Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

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Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

What ails fisheries insurance in India? An assessment of issues, challenges MARK

and future potential
⁎
Shinoj Parappurathua, , C. Ramachandrana, A. Gopalakrishnana, Dilip Kumarb, M.K. Poddarc,
Manas Choudhuryd, R. Geethaa, K. Mohammed Koyaa, R. Narayana Kumara, K.P. Salinia,
P.V. Sunila
a
ICAR-Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Kochi 682018, India
b
Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome 00153, Italy
c
Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, New Delhi 110001, India
d
NITI Aayog, Government of India, New Delhi 110001, India

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper undertakes a critical assessment of the present state of fisheries insurance in India. Various factors
Fisheries insurance that contribute to the poor performance of fisheries insurance in the country were identified and ranked based on
Economic risks the responses of fishermen and fish farmers in major maritime states. In the light of the findings, measures such
Safety nets as leveraging the potential of technological interventions, developing innovative institutional mechanisms,
India
bridging the trust deficit amongst the stakeholders and bringing about attitudinal changes through awareness
drives are suggested as way forward towards harnessing the potential of insurance as a safety net tool in fisheries
sector of India.

1. Introduction introduction of scientific carp farming aided by breakthroughs in

The fisheries sector in India has grown by leaps and bounds in a
span of six decades after independence, from a rudimentary sector that
contributed hardly a million tonnes of fish in the 1950s to a multi-
million dollar industry that harvests over 10 million tonnes of fish every
year [10]. Aided by the advancement of technology and entrepreneurial
capacity, the sector has transformed itself to a modern, capital intensive
one that is operating at an impressive scale and efficiency. In the cap-
ture fisheries sector, the past two decades witnessed widespread
adoption of mechanization and use of advanced navigation/commu-
nication devices for fishing operations. Traditional non-motorized
vessels were gradually replaced by outboard motorized vessels and
mechanized trawlers which are capable of operating a wide variety of
fishing gear and handling high-end catches. Improved sea-worthiness of
the modern fleet allowed the fishermen to extend their fishing efforts
from single day to multi-day operations during this period [21]. Even
better was the performance of the culture sector, which surpassed the
capture sector in terms of annual catch by the mid-nineties, and is
following an exponential growth path thereafter [10]. Aquaculture
ventures in India gained momentum in the eighties mainly with the
breeding and culture technologies [1]. The present day culture scenario
in the country entails diverse systems such as intensive pond culture,
coastal aquaculture, cold water fisheries, integrated fish culture with
poultry and horticulture, open sea and brackish water cage culture and
pen culture. In recent times, mariculture, the culture of marine fish
species in controlled conditions in the marine environment, has
emerged as a promising avenue with substantial potential to contribute
to future fish production. Consequently, India presently holds the dis-
tinction of having the 3rd largest fishery and aquaculture country in the
world [7].
In spite of the remarkable growth performance and promising future
growth potential, the fisheries sector in India faces several challenges.
The emergence of a harbor-based trawler fishing industry, parallel to a
very sizeable small-scale subsector along the beaches, resulted in fre-
quent conflicts and consequent social tensions [3]. Intense competition
for resources in an open-access, multi-gear, multi-species context led to
a variety of problems such as disguised unemployment, declining catch
rate and diminishing returns, overfishing and juvenile fishing leading to
depletion of fish stocks as well as destruction of marine biota
[15,16,18,5]. These challenges, together with increasing infusion of

