests that Nietzsche's views underwent considerablc changes during
his lifetime); and Gillian Rose, "Nietzsche's Judaica", in: Judaism and Modernity (Oxford, 1993),
pp. 89-110 (which argues with the Dufty and Mittelman framework).
292 Paul Bishop
twecn Germans and Jews, referring to "die Arier" äs "die Eroberer- und Herren-
Rasse" (GM I 5, KGW VI 2 p. 278) and to "die Juden" äs "jenes priesterliche
Volk des Ressentiment/*/· txcellencf' (GM 1 16, KGW VI 2 p. 300). We know
that Jung had read Zur Genealogie der Afora/, where these remarks öccur, and in
his copy of Die Geburt der Tragödie he marked the following comment: "Das, was
die arische Vorstellung auszeichnet, ist die erhabene Ansicht von der activen Sünde
als der eigentlich prometheischen Tugend" (GT 9, KGW III l p. 65). The likely
Nietzschean overtones in Jung's remarks about the Jews does not excuse him
for making them; but it does help to explain how any possible (conscious or
unconscious) prejudice might have been aroused or fostered.
VII
In 1921 Jung published a second major work, Psychologische Typen^ which

devoted an entire chapter to the Nietzschean antinomy of the Dionysian and
the Apollonian. Jung read Die Geburt der Tragödie in the light of Schiller's Briefe
über die Ästhetische Erziehung der Menschheit, Goethe's Faust and the philosophy of
Schopenhauer:
Das von Schiller empfundene und teilweise bearbeitete Problem wurde in
neuer und eigenartiger Weise von Nietzsche wieder aufgenommen in seiner
von 1871 datierten Schrift Die Geburt der Tragödie. Dieses Jugendwerk bezieht
sich zwar nicht auf Schiller, sondern weit mehr auf Schopenhauer und Goethe.
Es hat aber, wenigstens anscheinend, mit Schiller den Ästhetismus und den
Griechenglauben, mit Schopenhauer den Pessimismus und das Erlösungs-
motiv, und endlich vieles mit Goethes Faust gemeinsam (GW 6 206).
In Psychologische Typen^ Jung made an important shift in his attitude towards the
Dionysian and the Apollonian. In 1913, Jung had defined the Dionysian äs
representing the attitude of extraversion (and, concomitantly, the ApoUonian äs
representing Introversion). By 1921, however, Jung had seen that the destruction
of fatprincipium individuationis did not mean just the destruction of;the individual
(already present in 1913), but, more importantly, the abolition of individuation.
On Jung's revised äccount of the Nietzschean concept of the Dionysian, the
multiplicity of single individuals gives way to the unity of the individuated one
and, mutatis mutandis^ the individual merges with the collective, and hence with
the unity of Being:
Das Dionysische [...] ist das Grauen über die Zerbrechung des Individua-
tionsprinzips, und zugleich die "wonnevolle Verzückung" darüber, daß es zer-
brochen ist. Das Dionysische ist daher vergleichbar dem Rausch, der das Indi-
viduelle auflöst in die kollektiven Triebe und Inhalte, eine Zersprengung des"
abgeschlossenen Ich durch die Welt (GW 6 210).
With Dionysos, there are no individuals, no individuality: "Seine Individualität

muß daher gänzlich aufgehoben sein" (GW 6 210).^ In 1921, Jung proposed a
new pair of categories in order to accommodate the Apollo/Dionysos antinomy
more precisely within his typological System. Now he argued that it was neces-
sary to go beyond the distinction between Introversion and extraversion and
consider a new set of antinomies which is beyond "logisch-rationale Bearbei-
tung", the so-called "aesthetic" functions (in the Kantiari sense)44. Jung claimed
to have derived these psychological functions direcdy from Nietzsche, whereas
it is more likely that the comparative approach to Schiller and Nietzsche had
forced Jung to consider a new set of functions (Intuition and Sensation) over
and above his original pair (Thinking and Feeling;): "Nietzsches Begriffe führen
uns somit zu den Prinzipien eines dritten und vierten psychologischen Typus,
die man als ästhetische Typen gegenüber den rationalen Typen (Denk- und
Fühltypen) bezeichnen könnte" (GW 6 223). The two new categories of "An-
schauung" (Intuition) and "Empfindung" (Sensation) are associated with Apollo
and Dionysos: "Das Apollinische ist eine innere Wahrnehmung, eine Intuition
der Ideenwelt", and "Das dionysische Gefühl hat den durchaus archaischen
Charakter der affektiven Empfindung" (GW 6 221).
At the same time äs Jung began to encourage the use of drawing, painting
and other artistic activities äs part of a therapeutic technique of "Active Imagina-
tion", two short works of the Twenties and Thirties developed a Jungian aesthet-
ics. Jung's views on the röle of the artist are set out in his 1922 lecture "Über
die Beziehungen der Analytischen Psychologie zum dichterischen Kunstwerk"
and his 1930 contribution to Emil Ermatinger's Philosophie der Ltieratunvissemchaft
entitled "Psychologie und Dichtung" (also originally delivered äs a lecture, prob-
ably in 1930). In both essays, Nietzsche's fundamental Opposition between
Apollo and Dionysos lies behind all the distinctions in Jung's artistic typology,
even though those have been ostensibly borrowed from Schiller's Über naive und
sentimentalische Dichtung. The difference between Jung's two Statements of 1922
and 1930 about his psychoanalytical Interpretation of art parallels this change
of emphasis. Where, in the 1922 lecture, Jung had stressed the psychologfcal
and indeed sociological importance he ascribed to art, citing Nietzsche's work
äs äs example of these functions, the 1930 essay is even more clearly informed
by Nietzsche's conception of Dionysos äs that is set out in Die Geburt der Tragödie.
Towards the end of his 1922 lecture, Jung examined the sociological implica-
tions of the mythological background of certain works of art. According to
The so-called "aesthetic" (or "irrational") functions — "Anschauung" or Intuition (inner percep-
rion, i. e. the perception of ideas) and "Empfindung" or Sensation ("entwickelt die Sinne, den
Instinkt, die Affizierbarkeh") are of fundamental importance for Jung's theory of psychological
types and the Operation of the consciousness, and he suggests even that the rational functions
of Thinking and Feeling may be derived from Intuition and Sensation (GW 6 222).
294 Paul Bishop
Jung, it is the archetypal quality of art which explalns its peculiar emotional
appcaJ, enabling it to speak not to our individual, but to our collective meniory:
"Der Moment, wo die mythologische Situation eintritt, ist immer gekennzeich-
net durch eine besondere emotionale Intensität [· ,.] Wir sind in solchen Momen-
ten nicht mehr Einzelwesen, sondern Gattung, die Stimme der ganzen Mensch-
heit erhebt sich in uns'* (GW 15 128). This overcoming of the principle of
individuation and concomitant sense of universal union is mentioned by
Nietzsche in Die Geburt der Tragödie in a key passage which Jung had marked in
his own copy:
Jetzt, bei dem Evangelium der Weltenharmonie, fühlt sich Jeder mit seinem
Nächsten nicht nur vereinigt, versöhnt, verschmolzen, sondern eins, als ob der
Schleier der Maja zerrissen wäre und nur^noch in Fetzen vor dem geheimnis-
vollen Ur-Einen herumflattere (GT l, KGW III l pp. 25-26).
Jung's argument takes those ideas which Nietzsche had formulated with regard
to the origin of tragedy and applies them more generally to (extraverted) art.
In his quest for the archetypal universal in art, Jung's argument shifted from
psychological aesthetics to soteriology:
Wer mit Urbildern spricht, spricht wie mit tausend Stimmen, er ergreift und
überwältigt, zugleich erhebt er das, was er bezeichnet, aus dem Einmaligen und
Vergänglichen in die Sphäre der Menschheit, und dadurch löst er auch in uns
alle jene hilfreichen Kräfte, die es der Menschheit je und je ermöglicht haben,
sich aus aller Fährnis zu retten und auch die längste Nacht zu überdauern
(GW 15 129).
There are very strong echoes here of Die Geburt der Tragödie^ where Nietzsche
claims that theatrical art enables mankind to withstand the tragic implications
of Dionysian insight (GT 5, KGW III l p. 43). Just äs, for Nietzsche, art was
essentially a survival mechanism, so too, for Jung, art esseritially aids the devel-
opment of humanity.
Much of Nietzsche's thmking in Die Geburt der Tragödie^ which implicitly
informed Jung's thinking on art in 1922, was made even more explicit in bis
lecture of 1930, "Psychologie und Dichtung". Here, Jung associated two further
key aspects of his theory of art with Nietzsche: first, the autheÄticity of the
artist's original vision, and second, the archetypal hature of the imagery used to
express that vision. According to Jung, the foundation of all those works of art
which concern him is to be found in what he terms the "Urvision" or the
"Urerlebnis", a primordial experience which he describes in terms that are re-
markably similar to the account of the "Dionysian in Die Geburt der Tragödie, and
which is, moreover, explicitly linked with Nietzsche:
Der Wert und die Wucht liegen auf der Ungeheuerlichkeit; des Erlebnisses, das
fremd und kalt oder bedeutend und erhaben aus zeitlosen Tiefen auftaucht,
einerseits von schillernder, dämonisch-grotesker Art, menschliche Werte uncH
schöne Formen zersprengend, ein schreckenerregender Knäuel des ewigen
Chaos oder ein "crimen laesae majestatis humanae", um mit Nietzsche zu

