After examining conflict of interest theory and Axelrod's application of it to the

postdiction of postwar Italian parliamentary coalitions, a replication of Axelrod's work is

undertaken with Weimar Germany as the setting. Axelrod's theory is compared in terms of
its predictability with other theories (the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern theory, Leiserson's
bargaining theory, the basic and modified theories of William Riker: and De Swaan's
policy distance theory). Axelrod's minimum-connected winning approach is shown to
have a relatively higher predictive ability in postdicting Weimar coalition behavior. Some
suggestions as to the modification of conflict-of-interest theory for application to
"abnormal parliamentary periods" are offered in conclusion.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
THEORY AND
SPECIFIC SYSTEMS
Postwar Italy and
Weimar Germany

LON S, FELKER
East Carolina University

R obert Axelrod's (1970) conflict of interest theory attempts to ex-

plain the incompatibility of two or more actors. Using game
theoretic notions, he defines conflict of interest in both relative and
. absolute terms, and develops a model of his theory for application to
parliamentary settings in which coalition behavior is the norm. Axelrod
(1970: 167) starts with two basic assumptions:

(I) The less conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the
coalition will form.
(2) The less conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the
coalition will have long duration if formed.

Employing an ordinal policy space, Axelrod makes use of Black's

(1958: 7) concept of "single-peaked preferences" and predicts that coali-
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 14, No.3, October 1981 357-370
© 1981 Sage Publications, Inc.
357

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358 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES I OCTOBER 1981

tions will form in which the conflict-defined in terms of the number of

policy positions of the parties rather than as distance per se-is
minimized by the inclusion of only those parties sufficient to establish a
minimum connected winning coalition (hereafter referred to as an
MCW coalition). In other words, the dispersion of the coalition on
ordinal policy space is such that the parties are connected (that is, no
parties are "jumped") and the coalition possesses the minimal number of
seats in parliament to constitute a winning majority (Axelrod, 1970:
168-175). Axelrod (1970: 175ff.) then applies his theory in the postdic-
tion of postwar Italian parliamentary coalitions.

THE NEED FOR REPLICATION AND

VERIFICATION STUDIES

In the following, I replicate Axelrod's test of his theory using data

drawn from the national coalitions formed during the Weimar Republic
of Germany, from 1919 to 1931. I then compare the predictive strength
of this theory against that of other theories, employing the same setting
and data base.
I am attempting to verify a theory that has received considerable
attention within the political science fraternity, particularly among the
enthusiasts of game theory and formal modeling. Because Axelrod has
chosen coalition formation as one of the two areas (the other is the
Congressional Conference Committee) in which to attempt an opera-
tionalization of his conflict of interest model, the findings of any well-
conducted replication of his study should provide additional evidence
concerning the applicability of his theory of conflict of interest to
parliamentary coalition formation.

OTHER APPLICATIONS OF MCW THEORY

Prior to embarking on an examination of similarities of the two

systems for purpose. of this replication, I should note various other
efforts to assess the predictive strength of Axelrod's theory. Mahler and
Trilling (1975), in examining coalition formation in the Israeli parlia-

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 Felker I CONFLICT OF INTEREST TIIEORY 359

ment, found that Axelrod's theory performed well. They (1975: 220,
229) note:

Ideological considerations serve to constrain the number and kind of

viable coalition partners. Thus, Axelrod's notion of connectedness seems
appropriate.... Axelrod's notion of minimal-connected winning coali-
tions seems to be the most realistic theory, at least in the case of Israel.

An earlier and more exhaustive analysis of the relative predictive

strengths of various coalition theories was performed by Abram De
Swaan (1973). De Swaan applied a number of coalition theories to nine
European multiparty systems (including Weimar Germany and postwar
Italy). His general findings on the basis of his data analysis led De
Swaan (1973: J59) to conclude that "parliamentary coalitions tend to be
closed among the policy scale and, in times of normalcy, of minimal
range."
Focusing specifically on Weimar, De Swaan-concedingthat Weimar
is a difficult territory for most ofthe theories tested-found that ordinal
minimal range theory predicted best. I shall return to this assessment
later, but I should note that De Swaan (1973: 173) remarks in passing
that an investigation of the actual parliamentary support coalitions
"might yield data that agree more closely with some of the theories."