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pshinoj@gmail.com (S. Parappurathu), ramachandrancnair@gmail.com (C. Ramachandran), agopalkochi@gmail.com (A. Gopalakrishnan),
dk.dilipkumar@gmail.com (D. Kumar), mkpoddar@aicofindia.com (M.K. Poddar), manash.choudhury@gmail.com (M. Choudhury), geethaeconomist99@gmail.com (R. Geetha),
koya313@gmail.com (K.M. Koya), ramani65@gmail.com (R.N. Kumar), salinicmfri@gmail.com (K.P. Salini), sunilcmfri@gmail.com (P.V. Sunil).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.023
Received 7 August 2017; Received in revised form 20 September 2017; Accepted 20 September 2017
0308-597X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Parappurathu et al.
investments and technology resulted in the deepening of risks asso-
ciated with fishery operations. The risks in capture fisheries include a
variety of factors such as loss or damage to fishing vessels, equipment
and gear in operation, loss of catch and human casualties in the sea.
Though such risks and dangers are inherent with marine fishing op-
erations, the economic losses associated with such incidents have in-
creased with growing investments in the sector, thereby heightening
the vulnerability of small-scale fishers and boat owners. The risks as-
sociated with the aquaculture sector are even higher with considerable
probability of stock failure due to disease incidence, climate change and
consequent weather related factors (Cyclones, heavy and un-
precedented rains, flooding/drought, etc.), harmful algal blooms
(HAB), other natural calamities (earthquakes, tsunami, etc.), among
others. Common diseases such as white spot and early mortality syn-
drome in shrimp, viral haemorrhagic septicaemia, spring viremia, ar-
gulosis and viral nervous necrosis (VNN) in fish and perkinsus disease
in shellfish are seen to be causing widespread mortality and economic
losses in recent years [26,27]. Other constraints such as inadequate
supply of good quality natural feed, theft and pilferages also add to the
vulnerability of fish farmers.
Despite the above state of affairs, institutional mechanisms to
address risk and uncertainties in the fisheries sector have been
grossly inadequate in India. Insurance is one of the widely adopted
means for risk management and is used the world over as an ef-
fective instrument for containing and mitigating a wide variety of
risks such as asset risks, production and management risks, market
risks, personal and health risks. Insurance in fisheries is by far
under-utilized compared with other sub-sectors of agriculture in the
country, barring a few local exceptions, and therefore unavailable
for the majority of the stakeholders in this sector [25,33]. This is
notwithstanding the growing demand for risk management solu-
tions from the fishing community across the country. Therefore, this
paper specifically attempts to identify the major constraints asso-
ciated with fishery insurance service delivery in India. Based on the
findings, several measures to address the constraints and upscale
service delivery in the fisheries sector are put forth, which if suc-
cessful, could prove to be a big boon for the small and marginal
operators in the sector.
2. Global scenario of fishery insurance
2.1. Capture sector
Capture fisheries insurance markets in Europe, North America,
Oceania and Latin America are dominated by large composite pri-
vate sector insurance companies. In contrast, the public sector,
assisted by fishing cooperatives, civil society organizations and
other smaller entities, is playing a major role in Asian countries
[34]. Recently, micro-insurance 1 has gained widespread popularity,
as the level of affordability for individual fishermen in these
countries is quite low. A number of private insurance companies
such as Allianz and international development agencies such as GTZ
have ventured into this field by forging links with local govern-
ments, NGOs or fishermen organizations. Such low-premium, joint
ventures have proved to be highly effective in covering risks to
small fishermen and fish producers, particularly in Asia and Africa
[2,31]. The most common format in such initiatives is micro-credit
bundled with insurance for covering health risks, accidents, risk for
household assets from natural calamities, etc. The capture fisheries
insurance market in Japan is a special case, where a mutual
1
Micro-insurance is a concept inspired from micro-credit, wherein low income com-
munities are given insurance coverage against common perils like weather, catastrophes,
illness, death, etc. The micro-insurance schemes generally follow a group approach to
extend coverage and involve affordable premiums which are determined based on the
likelihood and cost of the relevant risk [30].
145
Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155
insurance system 2 with government support is highly active, and
about 90–95 per cent of the total number of active vessels are in-
sured [17]. China and the United States of America also have fairly
large coverage by vessel insurance. However, many small scale
fishers in Africa, South America, and large parts of Asia have little
access to fishing vessel insurance services. van Anrooy, Siar [34].
2.2. Culture sector
Wide variations in structure, conduct and performance are noticed
in the case of aquaculture insurance across countries and regions.
Europe is considered the best served market where many large re-
insurance corporations such as Swiss Re, Munich Re and Llyod's of
London have a widespread presence. As aquaculture, particularly the
salmon industry, in Europe is dominated by relatively large companies,
the level of adoption of insurance is quite high and often involves
professional intermediaries such as underwriters, insurance brokers,
etc. [28]. The aquaculture insurance scenario in North America is not
very inspiring. Though insurance programs were started as early as the
1970s, its coverage did not improve substantialy over the years. Among
the various species, catfish, salmon, trout, striped bass, abalone, etc.
have attracted insurance coverage in the United States of America.
More or less on similar lines, aquaculture insurance has received little
attention over the years in Latin America. Only 2.9 per cent of the total
agricultural insurance premiums written in the region were accounted
by aquaculture in 2009 [32]. The main markets for aquaculture in-
surance are Chile and Mexico. In Chile, one of the largest fish producers
in the world, a few subsidiaries of multi-national aquaculture insurance
companies have been operating with limited subscriptions over the past
10 years. In Asia as well, the aquaculture insurance industry has shown
limited growth (with the exception of Japan, where mutual insurance
schemes have exhaustive coverage). In most Asian countries, state-
owned insurance companies are involved in aquaculture insurance. The
main reason behind the absence of private players is the dominance of
small and marginal producers in the production portfolio who operate
at limited scale and are therefore unattractive for the private players
[33]. With the exception of South Africa, the performance of the in-
dustry is even worse in sub-Saharan Africa, where only a few sub-
sidiaries of some international insurance corporations have presence
[22].
3. The state of fisheries insurance in India
Public insurance companies were the only players in the insurance
market in India till 1999, with Life Insurance Corporation of India
Limited (LIC) dealing with life insurance and General Insurance
Corporation of India Limited (GIC) administering general insurance. A
milestone in this arena was achieved when the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority (IRDA) after its inception in 1999 liberal-
ized the insurance industry in the country leading to the registration of
over 35 private companies [20]. Presently, the public insurance
schemes in agriculture and allied sectors in India are being adminis-
tered and implemented by the Agricultural Insurance Company Limited
(AIC). Several corporate players such as ICICI Lombard, Bajaj Allianz,
IFFCO-TOKYO, HDFC ERGO and Royal Sundaram have also been active
in this field since 2002.
Insurance in the fisheries sector in India, unlike that of crop and
livestock, does not have a long history or an organized structure. Except
for the presence of a few public sector insurance companies and
2
The Fisheries Mutual Insurance Scheme (FMIS) operates on the basis of the Fisheries
Disaster Compensation Law enacted in 1964 in Japan. As per the scheme, government
subsidizes production costs in case of poor catch as well as unforeseen natural disasters
and covers fishing assets against losses. The scheme also necessitates financial institutions
to extend loans against insurance claims of fishers which are considered as collaterals
[17].
 Table 1
Description on various types of insurance avenues in fishery sector in India.
Source: Compiled by authors.

Sl. No Sector/Enterprise Types of risks insurable Level of Present status in India Specific schemes/programs in operation
S. Parappurathu et al.

riska

1. Marine /Inland Capture Fisheries Life/disability of fishermen/boat crew
Partial/complete damage of fishing vessels
Loss/damage to fishing gears
Medium Central Government schemes available in all states but
with differential level of penetration. Fairly high coverage
in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
Medium Coverage extended by public insurance companies. Only
complete damage of hull/engine covered by most policies.
Scanty in inland fisheries.
High Very few independent schemes are on offer. Certain vessel
policies also cover gears but with extra premium. Not in
inland fisheries.
Central scheme, ‘Group Accident Insurance Scheme for Active Fishermen’
operational in all maritime states [9]; ‘Fishermen Personal Accident
Insurance Scheme’ of Matsyafed (Kerala State Co-operative Federation for
Fisheries Development Limited) in Kerala [12]; Accident insurance
schemes offered by the state governments in Kerala and Tamil Nadu;
Accident insurance provided through micro-finance services of South
Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS) in Kerala and Tamil
Nadu [29]; Micro insurance schemes of DHAN Foundation in Andhra
Pradesh [6].
Direct vessel insurance schemes and credit-linked schemes offered by the
subsidiaries of GIC (New India Assurance Company Ltd., Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd. and United India Insurance Company Ltd.);
Vessel insurance offered by Matsyafed, Kerala for member fishermen on
vessels purchased under their subsidized loan scheme; Subsidized vessel
insurance schemes offered by the government of Tamil Nadu; Special risk
coverage against damage of vessels offered by boat owners’ associations
based at certain harbors (Eg. Neendakara harbor in Kollam district of
Kerala, Paradeep harbor in Odisha; Mangrol harbor in Junagadh district of
Gujarat) [13].
Specific insurance policies offered by the subsidiary companies of GIC.

