David 

Steinberg

The Multidisciplinary
Nature of Morality
and Applied Ethics
The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality
and Applied Ethics
“Morality can be a conversation stopper. In The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied
Ethics, David Steinberg expands the conversation. Drawing upon deep experience as a clinician
and medical ethicist, Steinberg offers a rich interdisciplinary analysis of a topic that is easy to
invoke yet difficult to define. To that end, Steinberg draws on philosophy, religion, evolutionary
biology, psychology, anthropology and the law to paint a nuanced portrait of morality in both
theory and practice. This is a beautiful book that will reward the thoughtful reader with its wisdom
and erudition.”
—Joseph J. Fins, M.D., M.A.C.P., F.R.C.P., is the E. William Davis, Jr., M.D.,
Professor of Medical Ethics and Chief of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell
Medical College and Solomon Center Distinguished Scholar in Medicine,
Bioethics and the Law at Yale Law School. He is the author of Rights Come to Mind:
Brain Injury, Ethics and the Struggle for Consciousness

“David Steinberg begins his remarkable new book by quoting the philosopher who quipped, “If
one starts by saying ‘morality is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right.” This puzzle
serves as both the theme and the motivation for his exploration of morality, taking the reader on a
journey through a startling and contrasting variety of perspectives. Steinberg first explores morality
through the eyes of evolutionary biologists. He then moves on to linguistic interpretations of
morality, morality as seen through the powerful social constructs of culture, religion, and the law,
and concludes with the insights of the great moral philosophers and how their work has influenced
the practice of ethics in organizations, medicine, and healthcare. A true tour de force, and a
fascinating read.”
—Robert Truog, M.D., Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Medical Ethics,
Harvard Medical School. Director, Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School
David Steinberg

The Multidisciplinary Nature

of Morality and Applied
Ethics

123
David Steinberg
Harvard Medical School
Boston, MA, USA
Lahey Hospital and Medical Center
Emeritus Staff
Burlington, MA, USA
david.steinberg@comcast.net

ISBN 978-3-030-45679-5 ISBN 978-3-030-45680-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my Grandchildren,
Ben, Emily, Alex, Sadie and Nora
Introduction

Most people intuitively understand the nature of morality; this tends to belie the fact
that morality is more complex and more interesting than is generally appreciated.
Although morality has been discussed for centuries, its essential nature is still
debated. That is because morality is an abstract concept, an idea that is not itself
amenable to empirical examination, but is susceptible to various interpretations.
Despite having spent decades involved with both practical and theoretical ethics
I found deciphering the essential nature of morality similar to solving an intriguing
puzzle. Despite centuries of debate morality has not acquired a consensus definition
and it encompasses many controversies: Should morality be known by reason or the
passions? What should predominate rules and principles, the virtues, or the actual
consequences of an action? Can morality yield objective truth? And, can these
questions be answered?
The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics is an exploration of
morality from various perspectives. Each chapter concerns morality; that is the
thread that ties everything together. My aim is to provide a comprehensive portrait
of morality—a fascinating and challenging concept that, despite its uncertainties,
has enormous influence on human behavior.
The literature on morality is vast, forcing me to be selective and write about what
would best contribute to a comprehensive portrait of morality. Chapters 1–8 include
an introduction and an examination of morality from a variety of perspectives
including evolution, psychology, culture, religion and the law. Chapter 3, Social
Darwinism concerns misguided attempts to emulate evolution. Chapter 9 illustrates
the vulnerability of morality as evidenced by the persistence of evil. Chapters 10–14
are devoted to moral theories and moral motivation. Chapters 15–16 include
discussions of morality as practically applied. Chapter 17 contains concluding
remarks.

vii
viii Introduction

My primary intended readers are the many people who have joined a profes-
sional, governmental, or organizational ethics committee and people taking a
fellowship or masters degree program in ethics. I have also written for the
thoughtful general reader who wants to learn more about morality. I have tried to
avoid the arcane language that often infiltrates philosophy books and have inserted
historic examples and real-life ethical quandaries that testify to the enormous
influence morality can exert on people’s lives.
Contents

Part I The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality

1 Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Morality and Intrinsic Objective Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Moral Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Definition of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Moral Skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Evolution and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Morality as Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A Tentative Definition of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Moral Capacities in Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Respect for Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Caring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Incest Taboo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Monogamy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Reciprocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Thou Shalt not Steal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Rules, Justice and Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Limitation of Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Moral Indignation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Is Human Morality Distinctive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Some Cynicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The Limitations of Evolutionary Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ix
x Contents

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Social Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Immoral-like Behavior in Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Thomas Henry Huxley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
The Mechanism of Biological Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5 Moral Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Moral Psychology and the Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Free Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
The Distortion of Rational Moral Deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Reason, Emotion and Confabulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Reason and Emotion in the Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas . . . . . . . 49
Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Framing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Incest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Embryo Donation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Terminal Sedation and Genetically Modified Organisms . . . . . . . . . 53
Fetal Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Other Extra-Moral Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6 Morality and Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
The Definition of Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Culture and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Stigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Multiculturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Moral Relativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Cultural Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A Response to Moral Relativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Contents xi

7 Morality and Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

The Definition of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Religion and Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Religion: Another Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Jewish Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Tzedakah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Tikkun Olam—Repairing the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
The Book of Proverbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Ethical Ideas in the Talmud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
The Golden Rule of Judaism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Comments on Jewish Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Conflict with Secular Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Christian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Christian Fundamentalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Buddhist Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Islamic Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Islamic Fundamentalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Confucian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Comments on Confucian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Hindu Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Caste System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8 Morality and the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Political Anarchism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Natural Law and Legal Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Legal Positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Immoral Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
The Obligation to Obey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Nuanced Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
9 Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Evil: Circumstances, Values and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
God and Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Evil: Obedience to Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
The Pathology of Imprisonment: The Stanford Prison Experiment . . . . 113
“Ordinary” Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
xii Contents

My Lai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Doctor Mengele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
The Roots of Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Situational Determinism Versus Individual Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . 121
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Part II Moral Theories

10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Moral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
The Objective of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Conflicting Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Uncertainty and Conceptual Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Challenges to Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Morality and Self Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Values and Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Other Moral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
11 Moral Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Amoralists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Antisocial Personality Disorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill,
and Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
The Ultimate End of Human Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Doctrine of the Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Practical Wisdom-Phronesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Bad Decisions: Akrasia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
The Moral Philosophers: David Hume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Necessary Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Moral Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Rationalism Versus Sentimentalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Contents xiii

The Moral Philosophers: Immanuel Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Immanuel Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Kant’s Moral Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
The Categorical Imperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
A Universal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
The Moral Philosophers: John Stuart Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
John Stuart Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
The Moral Philosophers: Friedrich Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Friedrich Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Psychological Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Nietzsche and Marx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Nietzsche on the Nature of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
13 Principlism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Conflicting Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
The Value of Principlism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Respect for Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
The Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
John Rawls and Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Beneficence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Nonmaleficence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
14 Common Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A Critique of Common Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Are Moral Rules Really Universal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
The Objectives of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
xiv Contents

Part III Practical Ethics

15 Applied Ethics: Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Approach to Ethical Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Professional Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Applied Ethics: Organizational Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Business Ethics: Data Breaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Engineering Ethics Case: The Challenger Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Pressure to Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
The Fatal Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
The Ethics of the Challenger Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Psychiatric and Political Applied Ethics: The Goldwater Rule . . . . . . . 201
Hospital Ethics Policy: The Right to Refuse Blood Transfusion . . . . . . 202
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Ethics Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Hospital Ethics Consultation Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Reasons for Biomedical Ethical Dilemmas? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Conceptual Disagreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Conflicting Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Scarce Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Prognostic Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Cultural Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Reasons for Ethics Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A Lobe of Liver for Their Physician . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
The Case of the Unresponsive Hermit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Request for Futile Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Other Biomedical Ethics Consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Moral Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
17 The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics:
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Moral Disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
The Nature of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Evolution and Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Natural Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Contents xv

What Is the Origin of Morality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
 Part I
The Multidisciplinary Nature
of Morality
Chapter 1
Morality

Abstract Although morality is widely embraced, often as a sacrosanct entity, it is

a complex and controversial concept. The moral philosopher Bernard Gert implied
the complicated nature of morality when he said, “If one starts by saying ‘morality
is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right”. Morality is a human concept
that cannot be empirically evaluated; in any case science is not the proper source of
moral values. Morality has been variously defined by respected ethicists and there
are conflicting moral theories which are based on differing fundamental arbitrary
assumptions. Philosophers who are moral skeptics deny the existence of moral truths.
The value of morality may lie in its usefulness rather than its truth. An exploration of
morality will be done from a multidisciplinary perspective that includes the relation-
ship of morality to biological evolution, moral psychology, anthropology, religion,
and the law.

Morality and Intrinsic Objective Truth

Morality, a term closely related to ethics, is widely embraced, often as a sacro-

sanct entity.1 It is our most important yardstick for judging people and ideas. Most
well-intentioned thoughtful people view an immoral person as a bad person and an
immoral idea as a bad idea. Moral considerations trump other notions of how we
ought to behave; duly enacted laws are suspect if they are deemed immoral. Despite
the strong emotions often elicited by moral controversies questions concerning the
nature of morality and its intrinsic objective truth are more complex, problematic
and controversial than is generally appreciated.
The tightness of the relationship between the concepts we employ and empirically
verifiable entities varies. The concept, water, corresponds to a substance with two
hydrogen and one oxygen atom; these atoms can be observed and their existence
in the physical world confirmed. Although the object of the concept, beautiful, be
it a natural wonder, a painting or a musical composition may exist in the empirical
world acquisition of the adjective beautiful requires the judgment of a human mind. A

1 Although
others might make a distinction, because of common usage, I use the term morality as
synonymous with ethics.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 3
D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_1
4 1 Morality

glacier with a tree lined, azure lake at its base does not become a beautiful scene until
a human mind makes that judgment. The link between beauty and empirical reality
is more tenuous than that between our notion of water and its observable reference
substance. Similarly, the notion of morality is a function of the human mind. The
consequences of an action with moral content may subjectively be judged relative
to our personal preferences; however, the intrinsic truth of morality eludes empiric
confirmation and is susceptible to controversy.
Philosophers have noted science, even if morality could be empirically examined,
cannot establish the truth of morality. Science might describe the origins and nature
of morality but cannot vouch for its intrinsic truth. David Hume noted what is, is not
necessarily what ought to be. John Kemeny said “scientific statements in themselves
cannot serve as a source of value judgments” (Kemeny 1959). G. E. Moore believed
that no moral property could be the same as a natural property. The notion, for
example, that what we observe in the world as pleasant or desirable, is what ought to
be, has been referred to as the “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore 1903). Although empiric
observations, such as those based on evolutionary theory, may demonstrate the results
of certain moral decisions are preferable to alternative options, that is different than
confirming the innate truth of morality.
The concept, morality, lacks empirical content and even if that was not the case
science should not tell us how we ought to behave. This does not prove skeptics
of morality correct, only that science, despite its potential to help us understand
the nature of morality, cannot validate the existence of moral truths. This does not
establish that we shouldn’t be moral beings. If morality is a fiction that is believed, it
may nonetheless serve a useful purpose, for example by influencing people to behave
cooperatively.

Moral Knowledge

Writings on morality have ranged the gamut from the evaluation of morality as a
God given sacrosanct entity to skepticism, even denial of its intrinsic truth. Campbell
makes the disconcerting statement that “moral disagreements often resist resolution,
however intelligent, informed and respectful the disputants may be, because moral
knowledge is impossible”. A different view allows the existence of moral knowledge
but, because of the influence of social groups, claims there may be moral knowledge
but “no moral truths are known universally”. (Campbell 2011). The moral philosopher
Bernard Gert declared the hazy nature of morality when he said, “If one starts by
saying ‘morality is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right” (p. 3, Gert 1988).
Although intimate involvement with a discipline typically leads to enhanced
understanding, in the case of morality that wasn’t my experience. In the practice
of medicine I encountered many clinical ethical dilemmas. More than 20 years ago
ethics became a second profession. I founded and directed the ethics program at a
major medical center where I performed ethics consultations, wrote hospital ethics
Moral Knowledge 5

policies, directed a program of ethics lectures and edited an ethics publication. I was
for years immersed in both the theoretical and practical aspects of morality.
Instead of an enhanced understanding of morality experience left me with nag-
ging questions about its nature. If morality is a solid discipline with a substantial
foundation why are there multiple, sometimes conflicting, ethical theories and other
significant disagreements amongst ethicists? When I searched for a consensus defi-
nition of morality I found there was none. That something as important as morality
could not be uniformly defined was puzzling. I also began to doubt people who
claimed ethical expertise.
Morality can be examined on at least three levels. There are specific ethical dilem-
mas; for example the wisdom of gene editing. There are multiple conflicting ethical
theories that purport to provide moral guidance. Although I will address these issues
my ultimate goal is the examination of morality itself.

The Definition of Morality

Similar to a blind man palpating an elephant, respected ethicists have a different per-
spective of morality depending on where they stand. Peter Singer defines morality
as being about how we ought to live and what our goals should be (Singer 1994)
Robert M. Veatch defines morality as the analysis of choices; to pursue a particular
choice is to decide it is better than available alternatives (Veatch 1989). Gert, despite
his qualms about defining morality, ventures that morality is “a public system apply-
ing to all rational persons governing behavior that affects others and which has the
minimization of evil as its end” (Gert 1988).
Peterson offers a functional definition of morality- “to negotiate the inherent
serious conflict between the self and others” and “enable inherently selfish individuals
to live in social groups”. (p. 51, Peterson 2011). Ruse and Wilson define ethics as
“the area of thought and action governed by a sense of obligation-a feeling that there
are certain standards one ought to live up to” (p. 186, Ruse and Wilson 1986) and,
according to Flack and de Waal, “that human morality is best understood as having
arisen out of an implicit agreement among group members that enabled individuals
to profit from the benefits of co-operative sociality” (pp. 1–29, Flack and de Waal
2000).
The social anthropologist Christopher Boehm’s definition is that “morality
involves common agreement as to which behaviors are acceptable and it also involves
a group’s overall conception of a satisfactory quality of social and political life” (p. 80,
Boehm 2000). Joyce attempts a more comprehensive definition of morality but can
only dance around its characteristics. According to Joyce moral judgments include
moral beliefs that are inescapable with “no opting out”; they tend to “transcend
human conventions”. They “combat rampant individualism”. They imply notions of
“desert and justice” (pp. 45–73, Joyce 2006). Joyce lists the properties of morality
as including virtue, obligation, fairness, and “inescapable practical authority”. Joyce
also says, morality consists of “prescriptions that are independent of one’s interests”
6 1 Morality

and “To morally transgress is to violate the conception of ourselves that is most
important to us” (pp. 179–219, Joyce 2006).
Joyce, who can’t provide a precise definition, identifies certain universals in moral
systems. These include: 1. a negative view of harming others. 2. values of reciprocity
and fairness. 3. behaving in an appropriate manner relative to ones status in a social
hierarchy. 4. regulations related to bodily purity. The first three items refer to inter-
personal and societal relationships. Joyce makes it clear that it’s a struggle to define
morality. He says,” much and perhaps all of morality can be disputed”, that morality
is “vague around the edges and “almost anything specific one says on the subject
will meet with howls of complaint” (pp. 45–73 and pp. 179–219, Joyce 2006). Many
of us become indignant in the face of what we perceive as an immoral act yet when
challenged to define morality thoughtful scholars face a dilemma similar to that of
US Supreme Court Judge Potter Stewart who made the famous confession, “I can’t
define pornography, but I know it when I see it” (Ohio 1964).
For Sober and Wilson, “The social function of morality is to get people to do things
that they would not otherwise be disposed to do, or to strengthen dispositions that
people already have in weaker forms” They add, “moral principles have functioned as
ideological weapons, allowing some individuals to prosper at the expense of others”
(Sober and Wilson 2000).
Leonard Katz begs the question when he says “I deliberately made no attempt to
define morality more sharply than common language and understanding have left it,
including our ordinary responses to right and wrong, but not all of the very diverse
thinking about this and other practical concerns- and about what we should make of
all these- that ethics encompasses” (p. xi, Katz 2000). In other words the best he can
do is accept the common understanding of morality, whatever that is.
Flack and de Waal allude to the confusion about morality when they say, defining
morality “is not an easy task-nor is it a task to be taken lightly-as many definitions,
conceptions and versions of morality exist”. They view “morality as a sense of right
and wrong that is born out of group-wide systems of conflict management based on
shared values that constrains individual behavior through a system of approval and
disapproval” (pp. 67–77, Flack and de Waal 2000). Pinker comes close to a definition
when he says, “Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off
like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking”
(Pinker 2008).
The lack of a consensus definition of morality may be explained by its complexity
with different ethicists focusing on a different one of its various dimensions. There
may be a sense of mystery and confusion over the true nature of morality. Another
reason for the inability of ethicists to agree on a definition is that ethics may only exist
in the human mind. We cannot deny the total existence of ethics because it is a widely
considered concept and is an entity of great concern to most people. The scholarship
of morality has some semblance to the reverence of God. Both God and morality are
extremely important concepts with huge implications. Yet some scholars have dared
to question the existence of God as moral skeptics have questioned the existence of
morality (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007).
Moral Skepticism 7

Moral Skepticism

Moral skepticism encompasses a complex collection of philosophical views that

doubt or deny the existence of moral facts and moral truths. Moral skeptics “raise
doubts about moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011).
Dogmatic skeptics believe “that nobody ever knows a substantive moral belief is
true”. Pyrrhonian skeptics have so much doubt they cannot say whether morality is
possible or impossible. They don’t deny or make claims about morality; they just
raise doubts about whether moral beliefs are ever justified.
Moral nihilists believe “there does not exist anything that is morally wrong. Epis-
temological moral skeptics deny there is ever an adequate reason for moral beliefs;
practical moral skeptics deny a role to reason in morality and focus on action (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2011). Some practical moral skeptics would allow that morality can be
justified “in some way that is independent of truth”. If morality was a fiction that was
generally believed the consequences of moral actions might be considered desirable
despite the absence of moral truth.
Pinker establishes the reality of morality-though admittedly a “diluted version of
the idea” by examining its consequences. He says it is in the nature of things that
people would be better off if they were unselfish and could abandon “an egocentric
vantage point” and adopt an “interchangeability of perspectives” (Pinker 2008). That
morality may have practical advantages over immorality is a testament to its prag-
matic value but does not define its basic nature. Also, the value of morality could
be balanced by the fact that people who behave in a manner generally considered
immoral may prosper. Most people don’t read the arcane theoretical arguments I’ve
just described, and believe there are moral truths and that, for example, killing or
torturing an innocent person is unquestionably immoral.
Emblematic of its epistemic fragility is that all moral systems given rational
expression rest on the foundation of an arbitrary assumption. Utilitarian theory is
based on the claim, that is best which brings the most net good. Kantian philoso-
phy and other deontological theories define the essence of morality as adherence
to certain rules and principles (pp. 336–343, Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Vir-
tuous behavior and moral character are the basis of virtue ethics (Pellegrino and
Thomasma 1993). Theologically based ethics assumes a God-willed morality. Other
ethical theories include: cultural relativism which does not allow for universal moral
truths with moral facts being “relative to the social group in which moral sensibility
is formed”; and moral reality as sui generis existing in a realm that is neither natural
nor theological where “we intuit moral truth directly” (Campbell 2011). That moral
theories rest on an arbitrary assumption suggests morality is a contingent form of
truth.
The locus of morality in man is the human brain where Darwinian forces have
influenced human values. Street distinguishes moral truths from evolved tendencies
that can bias our moral judgments. For example we can expect “overwhelming pres-
sure in the direction of making those evaluative judgments which tended to promote
8 1 Morality

reproductive success”. She says, “evaluative judgments are saturated with evolution-
ary influence” (Street 2006). In other words the search for moral truth is distorted by
deeply ingrained evolutionary inclinations. The strong and interesting relationship
between evolution and morality is the subject of the next chapter.
Is all lost if we conclude, as moral skeptics claim, that moral truth is impossible.
I don’t think so. Moral skeptics, if they are correct, leave us to judge the value of
morality using parameters other than moral truth. The worth of morality may lie in
its usefulness rather than in some presumed intrinsic truth; after all, scholarly moral
skeptics do not typically behave immorally.

A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Morality

Morality possesses a complexity and compelling vagueness that has seduced many
disciplines to attempt an unraveling of its essential nature. I will discuss morality
from the perspectives of biological evolution, moral psychology, anthropology, reli-
gion, and the law. Moral behavior may also be influenced by personal experience
and education. Humans are rational beings but not perfectly rational beings. Revela-
tions from the discipline of moral psychology document that our decisions may be
irrational. In morally identical situations we may take different actions for morally
irrelevant reasons.
I will review and evaluate the major theories of morality and also discuss the writ-
ings of several venerated moral philosophers. I will conclude with chapters devoted
to the practical application of morality.
There is a sense of vast complexity about morality because it has been analyzed by
numerous disciplines and not infrequently influences how we live our lives. Because
it is impossible to cover all that can be said about morality in a single volume I
have tried to select aspects of morality based on their importance and intellectual
challenge.
Moral beliefs are often are presented in a strident, dogmatic manner. An appreci-
ation of the nature of morality should make the reader more discerning about what
moral advice to accept and hopefully instill in the self-styled moralist a degree of
humility. I hope my qualms about morality don’t discourage the reader because the
mysteries of morality make for fascinating and intellectually challenging reading.

Conclusion

There are stark differences in how morality is perceived. Most people consider moral-
ity extremely important; however, morality is a human concept that is not itself
amenable to empiric verification and it is subject to the whims of the human mind.
Because of its vagueness, there is no consensus definition of morality. For these
reasons the objective truth of morality has been questioned.
Conclusion 9

I am writing this book to study morality from a variety of perspectives with the
goal of clarifying its nature. I’m inclined to agree that an objective proof of the truth
of morality is lacking. However, I don’t consider myself an immoral person and
would not jettison morality simply because it lacks objective truth. We can enjoy a
beautiful painting in the absence of objective proof of its beauty. Similarly moral
behavior can have advantages such as improvements in our quality of life in the
absence of objective proof of its intrinsic truth.

References

Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F. Childress. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Boehm, Christopher. 2000. Conflict and the Evolution of Social Control. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 7(1–2): 79–101.
Campbell, Richmond, 2011. Moral Epistemology. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2011/entries/moral-epistemology/. Accessed 15 Mar 2019.
Dawkins, Richard. 2006. The God Delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Flack, Jessica C, and de Waal, Frans B.M. 2000. Any Animal Whatever. Darwinian Building Blocks
of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 1–29.
Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hitchens, Christopher. 2007. God is Not Great. New York: The Hachette Book Group.
Jacobellis, V. Ohio. 378 US184 1964.
Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England:
The MIT.
Katz, Leonard D. 2000. Toward Good and Evil Evolutionary Approaches to Human Morality.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(No 1 and 2): xi.
Kemeny, John G. 1959. A Philosopher Looks At Science D. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand
and Company.
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica Pantianos Classics.
Pellegrino, Edmund, and Thomasma David. 1993. The Virtues in Medical Practice. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals New York. Berlin, London, Sydney: Bloomsbury
Press.
Pinker, Steven. February 10, 2008. The Moral Instinct. New York Times Magazine.
Ruse, Michael and Wilson Edward O. 1986. Moral Philosophy as Applied Science. Philosophy. 61:
186. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750474 Accessed 15 Mar 2019.
Singer, Peter. 1994. Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2011. Moral Skepticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Avail-
able at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/. Accessed 15 Mar 2019.
Sober, Elliott, and Wilson, David Sloan. 2000. Summary of Unto Others. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 7(1–2): 205.
Street, Sharon. 2006. A Darwinian Dilemma For Realist Theories Of Value. Philosophic Studies
2006; 127 (1):109–166.
Veatch, Robert M. 1989. Medical Ethics. Boston Portola Valley: Jones and Bartlett.
Chapter 2
Evolution and Ethics

Abstract Evolutionary biological antecedents have an important influence on our

moral dispositions. Because of evolutionary adaptations we share moral behaviors
with cooperative social primates such as chimpanzees. It’s been claimed that our
genes have created an illusion of objectivity to morality. Ruse and Wilson, who have
studied social primates, claim there is no objective morality and ethical standards
are relative to what a particular society or culture believes are right or wrong; they
provocatively add, “morality is a collective illusion foisted on us by our genes”. Moral
capacities observed in animals have similarities to what is ordinarily considered
moral behavior in humans. These behaviors include respect for authority, caring
and cooperation, empathy, reciprocity, monogamy, conflict resolution, limitations on
aggression, respect for the possessions of others, guilt, a sense of justice and moral
indignation. We cannot fully understand human morality without being cognizant of
its biological origins and the shape given by natural selection.

Morality as Biology

Morality is generally held in high regard and for most people possesses a near, if
not actual, divine quality. A moral person is regarded as a good person; an immoral
person is judged to be bad. Morality rests on a lofty perch from which my instincts
would only reluctantly relegate it, even partially, to the banal level of a biological fact.
Nonetheless, the origins of morality and the capacities that facilitate moral behavior
likely have evolutionary biological antecedents, though perhaps not as exclusively
as some evolutionary biologists might argue.
The locus of human morality is the brain; that is where decisions about what we
ought or ought not to do are made. Ruse and Wilson note the brain has “a material
base and originated during the evolution of the human genetic constitution and its
interaction with the environment”; they add, “there appears to be no escape from the
biological foundation of mind” (Ruse and Wilson 1986). de Waal who has interacted
on a daily basis with monkeys and apes notes their similarity to humans. “They
strive for power, enjoy sex, want security and affection, kill over territory, and value
trust and cooperation”. He also notes that although the human brain is three times

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 11

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_2
12 2 Evolution and Ethics

larger than a chimpanzee’s, it contains no new parts. These similarities to humans

suggest our psychological make-up remains that of a social primate and that “even
the posturing and deal-making among alpha males in Washington is nothing out of
the ordinary” (de Waal 2010).
Humans have certain natural tendencies that are laudable such as reciprocity rela-
tionships; but these co-exist with less admirable traits such as violence and cheating.
Flack and de Waal believe “our moral systems rely on basic mental capacities and
social tendencies that we share with cooperative primates, such as chimpanzees”
(Flack and de Waal 2000). They call these “the continuities”. “We are born with
powerful inclinations and emotions that bias our thinking and behavior”. In other
words, the workings of the human brain is consistent with its evolution from the
primate brain.
It would be overly conceited, if not grossly inconsistent, to consider the human
brain the only organ in the animal and plant world exempt from the force of evolution.
Although our tendency to label certain actions as right or wrong seems natural this
capacity warrants explanation. Why do we have intuitions associated with strong
emotional reactions that inform us that certain actions are right and others wrong?
Evolutionary biology does not explain all aspects of morality. Morality is also
shaped by religious and secular culture, parental upbringing, the quirks of human
psychology, education, experience and the ability to reason. But evolution has been
an important, innate influence on the development of moral (and immoral) behavior.
Greene notes, “Our most basic moral dispositions regarding others are considered
evolutionary adaptations that arose in response to the demands and opportunities
created by social life” (Greene 2007).
Evolution, as primarily formulated by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) refers to the
change in the inherited characteristics of biological populations over successive gen-
erations (Wikipedia 2019). These changes result from genetic mutations which rep-
resent inaccurate gene replication. Natural selection is the operational mechanism of
evolution. The term “natural selection” stands in contrast to the artificial selection
of selective breeding and eugenic maneuvers using reproductive and other tech-
nologies. Biologic characteristics become more or less common as a function of
the reproductive success of their bearers. Or, as Dawkins called us, “robot vehicles
blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (Dawkins
1976). Human behavioral traits that enhance survival and reproduction are selected
and tend to persist.
There is controversy over exactly where natural selection acts. Williams proposed
that traits evolve because they promote the replication of genes (Williams 1966).
Dawkins in his book, The Selfish Gene, first published in 1976, postulates natural
selection occurs at the level of the replicating gene which he has perhaps unwisely
cloaked with the anthropomorphic quality of being “ruthlessly selfish”; this is an
unwarranted stretch of the imagination since genes do not possess consciousness
(Dawkins 1976).
Dawkins states, “I shall argue that the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore
of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual.
It is the gene, the unit of heredity” (Dawkins 1976). His selection of the gene as
Morality as Biology 13

“the fundamental, independent agent of evolution” is because the gene is potentially

immortal (“genes are forever”) while individuals and groups may die out. Dawkins
admits qualification is needed because “the near immortality of the gene is in the
form of copies”.
Individuals may sacrifice to benefit their relatives who possess similar genes,
a phenomenon called kin selection. The tendency for people and other species to
preferentially aid their relatives promotes caring for one’s children which is critically
important because infants are so dependent. If humans and other species did not help
their infants they might become extinct; that is likely why kin selection has been
favored by natural selection. An additional benefit is that mechanisms put in place to
help one’s offspring can be utilized to help others (pp. 20–22, Joyce 2007). Although
we might ascribe a more lofty purpose to our existence, Dawkins views creatures,
including humans, as survival machines for genes.
A peculiar example that might support Dawkins’ theory is sexual cannibalism
which has been observed in arachnids and insects. Female spiders have been observed
killing and eating their mate during copulation; this phenomenon is the source of the
term, “black widow spider”. It is speculated that in sacrificing his life the male spider
increases the total number of eggs fertilized by his sperm with increased propagation
of his genes (Buskirk et al. 1984). The male spider’s genes are propagated at the cost
of destruction of its body.
The ability to preserve our genes in both relatives and other individuals has been
referred to as, inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness has been defined as the sum of the
effect of (an) action on the actor’s own fitness and on the fitness of the recipient
multiplied by the relatedness between actor and recipient.
A phenomenon called eusociality, commonly seen in ants, bees, wasps and ter-
mites, is associated with a caste system in which some social insects reduce their
reproductive potential to raise the offspring of others. Inclusive fitness purports to
explain this behavior. Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson disagree and argue that inclusive
fitness adds little to what can be explained by natural selection and question its
theoretical value (Nowak et al. 2010).
Sober and Wilson controversially argue that “group selection” has been important
in human evolution and has made altruism possible (Sober and Wilson 2000; pp. 101–
131, Sober and Wilson 1998). The clarion call of an animal warning of an approaching
predator may identify the animal’s location and make him a victim, but it may save
others in the group who heed the warning. “Many small birds, when they see a flying
predator such as a hawk, give a characteristic ‘alarm call’, upon which the whole
flock takes appropriate evasive action. There is indirect evidence that the bird who
gives the alarm call puts itself in special danger, because it attracts the predator’s
attention particularly to itself” (Dawkins 1976).
Another example that could be used to support group selection is, “The stinging
behavior of worker bees is a very effective defense against honey robbers. But the
bees who do the stinging are kamikaze fighters. In the act of stinging, vital internal
organs are usually torn out of the body, and the bee dies soon afterwards. Her suicide
mission may have saved the colony’s vital food stocks” (Dawkins 1976). Sober and
Wilson note because groups compete against other groups traits that are good for the
14 2 Evolution and Ethics

group but harmful to the individual support group selection as a locus of evolutionary
selection and make altruism possible (pp. 185–206, Sober and Wilson 2000).
An alternative mechanism is that natural selection acts at the level of the indi-
vidual organism “individual selection” or “within group selection”) which would
promote selfish behavior. Whether natural selection acts at the level of the gene, the
individual, the group or at multiple levels with “different traits evolved because of
different combinations of causes” (Sober and Wilson 2000) is an arcane and con-
troversial discussion that need not overly concern us as long as we understand that
certain phenotypes exist because in some manner they have provided a survival and
reproductive advantage.
Believers in morality as a gift from God in the form of the Ten Commandments or
other religious revelations are likely to be offended by Ruse and Wilson’s claim that,
“beliefs in extrasomatic moral truths and in an absolute is/ought barrier are wrong”,
that ethical premises “with a claim to ideal, eternal truth” are also wrong and “the
time has come to turn moral philosophy into an applied science”. By extrasomatic
they mean morality that is “divinely placed within the brain or else outside the brain
awaiting revelation” (Ruse and Wilson 1986).
The is/ought statement relates to the naturalistic fallacy; the naturalistic fallacy
denies that what exists in nature is good and ought to be. Ruse and Wilson’s views
can be interpreted as a refutation of the naturalistic fallacy and a turn toward nature
for moral guidance or at least moral understanding.
As will be described with ample examples, it is troubling to say that what exists
in nature is categorically morally good; perhaps that is why Ruse and Wilson hedge
a bit and qualify their “is/ought barrier are wrong” with the word “absolute”. What
exists in nature may help us understand the development and nature of morality, but
cannot in itself reliably tell us what we should consider moral or immoral.
Ruse and Wilson expand a perhaps cynical view of morality by saying, “human
beings function better if they are deceived by their genes into thinking that there
is a disinterested objective morality binding upon them which all should obey”.
Individuals with certain biological traits survive and reproduce more successfully
than others. Traits said to be favored by natural selection include those that help
avoid predators, promote efficient breeding and improve cooperation with others. In
short our sense of right and wrong is brought about by biological processes. These
processes create the “illusion of objectivity to morality” and lead us to “actions which
(unknown to us) ultimately serve our “genetic best interests” (pp. 173–190, Ruse and
Wilson 1986).
Ruse and Wilson assert morality is species related and that an alien intelligent
species might develop rules repugnant to humans such as cannibalism, incest, parri-
cide and the eating of feces if those behaviors were adaptive mechanisms for those
species; their point is that “ethical premises are peculiar products of genetic history,
and they can be understood solely as mechanisms that are adaptive for the species
that posses them” (p. 186, Ruse and Wilson 1986). In other words there are no “ob-
jective, eternal verities” and no “ultimate truths”; therefore, “the ethical code of one
species cannot be translated into that of another” (Ruse 1986).
Morality as Biology 15

Ruse and Wilson confront the question of moral relativism, the view that if there
are no ultimate moral rules and ethical standards are relative to what a particular soci-
ety or culture believes are right or wrong. They state that the rules of mental devel-
opment are only relevant to the species not the individual but admit to some variation
between groups in different geographic regions. Some of these differences may be
biological, such as the ability to metabolize alcohol. An example given is the Chinese
and Japanese rapid conversion of ethanol to acetaldehyde which causes unpleasant
symptoms and explains their preference for consumption of smaller amounts of alco-
hol than Caucasians who can sustain higher levels of drinking. “The interaction of
varying genetic material and the environment (can) create cultural diversity”. In any
case they claim, “the similarities between all humans appear to be far greater than
any differences” (p. 190, Ruse and Wilson 1986).
Ruse sums up his position as an evolutionary biologist by concluding, “morality
is a collective illusion foisted on us by our genes” (Ruse and Wilson 1986). This
can be taken as a challenge to those who believe there is something special about
morality; that it transcends the narrow and mundane lens of biology.