POSTWAR ITALY AND WEIMAR GERMANY

The postwar Italian parliamentary system, which provides the setting

for Axelrod's initial test of his theory, is characterized by a high number
of parties and relatively well-defined positions for these parties on a left
to right ideological continuum. Giacomo Sani (1976: 1) has observed
that in such fragmented multiparty systems
the distribution of political forces is such that parties are compelled to
seek out at least one and often two or more partners, depending on the
level of the system's fragmentation.
Sani states that the presence of a structural impetus toward cooperative
interaction makes coalition-related phenomena major features of the
political process.

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360 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / OCTOBER 1981

Weimar Germany had many of the same characteristics as postwar

Italy. Its party system was highly fragmented, and this fragmentation
made parliamentary coalition a highly visible feature of political life. -
Moreover, the nature of the parties in the two systems shows definite
similarities. While considerable caution should be exercised in making
generalizations about party systems in Western democracies (Blondel:
1968: 180-204), the presence of a Communist and a Fascist party at the
polar extremes of both systems' party spectrums, as welI as the central
position of a Catholic party in each, strengthens the overalI impression
of similarity.
In applying his theory to the postwar Italian party system, Axelrod
(1970: 176) follows the convention of arraying the parties on a left-right
continuum:

ABC D
Communist Party..--Socialist Party-v-Democratic Socialist-s-Republican
(CPI) (Nenni Soc.) (Saragat Soc.) Party

E F G H
«-Chrlstlan-c-Liberal Party-v-Monarchists-v-Fascist Party
Democratic (p.D.I.U.M.) (11S1)
(Catholic)

Samuel Barnes (1971) has noted that such an array, while in some cases
distorted when seen through the individual Italian voters' ideological-
"glasses," seems to reflect an objective picture of the Italian party
system.
When arrayed on a similar continuum, the similarity of the Weimar
party system to the above is readily apparent;'

A B C D
Communist----Independen t Socialist----Social Dernocratic-v-Democra tic
(KPD) (USPD) (SPD) Party
(DDP)

E F G H
----Center Party----Peoples' Party----Nationalist Party..·- Fascist
(Catholic) (DVP) (DNVP-Monarchist) (NSDAP-Nazis)

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 Felker I CONFLICT OF INTEREST THEORY 361

The Independent Socialists merged with the majority Social Demo-

crats in 1922, with a left-wing faction going over to the Communists.
The National Socialists emerged as a significant party in 1924. The first
of these developments can be compared with events in the postwar
Italian party system, where the Socialist Party (Nenni Socialists)
merged with the Democratic Socialist Party in October 1966, with a
small segment-the Socialist Party of Italian Unity-occupying the first
position on the ideological scale (A), moving the Communists to the "8"
position (see Axelrod, 1970: 178)
When all of these similarities are taken into account, the weight of the
evidence would suggest that a comparison of the two party systems is
possible, at least for purposes of a test of Axelrod's MCW theory.
I have chosen as the time span covered by this study the years from
1919 to 1931. During this period eighteen coalition governments ruled in
Germany. I have divided this twelve-year period into seven subperiods.
The first and third through seventh of these periods are based simply on
the electoral periods for the Reichstag. The second period (November
22, 1922 to November 30, 1923) is an exception: the reunification of the
Independent Social Democrats with the majority Social Democratic
Party (with a small number offormer Independent Socialists going over
to the Communists) created a new balance of power within the Reich-
stag, and for that reason this period has been treated as those other
changes in intraparliamentary power which resulted from elections.