146
Large scale stock decline of fish species
due to environmental phenomena/
overfishing
Damage to coastal assets of fishermen
2. Mariculture / cage culture in Loss / damage of marine cages
inland waters / sea farming Loss / damage of Inland cages
Loss of marine / inland fish crop in cages
Loss of farmed bivalve stock
3. Freshwater aquaculture Loss of fin fish crop
Damage to farm structures
4. Brackishwater aquaculture Loss of brackish water fish/shellfish crop
Damage to farm structures
5. Fish/shellfish hatcheries/brood Loss of fish fries/fingerlings/broodstock
banks Damage to hatchery /brood bank
equipment/machinery
Medium No schemes available presently either in marine or inland No schemes available presently.
fisheries.
High A few schemes offered by private companies in liaison ‘Disaster Risk Insurance Product for the Coastal Communities’ introduced
with NGOs in the recent past. in the aftermath of tsunami (2004) by Bajaj Allianz with assistance from
CARE India to provide micro-insurance to nearly 75,000 coastal families
in Tamil Nadu [2]. The scheme is not in operation presently.
High No policies available presently. No schemes available presently.
Low
High
High Only selective coverage available. Insurance scheme introduced by the Government of Kerala in 2017 for
green mussel farmers in Padanna estuary region in Kerala (Personal
communication with the Department of Fisheries official, GoK, 2017
[12]).
High Several public as well as private insurance schemes No Central scheme in operation presently. Schemes offered by the
available. Generally priced high due to high risk. subsidiary companies of GIC and certain private insurance companies are
available on demand.
Low Not readily available. No schemes in operation presently.
High Several policies on offer for shrimp culture, but few No Central scheme in operation presently. Schemes offered by the
schemes cover other shell fish/ finfish species. subsidiary companies of GIC and certain private insurance companies are
available on demand.
Low Not readily available. No schemes in operation presently.
High Only selective coverage available. No schemes in operation presently.
Low Only selective coverage available. No schemes in operation presently.

a
Authors’ classification based on field survey, ICAR-CMFRI, 2016 [13]. Several subjective criteria such as the level of exposure of the assets to common risks, the intensity of risks involved, extent of possible economic losses, relative probability
of recurrence of risky events, etc. were considered for the classification.
Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155
S. Parappurathu et al.
cooperative bodies at the local level with limited scale of activity, the
sector has received little attention either at the central or state levels.
The private sector operation in this arena is also limited to a few cases
scattered over time and space [25]. A brief account of various types of
risks in capture and culture sectors in fisheries and the insurance me-
chanisms available presently to cover the risks are outlined in Table 1
presented below;
As presented in Table 1, the ‘Group Accidental Insurance Scheme for
Active Fishermen’ is the major programme presently in operation that
covers the life/disability risks of the boat crew. Under this, the insured
fishermen (reserved for age group of 18–70 years) get a claim of Rs. 200
thousand in case of permanent disability/accidental death, and Rs. 100
thousand in case of partially disability. The premium is fully subsidized
and borne by the central government and state governments on 50:50
basis. An additional 300 thousand fishermen were targeted to be cov-
ered under this scheme during the 12th plan (2012–2017) [11]. A si-
milar scheme in operation under the patronage of Matsyafed in Kerala
provides a compensation of Rs. 500 thousand to the dependents of
fishermen who die in accidents. It also covers partial disability and
hospital expenditure of injured fishermen with payments varying from
case to case. The conditions for vessel insurance vary significantly de-
pending on the type of vessels, area of operation and companies in-
volved. However, the annual premium generally ranges between 3 and
5 per cent of the value of vessels. Compensation is generally given only
in case of complete damage of vessels. In comparison, the annual pre-
mium charged on aquaculture insurance is higher at 5–7 per cent of the
total cost of variable inputs [13]. Here also, the conditions on in-
demnity payable vary greatly depending on the type of crop, manage-
ment measures adopted, the companies involved and the extent of da-
mage.
Notwithstanding the above, it is fairly clear from Table 1 that the
available avenues and mechanisms of fisheries insurance in India's
capture and culture sectors has been rather limited. Except for a fair
coverage of accident risks of marine fishermen in the southern states of
Kerala and Tamil Nadu, other major risks under the sector are covered
only at a limited scale. The ensuing section is set apart for presenting
the results of a field survey conducted in major maritime states for
further understanding the subject.
4. What ails fisheries insurance in India? An analysis based on
field survey
4.1. Materials and methods
With the primary aim of assessing the grassroots level realities on
the spread and penetration of fisheries insurance in India, the responses
of fishermen / fish farmers from major sub-sectors of fishery across the
coastal belt were collected and analyzed based on a field sample
survey3 carried out during April to October 2016. The survey sought
specific information regarding personal/group accident insurance,
vessel insurance, fishing gear insurance as well as coastal asset in-
surance from marine fishermen and regarding crop insurance from
brackish water and aquaculture farmers. Further, the fishermen who
owned fishing boats were specifically asked to rank a list of ten con-
straints, in their order of importance, which they feel have resulted in
poor penetration of vessel insurance in their area. In the capture fish-
eries sector, the respondents included 259 boat owners and 125 vessel
crew belonging to the mechanized, motorized and non-motorized sec-
tors from the coastal states of Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Kerala, and Gujarat. For administering the surveys, 2–8 main fishing
harbors/landing centres were identified purposively from each selected
maritime state (Fig. 1). From each selected harbor, 10–15 fishermen/
vessel crew each were chosen on a random basis as respondents. In a
3
Carried out by the authors under an ICAR-funded institute project at CMFRI, Kochi.
147
Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155
similar manner, the responses of nearly 40 fish farmers involved in
freshwater aquaculture, brackish water aquaculture and mussel culture
were obtained from the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu (Fig. 1). The
detailed sampling framework for the capture as well as culture sectors
are presented in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2). Besides this, the
opinions of top executives from seven insurance companies4 (both
government and private) dealing with fishery insurance on the main
constraints faced were obtained using structured questionnaires. The
ten constraints pertaining to each group of respondents were identified
based on focus group discussions carried out by the study team with the
concerned stakeholders in each sector prior to the survey. The ques-
tionnaires thus prepared were pretested and standardized. The views of
the cooperative intermediaries and government officials administering
fishery insurance in respective states were also taken into account to
supplement the conclusions arrived at. To find out the most significant
constraints as perceived by the identified group of respondents in each
sub-sector, Garrett's ranking technique was used [8]. As per this
method, the ranks assigned for the selected constraints were converted
into percent position with the help of Eq. (1) as given below;
N
100(Rij −0.5)
Percentage position = ∑
ij = 1,2,3 … n
Nj (1)
Where,
Rij = Rank given for ith constraint by the jth respondent
Nj = Number of constraints ranked by the jth respondent
The percent positions were subsequently converted into Garrett
scores by referring to the Garrett Table. Based on this, the mean scores
of the respondents were obtained and the most critical constraints were
identified and ranked.
4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Level of adoption
A summary of the sample respondents’ feedback on their level of
adoption of various types of fisheries insurance schemes in marine
capture sector across states is presented in Table 2. Most of the vessel
owners in the sample were active fishermen themselves, except a few
cases in the mechanized sector in Gujarat and Odisha, and hence no
distinction was made out between vessel owner fishermen and vessel
crew for estimating the adoption rates of accident insurance policies. It
was observed that adoption of personal/group accident insurance was
fairly high in the state of Kerala with 80 per cent or more of the re-
spondents from the four selected districts having enrolled in an existing
scheme. Agencies such as Matsyafed and Kerala Fishermen's Welfare
Fund Board (KFWFB), Government of Kerala offered the service in
collaboration with public insurance companies operating in the state.
Reasonably good coverage was observed in Tamil Nadu as well, with
100 per cent of sample respondents in Puduchery district, 96 per cent in
Villupuram and 16 per cent in Cuddalore district maintaining an active
accident insurance policy. Most of these policies were administered by
the fisheries department of the Government of Tamil Nadu. In Gujarat,
35–50 per cent of the vessel owner fishermen had accident coverage
offered by boat owners’ associations located at the respective harbors.
Similarly, 50 per cent of fishermen operating from the Paradeep harbor
in Jagatsighpur district in Odisha had access to accident insurance
4
The insurance companies selected for the study were United India Insurance
Company Ltd., New India Assurance Company Ltd., Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.,
National Insurance Company Ltd., Matsyafed, Kerala, Reliance General Insurance, and
HDFC Ergo. These are the major companies offering insurance solutions for the fishery
sector in India. The scale of operations of the latter two private companies is limited only
to certain regions. The Bajaj Allianz Co. Ltd, which was previously involved in covering
coastal assets of fishermen in Tamil Nadu has limited operations in the field presently and
hence not considered in this study.
S. Parappurathu et al. Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