A Tentative Definition of Morality

My ultimate, perhaps Sisyphean goal, is an exploration of morality that achieves

a multidimensional and clear understanding of its nature. There are many compet-
ing definitions of morality but no consensus definition. Nonetheless, when for the
moment, I use the words moral and immoral I base those judgmental terms on our con-
ventional, ordinary understanding of morality. This approximates what philosophers
have referred to as the “common morality” (Turner 2003) (see Chap. 14).

Moral Capacities in Animals

If morality is a product of evolution examples of moral or moral-like behavior, should

be evident in animals. Because we cannot penetrate the consciousness of animals we
don’t know definitively whether they have a conscious awareness of moral principles
or moral rules and we cannot know if they have conscious intentions. We are limited
to inferences based on observations of their behavior.
Morality makes use of various capacities such as sympathy, empathy, gratitude
and the ability to follow rules. Multiple examples of moral or moral-like behavior
observed in animals are consistent with the evolution of capacities that over long
periods of time have made possible human moral understanding and behavior. I will
examine moral-like behavior in animals to understand how moral behaviors evolved,
not for a prescription of how we should behave. As Flack and de Waal note “What
we ought to do and how we decide this is a separate question from why and how
moral systems arose” (Flack and de Waal 2000).
16 2 Evolution and Ethics

Respect for Authority

Morality demands respect for rules and principles and the capacity to submit to their
authority despite ones contrary instincts, desires or interests. Many animals display
respect for authority though in most cases it is the authority of other animals or
people rather than respect for rules or principles; what is relevant to morality is the
ability to respect authority, a necessary condition for morality to function properly.
That respect for authority, in non-humans, can be imagined as ultimately evolving
to our respect for ethical rules and principles.
Elephants form a “dominance hierarchy” and limit violence by establishing a
system of authority. Elephants can be trained because they have the capacity to
define and obey authority figures. (and sometimes, in the hands of humans, to avoid
pain). That capacity is seen in many humans who accept the Ten Commandments,
at least in part, because they came with the authority of a presumed powerful and
perhaps jealous God (Peterson 2011). The teachings of perceived moral authority
figures such as Jesus, Buddha, Moses, Kant, and Marx have played an important role
in defining human morality. Chimpanzees who by a combination of strength and
intelligence have achieved the status of “alpha male” are obeyed by chimpanzees
lower in the hierarchy, often because of the fear of punishment. The “psychological
inclination of obedience to proper authority”, which Peterson defines as a moral
virtue, has its antecedent in traits observed in animals (p. 108, Peterson 2011).

Caring

“Learned adjustment” which Flack and de Waal call the precursor to empathy and
sympathy is common in primates who have the ability to change their behavior
when they become familiar with the limitations and disabilities of others. Juvenile
chimpanzees reduce their use of force when playing with younger chimpanzees or
infants. Monkeys and apes will intervene on behalf of disabled individuals in danger.
Primate infants who perceive distress in others may become distressed themselves
suggesting the capacity for empathy (p. 17, Flack and de Waal 2000).
Chimpanzees in zoos and laboratories are often socially perverted and psycho-
logically damaged, but even under these circumstances there are examples of their
capacity for caring. Jessie, a chimpanzee living in a half-acre compound in the south-
ern United States was often seen going to the drinking fountain to fill her mouth with
water, and then climbing to the top of a high structure where her friend lay waiting
and pouring the drink into her friend’s mouth. Jessie may have sensed that her friend
was thirsty and brought her a drink as an act of caring (O’Connell 1995; Peterson
2012). Other examples of caring behavior in chimpanzees include tickling, hold-
ing hands, kissing and embracing. Animals such as apes, monkeys and prosimians
engage in mutual grooming (p. 207, Peterson 2012).
Caring 17

Caring behavior is evident in chimpanzee adoptions. When a mother dies she

may leave behind a helpless infant who is unable to survive. Adoptions often happen
when an older sibling takes over the role of the deceased mother by providing protec-
tion, transportation, food, and steady emotional support. Pax, a chimpanzee at Jane
Goodall’s research site in Tanzania was four years old when his mother died. “Tiny,
trembling, depressed, and threatened by starvation”, Pax survived because his older
sister and subsequently his brother took care of him: providing food, protecting him
from older bullies, sleeping with him, and generally providing a mother’s support
during the next few years” (Peterson 2012).
“During an epidemic in early 1989, three-year-old chimpanzee Mel lost his mother
and two older brothers. How did this tiny infant survive with no family left? Mel
wandered by himself, dazed, unable to find food or comfort. He became ill and weak.
His hair had started falling out by the time twelve-year-old Spindle, unrelated to
Mel, began taking care of him. Spindle was “a wonderful caretaker.” He carried Mel
around during the day in search of food. He shared food with the infant, and at night,
Spindle brought Mel into the safety and comfort of the night nest. This relationship
saved Mel’s life. The two accidentally lost contact. Mel again was forced to wander
about helplessly until ten-year-old Pax took on the mothering role, piggybacking
Mel about, finding food, carrying the infant into trees and sharing his nest at night”
(Peterson 2012).
“Spindle returned after a few weeks, and the original relationship with Mel was
reinstated. After parting ways with Spindle, Mel was taken in by the childless older
female Gigi, who already had one adopted infant. Gigi now passed her days in
the forest with two youngsters in tow, neither of them her biological offspring,
both cared for physically and emotionally until they were old enough to fend for
themselves”(pp. 197–204, Goodall 1990).
Some primates are capable of consolation by grooming or embracing individuals
following a fight. Sometimes a juvenile chimpanzee will embrace and console an
adult male who has been injured in a fight. At the Field Station of the Yerkes Regional
Primate Center increased acts of consolation occurred after fights, mostly directed
to the recipients of aggression than to the aggressors. Monkeys and apes appear to
be capable of genuine concern for others (pp. 9–19, Flack and de Waal 2000).

Cooperation

Cooperative behavior, a vital component of human morality, is widespread in the

animal world. According to primatologist Jane Goodall chimpanzees, our closest
genetic relative, “have a rich repertoire of behaviors-mutual grooming, kissing and
hand holding- that serve to maintain or restore social harmony and produce cohe-
sion among community members” (pp. 210–211 Goodall 1990). Peterson describes
complex group cooperation when hunting amongst chimpanzees in the Taï Forest of
the Ivory Coast, West Africa.
18 2 Evolution and Ethics

“These creatures prey mostly on red colobus monkeys who, being much lighter
than chimps, can escape into fragile branches of the high forest canopy. The apes
compensate for that disadvantage with superior strength, intelligence, and cooper-
ation. Upon spotting a troop of colobus monkeys in the trees, a hunting party of
chimpanzees moves beneath the unsuspecting prey and one of the chimps climbs
silently to a height of about five meters. The climbing ape, not intent on capturing a
monkey, instead works as a driver who spooks the monkeys and gets them moving
in a particular direction. Even before the monkeys notice the driver and begin to flee
the other chimps on the ground are moving in anticipation of where the monkeys will
go; the monkeys are alarmed and fleeing from the driver–climbing higher, rushing
across branches, leaping between branches, diving from tree to tree–the chimpanzees
on the ground strive to focus that movement. Some serve as blockers, anticipating
possible escape routes and blocking such routes by climbing a tree and remaining in
position. Others work as chasers, isolating smaller groups of monkeys or perhaps a
slower-moving mother burdened by her clinging infant. The chasers might catch a
monkey at this point, but it’s unlikely. The fleeing prey can stay in the high canopy,
while gravity inevitably forces the much larger predators to remain lower in the
three-dimensional maze.
Still, the drivers, blockers, and chasers have managed to get the monkeys in
motion, have isolated a vulnerable group from the larger troop, and have begun
to direct the fleeing procession. Up ahead a final chimpanzee–the ambusher–has
posted himself at a certain height in a certain tree. The ambusher is an older and very
experienced hunter, and his critical role requires a finely-tuned sense of how monkeys
behave in order for his double anticipation (where and how high) to succeed. When
the monkeys arrive, the ambusher leaps out from his enveloping cloud of leaves
and forces them, desperate now, to descend into lower and sturdier parts of the forest
where the predators suddenly have an advantage over their prey. An unlucky monkey
is at last agonizingly transformed into food for apes” (pp. 203–204, Peterson 2011).
The Taï chimpanzees cooperate in their hunt with non-relatives, and they take on
various positions and roles with no obvious expectation of a commensurate reward
at the end. Meanwhile, the same males who cooperatively hunt also, at the end of the
hunt, share their meat with females and males too young to hunt” (Boesch 2003).
Spotted hyenas also hunt cooperatively; different prey are hunted differently. A
single hyena can kill a wildebeest; it takes five or more to kill a zebra and even more
to kill a rhinoceros (p. 194, Peterson 2011). Cheetahs also hunt cooperatively, for
example, when trying to trap Thompson’s gazelles (pp. 198–199, Peterson 2011).
Animals cooperate in many ways other than hunting: in sharing food; in forming
defensive huddles against bad weather and by raising the alarm when there is danger
(p. 195, Peterson 2011).
Peony, a chimpanzee at the Yerkes Primate Center, had arthritis and trouble walk-
ing; an unrelated female chimpanzee would place both hands on her behind and help
push her along. Inclinations of this type, according to de Waal, are best considered
the natural building blocks of morality; he says that animal morality differs from
human morality because it lacks “universal standards, combined with an elaborate
Cooperation 19

system of justification, monitoring and punishment (de Waal 2010). Cooperation,

typically considered a virtue in man, clearly has antecedents in animal behavior.
Food sharing, has been observed in chimpanzees, bonobos, siamangs, orangutans,
and capuchin monkeys, (p. 4, Flack and de Waal 2000). Explanations for food sharing
include a desire by the possessor to avoid aggression, known as the “sharing under
pressure hypothesis”. The “sharing to enhance status” hypothesis suggests that food
sharing helps maintain status. For example when an alpha male chimpanzee’s status
is challenged sharing food can help maintain the status quo. Food sharing has been
viewed as a system of mutual obligations and reciprocity.
A subordinate adult male chimpanzee will groom dominant males in return for an
undisturbed mating session (de Waal 1982). Adult male bonobos exchange food with
adolescent females in return for sex (de Waal 1982). Cooperation and sharing can
benefit both parties. Flack and de Waal suggest, “human morality is best understood
as having arisen out of an implicit agreement among group members that enabled
individuals to profit from the benefits of co-operative sociality” (p. 20, Flack and de
Waal 2000).

Incest Taboo

Many animals will not mate with close relatives; they act as if they believed in the
incest taboo, a moral transgression for humans. The biologic reason for avoiding
incest is that brothers and sisters may share the same defective genes which each has
inherited from the same parents. A child born of incest may inherit two similarly
defective genes, one from each parent with devastating results. Behaviors that prevent
incest and minimize genetic disasters have been favored by natural selection. Many
cultures reject incest; Ruse and Wilson use this as an example of “the co-evolution
of genes and culture” and the refutation of morality as purely a product of culture
(p. 185, Ruse and Wilson 1986)”.
Goodall notes that at Gombe Stream National Park no mature chimpanzee has
been seen to mate his mother and mating between siblings occurs with very low
frequency. When an adolescent female chimpanzee becomes sexually receptive she
leaves home and goes to a neighboring community (pp. 50–62, Goodall 1982; p. 145,
Peterson 2011). This eliminates the possibility of incestual mating. Amongst olive
baboons at Gombe Stream National Park in Tanzania sexually active males emigrate
(Peterson 2011); although the animals do not understand the genetic basis of their
behavior, evolution has favored incest avoidance because it minimizes the possible
serious genetic consequences of incest.
The Finnish sociologist and philosopher Edward Westermarck said we develop
an aversion to sexual relationships with people “by whom and with whom we are
reared” because this avoids the genetic dangers of inbreeding. We detect kin by
having been raised together. This works in environments where the people one is
20 2 Evolution and Ethics

raised with are likely to be kin. Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from
Israel where children reared together typically do not choose a childhood associate
as a sexual partner (Wolf 2007; Sheper 1971). Similar findings were noted in Chinese
households (Wolf and Huang 1980).

Monogamy

Gibbons are monogamous. A male Mentawai islands gibbon will threaten off another
male who has ventured too close to their home tree. Similarly, females gibbons chase
away intruding females. This is how they enforce pair bondings and disruption of
their marriage (p. 143, Peterson 2011). These acts in essence enforce rules against
adultery.

Reciprocity

Altruism which is generally considered a moral value also has evolutionary roots
visible in animals. It’s been observed that if Vampire bat A goes hungry Vampire bat
B who secured an ample blood meal will feed Vampire bat A. On another occasion
when the tables are turned Vampire bat A, now the one with an ample blood meal,
will feed hungry Vampire bat B in a “tit for tat” exchange (Wright 1995). There
are many other examples of food sharing. Trivers has called this phenomenon “re-
ciprocal altruism” which he considers “a symbiosis, each partner helping the other
while he helps himself” (Trivers 1971) The term reciprocal altruism is an oxymoron
because altruistic behavior is generally considered behavior that anticipates no mate-
rial reward (Steinberg 2010). Joyce has suggested as the more appropriate term, direct
reciprocity (p. 24, Joyce 2007), but the term reciprocal altruism has, despite its tech-
nical inaccuracy, persisted. The emotions required for reciprocal altruism, empathy,
sympathy and gratitude, have been conserved by natural selection and pave the way
for purer forms of altruism as seen in man.
Many species of smaller fish, called “cleaners” are known to clean ectoparasites
off larger fish. They indicate their willingness to do this by a distinctive swimming
pattern. The larger fish indicates a willingness to be cleaned by opening its gill plates.
The larger fish reciprocate by not eating their smaller cleaners and by protecting them
from predators (Trivers 1971). The anemone’s stinging tentacles inhibit predators
of clown fish and the clown fish in turn chase away anemone eating butterfly fish
(Peterson 2011; Porat and Chadwick-Furman 2004).
Reciprocal relationships have also been observed in primates. Cimpanzee A’s
grooming of Chimpanzee B correlated with Chimpanzee B’s sharing food with
Chimpanzee A (p. 343 de Waal 1991). What has been called “moralistic aggression”
is used to teach non-reciprocating primates the importance of reciprocal altruism.
Chimpanzees have memory and, in a form of revenge may use aggression to enforce
Reciprocity 21

the rules of reciprocation. What Flack and de Waal called ‘calculated reciprocity’
is based on the capacity to keep mental notes of favors given and received (p. 8
Flack and de Waal 2000); this capacity is prerequisite to the emotion of gratitude, a
calculation of the debt owed. Pinker sees in reciprocal altruism a resemblance to the
human sense of fairness (Pinker 2008).
At the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center reciprocity was found to have
its complexities. Food exchanges were found to be balanced between individual A
and B; however, if individual A shared his food with individual B, the following
day individual B was not necessarily likely to share his food with individual A;
however grooming appeared to be a more potent inducer of reciprocation. If B had
groomed A that day, A was more likely to share food with individual B. Primates
who were hesitant to share food had a greater chance of encountering aggression if
they approached a food possessor (p. 7, Flack and de Waal 2000).
Joyce describes indirect reciprocity. A creature may benefit by being helpful to
others and earning a good reputation. That reputation in turn may lead to important
benefits such as being chosen by others for participation in an important reciprocal
relationship or being rewarded by society. Indirect reciprocity may provide an advan-
tage in choosing a mate. Some Babbler birds who go out of their way to help others
are chosen as more attractive mates. Behaviors that enhance reputation are selected
when that good reputation ultimately imposes added reproductive fitness (pp. 32–
33, Joyce 2007), (Zhavi and Zhavi 1997). The opposite is also true; self-advancing
behaviors that are punished may ultimately no longer be self-advancing (p. 33, Joyce
2007). Morality in humans is, of course, also influenced by the desire to have a good
reputation.

Thou Shalt not Steal

There are examples of animals recognizing ownership as if they were obeying the
eighth commandment, “thou shalt not steal”. Dolphins have been observed playing
with a fish they have just caught; other dolphins in proximity who would like the fish
and could easily take it don’t touch it. They seem to recognize the fish belongs to
another dolphin (pp. 156–157, Peterson 2011). Chimpanzees after killing an animal
might claim ownership of the meat though they have to contend with both beggars and
thieves (p. 169, Peterson 2011). de Waal found that primate aggression is directed
at beggars for food which he interprets as respect of possession (p. 153, de Waal
2009). Goodall noted the respect for possession, at least for animal matter, when she
noticed “the alpha male of the community failed to claim food possessed by others
and actually had to beg for it” (p. 7, Flack and de Waal 2000). Animals may also lay
claim to real estate and fight wars over territorial possessiveness.
22 2 Evolution and Ethics

Conflict Resolution

When societal conflicts arise, as they inevitably do, individuals have a personal inter-
est in community harmony (pp. 9–16, Flack and de Waal 2000). Primates to varying
degrees have methods of conflict resolution. One method is clear dominance relation-
ships. Conflict intervention has been observed when alpha male chimpanzees stop
fights before they get out of hand. Impartial interventions and protective interven-
tions have been observed when females and infants interpose themselves between
two fighting mountain gorillas (pp. 14–24, Sicotte 1995). de Waal provides a graphic
example:
“A huge knot of fighting, screaming apes rolled around in the sand, until Luit leapt in and
literally beat them apart. He did not choose sides in the conflict, like the others; instead
anyone who continued to fight received a blow from him”. de Waal describes post-conflict
resolution after a confrontation in chimpanzees; if the proper tone is set these chimpanzees
may reconcile, usually involving a mouth to mouth kiss (p. 345 de Waal 1991).

Rules, Justice and Aggression

Flack and de Waal explain the evolution of community concern as coming from
“having a stake in the quality of life within the group as a whole” (p. 14, Flack and
de Waal 2000). The importance of cooperation in a society and the potential for
conflict was summarized by Rawls who noted, “although a society is a cooperative
venture, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There
is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for
all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. There is a
conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits of
their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer
a larger to a lesser share” (p. 4 Rawls 1971).
de Waal suggests that the human sense of justice has its origins in “the partner-
specific relationships of animals capable of individual recognition and of evaluating
entire histories of positive and negative interactions”. Chimpanzees and other pri-
mates have a sense of “social regularity” which de Waal defines as “a set of expecta-
tions about the way in which oneself (or others) should be treated and how resources
should be divided” (p. 335 de Waal 1991).
de Waal believes that “all species seem to act according to what they can (or
have come to) expect from others”. What counts is “the creation of order, or a
modus vivendi”; this may have been the starting point for the human sense of justice.
Although non-human primates may not possess an awareness of the concept of
morality there is the presence “of some of the emotions and capacities that we consider
essential to this concept in our own species”. This supports the notion of morality as
a product of evolution (pp. 335–349, de Waal 1991).
Rules, Justice and Aggression 23

Goodall describes how chimpanzees learn their proper role in society. Learning
in infant chimpanzees is directed by the mother. When the infant chimpanzee leaves
their mother’s protection “they learn by trial and error and by observing and imitating
others”. As they get older they learn to be more cautious, to fear adult males and
that submissive patterns may be required for their acceptance in society (pp. 50–62,
Goodall 1982).
Punishment is used to protect community interests and deter cheating and other
anti-social behaviors. Another mechanism for the evolution of a well functioning
community is selection of docile, individuals who have a disposition to commit to
community values. de Waal also speculates that the fear of punishment by dominant
members, those high in the group hierarchy, may also facilitate group functioning as
well as represent “an early stage in the evolution of a moral sense” (p. 340, de Waal
1991).
Male sexual competition is widespread amongst primates; Dominant males react
violently to sexual contacts by subordinate males with females of the colony. As
a result subordinate males suppress such activity or engage in it surreptitiously. de
Waal notes, “the circumspect manner in which rules are violated provide the clearest
indication of the animals awareness of them”. Chimpanzees may act as informants,
calling attention to transgressions with “hooting and nodding head movements”.
Dominant members of a hierarchy set limits for more subordinate members who
may be motivated by the fear of punishment, “an early stage in the development of
guilt” (p. 340, de Waal 1991).
Deviation from social expectations evoke a negative reaction manifest as protest in
subordinate individuals and punishment in dominant individuals. Protest can be man-
ifest as temper tantrums and in the face of a “despotic dominant” silent acquiescence.
The precursor to the more fully developed human sense of justice is the primate abil-
ity to recognize deviations from expectations and to react as appropriately as possible
(p. 336, de Waal 1991).

The Limitation of Aggression

Konrad Lorenz claimed that social animals possess “mechanisms designed to inhibit
lethal aggression against conspecifics” and referred to the inhibitory systems that
control aggression as “behavioral analogies to morality” (Lorenz 1966). These moral-
like inhibitory systems explain why intra- species cannabalism is limited. Even the
Aztecs, infamous for human sacrifice and cannibalism, limited the scope of this
practice. Social bonds would be difficult to maintain if an animal had to fear that
in a vulnerable moment they would be killed and eaten by one of its own kind
(pp. 114–117, Peterson 2011).
Hall points out that baboons “have a highly articulated system of appropriate
behavior patterns toward each other (and their) aggressive potential is rarely mani-
fested”; “infringements of group norms are rare. When they do occur, they may be
24 2 Evolution and Ethics

severely punished if the victim is caught”. Baboons have “a highly articulated sys-
tem of appropriate behavior patterns” and as in many other species there is often no
actual fighting but “ritualized displays and threat intention movements”. Although
it helps maintain primate social order, uncontrolled aggression can be devastating
(pp. 51–64, Hall 1964).
Goodall notes that threatening gestures rather than physical fights are used to
maintain social order amongst chimpanzees. She describes the “charging display”:
the alpha male chimpanzee “hurtles along, throwing branches or rocks, swaying
vegetation, making himself look more dangerous than he actually might be. It is a
supreme example of “bluff” and as Goodall notes, in chimpanzee society might is
almost always right (Goodall 1982). These non-violent reactions send a aggressive
message without inflicting physical harm and are adaptive (pp. 51–64, Hall 1964;
Bernstein and Gordon 1974).
The introduction of a new member(s) to a group is a common cause of aggression
in primates; even under these circumstances, compared to the damage that could
be inflicted by the large canine teeth of old world monkeys the damage inflicted
was not uninhibited (pp. 304–311, Bernstein and Gordon 1974). Kummer described
a “ritualized neck bite” as the way hamadryas male baboons display aggression
against a straying female. Damage done to the female is limited and the social
order is maintained (p. 189, Kummer 1968). Similarly, a “fighting rule” is that male
chimpanzees do not use their sharp canine teeth when fighting with females because
they could inflict serious damage; use of their canine teeth against a female elicits
strong negative reactions from the group (p. 340, de Waal 1991).
Aggression against the violators of group norms, especially if not overly damag-
ing, makes it possible for primates to live together in a group. Behavior that improves
group cohesion improves group survival, would be favored by natural selection and
as de Waal speculates that the fear of punishment by dominant members of the group
may represent “an early stage in the evolution of a moral sense” (de Waal 1991).
Certainly humans have devoted energy and resources to stigmatize and punish viola-
tors of social norms and laws. They have also tried to define appropriate gradations
of punishment.
There are many normative rules in primate societies. In some primate species
dominant individuals take what they want and other primate societies are more egal-
itarian. This does not differ greatly from human societies where wealth and power is
not uniformly distributed. In contrast to humans where behavioral expectations such
as fairness, equal rights and various theories of justice are explicitly stated, expecta-
tions in primates though not philosophically expressed do exist. de Waal calls these
“prescriptive rules” (de Waal 1991).
de Waal notes that the circumspect way established rules are violated, for example,
sexual contact in the presence of dominant males, indicates primates are aware of
social rules. Observation of excessive nervousness in primates who have violated the
rules might be either a sign of guilt or fear of punishment; either way de Waal suggests
that, “Fear of disciplinary actions by dominant members of the group, although not
the same as guilt, probably represents an early stage in the evolution of guilt”. de
Waal also describes reciprocity, moral aggression, revenge and reconciliation in
The Limitation of Aggression 25

non-human primates which he views as “a strong parallel with the human sense of
morality” (de Waal 1991).
Adherence to their social code is so important that violation of the social code
may be brought to the attention of the alpha male by acts such as hooting and nodding
by subordinate primates. de Waal speculates that primates may have feelings of guilt
when they break the rules. Lorenz described distress in domestic dogs who have
violated one of their master’s taboos, suggesting the presence of a conscience. Of
course, dogs, monkeys and chimpanzees cannot articulate, to humans, feelings of
guilt (p. 339, de Waal 1991).

Moral Indignation

Humans become incensed at what they deem immoral acts. For example, many people
were outraged over the beheadings of an aid worker and other innocent people by
Islamic radicals. What appears similar to moral indignation or moral aggression in
man has been observed in primates. Trivers labeled reactions against violations of
the moral code, “moralistic aggression” which increases the cost of non-cooperation
and helps prevent cheating and maintains the stability of social systems. Moralistic
aggression frightens the non-reciprocating individual “with immediate harm” (injury,
death or exile) or with “the future harm of no more aid” (Trivers 1971).
In one instance at the Arnheim Zoo a female chimpanzee supported male chim-
panzee A who was attacked by male chimpanzee B. Subsequently male chimpanzee
B threatened this female chimpanzee. She did not receive any help from male chim-
panzee A whom she had previously helped. She displayed with furious barking her
hostility to male chimpanzee A. Failure to reciprocate also meets a negative response
in other settings; chimpanzees are less likely to share food with stingy individuals.
Chimpanzees use aggression to reinforce a system of reciprocity (p. 345, de Waal
1991). which is sometimes manifest as getting revenge. de Waal describes “an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” revenge in chimpanzees. Victims of a chimpanzee
are likely to pay back the offending chimpanzee. If Chimpanzee A intervened against
Chimpanzee B, Chimpanzee B was more likely to intervene against Chimpanzee A
in the future (p. 8, Flack and de Waal 2000), unless an intervention was too risky. In
“indirect revenge” recipients of aggression attack the younger and more vulnerable
kin of their aggressors. Flack and de Waal call these acts of retributive behavior
“a form of calculated reciprocity”. Prescriptive rules “are generated when members
of a group learn to recognize the contingencies between their own behavior and
the behavior of others”. Flack and de Waal speculate these prescriptive rules may
reflect “a sense of social regularity and be a precursor to the human sense of justice
(p. 9, Flack and de Waal 2000). de Waal does not suggest that primates understand
the concept of justice; rather they are the evolutionary source of the emotions and
capacities essential to the human sense of justice (p. 337, de Waal 1991). What counts
most for natural selection is that these behavioral expectations create order and that
26 2 Evolution and Ethics

order promotes survival and reproduction. Goodall has called this, Order Without
Law.
Based on the observations of behavior in animals we can reasonably conclude
that human moral systems have biological roots with the building blocks, the raw
material of a human moral system visible in animals. We cannot fully understand
human morality without being cognizant of its biological origins and the shape given
by natural selection (Flack and de Waal 2000).

Is Human Morality Distinctive?

Kummer worries about “the application of terms coined for humans to monkeys
and apes” and considers the interpretation of animal behavior as moral precursors
speculative (Kummer 2000). Discussion of human morality as shaped by biologically
based elements is not intended to lower morality from its lofty perch to the banal
level of as biological fact. Morality is shaped by factors other than biology and there
are distinctive features of human morality.
Although animals exhibit behavior we recognize as moral or moral-like they
almost surely lack the language required for moral concepts and moral discourse.
Joyce notes non-human primates lack the capacity for cognitive formulation and the
development of abstract rules. Language is required for the development of moral
concepts such as autonomy, justice, beneficence and utilitarianism (p. 70, Joyce
2007).
Non-human apes may have a sense of which behaviors are accepted by their peers
and which elicit a negative reaction but in the absence of language lack the capacity
needed “for the cognitive formulation and communication of abstract rules” Joyce
grants apes the “building blocks” of morality but not “the real McCoy” (Kagan 2000);
phrased differently, “no moral judgments for chimps” (pp. 77 and 84, Joyce 2007)
or as Flack and de Waal put it, “Animals are no moral philosophers” (p. 23, Flack
and de Waal 2000).
Morality for Kagan is uniquely human. Kagan would weaken the cord that links
morality and evolution by denying the “appropriate origin for human morality” is the
behavior of infra human primates (Kagan 2000). He says we cannot assume similar
biological origins for behaviors that resemble each other. It may be comforting to
know that there is a natural foundation for humans to be “cooperative, fair and kind” or
that human violence and other despicable acts are a “natural, evolutionary derivative
of our primate ancestry”. But, he claims human morality is distinctive because it “is
defined by intention, not by behavior”.
Kagan says, apes do not have the essentials of human morality which include
the intention to do good, the ability to suppress actions that might harm others,
the capacity for empathy and the ability to set ideal goals. Kagan also notes animals
lack additional pre-requisites for morality that include “internalized standards” “con-
scious intentions” and “guilt for past failures” (Katz 2000). Ways in which humans
differ from primates include the possesion of language, a greater ability to adopt the
Is Human Morality Distinctive? 27

perspective of others, a greater degree of rule internalization, and a unique capacity

to debate the issues and communicate their rational.
Although we are creatures of intellect, “it is also clear that we are born with
powerful inclinations that bias our thinking and emotions”. These biologically based
feelings have been called moral intuitions. Some of these intuitions such as sympathy
and reciprocity are generally favorable; others such as in-group violence and cheating
are not (Flack and de Waal 2000). Darwin wrote “animals would inevitably acquire
a moral sense of conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well-
developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man” (Darwin 1871).
Railton would distinguish between a modus vivendi “by means of which indi-
viduals can live together in a stable arrangement that provides mutual benefits and
reduces certain kinds of costly conflict” from behaviors that are “distinctly moral
in character” (Railton 2000). Those that are moral in character “embody a capacity
for some measure of impartiality, fairness, and generalized benevolence”, to “put
ones own preferences aside”. Railton distinguishes behavior which has as its end the
capacity to live together from behavior that is truly moral. He also raises the possi-
bility that natural selection may have selected the capacity for “moral illusion” as “a
way of disguising from the self and others the opportunistic motivations underneath
actual behavior”.
Railton concedes evolution might have provided the building blocks of morality,
capacities not exclusively directed to moral tasks,—language, memory, perception,
choice, causal inference, self-control and empathy without “having to do the final
or near final assembly itself” (Railton 2000). If we deny an evolutionary basis for
human brain based morality we are in effect denying well-substantiated evolutionary
theory.

Some Cynicism

As previously noted morality can increase social stability which is advantageous to

individual group members. Morality and its associated emotions of conscience and
guilt provide a degree of individual protection. If it is considered immoral to kill
an innocent person theoretically fewer innocent people will likely be killed because
many people would prefer to avoid the resultant pangs of conscience, not to mention
the legal consequences. Individuals accept the moral rules and proselytize others to
do the same. Strictures against killing innocent people decrease the likelihood any
individual will be killed. This notion is expressed in the Golden Rule, “Do to others
as you would have them do to you.” Evolutionary theory has a cynical veneer because
it postulates that laudatory moral behaviors are conserved because they provide the
material benefit of increased fitness, survival or reproductive success.
28 2 Evolution and Ethics

The Limitations of Evolutionary Morality

Natural selection has bequeath us imperfect moral intuitions. Evolution did its work
in a different environment; what was advantageous in the past may be of limited value
or even detrimental now. Natural selection works at a glacial pace and may not have
equipped us to tackle present day problems Sophisticated questions about the use of
genetic information and the results of other modern technologies cannot be easily
answered by a process molded by the exigencies of a more primitive environment.
Natural selection did its major work when man did not travel far, leaving us less
equipped to empathize with problems at a distance. We often are more troubled by
the distress of a child in our home town than we are by the dire straits of thousands
of people living far away.
Evolution has primarily given us the ability to deal with short-term problems
(Ruse and Wilson 1986). The solution to many short term problems can lead to long
terms disasters. And, as I will soon discuss in greater detail our moral intuitions may
paradoxically lead to behavior that by contemporary conventional moral standards
is immoral.