reden, andererseits eine Offenbarung, deren Höhen und Tiefen zu ergründen
menschliche Ahnung kaum genügt, oder eine Schönheit, welche zu erfassen
Worte sich vergeblich mühen (GW 15 141).
In "Psychologie und Dichtung", Jung characterized the unconscious source
of Being from which the creative process arises in feminine terms, äs the creative
Mother: "Die Psychologie des Schöpferischen ist eigentlich weibliche Psycholo-
gie, denn das schöpferische Werk wächst aus unbewußten Tiefen empor, recht
eigentlich aus dem Reiche der Mütter" (GW 15 158). Similarly, in a passage
which Jung marked in his copy of Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche says that
Dionysian art reveals Nature äs the eternally creative Mother: "In der diony-
sischen Kunst und in deren tragischer Symbolik redet uns dieselbe Natur mit
ihrer wahren, unverstellten Stimme an: 'Seid wie ich bin! Unter dem un-
aufhörlichen Wechsel der Erscheinungen die ewig schöpferische, ewig zum Da-
sein zwingende, an diesem Erscheinungswechsel sich ewig befriedigende Urmut-
ter!'" (GT 16, KGW III l p. 1041). Moreover, Jung emphasized that the terror
inspired by the primordial vision is so great that man tries to hide himself from
it by means of a naive belief in universal order whose purpose is to cover over
the chaos at the heart of being: "Der Kosmos ist sein Tagglauben, der ihn vor
der Nachtangst des Chaos bewahren sollte" (GW 15 148). Similarly, in another
passage from Die Geburt der Tragödie which Jung marked in his own copy,
Nietzsche claimed that the Dionysian recognition of the horror of life could be
overcome only through the Apollonian illusion: "Jetzt öffnet sich uns gleichsam
der olympische Zauberberg und zeigt uns seine Wurzeln. Der Grieche kannte
und empfand die Schrecken und Entsetzlichkeit des Daseins: um überhaupt
leben zu können, musste er vor sie hin die glänzende Traumgeburt der Olym-
pischen stellen" (GT 3, KGW III l, p. 31). In "Psychologie und Dichtung" Jung
also stated, following Nietzsche, that in the course of artistic activity, the artist
himself disappears into his work: "als Künstler ist er sein Werk und kein
Mensch" (GW 15 156). And just äs Nietzsche speaks of Dionysos and Apollo
äs "Kunsttriebe" (GT 2, KGW l 27), so Jung wrote that "die Kunst ist [dem
Künstler] eingeboren wie ein Trieb, der ihn erfaßt und zum Instrument macht.
Das in letzter Linie in ihm Wollende ist nicht er, der persönliche Mensch,
sondern das Kunstwerk" (GW 15 157). Furthermore, the creative individual is
said by Jung to transcend, by means of artistic production, the limits of his own
subjectivity: "Jeder schöpferische Mensch ist eine Dualität oder eine Synthese
paradoxer Eigenschaften. Einerseits ist er menschlich-persönlich, andererseits aber un-
persönlicher, schöpferischer Prozeß* (GW 15 157). Similarly, Nietzsche claimed that
the essence of tragedy lay in the Identification of Dionysos both äs the victim
and äs the chief murderer, and participation in the tragic moment allows the
artistic genius to transcend the divide between subject and object:
296 Paul Bishop
Nur soweit der Genius im Actus der künstlerischen Zeugung mit jenem
Urkünsder der Welt verschmilzt, weiss er etwas über das ewige Wesen der
Kunst; denn in jenem Zustande ist er, wunderbarer Weise, dem unheimlischen
Bild des Märchens gleich, das die Augen drehn und sich selber anschaun kann;
jetzt ist er zugleich Subject und Öbject, zugleich Dichter, Schauspieler und
Zuschauer (GT 5, KGW III l pp.°43-44).
These clear parallele between Jung's view of art and Nietzsche's views in Die
Geburt der Tragödie demonstrate that Jung had assimilated Nietzsche's ideas to a
much greater extent than he was prepared to admit (or even than he himself
might have realized).
VIII
Jung gave his first Seminar on Analytical Psychology in 1925, and in 1934
he started to give a series of lectures on Zaratbustra (with questions from his
yery select audience) which lasted until 1939. The two volümes of transcripts
reveal the Seminar äs one of the most detailed and, at the same time, most
idiosyncratic interpretations of Zaratbustra ever given and which, perhaps, like
Heidegger's monumental lecture series on Nietzsche45, ultimately says more
about the Interpreter himself than about his ostensible object of Interpretation.
Jung's Seminar on Zaratbustra was given in English, and the translation by
Thomas Common (at that time the Standard version) was used. This translation,
with markings by Jung, is also held in his library at Küsnacht. His copy was
published in New York, but contains no date of publication and no publisher's
name. In the front of his copy äs l found it, there was a letter from one of the
participants in the Nietzsche Seminar, Mrs. Elisa Flower, so that it is highly
probable that Jung took this copy along to his Seminar. As the transcripts of
the Seminar show, Jung occasionally paused during his commentary to point out
a mistranslation in Common's version, and this suggests that he consulted both
the German original and the English translation during his Seminar. The mark-
ings in the translation are very sparse compared to the more detailed marginal
annotations and underlinings in his German edition, and in his English version
Jung frequently marked out only those passages which he intended to read out
in the seminar.
The annotations and underlinings in Jung's German copy of Zarathusfra show
that he noted the recurrence of certain concepts and images like "Untergang"
(SNZI pp. 86-87, 88-89, 243; II pp. 1160, 1492), the dancing star (SNZI
pp. 107, 708) and the "Possenreisser" (SNZ I pp. 102, 109-112, 141-50, 520; II
45
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 2 vols (Pfullingen, 1961).
Jung's Annotaüons of Nietzsche's Works " 297
pp. 1161,1262,1387-1392). By noting these page references in the margin, Jung