Fig. 1. Map showing the study locations.

Table 2 harbors in Ganjam district of Odisha and all of them from the state of
Percent of sample fishermen who adopted various types of fishery insurance schemes in Andhra Pradesh did not have any accident insurance coverage.
selected maritime states of India. As compared to accident insurance, the adoption of vessel insurance
State District Per cent of sample fishermen/ vessel crew who
among the sample fishermen was minimal. Except in Alappuzha district
adopted insurance of type: of Kerala state, where 50 per cent of the sample vessels were insured,
the level of vessel insurance in the three southern states (Kerala, Andhra
Personal/ Vessel Fishing Coastal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) was very low. None of the vessels operating in
group (hull) gear asset
any of the selected harbors in Andhra Pradesh was insured. As noted
accident insurance insurance insurance
insurance earlier, the boat owners’ associations functioning in the two selected
harbors (Mangrol and Veravel) of Gujarat and one (Paradeep) in Odisha
Kerala Kollam 100 (45) 12 (25) 0 (25) 0 (45) offered risk coverage to vessels owned by their member fishermen. This
Alappuzha 100 (20) 50 (10) 10 (10) 0 (20)
was done by maintaining a revolving corpus fund5 to which each
Ernakulam 79 (38) 17 (23) 0 (23) 0 (38)
Kasargod 87 (15) 0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (15) member-boat owner contributed a fixed sum. In case of losses due to
Andhra Vizianagaram 0 (22) 0 (17) 0 (17) 0 (22) accidents or engine failure, the concerned fisherman was compensated
Prade- Srikakulam 0 (24) 0 (19) 0 (19) 0 (24) based on the extent of loss. The advantages of such a scheme, as ex-
sh Vishakhapatnam 0 (14) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (14) pressed by the beneficiaries included assured claim settlement, quick
Tamil Cuddalore 16 (44) 0 (29) 0 (29) 14 (44)
disbursal of compensation, minimal hassles, internal grievance redress
Nadu Puduchery 100 (10) 10 (10) 0 (10) 0 (10)
Villupuram 96 (50) 0 (40) 0 (40) 0 (50) mechanisms and minimum costs involved. However, it is worth noting
Gujarat Junagadh 35a (20) 47a (15) 0 (15) 0 (20) that such avenues are available in large harbors only and are mostly
Gir Somnath 55a,b (20) 33a (15) 0 (15) 0 (15) limited to mechanized boat operators who are generally resource-rich.
Odisha Ganjam 0 (47) 0 (37) 0 (37) 0 (47)
The provision of gear insurance and coastal asset insurance was
Jagatsighpur 50a (20) 100a (10) 0 (10) 0 (20)
quite low, with only one case of gear insurance reported from
Note: Figures in parentheses denote total number of respondents applicable under each Alappuzha district of Kerala and just 14% of fishermen from Cuddalore
category; adoption estimates pertaining to vessel and gear insurance are based on re- district of Tamil Nadu having reported enrollment to coastal asset in-
sponses of vessel owners only. surance. Insurance coverage of income risks arising from decline of fish
a
Indicates risk coverage against personal accident and vessel damage provided by boat stocks and price risks due to market price fluctuations were not re-
owners associations for their members.
b ported by any of the respondents. The level of adoption of insurance in
The estimate includes personal accident insurance availed by vessel crew under
government schemes.
fresh water and brackish water aquaculture was also in the sample

coverage offered by boat owners’ associations. However, it is worth

noting that the vessel crew who work on a daily wage basis at these
harbors did not have any insurance coverage. In case of accidents, they
only received limited compensation, generally a few thousand rupees,
from their employers. Similarly, the fishermen hailing from small
5
A continuing fund maintained by the Boat Owners’ Associations to which the
member-subscribers contributed a pre-decided sum every year, for a term of 3–5 years.
Upon completion of the tenure, the balance amounts after payment of compensations are
returned to the subscribers. Fresh subscriptions are invited for the next term, which
continues in a similar fashion.

148
S. Parappurathu et al. Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

The constraint No. 4 is distinct from that of the constraint No. 5 such that the former indicates the unavailability /lack of accessibility due to circumstantial reasons (eg: a product reserved by the government to below poverty line households
areas. Interestingly, none of the sample farmers who were involved in

Garrett rank
freshwater/brackish water aquaculture in the selected districts of
Alappuzha and Ernakulam in Kerala as well as in the Villupuram dis-

10
trict of Tamil Nadu have opted for any sort of insurance coverage

9
8
6
5

4
1
3
7
2
against common risks in the sector. Similarly, the mussel farmers in

10.6
12.8

12.6
6.5
3.4

6.3
3.6
7.1
7.2
5.8
SD
Padanna estuary region in Kasargod district of Kerala were also devoid

83.3 (0.000)
of any insurance options during the survey period.6

Mean score
Odisha

30.0
38.8
44.6
47.6

24.0
62.2
74.1
66.7
42.0
70.0

0.67
10
4.2.2. Constraint analysis

Garrett rank
The results of the constraint analysis with respect to vessel in-
surance in the marine capture sector are presented in Tables 3–5. The

Note: SD denotes standard deviation; There are no observations pertaining to mechanized boats in selected harbors in Andhra Pradesh; Figures in parentheses indicate probability value of χ2 statistic.
results include the Garrett score with respective standard deviation and

10
3
4
6
9

5
2

8
7
1
rank for each listed constraint pertaining to mechanized, motorized and
non-motorized (artisanal) sectors across the five selected maritime

13.4
15.6
15.1

12.2
21.5

10.2
12.5
12.6
8.3

7.7
SD
states. The internal consistency of the Garrett scores was ascertained by

58.1 (0.000)
Mean score
estimating Cronbach's alpha for each vessel-state group [4]. Similarly,

Gujarat
the significance of the scores across the constraints under each group

64.2
58.6
43.8
35.7

45.9
68.0
30.2
42.4
43.0
68.2

0.71
was determined by performing Kruscal-Wallis test, the χ2 values of

10
Garrett's ranking of major constraints that deter spread of vessel insurance in selected coastal states of India based on the response of fishermen: Mechanized fishing vessels.
which are presented in the respective tables [14].

