Art. 14 (Par.) 9
Recidivism
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-appellant.
Recidivism
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code.
We held that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include
everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge
in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was convicted
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15,
1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became
final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was
rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is
crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused
had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the
rendition of the judgment for the second offense.
Facts: On May 25 1983, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. with
deliberate intent to kill with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
Reynaldo Aducal, with the use of a Batangas fan knife or
Balisong which the above-named accused had provided
himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said victim
fatal wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the
instantaneous death of the victim.
Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
the Revised Penal Code, that of murder in criminal case no.
1473.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.
The Regional Trial Court accepted his plea and declared
accused, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information,
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art. 40 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The imposition of the supreme penalty of Death warrants an
automatic review by the Supreme Court hence this review.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly appreciated the existence
of recidivism.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code. Herein accused was convicted of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There being
no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11,
1983. The second conviction was rendered on October 26,
1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is
a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final judgment
at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second
offense.
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the
phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in
its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In
US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase "at the
trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the course
of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is
announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the
accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473
on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment
therein became final on October 11, 1983. The second
conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder.
Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the
accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of
the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.
Art. 62 (Par.) 5, Art. 14 (Par.) 9
Recidivism
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS and LUISA CORPUZ Y
QUITONG, defendants. FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS,
appellant.
Recidivism as an Aggravating Circumstance
A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in
imposing the principal penalty upon him the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account.
However, for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty,
recidivism cannot be taken as an aggravating circumstance
for the reason it is inherent in habitual delinquency.
Facts: Both of the above-named defendants pleaded guilty to
the charge of theft of seven shirts belonging to one Cosme
Famorca. Both being, recidivists, were sentenced in the Court
of First Instance to suffer two months and one day of arresto
mayor and to pay the corresponding civil indemnity to the
offended party. Faustino Tolentino y de Dios was further
sentenced to suffer an additional penalty of six years and one
day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency. He alone
appealed to this Court.
The only question raised by the appellant is the correctness of
the additional penalty. The pertinent allegation of the
information is that the accused Faustino Tolentino y de Dios
is a habitual delinquent, he having been convicted of 3 counts
theft and one estafa by final judgments rendered by
competent court. On the other hand counsel for the appellant,
on the basis of the trial court's implied finding that this is
appellant's fourth conviction, contends that appellant should
be sentenced under paragraph 5 (a) of article 62, as if the
present were only his third conviction, on the ground that the
first conviction should be taken as an aggravating
circumstance and should be disregarded as an element of
habitual, delinquency.
The trial court sentenced the appellant under paragraph 5 (b)
of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as if this were only his
fourth and not his fifth conviction.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly appreciated the existence
of recidivism.
Held: No.
Ratio: This is appellant's fifth conviction, and accordingly, he
must be sentenced under paragraph 5 (c) of article 62 to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. This penalty must
be imposed in its minimum degree because of the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.
A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in
imposing the principal penalty upon him the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account. In
fixing the penalty provided by law for the last crime " as
required in paragraph 5 (a) (b), and (c) of article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14 (9)
and Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism
as an aggravating circumstance and lay down the rule for the
application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We
reaffirm the holding of this Court in People vs. Melendez, 59
Phil., 154, etc., as a correct interpretation of the Habitual
Delinquency Law. However, for the purpose of fixing the
additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as an
aggravating circumstance for the reason it is inherent in
habitual delinquency (People vs. de Jesus, supra).
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellant Faustino
Tolentino y de Dios shall suffer an additional penalty of ten
years and one day of prision mayor, the sentence appealed
from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Secs. 20 & 32, BP 129 as amended by RA 7691
Habituality
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
Habituality (Reiteracion)
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]).
In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished
previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal
or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]).
Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a
crime different in kind from that for which he was
previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences
and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, convicting the appellant for the crime
of murder with the attending aggravating circumstance of
recidivism. The information read as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof,
at the Poblacion of the Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and criminally attack, assault and hack with a
sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the
latter on the nape, causing an injury which caused the
death of the said Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing several days
thereafter.
Although the information says otherwise, the trial court and
the Solicitor General both agreed that that the attendant
aggravating circumstance was reiteracion and not
reincidencia as alleged in the information.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly appreciated the existence
of reiteracion.
Held: No.
Ratio: According to the information charging appellant of
murder and the evidence, the accused was previously
convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave
threats on November 25, 1968.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender shall have
been punished previously for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes
to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art.
14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion
commits a crime different in kind from that for which he was
previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and
Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of
homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment
by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to
be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[g]
rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised
Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires
that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the
same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title (Title
Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion
cannot be appreciated because such aggravating
circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense,
that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater
penalty than the one for which the accused has been
convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the
offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is
no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.