AXELROD'S TEST OF THEORY

As Axelrod notes, seventeen cabinets formed in Italy from the

Second Legislature in May 1953 to January 1969. The distribution of
legislative seats that resulted from the quinquennial elections beginning
in 1953 provided the data to determine the minimal connected winning
coalitions. For the four legislative sessions, Axelrod (1970: 177)
reported the following findings:

During each legislative session there were either two or three minimal
connected winning coalitions. Since there are 128 possible winning
coalitions with eight parties, the theory of coalitions based on conflict of
interest is bold when it singles out from this large number two or three
MeW coalitions and predicts that the government will be one of these.

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362 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES I OCTOBER 1981

In testing his first hypothesis-that minimal connected winning

coalitions are more likely to form than other coalitions-Axelrod (1970:
177) finds confirmation: ten of the seventeen coalitions were MCW
coalitions.
The second hypothesis, that MCW coalitions once formed will be of
longer duration, is also confirmed by Axelrod's (1970: 178) data
analysis:

The MeW coalitions that formed lasted on the average 14 months each
compared to only 8 months each for the others. The probability that this
result would have been attained by chance is less than one in ten.

ANALYSIS OF THE WEIMAR DATA

Turning then to the data on the parliamentary coalitions in the

Weimar Republic, certain basic differences previously alluded to
become more salient. The data consist ofthe political party composition
and duration of the ruling parliamentary coalitions in Germany from
1919 to 1931. In the next section, I have dealt with the predictive ability
of Axelrod's theory in postdicting the actual coalitions that formed,
compared with other, zero-sum theories.
In Table 8.1 (Axelrod, 1970: 178), Axelrod presents the "chronology
of Italian coalitions," complete with a listing of the possible MCW
coalitions, the dates of the coalitions that actually formed, a representa-
tion of the composition of those coalitions, their duration and an
evaluation (MCW, Not Winning, Too Many Supporters, Not Connec-
ted). In Table I, the Weimar coalitions are presented in a similar
fashion.
Table I is divided into seven time periods,decided upon the basis of
changes in parliamentary strength among the German political parties
represented in the Reichstag. These changes are, for the most part,
changes due to shifts in electoral support, although the period 1922-1924
was more the result of the merging of the Independent Socialist Party
with the SPD, with a'srnall leftist contingent of the Independents going
over to the Communist Party (KPD).
An examination of Table I shows significant differences from the
table presented by Axelrod (1970: 178). First, there are not as many
MCW coalitions as Axelrod reports in his study. Axelrod finds that ten
out of the seventeen Italian coalitions were minimum connected
winning coalitions. In the Weimar data, the number ofMCW coalitions

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 TABLE 1
Chronology of Weimar Coalitions, 1919-1931

MCW Coalitions Date A B C D E F G Duration Evaluation

ooxxooo 2/13/19 0 X X X 0 0* 4 mo. Too Large
oooxxxx 6/6/19 0 X X X 0 0 9 mo. Too Large
3/3/20 0 0 X X X 0 0 3 mo. Too Large
6/25/20 0 0 x X X X 0 11 mo. Too Large
oxxxxoo 5/5/21 0 x X X X x 0 5 mo. Too Large
oooxxxx 10/26/21 a 0 X X X 0 0 13 mo. Not Winning
11/22/22 0 0 X X X x 9 mo. MCW
8/13/23 0 X X X X 0 3 mo. Too Large
oxxxooo 10/6/23 0 X X X X 0 1 mo. Too Large
oooxxxx
xxxxooo 11/30/23 0 0 X X X 0 6 mo. Too Large
oxxxxoo 6/3/24 0 x X X X 0 0 6 mo. MCW
ooxxxxo 1/1/25 0 0 X X X X a 11 mo. MCW
oooxxxx 1/1/26 0 0 X X X a a 4 mo. Not Winning
5/16/26 0 0 X X X 0 0 6 mo. Not Winning
1/29/27 0 0 X X X X 0 5 mo. MCW
oxxxxoo 6/28/28 0 X X X X 0 0 21 mo. Mew
0 X X 0 20 mo.
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oxxxxxo 3/30/30 X X a MCW

xxxxooo 10/9/31 0 0 X X X x 0 8 mo. Not Winning

0*: Does not support the cabinet.