Garrett rank
The rankings indicates striking variations across the states. The

and hence not accessible to the rest), while the latter has more to do with the individual fisherman's choice to subscribe a product considering its various attributes.
mechanized boat owners in the state of Kerala perceived high pre-
vailing premium rates as the foremost constraint that deterred adoption

10
3

7
4

8
9
1
2
5
6
of vessel insurance, followed by poor settlement record on insurance

15.9
15.7
21.8
21.1

20.8
18.8
19.6
16.8
13.1
16.5
SD
claims (Table 3). In Tamil Nadu, high level of procedural hassles as-
sociated with insurance was rated as the foremost constraint followed

Tamil Nadu

9.5 (0.396)
Mean score
by poor claim settlement record and low awareness on insurance.
However, in contrast to that of Kerala, premium rate was not con-

52.2
45.2
48.0
51.1

47.3
46.6
57.1
52.9
50.2
49.4

0.57
30
sidered as a deterring factor, as the state government offers subsidized
schemes to promote vessel insurance in Tamil Nadu [13]. The me- Garrett rank
chanized vessel owners in Gujarat expressed high confidence in com-
munity support mechanisms which could be attributed to the presence

10
of active boat owner associations having their own risk mitigation
9
7
6
4

3
1
5
2

8
mechanisms for compensating the losses incurred. In Odisha, factors
19.5
21.0
13.1

10.6
16.8
15.1
13.8

15.2
7.8

9.3
SD

such as high perceived hassles, poor claim settlement record and high

63.5 (0.000)
Mean score

premium were found to be dissuading the mechanized vessel owners

from availing insurance. As in the case of Gujarat, community support
Kerala

34.3
48.9
49.8
54.0

54.1
71.4
52.9
61.8
32.9
40.8

0.69
through boat owner associations played a major role in mitigating the

17
risks of mechanized boat operators in Odisha as well. The statistical
Unavailability of insurance products to cover the specific risks /inaccessibility to available

tests indicated reasonable levels of internal consistency in the above

Unsuitability of the available products to match the customers’ specific preferencesa

results pertaining to the states of Gujarat, Kerala and Odisha. However,

Tamil Nadu fared poor both in terms of internal consistency as well as
inter-factor significance as obvious from the respective estimates of
Cronbach's alpha and Kruskal-Wallis χ2 value. The results of the Dunn's
test on pair-wise significance of constraints were performed for all cases
Assurance of government support/compensation in case of calamity

and are available upon request.

Poor claim settlement record/ Non-payment on partial damage

The main constraints identified by motorized and artisanal vessel

operators across the states were not highly divergent from that of the
Assurance of support from social institutions/community

respective mechanized operators. In general, factors such as high pre-

mium, poor claim settlement record, high hassles, low awareness, etc.,
High perceived hassles associated with insurance

were ranked high by these groups of respondents as well. Some of the

Source: Authors’ estimates based on field survey [13].

additions and notable deviations are discussed here: Lack of awareness

High premium in case of available options
No contact / persuasion from the sector

was the number one constraint identified by the motorized vessel op-
Low perceived risk in the profession

erators from Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Odisha. Those from Tamil
Lack of awareness about insurance

Nadu and Kerala also accorded high rank for this constraint. This was in
contrast with the views expressed by the mechanized vessel operators in
Kerala and Odisha who ranked this factor next to lowest. In relation to
the respondents from other states, the motorized as well as artisanal
Perceived constraint

vessel operators in Gujarat and Odisha did not consider that poor claim
χ2 (Kruskal-Wallis Test)
Number of observations

settlement record and high premiums are the major constraints for
them. Instead, they were more concerned about factors such as low
products

Cronbach's alpha

awareness, low contact/persuasion from the insurance industry and

Sl. No.

6
Table 3

The Department of Fisheries, Government of Kerala has initiated an insurance scheme

10.

for green mussel farmers in this region for the 2017 cropping season to compensate losses
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

due to summer kill.

149
 Table 4
Garrett's ranking of major constraints that deter spread of vessel insurance in selected coastal states of India based on the response of fishermen: motorized fishing vessels.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on field survey [13].

Sl. No. Perceived constraint Kerala Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Gujarat Odisha
S. Parappurathu et al.

Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank
score score score score score

1. Lack of awareness about insurance 55.2 14.3 4 63.7 19.5 1 58.1 12.7 2 72.0 9.0 1 75.9 9.0 1
2. Low perceived risk in the profession 47.0 11.5 8 33.9 15.5 10 49.4 17.2 5 62.3 12.6 2 25.6 6.1 10
3. No contact / persuasion from the sector 54.9 17.6 5 49.4 19.3 6 44.6 18.4 10 49.9 11.4 5 54.1 15.2 4
4. Unavailability of insurance products to cover the specific risks 53.3 9.9 6 50.5 17.7 5 58.3 21.9 1 40.5 20.8 8 48.7 3.8 6
/inaccessibility to available products
5. Unsuitability of the available products to match the 63.2 15.4 2 46.8 13.8 8 47.3 22.8 6 56.6 10.8 3 48.1 12.1 7
customers’ specific preferences
6. High premium in case of available options 58.9 10.9 3 51.5 19.6 4 51.6 20.1 4 56.1 19.5 4 46.6 11.2 8
7. High perceived hassles associated with insurance 49.0 17.8 7 55.4 16.2 2 54.2 14.2 3 40.6 9.7 7 58.4 16.2 3
8. Poor claim settlement record/ Non-payment on partial 64.1 15.6 1 53.7 18.1 3 46.0 18.9 7 38.9 14.4 9 49.7 17.2 5
damage
9. Assurance of government support/compensation in case of 27.4 9.3 9 48.3 12.0 7 45.4 14.5 8 36.0 10.9 10 60.1 6.7 2
calamity
10. Assurance of support from social institutions/community 26.9 8.5 10 45.9 16.1 9 44.8 17.7 9 45.6 24.7 6 37.3 19.5 9
Number of observations 24 32 20 10 11
Cronbach's alpha 0.62 0.70 0.59 0.88 0.81
χ2 (Kruskal-Wallis Test) 109.9 (0.000) 48.1 (0.000) 16.2 (0.060) 37.3 (0.000) 52.5 (0.000)

Note: SD denotes standard deviation; Figures in parentheses indicate probability value of χ2 statistic.