Conclusion

The field of evolutionary biology has contributed to our understanding of morality by

documenting that animals display behaviors reminiscent of human moral behavior
and these behaviors have likely served as the building blocks of human morality.
Evolutionary biologists paint a less than glorious picture of morality by suggesting
moral behavior may not always be strictly altruistic because it is often reciprocated
and provides reproductive and survival advantages, This entails a detraction from the
high esteem in which morality is generally held. Evolutionary theory is scientifically
well-established though it is rejected by some people, for example, by creationists.
I believe we can accept that at least some of our moral intuitions have biologically
evolved.
Humans are able to transcend animal behavior because of our higher cognitive
function and ability to communicate at a high level of sophistication. Kagan is right
that human morality is different from animal morality but evidence suggests that
many of the building blocks of human morality are derived from our evolutionary
past.
References 29

References

Bernstein, Irwin S., and Thomas P. Gordon. 1974 The Function of Aggression in Primate Societies.
American Scientist 62(3): 304–311.
Boesch, Christophe, 2003. Complex Cooperation Among Taï Chimpanzees. in Animal Social Com-
plexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies, ed. Frans B. M. de Waal and Peter L.
Tyack. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Buskirk, Ruth E, Frohlich, Cliff and Ross, Kenneth G. 1984. The Natural Selection of Sexual
Cannibalism.The American Naturalist 123(5): 612–625.
Darwin, Charles. 1871. The Descent of Man. London: John Murray.
Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at https://
archive.org/stream/TheSelfishGene/RichardDawkins-djvu.txt. Accessed 13 Apr 2015.
de Waal, Frans. 2010. Morals Without God The Opinionator New York Times. October 17, 2010.
Available at https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/morals-without-god/. Accessed
16 Mar 2019.
deWaal, Frans B.M. 2009. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other
Animals. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press.
de Waal, Frans B.M. 1991. The Chimpanzee’s Sense of Social Regularity and Its Relation to the
Human Sense of Justice. American Behavioral Scientist 34: 335–349.
de Waal F. B. M. 1982. Chimpanzee. Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Baltimore. Maryland:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Flack, Jessica C. and de Waal, Frans B. M. 2000. Any Animal Whatever. Darwinian Building Blocks
of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 1–29.
Goodall, Jane. 1990. Through A Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Goodall, Jane. 1982. Order Without Law. in Law, Biology and Culture: The Evolution of Law, ed.
M. Gruter and P. Bohannan. San Diego: Ross-Erikson, Publishers, Inc.
Greene, J. D. 2007. The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul. inMoral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neu-
roscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Available at https://static.squarespace.com/static/
54763f79e4b0c4e55ffb000c/t/5484abb5e4b0213f74375bce/1417980853923/the-secret-joke-of-
kants-soul.pdf. Accessed 16 Mar 2019.
Hall, K. R. L. 1964. Aggression in Monkey and Ape Societies in the Natural History of Aggression.
London: Academic Press.
Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge Ma and London: The MIT Press.
Kagan, Jerome. 2000. Human Morality is Distinctive. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7: 46–48.
Katz, Leonard. 2000. Toward Good and Evil: Evolutionary Approaches to Aspects of Human
Morality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): xi.
Kummer, Hans. 1968. Social Organization of Hamadryas Baboons. University of Chicago Press.
Kummer, Hans. 2000. Ways Beyond Appearances. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 48–51.
Lorenz, Konrad. 1966. On Aggression trans. Margaret Kerr Wilson. New York: Harcourt.
Nowak, Martin, A Tarnita, Corina E and Wilson E. O. 2010. The Evolution of Eusociality. Nature
466: 1057–1062.
O’Connell, Sanjida M. 1995. Empathy in Chimpanzees: Evidence for Theory of Mind? Primates
36 (3): 297–410.
Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals New York. Berlin, London, Sydney: Bloomsbury
Press.
Peterson, Dale. 2012. Chimpanzee Morality. Lahey Clinic. Journal of Medical Ethics Fall Edition.
Porat, D., and N.E. Chadwick-Furman. 2004. Effects of Anemone Fish on Giant Sea Anemones:
Expansion Behavior, Growth, and Survival. Hydrobiologia 530: 513–520.
Pinker, Steven. January 13, 2008. The Moral Instinct. New York Times.
Railton, Peter. 2000. Darwinian Building Blocks. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 7(1–2): 55–62.
30 2 Evolution and Ethics

Rawls, John A. 1971. Theory of Justice Cambridge. Massachusetts and London: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Ruse, Michael and Wilson, Edward O. 1986. Moral. Philosophy as Applied Science Philosophy 61:
173–192.
Ruse, Michael. 1986. Taking Darwin Seriously. New York: Blackwell Publishers.
Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan. 1998. Unto Others The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan. 2000. Summary of ‘Unto Others’. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 7(1–2): 185–206.
Sheper, J. 1971. Mate Selection Among Second Generation Kibbutz Adolescents and Adults: Incest
Avoidance and Negative Imprinting Archives of Sexual Behavior 1: 293–307.
Sicotte, P. 1995. Interpositions in Conflicts Between Males in Bimale Groups of Mountain Gorillas.
Folia Primatologica 65: 14–24.
Steinberg, David. 2010. Altruism in Medicine: It’s Definition, Nature and Dilemmas The.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2): 249–257.
Trivers, Robert L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism Quarterly Review of Biology. 46:
35–57.
Turner, Leigh. 2003. Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the “Common
Morality” Presumption in Bioethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3): 193–218.
Wikipedia Contributors. “Evolution,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title=Evolution&oldid=887758928. Accessed 16 Mar 2019.
Williams, George C. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wolf, Arthur P. 2007. Is This Incest? in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach To Moral
Issues In Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David. Lebanon. New Hampshire: University
Press of New England.
Wolf, Arthur P., and Chieh-shan Huang. 1980. Marriage and adoption in China, 1845–1945.
Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
Wright, Robert. 1995. The Moral Animal: Why We Are The Way We Are; The New Science of
Evolutionary Psychology Vintage Books.
Zhavi, Amotz and Zhavi, Avishag. 1997. A The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s
Puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 3
Social Darwinism

Abstract Social Darwinism is a largely discredited philosophy that based moral

judgments on Darwin’s theory of evolution. Because natural selection, the operative
mode of evolution, selected favorable variations and rejected injurious variations
Social Darwinism advocated behavior that mimicked evolution. Social Darwinism
advocates survival of the fittest and places the welfare of society over that of the
individual.
The British philosopher Herbert Spencer, whose name has been most promi-
nently linked with Social Darwinism, believed evolutionary theory should be applied
in various social fields including morality. Social Darwinists feared that well-
intentioned interventional programs would lead to “the multiplication of the reckless
and incompetent”.
Social Darwinism has been largely discredited because it was, to varying degrees,
used to justify unethical practices such as involuntary sterilizations, eugenics, and
Nazi racism. Although science can provide information that contributes to the
resolution of ethical dilemmas it should not be the source of our moral values.

Introduction

Darwin’s classic 1859 book on the Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection
focused on animals and nature; in later years he began to think about the evolution
of man and society. The operating principle of evolution is natural selection which
preserves favorable variations and rejects injurious variations. This was succinctly
summarized by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) when he coined the term “survival of
the fittest”. Spencer, was the person most identified in the popular imagination with
Social Darwinism because “many of the chief villains in the social Darwinist hall of
fame, especially in the United States, were zealous followers of Spencer” (Levy and
Pearl 2009).
The application of evolutionary theory in various social fields, including moral-
ity, has been referred to as Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism is a complex and

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 31

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_3
32 3 Social Darwinism

controversial topic which is “inspired by the view that human nature and social
activity are driven by our biologic nature, especially as defined by the process of
evolution” (Bowler 2016). What concerned Darwin and many of his contemporaries
were medical and other societal programs that protected the biologically inferior. It
was feared that “people who in the natural course of events would die before repro-
ducing now survive and have offspring, offspring who are in turn handicapped. This
absolutely encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering
them an unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of the competent and
provident” (Spencer quoted by Ruse 2009a, b).
Darwin said “We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the
process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick;
we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the
life of every one to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has
preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed
to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No
one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must
be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or
care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in
the case of man itself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to
breed” (Darwin 1871).
Social Darwinism provided evolutionary biology an important role in societal
decisions and morality; however, because of unsavory practices justified in its
name “today Social Darwinism functions as an omnibus term of abuse” (Leonard
2009a, b).
Herbert Spencer, a British philosopher, evolutionist, and sociologist viewed the
human species as “the apotheosis of the evolutionary process” and said of evolu-
tion, it “is progressive and hence tends to the good and the valuable” (pp. vii–xxiv,
Ruse 2009a, b). He said “the supreme principle of morality must be to cherish the
evolutionary process” and claimed that evolutionary theory could be the basis for
social, economic and political philosophy. Spencer emphasized freedom and respect
for the freedom of others and advocated limiting the role of government to “a rel-
ative paucity of restraints” (Ruse 2009a, b). His attitude regarding matters such as
healthcare, poverty, and education was that it was not the responsibility of the state;
for the state to intervene in these matters would encourage laziness and was contrary
to evolution (Sweet 2019).
Spencer’s name has become associated with the application of the principles
of natural selection to the population with survival of the fittest being a worthy
goal; Social Darwinists proposed that humanitarian efforts should not be allowed to
interfere with nature’s laws, including the social struggle for existence. According
to Barondess, Social Darwinism tended to shift concern “from the development of
the individual to the welfare of society as a whole” (pp. 891–898, Barondess 1998).
Spencer’s “laissez-faire” philosophy was, “every man has freedom to do all that he
wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Sweet 2019).
Dawkins does not agree with Spencer and notes the suffering due to natural
selection; he says, “the force that has shaped the evolution of living creatures with
Introduction 33

all their beauty and elegance is a whole lot of rather unpleasant deaths”. Dawkins
sites the political misuse of Social Darwinism by Hitler, Herbert Spencer and John
D. Rockefeller. He says “that in our political and social life we are entitled to throw
out Darwinism, to say we don’t want to live in a Darwinian world. We might want
to live in say, a socialist world which is very un-Darwinian” (Lauriergracht 1997).
Dawkins asks us to separate what exists in nature from one’s political beliefs.
Eugenics, the “planned social control of human heredity”, with the goal of improv-
ing the genetic quality of the human population, was advocated by Francis Galton,
a cousin of Charles Darwin (Leonard 2009a, b). The goal of eugenics was “to create
better humans” and it focused on two dimensions of its philosophy: “to encourage
people of good health to reproduce together to create good births (known as positive
eugenics), and to end certain diseases and disabilities by discouraging or preventing
others from reproducing known as negative eugenics (Goering 2014)”. Although the
influence of negative eugenics would reach its most horrific zenith in Nazi Germany
its philosophy and aims were manifest in other countries including the United States.
Charles B. Davenport the founding director of the Station for Experimental Evolu-
tion at Cold Spring Harbor believed that heredity was the cause of conditions such as
“insanity, epilepsy, alcoholism, criminality and pauperism” and that race determined
behavior (Barondess 1998). These views ultimately led to a program of involuntary
sterilization. In the United States about 60,000 people were subject to involuntary
sterilization because they were criminals or “feebleminded” (Barondess 1998). In
1923 the American Eugenics Society (now called, The Society for Biodemogra-
phy and Social Biology) was formed, “to further knowledge of the biological and
socio-cultural forces affecting human populations and their evolution”.
The United States Supreme Court in Buck versus Bell (Buck versus Bell 1927)
upheld state sterilization laws. Carrie Bell was said to be “feebleminded” (an impre-
cisely defined condition) and both the daughter of a “feebleminded” woman and the
mother of a “feebleminded” child. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said,
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough”. Holmes noted, “We have seen more
than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, to pre-
vent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for a crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind” (Buck versus Bell 1927).
Social Darwinism reached its apogee and most grotesque aberration in Nazi Ger-
many. Alfred Ploetz in 1895 espoused what came to be known as racial hygiene.
He advocated the avoidance of “counterselective forces” such as medical care for
the weak which would increase their reproduction, noting that the fit should be the
primary survivors. Under Nazi rule Germany established “heredity health courts”
which approved sterilization for a variety of disorders that included feeblemind-
edness, schizophrenia, hereditary blindness or deafness, severe physical deformity,
epilepsy, alcoholism and other disorders (pp. 893–895, Barondess 1998). Thousands
were sterilized without having given voluntary consent. It should be distressing to
34 3 Social Darwinism

Americans that German scientists had come to the United States to learn eugenic
methods (Goering 2014).
Nazi Germany ultimately took an ignominious step beyond involuntary steril-
ization; based on the notion that there were certain “lives not worth living” Nazi
Germany began a program of active euthanasia with racial overtones. Groups tar-
geted for extinction included gypsies, homosexuals and, most prominently, Jews. The
most horrific result of human attempts to mimic natural selection was the Holocaust.
An important aspect of both eugenics and euthanasia was the facilitation of its pop-
ular acceptance by demonizing “the infirm, the disabled and the genetically blighted”
who were “the polluter of the purity of German blood” (Barondess 1998). This demo-
nization allowed the perpetrators of horrendous crimes against humanity to believe
their nefarious actions were supported by a philosophy rooted in moral goodness.
In 1978 Robert K. Graham, the wealthy inventor of shatterproof eye glasses and a
eugenicist set up the Repository For Germinal Choice. In his 1971 book, The Future
of Man, Graham claimed that natural selection had stopped working on humans
because health and social welfare systems were preventing it from “purging the
feeble and preserving the strong”. Graham believed when man learned to master the
natural environment it allowed “retrograde humans” to reproduce (Plotz 2019). His
plan was to reverse the genetic decay in society and offer the sperm of exceptional
men to interested women to “stimulate (humanity’s) ascent to a new level of being”
(Plotz 2019).
Graham set up his sperm bank on his Southern California estate. When few Nobel
Prize winners signed up (at one point his project was referred to as the Nobel Prize
Sperm Bank) he obtained sperm from Olympic athletes, promising young scientists,
and successful business men. Women had to be married with infertile husbands, well
educated and financially secure. Nazism had put eugenics in ill repute and Graham
was accused of trying to create a master race. Graham’s repository closed in 1999
after producing about 200 babies some of whom had characteristics of their sperm
donors (Agar 2004).
Despite tragedies perpetrated in its name, eugenic variants persist because the
desire for a perfect or near perfect baby persists. Currently gametes from donors con-
sidered of high quality can fetch a high price. Successful young women in elite col-
leges are offered large sums of money for their “perfect” eggs (Kenney and McGowan
2014). Reproductive technologies, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis with
embryo selection and other techniques in various stages of development make it
possible to select desirable embryos over diseased embryos, to select the sex of an
embryo, and to insert genetic material such as mitochondria from a normal woman
into a diseased embryo.
A relatively recent technique called Crispr-Cas9 and referred to as “gene editing”
holds the promise of repairing and enhancing genes to modify the DNA of human
embryos with the dangled prospect of creating “designer babies” (Zehr 2019). Scien-
tists working in the field have called for caution when making changes that could alter
the germ line genome and affect future generations; until more studies are done they
have called this technique an “enormous peril for mankind” (Wade 2015). Advocates
of liberal eugenics contrast it with the discredited eugenics of the past which was
Introduction 35

mediated by the state and involuntary. Liberal eugenics is said to be voluntary, based
on scientific standards, respectful of procreative liberty and its goal is the welfare of
the child and family (Goering 2014; Agar 2004).
Spencer and the Nazi’s both invoked the merits of evolution but differed in their
analysis of its implications. Spencer’s passive approach advocated limited interven-
tion by the state whereas the Nazis used the apparatus of the state for an active geno-
cidal intervention of frightful proportions. History shows that a scientific premise, in
this case, evolution, considered worthy of human emulation, can be twisted in dif-
ferent directions and that the identical premise can become a potent force for either
good or evil. We obviously can learn from nature but should be reluctant to use what
occurs in nature as the justification of morality.
In fairness to Spencer, the term Social Darwinism was not widely used until well
after his death and he would have strongly disapproved of many of the disturbing
paths justified by applying the principles of evolution to the social sphere. Today
the term Social Darwinism is an “omnibus term of abuse” that disparages biological
justification in the social sphere. The use of evolution as a philosophical template for
moral behavior is also suspect because there are evolved animal behaviors that are
immoral.

Conclusion

The concept morality cannot be empirically examined but the study of evolution
includes a lot of scientific data. A relevant question is whether scientific information
can be the sole foundation of a moral theory.
Science often plays an important role in informing ethical discourse. However, I
agree with philosophers who claim that what is, is not necessarily what ought to be.
We can learn from science but science should not serve as the primary source of our
values. The unfortunate consequences justified when evolutionary theory was used
as the basis of a moral theory illustrate the dangers of this approach. Morality is a
complicated matter that can’t simply be resolved by reliance on a scientific theory.

References

Agar, Nicholas. 2004. Liberal Eugenics, in Defense of Human Enhancement. Hoboken, New Jersey:
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.
Barondess, Jeremiah A. 1998. Care of the Medical Ethos: Reflections on Social Darwinism.
Bowler, Peter. 2016. Social Darwinism. Oxford Bibliographies. May 26, 2016.
Buck v Bell. 1927 274US200.
Darwin, Charles. 1871. The Descent of Man. London: John Murray.
Goering, Sara. 2014. Eugenics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/eugenics/. Accessed 20 Mar 2019.
36 3 Social Darwinism

Kenney, Nancy J., and McGowan, Michelle L. 2014. Egg donation compensation: Ethical and legal
challenges. Dove Press (4): 15–24.
Lauriergracht, Frans Roes. 1997. An Interview of Richard Dawkins. Human Ethology Bulletin 12
(1): 1–3.
Leonard, Thomas C. 2009a. Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of
Richard Hofstader’s social Darwinism. American Thought Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 71: 37–51.
Leonard, Thomas C. 2009b. Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of
Richard Hofstader’s social Darwinism in American thought. The Economist Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 71: 37–51.
Levy, David M., and Pearl, Sandra J. 2009. Sympathy, evolution and The economist. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 71: 29–36.
Plotz, David. 2019. The “Genius Babies” and How They Grew. Available at www.slate.com/articles/
life/seed/2001/02/the_genius_babies_and_how_they_grew.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2019.
Racial Hygiene, and the Holocaust. Annals of Internal Medicine 129: 891–898.
Ruse, Michael. 2009a. Introduction in Evolution and Ethics Princeton. Princeton University Press.
Ruse, Michael. 2009b. Charles Darwin on human evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 71 (1): 10–19.
Sweet, William. 2019. Herbert Spencer. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. www.iep.utm.edu/
spencer/#H6. Accessed 20 Mar 2019.
Wade, Nicholas. 2015. Scientists seek ban on method of editing the human genome. New York
Times, 19 Mar 2015.
Zehr, E. Paul. 2019. Human gene editing: great power, great responsibility. Scientific American, 16
Jan 2019.
Chapter 4
Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

Abstract Although there are numerous examples of moral-like behavior in animals,

examination of the darker side of nature reveals creatures capable of deceit, dishon-
esty, violence and killing. Rape, cannibalism, infanticide, deception, within species
killing, sexual intrigue, adultery, lethal violence, and wasteful predation have also
been observed. Evolution appears responsible for both moral and despicable behavior.
Natural selection is blind to our ordinary understanding of morality.
Thomas Henry Huxley noted the “essential evil of the world” and found it difficult
to reconcile that with sound ethical principles. He believed man should use reason and
intelligence and refuse to be instruments of the evolutionary process. Evolution has
provided the capacity to identify, protect and preserve important values; this capacity
makes both moral and immoral behaviors possible. Hopefully, human reason will
select moral values that counteract the immorality of nature.

Introduction

I am hesitant to describe animal moral-like behavior in terms of human conventional

standards because animal cognitive and communicative abilities are less developed
and their existential exigencies are also different. What animals have in common with
humans is that both are subject to natural selection; therefore, the study of animal
moral-like and immoral-like behavior has implications for the nature of morality in
man.
Although there are numerous examples of moral-like behavior in animals, the
relationship of evolution and morality is complicated because animals also display
behaviors that by conventional human standards would be considered immoral. Flack
and deWaal note, “Ironically, morality and immorality make use of the same capac-
ities”. Empathy can be used to ameliorate suffering or to inflict cruelty (Flack and
deWaal 2000).
Examination of the darker side of nature, reveals creatures capable of deceit, dis-
honesty, violence and killing. George C. Williams wrote “the conscience of man

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 37

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_4
38 4 Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

must revolt against the gross immorality of nature” (p. 384, Williams 1988). He but-
tresses this point with examples in nature of what he calls immoral behavior. He also
denigrates that which on its surface appears moral. In reciprocal altruism, he states,
“Whatever is given up by the donor costs it less than some expected repayment”.
Cooperation may ultimately be a matter of self-interest. As Williams puts it, “Two
hyenas in a cooperative attack on a wildebeest defended by its mother are more than
twice as likely to succeed as one acting alone. A cooperative hyena may therefore
eat while a loner goes hungry” (p. 390, Williams 1988). Ruse similarly notes that
moral behavior is derived from the biologic fact that “one can often get more out of
life by helping rather than hurting” (Ruse 1988a, b). Williams takes these facts to
mean, “we need all the help we can get to overcome billions of years of selfishness”
(Williams 1988).
Rape has been reported in birds and turtles and in geese and mallards (Williams
1988; Barash 1977). Cannibalism is common among fishes and other animals (Polis
1981). Stomachs of large walleye fish have been found to contain smaller ones which
had been eaten and even smaller ones in those fish (Cuff 1980). Trivers demonstrated
that natural selection favored off spring that try to get more than their fair share of
resources from parents (Trivers 1974). Nearly half the litters in a prairie dog colony
were the object of infanticide, sometimes inflicted by close relatives (Hoogland
1985). Many animal deaths are the result of fighting over females (Clutton-Brock
et al. 1979). Williams finds in nature manipulation, deception, nepotism, within
species killing, sexual intrigue, adultery, lethal violence, and wasteful predation in
animals who kill more than they need for nutrition (Williams 1988). Williams said
moral axioms should not be derived from nature.
A male firefly of the species Photinus flashes a signal of sexual availability. A
predatory, carnivorous female firefly of the species Photuria flashes signals deceit-
fully mimicking the female Photinus signal and then kills the approaching Photinus
male firefly (Lloyd 1965). Chimpanzees can also be deceitful and for devious reasons
distract others; they can also fake “an interest, an injury and an emotion” (p. 184,
Peterson 2011).
The killing of innocents is rampant in the natural world; typically the stronger
species kill and consume the weaker. Birds eat worms. Lions kill and eat zebras.
Chimpanzees kill and devour monkeys. Evolution has conserved the ability and
desire to kill innocent creatures, typically, though not always, those of a different
species. Though the act of killing an innocent creature can be deemed immoral
in humans, animals who kill should not be judged immoral; they cannot go to the
supermarket for food and must kill in order to survive. Also, animals typically possess
neither the sophisticated language nor the mental capacity for the abstract thinking
required to grasp the principles of morality and cannot appreciate that killing innocent
creatures might be wrong. Nonetheless, the killing of innocents is a prominent result
of evolution. Humans have during the course of history displayed their willingness
to kill innocent people; for example, during World War Two multiple millions of
innocent civilians were killed.
Introduction 39

Chimpanzees kill members of their own species. Chimpanzee war is largely fought
by males against another social group of chimpanzees and can be vicious. Chim-
panzee communities have territories defined by borders they patrol. Chimpanzee
neighbors are often hated and viewed as dangerous. When encountered a lone neigh-
boring chimpanzee may be attacked and killed. In an attack chimpanzees have been
seen to “pummel him with their fists, kick him with their feet, bash him with a rock,
bite, tear, lift and slam him down to the ground. The goal is to annihilate” (p. 123,
Peterson 2011).
Chimpanzee war was observed in the Gombe National Park in 1974 when one
group of chimpanzees increased their territory by eventually annihilating another
group. Human war is often supported by our presumed moral leaders, priests, min-
isters, rabbis, imams, and the like. Similarly, chimpanzee war, is an effort of “coop-
erative violence” and “like human war, is socially approved, or at least it certainly
seems to be, judging from the positive communal excitement it provokes” (Peterson
2012). Chimpanzees, treat their soldiers as heroes and their wars as though they are
morally justified. Chimpanzees who kill or exile their weaker neighbors increase the
amount of territory they control and the availability of food. Because war, at least
for the victorious, may improve the survival of individuals or a group, despite its
cruelty and the infliction of harm and suffering, it has been conserved by natural
selection. The biological basis of war merits attention because war has destructively
and almost continuously punctuated human history; that may not be a coincidence
because humans share about 99 percent of their DNA with chimpanzees (Gibbons
2012).
With the exception of vegetarians and vegans humans kill and eat innocent animals
and in some eyes are morally culpable because they have both other nutritional
options and the capacity to understand the moral implications of killing. A review of
history and attention to the daily news document numerous human wars, genocides,
murders and other crimes. The persistence throughout human history of these killings
as well as other atrocities confirms that evolution while preserving many behaviors
that could be classified as morally worthy, also has a penchant for the preservation
of what could reasonably be considered evil.
The possessiveness of mother chimpanzees toward their infants is rarely chal-
lenged; nonetheless, Goodall has described at Gombe “criminal deviance” with
examples of the biting into the forehead and killing of another chimpanzee’s infant.
The dead chimpanzee infant may then be eaten. Goodall notes that in chimpanzee
society “almost always, might is right”. The evidence is ample: natural selection is
morally blind.
There are no permanent pair bonds between males and female chimpanzees who
are not related and any male theoretically can impregnate any female; Goodall sug-
gests males protect infants because any infant might be their child. However, “if an
infant gets in the way of a charging display, it may be used as a display object, picked
up and flailed, dragged or thrown”. By the time a male chimpanzee is 13–15 years
old he is able to dominate females. The only female he does not try to dominate is his
mother whom he respects. A male will, without hesitation, take prey from a female.
Goodall notes that “chimpanzee behavior patterns are so similar to our own”, and
40 4 Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

the need to constrain certain chimpanzee-like behaviors are reflected in our laws.
She characterizes chimpanzee behavior as ‘order without law’ and says this suggests
“evolutionary factors have molded human social behavior” (Goodall 1982).
The evolution of aggressive behavior may entail some controls and limitations.
Flack and deWaal noted that most chimpanzee aggression is directed, not at pos-
sessors of food, but at beggars for food, especially at those who had been reluctant
to share their own food. Goodall and others ascribe this behavior to “respect for
possession” which exists in other primates (Flack and deWaal 2000; Goodall 1971).
Flack and deWaal, though they acknowledge “animals are no moral philosophers”
note our moral systems “rely on basic mental capacities and social tendencies we
share with other co-operative primates”. They also state that implicit social contracts
noted in primates may be inadequate from a normative perspective because they are
rough compromises that do not respect “worth, value or rights” (pp. 20–22, Flack and
deWaal 2000). Nonetheless, primates appear to obey at least some rules that guide
behavior and define expectations. These serve as constraints on aggression (deWaal
1991).
Non-human creatures exhibit behaviors that we might judge moral-like and behav-
iors we might judge immoral-like. There also appear to be social restraints that limit
aggressive behavior. For example, aggressive barking and squealing is often suffi-
cient to prevent actual aggression. The similarities of animal behavior, especially that
of primates, to our own behavior is a bit unnerving and undermining to the preferred
image of humans as uniquely special.
Humans should acknowledge that we are subject to the pressures of moral intu-
itions bequeath to us by natural selection, a process that ignores moral considerations.
Evolution concerns itself with reproduction and survival of the fittest; it operates
oblivious to morality. The distressing prospect of looking in the mirror and seeing
a chimpanzee can be assuaged by the realization that humans are endowed with
consciousness, language and rationality that potentially enable us to transcend our
evolutionary heritage and create advanced moral systems.

Thomas Henry Huxley

Thomas Henry Huxley, (1825–1895) an anatomist born in England in 1826, was

a believer in evolution which he called “so perfect as a mechanism, so beautiful
as a work of art” which attained “its highest level in man” who has fared best in
the struggle for existence (Huxley 1893). Although Huxley accepted evolution he
considered it indifferent to morality and felt there was “as much selection for the
immoral sentiments” as for the moral. He found it hard “to bring the course of
evolution into harmony with even the elementary requirements of the ethical ideal of
the just and the good”. Huxley noted “the essential evil of the world” and “the ape and
the tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical
principles”. For Huxley evolution was “the headquarters of the enemy of ethical
nature” and “of moral purpose I see not a trace in nature” (pp. 1–41, Huxley 1893).
Thomas Henry Huxley 41

Huxley in his famous essay, Evolution and Ethics, expressed the view that human
nature is essentially evil and that morality is a “human invention to suppress the selfish
and competitive tendencies” that are the result of evolution. Huxley advocated the
origins of morality be sought outside of biology. He believed man must use reason
and intelligence to “subdue nature to his higher ends” and “must refuse any longer
to be the instruments of the evolutionary process, and withdraw from the struggle for
existence” with its “ruthless and ferocious destructiveness” (pp. 4, 11 and 23, Huxley
Evolution and Ethics 1893). He would replace survival of the fittest with survival
“of those who are ethically the best”. Huxley believed that human “intelligence and
will should be able to curb “the instincts of savagery in civilized men” and the
“immeasurable miseries” of evolution”, though this change might take a very long
time. Huxley essentially envisioned a struggle in opposition to the state of nature
(pp. 12, 22, Huxley 1893).
Williams echoed similar feelings and said that nature is propelled by the forces
of kin selection that maximizes genetic selfishness and that matters of justice were
settled on the basis of “might-makes-right” (p. 396, Williams 1988). He said morality
is “an accidental capability produced, in its boundless stupidity, by a biologic process
(natural selection) that is normally opposed to the expression of such a capability”
(Flack and deWaal 2000). Williams, in sympathy with Huxley, concluded “nature is
morally unacceptable” and we should “refuse any longer to be the instrument of the
evolutionary process” (p. 403, Williams 1988).
Ruse asks a difficult question that we will also need to confront: if Huxley believed
ethics is not justified by evolution, how is ethics justified? Ruse adds there is “no
generally accepted answer to this question” (Ruse 2009). I think Ruse is correct; but to
attempt an answer now is getting ahead of ourselves. We have more to explore before
we tackle that question. Huxley would use intelligence and reason to promote ethical
behavior; for Huxley its justification would be avoidance of the pain and miseries of
the essential evil of the world which he saw as largely the result of natural selection
and evolution.
Anyone aware of world events would know that despite millions of years of
evolution what moral philosophers and most of us call evil persists. That can be
explained because in many environments survival and reproduction, the goals of
evolution, are most successfully met by resorting to what are evil methods. Huxley’s
reservations about evolution as expressed in 1893 remain valid. In his discussion
of morality in animals and humans Ruse makes a distinction between humans and
some animals. He claims morality requires “a thinking, acting being- which I assume
is what humans are, what the snake is probably not” and what “the chimpanzees
probably are” (p. 415, Ruse 1988a, b).
Ruse argues that if nature is evil, and our moral sense is derived from nature and
biology then how do we know morality is not evil. He writes, “What right have we
to say that our feeling of good and evil is other than a selfish adaptation which serves
our ends no less than do the poison fangs of the snake?” Ruse notes the harms done
by humans in the name of morality. Our options are to “argue that our moral sense
42 4 Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

lies outside the biological framework or we must allow that not everything evolution
produces is morally worthless, and that some things indeed are positively good”
(p. 415, Ruse 1988a, b).

The Mechanism of Biological Morality

How has evolution shaped the brain to allow a spectrum of morally exalted to
immorally heinous behaviors? How can the same evolutionary process account for
altruistic behavior and genocide? This is a difficult question because the human brain
is extremely complex, its circuits poorly understood, it is subject to various influences
and is not always rational even in the absence of psychiatric illness.
The moral philosopher Emmanuel Kant (1724–1804) saw the fundamental prin-
ciples of morality as based on an autonomous rational will; that the fundamental
principles of morality, which he referred to as “categorical imperatives” is derived
from “self-governing reason” (Johnson 2016). Although we may agree with Kant’s
moral imperatives we can’t ignore the role of biology. Flack and deWaal suggest
an integrated perspective that acknowledges both the biological basis of morality
and the role of cognition. They note, “many of the tendencies and cognitive abilities
underlying human morality antedate our species appearance on the planet” (p. 24,
Flack and deWaal 2000).
This exploration of morality will reveal that the nature of morality is more enig-
matic and complex than commonly believed. If we could accept that God gave Moses
the Ten Commandments the origin of morality and moral principles would be easier
to understand. But rather than rely on biblical history I will place an emphasis on
what can be observed. If we arrive at doubt and confusion that may simply reflect
the nature of morality.
If morality has biological roots as evidence suggests, what brain based mechanism
might explain the prevalence of both moral-like and immoral-like behavior in both
animals and man? How has evolution shaped our brains to accommodate both moral
and immoral propensities. The best answer to that question is that natural selection
and evolution are blind to morality and morality and immorality were irrelevant to
the processes that shaped the human brain.
I will speculate that an additional evolutionary mechanism has made morality
possible. Evolution has provided the capacity to sense or specifically identify certain
behaviors and values as worthy of preservation and protection. Violation of these
values will elicit a strong emotional reaction, often called “moral indignation“. We
may be outraged if an innocent person or child is wantonly killed. We get upset if
an elderly couple has been cheated of their life savings. In some instances behavior
that violates important conserved values is punished, even at a cost to the punisher,
a phenomenon called altruistic punishment.
The process of natural selection favors behaviors that promote its goals; to accom-
plish this it must also favor the ability to recognize and preserve those behaviors.
Animals who participate in beneficial activities such as cooperative hunting and
The Mechanism of Biological Morality 43

reciprocal altruistic behaviors must remember and recognize the behaviors favored
by natural selection. An animal’s brain must in some manner recognize that it will eat
more and enhance its reproduction and survival if participates in cooperative hunting.
A vampire bat must in some manner know that reciprocal altruism can enhance its
survival. A cheetah must know it needs to work cooperatively if it wants to kill a
gazelle.
Natural selection must have endowed animals with a capacity to recognize and
remember which behaviors are important. That capacity, the ability to recognize
certain behaviors as important, is likely a precursor of human morality. From a
biological perspective a reasonable definition of morality is the ability to identify
certain behaviors as important and worthy of protection.