was able to make coniiections across the text and reel off one reference after
another in the Seminar — to, for example, the image of the dancing star (SNZ I
107). This technique of cross-referencing was, in fact, Jung's main methodologi-
cal principle, and he stated it äs follows: "First, there is generally an allusion to
a certain Situation, and then the motif goes on and on, returning from time to
time in a more definite form, a more definite application" (according to Jung,
"that is absolutely typical of the way in which the Unconscious works") (SNZ I
p. 1387). Another marginal note, "Schlange und Hirt", links a paragraph from
the chapter Vom Gesindel ("Und nicht das ist der Bissen, an dem ich am meisten
würgte, zu wissen, dass das Leben selber Feindschaft nöthig hat und Sterben
und Marterkreuze" [ZA II6, KGW VI l p. 121]) with the episode of the Shep-
herd and the Snake in the chapter entided Vom Gesicht und Rätsel (Za III 2, KGW
VI l pp. 197-198).
In his Seminar, Jung often read the text in biographical terms and with
reference to Nietzsche's well-known psychological difficulties. Many of Jung's
marginal annotations appear naive in the light of more sophisticated notions of
textuality. For example, against the second paragraph of Von den Lehrstiihlen der
\ Tugend ("Ehre und Scham vor dem Schlafe! Das ist das Erste! Und Allen aus
' dem Wege gehn, die schlecht schlafen und Nachts wachen!" [Za Reden 2, KGW
i VI l p. 28]), Jung wrote: "Er leidet an Schlaflosigkeit. Rede an sich selber". And
! in his Seminar, Jung remarked: "if you remember that Nietzsche himself suffered
very much from sleeplessness and always had to use drugs in order to sleep,
you understand what secret passion is revealed in this chapter" (SNZ I p. 277).
In his note against Zarathustra's remark "Unter Völkern wohnte ich fremder
Zunge" in Vom Gesindel (Za II 6, KGW VI l p. 121), Jung noted: "Italien [,] um
der Selbsterstickung zu entgehen". And against Zarathustra's question "Ach,
wohin soll ich nun noch steigen mit meiner Sehnsucht!" in Vom Lande der Bildung
(Za II14, KGW VI l p. 151), Jung wrote in the margin: "ja, wohin? eben zu
den Menschen". *+
In these cases and in others, there is a close correspondence between Jung's
annotations and the record of the Seminar. For example, on 26 February 1936,
he spoke of National Socialism äs a revival of Wotanism: "[O]ld Wotan has to
a certain extent come to life again [...] the myth is enrnarche,old Wotan is going
strong again; you might even include Alberich and those other demons. That
thing lives" (SNZ II p. 868). This remark was made in the context of a discus-
sion of Das Kind mit dem Spiegel and in particular the following paragraph:
"Wahrlich, einem Sturme gleich kommt mein Glück und meine Freiheit! Aber
meine Feinde sollen glauben, der Böse rase über ihren Häuptern" (Za II l, KGW
VI l p. 103). In his German edition of Zarathustray Jung had written in the
margin "Wuote's her", a reference to a medieval Swiss legend which saw storm-
298 Paul Bishop
ciouds in the sky äs the troops of the Germanic war-god, Wotan. Against the
opening two paragraphs of the chapter in Part I of the German edition of
Zarathustra entitled Vom bleichen Verbrecher (Za Reden 6, KGW VI l p. 41), Jung
noted against the opening two paragraphs, that the Pale Criminal was "Der, der
mit seinem Ich nicht einverstanden ist, weil er daran leidet. Er soll es sterben
lassen". In his Seminar, Jung registered a very strong emotional reaction to Vom
bleichen Verbrecher^ calling it "not a particularly engaging chapter — even disagree-
able [...] [this chapter] is exceedingly disgusting to my feeling [...] here
Nietzsche really becomes an intellectual criminal" (SNZ I pp. 457, 459), and he
made very few underlinings in his German copy. It is therefore significant that
Jung chose to invoke the image of the Pale Criminal in the context of his
discussion of Nazi Germany in "Nach der Katastrophe" (1945): "Dieses Schau-
spiel erinnert an jene von Nietzsche so trefflich beschriebene Gestalt des
'bleichen Verbrechers', der in Wirklichkeit alle Merkmale der Hysterie an sich
trägt" (GW 10 417). In the light of this associarion, Jung's outburst in his Semi-
nar on Vom bleichen Verbrecher makes sense äs an unconscious recognition of the
suppressed Shadow of his own personality, which manifested itself in his ambig-
uous attitude towards National Socialism46.
In the margins of the German edition of the chapter entitled Das Tan%liedy
Jung noted the names of two of his ärchetypes, the "Anima" and the "Old
Man", both of which he had described in "Über clie Archetypen des kollektiven
Unbewußten", an Eranos lecture delivered in 1934. Both these ärchetypes took
form on the basis of deep Nietzschean influence, äs is particularly clear in the
case of the Anima. A close reading of the lecture reveals that Jung's description
of the Anima has its literary counterpart in Nietzsche's Zarathustra, since many
of the characteristics of the Anima are identical with those of the figure of Life
in the chapters Das Tanzlied ancl Das andere Tanzlied*7. And in the same lecture,
46
Jung equates the Shadow with the "inferior function", which he identifies with "the dark side
of the human personality" (GW 9(i) 222). A likely source for the notion of the "Shadow" is
Nietzsche. For example, in the scene which recapitulates the opening dialogue of "Der Wanderer
und sein Schatten", the second section of Volume II of Menschliches, Altymenschliches (MA II
WS, KGW IV 3 p. 173), Zarathustra encounters his shadow, described äs "dünn, schwärzlich,
hohl und überlebt" and displeasing to Zarathustra (Za IV 9, KGW VI l p. 335). It is the Shadow
who sings the erotic song "Die Wüste wächst: weh Dem, der Wüsten birgt!" (ZA IV 16, KGW
VI l pp. 376—81). In Zur Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche compared the philosopher to a shadow:
"Darin ist er wie ein Schatten: je mehr ihm die Sonne sinkt, um so grösser wird er" (GM III 8,
KGW VI 2 p. 372), and Nietzsche's investigation of the Dionysian depths parallels Jung*s con-
cern with the "dark side" of the soul
47
Seven major characteristics are common to both Nietzsche's and Jung's quasi-allegorical figures.
First, both are gendered äs feminine; second, both are fundamentally ambiguous and ambivalent
figures; third, the encounter with the Anima or with Life is essentially conflictual; fourth, both
are "beyond Gopd and Evil"; fifth, the Anima is "die Schlange im Paradies des harmlosen
Menschen voll guter Vorsätze und Absichten" (GW 9(i) 59) and, correspondingly, in Das andere
Tanylied, Life is accompanied by snakes, and Zarathustra calls her "diese verfluchte-flinke gelenke
Jung saw die archetype of the Old Man embodied in that mouthpiece of Diony-
sian wisdom, Zarathustra (GW 9(1) 77).
However, othef annotations in Jung's German copy of Zarathustra are more
enigmatic and were not täken up in his Seminar. For example, against the para-
graph "Ihrem Elende wollten sie entlaufen, und die Sterne waren zu ihnen zu
weit. Da seufzten sie: Oh dass es doch himmlische Wege gäbe, sich in ein
andres Sein und Glück zu schleichen!7 - da erfanden sie sich ihre Schliche und
blutigen Tränklein!" from the chapter Von den Hintenwltlern (Za Reden 3, KGW
VI l p. 33), Jung wrote in the margin: "Missverständnis des Symboles auf der
Objectstufe, darum ist N[ietzsche] auf die Objectstufe verdammt". Or again,
against the first paragraph "O Himmel über mir, du Reiner! Tiefer! Du Licht-
Abgrund! Dich schauend schaudere ich vor göttlichen Begierden" in VorSonnen-
Aufeang (Za III4, KGW VI l p. 203), Jung wrote the cryptic remärk: "Incanta-
tion des Eies". In his Seminar, however, Jung interpreted this opening apostro-
phe along more convenrional psychoanalytic lines äs an image of the introjection
of values (SNZII pp. 1319-1320). Some other notes in the German edition
appear to contradict assertions made by Jung in his Seminar. For example, Jung
pointed out that what he called the Anima archetype was absent from Zarathustra
until the very end (SNZ I pp. 533, 597, 631). But in the margins of his own
German copy of Zarathustra ]ung noted "Anima!" in the margin of three chapters
of Part I: against the paragraph "Auch wenn du ihnen milde bist, fühlen sie sich
noch von dir verachtet; und sie geben dir deine Wohltat zurück mit versteckten
Wehthaten" in Von den Fliegen des Marktes (Za Reden 12, KGW VI l p. 63);
against the paragraph "Ist es nicht besser, in die Hände eines Mörders zu gera-
then, als in die Träume eines brünstigen Weibes?" in Von der Keuschheit (Za
Reden 13, KGW VI l p. 65); and against the paragraph "Du kannst dich für
deinen Freund nicht schön genug putzen: denn du sollst ihm ein Pfeil und eine
Sehnsucht nach dem Übermenschen sein" in Vom Freunde (Za Reden 14, KGW
VI l p. 68). By noting the presence of the Anima in these chapters and providing
evidence of the archetype which he claimed was suppressed, Jung's annotations
challenge his claim in the Seminar that the Anima remains absent until-the end
of Zarathustra.
Jung gave his last lecture on Zarathustra on 15 February 1939 and, because
of the imminent outbreak of war, he never resumed his Nietzsche Seminar. By
that time he had reached the chapter in Zarathustra entitled Von alten und neuen
Schlange und Schlupf-Hexe!" (2a 11115, KGW VI l p. 279-80); sixth, Jung repcatedly empha-
sizes diät die Anima can be like a witch (GW 9 54, 61), and correspondingly, Zarathustra
calls Ufe a "Hexe" and a "Schlupf-Hexe"; and sevendi, the Jungian Anima is said to reveal that
*4(d]as Leben ist närrisch und bedeutend" (GW 9© 65), and correspondingly, in Das andere
Tanzlied Life uses an almost identical oxymoronic expression to describe another fcmale figure,
Zarathustra's Wisdom: "Ah, diese tolle ake Närrin von Weisheit!" (Za 11115, KGW VI l p. 280).
300 Paul Bishop
Tafeln, leaving the four remaining chapters in Part III and the whole of Part IV
undiscussed. However, Jung's comments in the margin of bis own German
edition provide sufficient clues to allow us to undertake a tentative reconstruc-
üon of what hc might have said.
In bis earlier Seminar lectures, Jung had claimed that the Statement "God is
dead" was central to the work: "It is, one could say, the exposition of the whole
problem of Zarathustrrf* (SNZ I p. 43), He had considered the problem a com-
plex one, so that, äs he had put it, God was not so much dead äs "somehow
lurking in die background" (SNZ I p. 72). For Jung, the Death of God was not
a metaphysical proposition but a psychological process, to which he variously
referred äs the "introjection" of the concept of God (SNZ I p. 671), or "infla-
tion", an identification with the archetypal (SNZî pp. 50, 333). However, Jung
considered that Zarathustra represented a turning-point in the collective psychol-
ogy of the West and the Start of a new psychological transformation. In bis
seminar (9 June 1937) on the chapter entitled Von den berühmten Weisen he had
declared: »Zarathustra [...] is like a dream in its representation of events. It
expresses renewal and self-destruction, the death of a god and the birth of a
god, the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new one. When an epoch
comes to an end a new epoch begins. The end is a beginning: what has come
to an end is reborn in the moment when it ceases to be" (SNZ II p. 1132). And
in bis penultimate seminar (8 February 1939), in the context of a discussion of
the chapter entitled Von alten und neuen Tafeln^ he claimed:
We know that Nietzsche has declared God to be dead, and here it appears äs
if God were not so dead; that is, äs if there were no personal or monotheistic
God, but there was divinity [...] Nietzsche thinks here of a peculiar trans-
formation: namely, that through the abolition of Christianity the divine element
leave the dogmatic idea of God and will become incarnated in man, so
there will be gods. That is a sort of Intuition of an individuation process' in
man, which eventually leads to a deification of man or to the birth of God in
man. Then we are confronted with that dilemma: is it the deification of man
or the birth of God in man? (SNZ II p. 1527).
The solution to this dilemma in Jung's System, mpst explicitly discussed \v\Aion
(1951), is the constellation of the Seif (in which the opposites, inclucüng con-
sciousness and the Unconscious, would be unified). The Seif, too, is another
concept which Jung adapted from Nietzsche (SNZ I p. 391), psychologizing it
into the archetype of totality.
Jung's marginalia in his German edition reflect this theme of a Rebirth of
God. Against the paragraph "Messbar für Den, der Zeit hat, wägbar für einen
guten Wäger, erfliegbar für starke Fittige, errathbar für göttliche Nüsseknacker:
also fand mein Traum die Welt" which introduces Zarathustra's dream in the
chapter entitled Von den drei Bösen (Za III10, KGW VI i p. 231), Jung wrote in
the margin of his own German copy: "Hier ist der vermisste Gott". But against
Jung's Annotations of Nietzsche's Works , 301
the paragraphs "Alle Dinge sehnen sich nach dir, dieweil du sieben Tage allein
bleibst, - tritt hinaus aus deiner Höhle! Alle Dinge wollen deine Ärzte sein!"
and the paragraph "Für mich - wie gäbe es ein *Ausser-mir? Es giebt kein
Aussen! Aber das vergessen wk bei allen Tönen; wie lieblich ist es, dass wir
vergessen!" in the chapter entitled Der Genesende (Za III13, KGW VI l p. 268),
Jung wrote in the margin of his own copy: "Gott". And against the paragraph
"- ach, der Mensch kehrt ewig wieder! Der kleine Mensch kehrt ewig wieder!"
from the same chapter (Za III13, KGW VI l p. 270), Jung wrote a barely legible
note: "[...] dann kehrt [...] der Gott wieder". Furthermore, in his Ger man
copy against the paragraphs "das aber ist der Winzer, der mit diamantenem
Winzermesser wartet, -/-dein grosser Löser, o meine Seele, der Namenlose -
dem zukünftige Gesänge erst Namen finden!" from the chapter entitled Von der
großen Sehnsucht (Za 14, KGW VI l p. 276), Jung wrote: "ein 'Erlöser'!". Taken
together with the marginalia, the remarks which Jung made in his later Seminar
lectures suggest that he might have been sensitive to the Dionysian allusions of
such chapters äs Von der großen Sehnsucht and Das andere Tanzlied of Part III and
such chapters äs Mittags of Part IV (which Jung anälysed in his Eranos lecture
"Die verschiedenen Aspekte der Wiedergeburt" (1939) delivered shortly after
the end of his Nietzsche Seminar48). If this is so, then the question is not
simply whether, äs Jung put it, the psychological message of Zarathustra was the
deification of Man or the birth of God in Man, but whether the god, whose
return Jung thought that Nietzsche had foreseen, was the Christian God or the
pagan Dionysos.
IX
Almost all of Jung's essays written immediately before and in the midst of
the Second World War deal with religion (both Western and Eastern), äs the
titles of some of his works written during this period show: the Terry Lectures
at Yale University on "Psychology and Religion" (1937), "Die Visionen des
Zosimos" (1938), "Die träumende Welt Indiens", "Was Indien uns lehren kann",
the foreword to D. T. Suzuki's Die große Befreiung: Einßihrung in den Zen-Buddhismus,
the foreword to the German translation of the Tibetan Book of the Great
Liberation and the Eranos lecture "Die verschiedenen Aspekte der Wiederge-
burt" (all written in 1939), "Zur Psychologie der Trinitätsidee" (1940), "Das
Wandlungssymbol der Messe" (1941), "Der Geist Mercurius" (1942), "Zur
48
According to Jung, the cpisodc of the Noontide Vision (Mitta&vision [Za IV 10, KGW VI l
pp. 338—41 j) frono Zaratbttstra was a "klassisches Beispiel" of the rebirth cxperience wliich sym-
bolized the transcendence of life (GW 9( ) 21 ).
302 Paul Bishop
Psychologie östlicher Meditation" (1943), thc introduction to Heinrich Zimmer's