.... x: Supports the cabinet, but Is not represented In It •
0-
.... X: Supports the cabinet, and Is represented In It •
364 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES I OCTOBER 1981

is six out of a total of eighteen. Second, while two of the seventeen

coalitions in Axelrod's study were not connected, none of the coalitions
in the Weimar case can be so described. Third, as compared with three
in Axelrod's study, seven coalitions are oversized, or enjoy too many
supporters to be of minimal size. Fourth, five of the Weimar coalitions
are of less than winning size (Not Winning), as compared with two in
Axelrod's study.
Thus, while the majority of the Italian coalitions that formed between
1953 and 1969were MCW coalitions (ten out ofa total of seventeen), the
ruling coalitions in the Weimar period can be broken down into three
equal sized subsamples: six minimal connected winning coalitions,
seven coalitions with too many supporters (Too Large), and five with
insufficient strength to be winning.
In testing his first hypothesis, that minimal connected winning coali-
tions are more likely to form than other types, Axelrod finds that the ten
MCW coalitions were 29 times more likely than the average winning
coalition. Applying the same test to the Weimar coalitions, it can be
shown that with an average of2.l6 MCW coalitions for anyone legisla-
tive period, the likelihood of a winning coalition being an MCW
coalition is (2.16)/64 = .03. With eighteen coalitions, the number of
MCW coalitions to be expected is (.03) (18) .54. With six MCW =
coalitions actually occurring, this makes them 6/ .54 I I times more =
likely than the average winning coalition.
Axelrod's second hypothesis, that MCW coalitions once formed last
longer than other coalitions, was borne out by the Italian data: MCW
coalitions lasted an average of fourteen months each compared to eight
months for each of the others. A look at the Weimar data (see Table 2)
indicates that the mean duration of MCW coalitions was twelve months,
compared with 5.17 months for the "Too Large" coalitions and a
surprising 7.4 months for the "Not Winning" coalitions.
In Axelrod's study, MCW coalitions were found to have ruled Italy
70% of the fifteen-year period. In the twelve-year history of parliamen-
tary government in Weimar Germany, minimal connected winning
coalitions were in power only 50% of the time. "Not Winning" coalitions
account for 26% of the period, while "Too Large" coalitions make up
21% of the period under consideration.
If those coalitions in the 'Too Large" category are subdivided into
further classifications of (I) not minimal, (2) cabinet too inclusive, and
(3) too many supporters (see Axelrod, 1970: 180), additional differences
between Axelrod's findings and my own may be perceived. Axelrod
finds that I% of the time the Italian coalitions were not winning,

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 Felker I CONFLICT OF INTEREST THEORY 365

TABLE 2
Coalitions in Weimar Germany (1919-1931) by Type
Average Total Per Cent
Type Nurab e r
of Duration Number of Total
Occurrences (months) of months (months)

Not Hinning 5 7.4 37 26%

l-!inning But
Not connected 0 0.0 00

"'inning But
Not minimal 0 0.0 00

Too Inclus i ve 6 5.17 31 21%

(Cabinet)