Conclusion

The locus of moral decision-making is the brain which has been molded by the
evolutionary process of natural selection. Behavior in animals has been observed to
be both moral-like and immoral-like. Some scholars have claimed nature is immoral;
we can, at the least, say that natural selection is blind to morality. Evolution has not
designed us to be moral creatures. However, evolution has provided the capacity to
recognize and remember which behaviors are worthy of protection and preservation.
This capacity makes human moral behavior possible.
Because humans-and perhaps some primates- are rational, theoretically, they can
employ reason to counteract our evolutionary burden of selfishness. Whether reason
will ultimately vanquish immorality remains to be seen.

References

Barash, David P. 1977. Sociobiology of rape in Mallards: Responses of the mated male. Science
197: 788–789.
Clutton-Brock, S.D. Albon, R.M. Gibson, and F.E. Guiness. 1979. The Logical Stag: Adaptive
Aspects of Fighting in Red Deer Animal Behavior 27: 211–225.
Cuff, Wilfred R. 1980. Behavioral Aspects of cannibalism in larval walleye. Canadian Journal of
Zoology 58 (8): 1504–1507.
de Waal, Frans B.M. 1991. The chimpanzee’s sense of social regularity and it’s relation to the human
sense of justice. American Behavioral Scientist 34: 335–349.
Flack, Jessica C, and Frans B.M. deWaal. 2000. Any animal whatever: Darwinian building blocks
of morality in monkeys and apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1, 2): 1–29.
Gibbons, Ann. 2012. Bonobos join chimps as closest human relatives. Science Daily News, 13 June
2012.
Goodall, Jane. 1971. In The Shadow of Man. New York: Houghton, Mifflin Harcourt.
Goodall, Jane. 1982. Order without law in Gruter M and Bohannan, R law biology and culture.
Santa Barbara Ca: Ross-Erickson.
44 4 Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

Hoogland, John L. 1985. Infanticide in prairie dogs affects forty-seven percent of litters. Science
230: 1037–1040.
Huxley, Thomas Henry. 1893. Evolution and ethics, in The Romanes Lecture. Available at http://
www.aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE9/E-E.html. Accessed 21 Mar 2019.
Johnson, Robert. 2016. Kant’s moral philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ Accessed 21 Mar 2019.
Lloyd, James E. 1965. Aggressive mimicry in photuris firefly femmes fatales. Science 149: 653–654.
Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals. New York Berlin London Sydney: Bloomsbury
Press.
Peterson, Dale. 2012. Chimpanzee morality. Lahey Clinic Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (3): 6–7.
Polis, Gary A. 1981. The evolution and dynamics of intraspecific predation. Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics 12: 225–251.
Ruse, Michael. 1988a. Response to Williams: Selfishness is not enough. Zygon 23 (4): 412–416.
Ruse, Michael. 1988b. Response to Williams: Selfishness is not enough. Zygon 23 (4): 413–416.
Ruse, Michael. 2009. Introduction in Thomas Henry Huxley in Evolution and Ethics. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Trivers, Robert L. 1974. Parent-offspring conflict. American Zoologist 1974 (14): 249–264.
Williams, George C. 1988. Huxley’s evolution and ethics in sociobiological perspective. Zygon 23
(4): 383–407.
Chapter 5
Moral Psychology

Abstract Moral psychology has been defined as “the study of human thought and
behavior in ethical contexts”. The rational nature of morality has been questioned by
some moral psychologists who believe emotions are the force behind morality; they
claim we create rational justifications to explain what are essentially emotionally
driven confabulations.

The human brain is susceptible to factors that distort rational moral deliberation.
Though morally similar the trolley and footbridge dilemmas are represented dif-
ferently in the brain and associated with different moral conclusions. Other “extra-
moral” factors that can lead to distortion of rational moral thinking include word
framing effects, unhelpful heuristics, and the absence of consensus definitions of
important concepts.
Humans possess moral intuitions that can react to ethical dilemmas with “quick,
involuntary and automatic responses” in the absence of explicit reasoning. These
intuitions can be useful but they are inflexible and their speed doesn’t allow time for
reasoned scrutiny. Examples of misguided moral intuitions include revulsion against
homosexuality and hatred of foreigners.
de Waal, an eminent scholar of primate behavior, regrets that philosophers have
taken over the role of telling us how to behave from religious dogma or scriptures.
Philosophers prefer principles, logic and reasoning rather than consistency with
human psychology or as he might say, “primate behavior”. Although humans speak
in terms of right and wrong, for animals morality is a matter of what is “acceptable”
and what is “unacceptable”.

Moral Psychology and the Brain

For simpler creatures such as ants and bees sociobiology “seeks to explain behav-
ior by reference to innate biology”. Evolutionary psychology in its study of far
more complex humans has focused on “the psychological mechanisms underlying
behavior” (p. 5, Joyce 2007). Moral psychology has been defined as “the study of

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 45

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_5
46 5 Moral Psychology

human thought and behavior in ethical contexts”. It is multidisciplinary because it

employs terms and concepts from moral philosophy (Doris et al. 2017).
Moral theories, principles and rules as devised by moral scholars typically aim to
be rational and internally coherent; but, to be followed they must first encounter the
human brain, a marvelous organ that is incompletely understood, can keep some of
its work hidden from consciousness, and is subject to inconsistency and irrationality.
Hauser, Young and Cushman speculate there is a moral faculty that, based on the
causes and consequences of actions, makes moral judgments possible. They analo-
gize this to Chomsky’s innate language faculty of universal grammar that provides a
set of principles that allows the development of various languages. They state anal-
ogous faculties may be operative in mathematics, biology, music and, of relevant
interest, morality (Hauser 2006). Their postulated moral faculty delivers verdicts
based on principles that may be inaccessible to consciousness.
Prinz takes a different position and denies the likelihood of an innate system
dedicated to morality. He says “moral judgments may issue from general-purpose
emotion systems and socially transmitted rules and be the result of other than moral
capacities” (Prinz 2007).
It is questionable whether evolution would create a specific structure or brain fac-
ulty dedicated to morality. Many moral behaviors contribute to survival and reproduc-
tion; however, in a world historically plagued by violence, wars and genocide, with
the morally righteous often the victims, it’s questionable whether natural selection,
a process that rewards survival and reproduction, would have selected an anatomic
locus specifically dedicated to the promotion of ordinary moral behavior.
There is an extensive literature on moral psychology; one moral psychology series
of so far five volumes consists of about 2800 pages (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). I will
try to focus on those aspects of moral psychology of most interest and practical value.
The study of moral psychology has led to disturbing evidence that rational moral
decision-making can be influenced by irrelevant extra-moral factors and the irreverent
suggestion that respected moral judgments are little more than moral confabulations.
de Waal, an eminent scholar of primate behavior, regrets that philosophers have
taken over the role of telling us how to behave from religious dogma or scriptures.
Philosophers prefer principles, logic and reasoning rather than working with human
psychology or as he might say, “primate behavior”. Although humans speak in terms
of right and wrong, for animals morality is a matter of what is “acceptable” and what
is “unacceptable”. Transgressions of what is expected likely will elicit a violent
reaction. deWaal specifically criticizes moral philosophy for asking us to treat all
human life equally when every mammal values its own kin and offspring above
all others. His preference is for a philosophy more in tune with human inherited
tendencies (deWaal et al. 2017).
I have speculated the brain has neural circuits that allow us to identify highly
important values worthy of preservation and protection. These values may not always
be consistent with our common notions of morality. This explains why people who
act contrary to ordinary moral standards might believe they are acting morally. Lenin,
whose highest value was success of the Russian Revolution, probably thought he was
Moral Psychology and the Brain 47

acting morally when he said he would prefer the death of hundreds of innocents to
the death of one revolutionary (Sebestyan 2017).

Free Will

Free will has been interpreted as the ability to have done otherwise, that under
identical circumstances we could have made an alternate choice. Free will is about
the power of self-control and stands in contrast to the argument of determinists who
claim that under identical circumstances no one can do otherwise than one actually
does (O’Connor and Christopher 2019). If we adopt the latter perspective free will
becomes an illusion. An implication of what has been a centuries long debate is
that if a person cannot control their behavior and do otherwise, they cannot be held
morally responsible.
“Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism”.
Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral respon-
sibility, “compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility
between moral responsibility and determinism” (McKenna et al. 2018). According
to Dennett neuroscience does a disservice if it claims all is determined because that
will lessen our sense of moral responsibility and lead to undesirable behavior. Neu-
roscientists claim the problem cannot be solved by logical argumentation. Tse, a
neuroscientist, claims the answer will come when we have a better understanding of
how information-processing neural circuits function (Tse 2013).
Dennett claims that “it simply doesn’t matter at all to moral responsibility whether
the agent in question could have done otherwise”. He exempts the situations where
it is obvious the agent could not do otherwise; for example, when a gun is at the head
or when plagued with major mental illness. He quaintly calls these conditions, “local
fatalism”. Dennett notes that in the real world we don’t exempt people from blame
because they couldn’t do otherwise and no defense attorney has mustered expert
testimony that a client committed a dreadful act because of determinism and could
not have done otherwise.
An experiment to prove whether an agent could have done otherwise would require
replication of the identical physical, psychological and cognitive state which is prob-
ably impossible. For Dennett whether someone could do otherwise doesn’t matter
(Dennett 1984).
According to Dennett neuroscience does a disservice if it claims all is deter-
mined because that will lessen our sense of moral responsibility and lead to unde-
sirable behavior. Neuroscientists claim the problem cannot be solved by logical
argumentation.
If we ask what provides our personal identity, it is our brain. It’s not our heart, liver
or kidneys; if they are replaced with transplanted organs our personal identity remains
unchanged. If our actions are determined by our brain; it is virtually determined by
us because our brain largely provides our personal identity. Although the brain may
48 5 Moral Psychology

act at a sub-conscious level it is likely to have been affected by our previous thoughts,
experiences and actions.
As a practical point, free will has been discussed since ancient times, without
definitive resolution. There have been arguments over the definitions of the relevant
concepts and long winded, headache inducing philosophic discussions (McKenna
et al. 2018). Because at this time the answer is largely irrelevant to moral decision-
making I advise the reader not to stay up at night struggling to resolve the weighty
problem of free will. I believe that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, we
should hold people responsible for their actions.

The Distortion of Rational Moral Deliberation

A variety of factors can distort rational moral deliberation. These include moral
intuitions, emotion, how language is employed, heuristics, and inappropriate moral
intuitions.
Moral psychology includes the study of moral intuitions which are “quick, invol-
untary and automatic responses” in the absence of explicit reasoning (Dellantonio
and Remo 2012). Moral intuitions, which have also been called moral sentiments,
stand in contrast to rational thought. Moral intuitions include sympathy, empathy,
compassion, loyalty, contempt, disgust, guilt and conscience.
Kahneman describes intuitions as automatic, efficient, largely unconscious rapid
responses that comes from our “intuitive mind” (Kahneman 2011). Moral intuitions
are evolutionary based “alarm” processes that with electrical speed tell us whether
an action is right or wrong. Moral intuitions are often emotion laden reactions that
explain why, without labored reflection, we might almost immediately determine an
action is morally wrong. Moral intuitions have limitations; they are inflexible and
their speed doesn’t allow time for reasoned scrutiny.
Haidt and Pinker note that actions underpinned by moral intuitions can be either
good or bad.
Leon Kass controversially claimed that the emotion, repugnance, also referred
to as an “appeal to disgust” was a sign of deep wisdom not necessarily explained
by reason (Kass 1997). Sometimes our moral intuitions, including disgust, can be
shown to be “indefensible gut reactions” that cannot be morally justified. Haidt and
Pinker give as examples of indefensible intuitions “revulsion against homosexuality
and racial mixing”, “callousness towards slaves”, and “hatred towards foreigners”
(Haidt and Pinker 2016).

Reason, Emotion and Confabulation

David Hume famously said, “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions”
(Hume 1739). He did not believe reason alone would motivate actions. Greene,
Reason, Emotion and Confabulation 49

apparently agrees and takes a subjective, “emotivist” position, that likely would
make the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant turn over in his grave. Kant was a
deontologist, which means he believed moral judgments should be based on rules,
principles and conscious reasoning, not naked emotion.
Greene turns the tables and says that “evolutionary based intuitions explain deon-
tological ethics”. Although we may think we should not steal, lie or fail to keep
promises because doing so violates a moral rule, our beliefs are propelled by ingrained
moral intuitions and we subsequently “produce rational justifications for emotionally
driven moral judgments”. Greene claims, that an “underlying psychology … is the
hidden essence of deontological philosophy” (Greene 2008).
We are creatures prone to rationalizations of our behavior and deontological phi-
losophy “is a kind of moral confabulation” devised by “especially creative philoso-
phers” who make up a “rationally appealing story”. Deontology is “a natural cogni-
tive expression of our deepest moral emotions” but do not necessarily “reflect deep
rationally discoverable moral truths”. Greene could be correct but his assertions are
troubling to those who believe we depend on reason to make moral judgments, not
on emotion. Greened waffles when he also says, “I don’t believe either approach is
strictly emotional or “cognitive” or even that there is a sharp distinction between
“cognition” and emotion” (Greene 2008).
Despite these qualifications, Greene claims evolution has selected emotion as
the primary enforcer of morality (Greene 2008). Kant’s categorical imperatives,
according to Greene, are not cognitively based; they are a rationalization “driven
largely by intuitive emotional responses”. “The brain fools us into thinking that
our decisions are reasoned when they are beyond our control and emanate from
what T. D. Wilson called our “adaptive unconscious” (Wilson 2002).” Our brains
cleverly dupe us to think illusory entities are real (Evans 2010); the truth is that
deontology is simply “a kind of (moral) confabulation” (Greene 2008). Haidt agrees
and says, “When people don’t know why they are doing something they make up an
explanation” (Haidt 2001). Although we may be inclined to think we should not kill
an innocent person because that violates a moral rule, we act because of ingrained
moral intuitions and “produce rational justifications for emotionally driven moral
judgments”.

Reason and Emotion in the Trolley and Footbridge

Dilemmas

Greene is not exclusively committed to the role of emotion and admits there can be
competition between emotional and cognitive processes; he uses as an example the
trolley and footbridge dilemmas. In a fantasy experiment called, the trolley dilemma,
a runaway trolley whose brakes have failed is headed toward five people who cannot
get off the tracks in time and, if nothing is done, will be killed. The five people can
be saved if the driver flips a switch that diverts the trolley to a side track where it will
50 5 Moral Psychology

kill only one person (Thomson 1976). In this thought experiment most philosophers
and people who have been tested experimentally believe it is morally acceptable to
kill one person to save five lives.
In the footbridge dilemma the situation is morally similar to the trolley dilemma
except to kill one person in order to save five lives it is necessary to push a large
stranger off a footbridge whose big body will alter the course of the train. This will
kill the stranger but save five lives. The prevalent belief is that, in this situation, it is
wrong to push the man off the bridge and kill one person to save five people (Greene
2008).
These experiments illustrate apparent contradictory elements in our moral behav-
ior. In the “trolley dilemma” there is a moral acceptance of flipping a switch that
diverts a runaway trolley from one set of tracks where it would kill five people, to
another set of tracks where it would kill only one person. In the morally similar
“footbridge dilemma“, most people do not find it morally acceptable to push a large
man off a bridge to divert the trolley and kill one person to save five (pp. 112–121,
Hauser 2006).
Greene explains the difference as, pushing someone to their death is “up close and
personal” which triggers an emotional response, whereas flipping a switch is imper-
sonal and associated with a lesser emotional response that doesn’t overwhelm conse-
quentialism. In other words, in the footbridge dilemma the emotional element over-
whelms the rational element. In the trolley dilemma cognitive reasoning is decisive
(Greene 2008).
Mikhail relates moral cognition to “computational theory”. The brain in an uncon-
scious manner takes the input of moral actions and computes “representations of the
deontic status of human acts and omissions that influence its moral output”. Permis-
sibility judgments do not necessarily depend on the superficial properties of an action
description, but on” how that action is mentally represented” in the brain. The trolley
and footbridge dilemmas are morally similar and involve the death of one person to
save five. Throwing a switch in the trolley dilemma and killing one person may be
represented in the brain as a “subsequent and foreseen side effect” whereas in the
footbridge dilemma throwing a man off a bridge to switch tracks may be represented
in the brain as an “unacceptable act of battery” (pp. 81–91, Mikhail 2008). Despite
the similar moral consequences of the two actions they may “trigger distinct mental
representations” (pp. 105–117, Greene 2008a, b).
Although Greene believes emotion predominates in the decision he allows for
some competition between our affective emotional system and our rational cognitive
system and says both can contribute to moral judgments. In the trolley dilemma
a cognitive rational processes wins out; in the footbridge dilemma our emotional
system prevails with the near immediate message, don’t do it! (Cushman et al. 2010).
Reason and Emotion in the Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas 51

Distortions of moral thought have been observed when an action involves an iden-
tified victim versus an “indeterminate statistical” victim. We have a greater emotional
reaction to the death of an identified person than to the deaths of many anonymous
people in a far-away ferry boat disaster. Josef Stalin articulated this when allegedly
he said, “The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic”.
The emotion not to kill an identified individual person may seem irrational in the
footbridge dilemma because we accept that it is permissible to kill one to save five
in the trolley dilemma; however, the general employment of this emotion not to kill
“up front and personal” overall likely results in fewer people being killed.
The emotional capacities that mediate morality such as empathy can also be
employed for immoral ends. Flack and De Waal ironically note “that in order to be
intentionally cruel one needs to understand the effects of one’s behavior on the other:
That empathy can mediate cruelty illustrates that “morality and immorality make use
of the same capacities” (Flack and deWaal 2000)”.
Bleske-Rechek et al. found that moral decisions might be influenced by evolution-
ary factors. When they manipulated data from the trolley dilemma they discovered
people were less likely to kill one to save five if the one person was young, a repro-
ductively viable genetic relative, or a current mate. This has been interpreted to mean
that people may act to preserve and perpetuate their genes, a finding at least consis-
tent with Dawkin’s concept of the selfish gene and the notion of inclusive fitness. The
authors of this study acknowledge their data are derived from hypothetical studies
because obtaining information from real life incidents and manipulating the data is
difficult (Bleske-Rechek et al. 2010). Kahneman describes a second mode of moral
decision-making that is a slower, less efficient, more flexible and more deliberate
cognitive process that emerges from our “reflective mind” (Kahneman 2011). This
is best typified by utilitarian judgments which “are largely driven by cognitive pro-
cesses” that take into account multiple factors and in an actuarial manner calculate
and balance risk and benefit. Utilitarian philosophy seeks to maximize the good,
however that is defined. This usually requires thought, reason and calculation and by
necessity predominates over moral emotion (Greene 2008).

Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language

Framing Effects

The expression of moral thought requires words and concepts. Language is the indis-
pensable medium of moral reasoning. We must be scrupulously careful in the use
of language because how moral dilemmas are phrased, or to use the more technical
term, “framed”, can bias moral thinking and decision-making and inappropriately
influence moral discourse (Edwards et al. 2001). Language has power and its use
warrants careful scrutiny; it should reveal the world as objectively as possible. That
requirement is much easier said than achieved.
52 5 Moral Psychology

Sinnott-Armstrong states a belief is subject to a “word framing effect“ when

that belief depends on which words are used in its description (pp. 47–76, Sinnott-
Armstrong 2008). Predictable shifts in preferences have been observed due to changes
in the formulation of problems. Tversky and Kahneman analogize this to perceptual
changes due to changes in perspective which can alter the apparent relative size
of objects like mountains in the distance. “The relative attractiveness of options
varies when the same decision problem is framed in different ways” (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981).
Available evidence shows that the manner information is presented can have sig-
nificant effects on decision-making (Edwards et al. 2001). In one study actions that
would kill some and not others were presented to two groups with different wording.
One group got a Kill wording,- that an action would kill some; the other group got
a Save wording, that the same action would save some. The results for both groups
were identical in terms of the number living and dying but moral decisions differed
simply based on how the question was phrased. More people chose an action that
would Save rather than Kill even though the outcome was the same with the only
difference being the wording (Petrinovich and O’Neil 1966).
In a similar experiment concerning a policy relevant to Asian flu, experimental
subjects were either told without the policy 400 of 600 people would die; another
group was told that without the policy 200 of the 600 people would be saved. The
experiment revealed subjects found it worse for people to lose their lives than if people
were not saved even though the outcome in both options was the same (pp. 424–425,
Kamm 2007).
In the Trolley dilemma if the case is presented as an unintended consequence
of saving five lives rather than as a means to save five lives more people would be
willing to sacrifice the lone person (Hauser 2006). When framing is used to influence
moral decisions Tversky and Kahneman note that people might alter their preference
if issues are framed differently; they also point out that people are normally unaware
of alternate framing options. Extra-moral framing factors can introduce moral unreli-
ability. How language is used can inappropriately influence moral decision-making.
Tversky and Kahneman consider the purposeful alteration of framing to inappro-
priately affect moral decisions as being an ethically significant act (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981).

Incest

Moral decisions can also be affected by how options are presented (Petrinovich et al.
1993).
Wolf, an anthropologist, describes a 42 year-old single woman who wants to have a
genetic connection with her baby. She is using a donated egg for in vitro fertilization
and asks whether she can request her father be the sperm donor; her concern is
whether the use of her father’s sperm would constitute incest. The fertility clinic
staff also wonders whether they would be violating the incest taboo and hesitated
Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language 53

to proceed. The essence of incest is sexual relations between kin; the woman would
not be engaging in incest because she is not having sexual relations with her father.
Although Wolf believes this would not be biological incest he worries that the word
“incest” is so emotionally charged and disapproving that its mere mention might
discourage the woman from proceeding and perhaps stigmatize a child conceived in
this manner.
The inappropriate use of the word incest transformed an acceptable procedure
into an irrelevant worrisome concern (pp. 67–70, Wolf 2007).

Embryo Donation

Infertile couples who use in vitro fertilization to have children may create excess
embryos that are frozen or may be given to other infertile couples. Brakman notes
that the name given to the donation process has significant conceptual implica-
tions (Brakman 2007). She lists several candidate terms: embryo transfer, embryo
donation, embryo rescue and embryo adoption.
When embryo donation is called embryo adoption the word adoption creates the
impression that the embryo is a child. Majumder quotes Caplan who calls this a “rear
guard attack” on stem cell research (pp. 75–78, Majumder 2007).

Terminal Sedation and Genetically Modified Organisms

Taylor illustrates the intrusive and manipulative potential of language when he

suggests “terminal sedation” should more properly be called “palliative sedation”
because the term “terminal sedation” suggests a form of euthanasia (Taylor 2007). In
the 1990s the pejorative term, Frankenfood, which combines the word Frankenstein
and the word food was created to refer to genetically modified organisms (plants and
animals). The use of the term “Frankenfoods” in reference to genetically modified
organisms is an example of damning, not with scientific data, but by the employment
of emotionally charged language (Magnus 2007).

Fetal Research

Chervenak and McCullough in their discussion of an ethical framework for con-

sidering fetal research explicitly acknowledge the power of language (Chervenak
and McCullough 2007). They caution against using the words “mother”, “father”
and “baby” because those words suggest moral relationships that they believe do
not exist; instead, they advise the words “pregnant woman”, “husband”, “fetus” and
“fetal patient”. Callahan calls their suggestion that only neutral language be used
54 5 Moral Psychology

unrealistic because pregnant women considering fetal surgery do not think of them-
selves as carrying a “fetal patient”; they believe they are carrying a “baby” with a
problem (Callahan 2007). Words have persuasive and manipulative connotations and
we must be wary of their ability to subtly influence independent of facts and reason.

Definitions

How words are defined can have an impact on moral decision-making. Youngner et al.
have written a 339 page book, The Definition of Death, that examines numerous
opinions of the meaning of death, (Youngner et al. 1999). Definitions include the
cardiac/circulatory, whole brain and, higher brain versions.
More recently, Veatch and Ross have written that death is a social construct
with religious, philosophic and social elements (Veatch and Ross 2016). DeVita
and Arnold claim the criteria for death are not simply matters of biologic fact but
“value-laden propositions” (Devita and Arnold 2007). They regret the term, “non-
heart-beating organ donation”, initially attached to their policy of declaring death
using cardiopulmonary criteria prior to organ retrieval. In their discussions Bernat,
DeVita and Arnold confront the distinction between language as a reflection of objec-
tive reality and language distorted by value-laden propositions. Their debate concerns
language, but the consequences may not be trivial. At the opposite end of the spec-
trum that extends from birth to death there is significant and sometimes angry debate
related to abortion and the definition of when life first begins.
Philosophers have long understood that language can be problematic because
conceptual definitions which purport to describe reality are human constructs and
vulnerable to subjective interpretation. Skeptics can be forgiven their doubts about
the value of a bioethics enterprise that cannot find unanimity on the nature of a state,
being dead, that for centuries has been intuitively obvious. In defense of bioethics,
the circumstances of modern medicine ask it not only to define established death
but also—and here is the difficulty—the first moment of death. In the absence of
a consensus definition moral discourse can become controversial and lead to sig-
nificant practical problems; this has been especially relevant in the field of organ
transplantation.
Morality can be distorted when normative questions are presented as if they were
matters of fact. In transplantation the Dead Donor Rule has been accused of being
deceptive because a potential organ donor may be declared dead when the relevant
criteria used to determine death are controversial. The notion of whole brain death
has been accused of being a “legal fiction” used for expediency; a whole brain
determination may be false, though probably in a minor way, because there may be
some persistent brain activity, for example hypothalamic function. Technically, this
means the whole brain is not dead.
Bernat defends the concept of whole brain death, “an unfortunate and mislead-
ing term”, that refers to the use of neurological criteria to determine death (Bernat
2007). He rejects as a “contrived redefinition of death” a higher brain criterion
Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language 55

that would declare death when consciousness and cognition were permanently lost.
Bernat argues that failure to agree on a uniform criterion of death and allowing the
removal of organs for transplantation as a justified form of killing would be bad
public policy. Moral discourse depends on language which can influence discussion
independent of relevant moral facts (Bernat 2007).
Words are often used to generate emotions that support or undermine an argument.
Veatch has contemplated the future widespread availability of a total artificial heart
and asks whether its removal and the associated cessation of the heart-beats that
have defined life would constitute murder (Veatch 2007). He recognizes “killing”
and “murder” are words with a dubious reputation and that their use could damn
an action he approves. To avoid the implication of direct intended killing Veatch
proposes changing the definition of death to the loss of brain function, instead of
cardiac function.
Steinberg, says removal of an artificial heart resembles killing; however, instead of
changing the definition of death he suggests changing the nature of the patient’s exis-
tence to “medically contingent life” (Steinberg 2007). At the same time he expresses
caution about the use of manipulated language to help justify a medical intervention.
Veatch and Steinberg agree that removal of a total artificial heart may be justified
when that intervention is deemed inappropriately burdensome. Although changing
the definition of death or the nature of a patient’s existence might help avoid the
stigma of “killing”, it also alerts us that language can be used to by-pass or minimize
moral discourse (Veatch 2007).
Spack describes illness as susceptible to mislabeling when he argues that “gender
dysphoria” has erroneously been called a psychiatric condition (Spack 2007). The
Soviets were similarly guilty of mislabeling language when political dissidents were
locked up under the pretext of a psychiatric diagnosis. Hughes criticizes the medical
model used to classify individuals with gender dysphoria and advocates “morpho-
logical liberationism” (Hughes 2007). He objects to “passé binary assumptions” that
linguistically divide gender into male and female and argues for recognition of var-
ious intermediate “ambiguous gender positions”. The concept of gender dysphoria,
can therefore be defined as a psychiatric condition, a medical condition that merits
treatment or the reflection of a sexual preference that merits respect.
I’ve presented examples of linguistic issues to illustrate that rational moral
deliberation can be distorted, sometimes subtly, by the manipulation of language.

Other Extra-Moral Influences

“Psychological mechanisms productive of adaptive behavior in a prehistoric past

may, when operating in creatures no longer living in such an environment, result
in surprising and/or maladaptive behavior” (p. 9, Joyce 2007). Moral intuitions are
shaped by culture, evolution and experience which can change over time with the
persistence of intuitions that are no longer adaptive. Our brains evolved when our
ancestors did not have contact with people in distant places leaving us without strong
56 5 Moral Psychology

emotional ties to people not in proximity. That helps explain, at least in part, why
Americans tend to be less upset about a bombing in Afghanistan than they would
have been if San Francisco had been bombed (Greene 2008).
Underlying beliefs can influence moral reasoning. Specialism was found to be a
deep seated tendency with more people benefitting humans, even very old humans,
over animals, even animals in danger of extinction. To a greater extent than men,
women’s moral thinking is based on attachment and affection rather than concepts
of justice. There are certain near universal moral beliefs such as a repugnant attitude
toward cannibalism, incest and parricide, as well as attitudes that favor kin and
members of the group to which one belongs (Petrinovich et al. 1993).

Heuristics

Heuristics in morality can be both useful and problematic. Heuristics are a quick,
practical approach to problem solving that can be understood as “rules of thumb”.
In the moral sphere they avoid the difficult work of complex reasoning. Gigerenzer,
who relates heuristics to a species of moral intention describes an incident in Poland
in 1942 (Gigerenzer 2008). The older, “ordinary men” of Reserve Police Battalion
101 were awakened at dawn and taken to the outskirts of a small Polish Village where
women, children and elderly Jews were to be shot. The police were given the option
not to participate, yet of the 500 policemen who viewed the impending massacre
of innocent Jews with horror only twelve refused to participate. Gigerenzer says the
men participated in the killing because of a social heuristic, “Don’t break ranks”. The
heuristic they followed was an example of the tremendous pressure of peer group
norms. They killed to avoid breaking ranks (Browning 1993).
Another problematic heuristic is the default rule: If there is a default, do noth-
ing about it. In countries where potential organ donors are assumed to be donors
unless they opt out, more organs are obtained because few actively opt out. In coun-
tries where it is necessary to opt in fewer people indicate a willingness to donate
Moral heuristics are fast and avoid complicated decision making; they sometimes
are morally appropriate, but not always (Gigerenzer 2008).
The attachment of various metaphors to illness was criticized by Sontag in her
classic work, Illness As Metaphor. She uses tuberculosis as one example. The disease
has been called consumption; it was called a romantic disease, a disease of the
soul, an edifying and refined disease, a disease emanating from love; deaths from
tuberculosis have been called noble. The association of illness with psychological
traits risks making victims feel their illness was due to their feelings (Sontag 2001).
Moral Obligation 57

Moral Obligation

I include moral obligation in the discussion of moral psychology because it is a

concept that may cause a person to struggle over whether their values demand action.
A moral obligation has been defined as, a duty which one owes and which he ought to
perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfill. A person asked to donate one of
their kidneys or part of their liver to a relative may struggle over whether the donation
is a moral obligation. The psychological consequences of failing to perform a moral
obligation can be the pangs of a guilty conscience and the fear that you might be
considered an immoral person. Beauchamp and Childress consider moral obligations
as an aspect of the principle of beneficence (Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Gert,
who doesn’t like the word obligation subsumes the concept of moral obligations under
his moral rule, Do Your Duty. Gert uses the word duty in the context of professionals
and others whose job entails specific defined obligations (Gert 1988).
Philosophers have provided criteria that determine when a moral obligation exists.
Gert’s three indications for a moral obligation are: 1. one is in physical proximity to
someone in need of help to avoid a serious evil, usually death or serious injury. 2.
One is in a unique or close to unique position to provide that help. 3. It would be
relatively cost free for one to provide that help.
Beauchamp and Childress agree with Gert’s three points and add the benefits the
person at risk gains outweigh the harms or burdens to the rescuer.
A danger with the concept of moral obligation is that the list of what constitutes a
moral obligation can be expanded. Being accused of violating a moral obligation can
be a cause of shame and guilt. The claim of a moral obligation should be justified.
Singer did this in his 1971 article, Famine, Affluence and Morality (Singer 1972).
His definition of a moral obligation is: “if it is in our power to prevent something
bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,
we ought, morally to do it”. If a child is drowning in a shallow pond we ought to pull
the child out even if our shoes get muddy. Most people would agree with that.
Singer’s 1971 article was a plea for the people in East Bengal dying of malnutrition.
He noted the British government valued the development of the supersonic airplane,
Concord, more than thirty times the lives of nine million refugees. Singer argues
that we instinctively prefer to help those who are close to us but what we should
do is ignore the factor of distance. Singer said that at least nine million destitute
refugees were in danger of dying and the world did relatively little to help. Singer
says we should help even if we are not in a unique position to help, even if millions
of other people can help that does not eliminate our obligation to help. That decades
have past and Singer’s suggestions have not had much impact illustrates both practical
considerations and our moral intuitions. Also, if we keep giving to those less fortunate
our own material state will ultimately decline.
The statement that we have a moral obligation can be manipulative because failure
to meet the obligation can cause guilt and shame. Moral obligations have been sug-
gested that are less convincing, for example the obligation to participate in biomedical
research (Schaefer et al. 2009) Singer asks, “ Where should we draw the line between
58 5 Moral Psychology

conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required”. Morally
worthy actions that don’t meet the bar of an obligation have been referred to as moral
ideals.