Art. 160
Quasi Recidivism
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and
JOVENTINO GARCES, defendants-appellants.
Quasi Recidivism (Art. 160)
Any person who shall commit a Felony after having been
convicted by final judgement, before beginning to serve
such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished
by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony.
Facts: On January 17, 1964 Layson, Ragub, Fugoso, and
Garces acting in concert took turns stabbing Regino Gasang
to death, while they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony
serving sentences of conviction for their own respective
crimes.
On September 30, 1965 the court rendered its decision
convicting the four assailants of murder with the attending
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly appreciated the existence
of quasi-recidivism.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly
considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the
commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving their
respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-
recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused
with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the
accused admitted all the material facts and circumstances
alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Because of the attendance of the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no
alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the
court a quo.
Art. 62 (Par. 5)
Habitual Delinquency
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CANUTO BERNAL, defendant-appellant.
Habitual Delinquency (Art. 62 (Par. 5))
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to
be habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of
robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any
of said crime, a third time or oftener.

Recidivism vs Habitual Delinquency
Recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a
factor or element which necessarily forms an integral part
of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal Code
considers as an extraordinary and special aggravating
circumstance.
Recidivism vs. Habitual Delinquency (Separate Opinion)
It seems clear from the provisions of law that if, within a
period of ten years from the date of his release, or last
conviction of the crime of robo, hurto, estafa, or
falsificacion, a person be found guilty of the same crime for
the second time, he would be deemed a recidivist; and if he
be found guilty for the third time or oftener, he would be
deemed a habitual delinquent. The law determines the
effect to be given to one previous conviction, and it also
determines the effect of two or more previous convictions.
One previous conviction merely constitutes the generic
aggravating circumstance prescribed by article 14,
paragraph 9, while two or more previous convictions qualify
the crime.
Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of theft, the
information alleging that, aside from the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the accused is an
habitual delinquent because he had been convicted, prior to
the commission of the offense at bar, thrice of the same crime
of theft. The accused pleaded not guilty, but the court, after
trial, found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, to pay the
accessories of the law, to return the three stolen roosters to
Mariano de Leon or to indemnify the latter the value thereof in
the sum of P3, and to pay the costs.
As a habitual delinquent, because previously convicted three
times of the same crime of theft, he was sentenced to an
additional penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor.
The Defense contends that the said additional penalty should
not be imposed, and that the applicable provision is that
found in subsection (a) of the aforesaid codal paragraph and
article, because in truth and according to the decisions, the
accused has no more than two prior convictions, the third
being the one at bar.
Elaborating on this contention, the defense alleges that the
conviction on October 19, 1935, for the crime of theft should
not be counted against the accused because it took place after
the commission of the offense at bar on the 11th of the said
month and year. The Solicitor-General in his brief agrees with
the defense, and recommends that the penalty fixed in
subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code be imposed upon the accused.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly appreciated the existence
of habitual delinquency and the imposition of the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: In People vs. Melendrez (59 Phil., 154), and People vs,
Espina (62 Phil., 607), we have already held that in cases
similar to the one at bar, the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism should be taken into consideration,
notwithstanding the allegation and proof that the accused
were habitual delinquents and should accordingly be
sentenced to the additional penalty provided by law.
It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into
account when the accused is declared an habitual delinquent
and when it is deemed to aggravate the crime in fixing the
principal penalty to be imposed, because recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance modifying criminal liability is not an
inherent or integral element of habitual delinquency which
the Revised Penal Code considers as an extraordinary and
special aggravating circumstance.
Recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a
factor or element which necessarily forms an integral part of
habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the elements as it also determines the effect of two or more previous
well as the basis of each of these circumstances are different. convictions. One previous conviction merely constitutes the
For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the generic aggravating circumstance prescribed by article 14,
date of his trial, shall have been previously convicted by final paragraph 9, while two or more previous convictions qualify the
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title. For the crime.
existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the
accused shall have been convicted of any of the crimes
specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place
ten (10) years before the commission of the last offense. It is
necessary that the crimes previously committed be prior to
the commission of the offense with which the accused is
charged a third time or oftener.
Separate Opinion
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should not be taken
into consideration in the imposition of the penalty prescribed by
law for the crime of which the appellant has been found guilty.
Article 14, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code, defines a
recidivist as follows:
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
And article 62, paragraph 5 (c), of the same Code, defines a
habitual delinquent as follows:
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo,
hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said
crime, a third time or oftener.
It seems clear from the provisions of law that if, within a period
of ten years from the date of his release, or last conviction of
the crime of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, a person be
found guilty of the same crime for the second time, he would be
deemed a recidivist; and if he be found guilty for the third time
or oftener, he would be deemed a habitual delinquent. The law
determines the effect to be given to one previous conviction, and