Too Hany Supporters 1 5.0 5 3%

~linimal Connected

IHnning 6 11.5 72 50%

Total 18 145 100

compared to 26% of the time for the Weimar coalitions. For 9% of the
sixteen-year period, coalitions in Italy were winning but not connected,
while in contrast there were no unconnected coalitions which governed
in the Weimar Republic, winning or otherwise. No cabinets in the
Italian case were found to be too inclusive, while for 21% of the twelve-
year period this was the case in the Weimar Republic.
A t-test of the correlation between the duration of the coalitions and
their type gave a t-score of 3.25 which, with seventeen degrees of
freedom, is significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed test. When at-test
of the correlation between the duration of MCW and nonwinning
coalitions was run, no significance was found. A similar test of the
MCW and too large coalitions, on the other hand, produced a rather
high score of 5.7.
Axelrod finds that MCW coalitions last on the average fourteen
months, compared to eight months for each of the other types of coali-
tions. By means of a t-test of the product moment correlation between
the duration of the coalitions and their type, Axelrod obtains at-score
that is significant at the .01 level with sixteen degrees of freedom.
The second hypothesis, that MCW coalitions once formed tend to
rule longer than other types, is largely supported by the Weimar data,

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366 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / OCTOBER 1981

although the surprisingly long average duration ofthe less than winning
coalitions (9.4 months) does not confirm this interpretation.

COMPARISON OF MCW THEORY

WITH OTHER THEORIES

Axelrod also compares his theory's predictive strength to that of four

other coalition theories. 1 compare the predictability of Axelrod's
theory and the four others-the Von Neumann-Morgenstern, Leiserson
Bargaining, and Riker Basic and Modified theories-together with that
of De Swaan (the core version of the policy distance theory).2 The results
of this comparison are presented in Table 3.
The findings presented in Table 3 show the higher predictive strength
of MCW theory. Axelrod's theory predicts six of the actual coalitions
formed out of a total of 21 predictions made. The Von Neumann-
Morgenstern theory predicts two out of a total of 52, and the Leiserson
bargaining theory one out of sixteen. All other theories fail to make any
accurate predictions, although De Swaan (1973: 173) reports better
results for two other versions of the policy distance theory (seeTable 3).
The results of this comparison provide some independent confirma-
tion for De Swaan's similar finding in his general statistical analysis of
nine nations presented in Table 3, and dispute De Swaan's specific
finding in his analysis of the Weimar case: That ordinal minimal range
theory -De Swaan's (1973: 173) reinterpretation of the original Leiser-
son (1966) formulation-provided the best predictive results.
This difference in results is probably due to my inclusion of
parliamentary support coalitions in the calculations (coalitions supported
by parties without formal representation in the cabinet), as well as a
different interpretation of the role of the Bavarian Peoples Party, that is,
as basically a somewhat more conservative branch of the Catholic
Center Party.

CONCLUSION

The replication of Axelrod's theory reveals that it is definitely

superior in predictability to the other theories considered here. The
Weimar case, like the Italian one, presents a definite challenge to any
theory seeking to explain parliamentary coalition behavior. Weimar-

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 TABLE 3
Comparison of MeW Theory with Other Theories

Period Number of Coalition Von Neumann- Leiserson Riker Riker Axelrod

Governments Horgenstern Bargaining - - - - De Swaan 1
Basic Modified Policy MCH
Distance
1919-20 3 0/5 2 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/10 0/2
1920-21 4 1/9 1/4 0/1 0/6 0 0/6 0/6
1922-24 3 0/7 0/1 0/1 0/3 0/6 1/2
1924 1 0/7 0/1 0/2 0/2 0/23 1/4
1924-28 4 0/9 0/4 0/2 0/2 0 0/33 2/4
1928-30 1 0/7 0/2 0/2 0/6 0/13 1/1
1930-31 2 1/8 0/3 0/2 0/6 0/39 1/2
Total 18 2/52 1/16 0/12 0/27 6/21 0/130