Der Weg ^m Selbst: Lehre und Leben des indischen Heiligen Shri Ramana Maharshi aus
Ttruvannamalei (1944) and "Zur Psychologie des Geistes" (1945) (all in GW 11
and GW 13). In Wandlungen und Symbole der Ubido (1911/1912), Jung had argued
that the origins of religion lay in die incest-taboo, although he had also suggested
that this showed the necessity of religion. In Psychologische Typen (1921), he had
stressed the religiöus nature of the reconciling symbol. And in Antwort aufHiob
(1952) (GW XI 553-758), Jung went so far äs to put Gqd himself on the
psychiatrist's couch. Taken äs a whole, these works reflect the move away from
the world to the seif, a move which St. Augustine summarized in the phrase
chosen by Jung äs a preface to his book on the Trinity: "noli foras ire, in teipsum
redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas" (Go not outside, return into thyself:
Truth dwells in the in ward man49).
Jung's psychological approach to religion was similar to Nietzsche's in several
important respects and took shape under his influence. The annotations in
Jung's edition of Nietzsche's Werke show that he paid close attention to
Nietzsche's comments on religion from Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) through
der Der Antichrist (written in 1888). In particülar, Jung's copy of Der Antichrist
contains many underlinings, marginal linings and jottings on this theme. For
example, Jung notes Nietzsche's attacks on Christianity in Section 51, marking
(amongst others) the following phrases; "Das Christentum hat die Krankheit
nötig [...] Und die Kirche selbst - ist sie nicht das katholische Irrenhaus als
letztes Ideal? [...] Gott am Kreuze — versteht man immer noch die furchtbare
Hintergedanklichkeit dieses Symbols nicht? — Alles was leidet, Alles, was am
Kreuze hängt, ist göttlich ..." (AC 51, KGW VI 3 p. 230). Correspondiftgly, Jung
read the symbolism of the crucified Christ äs a representation of the painful
clash of psychic opposites, a conflict which, however, he thought could be
resolved. He also noted the biographical background to Nietzsche's comment
in Section 9: "Diesem Theologen-Instinkte mache ich den Krieg: ich fand seine
Spur überall" (AC 9, KGW VI 3 p. 173), but at the same time Jung's marginal
comment - "Grosspapa und Vater!!" — implicitly draws attention to himself äs
well (his own father was a Protestant pastor). Jung also noted Nietzsche's attack
on the Christian ideal: "Die widernatürliche Castration eines Gottes zu einem
Gotte bloss des Guten läge hier außerhalb aller Wünschbarkeit" (AC 16, KGW
VI 3 p. 180). Seen in this context, Jung's childhood dream of a giant un-
derground phallus — "ein unterirdischer und nicht zu erwähnender Gott" —
represents the phallus of the castrated go.d of Christianity50. Significantly, Jung
dated his intdlectual work right back to this dream: "Damals hat mein geistiges
Leben seinen unbewußten Anfang genommen". ' - ' .
49
St. Augustine, Über de vera religione, xxix (72). '
50
Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, pp. 19—21; see Anthony Stevens, p. 103; and Philip Rieff, Tbe
Triumph of the Therapeutic. Uses ofFaith öfter Freud (London, 1966), p. 110.
Jung's Aenotations of Nietzsche's Works 303
Two of Nietzsche's other books (which Jung hardly mentioned in his pub-
lished works) anticipate many of Jung's ideas in terms of methodology and
approach: Jenseits von Gut und Böse and Zur Genealogie der Moral The markings in
Jung's edition strongly suggest that he had noted the points of contact and had
incorporated them into his psychological System, suggesting that Nietzsche's
influence was greater than even Jung himself might have realized and that the
affinities between them were äs great äs their differences. Before trying to ex-
plain why such works, which were clearly so important to Jung, are barely ac-
knowledged in the published writings, I shall briefly sketch which parts of these
works represent the main areas of convergence between Jung and Nietzsche
and where the fundamental differences between them arise.
First, many of Jung's major psychological assumptions appear to have ab-
sorbed certain Nietzschean arguments. For example, Jung adopted Nietzsche's
perspective which views philosophical Statements äs indicative of psychological
attirudes. In "Die psychologischen Aspekte des Mutterarchetypus", a lecture at
the Eranos Conference of 1938 which contains a number of important theoreti-
cal Statements, Jung claimed that, subsequent to Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
the activities of understanding and reason could no longer be understood äs
processes which are subject to the laws of logic, but had to be seen äs psychic
funcrions corresponding to the personality. In other words: "die Persönlichkeit
Kants [war] eine nicht unwesentliche Voraussetzung der "Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft (GW 9(i) 150). Jung's argument is straight out of Jenseits von Gut und Böse,
where Nietzsche had argued that philosophy could take the form of a psycho-
logical critique of personal outlooks and attitudes disguised äs philosophy:
"Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede grosse Philosophie bisher war:
nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und eine Art ungewollter und un-
vermerkter memoires" QGB 6> KGW VI2 p. 13; cf. JGB 3, KGW VI 2
pp. 11-12). Indeed, Nietzsche thought this was also the truth of his own philos-
ophy: "Meine Schriften reden w/rvon meinen Überwindungen" (MAII Vorrede,
KGW IV 3 p. 3); and his view that the nature of truth is essentially subjective
is emphasized by his use of such subtitles äs "wir Gelehrten" and "unsere
Tugenden" 0Gß' VI, VII, KGW VI 2 pp. 131, 155).
From the underlinings and marginal linings in his copy, we know that Jung
had also read the passage from Jenseits von Gut und Böse where Nietzsche defined
the parameters of psychology, which intersect with the areas of interest to Ana-
lytical Psychology:
Die menschliche Seele und ihre Grenzen, der bisher überhaupt erreichte Um-
fang menschlicher innerer Erfahrungen, die Höhen, Tiefen und Fernen dieser
Erfahrungen, die ganze bisherige Geschichte der Seele und ihre noch unausge-
304 Paul ßishop
trunkenen Möglichkeiten: das ist für einen gebornen Psychologen und Freund
der "grosseil Jagd" das vorbestimmte Jagdbcrcich QGB 45, KGW V I 2
pp. 63-64).
Later on in the same aphorism, Nietzsche wem on to emphasize the personal
engagement required by such a task in a passage which Jung ünderlined in bis
copy: "Zuletzt muss man Alles selber thun, um selber einiges zu wissen: das
heisst, man hat viel zu thun!" (JGB 45, KGW VI 2 pp. 63-64). Inasmuch äs Jung
formulated die central tenets of Analytical Psychology in tandem with his own
exploration of the Collective Unconscious in dreams and visions, he accepted
the burdens of this personal responsibility. Finally, like Nietzsche, Jung saw that
it was possible to use religion for the purposes of psychological development,
radier than merely submitting to it, and he ünderlined the following passage in
his copy: "dieser Philosoph wird sich der Religionen zu seinem Züchtungs- und
Erziehungswerke bedienen" QGB 61, KGW VI 2 p. 77).
Although Jung had mentioned in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libzdo that See-
tions 12 and 13 of Menschliches, Alltymenscbliches had anticipated his theory of
archetypes, he neglected to mention Nietzsche's concept of an ancient and dis-
tant " 'Gesammt-Haushalt' der Seele" which occurs twice in Jenseits von Gut und
Böse (and is marked both times in Jung's own copy). In the first passage where
this expression occurs, Nietzsche restates the Platonic notion of anamnesis and
argues:
[Das] Denken [der verschiedensten Philosophen] ist in der That viel weniger
ein Entdecken, als ein Wiedererkennen, Wiedererinnern, eine Rück- und Heim-
kehr in einen fernen uralten Gesammt-Haushalt der Seele, aus dem jene Be-
griffe einstmals herausgewachsen sind: — Philosophiren ist insofern eine Art
von Atavismus höchsten Ranges [...] Dank der gemeinen Philosophie der
Grammatik - ich meine Dank der unbewussten Herrschaft und Führung durch
gleiche grammatische Funktionen — von vornherein [liegt] Alles für eine gleich-
artige Entwicklung und Reihenfolge der philosophischen Systeme vorbereitet
[...] 0GB 20, KGW VI 2 p. 28).
Expressed in psychological terms, this argument amounts to the claim that phi-
losophy is nothing other than the process of regression (in the Jungian sense,
i. e. a return to a more primitive' state of consciousness). According to Jung,
the psychic, resources of niankind are preprograrnmed in the form of the arche-
types of the Collective Unconscious, and he held that it was impossible to escape
the psychic limits of thought in order to gain access to a realm of pure reason.
Whilst the archetypes, like the Kantian table of categories, structure all thought,
they too, like the categories, rule out any knowledge of the noumenal realm.
With Jung, however, the distinction between the phenomenon and the noume-
non collapses; for he held that the phenemonal world and the noumenal world
are part of the psychic world. Just äs Nietzsche abolished the distinction between
the real world and the apparent world, leaving us only with the world of appear-
Jung's Annotätions of Nietzsche's Works 305
ances which are, nonetheless, said to be real, so Jung would argue in Theoretische
Überlegungen %um Wesen des Psychischen (1954) that what we know is the psyche
and only the psyehe (see below). In Wandlungen und'Symbole der Ubido, written in
1911—1912 when Jung was probably reading Jenseits von Gut und Böse (making
one reference to this text, äs discussed below), he argued for an archetypal
limitation to philosophy äs follows:
Der Moment der Bewußtseinsentstehung, der Trennung vom Objekt und Sub-
jekt, ist eine Geburt; wahrlich, das philosophische Denken hängt flügellahm
an den wenigen großen urtümlichen Bildern der menschlichen Sprache, über
deren einfache alles überragende Größe sich kein Gedanke erhebt (WSL:
p. 311).
Although Nietzsche bases his argument m Jenseits von Gut und Böse on the primacy
of language over thought, his conclusion that the limits of philosophy, although
unconsciously imposed, are nevertheless inescapable is close to some of Jung's
assertions in the first chapter of Wandlungen und Symbole der Ubido. There, Jung
argued that rational thought and language are the product of some kind of
archetypal (Hnguistic?) structures, although at this stage he left it open äs to
whether language referred only to intra-psychic reality. "So ist die Sprache
ursprünglich und wesentlich nichts als ein System von Zeichen oder Symbolen,
welche reale Vorgänge oder ihren Widerhall in der menschlichen Seele bezeich-
nen [...] Historisch ist diese ideelle Sprache oder, mit anderen Worten, das
gerichtete Denken doch ein Abkömmling der Urworte [...]" (WSL: pp. 26-27).
And curiously, he mentioned Nietzsche in his reflections on the sad conse-
quences of this idea:
Ein noch so abstraktes System der Philosophie stellt also in Mittel und Zweck
nichts anderes dar als eine äußerst kunstvolle Kombination ursprünglicher Na-
turlaute. Daher der Drang eines Schopenhauer, eines Nietzsche nach Anerken-
nung und Verständnis, die Verzweiflung und die Bitterkeit ihres Alleinseins
(WSL: p. 27).
And in the second passage where he talked about a " 'Gesammt-Haushalt'
der Seele", Nietzsche explicitly linked the 'common stock of the soul' with the
phenomenon of dreaming and implied that such dream experiences -Were of
equal validity äs empirical (or "real") experiences: "Quidquid luce mit, tenebris
agit: aber auch umgekehrt. Was wir im Traume erleben, vorausgesetzt, dass wir
es oftmals erleben, gehört zuletzt so gut zum Gesammt-Haushalt unserer Seele,
wir irgend etwas 'wirklich' Erlebtes" QGB 193, KGW VI2 p. 116). It is stränge
that Jung made no references to either passage, particulady when he made an-
other, far obscurer reference to Jenseits von Gut und Böse (which he attributed to
Nietzsche but without identifying the work) in Chapter 2 of Wandlungen und
Symbole der LJbido:
Nietzsche hat aber den biologischen Hintergrund geahnt, als er von der
"prachtvollen Spannung" des germanischen Geistes sprach, welche das Mittel-
306 Paul Bishop
alter schuf [a refercncc to thc "Vorrede": "der Kampf gegen den christlich·
kirchlichen Druck von Jahrtausenden [...] hat in Europa eine prachtvolle Span-
nung des Geistes geschaffen, wie sie auf Erden noch nicht da war" (JGB
Vorrede, KGW VI 2 pp. 4-5)] (WSL: p. 33).
The Jungian notion of the archetype can be clearly understood äs an extension
of some of the ideas in these passages. Where Nietzsche had spoken of primor-
dial modes of thinking and argued that the repetition of a set of experiences
could structure our existence, so Jung sought to develop an awareness to the
revelation of the archaic which revealed, so he thought, the dynamic patterns
of the psyche. But Jung only half-acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche äs an
intellectual source of his theory of the archetype, referring to Menschliches, All%u-
menschlkhes but not to Jenseits von Gut und Böse. /
Second, Jung paid great attention to Nietzsche's critique of religion m Jenseits
von Gut und Böse. He underüned Nietzsche's contention in Section 46 that "Der
christliche Glaube ist von Anbeginn Opferung: Opferung aller Freiheit, alles
Stolzes, aller Selbstgewissheit des Geistes; zugleich Verknechtung und Selbst-
Verhöhnung, Selbst-Verstümmelung" (JGB 46, KGW VI 2 p. 64). Then ägain,
Jung marked Nietzsche's claim in Section 54 that all post-Cartesian philosophy
was, under the disguise of a critique of the subject-predicate form, in fact an
attack on the concept of the soul by underlining the conclusion that ultimately
this was also "ein Attentat auf die Grundvoraussetzung der christlichen Lehre"
(JGB 54, KGW VI2 p. 71). Jung also underlined Nietzsche's observation in the
preceding section "dass zwar der religiöse Instinkt mächtig im Wachsen ist"
without, however, underlining the conclusion — "dass er aber gerade die the-
istische Befriedigung mit tiefem Misstrauen ablehnt" [JGB 53, KGW VI2
p. 71]). And in the margin of Section 58 QGB 58, KGW VI 2 pp. 73-74) Jung
noted: "also ist Nietzsche sehr religiös".
Third, Jung understood that an examination of the problems of rriethod and
value was a key part of Nietzsche's philosophical enterprise. In Der Antichrist^
Nietzsche wrote: "Die werthvollsten Einsichten werden am spätesten gefunden:
aber die werthvollsten Einsichten sind die Methoden" (AC 13, KGW VI 3 p. 177)..
Nietzsche's concern with "[das] Gewissen der Methode" comes to-the fore in
Section 36 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse, where he articulates a presüpposition
which jung virtually placed at the heart of his own analytical psychological pro-
ject:
Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real "gegeben" ist als unsre Weit der Begierden
und Leidenschaften, dass wir zu keiner, ändern "Realität" hinab oder hinauf
können als gerade zur Realität unsrer Triebe — denn Denken" ist nur ein Verhal-
ten dieser Triebe zueinander [...] (JGB 36, KGW VI 2 p. 50).
Jung, who marked this passage with a marginal line in his owri copy, voiced
precisely the same idea in Theoretische Überlegungen %um Wesen des Psychischen (1954),
a revision of a leeture given to the Eranos Conference in 1946, where he sum-