150
Table 5
Garrett's ranking of major constraints that deter spread of vessel insurance in selected coastal states of India based on the response of fishermen: Non-motorized (artisanal) fishing vessels.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on field survey [13].

Sl. No. Perceived constraint Kerala Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Gujarat Odisha

Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank
score score score score score

1. Lack of awareness about insurance 39.7 12.1 7 52.2 8.3 3 49.2 14.3 6 77.2 6.2 1 54.4 25.3 4
2. Low perceived risk in the profession 30.0 9.8 9 39.8 13.4 9 47.0 16.3 8 71.5 7.7 2 22.0 8.5 10
3. No contact / persuasion from the sector 48.2 6.2 6 49.2 15.7 7 49.5 17.1 5 52.8 7.7 3 65.6 17.5 1
4. Unavailability of insurance products to cover the specific risks 51.5 4.4 5 44.5 15.1 8 45.1 22.0 9 50.6 15.9 4 61.8 8.8 2
/inaccessibility to available products
5. Unsuitability of the available products to match the 58.6 2.7 4 39.6 12.2 10 56.4 18.7 2 44.2 14.8 6 51.7 12.7 6
customers’ specific preferences
6. High premium in case of available options 77.5 6.7 1 49.7 21.5 6 48.4 21.1 7 44.6 16.9 5 39.0 9.7 9
7. High perceived hassles associated with insurance 62.7 9.4 3 52.0 7.7 5 58.8 19.1 1 41.1 16.4 7 58.1 19.2 3
8. Poor claim settlement record/ Non-payment on partial 71.3 7.3 2 61.8 10.1 1 50.9 16.7 4 39.4 11.7 8 42.8 16.2 8
damage
9. Assurance of government support/compensation in case of 31.2 7.8 8 56.1 12.5 4 54.3 12.8 3 39.3 14.7 9 53.8 7.2 5
calamity
10. Assurance of support from social institutions/community 29.3 8.3 10 55.0 12.6 2 43.3 21.2 10 38.2 16.4 10 50.8 7.4 7
Number of observations 15 11 20 10 9
Cronbach's alpha 0.68 0.81 0.61 0.79 0.70
χ2 (Kruskal-Wallis Test) 127.7 (0.000) 13.3 (0.151) 11.7 (0.230) 49.0 (0.000) 37.5 (0.000)

Note: SD denotes standard deviation; Figures in parentheses indicate probability value of χ2 statistic.
Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155
 S. Parappurathu et al.

Table 6
Garrett's ranking of major constraints that deter spread of aquaculture insurance in selected coastal states of India based on the response of fish farmers.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on filed survey [13].

Sl. No. Perceived constraint Kerala Tamil Nadu

Fresh water fish farming Mussel culture Brackishwater fish farming Overall Brackishwater fish farming

Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank Mean SD Garrett rank
score score score score score

1. Lack of awareness about insurance 62.8 13.6 2 59.1 4.9 4 74.6 14.7 1 65.1 13.4 1 63.6 12.9 1
2. Low perceived risk in the profession 37.7 14.1 8 42.3 8.0 8 39.7 11.9 8 39.8 11.4 8 47.2 18.6 7
3. No contact / persuasion from the sector 54.9 8.1 6 61.0 4.1 3 62.0 10.0 3 59.1 8.1 3 51.6 20.3 4
4. Unavailability of insurance products to cover the specific risks 55.4 6.5 5 73.2 6.9 1 58.2 5.4 4 62.2 10.1 2 39.6 13.6 10

151
/inaccessibility to available products
5. Unsuitability of the available products to match the specific 54.4 14.9 7 71.3 12.3 2 50.9 7.3 6 59.0 14.8 4 43.9 20.7 9
preferences of the subscriber
6. High premium in case of available options 56.5 16.5 4 51.8 11.9 5 44.8 7.9 7 51.4 13.4 7 47.4 23.7 6
7. High perceived hassles associated with insurance 59.0 18.1 3 46.1 14.1 6 63.9 11.1 2 56.1 16.3 5 55.4 19.2 2
8. Poor claim settlement record/ Non-payment in case of partial 63.7 19.0 1 45.1 5.8 7 55.5 14.8 5 55.1 16.1 6 45.6 18.6 8
damage
9. Assurance of government support/compensation in case of 29.2 8.3 9 20.1 6.3 10 27.8 6.6 9 25.8 8.0 10 50.5 15.2 5
calamity
10. Assurance of support from social institutions/community 26.4 8.1 10 28.7 4.0 9 22.5 6.2 10 26.0 6.7 9 54.1 12.7 3
Number of observations 10 10 10 30 10
Cronbach's alpha 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.72 0.71
χ2 (Kruskal-Wallis Test) 51.6 (0.000) 72.1 (0.000) 56.7 (0.000) 154.0 (0.000) 14.4 (0.099)

Note: SD denotes standard deviation; Figures in parentheses indicate probability value of χ2 statistic.
Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155
S. Parappurathu et al. Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