Conclusion

Some moral psychologists endorse the counterintuitive claim that our emotions,
not reason, are the ultimate arbiter in moral deliberation. Greene and other moral
psychologists claim that after making a moral decision we conjure an explanation
for our decision; however, our passions (emotions) subjugate reason. The respected
philosopher David Hume in the eighteenth century, agreed and said reason ought to
be the slave of the passions. Such thoughts are probably heresy to moral philosophers
who prefer principles, logic and reasoning. The conflict over the primacy of reason
or emotion in morality illustrates how much is not definitively known concerning the
nature of morality. I suspect both reason and emotion play roles in moral deliberation.
de Waal who has worked extensively with primates and is a renowned expert on
primate behavior considers human psychology to be “primate behavior”. Based on
how primates behave de Waal believes the terms, acceptable and unacceptable, are
more appropriate moral judgments than right and wrong. This sounds like a rejection
of reason and the acceptance of the moral behavior of chimpanzees; though I suspect
de Waal is advocating morality as what other humans are willing to accept. It may be
realistic to believe that valid moral ideas should be acceptable to people; however, it
would be ludicrous to try to resolve a moral dilemma by asking whether a chimpanzee
would accept a proposed solution. I doubt whether that is what deWaal had in mind.
We have evolved from a primate brain and if primates behavior is determined
by what they find acceptable, perhaps we should want our moral solutions to be
acceptable.
Morality is susceptible to non-moral influences. Many of these are linguistic. How
we phrase moral dilemmas can, independent of legitimate moral concerns, influence
outcomes. This has been referred to as word framing effects. Morality can also be
traumatized by the lack of consensus definitions. Other non-moral interfering factors
include heuristics and the imposition of moral obligations that affect our conscience
and may get us to do things we might not otherwise do. We should be extremely
cautious about the use of language in moral discourse because manipulated language
can distort both meaning and moral discourse.
References 59

References

Beauchamp, Tom L., and Childress, James F. 1989. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3rd edn.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bernat, James L. 2007. Defending challenges to the concept of “brain death”. In Biomedical Ethics:
A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David,
pp. 78–82. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Bleske-Rechek, April, Lyndsay A. Nelson, Jonathan P. Baker, Mark W. Remiker, Brandt Sarah J.
2010. Evolution and the trolley problem: People Save five over one unless the one is young, genet-
ically related, or a romantic partner. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology 4
(3): 115–127.
Brakman, Sarah-Vaughan. 2007. Embryo adoption. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 70–74. Hanover
and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Browning, Christopher R. 1993. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution
in Poland. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Callahan, Sidney. 2007. Ethics and fetal research. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 90–94. Hanover
and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Chervanak, Frank A., and Laurence B. McCullough. 2007. An ethical framework for fetal research.
In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology,
ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 87–90. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Cushman, Fiery, Liane Young, and Joshua D. Greene. 2010. Multi-system moral psychology. Oxford
Scholarship Online. In The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford and London: Oxford University
Press, pp. 47–71. Available at http://simbi.kemenag.go.id/pustaka/images/materibuku/the-moral-
psychology-handbook.pdf. Accessed 26 Mar 2019.
Dellantonio, Sara, and Job, Remo. 2012. Moral intuitions versus moral reasoning. A philosophical
analysis of the explanatory models intuition relies on. In Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Springer Link.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984. I could not have done otherwise—So what. The Journal of Philosophy 81
(1): 553–565.
Devita, Michael A., and Robert M. Arnold. 2007. The concept of brain death. In Biomedical Ethics:
A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David,
pp. 82–86. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
deWaal, Frans, Hanno Sauer, Paolo Haywood, Verena Wieser, Edouard Machery, and John M. Doris.
2017. Current Perspectives in Moral Psychology, eds. Voyer, Benjamin G., and Tor Tarantola.
Springer Link. Available at https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-61849-4_8.
Accessed 26 Mar 2019.
Doris, John, Stich, Stephen, Phillips, Jonathan and Walmsley, Lachlan. “Moral Psychology: Empir-
ical Approaches”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia (Winter 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/moral-psych-emp/.
Edwards, Adrian, Glyn Elwyn, Judith Covey, Elaine Matthews, Roisin Pill. 2001. Presenting risk
information a review of the effects of framing and other manipulations on patient outcomes.
Journal of Health Communication 6 (1): 61–82.
Evans, Jonathan St. BT. 2010. Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Flack, Jessica C., and Frans B.M. de Waal. 2000. Being nice is not a building block of morality:
Response to commentary discussion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1–2): 76.
Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. Oxford and New York
Oxford University Press.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2008. Moral Intuition: Fast and Frugal Heuristics in Moral Psychology, ed.
Sinnott-Armstrong, vol. 2. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
60 5 Moral Psychology

Greene, Joshua D. 2008a. Reply to Mikhail and Timmons. In Moral Psychology, ed. Sinnott-
Armstrong, vol. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
Greene, Joshua D. 2008b. The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul in Moral Psychology, ed. Sinnott-
Armstrong, vol. 3 Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and it’s rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to
moral judgment. Psychological Review 108: 814–834.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Steven Pinker. 2016. Moral Psychology: An Exchange. New York Review of
Books April 7.
Hauser, Marc D. 2006. Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong, pp. 112–121. New York:
Harper Perennial.
Hughes, James J. 2007. Beyond the medical model of gender dysphoria to morphological self-
determination. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine
and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 99–103. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England
Press.
Hume, David A. 1739. Treatise of human nature. Oxford Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: Massachusetts and London, England
The MIT Press.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kamm, F.M. 2007. Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kass, Leon. 1997. The Wisdom of Repugnance New Republic 216: 17–26.
Magnus, David. 2007. Genetically modified organisms. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 150–153. Hanover
and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Majumder, Mary. 2007. The Politics of Embryo Transfer in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issue in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David. Lebanon NH: University
Press of New England.
McKenna, Michael, and D. Justin Coates. “Compatibilism”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy (Winter 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/
entries/compatibilism/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019.
Mikhail, John. 2008. Moral cognition and computational theory. In Moral Psychology: The Neu-
roscience of Morality, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong, vol. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,
England: The MIT Press. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1029511. Accessed 26 Mar 2019.
O’Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. 2019. “Free Will”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2019/entries/freewill/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019.
Petrinovich, Lewis, and O’Neill. 1966. Patricial influence of wording and framing effects on moral
intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology 17: 145–171.
Petrinovich, Lewis, Patricia O’Neill, and Matthew Jorgensen. 1993. An empirical study of moral
intuitions: Toward an evolutionary ethics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64 (3):
467–478.
Schaefer, G. Owen, J. Emanuel Ezekiel, and Alan Wertheimer. 2009. The obligation to participate
in biomedical research. JAMA 302 (1): 67–72.
Sebestyan, Victor. 2017. Lenin: The Man, The Dictator, and the Master. Pantheon Books.
Singer, Peter. 1972. Famine, affluence and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1): 229–243.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008. Framing Moral Intuitions in Moral Psychology, vol. 2. Cambridge
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Sontag, Susan. 2001. Illness as Metaphor. New York: Picador USA.
Spack, Norman. 2007. Transgenderism. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to
Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 95–99. Hanover and Lebanon:
University of New England Press.
References 61

Taylor, Robert M. 2007. Is terminal sedation really Euthanasia? In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisci-
plinary Approach To Moral Issues In Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 238–240.
Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1976. Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist 59 (2):
204–217.
Tse, Peter. (2013). The Neural Basis of Free Will, pp. 1–10. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel, Kahneman. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of
choice. Science 211: 453–458.
Veatch, Robert M. 2007. The total artificial heart: Is paying for it immoral and stopping it murder?
In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology,
ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 58–62. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press.
Veatch, Robert M., and Laine Ross. 2016. Defining death: The case for choice. Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Wilson, T.D. 2002. Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
Wolf, Arthur P. 2007. Is this incest? In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to
Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 67–69. Hanover and Lebanon:
University of New England Press.
Youngner, Stuart, Robert Arnold, and Renie Shapiro. 1999. The Definition of Death. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Chapter 6
Morality and Culture

Abstract Culture has been defined as “an integrated system of learned behaviors
which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of
biological inheritance”. Cultural norms are protected and preserved by the deeply
discrediting process of the stigmatization and the punishment of those who violate
cultural norms.

Moral relativism is the position that there are no objective moral truths and morality
should be judged in the context of social and cultural customs. It has been claimed
that all cultures have equal validity. This allows a moral judgment to be true in one
culture and false in another. A variety of disturbing practices, such as honor killings
and female genital mutilation, have been described in some cultures. Although we
may not be able to objectively confirm the intrinsic truth of morality, that does not
make morality irrelevant and necessarily subservient to cultural norms.

The Definition of Culture

The term culture can be traced back to the Latin term cultura which referred to “the
cultivation or rearing of a crop, an act of promoting growth in plants”. The German
term kultur first used in 1914 referred to, “ideals of civilization as conceived by the
Germans” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2019). Today there are various definitions
of culture.
Culture is a theoretical concept to explain a wide range of human behavior. Geertz
emphasized the important influence of culture on our conception of man. He said,
“man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take
culture to be one of those webs”. He also said, “we are unfinished animals who finish
ourselves through culture and our ideas and our values are cultural products” (Geertz
1973).
Kroeber and Kluckhohn collected an impressive 164 different definitions of cul-
ture. Culture was given its first modern definition by Tyler in 1871. He said, “culture
is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom,

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 63

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_6
64 6 Morality and Culture

and any other capabilities and habits, acquired by man as a member of society”
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952).
Hofstede defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which dis-
tinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. Spencer-
Oatey said culture is “a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life,
beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioral conventions that are shared by a group of
people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s behavior and his/her
interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behavior” (Spencer-Oatey 2008).
Kluckhohn (1905–1960), a cultural anthropologist, kept his definitions of culture
relatively simple: “the total way of life of a people, the social legacy the individual
acquires from his group” and “that part of the environment that is the creation of
man” (p. 17, Kluckhohn 1949).
Hoebel describes culture as “an integrated system of learned behavior patterns
which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of bio-
logical inheritance (Boroch 2013). Kluckhohn claims morality is a human universal
as is language and that all cultures have moral systems. He provides a definitional list
of the characteristics of culture. These qualities are learned in childhood and people
judge themselves by how they conform to these standards.
Kluckhohn’s cultural characteristics include: (1) the total life way of a people
(2) the social legacy the individual acquires from his group (3) that part of the
environment that is the creation of man (4) an abstraction derived from observed
behavior (5) a way of thinking, feeling and believing (6) the distinctive ways of life
in a group of people. Kluckhohn says, “culture is a theory that helps us understand
a mass of otherwise chaotic facts” (pp. 17–44, Kluckhohn 1949).
Fowers and Richardson define culture as “the set of shared meanings that make
social life possible. They consist of meanings and assumptions that orient members of
a culture and structure their lives through norms and standards of behavior” (Fowers
and Richardson 1996).
Shweder, a cultural anthropologist, proposed that on a world-wide basis there is “a
big three of morality”. There is an ethics of autonomy based on moral concepts such
as harms, rights and justice. There is an ethics of community with moral concepts such
as duty, hierarchy and interdependence. And there is an ethics of divinity based on
moral concepts such as natural order, sacred order, sanctity, sin and pollution With the
exception of autonomy Shweder’s categories differ from the typical categorizations
of moral philosophers. The content of these categories vary both within and across
cultural groups (pp. 18–21, Schweder 2007).
A complex society may include a variety of cultures and people can belong to
more than one culture; for example, by religion and socio-economic status. A person
may adhere to a culture related to their profession and a different culture related to
their religion. A person’s cultures may conflict with each other; for example, living
in a society accepting of abortion and belonging to a religion that prohibits abortion
(pp. 3–4, Spencer-Oatey 2008).
Culture may change over time. Tribes that once were head hunters have abandoned
the practice. In the United States physicians once adopted a paternalistic attitude
toward patients, often not informing them of important facts concerning their health
The Definition of Culture 65

and not discussing the various treatment options. That has changed and physicians
now accept the need for informed patient consent and shared decision- making.
Moral philosophers and cultural anthropologists are both interested in morality.
Moral philosophers tend to focus on the rational foundations and universality of
ethics, largely stripped of cultural influences. Their focus has been on what ought
to be the case. Many moral philosophers would say that morality is universal and at
most minimally influenced by culture; they are more interested in what should be
the case, than what is the case. Cultural anthropologists believe culture is important
in the shaping of morality.

Culture and Evolution

It has been argued that natural selection works at both the level of the gene and the
level of the group. When Darwin wrote his theory of evolution knowledge of the
gene did not exist. Joyce notes that for cultural group selection to exist there must be
some uniformity within groups and variability between groups. As an example, he
postulates that groups that punish non-reciprocators will have a survival advantage.
This is based on his presumption that groups that accept a degree of self-sacrifice for
the welfare of group members will have a survival advantage. Joyce believes both
genetic and cultural factors are subject to natural selection.
The interaction of culture and genetics was described in West Africa where the
cultivation of yams led to clearing of the rain forest. That in turn left more standing
water for malarial mosquitoes to breed; the cultural preference for yams ultimately
favored the sickle cell genetic allele which provides protection against malaria. The
practices of a social group can have evolutionary consequences and interact with
genetic evolution (pp. 40–44, Joyce 2007).
Moral epistemologists have viewed “culture as taking off with its own units of
heredity” (Dawkins 1976). Dawkins has called these units memes; they are cultural
ideas that can change over time, replicate and be transmitted. In contrast to genes they
don’t contain DNA but memes are involved in the struggle for existence. Dawkins
says culture can change over time and be transmitted to future generations; “memes
reproduce the content of their immediate predecessors, as modified by those particular
intellectual novelties which were selected out” (Ruse 2009). Examples of memes
include religion, the internet meme and cultural positions such as “everyone should
be treated equally” and “don’t use contraception”. Memes can be adaptive or, like
racism be harmful (Dawkins 1976; Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c).
E. O. Wilson believes culture sits on top of our biology, the biology informing if
not actually determining the culture. Wilson famously likened biology “as the twig
and culture as something that can bend it somewhat but not too far or it would resist
or snap” (Wilson 1978). Although culture plays an important role, both Darwin and
Wilson favor the influence of biology over that of culture (Ruse 2009).
66 6 Morality and Culture

Stigma

Cultural norms are protected and preserved by stigmatizing those who violate them.
Goffman defined stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”, with a stigma-
tized person reduced “from a whole and usual person to a tainted and discounted
one”. Stigma marks a person or group as flawed. Deviation from expected behav-
ior is associated with discomfort and withdrawal of love and protection, or worse.
Stigmatized groups have included the mentally ill, people with HIV/AIDS and homo-
sexuals. When a group is stigmatized there can be discriminatory cultural practices
(Yang et al. 2007).
Stigma in society is a moral issue because it damages a person’s self-esteem,
mental health, and ability to achieve; it identifies a person as flawed, which limits their
social prospects and increases the sense that life is uncertain and dangerous. Cross
cultural studies identify stigma as a universal phenomenon. The stigmatized are often
subject to unfavorable moral judgments, lowered moral standing and discredited.
Stigma is a moral issue for Yang et al. because it threatens “what is most at stake”
(Yang et al. 2007).

Multiculturalism

The term multiculturalism refers to the challenge of cultural and religious diversity
in societies. Multiculturalism has also been used as an umbrella term to reference
marginalized groups such as women, African Americans and LGBT people (Song
2017). Rather than suggest members of a minority group assimilate into the “melting
pot” of the dominant culture, multiculturalism tends to advocate that members of a
minority groups should be able to maintain their distinctive identities and practices
(Song 2017).

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism has been interpreted as what determines right and wrong is the
attitude of one’s culture; it is the belief that there are no objective moral truths
and morality should be judged in the context of social and cultural customs. Moral
relativism claims that members of different cultures can make rationally justified but
opposing moral statements (Claes 1990).
“Most often multiculturalism is associated with an empirical thesis that there are
deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or
justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of
some person or group of persons”. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is also connected
with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with
Moral Relativism 67

whom we morally disagree, The most critical message of support for multiculturalism
is that the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute
or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of
persons (Gowans 2018).
The impetus for moral relativism came from early twentieth century cultural
anthropologists. Ruth Benedict (1887–1948), a student of Franz Boas, who has been
called the father of American anthropology, said cultures, like individuals, have a
more or less persistent pattern of thought and action. She believed that each culture
had its own moral imperatives and that it is wrong to disparage a culture different
from one’s own. For Benedict morality was relative to the culture in which it operated
and that all cultures have equal validity (Gowans 2018). Benedict said, “The purpose
of anthropology is to make the world safe for human differences” (Wheeler 2017).
Moral relativism implies a moral judgment may be true in one culture and false in
another.
Prinz provides a twenty-first century justification of moral relativism. He claims
that conflicting moral beliefs can both be true and that moral relativism is a plausible
doctrine. Although he acknowledges there are cross-cultural moral similarities, he
notes various cultural beliefs across time that might be foreign to us. These include
cannibalism, killing for pleasure as done by Roman gladiators, and cultures that
engage in extreme forms of body modification, such as scarification. He also notes
that for a thousand years foot binding, which involved excruciating crippling of
young girls was practiced in China. He cites other practices including polygamy,
arranged marriages and the marriage of young children that some of us might find
unacceptable.
Prinz contends, “With morals, unlike scientific knowledge, there is no well rec-
ognized standard that can be used to test, confirm or correct when disagreements
arise”. He says reason and empirical observation do not explain moral variation. He
believes, “all values, at bottom, are emotional attitudes”. For perspective he notes
earlier cultures might look with superiority at our current grotesque acceptance of
weapons of mass destruction and capitalistic exploitation. Prinz does not exclude a
role for reason to tell us the facts of a case, but he claims reason cannot tell us what
ought to be.
An objective basis for morality could come from three sources, all denied by
Prinz. They include a benevolent God, innate values built into human nature and
rational principles that all rational people could accept. For Prinz morality has no
objective basis. (pp. 167–189, Prinz 2013).
Joyce criticizes Prinz’s moral relativism as emasculating the effectiveness of the
role of objective morality in motivating behavior. He says that it is “the strong
inescapable objective categoricity with which moral judgments are imbued that
allows them to play this role effectively” (Joyce 2009).
Using examples of different moral behaviors in different cultures Prinz says that
morality is not innate in the brain and not totally determined by biology. He supports
his claim that there is no universal morality with examples. Most cultures have a
norm against killing the innocent. But this norm, like other commonly accepted
norms, is often violated. The Yanomamo of the Amazon raid and kill the first man
68 6 Morality and Culture

they encounter. The Ilongot of Luzon in the Philippines practiced headhunting. The
rule against incestuous sexual relations may seem to be a universal but is violated
in many cultures. The Thonga of South Africa are permitted to have sex with their
daughters before a hippopotamus hunt. The Zoroastrians of ancient Iran encouraged
parent-child and brother-sister incest (Prinz 2009).
Prinz takes the variation in morality as products of “cultural evolution under
the pressure of social and ecological conditions that may be specific to a particu-
lar group”. He believes these cultural differences cannot be resolved by reason and
concludes “cross-cultural moral disputes cannot rationally be adjudicated”. He con-
cludes “there is not a single true morality”, and there is no way to resolve moral
disputes using reason. He concludes “moral convictions are cultivated by human
societies” (Prinz 2009).
The best Prinz argument for moral relativism is that by having no single true
morality we can become more humble and tolerant of the values of others. He claims
relativism is consistent with moral progress and says moral relativism doesn’t mean
anything goes because, “values that are destructive cannot last”. Of note, he doesn’t
say those destructive values are wrong because his moral relativism doesn’t permit
criticism of other cultures.
In response to whether relativism means we cannot criticize Hitler and the culture
of Nazi Germany he claims Hitler’s actions were partly based on false pernicious
beliefs. Prinz says “the problem with Hitler was not that his values were false and
he seems unable to bring himself to call Hitler immoral”. To describe, arguably the
most immoral man in history, who killed on an industrial scale millions of Jews,
homosexuals, Romas, and innocent civilians and be unable to use the word immoral
shows that a determined defense of a questionable theory can lead to dark places.
Prinz’s position that we should accept and respect all cultural views because we
can’t objectively define one true morality doesn’t make sense. Humans have not
evolved to require scientific truth for all their beliefs and actions. Billions of people
believe in God and their actions are influenced by that religious belief even though
the existence of God cannot be empirically and objectively proven. Similarly, moral
behavior does not depend on absolute truth. I will elaborate a justification of morality
in a subsequent chapter.
Some moral philosophers believe, contrary to Prinz and other moral relativists,
there is a common morality that permeates all cultures. Gert describes moral rules
that “are open to all rational persons in all societies at all times” Gert’s rules focus on
the prevention of evil, and include don’t kill, don’t lie, and don’t steal (pp. 62–76, Gert
1966). Turner joins Prinz in denying the existence of a common morality. Turner says
historical, sociological and anthropological evidence does not support the claim that
common moral norms are shared by all rational and moral people. He denies “broad
empirical support for a common morality through time and across different cultural
settings” (see Chap. 14). Turner says “we underestimate plural moral traditions” and
the powerful role of “religious and cultural norms”. He concludes ethics has its limits
and we are better off recognizing that (pp. 42–47, Turner 2007).
The most vexing question related to multiculturalism is whether we should respect
the practices of a culture because we have an obligation to tolerate other cultures
Moral Relativism 69

or whether we should subject them to independent ethical scrutiny. I will describe

a variety of cultural practices; the reader can decide whether their cultural origin
justifies tolerance.

Cultural Practices

It’s been suggested there probably are more similarities between cultures than dif-
ferences. A series of practices and behaviors that deviate from ordinary moral norms
follows. Consider whether these practices merit respect because of moral relativism
or do some of these practices so egregiously violate moral rules they should be
rejected?
Practices that might make us uneasy include polygamy, suicide as a requirement
of honor, severe punishment for blasphemy, and adultery Although we may have
difficulty understanding the behavior of other peoples, the reverse is also true. In
the United States and other countries monogamy, including serial monogamy, is
the dominant practice. Women do not feel comfortable sharing their husband with
another woman. A Koryak woman in Siberia would have trouble understanding why
a woman would be so undesirous of female companionship that she would restrict
her husband to one wife (Kluckhohn 1949).
Some cultures prohibit sexual activity before marriage, whereas a Polynesian
adolescent who was not sexually promiscuous would be abnormal. Homosexuality
has been permitted in the Greco-Roman world and various primitive tribes but dis-
approved elsewhere. Cultures start with different moral assumptions. The Christian
tradition starts with the assumption that sex is “inherently nasty as well as danger-
ous”. Other cultures assume that sex is natural and good (Kluckhohn 1949). Shweder,
who spent time in India, notes that in India the category of bad acts includes a widow
eating fish, a woman having a conversation with her husband’s older brother and
parents refusing to sleep in the same bed as their children (Shweder 2007).
In the Indonesian village of Lihokbani, in the East of Aceh district, a 25 year-old
widow was gang raped by eight men simply because they found her with a married
man in her house. The man was reportedly beaten and both the man and the woman
were doused with sewage before being turned over to the Islamic police. The head
of Islamic Sharia law in the district, Ibrahim Latief, recommended both of them be
caned nine times simply for being in the same house together (New York Times
2014).
In several countries physical displays of affection in public view violate Islamic
tradition and Sharia law. Amnesty International reported on April 20, 2018 that in
Aceh province in Indonesia men and women were caned in front of hundreds of
spectators for showing affection in public. Amnesty International calls caning an
inhuman form of torture (Amnesty International News 2018).
In Dubai displays of affection between couples in public places does not fit local
customs and culture and can be punished by imprisonment. A law in Nigeria pre-
scribes ten years in prison for those who “directly or indirectly make a public show
70 6 Morality and Culture

of same sex relationships” (Nossitter 2014). Rules also exist regarding acceptable
styles of dress, swearing, dancing in public and other aspects of life.
Farzana Parveen, a twenty-five year old pregnant Pakistani woman, was beaten to
death because she had defied her family’s wishes that she marry a cousin chosen by
her parents and instead married the man of her choice, Muhammad Iqbal, a widower
from a neighboring village. To preserve the family’s honor her brother fired a gun at
her, but missed; he then beat her on the head with bricks from a nearby construction
site. A crowd of about 30 men, including her father reportedly witnessed the beating
but did not intervene. This so-called “honor killing” took place in rural Pakistan and
was attributed to deep rooted cultural norms and strong tribal traditions that are often
precipitated by marrying without familial consent. In 2013 in Pakistan, 869 women
were stabbed, shot, beaten or burned to death in honor killings, usually at the hands
of family (Gillani and Walsh 2014).
An honor killing has been defined as the homicide of a member of a family due
to the perpetrator’s belief that the victim has brought shame or dishonor upon the
family, often by refusing to accept an arranged marriage, being in a relationship not
approved by the family, having sex outside marriage, being a rape victim, violating
the principles of a community, having non-heterosexual relations or renouncing a
faith (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c).
The victim of an honor killing typically is a young woman; often honor killings are
designed to control female sexual propriety, with men less often victims. The view
of women as being under the authority of their male kin is deeply culturally rooted.
Honor misconduct can bring shame to a family who kill to regain social status. Data
on the incidence of honor killings is difficult to obtain because many honor killings go
unreported. Honor killings are most likely to occur in lower economic class families,
in rural and economically disadvantaged areas, and be associated with families who
have limited formal education. The killer is usually the youngest brother of the victim
or a male cousin. Honor killings are a lesson to others of the cost of deviating from
the norm. In some parts of the world honor killings are distinguished from other
murders, inadequately investigated by the police, and perpetrators receive lenient
sentencing (Kulczycki and Winddle 2012).
In her book, A Family Conspiracy, Phyllis Chester, comments on her observations
about honor killing: “an honor killing is the cold blooded murder of girls and women
simply because they are female….Every girl has to keep proving that she is not
dishonoring her family; even so, an innocent girl can be falsely accused and killed
on the spot”. She also says, “Her virginity belongs to the family and is a token of their
honor. If she is not a virgin, the shame belongs to her family and they must cleanse
themselves of it with blood; her blood”. From a tribal point of view this shame and
honor code enforces social stability, but at the price of individual rights and personal
freedom. Chester adds, “any family that fails to kill a disobedient girl or woman
will find that no one will marry their other children or deal with them economically”
(Chester 2008).
In Afghanistan strict social traditions trump new laws and rights. Girls must remain
covered and usually can go out only in the company of close male relatives. Zakia
and Mohammed declared their love for each other without parental permission. That
Cultural Practices 71

made them outcasts and marked for death “for dishonoring their families, especially
hers”. A university professor said, “The story of true love in Afghanistan is the story
of death” (Nordland 2014).
In Swang Gulgulia Dhoura, a remote poor village in India, the head man has
adjudicated disputes between neighbors. In 2014 a young man groped a married
woman in her hut. The victim’s husband took the young man’s thirteen year old
sister into the woods where he raped her. Although villagers heard the girl’s cry for
help they did nothing. There have been other examples in India of sexual assault used
as a form of “eye for an eye” village punishment (Barry 2014).
A Ugandan newspaper, The Red Pepper tabloid, published a list of Uganda’s “200
top gays” a day after the country passed an anti-gay law which punishes gay sex with
up to life in prison. The list included a Catholic priest. A similar list published
by a tabloid in 2011 resulted in the killing of David Kato, a prominent gay activist
The criminalization of homosexuality was denounced by John Kerry, then the United
States Secretary of State as a violation of human rights (Associated Press in Kampala
2014).
In Egypt, where widespread repudiation of homosexuality has been reported
homosexuals are at risk of imprisonment (Londono 2014). Homosexuality is ille-
gal in many countries and in some carry the death penalty. An op-ed in a major
Nigerian newspaper asked, “Are gay people similar to Animals?” The President of
Nigeria in justifying his government’s harsh anti-gay laws said, “Every culture has
what they regard as sacrosanct or important to them” (Nossitter 2014).
Female Genital Mutilation which is also known as female genital cutting and
female circumcision refers to the cutting or removal of part or all of the external
female genitalia. This includes the clitoris, the labia, and a procedure called infibu-
lation in which a small hole is left for urine and menstrual flow. Female genital
mutilation provides no health benefits, but is associated with many side effects that
include chronic pain, recurrent infections, bleeding, sexual problems, childbirth com-
plications and a number of other difficulties including emotional distress. Traditional
cutters often use unsterile knives, razors, glass, scissors and sharp rocks; they may
or may not use anesthesia (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). It is often done on
children using physical force. In 2016 the United Nations Children’s Fund estimated
that 200 million women living in 30 countries have undergone the procedure.
According to the United Nations, the local culture has resulted in 98% of women
in Somalia and 96% in Guinea being cut (Turkewitz 2014). Other countries where
female genital mutilation is prevalent include 27 African countries, Indonesia, Iraqi
Kurdistan and Yemen (UN Children’s Fund 2016). Most female genital mutilation
is performed by women. UNICEF calls the practice, “a self-enforcing social con-
vention” done to avoid uncut daughters from facing social exclusion. There is also
a widely prevalent belief it is a religious requirement though it appears to have no
basis in Islamic law. Female genital mutilation has been described in antiquity and
it antedates Christianity and Islam. A 2007 fatwa stated that female genital mutila-
tion had no basis in Islamic (Sharia) Law and that it is a sinful action that should be
avoided. The practice is in large part a tradition in the culture of an Islamic community
(UNICEF 2013).
72 6 Morality and Culture

Global migration has brought female genital mutilation to Europe, Australia, New
Zealand and the United States and Canada (Perron et al. 2013). Although female gen-
ital cutting is illegal in the United States immigrant girls sent back to their ancestral
homes have been subject to “vacation cutting” in the belief it will prevent promiscu-
ity, prepare them for marriage or put them in tune with the ideals of their culture. In
their book, “They took it”, Miriam Camara and Haddiejatou wrote, “I had my female
cut from me, my sensations stolen and discarded, replaced with numbness and pain.
My say in the matter? Negligible and disregarded. They mutilated me; they cut me
with razor sharp non-sterilized blades, they sliced me” (Turkewitz 2014).
In India there is a cultural preference for the birth of sons. Sons carry on the
family name and provide economic protection for the family because there are fewer
opportunities for women to earn money. When they marry families must provide a
dowry for their daughters which makes girls a future financial burden (Huffington
Post 2013). There have been reports of female infanticide and documentation of sex
selective abortions which have resulted in greater male to female birth rates in at least
some Indian states (Arnold et al. 2002). Although the law in India states prenatal
sex scanning is a crime, antenatal amniocentesis and more commonly ultrasound are
used which define the sex of a fetus.
These and other practices confront us with the question of whether moral
relativism should trump moral scrutiny.

A Response to Moral Relativism

Rosaldo believes “culture is the stuff you learn after birth” and if we were born in a
different culture we would adopt the values of that culture. He argues for dialogue
between cultures to learn what the other person is thinking, but is against cultural
imperialism. He says our imagination is limited by our own culture and by looking
at what other people do we can challenge our own notions (Rosaldo 2000a, b). He
tells the interesting story of his time with a Filipino hill tribe of headhunters called
the Ilongots. He was horrified by their headhunting. The Ilongots told him during
World War Two the tribe lost a third of its population and that they were horrified by
modern warfare. This made Rosado realize that some things we accept, like modern
warfare, seem horrific to other cultures (Rosaldo 2000a, b).
Kluckhohn argues that all cultures have moral systems. I will argue that doesn’t
mean all cultures are morally valid. If a doctrine of coexisting and equally valid
cultures is accepted that would preclude criticism of any cultural practice, including
criticism of Nazi genocide slavery or any other blatant evil. Theoretically moral
relativism can be employed to subdue criticism of any cultural practice, however
evil.
Rosaldo has devised a solution for this problem by considering ethical relativity a
special case of cultural relativity; he considers himself a cultural relativist but not an
ethical relativist. He believes in the value of studying and learning from other cultures
and that because another culture has a different of values does not necessarily make
A Response to Moral Relativism 73

them stupid or evil. However, he says, just because you understand how something
works in another culture doesn’t mean you have to agree with it. “To understand is
not to forgive”. He wants to understand other cultures yet be free to criticize other
cultures on ethical grounds (Rosaldo 2000a, b).
Kluckhohn sees morality as a matter of cultural survival. He says that savage
practices in one tribe does not mean that kind of behavior is warranted in other groups.
Cultural relativity for him means how a practice fits with other group practices. He
says, “having several wives makes sense for herders but not hunters”. He defines
morality pragmatically. If surviving societies have all found it necessary to impose
similar restrictions on behavior those aspects of the moral code are indispensable.
Although he says, “anthropology does not as a matter of theory deny the existence of
moral absolutes”, His view of morality appears to be that those cultural restrictions
universally present in surviving societies define morality. Morality for Kluckhohn
seems to be a matter of cultural survival rather than morality as a form of intrinsic
truth. Phrased differently, he abdicates the definition of morality to natural selection
at the level of the group. Optimistically, he notes that culture is made by man and
can be changed.