marized his psychological teachuig. Arguing that, because of the absence of a
"Archimedean point" outside the psyche from whkh .to observe it, the psyche
could only translate the psychic back into the psychic, Jung claimed: "Die Psyche
kann sich in nichts abbilden; sie kann sich nur in sich selber darstellen und sich
selber beschreiben" (GW 8 421). On his account, the e'ntire economy of the
psyche can be understood äs a series of negotations between different balances
of energy flows (GW 8 407); and arguably, Jung's most important contribution
to psychology is his notion of the self-regulating psyche51. In aphorism 36 of
Jenseits von Gut undBöse^ Nietzsche spoke of "eine primitivere Form der Welt der
Affekte, in der noch Alles in mächtiger Einheit beschlossen liegt", and then
went on to imagine what sounds like a prototype for the Jungian self-regulating
psyche: "eine Art von Triebleben, in dem noch sämmdiche organische Funktio-
nen, mit Selbst-Regulirung, Assimilation, Ernährung, Ausscheidung, Stoffwech-
sel, synthetisch gebunden ineinander sind" QGB 36, KGW VI 2 pp. 50-51).
Nietzsche's argument then takes a sudden turn, when, in the light of these
preceding considerations, he proposes to understand causality in terms of voli-
tion and reveals that he will revalue the values which contemporary culture takes
for granted from the perspective of the Will to Power (äs the concluding lines
of that section, marked by Jung in the margin of his copy, make clear):
Die Frage ist zuletzt, ob wir den Willen wirklich als wirkend anerkennen, ob
wir an die Causalität des Willens glauben: thun wir das, [...] so müssen wir den
Versuch machen, die Willens-Causalität hypothetisch als die einzige zu setzen
[...] Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren "intelligiblen Charakter"
hin bestimmt und bezeichnet — sie wäre eben "Wille zur Macht" und nichts
ausserdem (JOB 36, KGW VI2 p. 51).
Jung, too, was preoccupied with the dual question of method and value and
distinguished his own "synthetic" (or "constructive") method of dream Inter-
pretation from the "analytic" or "causal-reductive") view which he associated
with Freudian analysis (GW 7 121-140). This distinction later broadened out
into the dichotomy between the "mechanistic" (or "causal") way of looking at
physical events and the "energic" (or "final") standpoint which he himself es-
poused (GW 8 1-5). As has been pointed out, "Jung's "will to Interpretation' is
much closer to Nietzsche's 'progressive' than to Freud's 'regressive' hermeneu-
tics"52.
51
"Eine psychologische Theorie, die mehr sein soll als bloß technisches Hilfsmittel, muß sich auf
das Gegensatzprinzip gründen; denn ohne diese könnte sie nur eine neurotisch unbalanciertc
Psyche rekonstruieren. Es gjbt kein Gleichgewicht und kein System mit Selbstregulierung ohne
Gegensatz. Die Psyche aber ist ein System mit Selbstregulicrung" (GW 7 92).
52
C G. Jung and tbe Humanlties: Towards a Hermentuties of Culittrt, edited by Karin Barnaby and
Pdlegrino D'Acierno (London, 1990), "Preface", p. xvii.
308 Paul Bishop
But Jung's annotations of one particular pasasage of Jenseits von Gut und Böse
reveal, however, the major, fundamental difference between himself and
Nietzsche - which explains why he ates Jenseits von Gut und Böse so rarely in his
published work. In "Das Grundproblem der gegenwärtigen Psychologie" (first
delivered in 1931 äs a lecture to the Kulturbund in Vienna and published in its
present form in 1934), Jung argued that whereas psychology had hitherto been
subordinated to philosophy, this state of affairs would now be reversed. In this
lecture, he claimed that Nietzsche had foreseen this development: "Bis vor kur-
zem noch war die Psychologie ein besonderer Teil der Philosophie, aber jetzt
nähert sich, wie Nietzsche es vorausgesagt hat, ein Aufstieg der Psychologie,
der die Philosophie zu verschlucken droht" (GW 8 659). Jung was undoubtedly
thinking here of Section 23 of Jenseits von Gu/und £öse, where Nietzsche had
proclaimed psychology äs the "Herrin der Wissenschaften" in a passage which
Jung had underlined in his copy: "Die gesamte Psychologie ist bisher an mora-
lischen Vorurteilen und Befürchtungen hängen geblieben: sie hat sich nicht in
die Tiefe gewagt [...] Denn Psychologie ist nunmehr wieder der Weg zu den
Grundproblemen" (JGB 23, KGW VI2 pp. 32-33). However, we can detect a
note of scepticism about Nietzsche's own approach to seientific enquiry in Jung's
marginal note against the previous aphorisrn (Section 22): "Der Philolog hat
keinen Eindruck von der Naturwissenschaft". Jung's System was to develop an
energic conception of "psychological value", according to which välues were
quantitative estimates of energy ("Werte sind energetische Quan-
titätsschätzungen" [GW 8 14]). And in his writings on psychology and religion,
Jung was to Interpret the "Death of God" (obviously, a highly Nietzschean
theme) to mean that "der höchste, lebenspendende und siiingebende Wert ist
verlorengegangen" (GW 11 149). This echoes both Nietzsche's vision in Die
fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW 125, KGW V 2 pp 158-60) of a world which has be-
come unhinged, and Nietzsche's definition of nihilism in his notes for Der Wille
ûr Macht "was bedeutet Nihilism? — daß die obersten Werthe sich entwertherf* (WM 2,
KGW VIII 2 9 [35] p, 14)53. But Nietzsche defmed value in his notes for Der
Wille %ur Macht^not just iri terms of energy, but of power: "Werth [ist] das höchste
Quantum Macht, das der Mensch sich einzuverleiben vermag" (WM 713, KGW
VIII 3 14 [8] p. 13). - ;>
The Will to Power was the doctrine which Jung decisively rejected. This is
anticipated in the chapter of Über die Psychologie des Unbewußten (1916) entitled
"Der andere Gesichtspunkt: Der Wille zur Macht" (GW 7 35-55), and con-
firmed by his note against section 23 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse where he rejects
53
Whilst there is no evidence from his annotations or writings that Jung knew Der Wille %ttr Macht,
he was familiär with much of the earlier secondary material on Nietzsche, and had received
Ernst Horneffer's selection of ''Nachlaß" material äs a gift from Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche *
(see note 17 above).
Nietesche's definition of psychology äs the "Morphologie und Entwicklungslehre