lack of suitable products in the market. Notably, the kind of community
support enjoyed by the mechanized vessel operators in Gujarat and
Odisha was absent in case of their counterparts from the other two
sectors. This indicates that social capital mechanisms such as boat
owners’ associations were limited mostly to large players in the sector
in these states. The tests of consistency indicated that the results per-
taining to motorized and artisanal sectors in Kerala and Tamil Nadu
were not satisfactory. Similarly, the Kruscal-Wallis test pointed to poor
inter-factor significance for the results on motorized and artisanal sec-
tors in Tamil Nadu as well as for the latter in Andhra Pradesh.
The ranking of constraints with respect to aquaculture are presented
in Table 6. The broad set of constraints for which responses were
gathered was the same as that of vessel insurance. As obvious from the
results, producers practicing freshwater fish culture in Kerala identified
poor claim settlement record of insurance companies and low aware-
ness on available insurance schemes as the two major factors that dis-
couraged them from insuring their crops. Other constraints such as high
hassles associated with insurance and high premiums also dissuaded
them. In contrast, the mussel producers based at Padanna backwater
region in Kerala were interested to insure their stocks, but did not
pursue it mainly due to unavailability of adequate insurance options,
lack of suitable products, absence of contact with the sector and low
awareness. The brackish water fish farmers in Kerala and Tamil Nadu
mainly attributed their ignorance on insurance options and high per-
ceived hassles as the main reasons behind their poor response towards
insurance options. All the above scores/rankings were found to be in-
ternally consistent and were found to display significant difference from
one another (except brackish water fish farming in Tamil Nadu).
A different set of constraints were identified against which the re-
sponses of the executives from the selected insurance companies were
solicited through personal interviews. The results of Garrett ranking of
the above constraints with respect to marine hull (vessel) insurance and
aquaculture insurance are presented in Table 7. The respondents felt
that factors such as low affordability of target group to prevailing in-
surance premiums, low profitability in the segment and low interest /
participation by the target group are the main reasons behind poor
penetration of insurance products. Further, high associated risks and
high incidence of moral hazards are also cited as determinants that pull
back the companies from vigorously pursuing business in the sector.
4.3. Main insights from the field study
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis that
explain the reasons behind low risk financing of the fishery sector in
India. The fishers / fish farmers are either unaware or are less con-
cerned about the need to insure their assets against various types of
risks. In certain cases like vessel insurance in Kerala, people are well
aware of insurance, but are reluctant due to high premiums involved,
lack of provision for claim settlement in case of partial damage, high
hassles involved in claim settlement process, reservations about timely
and assured settlement of claims and so on. As enrollment is lower due
to the above reasons, the insurance companies have limited options to
develop products that are affordable. The companies are also concerned
about malpractices such as intentional dumping of fishing vessels,
especially old and less energy-efficient ones, to secure claims. Unlike in
land, the mechanisms to detect such malpractices are scanty. At many
places, the fishermen/fish farmers pointed to lack of availability of
adequate insurance options as one of the reasons for their non-enroll-
ment. This is particularly relevant for aquaculture, where the industry
has never explored the potential of launching suitable products for a
number of enterprises citing low interest of farmers, poor demand for
insurance, low profitability, high risk involved, high moral hazards, and
so on. In short, insurance in India's fishery sector suffers from problems
such as lack of transparency, low affordability, high moral hazards and
poor customer acceptance. Against this backdrop, the following sec-
tions discuss various options and strategies to reform fishery insurance
sector in India.
5. Towards reforming fisheries insurance: technology and policy
perspectives
Technology can play a vital role in improving efficiency, bringing
transparency and reducing moral hazards in fishery insurance.
Innovative products such as weather-index based insurance schemes
have already been in force in the agriculture sector, wherein, satellite
data and inputs from weather stations are being used to trigger in-
surance payments in case of occurrence of weather related events
[23,24]. These can be extended to capture and culture fisheries sectors
as well, to increase efficiency and simplify procedures. For instance,
geo-spatial tools and protocols could be used for mapping the incidence
of diseases and HAB, destruction due to natural calamities and other
perils. The inputs from such platforms could be used for compensating
damages to coastal assets of fisher folk, marine cages, aquaculture farms
and other fishery-related infrastructure. Applications of remote sensing
and GIS could also be relied upon to generate inventory database of the
insured farms. Similarly, advanced vessel monitoring systems (VMS),

Table 7
Garrett's ranking of major constraints that deter spread of vessel / aquaculture insurance based on the response of insurance company managers.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on filed survey [13].

Sl. no. Perceived constraint Marine hull Aquaculture

Mean score SD Garrett rank Mean score SD Garrett rank

1. Low profitability in the sector. 63.1 14.2 2 68.4 13.2 1

2. Less interest / participation by fishermen/fish farmers. 61.7 18.1 3 60.0 17.7 2
3. Low affordability of fishermen/small farmers to pay premium at the rate that is viable for the 68.7 11.8 1 59.6 16.1 3
business.
4. High risk involved in the sector (chance of bulk compensation in case of calamities or disease 53.0 15.9 4 57.6 20.0 4
incidence).
5. High chance/Incidence of malpractice by the beneficiaries. 51.7 21.1 5 49.2 20.1 6
6. Lack of adequate data about disaster risks and the sector in general. 46.8 17.2 6 52.6 10.9 5
7. Difficulty in access to the sector due to poor infrastructure and low financial literacy of fishermen. 45.8 10.3 7 46.2 12.5 7
8. Inadequate presence/response of cooperatives/civil society organization that can mediate access to 41.3 18.8 8 41.4 20.2 8
the sector.
9. Inadequate presence of reinsurance companies to share risk. 30.8 14.8 10 27.6 13.1 10
10. Lack of adequate government policy/guidelines in the sector. 37.0 7.9 9 37.4 7.8 9
Number of observations 6 5
Cronbach's alpha 0.77 0.82
χ2 (Kruskal-Wallis Test) 23.3 (0.005) 19.3 (0.023)

Note: SD denotes standard deviation; Figures in parentheses indicate probability value of χ2 statistic.

152
S. Parappurathu et al. Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

Table 8
Perspectives for reforms in the field of fishery insurance based on insights from the study.
Source: Authors.

Sl. no. Dimensions Present status Perspectives for reform

1. Fisher folk's awareness on the • Lack of risk financing culture among fishing community. • Strong measures from both government and insurance
need and benefits of
insurance.
• Fishermen, particularly operating in non-mechanized sector
in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Odisha perceive lack of
companies to inculcate risk financing culture. Developing
linkages with fishermen/fish farmer cooperatives, producer
awareness on insurance programs as a major constraint. associations, etc. would prove beneficial in this respect.
2. Mutual reciprocities between
insurance companies and
• Serious trust deficit between insurance companies and fishing
community.
• Ensuring the participation of grass-root level organizations
(fishery cooperatives/NGOs/boat owner associations) as
fisher folk • Fishermen not kept informed about various insurance intermediaries or partners for insurance administration.
schemes and provisions therein. • Deployment of a brigade of rural insurance agents/service
• Lack of interest of private insurance companies to enter into providers to strengthen grass root level support services.
fisher sector. • Popularization of micro-insurance initiatives among fishing
• High perceived procedural hassles associated insurance community.
formalities. • Bundling micro-credit with asset/disaster insurance programs.
• Involving fishermen/fish farmer thrift/entrepreneurial groups
such as SHGs/MFI in insurance programs.
• Increasing competition in the sector by incentivizing the entry of
new players to the sector.
3. Availability of suitable/
affordable insurance products.
• General discontent among fishermen/fish farmers about high
insurance premium, unavailability of custom-made insurance
• Bringing flexibility in insurance schemes through options such
as payment of premium in installments, partial coverage of
products, etc. fishing /production units and augmented products with
coverage on fishing gear.
• Exploring innovative index-based insurance products in capture
and culture fisheries sector to leverage the advancements in
technology (remote sensing, GIS, ICT)
4. Claim settlement and related
formalities.
• Fishermen's perception about low claim settlement ratio of
insurance companies.
• ICT interventions for introducing simple, efficient and fool-
proof insurance claim mechanisms.
• Long delays for final settlement of claims. • Including partial damage of insured units in the purview of
• Lack of transparency in claim settlement process. insurance claims.
• No compensation for partial damage of crops/vessels. • Awareness drives among fishermen/fish farmers to adhere to
conditions laid down on policies.
• Adequate dispute settlement mechanisms to address grievances.
5. Coverage of enterprises/
stakeholders.
• Many enterprises in fisheries sector are not presently serviced
by the insurance industry.
• Launching new products in hitherto un-serviced areas like
mariculture, seaweed farming and mussel culture.
• and
No specific schemes to cover the risks of women in fishery
allied enterprises.
• Special insurance products for women workers/entrepreneurs in
the sector.
• Reallocating some of the existing unhealthy subsidies towards
incentivizing greater insurance coverage.
• Introducing some degree of legislative coercion through
mandatory insurance coverage, wherever possible.