Conclusion

We should try to understand the reasons for the practices of other cultures; however,
cultural differences should not automatically entail immunity from moral scrutiny.
It is difficult to justify practices that result in significant harm. Social stability does
not seem adequate justification for culturally rooted practices such as female genital
mutilation or honor killings. More benign practices such as polygamy and arranged
marriages might be easier to accept. We need to approach multiculturalism with a
dose of humility because no culture, including our own, is an exemplar of moral
perfection.

References

Amnesty International News. 2018. Caning of Unmarried Couples for Showing Affection in Public
an Act of Utmost Cruelty. Indonesia.
Arnold, Fred, Sunita Kisher, and T.K. Roy. 2002. Sex Selective Abortions in India. Population and
Development Review 28 (1): 759–785.
Associated Press In Kampala. 2014. Ugandan Tabloid Prints List of ‘Top 200 Homosexuals’. The
Guardian.
Barry, Ellen. 2014. Indian Girl’s Rape Called Case of Eye-for-Eye Village Justice. New York Times.
Boroch, Robert. 2013. A Formal Concept of Culture in the Classification of Alfred l. Kroeber and
Clyde Kluckhohn. Available at https://philarchive.org/archive/ROBAFC-5 (accessed March 30,
2019).
Chester, Phyllis. 2008. A Family Conspiracy: Honor Killing. Nashville and London: New England
Review Press.
74 6 Morality and Culture

Claes, Tom. 1990. Culture and Morality Revisited. Cultural Dynamics 3 (4): 349–386.
Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene.
Fowers, Blaine J., and Frank C. Richardson. 1996. Why is Multiculturalism Good? American
Psychologist 51 (6): 609–621.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Impact on the Concept of Culture On The Concept Of Man in The
Interpretations of Culture New York: Basic Books. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture (accessed
January 30, 2014).
Gert, Bernard. 1966. Morality A New Justification of the Moral Rules. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gillani, Waqar, and Walsh, Declan. 2014. Pregnant Pakistani Woman Is Beaten To Death by Her
Family. New York Times.
Gowans, Chris. 2018. Moral Relativism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Edward
N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/moral-relativism/
(accessed November 19, 2019).
Huffington Post. 2013. Female Infanticide-India’s Unspoken Evil.
Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality Cambridge. Massachusetts: The MIT.
Joyce, Richard. 2009. Moral Relativists Gone Wild. Mind 118 (470): 508–518 Available at http://
personal.victoria.ac.nz/richard_joyce/acrobat/joyce_2009_review.prinz.pdf (accessed March 30,
2019).
Kluckhohn, Clyde. 1949. Mirror For Man. London and Toronto: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc.
Kroeber, A.L., and Kluckhohn C. 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.
The Museum Series Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.
Kulczycki, Andrzej, and Winddle, Sarah. 2012. Honor Killings in the Middle East and North Africa.
A Systematic Review of the Literature Violence Against Women; 17 (11): 1442–1464.
Londono, Ernesto. 2014. The Crackdown On Gay Men In Egypt. The New York Times.
New York Times. 2014. Indonesia: Shariah Official Urges That Gang-Rape Victim Be Caned.
Nordland, Rod. 2014. Star-Crossed Afghans Cling to Love, Even at Risk of Death. New York Times.
Nossiter, Adam. 2014. Wielding Whip and a Hard New Law, Nigeria Tries to ‘Sanitize Itself of
Gays. New York Times.
Online Etymology Dictionary. 2019. Available at https://www.etymonline.com/word/culture
(accessed November 18, 2019).
Perron, L., V. Senikas, M. Burnett, et al. 2013. Female Genital Cutting. Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynecology Canada 35 (11): 1028–1045.
Prinz, Jesse J. 2009. Against Moral Nativism in Stitch and His Critics, 167–189. Hoboken, New
Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
Prinz, Jesse. 2013. Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response. Philosophy Now.
Rosaldo, Renato. 2000a. Separating Cultural and Ethical Relativism Issues in Ethics 11 (1): 22–6.
Rosaldo, Renato. 2000b. Of Headhunters and Soldiers: Separating Cultural and Ethical Relativism
Issues in Ethics 2000, vol. 11(1) pp. 2–6. Available at http://scu.edu/ethics-resources/ethical-
decision-making/of-headhunters-and-soldiers/ (accessed April 30, 2018).
Ruse, Michael. 2009. Charles Darwin On Human Evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 71 (1): 10–19.
Shweder, Richard. 2007. The Category of Bad Acts. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. David Steinberg. Hanover and London:
UniversityPress of New England.
Song, Sarah. 2017. Multiculturalism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Edward N.
Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/#ClalMul (accessed March
26, 2019).
Spencer-Oatey, H. 2008. What is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations. Global/PAD Core
at https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad/openhouse/interculturalskills/global_pad_-_what_
is_culture.pdf (accessed March 27, 2019).
Turkewitz, Julie A. 2014. Fight as U.S. Girls Face Genital Cutting Abroad. New York Times.
References 75

Turner, Leigh. 2007. Bioethics in Culturally Diverse Societies in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidis-
ciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and, Biology ed. David Steinberg: University
Press of New England Hanover and London pages.
UNICEF Data Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women 2013.
United Nations Children’s Fund. 2016. Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting. A Global Concern.
Wheeler, Ryan. 2017. Ruth Benedict and the Purpose of Anthropology. The Peabody.
Wikipedia contributors. 2019a. Honor killing. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Honor_killing&oldid=889170834 (accessed March 29, 2019).
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019b. Female Genital Mutilation. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclope-
dia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Female_genital_mutilation&oldid=887045308
(accessed March 29, 2019).
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019c. Meme. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available at https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Meme&oldid=924983091 (accessed November 20, 2019).
Wilson E.O. 1978. On Human Nature. Harvard University Press.
Yang, H.L., A. Kleinman, B.G. Link, J.C. Phelan, S. Lee, and B. Good. 2007. Culture and Stigma:
Adding moral experience to stigma theory. Social Science and Medicine 64: 1524–1535.
Chapter 7
Morality and Religion

Abstract Religions provide moral guidance; because billions of people world-wide

identify with a religion, religion has an enormous influence on moral behavior.
Religion provides moral motivation and a community of believers. Although reli-
gions promote morality, they also have a darker side that has cluttered history with
religiously related immoralities that include the Crusades, the Inquisition, numer-
ous destructive wars and acts of cruelty. I review important aspects of the moral
codes of the influential religions, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism
and Hinduism.

The Definition of Religion

Similar to other concepts that elude consensus definition because they describe enti-
ties that come in various shapes and forms, there is no consensus definition of
religion. One definition of religion is, “it may be defined as a cultural system of
designated behaviors and practices, world views, texts, sanctified places, prophe-
cies, ethics, or organizations, that claims to relate humanity to supernatural, tran-
scendental or spiritual elements” (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). Another definition
of religion is the belief and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a
personal god or gods, and a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature and purpose of
the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or
agencies. Religion may be associated with sacred histories and narratives, spiritual
elements, prophecies, prayers, faith, ritual observances and usually include a code
of moral behavior.
There are many religions; the largest worldwide by population are Christianity
(2.38 billion), Islam (1.8 billion), and Hinduism (1.1 billion) (Hackett and McClen-
don 2017), Other important religions include Confucianism and Buddhism. Judaism
is the oldest of the Abrahamic monotheistic religions that also include Christianity
and Islam.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 77

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_7
78 7 Morality and Religion

Religion and Morality

God gave the Ten Commandments to Moses and the Israelites on Mount Sinai (Exo-
dus 20). The Ten Commandments contain moral rules such as, don’t murder, don’t
steal, don’t give false testimony and don’t covet your neighbor’s property or wife.
They also contain rules that are not strictly moral such as remember the Sabbath.
The Ten Commandments do not mention going beyond its basic requirements and
don’t mention what has been called, the moral ideals (pp. 166–178, Gert 1966).
The belief that morality is given to us by God, that it comes from a higher authority,
is important for morality which otherwise stands on less substantial ground. Theists
who believe in a God (or multiple Gods) may have a substantial motive for moral
behavior because God may reward those who led a morally praiseworthy life and
punish those who led a morally flawed life. Religion has given us morally influential
role models such as Moses, Christ, Buddha, Muhammad, and Confucius.
Zoloth says religion provides an ingredient that is missing in secular ethics because
it deals with ultimate meanings, goals and long term consequences that may be
ignored in secular morality. She also believes religion increases moral awareness
and provides a sense of humility often lacking in secular ethics. Other moral virtues
of religious ethics include a powerful presence of the voice of the vulnerable and a
search for meaning in the face of physical and existential suffering (pp. 29–32, Zoloth
2007). Callahan, an avowed atheist, admired religion for its historic contribution to
ethics. He also believed religion can deal with problems in a coherent and sensitive
manner better than secular ethics. He says, “on questions of human meaning and
suffering” secular ethics tends to fall silent and he notes “reason is only part of
human nature” (pp. 32–35, Callahan 2007).
Sia acknowledges there can be a humanistic morality without God and says,
“if we look around us, we will discover that there are countless individuals who,
without any explicit religious beliefs, can be said to lead morally good lives”. But,
he adds, “religious belief in a personal God can have a positive contribution to
morality by way of vision and motivation”. Sia claims religion provides a vision,
not shared by secularists, of what it means to be human. He also says, “The material
content, what we ought to do, does not differ significantly from a non-religious
one”; but “what motivates a Christian (and the same can probably be said of other
theists) is not what motivates a secularist”. A religious belief in a personal God can
contribute to morality by increasing the motivation to behave morally, which in turn
increases our relationship with God. Morality based on belief in a personal God
would enhance morality as a matter of obedience and would make wrong, “what is
prohibited by God”. He also argues morality combined with religion can motivate a
sense of community and the importance of the common good (Sia 2008).
Most religions exist as a community with leaders and teachers who typically in
their sermons exhort their congregations to live a noble life. To the extent that mem-
bers of a religious community share common beliefs and have a sense of community
they can reinforce each other’s commitment to their shared morality. The morality
Religion and Morality 79

of a theistic religious community is invoked with the authority of an all powerful,

all knowing God. There are prayers, music, singing, hallelujahs, and promises of
paradise that recruit the emotions in the service of doing good. Religions can sup-
port their version of the ethical life with greater intensity than secular morality, its
relatively sterile counterpart.
Kuhse and Singer state that ethics and religion, are fundamentally independent
and accord ethics priority. To say God is good requires prior knowledge of what good
means and that comes from ethics (pp. 5–6, Kuhse and Singer 2006). Gert set limits
on the notion of morality as God given when he said that God is “neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for moral rules” (p. 64, Gert 1966). Most religions urge their
adherents to lead an ethical life; that is admirable, but doesn’t imply an atheist can’t
be a moral person.
Delfino defends religion against atheism and criticizes atheistic scientists like
Richard Dawkins because they fail to provide an adequate foundation for objective
moral values. Delfino speaks of evolution, which has been cited as the foundation
of morality, as being without purpose and quotes Dawkins who, in his book, The
Blind Watchmaker, says, “Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic pro-
cess which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the
existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no
mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight,
no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind
watchmaker”. Delfino says God provides “the only satisfactory metaphysical foun-
dation for objective moral values”. Delfino’s argument rests on two assumptions:
that objective moral values and God both exist (Delfino 2015).
Dawkins, an outspoken atheist, calls religious faith a process of non-thinking and
bemoans the replacement of reason and science by irrational, sometimes militant
faith. He has said that the abandonment of our critical faculties has turned untested
faith into perceived truth. He calls this dangerous and points to suicide bombers who
kill because they believe that will gain them entrance to paradise. He also condemns
religion that forbade the use of condoms in AIDS Africa (Dawkins 2013).
Although most religions preach morality and are capable of promoting moral
ideals such as “loving-kindness”, the opposite is also true. Because of the good
advocated by a religion its adherents may fail to recognize when it strays from
morality for its own particular reasons.
Gert says, this can be “extraordinarily dangerous” (pp. 255–256, Gert 1966).
Gert, who believes the only legitimate moral rules are those that can be advocated
by all impartial rational persons warns against the dangers of religious ideals which
have permitted “the infliction of an extraordinary amount of evil” (pp. 154–155, Gert
1966). James Veitch remarked, “When religion empowers political terrorism then the
terrorism apparently has no limits and acknowledges no boundaries” (Pratt 2010).
80 7 Morality and Religion

Religion: Another Perspective

The relationship of religion to morality is ambivalent; religion has dual potential

capacities: to foster morality and to promote evil. Religion has been associated with
immorality. For example, the Bible speaks of how to properly treat slaves. Religion
has divided people into different religious groups, or tribes, who have discrimi-
nated against each other and have fought and killed each other. In recent years the
Rohingyas, a Muslim sect, has been subject to brutal human rights violations by
Buddhists in Myanmar and many of them were forced to leave the country. Conflict
exists between two branches of Islam, Shiites and Sunnis, who have fought wars in
the Middle East. To further illustrate the darker side of religion I will list some of
the religiously related disasters of the past.
In 1095, at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II urged Europe’s warriors to
free the Muslim held Holy Land. Prior to embarking on the First Crusade thousands
of infidels were killed, including thousands of Jews. The First Crusade resulted in
a rout of the Europeans with tens of thousands killed or enslaved. The Crusaders
subsequently gained a foothold in four Crusader states that included Jerusalem.
Saladin, who as sultan led Islamic forces, subsequently captured Jerusalem with many
of his captured prisoners put to death. England’s King Richard I, the Lionheart, later
defeated Saladin. The Crusades persisted as a series of military campaigns mostly
by Western Christians against Muslim and other infidels in the Holy Land. The holy
war of the Crusades lasted until about 1291 and are estimated to have killed from
one to three million people (pp. 98–106, White 2012).
The Inquisition was a powerful office established within the Catholic Church to
root out heresy. It was established in the twelfth century and lasted a few hundred
years. The Inquisition persecuted non-Catholics including Jews, Muslims, Protes-
tants, and Jews who had converted but were suspected of secretly practicing their
religion. Thousands of Jews were expelled from Spain because of the Inquisition.
The methods of the Inquisition included torture and executions. Sentencing of the
accused took place in public at the auto-da-fé (act of faith). Many heretics were
burned alive at the stake, Joan of Arc being the most famous victim. One estimate
is that during the Inquisition, from 1480 to 1808 almost 32,000 people were killed
(p. 159, White 2012).
Although it may be difficult to disentangle religion from other factors there have
been numerous wars with the root cause of the conflict religious. White, whose
book has the compelling though macabre title, The Great Big Book Of Horrible
Things, lists: Thirty Years War (1618–48) Catholics versus Protestants 7.5 million
dead; Partition of India (1947) Hindus versus Muslims 500,000 dead; Bosnia (1992–
1995) Bosnian Muslims versus Christian Serbs 200,000 dead; Lebanon (1975–1990)
Christians versus Muslims 150,000 killed.
Religion has led to death and discrimination for millions of people: The Holocaust
(1933–1945) 6,000,000 Jews murdered; Aztecs’ Human Sacrifice (1440–1524) 1,
200,000 people killed; Russian (1919) pogroms in Ukraine during the Russian Civil
Religion: Another Perspective 81

War 115,000 Jews killed. The list of historical atrocities and wars rooted in religion
is even longer (pp. 107–112, White 2012).
Proponents of religion, taking a historical perspective, can at best, adopt an
ambivalent position on the contribution of religion to the flourishing of moral behav-
ior. I will review the ethics of five influential religions. These include Judaism,
Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. Much has been written and
discussed about the ethics of each of these religions. I can only scratch the surface
in the limited space available.

Jewish Ethics

Judaism is a monotheistic religion based on the concept that there is a single God
who gives commandments which constitute a moral law for all humanity. This divine
moral law is embodied in the codes set out in the first five books of the Bible, known
as the Torah, and expanded in a continuing flow of ethical and legal commentary, in
the Talmud and other literature. The codes in the Torah set out 613 commandments
(mitzvot), which include the Ten Commandments.
Jewish ethics when viewed in its entirety is an impressive comprehensive, complex
moral system that includes a variety of moral principles concerning justice, equality
before the law, loving-kindness, social welfare, and the ideals of peace and politi-
cal freedom. A few examples include: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”
(Leviticus 19.17); “The meek shall inherit the earth and delight in the abundance of
peace”. (Psalms 37:11); “Do not join your hand with the wicked to be a malicious
witness”. “Do not follow a crowd to do evil; neither shall you testify in court to side
with a multitude to pervert justice; neither shall you favor a poor man in his cause
if it is not just” (Exodus 23; 4–13). Others include: “Do not deny justice to your
poor people in their lawsuits”; “Keep far from a false charge”, and “don’t harm the
innocent and righteous”; “Do not oppress a stranger, for you know the heart of a
stranger, for once you were strangers in the land of Egypt”.
Other ethical principles of Judaism include:

Tzedakah

This is generally translated as “charity”. However in Hebrew the meaning is closer

to righteousness and fairness. Indeed, the Hebrew root of the word ‘tzedakah‘ is
‘justice’. In Judaism, giving to those in need is simply an act of justice and the right
thing to do. It is the performance of a duty prescribed in the Torah: “For the poor
will never cease out of the land; therefore, I command you, You shall open wide your
hand to your brother, to the needy and to the poor, in the land.” The highest forms
of tzedakah are to give so that the recipient does not know the donor, and in such a
manner as to assist the recipient to become self-reliant (Deuteronomy 15.11).
82 7 Morality and Religion

The Torah also prescribes the equivalent of the modern concept of ‘social justice’.
These include commandments not to harvest the corners of the field, or to pick the
last fruit from the tree, so that the poor should have a right to “glean” the remaining
produce (Leviticus 23:22).

Freedom

The centrality of freedom in Jewish thought is expressed in: “The mountain fortress
of Masada, where in 73CE over 900 Jews committed suicide to die in freedom rather
than submit to slavery and worse under Roman rule”. Jews remind themselves, “Once
we were slaves in Egypt, now we are free people.” “Do not oppress a stranger, for
you know the heart of a stranger, for once you were strangers in the land of Egypt”
(Exodus 23.9). And “if a stranger sojourn with you in your land, you shall not vex him.
But the stranger that dwells with you shall be as one born among you, and you shall
love him as thyself; I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19; 33–34). Importantly,
there is a distrust of autocratic government and an insistence that rulers must be
subject to the law.

Tikkun Olam—Repairing the World

The concepts of justice, righteousness and freedom come together in the vision of an
ideal world articulated by the Prophets. This is expressed in the idea that each of us
can make our contribution to making the world a better place. It is often evidenced
by a strong Jewish involvement in advancing social justice and in protecting the
rights of other minority groups.

The Book of Proverbs

This Biblical collection of hundreds of moral sayings is ascribed to King Solomon.

The central theme of the Book is the idea of wisdom and understanding as the highest
human values. A few of the proverbs follow:
Happy is the man who finds wisdom,
and the man who gets understanding,
for the gain from it is better than gain from silver
and its profit better than gold. (3:13–14)
Better is a dinner of herbs where love is
than a fatted ox and hatred with it. (15:17)
The Book of Proverbs 83

Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and let not your heart be glad when he
stumbles (24:17).
Much is made of the devastating effects of sexual immorality. Here the Proverbs
follow themes which appear throughout the Hebrew Bible, extolling sexual love,
while fiercely denouncing promiscuity and adultery. The Book of Proverbs ends
with a chapter of praise for the virtues of the “good wife”. In addition to teaching
caring for others, Jewish sources tend to teach that humans are duty bound to preserve
their lives. Other Jewish laws can be broken to save a life.

Ethical Ideas in the Talmud

The Talmud contains the teachings and opinions of thousands of rabbis dating from
before the Common Era on a variety of subjects, including Halakha (law), Jewish
ethics, philosophy, customs, history, lore and many other topics. The Talmud is the
basis for all codes of Jewish law, and is widely quoted in rabbinic literature.
The Talmud is the central text of Rabbinic Judaism and the primary source of Jew-
ish religious law and theology. Until the advent of modernity, in nearly all Jewish
communities, the Talmud was the centerpiece of Jewish cultural life and was foun-
dational to “all Jewish thought and aspirations”, serving also as “the guide for the
daily life” of Jews.
The term Talmud normally refers to the collection of writings named specifi-
cally the Babylonian Talmud although there is also an earlier collection known as
the Jerusalem Talmud. The Talmud has two components; the Mishnah (about year
200 CE), a written compendium of Rabbinic Judaism’s Oral Torah; and the Gemara
(circa year 500 CE), “Talmud“ translates literally as “instruction” in Hebrew, and
the term may refer to either the Gemara alone, or the Mishnah and Gemara together.
(Wikipedia Contributors 2019).
The Talmud in standard print is over 6,200 pages long. It contains the teachings
and opinions of thousands of rabbis on a variety of subjects, including Halakha
(law), Jewish ethics, philosophy, customs, history, lore and many other topics.

The Golden Rule of Judaism

Rabbi Hillel the Elder supposedly was once asked, “Teach me the entire Torah while I
stand on one foot.” Rabbi Hillel responded: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your
fellow”. This is the entire Torah and the rest is commentary. Now go learn” (Israel
and Judaic Studies 2019).
84 7 Morality and Religion

Comments on Jewish Ethics

The establishment over centuries of a detailed system of morality, an announcement

to the world that the Jews intend to behave in a sensitive and ethical manner, does
not necessarily come with a reciprocal response. Despite a well-developed detailed
system of morality Jews have encountered centuries of pogroms and other anti-
Semitic acts, and suffered the most heinous crime in human history, the industrial
killing of six million Jewish men, women, and children in the Holocaust.
As with all religions, and secular ethics, there are disconnects between theory and
reality. It says in Leviticus, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus
19:18). On April 9, 1948 two Jewish paramilitary groups, the Irgun and Lehi attacked
the Arab village of Deir Yassin. During the attack of Deir Yassin Arab prisoners,
men, women and children were reportedly killed. The brutality of the Jewish attack
resulted in Palestinian flight from Arab villages (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). The
details of this attack are disputed but the Jews who attacked Deir Yassin clearly did
not show love toward their neighbors (Jewish Virtual Library 2019).
Every major religion and secular moral theory can be cited for ethical violations
by some of its adherents. It’s prudent to accept that ethical systems, even those pro-
mulgated in the name of a powerful God, are not always adhered to. Some members
of a religion are likely over time to violate, intentionally or inadvertently, their own
religion’s moral code. In some cases morality can be perverted to justify evil ends.

Conflict with Secular Law

Judaism, similar to other religions, can conflict with secular laws. In the twelfth
century the physician-scholar and rabbi Moses Maimonides argued that a decapitated
person was immediately dead. Death using neurological criteria is widely accepted
by most Jews and others in the Western world. For millennia Jewish law said that
breathing was the essence of life. With the development of the respirator respiration
can be maintained even when a patient meets the neurological criteria for death.
Because air is still flowing some Orthodox and ultra Orthodox Jews will not accept
neurologic death has occurred even though in most of the United States they are
considered legally dead.
An exception is the New Jersey law that states “the death of an individual shall not
be declared upon the basis of neurological criteria… when the licensed physician
authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis of information in
the individual’s available medical records, or information provided by a member of
the individual’s family or any other person knowledgeable about the individual’s
personal religious beliefs that such a declaration would violate the personal religious
beliefs of the individual”. Refusal to accept brain death is in practice limited to only
the strictest Orthodox Jews (p. 267, Bernat 2008). This can lead to the confusing
situation of a person alive in New Jersey who would be dead if in another state;
Conflict with Secular Law 85

it also illustrates that religious ethics may cause confusion and conflict when they
deviate from prevailing secular law.

Christian Ethics

The concept of natural law has been most closely related to Catholicism and Thomas
Acquinas. Natural law has been given to man by God as an act of divine providence
and is the way man participates in the eternal law. God has brought into existence
human beings who can act freely and use reason. The precepts of natural law, an
expression of God’s will, are universally binding by nature, are knowable to all and
direct us toward the good. Natural law is incompatible with atheism, moral relativism
and skepticism about values (Murphy 2019). Natural law establishes morality as an
act of God. The truth of natural law is ultimately faith based; its foundation rests on
the belief that God exists and that God has endowed us the practical rational capacity
to discern the good.
Natural law favors the good over the right. There has been dispute over what
constitutes the good. The good as noted by Aquinas include the preservation of
life, procreation, social life, and rational conduct. Goods added by others include
justice, friendship, health, aesthetic appreciation, pleasure and the avoidance of pain
(Murphy 2019).
Morality is a man made concept that cannot itself be empirically examined; the
vagueness of its definition has made possible theories from morality as God given
eternal truth to its characterization as devoid of objective truth. Ironically, morality
exists because a morally blind process of natural selection has conferred the ability
to recognize and protect behaviors deemed important for reproduction and survival.
God, who is central to Christian theology, both commands us and loves us. Chris-
tian morality honors the Ten Commandments and finds in Jesus Christ a life without
sin which we should imitate. Moral knowledge in Christianity comes from Scripture,
especially the Bible, divine Revelation, reason, the teachings of Jesus and tradition.
Tenets of Christian morality include: love thy neighbor as thyself; love thy enemies
and those who hate us, love God with all ones heart and soul; don’t lust; don’t anger;
and God forgives through Redemption. Christian morality is heavily focused on the
virtues.
Christianity is not a homogeneous entity and consists of Catholicism and various
Protestant denominations. The subject of its moral philosophy is too broad and varied
to discuss in detail; however, I will mention two atypical Christian groups of interest.
Christian Science, founded by Mary Baker Eddy, claims a unique approach to heal-
ing that is said to have proven effective for generations of Christian Scientists. Many
times after medicine indicated a condition was incurable Christian Science healing,
which calls for Christian faith and an understanding of God as dependably good
and to whom nothing is impossible, has been effective. Christian Science healing is
based on the belief that sickness is a mental error best corrected by prayer. Christian
86 7 Morality and Religion

Science healers are available to the sick as an alternate to traditional medicine. Mod-
ern medicine provides effective treatment for many conditions; I worry that some
people with significant medical illness might suffer because prayer replaces effective
medical treatment.
Jehovah’s Witnesses doctrines are based on its interpretations of the Bible. They
believe that the destruction of the present world system at Armageddon is imminent,
and that the establishment of God’s kingdom over the earth is the only solution for
the problems faced by humanity. Based on their interpretation of the statement in the
Bible not to “eat blood” Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood transfusions, even if that
refusal entails death. If a Jehovah Witness accepts a blood transfusion they may be
shunned by other Jehovah Witnesses.
I personally took cared for a 32 year-old Jehovah’s Witness who had aplastic
anemia, a condition in which the bone marrow has been damaged and does not
manufacture blood cells normally. She died of severe anemia because she steadfastly
refused blood transfusions. This was a difficult experience for her caregivers, myself
included, who had trouble accepting the loss of a young human life that could have
been saved. Religious beliefs are comforting and important to billions of people but,
at least from my perspective, can occasionally be dangerously misguided.

Christian Fundamentalism

An emphasis on fundamentals may be seen in religions. The spread of philosophical

skepticism toward literal interpretations of the Bible motivated Protestant Christians
who called themselves fundamentalists to state their belief in the literal interpretation
and infallibility of the Bible. This included a belief in creationism, which challenged
the scientific theory of evolution. Christian fundamentalists gained notoriety in 1925
during the Scopes “Monkey” trial. The Scopes Trial, formally known as The State of
Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes is commonly referred to as the Scopes Monkey
Trial (Wikipedia Contributors 2019).
A substitute high school teacher, John T. Scopes, was accused of violating Ten-
nessee’s Butler Act, which had made it unlawful to teach human evolution in any
state-funded school. Scopes, who was represented by the famous lawyer, Clarence
Darrow, was convicted, but the verdict was overturned on a technicality. (Wikipedia
Contributors 2010).
For religious ethicists, “professionally generated ethical codifications… are out-
side the bounds of moral insight” (Veatch 2012). Conflict may develop between
adherents to religious ethics and adherents of secular philosophical ethics. This divide
has already become apparent concerning abortion, contraception, assisted suicide,
euthanasia, same sex marriage, the use of stem cells, the definition of death and other
matters.
Buddhist Ethics 87

Buddhist Ethics

Ethics in Buddhism are traditionally based on the enlightened perspective of the Bud-
dha, or other enlightened followers. The Buddha (originally named Siddhartha Gau-
tama) was an ascetic and sage who had insight into transcendental truth. The Buddha’s
moral instructions were handed down through tradition and later written in Buddhist
scriptures. Buddhism tries to cultivate a calm and peaceful mind. Dharma refers to
Buddhist doctrine and Vinaya to Buddhist discipline and rules.
The foundation of Buddhist ethics for lay people is the Pancasila, the Five Precepts.
These rules include: 1. no killing of any living being 2. no taking of anything unless it
is intended for you; certainly no stealing 3. no lying or slander 4. no sexual misconduct
or sensual over indulgence such as gluttony. 5 no intoxicants or substances that could
be the cause of breaking the other four precepts.
Buddhism aims to cultivate a calm and peaceful mind that avoids suffering, anx-
iety, remorse and guilt—a transcendent state in which the subject is released from
the effects of karma, the belief that our actions effect us in the future including rein-
carnation. Karma effects all past and future lives in the cycle of death and rebirth.
Buddhism seeks the final goal of Buddha, Nirvana.
Buddhist monks and nuns, called Sangha, take hundreds of vows, up to 253 for
men and up to 354 for women. These rules are contained in a collection of scriptures,
the Vinaya. Buddhism does not advocate war; the Dalai Lama has never advocated
armed conflict with the Communist Chinese who have occupied Tibet and caused
the Dalai Lama to flee to India (BuddhaNet 2019).
The Buddha also proposed other ethical codes inculcating positive virtues. The
Mangala Sutta, for example, commends reverence, humility, contentment, gratitude,
patience, learnedness, and generosity. Other discourses prescribe numerous fam-
ily, social, and political duties establishing the well being of society. And behind
all these duties lie the four attitudes called the “immeasurables”—loving-kindness,
compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity (O’Brien 2019). Buddhism has a well-
developed system of ethics which, if universally followed, likely would lead to peace
and harmony.

Islamic Ethics

Islam is based on the Muslim understanding that man is able to know the reality of
God’s existence and has a moral responsibility to abide God’s will as expressed in
the Quran (Koran). Muslims believe that the Quran was verbally revealed by God
to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel over a period of years beginning in 609 CE
when Muhammad was 40 years old.
Muslims regard the Quran as the most important miracle of Muhammad, a proof of
his prophethood. Muslims have a moral responsibility to follow Islam as described in
the Quran, the Sunnah (the body of traditional social and legal customs and practices
88 7 Morality and Religion

of the Islamic community) and the sayings of Muhammad. The Quran and the Sunnah
make up the two primary sources of Islamic theology and law. Absolute and perfect
justice and goodness are attributes of the Divine. According to Muslim legal theory,
the purpose of Islamic law is to seek the righteous path, to try to come as close as
possible to it and in doing so, foster the welfare of the people.
The duty to do good amounts to an obligation to adopt Godly virtues which
are embedded in the very nature of human beings. It is the natural intuition (fit.rah)
woven into the very fabric of human consciousness that aids people in differentiating
between what is Godly and good (h.asan), and what is ungodly and bad (qabı̄h.). The
Quran describes the Divine as pure and unadulterated light, and says that those who
deny God’s existence are spiritually blind.
Muslims believe that Muhammad was sent by God to remind human beings of
their responsibility to seek a moral life. Recognition of Divinity necessitates the
recognition of the values that attach themselves to the Divine—values such as jus-
tice, fairness, compassion, mercy, honesty, and goodness. Muslim and non-Muslim
writers often refer to Islamic law as Shariah. Shariah law controls public behavior,
private behavior and private beliefs. Jurisprudentially, the Shariah is the revealed
guidance of God—perfect, complete, incorruptible, immune, and immutable; the
Shariah provides the moral norms of the Islamic legal system.
Muslin morality includes piety and humility, A Muslim must be humble with God
and with other people and avoid arrogance. Morality in Islam addresses every aspect
of a Muslim’s life and is universal in its scope and in its applicability. Morality reigns
in selfish desires, and bad habits. Muslims must not only refrain from evil and vice,
they must also forbid them and must contribute to the moral health of society as a
whole.
Muslims must also be in control of their passions and selfish desires and not be
vain or attached to the ephemeral pleasures of this world. They should speak justly,
show moderation both when poor and when rich. They should reunite friendship with
those who have broken off and silence should be occupied with thought.
The good Muslim should avoid materialism and challenge those ideas in society
which oppose submission to God. This challenge is directed against five main charac-
teristics: 1. The division of Arabs into varying tribes (based upon blood and kinship)
with the goal being a unified community based upon Islamic piety 2. The acceptance
of the worship of a multitude of deities besides Allah, because Allah has no equal 3.
The trait of manliness instead of humility and piety 4. The focus on achieving fame or
establishing a legacy. (This was replaced by the concept that mankind would be called
to account before God on the day of resurrection) 5. The reverence of and compliance
with ancestral traditions, (This practice challenged by Islam which assigned primacy
to submitting to God and following revelation) (Wikipedia Contributors 2019).
According to Muslim legal theory, the purpose of Islamic law is to seek after
the righteous path-to try to come as close as possible to it. The pursuit of justice,
compassion, mercy and honesty, is supposed to translate into concrete and tangible
benefits enjoyed by human beings. This has not always been the case because Islam
has been associated with slavery and male dominance. The Shariah, Islamic law, is
considered Divine because it emanates from God and it exists only through God.
Islamic Ethics 89

Shariah law can be harsh and favors corporal and capital punishment over incar-
ceration. According to Shariah law criticism of fundamental Islamic beliefs can lead
to drastic consequences. Criticizing or denying any part of the Quran is punishable
by death. Criticizing Muhammad or denying that he is a prophet is punishable by
death. Criticizing or denying Allah is punishable by death. A Muslim who becomes a
non-Muslim is punishable by death. A non-Muslim who leads a Muslim away from
Islam is punishable by death. A non-Muslim man who marries a Muslim woman
is punishable by death. A woman or girl found guilty of adultery is punishable by
death. A girl’s clitoris should be cut (Islamic Sharia Law 2018).
Other examples of Shariah laws include the command to pray five times a day,
fast during the month of Ramadan and the prohibitions against extra-marital sex,
slander, or the consumption of alcohol and pork. Another example is the Quranic
command that all contracts be consensual and free from coercion, fraud, deception
or misrepresentation, and also that parties to a contract must in good faith make every
effort to honor their promises. Muslim jurists have argued that laws clearly mandated
by God such as these are stated in an unambiguous fashion in the text of the Quran
in order to stress that the laws are in and of themselves ethical precepts that by their
nature are not subject to contingency, context, or temporal variations.
The so-called h.udūd punishments which were mandated and fixed by God were for
serious offenses that include: unlawful consensual sexual intercourse. “The woman
and the man guilty of adultery or fornication—flog each of them with a hundred
stripes (lashings). Let not compassion move you in their case” (Qur’an 24:2); “As to
the thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example,
from Allah, for their crime” (Qur’an 5:38); for civil disturbance against Islam: “The
punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with
might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the
cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their
disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter” (Qur’an
5:33).
The h.udūd punishments are in the modern age the most controversial aspect of
Shariah law and for many non-Muslims are considered medieval, draconian, and
barbaric. Furthermore, many non-Muslim and Muslim scholars and writers, who are
poorly informed about Islamic jurisprudence, treat these laws as if they are the very
heart and core of the Islamic legal system. Consequently, many have come to the
conclusion that Shariah law is fundamentally incompatible with modern conceptions
of human rights (pp. 7–28, El Fadi 2017).

Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic Fundamentalism is a movement of Muslims who seek to return to the fun-

damentals of their religion and live similarly to how the prophet Muhammad lived.
Islamic fundamentalists favor “a literal and originalist interpretation” of the primary
sources of Islam (the Quran and Sunnah), seek to eliminate “corrupting” non-Islamic
90 7 Morality and Religion

influences from every part of their lives and return to the fundamentals of the reli-
gion. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the term fundamentalism as
“the strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion, espe-
cially Islam”. The word jihad has in recent years been used more frequently; juhad
has various meanings from striving in the path of God to, in the age of Islamic terror-
ism, holy war. Much anti-Muslim sentiment is due to the acts committed by Islamic
Fundamentalists who have used the term jihad to describe the most violent persons
and movements of Islamic fundamentalists. The term jihad has been used by Islamic
terrorists and can mean armed struggle against non-believers, though it also has more
benign interpretations.
Extreme Quranic interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic vio-
lence and terrorism as a religious effort to preserve Shariah and the will of God in
an Islamic community (Venkatraman 2007). The Quran allows individual interpre-
tations and Islamic terrorists have taken advantage of this to select extreme religious
interpretations to describe what can be done to preserve the will of God. Jihadists
refer to Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent jihad as a method ordained
by God to preserve Sharia law. They emphasize the Quran says preservation of
the Shariat is “an obligation of every able bodied individual” and justifies violent
jihadism saying, martial jihad refers to a method of jihad that can be used for internal,
external, or inter-communal purposes to protect and to promote the integrity of Islam
and to defend the community against hostile unbelievers.
Religious terrorism is based on several essential principles (Venkatraman 2007).
They are: the ends justify the means, holy war, blind obedience, and absolute truth
claims the use of extremist religious doctrine like weapons so people see themselves
as agents of God. The most consequential Islamic terrorist attack was the September
11, 2001 hijacking of large commercial air planes which crashed into the World Trade
Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon. These attacks killed about 3,000
people. There have been many Islamic suicide bombings directed against civilians,
soldiers, and government officials. Suicide bombers have been called martyrs who
believe they will earn a place in Paradise. Islamic terrorists have made extensive use
of kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of beheadings. The names of
a few Islamic terrorist groups are: ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), Al-Qaeda,
Hamas, and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Venkatraman 2007).
Defenders of Islam note that many modern Muslims ignore the harsher aspects of
Islam which are no longer considered ethical and are upset that Islamic Fundamen-
talism has come to be associated with a dogmatic, reactionary violent, brutal and
anti-democracy movement that they believe is not representative of modern Islam.

Confucian Ethics

It is believed that Confucius was born in 551 BCE. Confucius’ sayings, teachings and
his conversations and exchanges with his disciples are recorded in the Analects (also
referred to as Lunyu). Confucius claimed that he enjoyed a special and privileged
Confucian Ethics 91

relationship with Heaven and that, he had come to understand what Heaven had
mandated for him and for mankind (Lunyu 2.4). His teachings focus on how a Chinese
individual ideally should live their life and interact with others. Confucius believed
that people live their lives within parameters firmly established by Heaven-heaven
meaning both a Supreme Being and ‘nature’. He also believed men are responsible
for their actions, especially for their treatment of others.
Confucian ethics is largely a form of virtue ethics. Virtue is considered a form of
moral power with three major associated concepts: dao. ren and junzi. Dao, which
roughly translates as the path, refers to the way humans ought to live their lives. Ren
has been variously translated with its essence being complete ethical virtue. Ren is
the Confucian virtue denoting the good feeling of virtuous human experiences when
being altruistic. Confucius taught that the practice of altruism was necessary for
social cohesion and could be mastered only by those who have learned self-discipline.
Learning self-restraint involves studying and mastering li, a Chinese concept often
rendered as “ritual”. Junzi refers to a person whose humane conduct (ren) makes him
a moral exemplar.

Virtues

Virtue ethics is a system of ethics in which character is the primary emphasis for how
an individual and society should guide their lives. Confucius conceived of virtue as a
kind of moral power that allows one to win a following without recourse to physical
force. Confucian ethics de-emphasizes legal coercion as a method for guiding people
and instead puts the emphasis on moral exhortation and inspiration by way of example
(most famously, 2.3 of the Analects, which emphasizes the necessity of a ruler’s
guiding his people by instilling in them a sense of shame rather than by the threat of
external punishment). Elsewhere in the Analects he suggests that the primary locus
of virtue is to be found in how people treat each other in the fabric of everyday life and
not in the dramatic moral dilemmas often discussed in contemporary Western moral
philosophy. Confucius based his system of ethics on six virtues: xi, zhi, li, yi, wen,
and ren. Each of these attributes has a different meaning and focus, allowing any
person to easily focus on an area for improvement or meditation.

Xi
Xi is the attribute of learning. Someone who meditates on the concept of xi is one
who has a natural capacity or desire to learn. This virtue is important due to the
danger of ignorance. One who is ignorant or does not desire to learn, is in danger
of leading a foolish existence and spreading folly among other people. The act of
learning and living in wisdom brings with it virtue and a meaningful, impactful life.
Confucius famously said, “He who learns but does not think is lost. He who thinks
but does not learn is in great danger” (Lunyu 2.15).
92 7 Morality and Religion

Zhi
Zhi is the virtue of character. Confucius likens the project of cultivating one’s char-
acter to crafting something fine from raw material (Analects 1.15). The closest trans-
lation of zhi is the substance of which one is made or their basic makeup. This can
refer to the physical construction of a person, but is more about the character of that
person. Zhi states that a person is created neither good nor bad, but is free to choose
how he or she will learn, grow, and progress. For example, someone might be born
into a family of criminals, but it is up to them whether they will chose a path of
immorality or morality.

Li
Li, which has been translated as rites or ritual, is about community and one’s inter-
action and responsibilities toward those around him. Li is mostly about how people
behave toward each other and treat each other. This concept is closely related to
fairness and justice in a community. The idea is that the more fair and just someone
is, the more these virtues will spread and bring about a more fair and just society. Li,
is often rendered as “ritual”, “proper conduct,” or “propriety.”
Li includes filial and ancestral piety and respect for the performance of traditional
forms of conduct. In the Analects ritual includes ceremonies of ancestor worship,
the burial of parents, and the rules governing respectful and appropriate behavior
between parents and children. The word eventually came to cover a broad range of
customs and practices that spelled out courteous and respectful behavior of many
different kinds. Engaging in ritual, learning to perform it properly and with the right
attitudes of respect while performing it, is to engage in a kind of cutting, carving,
polishing and grinding of the self. One of the most distinctive marks of Confucian
ethics is the centrality of ritual performance in the ethical cultivation of character. Li
was very important to Confucius.
The centrality of filial piety is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Confu-
cian ethics. In the Analects (2.6) Confucius says to give parents no cause for anxiety
other than illness; it also emphasizes (2.7) the need for the material support of parents
to be carried out in a respectful manner and says (2.8) that it is the expression on
one’s face that is filial and not just taking on the burden of work or letting elders
partake of the wine and food before others.
Confucius says, “Do not disobey,” but when queried further as to his meaning, he
explains obedience in terms of conformance to the rites for burying and sacrificing
to deceased parents. Confucius says that when one disagrees with one’s parents,
one should remonstrate with them gently. Most translations of what follows have
Confucius concluding that if parents are not persuaded, one should not oppose them
though it might very well fail to be of service to parents if following their wishes is
to bring moral disgrace to them and the family.

Yi
Yi is usually translated as morality. But, there are many connotations that emerge
from this simple definition, such as righteousness and duty. Yi basically comes down
to the right action or the treatment of others in a right way. For example, if someone
Virtues 93

is in need and weak, the right action would be to help that person, not to oppress
them for financial or personal gain. Virtue should take precedence over satisfaction
of material desires.

Wen
Wen is about leisure and self development. Within any society, pursuits such as art,
music, poetry, and other types of recreation or self improvement are important. Wen
is the concept of spreading beauty and meaning through developmental pursuits.
However, wen is not interested in these pursuits as mere self-aggrandizement, but
as a way to affect other people and society as a whole in meaningful and significant
way.

Comments on Confucian Ethics

Confucian ethics is largely based, on how one should behave and in this regard
provides a different understanding of morality. Instead of the approach of Western
ethics which typically relies on abstract principles and rules its focus is on a society’s
customs and practices and the character of its citizens. Confucian ethics is more
deeply rooted in how one lives their life than in complex rationality. By claiming
man can change his behavior Confucian ethics implies man has free will, a subject
debated in Western philosophy. A secular ethical theory, virtue ethics, has similarities
with Confucian ethics and shares a similar problem—the selection of which behaviors
should be deemed virtues is ultimately arbitrary; also, in some situations virtues may
conflict with each other.
Confucian ethics provides a distinctive, almost pre-theoretical alternative to under-
standing the nature of the moral life that differs from the Western understanding that
is primarily based on abstract rules and principles. Much of the substance of ethically
significant attitudes such as respect, honesty and filial piety reflects cultural norms
and practices. Learning Confucian morality involves learning these norms and prac-
tices; what Confucius taught is what he thought these norms and practices should
be. For Confucius a society’s morality is to be found in its customs and practices and
how people lead their lives.
There is an aesthetic dimension to the Confucian notion of a fully human life.
Such a life is lived as a beautiful and graceful coordinated interaction with others that
expresses mutual respect and contextualized moral judgment. This aesthetic value of
human interaction according to custom and tradition is missing in the colder, rational
approach of Western ethics.
A criticism of Confucian ethics is that humans are influenced by the situation in
which they act which might overwhelm the force of their character; for this reason
Confucian ethics advises a long and arduous program of ethical and ritual training
(li) to inculcate the virtues. Virtue ethics may be imperfect but that is true of other
moral theories.
94 7 Morality and Religion

Confucian rituals help to express attitudes of respect and reverence for others that
can exist independently of the rituals themselves, but rituals provide conventionally
established, symbolic ways to express these attitudes toward others. Ritual forms,
therefore, give participants manifold and regularly recurring ways to act on and
therefore to strengthen the right attitudes and behavioral dispositions. Given the
renewed appreciation in contemporary psychology for the power of emotions to
influence attitude and behavior, the resource offered by ritual training should not
be ignored by anyone concerned about the problem of how to resist inappropriate
situational influence (Wong 2018; Riegel 2013).

Hindu Ethics

Morality is part of the complex, difficult to define concept Hindus call Dharma which
encompasses everything that is essential for people, the world and nature to exist and
prosper together in harmony. The term “Dharma” does not have a synonym in the
English language. It can mean justice, right, moral, good, and much more. Dharma
is an important concept and is what distinguishes man from other creatures. Dharma
incorporates the metaphysical and practical wisdom of the Hindus.
The central philosophical and moral concepts of Hinduism are contained in ancient
Indian Sanskrit scriptures called Vedas and Upanishads. Ethics in Hindu philosophy
is something that cannot be imposed, but is realized and voluntarily lived up to by
each individual. Man is understood to have four values in life: success (artha); passion
and desire (kama); virtue (dharma) and self perfection (moksa).
Hindu literature variously discusses morality in four contexts: (1) Gunas, that
is inner tendencies of conduct found in every individual (psychology);
(2) Purushartha, the proper aims of life for every individual for self-development
and happiness; (3) Ashramas, ethics for an individual in different periods of one’s
lifetime; and (4) Varnasramas, ethics and conduct for every individual in relation to
society. Hindu ethics is concerned with self-realization and spiritual freedom and is
intimately involved with how one lives their life; it also recognizes there are distinct
periods of life.
Virtuous behavior in Hindu ethics (Niyamas) includes: purity in body, speech
and mind (Sanca), contentment, acceptance of circumstances with optimism; (San-
tosha); perseverance, meditation, austerity (Tapas); lifelong learning (Swadhyaya)
and the right attitude, and contemplation (Pranidhan). Other Hindu virtues include
courage, forgiveness, inner purity, wisdom, reflective prudence, freedom from anger.
Hindus should avoid the five Yamas (ethical rules) of ancient Hindu ethics: violence,
falsehoods, stealing, sexual intercourse if unmarried and cheating on one’s partner
if married, and possessiveness. Also not killing, stealing nor hoarding up treasures.
The Bhagavad Gita, a historic 700 verse Hindu discussion of virtues and an alle-
gorical debate on what is right and what is wrong argues some virtues are not neces-
sarily always absolute, but sometimes relational; for example, it explains an important
Hindu Ethics 95

virtue such as non-violence (Ahimsa) must be re-examined when one is faced with
war or violence.
Hinduism has a strong spiritual component. Hindu incorporates morality into the
broader context of an individual’s material and spiritual life (Crawford 2018). The
highest Hindu ideal is a state of liberation (moksa)-one without craving, one that
is content, and one attained through knowledge and by abstaining from evil. The
ultimate Hindu goal is a life, “absolute and transcendental”, similar to Buddha’s
Nirvana. That mystical state reveals the essential nature of the soul as pure existence
(sat), pure consciousness (cit) and pure bliss (dnanda) (Crawford 2018). Ethical
behavior in Hindu theology comes with the ultimate reward of a transcendental state
of being.

Caste System

In ancient and medieval Indian society a caste system, called varna-dharma consisting
of four castes was developed. There has been debate over the origins of the caste
system. Controversy exists over whether its origin should primarily be attributed to
the four varnas in the ancient law book, Manusmriti, or simply to socioeconomic
factors. The highest in the caste system were the Brahmins who were priests and
teachers and lived on an exalted plain of intellect and probity. The next level of
importance included the Kshatriyas who were stereotypically virile warrior kings and
men of action. In the third level were the Vaisyas who were traders and craftsmen.
The lowest level included the Sudras who tended to be manual laborers.
Outside the caste system were the “Untouchables”. Untouchables were too lowly
for the caste system and were assigned menial and unpleasant jobs. Untouchables
could not own land, could not use temples, could not use high caste wells, and had to
live outside villages (Hoff and Pandey 2004). Scholars have claimed the caste system
violates Hindu dharma where only virtue counts. When India became independent in
1947 its Constitution abrogated the caste system; however, discrimination by caste
persisted. During British colonial rule a census of people and their caste was used to
determine job suitability (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). The persistence of a caste
system in India was an injustice that persisted for thousands of years despite Hindu
morality that should have deemed it unethical.

Conclusion

Amalgamated in most religions are rules that define appropriate behavior that essen-
tially constitute a system of morality. Since billions of people adhere or have over the
eons adhered to a religion, this suggests many humans are accepting of guidance on
appropriate ethical behavior. Most religions either believe in a deity or an extremely
authoritative figure—Moses, Christ, the Buddha, Muhammad, Confucious—which
96 7 Morality and Religion

endows religious beliefs with an apparent authoritative basis lacking in secular ethics.
Secular ethics probably lacks the spirituality, imagination, and richness of religious
ethics which more deeply and specifically incorporates morality into the fabric of an
individual’s material and spiritual life. This advantage over secular ethics is problem-
atic to the extent that the actual existence of a deity, or a person or scripture capable
of conveying a deity’s wishes, can be questioned.
Religion has been misused to provide justification for troublesome or frankly
immoral acts; for example, that innocent people should die for the cause of Islamic
jihad and the persistence of a caste system in India for thousands of years despite its
being contrary to Hindu morality. Religious morality is not always kind to the infidel
and discrimination, hatred and violence (religious wars) between religions has been
common. Religions have mandated severe and unusual punishments such as caning,
stoning, and burning a person at the stake. Amputations for theft in Shariah law are
not a humane form of justice.
Religions can manipulate Biblical statements, for example, when they forbid
life-saving blood transfusion that might have prevented the death of innocent believ-
ers. Religion has been used to question well-established science, such as evolution.
Many religions have a long history and may have less flexibility in changing ethical
standards that evolve over time. Despite these problems a significant portion of the
population identifies with a religion. Religious ethics need to be both appropriately
scrutinized and appropriately respected.
Religions have promoted spirituality, devised systems of morality, provided com-
fort, and tried to guide its adherents toward an ethical and meaningful life. But reli-
gions have also spawned hatred, warred against each other with untold millions killed
and maimed. Religion has imposed harsh punishments including canings, amputa-
tions, burnings at the stake, torture, beheadings and other forms of execution. Wars
between religions have not been uncommon; religions have often acted in violation
of their own moral rules.
Secular moralities tend to be less violent, but their diversity of opinion has pro-
voked moral debate, political disagreement, and in some of its plodding debates
boredom and confusion. Because secular and religious ethics can both go astray,
perhaps they should scrutinize each other.

References

Bernat, James. 2008. Ethical Issues in Neurology, 3rd ed. Wolters Kluwer: Lippincott Williams and
Wilkins.
Buddha Dharma Education Association and BuddhaNet. 2019. Buddhist Ethics. https://buddhanet.
net/e-learning/budethics.htm. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Callahan, Daniel. 2007. Religion and Bioethics in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach
to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology. University Press of New England.
Crawford, S. Cromwell. 2018. Hindu Ethics Albany:SUNY Press. http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/
60778.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2019.
References 97

Dawkins, Richard. 2013. The Root of Evil. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nAos1M-_Ts.

Accessed 31 March 2019.
Delfino, Robert A. 2015. The Failure of New Atheism. Morality Studia Gilsoniana 4 (3): 229–240.
El Fadi, Khaled Abou. 2017. Our’anic Ethics and Islamic Law. Journal of Islamic Ethics 1 (1–2):
7–28.
Gert, Bernard. 1966. Morality. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hackett, Conrad and McClendon, David. Pew Research Center. 2007. Christians remain world’s
largest religious group, but they are declining in Europe. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/.
Accessed 31 March 2019.
Hoff, Karla and Pandey, Priyanka. 2004. Belief Systems and Durable Inequalities: An Experimental
Investigation of Indian Caste. Policy Research Working Paper;No.3351. World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Islamic Sharia Law. 2018. http://www.billionbibles.org/sharia/sharia-law.html Accessed 11 June
2018.
Israel and Judaic Studies, Core Ethical Teachings of Judaism. www.ijs.org.au/Accessed. March 31,
2019.
Jewish Virtual Library. 2019. The Israel War of Independence: The Capture of Deir Yassin. April 9,
1948. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-capture-of-deir-yassin. Accessed 1 April 2019.
Kuhse, Helga, and Peter Singer. 2006. Introduction to Bioethics: An Anthology. Hoboken New
Jersey: Blackwell Publishing.
Murphy, Mark. 2019. The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-
ethics/. Accessed 23 November 2019.
O’Brien. 2019. The Four Divine States or Four Immeasurables:loving-kindness, compassion, sym-
pathetic joy, and equanimity. https://www.thoughtco.com/brahma-vihara-the-four-divine-states-
449717. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Pratt, Douglas. 2010. Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism. Terrorism
and Political Violence 22 (3): 438–456.
Riegel, Jeffrey. 2013. Confucious. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, Edward
N. https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=confucius. Accessed 1
April 2019.
Sia, Santiago. 2008. Ethics and Religion. New Blackfriars 89 (no. 1024): 702–09. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/43251280. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Veatch, Robert M. 2012. Religious Medical Ethics: Revealed and Natural Alternatives in Hip-
pocratic, Religious and Secular Medical Ethics Washington DC: Georgetown University Press
2012.
Venkatraman, Amritha. 2007. Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpreta-
tions. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (3): 229–248.
White, Matthew. 2012. The Great Big Book of Horrible Things New York and London: W.W. Norton
and Company.
Wikipedia Contributors. “Talmud,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Talmud&oldid=889522711. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019. “Religion,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.
org/w/index.php?title=Religion&oldid=889713770. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2010. “Scopes Trial,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Scopes_Trial&oldid=890057834. Accessed 31 March 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. “Ethics in religion,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ethics_in_religion&oldid=884224442. Accessed 31 March
2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. “Caste system in India,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Caste_system_in_India&oldid=890118325. Accessed 1 April
2019.
98 7 Morality and Religion

Wong, David. 2018. Chinese Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta.
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=ethics-chinese. Accessed 1
April 2019.
Zoloth, Laurie Religion and the Public Discourse of Bioethics. 2007. In: Biomedical Ethics: A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology. University Press of New
England.
Chapter 8
Morality and the Law

Abstract Several conflicting philosophic positions attempt to describe the appropri-

ate relationship between morality and the law. Relevant legal theories include polit-
ical anarchism, legal naturalism, and legal positivism. Political anarchism, which
is grounded in moral claims of individual liberties, has its roots in the fear of an
oppressive state; it advocates individual liberty and bases human flourishing on the
ideal of a non-coercive consensus. Legal naturalism is derived by reason from the
nature of man who is expressed as having been created by God. The introduction
of religiously derived legal doctrine is problematic. Legal positivism, a reaction to
legal naturalism seeks to avoid metaphysical and moral beliefs that are inaccessi-
ble to objective proof; it does not believe the law should be influenced by moral
considerations. Three horrific laws that affected slaves, American Indians, and Jews
illustrate the dangers of law when moral consideration is considered irrelevant.

Introduction

Although peer pressure, moral persuasion, and a troubled conscience can motivate
proper behavior, those influences are often dwarfed by the power of the law which
can inflict punishment. The law in the United States may express itself from several
“sources”; these include federal, state and municipal statutes, case law, judicial opin-
ions, administrative regulations, and judicial interpretation of constitutional rights
and responsibilities.
The relationship between the law and morality is controversial. The philosophi-
cally relevant question is the role of morality in the construction and administration
of the law itself; “is there a necessary connection between law and morality”? I will
discuss three legal theories that purport to describe the proper relationship between
law and morality. Political anarchism claims the law is itself immoral. Legal natural-
ism, accepts moral judgments based on natural law. Legal positivism holds the law
should essentially rely on legal “sources” because morality has no place in the law.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 99

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_8
100 8 Morality and the Law

Political Anarchism

Political anarchism, which is grounded in moral claims of individual liberties, is

skeptical of power and authority, especially the power of the state. Political anar-
chism advocates individual liberty and bases human flourishing on the ideal of a
non-coercive consensus. Some political anarchists believe, “it is of the essence of
law to have features which render it inconsistent with morality; hence the law is
essentially immoral” (Fiala 2018). This provocative statement has been softened by
some theorists to mean legal authorities do not have moral authority.
Political anarchists claim the law demands obedience even when the law differs
from an individual’s moral judgment and thus is inconsistent with a person’s moral
autonomy which requires people to accept responsibility for their actions. Hobbes
described the horrors of living in the anarchist state of nature; in contrast, anarchists
fear the oppressive, violent and corrupt nature of the state (Gert 2010).
The discussion of morality and the law has its nuances because all sides are able
to make exceptions to their predominant position. Legal naturalists who believe the
law can be morally good admit some laws are evil. Political anarchists could accept a
particular law if they believed they should obey that law and were not being coerced.
All positions admit the law can be corrupted and put to evil use (Raz 2003). It would
be difficult to imagine a stable society with no laws; that may explain why political
anarchism has not established firm roots.

Natural Law and Legal Naturalism

Natural law is a prominent aspect of Catholic theology. It was most notably elaborated
by Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) who was influenced by the teachings of Aristotle
who recognized the distinctiveness of human reason. Natural law in its religious
formulation affirms the laws of nature were dictated by God and are superior to all
else in obligation (See Chap. 7).
The Bible says there are laws of nature that describe the way God normally
accomplishes his will in the universe (Jeremiah 33:25). Natural law is a crucial
obligation for believers because natural law originates with God. In recent years
some writers have acknowledged the value of natural law without including its God-
given status (Murphy 2019). Human practical reason is said to be capable of revealing
God’s natural law concerning how we should act. Natural law followers claim Natural
law theory allows moral propositions to be objectively judged as true or false (Himma
2019).
A variety of values or “goods” have been considered consistent with natural law.
Thomas Hobbes’ central natural law thesis is that the dominant human desire is to
avoid violent death. His natural law theory is based on the value of self-preservation.
The Aristotelian perspective on natural law values what is perfective or completing
of man life. Other postulated “goods” of natural law include procreation, religion,
Natural Law and Legal Naturalism 101

knowledge for its own sake, friendship and sociability, the ability to reason correctly
about what is best for yourself and act on those decisions, whatever man likes and
desires, justice, avoidance of pain, being in harmony with other people and aesthetic
experience. In Natural legalism the authority of legal standards derives from the
moral merit of those and other similarly derived natural law “goods” (Finnis 2016;
McCarthy 2015).
Froude said, “Our human laws are but the copies, more or less imperfect, of the
eternal laws”. These laws have been said to be derived from “the nature of humans
and as abstracted from reason” (Kirk 1993). Law not grounded in these standards is
“not really law”. The philosophical legacy of Thomas Aquinas, regards natural law
as good in its nature (Raz 2003). No human laws have validity if they are contrary
to natural law.
In general, natural law legal theories consider the law authoritative in virtue of its
moral content. The classical theory of Thomas Aquinas finds overlap between natural
law morality and natural law legal theories. The idea that natural law morality and
the law intersect in some way has been called the Overlap Thesis. Natural law legal
theorists embrace the idea that the law and morality should be conjoined and morality
should influence the law (Himma 2019).
Definition of which values are derived from natural law can differ amongst people.
Natural law opposes abortion, contraception, especially for unmarried couples; it has
also opposed gay and LGBT rights, including same sex marriage. A concern is the
use of natural law by judges (Murray 2014). Natural law incorporated in the legal
system is problematic because laws affect everyone, including people who do not
believe in natural law.

Legal Positivism

Legal positivism is a philosophy of law that addresses the question of what criteria
make a law legally valid. Phrased more specifically it also asks “is there a necessary
connection between law and morality?” Legal positivism is in opposition to natural
law legal theory because legal positivists believe morality should not be a criteria of
legal validity. This does not mean legal positivists are indifferent to morality or are
tolerant of immoral laws. The relevant question is whether morality should shape the
law and guide its functioning.
Legal positivists believe law belongs in its own domain because law is a social fact
with validity based on its establishment by some socially recognized legal authority
(Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). “According to legal positivism, law is a matter
of what has been posited, ordered, decided, practiced, or tolerated”. Legal positivism
is the view that the law is a complex social practice. “The validity of a legal norm
depends, not on the moral value attached thereto, but from its sources as determined
by a social community’s rules and conventions” (Green 2018).
The “normatively inert” position of legal positivism might suggest an indifference
to morality. Legal positivists do not claim morality is not important; they are saying
102 8 Morality and the Law

morality should not be used as a criteria for legal validity. Because morality can be
contentious, controversial and immune to empirical proof it’s understandable that
legal positivists might want to keep the law free of potentially destabilizing moral
convictions.
According to legal positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited, ordered,
decided, practiced, and tolerated. Legal positivists believe that intellectual clarity
is best achieved by leaving contentious moral questions to a separate investigation.
However, the relationship between morality and the law is complicated. Legal posi-
tivists would prefer a wall that separates morality and the law but in many ways the
two are intertwined (Green 2018).
The thesis of legal positivism has been summarized in three theoretical commit-
ments: The Social Fact Thesis asserts legal validity is ultimately a function of certain
social facts, such as the promulgations of a legislature. The Conventionality Thesis
emphasizes law’s validity is the result of a social convention; the social facts giving
rise to legal validity are authoritative in virtue of a social convention such as an
agreement among officials or an agreement to follow a constitution. The Separa-
bility Thesis claims there is no conceptual overlap between the notions of law and
morality. The Separability Thesis is “just the simple contention that it is in no sense
a necessary truth that laws satisfy the demands of morality though they often do so
(Himma 2019).
The position of legal positivists is the legal system should be a closed system in
which appropriate legal decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal sources
without reference to morality. The validity of a legal norm depends on its legal source
as determined by a social community’s rules, conventions, and the actions of judges.
Legal positivists value empirical evidence and recognize morality as metaphysical
and inaccessible to objective proof. Moral judgments, unlike factual statements,
cannot be proven valid. Legal positivists prefer addressing the “merits” of a law as a
separate issue; it may be a “bad law” but if it was added to the system by a legitimate
authority, it is still a law. For legal positivists the authority of a law is based on its
legal ancestry, not its morality (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c).
An important reason for denying a connection between law and morality takes
into account the variability of ethical beliefs. If judges and other agents of the law
were left to decide which laws were unjust there might be chaos given the diversity
of moral opinions. A county jailer should not let a prisoner go free simply because he
thinks the prisoner is a victim of an immoral law. Legal positivists prefer the “merits”
of a law be treated as a separate issue.
Similar consideration would hold for religious beliefs. Religiously based moral
teachings such as prohibitions against artificial contraception and abortion, have
been advocated for legalization. This has created controversy, societal division and
impassioned debate. Morality as expressed in sacred texts such as the Bible, the
Torah and the Koran would not be considered by legal positivists to be a sufficient
basis for legal validity. Finnis claims law cannot solely be based on social facts and
that some norms are required (Finnis 2016).
Immoral Laws 103

Immoral Laws

There have been many immoral laws, both in the United States and elsewhere. I will
briefly summarize three examples. These cases should provoke some uneasiness
over the legal positivist position that there should be no connection between law and
morality.
The Fugitive Slave Act was passed by the United States Congress on September
18, 1850, as part of the Compromise of 1850 between Southern slave-holding inter-
ests and Northern Free-Soilers; the Free Soil party rejected slavery. The act required
that all escaped slaves, upon capture, be returned to their masters and that officials
and citizens of free states had to cooperate. Abolitionists nicknamed it the “Blood-
hound Law”, for the dogs that were used to track down runaway slaves (Wikipedia
Contributors 2019a, b, c).
Andrew Jackson had long been an advocate of what he called “Indian removal.”
As an Army general, he had spent years leading brutal campaigns against the Creeks
in Georgia and Alabama and the Seminoles in Florida—campaigns that resulted
in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of acres of land from Indian nations to
white farmers. As President, he continued this crusade. In 1830, he signed the Indian
Removal Act, which gave the federal government the power to exchange Native held
land east of the Mississippi for land to the west.
President Jackson and his government frequently ignored the letter of the law and
forced Native Americans to vacate lands they had lived on for generations. In the
winter of 1831, under threat of invasion by the U.S. Army, the Choctaw became the
first nation to be expelled from its land altogether. They made the journey to Indian
territory on foot without adequate food, supplies or other help from the government.
Thousands of people died along the way. It was, one Choctaw leader said, a “trail of
tears and death” (History.com Editors 2018).
The Nuremberg Laws were anti-Semitic racial laws passed in Nazi Germany by
the Reichstag on September 15, 1935. There were two laws: the Law for the Protection
of German Blood and German Honour, which forbade marriages and extramarital
intercourse between Jews and Germans and forbad employment of German females
under 45 in Jewish households. The second law, the Reich Citizenship Law, declared
that only those of German or related blood were eligible to be Reich citizens; the
remainder were classified as state subjects, without citizenship rights. Persons con-
victed of violating the marriage laws were imprisoned, and upon completing their
sentences were re-arrested by the Gestapo and sent to Nazi concentration camps
(Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c).
In defense of legal positivism these cases were influenced by factors other than
the absence of moral considerations. These include ignoring the letter of the law
(Indian Removal Act), political considerations (Fugitive Slave Act) and a virulently
anti-Semitic dictatorship (Nuremberg Laws).
Legal positivists hold that morality should not be used to establish legal validity
and that an immoral law was, nonetheless, “a law”. A criticism of legal positivism is
that it over emphasizes the rules and makes too great a separation between legal and
104 8 Morality and the Law

moral judgments (Greenawalt 2012). Cases of the type just described should elicit
caution before advocating the complete separation of law and morality. Legal posi-
tivists are aware that laws can be oppressive, even evil yet they accept the separation
of law and morality.