des Willens %ur Mach? with a curt wave of the band (and the pencil): "schlechte
Interpretation". The doctrine of the Will to Powe*r .was unacceptable to Jung
because of what he saw äs its psychological one-sidedness, äs bis marginal notes
on Section 44 oi Jenseits von Gut und Böse make clear. Against Nietzsche's attack
on "die Nivellirer" (JOB 44, KGW VI2 p. 57), Jung wrote: ifWiUe zur Macht -
das Grundprinzip"; but against the claim that Man's Will to Life must become
a Will to Power, he wrote: "Wo ist das Nicht-Können!! und Alles Schwache und
Moralische dazu". In Jung's thought, both weakness and strength, regression
and progression are inescapably paired (äs all opposites are to be united)54, so
that, in the end, Nietzsche's concept of the Will to Power is a point of view
which Jung found to be just äs reductive äs Freud's sexual theory of libido. The
theory of "psychic energy", which Jung traces back through such contemporar-
ies äs the Russian psychologist and philosopher Nicolas von Grot (1852-1899)
and the German philosopher and aesthetician Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) to
Schiller's Ästhetische Briefe (GW VIII26), is äs far removed from the Freudian
definitiön of libido äs it is from the Nietzschean Will to Power. And, according
to Jung, Nietzsche's own case-history provided an example of the dangers of a
one-sided pursuit of power. In the chapter of Über die Psychologie des Unbewußten
called "Der andere Gesichtspunkt: Der Wille zur Macht", Jung, whilst recogniz-
ing the ineluctability of the Dionysian urges äs the profoundest expression of
Man's animal nature, made plain bis doubts about Nietzsche's own Dionysian-
ism:
Der Fall Nietzsches zeigt einerseits, welches die Folgen der neurotischen
Einseitigkeit, und andererseits, welches die Gefahren sind, die der Sprung über
das Christentum hinaus in sich birgt. Nietzsche hat unzweifelhaft die
christliche Verleugnung der Tiernatur aufs tiefste empfunden und suchte nach
einer höheren menschlichen Ganzheit jenseits von Gut und Böse. Jeder, der
die Grundhaltung des Christentums ernsthaft kritisiert, entledigt sich auch des
Schutzes, den ihm dieses gewährt. Er lieferte sich unweigerlich der Tierseele ans. Das
ist der Augenblick des dionysischen Rausches, die überwältigende Offenbarung
der "blonden Bestie", die mit ungekannten Schauern den Ahnungslosen er-
greift (GW 7 40).
54
According to Jung, all opposites exist in an complementary relationship to each other, and all
judgments are predicated in this Opposition; for example, the antithesis between good and evil
is said to generate all moraJ judgments: "Die Idee von Gut und Böse ist [...] die Voraussetzung
des moralischen Urteils. Es ist ein logisch äquivalentes Gegensatzpaar, das als solches einer
conditio sine qua non jedes Brkenntnisaktes bildet" (GW 9(ii) 84). For Jung, the very act of
cognirion is the moment of discrimination of the opposites, but this is a precondition of con-
sdousness of the object and not the property of the objcct of cognition (GW 9(ii) 112). For
the founding of Jung's dualistic ontology, see his Septtm sermones ad mortuos (reprinted in Erinne-
rung», Träumt, Gedankfn, pp. 389-398).
310 Paul Bishop
In Jungian psychology, the middle path is always the onc to be taken — not an
*4either-or", but a complementary "union of opposites": "Das endlose Dilemma
Kultur-Natur ist im Grunde stets die Frage eines Zuviel oder eines Zuwenig,
kein Entweder-Oder" (GW 7 41).
There are further important aspects of Jung's work which stopped him from
using two other heavily annotated texts, Zur Genealogie der Moral and Der Anti-
christ. As Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken reveals, Jung's childhood and Student
years were much affected by die decüne in faith of his father, a Protestant
pastor; and Jung himself found litde of psychological appeal in Protestandsm.
He was also aware that Nietzsche, too, had been the son of a pastor, and
repeatedly referred to this fact in his Seminar on Zarathustra (SNZ I pp. 69, 429,
451, 462, 576; II pp. 1095-1096, 1204-1206). ^faereas Nietzsche had thought
that to understand the psychological mechanism behind Christianity was to cease
believing in Christianity (MA 1135, KGW IV 2 p. 129), Jung wanted to replace
belief with understanding and so maintain "the symbolic life" (GW 18) for those
to whom "the charisma of faith" had not been granted (GW 5 343). At its
deepest level, Analytical Psychology is an attempt to recuperate religion from
the onslaught of Nietzschean atheism/nihilism, and, according to Jung's corre-
spondence with Freud (see above), religion was to be reclaimed on the distinctly
Nietzschean territory of the Dionysian. Nietzsche's vitriolic and caustic attacks
on the religion of his own father, which was also the religion of Jung's father,
would have been highly üncomfortable for Jung to deal with. And to Nietzsche's
question in Section 51 of Der Antichrist— "Gott am Kreuze— versteht man immer
noch die furchtbare Hintergedanklichkeit dieses Symbols nicht?" (AC 51, KGW
VI 3 p. 230) — Jung gave the following analytical psychological answer. The
Cross, he claimed, symbolizes the painful but necessäry mediation of the oppo-
sites (Man and God, Good and Evil, Conscious and Unconscious) (GW 11 659,
739), and hence represents the stages of the IndividuationsprosyfP*'. Whilst praising
Nietzsche's intellectüal honesty, however, Jung also used Nietzsche äs a example
of a failure to mediate the opposites and äs a warning against falling foul of
Dionysos.
As for Zur Genealogie der Moral, Jung was not alone in his intellectüal proxim-
ity to this text. In such early works äs Wandlungen und Symbole der Ubido (191l/
12) and 'Neue Bahnen der Psychologie' (1912), Jung spoke of the 'Zwang %ur
Domestikation\ 'die Libido, die nach innen, ins Subjekt gewendet ist', arid the
'moralische Bändigung animalischer Triebe' (WSL: pp. 265, 94, 79), and he de-
fined "der Kulturprozeß" in terms of "einer fortschreitenden Bändigung des
55
Individuation' may be defined äs the process by which a persorrbecomes a separate, individual
unity, expanding beyond ego consciousness to realize the higher potential whieh Jung termed
the «Seif*.
Animalischen im Menschen" and of "ein Domestikationpro2eß" (GW 7 425),