which are presently in the pipeline to be introduced in India, could be
made use of to track the fishing vessels and assess incidents such as mid-
sea capsizing and collisions [19]. Such data would be valuable for the
insurance companies to verify insurance claims by affected bene-
ficiaries. Further, interactive ICT tools and mobile applications could be
leveraged for speedy processing of insurance claims as well as for real-
time assessment of damages incurred to fishing vessels, mariculture
units and fish farms in case of calamities.
Though the above diagnostic exercise makes it easier to identify and
propose policy prescriptions, the multiplicity of problems leaves no
room for simple, straight-forward solutions. Some of the potential op-
tions for reforms derived based on the responses of stakeholders are
presented in Table 8.
6. Conclusions
This paper seeks to throw light on the present status of fisheries
insurance in India and attempts to assess the factors behind poor
adoption of the insurance-based safety net mechanisms among the
fishing community. Based on a literature survey and primary field level
assessment through stakeholder surveys, the study concludes that there
is fair coverage of personal accident insurance programs in some
southern states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, most of which are ad-
ministered through active mediation of fisheries cooperatives ([12,29]).
However, the penetration of marine hull, gear or equipment insurance
is found to be at low levels. Similarly, household asset insurance cov-
erage against unforeseen natural disasters, to which most of the coastal
families are routinely exposed, remains scanty [13]. Most of the
available insurance schemes in the capture sector are operated by
government owned insurance companies, with the presence of private
players hardly recognizable. In the culture sector too, insurance is not a
commonly available option for marginal and small producers. Those
which are available, particularly from the private sector, lack accessi-
bility and affordability due to prohibitive costs involved. Over and
above complementing and updating the available literature, this study
undertook a constraint analysis using primary survey data, based on
which the main constraints limiting fishery insurance in selected coastal
states were identified. Factors such as low awareness of fisher folk /fish
farmers on the need for risk management solutions, low interest due to
unaffordable insurance premiums, lack of provision for claim settle-
ment in case of partial losses, high hassles involved in claim settlement
process, reservations about timely settlement of claims and so on, are
identified as the main reasons behind poor adoption of safety-nets. On
the part of the insurance industry, high risk perception, profitability
concerns, high chance of moral hazards and lack of adequate data about
disaster risks are the dissuading factors, among others. This paper,
however, emphasizes the need for catching up with rest of the sectors,
as the investment stakes in fisheries have gathered weight in recent
times thereby deepening the vulnerability of the stakeholders asso-
ciated with it. For this, measures such as leveraging the potential of
technological interventions, developing innovative institutional me-
chanisms, bridging the trust deficit and bringing about attitudinal
changes through awareness drives are suggested. Promising options
such as micro insurance, which has already proved its potential to
change the lives of resource poor people in various parts of the world,
can also contribute a great deal in this endeavor. Over and above these,

153
S. Parappurathu et al. Marine Policy 86 (2017) 144–155

long-lasting efforts to improve the socio-economic conditions and living
standards of the fishing community through development programs can
complement in no lesser extent.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support obtained
from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (through Institute
project no. FISHCMFRISIL201202200020) for conducting the study. A
part of the paper goes as inputs to the Report of the ‘Taskforce on Use of
Technology for Agriculture Insurance’ constituted by NITI Aayog,
Government of India. The authors are grateful to Dr. P.K. Aggarwal,
Chairman of the Taskforce, Dr. Sunil Mohammed, HoD, Molluscan
Fisheries Division, CMFRI and Dr. Sujithkumar Surendran, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, USA for their valuable inputs and necessary gui-
dance in shaping-up the paper. They are also grateful to the experts of
the Sub-group 5 of the Taskforce; fishermen/ fish farmers, officials of
various insurance companies and government departments who have
participated in the primary surveys conducted as part of the study. The
technical support provided by Dr. S.S. Raju, CMFRI in data collection is
also thankfully acknowledged. The views expressed are personal.

Appendix A

See Table A1 and A2

Table A1
Sampling framework for data collection from fishermen in selected coastal states of India, 2016.

State District Landing Centre Number of boat owners Vessel crew

Mechanized Motorized Non-motorized All type

Kerala Kollam Sakthikulangara 5 0 0 10

Neendakara 0 9 0 5
Thankasseri 0 11 0 5
Alappuzha Punnapra 0 8 2 10
Ernakulum Munambam 4 0 0 5
Chellanam 0 6 7 5
Cochin Fisheries Harbor 6 0 0 5
Kasaragode Cheruvathur 5 0 0 10
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram Chintapalli 0 9 8 5
Srikakulam Kalingapatnam 0 15 4 5
Visakhapatnam Bhimli 0 9 0 5
Tamil Nadu Cuddalore Periyakuppam 10 0 0 5
Iyyampettai 0 9 0 5
Parankipettai 0 0 10 5
Puduchery Pillaychawadi 10 0 0 0
Villupuram Chettikuppam 10 0 0 5
Anumendhaikuppam 0 10 10 5
Koonimedukuppam 0 0 10 0
Odisha Ganjam Gopalpur 0 10 10 5
Arjipalli 0 8 9 5
Jagatsighpur Paradip 10 0 0 10
Gujarat Junagadh Mangrol 5 5 5 5
Gir Somnath Veravel 5 5 5 5
Total 70 109 80 125

Table A2
Sampling framework for data collection from fish/shell fish farmers in selected coastal states of India, 2016.

State District Places covered in Type of Number of

survey farming fish
farmers
covered

Kerala Alappuzha Ambalappuzha, Fresh water 10

Neerkunnam aquaculture
Ernakulam Moothakunnam, Brackishwater 10
Cherai, Njarakkal aquaculture
Kasargode Ori, Padanna Mussel culture 10
Tamil Nadu Villupuram Kottikuppam, Brackishwater 10
Vandipalayam, aquaculture
Kalliyankuppam

154
S. Parappurathu et al.
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