1. These tabulations are derived from De Swaan (1973: 160-173). The above represent only the core version predictions. The "1, n permissi-
bility" version predicted 2/155, while the "closed coalltlon" version did best of the policy distance theory versions (3/75).
2. Correct predictions/Number of predlctjbns generated by the theory.
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t.I
-..j
'"
368 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES I OCTODER 1981

represents a fairly strong example of an unstable system, in which

"normal" rules of coalition formation may be suspended. De Swaan
(1973: 159) suggests that "closed minimal range" theory predicts best in
times of normalcy. It can only be observed that MeW theory does
remarkably better than other theories in even abnormal conditions.
However, in view of De Swaan's opinion it is worth noting that in the so-
calIed "stable period" of the Republic's history-from 1924 to 1928-
MCW theory predicted (postdicted?) four of the actual governments,
while the other two predictions were for the 1922 and 1930 coalitions.
While Axelrod's theory makes no statements about the frequency of
MCW coalitions, it is interesting that only one-third of the Weimar
coalitions were of this type. The large number of oversized coalitions
suggests that perhaps the coalitions were formed with an eye to a margin
of security a la Riker's Modified Theory, or maybe it was the maximal
dispersion of responsibility for worsening conditions that accounts for
such larger-than-winning coalitions. In fact, neither of these explana-
tions is mutualIy exclusive.
While many of these coalitions were too large to falI under the "Riker
Modified" theory's predicted set, the prevalence of such coalitions as the
"Too Inclusive" and "Too Many Supporters" type indicates a tendency
toward building larger-than-winning coalitions in the face of consider-
able uncertainty. This would certainly be "normal" coalition behavior in
abnormal times.
If Axelrod's theory offers the best predictive theory for normal
parliamentary situations, then perhaps some modification of the MCW
specifications are calIed for in periods of parliamentary abnormality.
While the "connectedness" element should still hold, the minimum
winning element warrants reconsideration, with a margin of error
alIowed for periods of extraordinary uncertainty. Defining such
periods-and operationalizing such a definition-are tasks that cannot
be addressed in the framework of this article.
This replication of Axelrod's theory demonstrates some of the
advantages of following up another researcher's efforts. A much fulIer
appreciation is gained of the original work, and there is always the
opportunity to discover new insights and applications of the theory,
Moreover, there is the advantage of being able to relate subsequent
work in the field to the theory in question, and of assessing the theory in
the light of those later contributions. Thus far, Axelrod's theory seems
to have stood up well.

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 Felker / CONFLICT OF INTEREST THEORY 369

NOTES

I. This array of the Weimar party system follows the left-to-right convention of most
scholars of the period. See for example Bracher (1957: 546-575), De Swaan (1973: 161·
165), Kastning (1970: 167-169), and Urwin (1974: 126).
2. The Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947: 420fL) theory predicts that a coalition
will encompass no parties that are unnecessary to win. Basically, it assumes that in zero-
sum conditions, the winners will not share the rewards of office with any more parties than
are absolutely necessary.
Leiserson's bargaining theory (1968) posits that those winning coalitions will form
which have the least number of parties, In other words, the fewer the parties, the easier the
bargaining process over the formation of the coalition.
Riker's basic theory (1962: 32) posits only those winning coalitions of the smallest size.
That winning coalition with the least number of parliamentary seats will be able to provide
its members with the optimal division of the rewards of office.
Riker's modified theory (1962: 77fL) takes into account the absence of perfect inforrna-
tion. As a result of this condition,largerthan winning coalitions will tend to form having a
margin of error. (I follow Axelrod's operationalization of this and predict any coalition
with less than 550/0.)
De Swaan's Policy Distance theory (1970: 424-444, 1973) predicts that those winning
coalitions will form which are preferable to all others by the various parties. Each party's
preference is based on the minimization of policy distance, that is, the distance between a
party's policy position and that of the expected coalition. In other words, an actor's
(party's) preference is for those coalitions in which the median party of the coalition is
closest to that actor's own position, that is, the party prefers that coalition in which the
total of seats to the right of the median party or the total of seats to the left of the median
party is smallest, depending on whether the party is to the right or left of the median party.

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Lon S. Felker received his doctorate from Michigan State University"(l975), and
is now Assistant Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University. His
research and teachingfields include comparative politics and public administration.

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