ideas and expressions redolent of the general thrust of Zur Genealogie der Moral
and of Sectionlo in the second essay, "Schuld'l * Schlechtes Gewissen" und Ver-
wandtes^ in particular. Yet many of Jung's concepts (especially his concept of
libido äs 'psychic energy', which rejected Freud's exclusively sexual Interpretation
of the incest-taboo and the nature of libido) nonetheless remained governed by
Freudian psychoanalysis, inasmuch äs they stood direcdy opposed to it. Freud
himself was reticent about his intellectual relationship to Nietzsche, but clearly
owes mudi to him56. Although Jung's point of departure from Freudian ortho-
doxy was the Nietzschean concept of the Dionysian, his reluctance to fore-
ground a common source in Nietzsche between himself and Freud in other
respects may be due not just to a desire to create an Impression of originality,
but also to the need to repress in public anything which reminded him of Freud.
Instead of either Freudian psychoanalysis or the Nietzschean hermeneutics
of the Will to Power, Jung was set to follow a different path, äs his annotation
of another of the aphorisms in Jenseits von Gut und Böse indicates. Drawing atten-
rion to the figure of the saint in a passage which, in Jung's copy, is marked
by underlining and marginal lines, Nietzsche formulated the following task of
discovering: "was eigentlich am ganzen Phänomen des Heiligen den Menschen
aller Art und Zeit, auch den Philosophen, so unbändig interessant gewesen ist".
He suggested the following answer: "so ist es ohne allen Zweifel der ihm anhaf-
tende Aufeinanderfolge von Gegensätzen, von moralisch entgegengesetzt gewertheten
Zuständen der Seele", and criticized psychology for its reticence with regard
this question ("Die bisherige Psychologie litt an dieser Stelle Schiffbruch"),
ascribing this lack of interest to psychology's own subscription to "die mora-
lischen Werth-Gegensätze" (JGB 47, KGW VI2 pp. 66-67). And in Section 51
56
Freud's reception of Nietzsche has been repeatedly but unsystematically documented. See: Ru-
dolf J. Brandt, "Freud and Nietzsche", Revue de Universite d'Ottowa, 25 (1955), 225-234; Friedrich
Tramer, "Friedrich Nietzsche und Sigmund Freud", Jahrbuch für Psychologie, Psychotherapie und
Anthropologie, 7 (1960), 325-350; Richard Schmitt, "Nietzsche's Psychological Theory", Journal
of Existential Psychiatry, 2 (1961), 71-92; Christo Dimitrov and Assen Jablenski, "Nietzs'die und
Freud", Zeitschrift für pychosomatische Medizin und Psychoanalyse, 13 (1967), 282-298; Bruce Mazlish,
"Freud and Nietzsche", The Psychoatialytic Review, 55 (1968), 360-375; Richard Waugamann, "The
Intellectual Relationship between Nietzsche and Freud", Psychiatry, 36 (1973), 458-467; Mitchell
Ginsberg, "Nietzschean Psychiatry", in Nietzsche: A Colleciion ofCritical Essays, edited by Robert
CSolornon (University of Notre Dame, 1973), pp. 293-315; Jean Granier, "Le Statut de la
Philosophie selon Nietzsche et Freud", Nietzsche-Studien, 8 (1979), 210-224; Jacob Golomb,
"Freudian Uses and Misuses of Nietzsche", American Imagr, 37 (1980), 371-385; Lorin Andcr-
son, "Freud, Nietzsche", Salmagundi, No. 47-48 (Winter-Spring 1980), 3-29; Rollo May,
''Nietzsches Beiträge zur Psychologie", Jahrbuch ßr verstehende Tiefenpsychologie und Kulturanalyse, l
(1981), 11-22; Claudia Crawford, "Nietzsche's Mnemotechnics, the Theory of Ressentiment,
and Freud's Topographies of the Psychical Apparatus", Nietzsche-Studien 14 (1985), 281-297; and
Jacob Golomb, Nietzsche'* Entlang Psychology of Power (Ames and Jerusalem, 1989). Freud's Das
Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930) most clearly dcmonstrates his indebtedncss to Nietzsche.
312 Paul Bishop
of Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche provided another answer. By reading reli-
gion in terms of a universal Will to Power, he cxplained that even the most
powerful individuals bowed their heads before the saint because they recognized
in him a superior Will to Power: "der 'Wille zur Macht* war es, der sie nöthigte,
vor dem Heiligen stehen zu bleiben. Sie rhussten ihn fragen —" (JGB 51, KGW
VI 2 p. 69). In his own copy Jung made a marginal line against Nietzsche's main
point: "sie ehrten Etwas an sich, wenn sie den Heiligen ehrten" (ibid); in other
words, die warriors recognized the superior (because more Spiritual) Will to
Power of the saint.
Indeed, much of Jung's enrire psychological project can be read äs an at-
tempt to answer Nietzsche's question in Section 47 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse:
"Wie ist die Willensverneinung möglich? wie ist der Heilige möglich?"; but with-
out recourse to the idea of the Will to Power. Jung followed Nietzsche inasmuch
äs he questioned the absolute Opposition of Good and Evil and postulated a
complementary relationship between them. Although Jung had his doubts (ex-
pressed most strikingly in GW 12 559) about the Superman äs a fit goal for
human striving, his own telos of complementarism appears in Nietzschean guise
äs the "komplementärer Mensch" in whom existence is said to justify itself
(JGB 207, KGW VI 2 p. 140). The very title of Niet^sche's book heralded its
message that Good and Evil are not absolute, but only relative categories, and
equally necessary. Rather than transcending them, Nietzsche suggests :that both
Good and Evil must be created anew. Such ideas are close to the central Jungian
notion, that of the complementarity of all opposites (including moral ones), and
Jung sought to restore to Man that dark side of his soul whose repression, he
believed, restricted Man's creativity. Like Nietzsche, Jung saw the division be-
tween Good and Evil äs fundamentally problematic, and in the practice and
iconography of Christiariity he found an example of the debilitating effect of
these values äs traditionally understood (GW 12 25). Moreover, like Nietzsche,
Jung wanted to move to a stage where the relativity of Good and Evil would
be appreciated (GW 11 258). But two further important differerices must be
noted here. First, unlike Nietzsche, Jung had doubts about the practicability of
any project to go "beyond Good and Evil" without recourse to transcendent
"Geist" (a category entirely absent from Nietzschean philosophy).,And second,
unlike Nietzsche, Jung saw in Good and Evil more than merely contingent
counterparts (or worse, the product of ressentiment). He absolutized Evil, insisting
on the necessity of the "eine ebenso seltene wie erschütternde Erfahrung" of
gazing directly into the face of 'd[as] Absolute-BöseQ' (GW 9(ü) 19), and at the
same time maintained that Good and Evil were both complementary and neces-
sary (GW 11 267 and GW 13 257). Not surprisingly, the antinomial character of
Jung's concept of the Seif is far more paradoxical ,than the intricacies of
Nietzsche's notion of the Will to Power. But to get beyond Good and Evil, Jung
had to get beyond Nietzsche.
Jung's Annotation? of Nietzsche's Works 313
Conelusion
The annotations and markings in Jung's edition of Nietzsche's Werke are an

essential element in understanding bis reception of Nietzsche. They both con-
firm and widen the picture derived from a study of the way in which Jung used
Nietzsche in his psychological writings, autobiography and letters. This in turn
allows us to make more careful judgments about the extent to which Nietzsche
was a direct source for certain Jungian concepts, and whether we are dealing
with a developing affinity or a divergence of thought, a pattern of reaction and
response. In my view, the textual evidence suggests that Jung came across
Nietzsche at the most important period of his life, the time of his friendship
with Freud, and used Nietzsche äs a means which helped him to move away
from Freudian psychoanalysis. Although much of Jung's psychology can be read
äs a transformation of certain Nietzschean claims and propositions, it is clearly
not simply "Nietzschean". The clue to the major difference between these two
thinkers lies in their attitude towards the Will to Power, and Jung's conflict with
his favourite philosopher at this point is the main reason why he suppressed -
or repressed — the proximity in other irespects of his own approach to psychol-
ogy to that of Nietzsche in Jenseits von Gut und Böse and Zur Genealoge der Moral,
despite the close attention that he paid to these works.
The transidon from a philosophical project whose design is essentially criti-
cal to a psychology whose intent is therapeutic was not an easy one, Nietzsche's
imagery of sickness and health notwithstanding57, and despite the evident source
of Inspiration and provocation which Nietzsche represented for Jung. Whereas
Nietzsche's notion of the Will to Power was an intellectual tool capable of
deconstructing the hierarchies and hypocrisies of Western thought, and Freud's
construct of Eros provided him with a means of writing complex cultural his-
tory, Jung's notion of libido äs 'psychic energy' remains an imprecise and some-
times highly obscure concept. Never pursued with sufficient rigour, Jung's dia-
lectic often provides no real synthesis but merely a naive 'union' of the oppo-
sites, bordering on their dissolution. And although the philosopher arid the
psychologist can both be regarded äs "disciples of Dionysus"58, there is one
final, psycho-biographical difference. For whereas Nietzsche's descent into mad-
ness was long-lasting and final, Jung on the other hand succeeded in recovering
from his collapse into psychosis following his break with Freud in the years
from 1913 to 1919, the period referred to in his autobiography äs "Die Ausein-
andersetzung mit dem Unbewußten". From his encounter with the Uncon-
57
See Malcolm Pasley, "Nietzsche's Use of Medical Terms", in: Nietzsche Imagery and Thought,
edited by Malcolm Pasley (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1978), pp. 123-158.
58
See the tide of Rose Pfeffer's Book, Nietzsche Dlsciplc ofDhnysus (Lewisburg, 1972).
314 Paul Bishop
scious, Jung derived the Stimulus and strength for another forty years of semi-
nars, papers, correspondcnce and fifteen more volumes of the Collected Works —
an instance of that productive relationship between sickness and genius which
Nietzsche himself had both discussed and exemplified. Juflg's reluctance torefer
to Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Zur Genealoge der Moral (and Der Antichrist) is sympto-
matic of his relationship to Nietzsche: unwilling, and perhaps unable to continue
Nietzsche's critical project and to embrace the goal of "non-metaphysical trän-
scendence" symbolized by the Super man59, Jung sought instead to retain a space
for God, not in the cosmos but in the psyche. If Nietzsche's philosophy was a
reversal of Platonism, Analytical Psychology is to be read äs an attempt to
reverse Nietzsche; and the story of Jung's long-standing obsession with
Nietzsche, into which his autobiography, his Seminar on Zarathttstra, and now
his annotations in his private copy of Nietzsche's Werke give us more detailed
and substantial insight, teils ultimately of his overcoming, not just of Fteud, but
of Nietzsche äs well
59
R. J. Hollingdale, A Nietzsche Reader (Harrnondsworth, 1977), p. 11.

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PAUL BISHOP

JUNGES ANNOTATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S WORKS:

Although the impact of Nietzsche on Jung has frequently been acknowledged,

of Jung's edition containing an inscription is Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (KA V), in

growing8. A graph prepäred by Herbert Reichert and Karl Schlechta showing

And according to another source, Duke Carl-August of Sachsen-Weimar 5s re-

radikalen Parteien (Sociälisten, Nihilisten, Antisemiten, christlichen] Orthodoxen, Wagneria-

university (1895-1900) coincided with the first boom in critical commentary on

tional Psychoanalyttc Congress In Munich (1913). Once a very clöse friend of

On 18 May 1895, Jung became a rhember of the Zofingiaverein, the Swiss

to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, which suggests that his interest in Nietzsche

If, äs Kaufmann has suggested, Nietzsche's critique of Christianity drove

In a letter foreshadowing the major theoretical differences between himself and

Sccond, in a passage of Menschliches^ Altyunenschliches which Jung marked in thc

In September 1913, Jung gave a paper to the Psychoanalytic Congress in

included a discussion of the Apollo-Dionysos anrinomy and involved several

ried me to a desert coüntry in which I read Zarathustra. I did not widerstand

Eigentlich um nun die gewonnene Einsicht in die menschliche Natur wirklich

In 1921 Jung published a second major work, Psychologische Typen^ which

With Dionysos, there are no individuals, no individuality: "Seine Individualität

Chaos oder ein "crimen laesae majestatis humanae", um mit Nietzsche zu

pp. 1161,1262,1387-1392). By noting these page references in the margin, Jung

Psychologie östlicher Meditation" (1943), thc introduction to Heinrich Zimmer's

a revision of a leeture given to the Eranos Conference in 1946, where he sum-

Nietesche's definition of psychology äs the "Morphologie und Entwicklungslehre

Animalischen im Menschen" and of "ein Domestikationpro2eß" (GW 7 425),

The annotations and markings in Jung's edition of Nietzsche's Werke are an

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NS 24 - 271-314 - Jung's Annotations of N's Works... - P. Bishop

NS 24 - 271-314 - Jung's Annotations of N's Works... - P. Bishop