The Obligation to Obey

Joseph Raz, a legal, moral and political philosopher is a legal positivist. He says “the
general virtues and moral properties of legal systems as a whole justify a general
obligation to obey them; the obligation to be obedient comes from the main systemic
features of the law”. He recognizes the great value of human societies and a moral
need for those societies to be governed by authority. A general duty to obey the law
does not rely on the moral quality of every standard. Raz acknowledges there can be
morally degenerate and radically evil laws and acknowledges that morally bad laws
can be laws.
Raz deals with the problem of immoral laws using the concept of legitimate
authority. Those who control power must show they have legitimate authority for
there to be an obligation to obey their laws. Raz’s requirements for obedience include:
1. The authority does its job successfully. 2. Laws must not exceed a government’s
authority by straying into areas not in its relevant domain. 3. A government must be
a just legal system that facilitates conforming with reason (Raz 2003).
Raz is trying to resolve the problem of bad laws for a philosophy that denies the
relevance of moral considerations. He does this by denying legitimacy to authorities
who promulgate inappropriate laws. Instead of a direct focus on immoral laws, the
need to make morality relevant is avoided by identifying the problem as due to its
origin in the illegitimate legal system from which it emanated. Raz says there is no
obligation to obey an illegitimate law. Raz’s main focus is not on the immoral nature
of a law but on the legitimacy of the promulgating legal authority.
This amounts to a philosophical sleight of hand. It also creates a public burden
because refusing to obey an illegitimate law can have adverse consequences; it would
be simpler and preferable if a law’s morality was considered prior to its enactment.
Green says, “the laws of a legal system may be quite unjust, and the state may be
quite illegitimate. As a result, there may be no obligation to obey them (Green 2018).
The limitation of this argument is that there are unjust laws that people are not free
to disobey. The Indians of Andrew Jackson’s day could either accept removal from
their lands or face the power of the American army. Fugitive slaves were returned
to slavery. The Jews of Nazi Germany were annihilated in the Holocaust. Legal
positivists can present the option of disobeying an unjust law but cannot guarantee
protection from its possible severe, even deadly, consequences.
Nuanced Morality 105

Nuanced Morality

Although legal positivists have argued against incorporation of morality in the legal
system, moral elements have been described that are intrinsic to the law. The law
is a morally valuable system by its nature because it can be used for moral ends.
People prosper in human societies; the law’s virtue is to place a legitimate moral
authority over its subjects. “The law can be a constitutive component of valuable
social groups”.
Intrinsic features of law have been said to have moral dimensions. The law gen-
erally has rules so issues can be resolved uniformly. It advocates its rules be under-
standable and rules people are expected to observe be made publically available. The
law usually does not mandate rules incapable of being followed. The legal positivist
H.L.A. Hart acknowledges that a minimum of justice is required when behavior is
controlled. The position that the nature of law has a moral component because it aims
to serve the common good has been qualified by the contention that the “typical use
of law is to maintain power and privilege and to oppress” (Greenawalt 2012).
Hart, the legal positivist, acknowledged that any society’s moral and legal systems
would by necessity overlap. For example, the killing of innocent people and theft
would connect the law and morality. Positivists would have to overlook examples of
this type to maintain the view that no connection exists between law and morality.
Dworkin maintains that judges dealing with difficult cases must rely on principles
that have a mixed legal and moral status. Judges have discretion and must decide
which decision best fits the legal material; in making this judgment a judge might
make a choice that takes account of moral concerns. Thus, perhaps to the chagrin of
legal positivists, there is an internal morality to the law which intertwines legal and
moral judgments (Greenawalt 2012).
Raz, argued that the validity of a law can never depend on its morality. However,
Raz has come to accept that law may depend upon morality in certain circumstances
(Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). Judges have discretion and must decide which
decision best fits the legal material; in making this judgment a judge might make
a choice that takes account of moral concerns. For example, a judge who decides
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual must make some kind of moral judgment
(Greenawalt 2012).
An example noted by Ronald Dworkin of the interaction of law and morality is
the Court of Appeals of New York case, Riggs v. Palmer (Riggs 1889). Mrs. Riggs
and Mrs. Preston sought to invalidate the will of their father Francis E. Palmer.
Mr. Palmer’s will left the bulk of his estate to his grandson Elmer. The will was
legally valid. According to New York State law Elmer was entitled to inherit. What
complicated this case was that Elmer, fearful his grandfather might change his will,
used poison to murder him. Elmer was convicted of his grandfather’s murder and
imprisoned (Leiter 2009).
The legislators who wrote the statute relevant to wills probably would not have
intended for a murderer to benefit from his crime. Elmer was not awarded his inher-
itance because the court decided it could make an exception to avoid an unjust and
106 8 Morality and the Law

absurd result. The court employed the moral principle, “one cannot benefit from
one’s own wrong doing” in reaching its decision (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b,
c). Although legal positivism rejects the intrusion of morality in a legal system, at
times circumstances make that difficult because there are principles intrinsic to law
that have a moral dimension (Leiter 2009).
Ronald Dworkin, a critic of legal positivism, notes the Riggs case is an example
of how the law and morality can interact. Dworkin has claimed legal positivism does
not account for theoretical disagreement. In the Rigg’s case controversy existed over
whether a valid legal statute or an equitable moral principle should take precedence.
Dworkin claims that in addition to rules and statutes equitable principles may be
required to adjudicate legal cases. This may entail, contrary to legal positivism theory,
the introduction in a legal case of a connection between law and morality (Beehler
1990).

Conclusion

The position of legal anarchists is difficult to accept because lawlessness can lead
to chaos, violent crime, robbery, vigilante hunts for alleged criminals, rebellion,
and undemocratic and tyrannical responses to the unlawfulness. Although anarchists
may make a valid theoretical point, the absence of law, can have painful undesirable
consequences and cannot be enthusiastically embraced.
Natural law is originally derived from a theological doctrine; in a religiously
diverse society, especially one that explicitly advocates the separation of church and
state, its implementation is unsettling. Legal positivism rejects a relationship between
morality and the law and struggles because the two are not so readily separable.

References

Beehler, Rodger. 1990. Legal Positivism, Social Rules, and Riggs v. Palmer. Law and Philosophy
9: 265–293.
Fiala, Andrew. 2018. Anarchism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/anarchism/.
Finnis, John. 2016. Natural Law Theories. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/natural-
law-theories/. Accessed November 30, 2019.
Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press.
Green, Leslie. 2019. Legal Positivism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/legal-
positivism/. Accessed 18 Jan 2019.
Greenawalt, Kent. 2012. Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism in The
Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. ed. Robert P. George. Oxford Scholarship Online.
Available at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.001.
0001/acprof-9780198253457-chapter-1. Accessed 22 Jan 2019.
References 107

Himma, Kenneth Einar. Natural Law. 2019. Naturalistic Epistemology. The Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed 17 Jan 2019.
History.com Editors. 2018. Trail of Tears. Available at https://www.history.com/topics/native-
american-history/trail-of-tears.
Kirk, Russell. 1993. The Case For and Against Natural Law. The Heritage Foundation. July 15, 1993.
Available at https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/the-case-and-against-natural-law.
Accessed 27 Nov 2019.
Leiter, Brian. 2009. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Chicago Law Review Chicago Unbound,
76: 1215–1231. Available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol76/iss3/5/ Accessed
24 Jan 2019.
McCarthy, Hugh. 2015. ASC Blog. A Summary of John Finniss Theory of Natural
Law. Available at https://hughmccarthylawscienceasc.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/a-summary-
of-john-finniss-theory-of-natural-law/. Accessed 30 Nov 2019.
Murphy, Mark. 2019. The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/
entries/natural-law-ethics/.
Murray, Anthony. 2014. When Judges Believe in ‘Natural Law’. The Atlantic. 27 Jan 2014. Avail-
able at https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/when-judges-believe-in-natural-
law/283311/. Accessed 1 Dec 2019.
Raz, Joseph. 2003. About Morality and the Nature of Law. The American Journal of Jurisprudence
48 (1): 1–16.
Riggs v. Palmer 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019a. Legal Positivism. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Legal_positivism&oldid=869079462. Accessed 18 Jan 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019b. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fugitive_Slave_Act_of_1850&oldid=878571943.
Accessed 25 Jan 2019.
Wikipedia contributors. 2019c. Nuremberg Laws. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nuremberg_Laws&oldid=879322790. Accessed 25 Jan 2019.
Chapter 9
Evil

Abstract The existence of immoral behavior and evil expose the vulnerability of
morality; both persist despite centuries of moral discourse. The existence of evil has
been a vexing problem for believers in an all knowing, omnipotent and beneficent
God. The study of atrocities such as the Holocaust, the My Lai massacre, the Arme-
nian genocide, killings by the Khymer Rouge, and the “disappearances” in Argentina
have helped define some of the causes of evil. Responsibility for evil acts can often
be traced to individual personality factors and the action of individuals, especially
those in a position of power. Human behavior can be difficult to predict. Individuals
previously considered ordinary have participated in evil acts. Under identical circum-
stances some individuals can behave admirably while others do not. A human ten-
dency to place obedience to authority over moral concerns and the capacity to accept
killing as not extraordinary foster the persistence of evil. Social situational variables
can contribute to the emergence of evil behavior. Prevailing circumstances, such as
extreme social disorganization, economic distress and major political divisions, have
facilitated evil acts. Malicious ideology and propaganda with the dehumanization of
out groups can inflame passions and has played a significant role in genocide; for
example the virulent anti-Semitism that preceded the Holocaust.

Introduction

The Oxford English Dictionary defines evil as, “profoundly immoral and wicked”.
Studies that seek a deeper exploration of evil admit, “which experiences justify when
the word evil is to be used as a descriptor is no easy matter”. Staub, a psychologist,
says, evil is not a scientific concept with an agreed meaning but, “The essence of
evil is the destruction of human beings” (p. 25, Staub 1989). Gert has defined evil
as “what all rational persons desire to avoid for themselves personally” (pp. 50–51,
Gert 1988). He lists the consequences of evil—death, pain, disability, loss of freedom
and loss of pleasure—but otherwise doesn’t define evil. Zimbardo believes, “human
beings are both good and evil beings at the same time” and evil refers to “behaving
in ways that harm, abuse, demean, dehumanize, or destroy innocent others” (p. 5,
Flescher 2013).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 109

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_9
110 9 Evil

I have included a chapter on evil in a book on morality because evil represents

the gross suppression of morality; the existence of evil is an alert to the vulnerability
of morality. An understanding of the genesis of evil might help prevent it.

Evil: Circumstances, Values and Beliefs

A person’s only option might be theft to pay for a son’s life saving surgery. We might
consider theft immoral; however, for the involved parent, in the hierarchy of values,
saving his son’s life is justifiably paramount. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) has barbarically beheaded innocent aid workers, burned a captured pilot alive
and murdered prisoners of war. These acts are immoral acts. However, if we could
penetrate the mind of the ISIS members who committed these atrocities we might
find that they did not consider their actions unethical. For them the highest order
value might be the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East. If in
their minds the heinous acts they commit are considered necessary to bring that about
their priority value they can act in the false belief their behavior, if its motivation was
understood, would be judged moral. Values can promote evil behavior; of course,
believing you are acting morally does not make evil acts moral.
Evil can be the result of a false belief. Innocent women have been hanged because
of the mistaken belief they were “witches” practicing witchcraft. Ruse questions
whether our sense of morality is not yet another selfish adaptation and as cynics have
argued “humans have done more harm in the name of morality than have any number
of snakes, poisonous or otherwise” (Ruse 1988).
Flack and deWaal note, “Ironically, morality and immorality make use of the same
capacities” (Flack and deWaal 2000). Empathy can be used to ameliorate suffering
or to inflict cruelty. Natural selection is morally blind. It has provided the capacity to
identify and protect values; it has given us the capacity for moral indignation when
we believe our values have been violated. Misguided values can lead to evil acts.

God and Evil

Evil has almost hypnotically commanded the attention of both religious and secular
scholars as well as the general public. The Devil (Satan) serves as an avatar of
evil. Religions that embrace an all knowing, all powerful and beneficent God have
struggled with the pervasive evil and suffering on earth. After centuries of writings on
moral philosophy and erudite explanations of how we ought to behave, the twentieth
century was the bloodiest in human history and the current century, has experienced
the killings of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Both religious and secular
efforts have failed to substantially suppress evil.
There are different kinds of evil. Natural evil includes earthquakes, volcanoes and
tornadoes to the extent they are not due to human activity or incompetence. Evil acts
God and Evil 111

due to mental illness (“innocent by reason of insanity”) have a different genesis and
are not considered here. Another form of evil is moral evil which is the subject of
this discussion. Moral evil has been a problem for religion. If God is omniscient,
omnipotent and beneficent he would not have permitted the extensive moral evil we
have witnessed throughout history.
Theodicy, is an answer to this conundrum and views evil as tantamount to the good
in disguise or the good as unknowable. The word theodicy is a combination of the
Greek words for God and justice and were linked by Gottfried Leibnitz (1646–1716)
to mean “the justification of God” (pp. 79–79, Fleischer 1989). The challenge of
theodicy is to reconcile the notion of God with the existence of evil. It has been defined
as the vindication of divine goodness and providence in view of the existence of both
evil and the “incongruity of merit and fate”. One thesis of theodicy is we emerge
stronger having been tested by evil; evil makes the human experience meaningful
and allows us to show fortitude and have genuine accountability. God allows us to
suffer so we will know joy better. Evil ultimately serves as an agent for the good
(Green 2018).
The simultaneous existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and beneficent God
and the Holocaust seems contradictory. One of the several explanations of evil is
the Manichean model which sees a dichotomy between good and evil; the latter is
symbolized by the devil (Satan) whose function is to tempt humans to sin. “The devil
can score points against God by appealing to humanity’s base material nature and
by corrupting human souls” (pp. 23–33, Flescher 2013). This leaves God less than
all powerful- a point some have taken as heresy- but does not exclude his existence.
Another explanation is because humans have been given free will they, not God, must
take personal responsibility for their actions. Yet another explanation of evil is that
unjust suffering on earth will be more than compensated in a future life (eschatolog-
ical theodicy). The Holocaust has provoked considerable theological discussion and
controversy (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). Of course, the problem of God and
evil becomes irrelevant if one does not believe in the existence of God or accepts
God may not have the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and beneficence.
Another defense of God’s existence in the face of evil involves a minority and
radical perspective on the nature of morality. Subjectivism is presented as “the view
that the existence of every describable thing depends on an individual’s awareness and
filtering of that thing through language and culture … and that no objective underlying
reality exists” (pp. 120–121, Flescher 2013). That perspective limits evil to a sensory
experience. David Hume (pp. 468–469, Hume 1738–1740) wrote that willful murder
or any other action deemed vicious “creates a sentiment of disapprobation which
arises in you…, not in the object”. “No thing that has meaning in the world is
ever discovered; it is always created (p. 121, Flescher 2013)”. “Our sentiments, our
preferences and passions … tell us what we should and should not do”. Subjectivism
says our passions, not some universal reality determine our thoughts and we should
be skeptical of concepts such as good and evil. Hume famously said, “reason is the
slave of the passions”. If we accept that our moral principles are ultimately subjective
the existence of an all knowing, all powerful and beneficent God is salvaged because
evil is demoted to simply a creation of our minds (pp. 120–124, Flescher 2013).
112 9 Evil

The radical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, expressed in his book, Beyond

Good and Evil, and other writings, is an extension of a subjectivism that supports
the notion of evil as a human invention. Nietzsche expressed skepticism about con-
ventional moral ideas. According to Nietzsche what motivates every idea or maxim
is a self-interested struggle for power. For Nietzsche rational discourse is a fraud
and in reality a struggle for power; there are no standard norms. Virtues are not to
be regarded as intrinsically valuable, but judged from where their being considered
intrinsically valuable gets us. Actions should be avoided because of their impact on
our goals, not because of any intrinsic immorality; the feeling of guilt is the result of
exploitation. Our moral norms reflect our strong moral preferences and our faith in
them.
Nietzsche (See Chapter 12) in his critique of moral and religious values says it is
our passions that determine our norms which have to be considered in the historical
context of their evolution. We should ask what was the end for which a character
trait was cultivated by those in power. He views morality as an impediment on the
self for the benefit of others. Nietzsche would undo the timeless quality we attach
to what we consider moral to our understanding of good and evil and to our support
of universal moral norms. Nietzsche’s nihilism denies the validity of our concepts
of good and evil and says philosophy cannot tell us what kind of person we should
become because there are no moral truths (pp. 124–130, Flescher 2013). Flescher
has used Nietzsche’s philosophy to salvage God. If there is no true evil there is no
need to reconcile God’s beneficent nature with the existence of evil.

Evil: Obedience to Authority

Milgram in the introduction to his famous experiment, Behavioral Study of Obedi-

ence, notes that obedience to authority serves numerous productive functions; how-
ever, he also notes, the inhumane policies of the Nazi Third Reich, though perhaps
originating in the mind of a single individual, succeeded on a massive scale because
“a very large number of persons obeyed orders”. The aim of Milgram’s experiment
was to determine whether “obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tendency
… overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct” (Milgram 1963).
The study took place at a respectable location, Yale University. Subjects were 40
males from a variety of occupations that included postal clerks, salesmen, high school
teachers and engineers. Subjects were (falsely) told the study was being performed
to determine the effect of punishment on learning. The experiment included a teacher
and a learner; the naive subject was always the teacher. The learner was a likable
Irish-American who was supposedly strapped into an “electric chair apparatus”. After
being read a series of word pairs, the subject (“the teacher”) read the first word of one
of the pairs along with four words. The learner was asked which of the four words
was originally paired with the first word.
The “learner” was placed in an “electric chair” and the teacher given the option
of administering an electric shock whenever the learner gave a wrong response or
Evil: Obedience to Authority 113

no response. Shocks ranged from 15 to 450 V. Subjects were told that although
the shocks might be “extremely painful” they caused no permanent tissue damage.
Shock switches included labeling from Slight Shock to Extreme Intensity Shock to
Danger: Severe Shock. An experimenter instructed subjects to increase the shock
by one level every time the learner gave a wrong answer. When the level reached
300 V the learner started pounding to let the subject know he was suffering. Learners
were not suffering because they were part of the experiment and no electricity was
administered; but subjects thought they were administering painful shocks. Reluctant
subjects were prodded to continue the shocking “to bring the subject in line”.
Subjects displayed significant tension while administering the shocks with sweat-
ing, groaning and trembling and what was described as seizures in three subjects. Of
the 40 subjects, 26(65%) obeyed the experimenters and punished the learner with
shocks beyond the designation, “Danger: Severe Shock”. Milgram concluded that
obedient tendencies were strong, especially since the experimenters had no power to
enforce their commands and were able to get subjects to act against their own values.
C. P. Snow said, “When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you
will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than
have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William
Shirer’s “Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” (Shirer 1960). The German Officer Corps
“were brought up in the most rigorous code of obedience… in the name of obedience
they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large scale actions in the history
of the world” (Snow 1961).

The Pathology of Imprisonment: The Stanford Prison

Experiment

In an unusual experiment Philip Zimbardo selected subjects from a group of homoge-

neous, stable, mature, normal, intelligent college students from middle class homes.
Half of them were designated prisoners by flip of a coin, the other half were des-
ignated prison guards. The designated prisoners were unexpectedly picked up at
their homes by city policemen in a squad car, searched, handcuffed, fingerprinted
and booked at the Palo Alto station house. They were then blindfolded and taken
to their jail where they were strip searched, deloused and put into a cell with two
other prisoners. The jail was realistically constructed in the Stanford psychology
Department.
After only six days the experiment had to be terminated because of frightening
findings. Prisoners and guards adopted their roles and lost the sense of their true self.
In less than a week the “ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature sur-
faced”. One third of prison guards became tyrannical and treated prisoners as if they
were despicable animals, taking pleasure in their cruelty while the prisoners became
dehumanized, servile, and developed hatred for the guards. Three prisoners had to
be released because they were crying hysterically and became severely depressed;
114 9 Evil

guards used their power to made prisoners feel worthless. There were some good
guards but they did not do anything to interfere with the bad prison guards. The early
solidarity of prisoners deteriorated into every man for himself (Zimbardo 1972).
Zimbardo concludes, “Individual behavior is largely under the control of social
forces and environmental contingencies rather than personality traits”. Zimbardo
speculates that perhaps the majority of people can be made to do almost anything
regardless of their morals and values. He says “ordinary good men and women
are induced into behaving in evil ways by turning on or off one or another social
situational variable” (Zimbardo 2004).
Zimbardo identifies situational factors that facilitate evil. These include the use of
ideology, for example acting in the name of national security; also giving participants
a meaningful role to play that carries with it positive values. For example, in the
Milgram experiments subjects were told they would act as teachers when, in fact, they
were simply asking them to administer painful electric shocks. Altering semantics
to make an unethical behavior sound ethical as was done in Milgram’s experiments
with shocking presented as facilitating learning. Presenting basic rules to follow that
justify mindless compliance can also be used to promote immoral behavior.
Zimbardo explains how good people can be transformed into perpetrators. Dif-
fusing responsibility so others might be held responsible makes it easier to engage in
unethical behavior. Starting the pathway to evil with a small first step and increasing
the level of aggression in gradual steps that may go unnoticed can perpetuate unethi-
cal behavior. A similar approach is gradually shifting the nature of an authority figure
from reasonable and just, to unreasonable and irrational. Other effective methods for
promoting unethical or evil behavior include prohibiting dissent, maintaining the
anonymity of perpetrators, attributing blame to the victim and labeling an enemy an
aggressor, an atheist, or a dehumanized animal.

“Ordinary” Germans

Goldhagen confirms that in real life, non-experimental situations, ordinary people

can become torturers and killers. During the Holocaust Nazi police battalions played
a significant role. These battalions consisted of men who were haphazardly chosen,
typically older than army soldiers and had relatively limited training and limited
armaments. They were frequently unfit for military service. Their selection did not
involve any ideological screening. Their police training consisted of limited Nazi
indoctrination. During the war these battalions had functions in addition to tradi-
tional policing that included fighting partisans in occupied countries, transferring
populations, fighting alongside the army when needed and, though not mentioned
in official reports, killing civilians, which essentially meant killing Jews. When he
examined other aspects of their life Goldhagen concluded members of these police
battalions were “ordinary” Germans (p. 191, Goldhagen 1996).
Police battalions participated in large scale killing following the German attack on
the Soviet Union. Bialystok, a Polish city, was given to the Soviet Union as part of the
“Ordinary” Germans 115

German- Soviet Pact of 1939. After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union they took
control of Bialystok. On June 27, 1941 German members of Police Battalion 309
rounded up male Jews in Bialystok as ordered. Although their orders were limited
to rounding up the Jews, many Jews were beaten, shot and suffered other brutalities.
Battalion police told some elder Jews to dance; because they were not pleased by the
dancing, the police mocked them and then set their beards on fire. Police battalion
309 also searched the local hospital and killed all the Jews they could find. They took
hundreds of Jews from the marketplace and shot them. Because so many more Jews
were being rounded up the men of Police Battalion 309 herded them into the main
synagogue of Bialystok and set it on fire. Members of the police battalion surrounded
the synagogue to prevent anyone from escaping. The members of Battalion 309, when
given a free hand, killed 2000–3000 innocent Jews in Bialystok that day, many by
burning them alive (pp. 181–202, Goldhagen 1996; Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018).
Other German police battalions behaved in a similar fashion.
After the war Goldhagen searched for an explanation of the perpetrators murder-
ous actions. He identified as a predominant factor the long history of anti-Semitism
in Germany and the existence of a “Jewish Problem”. This combined with the war
which gave Germany access to millions of Jews in eastern Europe and Hitler’s exter-
mination plans set the stage for the Holocaust. Features of the behavior of Germans
included killing Jews when they had no order to do so, enthusiastically following
a superior’s orders to kill Jews, the torturing of Jews and other acts of gratuitous
suffering and cruelty. The perpetrators were apparently at little risk if they refused
to kill Jews; there is little evidence that any German soldier or police was punished
for refusing to kill Jews (pp. 375–415, Goldhagen). Goldhagen dismisses a slavish
tendency to follow orders as the basis for the torture and killing of Jews because
the same Germans previously rebelled against actions of the Weimar Republic. He
calls obeying orders “a moral alibi that should be exposed and discarded”. He also
dismisses peer pressure as a major motivating factor in the Holocaust. Goldhagen
refutes conventional explanations and concludes the German cruelty and killing of
the Jews emanated from a set of beliefs that resulted in profound hatred and vicious
anti-Semitism. The Jews were bad and deserved to be annihilated (pp. 389–415,
Goldhagen).

My Lai

The immoral behavior at My Lai on March 16, 1968 revealed that situational factors
can induce immoral behavior in some individuals and moral behavior in others under
similar circumstances. At My Lai hundreds of South Vietnamese civilians, mostly
women and children, who showed no signs of hostility, were massacred by American
troops. Lieutenant William L. Calley was court marshaled and initially convicted of
murder. Evidence suggests Calley was not the only killer. It’s easy to conclude the
impetus for the killing was situational and inevitable. Had there not been a Vietnam
War and had Calley and his comrades not been sent to Vietnam this atrocity would
116 9 Evil

not have occurred. The troops had suffered losses in the war and the Vietnamese had
been portrayed as dehumanized beings. These situational factors may help explain
the killings but they do not exonerate individuals.
At the time of the My Lai massacre it is said that three soldiers tried to protect the
civilians. One of them, Hugh C. Thompson, Jr., then Warrant Officer One, United
States Army was awarded the Soldier’s Medal thirty years later (March 6, 1998), for
being one of the soldiers who tried to save the civilians at My Lai. His situation may
have been slightly different than Calleys; but whereas Calley and other soldiers were
killing civilians, Thompson’s response was to save them.
His medal read: “For heroism above and beyond the call of duty on 16 March
1968, while saving the lives of at least 10 Vietnamese civilians during the unlawful
massacre of noncombatants by American forces at My Lai, Quang Ngai Province,
South Vietnam. Warrant Officer Thompson landed his helicopter in the line of fire
between fleeing Vietnamese civilians and pursuing American ground troops to pre-
vent their murder. He then personally confronted the leader of the American ground
troops and was prepared to open fire on those American troops should they fire upon
the civilians. Warrant Officer Thompson, at the risk of his own personal safety, went
forward of the American lines and coaxed the Vietnamese civilians out of the bunker
to enable their evacuation. Leaving the area after requesting and overseeing the civil-
ians’ air evacuation, his crew spotted movement in a ditch filled with bodies south
of My Lai. Warrant Officer Thompson again landed his helicopter and covered his
crew as they retrieved a wounded child from the pile of bodies. He then flew the child
to the safety of a hospital at Quang Ngai” (United States Naval Academy Soldiers
Medal 2018). The opportunity to kill Vietnamese civilians evoked opposite reactions
in Calley and Thompson.

Doctor Mengele

Evil can be due to a combination of personal and situational factors. Robert Jay
Lifton’s book, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing And The Psychology of Geno-
cide, confirms the unsettling truth that ordinary people can be “socialized to killing”
and “adapt to existing genocidal institutions”. Nazi doctors at the Auschwitz con-
centration camp were ordinary practitioners who previously had never intentionally
killed anyone; nonetheless, they became involved in every aspect of the killing at
Auschwitz. They selected who would be immediately killed when trains arrived at
the concentration camp, supervised the mass killing by poison gas, injected phenol
to kill debilitated prisoners, determined when victims were dead, and falsified death
certificates (Lifton 2000).
The Holocaust followed a long history of anti-Semitism in Germany. Jews were
called “destroyers of culture”, agents of “racial pollution”, “parasites”, and “eternal
bloodsuckers”. Acts against Jews were justified on the basis of national and racial
healing. There was a deadly racial disease and the cure had to be the killing of all
Jews. A Nazi doctor, Fritz Klein, said, “Out of respect for human life I would remove
Doctor Mengele 117

a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix
in the body of mankind” (pp. 3–18, Lifton 2000). Mass killing was done in the name
of healing, a medicalization of killing.
Lifton in a chapter devoted to the most infamous of Nazi doctors, Josef Mengele,
illustrates what can happen when a situation ripe with evil exists for a person with
immoral inclinations. Mengele, the son of a well-to-do Bavarian industrialist was
wounded while serving on the Russian front. He returned to Germany in January
1943, and began work at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human
Genetics, and Eugenics, which was directed by his former mentor, Professor Otmar
Freiherr von Verschuer. Mengele was a physician and an ardent Nazi whose stud-
ies at the Frankfurt University Institute of Hereditary Biology and Racial Hygiene
were focused on physical anthropology and genetics. He requested a transfer to the
Auschwitz concentration camp because he thought there he could best use science
to help Nazi Germany. On May 30, 1943 he was transferred to Auschwitz where he
served as a Waffen SS (a major paramilitary organization under Hitler and the Nazi
party) medical officer.
Mengele was thirty-two years old when he arrived at Auschwitz. He participated
in all aspects of the killing at Auschwitz where more than a million people, mostly
Jews, were murdered. When trains with prisoners arrived at Auschwitz he played a
significant role in selecting who would go directly to the gas chamber and crema-
tory ovens and who was sufficiently fit to join the prisoner work force. Mengele is
associated more closely with this “selection duty” than any other medical officer at
Auschwitz, although by most accounts he performed this task no more often than
any of his colleagues. The ubiquitous image of Mengele at the train arrival ramp in
so many survivors’ accounts is because Mengele often appeared there when he was
“off-duty” searching for twins.
Mengele had a passion for cleanliness and sent anyone with blemishes, wounds
or scars to the gas chamber. In one instance a teenager was directed in a different
direction than her mother; the mother did not want to be separated from her child and
protested. Mengele shot dead both the mother and child and directed all the people
in that transport, even the ones selected for work, to the gas chambers. Observers
who survived Auschwitz described a cynical and sadistic component to Mengele’s
personality.
Mengele was observed with what appeared to be appropriate medical demeanor
injecting deadly phenol into prisoners. He did this with detachment and efficiency.
He was also reported to have thrown new born babies into the crematorium or open
fires. Mengele’s favorite research interest was the study of twins, especially identical
twins. The prisoner anthropologist who worked with Mengele estimated that in the
summer of 1944 Mengele collected 250 individual twins. By keeping some twins
alive for his experiments he probably saved them from the gas chambers. When
examining naked twins he was methodical and never rude. There was a puzzling
aspect to his personality. Mengele was described as having a dual personality of
affection and violence. He talked to children “as gentle as a father”, but at a later
date had no compunction about killing them.
118 9 Evil

Mengele also studied dwarfs and people with other abnormalities such as one
eye colored differently than the other (heterochromia). In one experiment Mengele
injected methylene blue into the eye of a twin in an attempt to change eye color; this
painful experiment was unsuccessful. The sinister side of Mengele’s twin research
was the pathological examination of the twins’ corpses. Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, Men-
gele’s prisoner pathologist testified that Mengele directly murdered some twins.
Sometimes twins were killed simply to resolve a dispute over their diagnosis. The
doomed twin was undressed and put on the dissecting table, Mengele administered
a sedative and then a lethal dose of chloroform given intravenously. During one
night Mengele reportedly killed fourteen twins. His scientific activity was described
as being done with “murderous scientific fanaticism”. Although twins were killed
many were kept alive so that Mengele could continue his various experiments. Lifton
says, “the twins became aware that, unlike most prisoners, their lives had existential
value”.
Mengele sent patholgical specimens to Professor von Verschuer at the Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology and Human Heredity and Eugenics in Berlin-
Dahlem. A prisoner assistant was once given a box by Mengele to move to another
part of the concentration camp; she opened the box and was shaken to find the
box filled with glass bottles containing human eyes (pp. 337–383, Lifton 2000). A
prison doctor described how Mengele once brought in “two heads” for bacteriological
examination.
Mengele had academic ambitions and saw himself as a potentially great racial
scientist. His examinations were highly detailed with measurement of multiple bones
and the characteristics of various body parts. He wanted to demonstrate German racial
superiority. Comments about Mengele from those who observed him thought he felt
it would be a sin not to take advantage of the permissive opportunities for twin
research available at Auschwitz, because there would never be another chance like
it.
Mengele embraced the idea of genetic determinism and had an obsession with
Jewish abnormality. He was thought to believe that among Jews there was “greater
hereditary of bad qualities” compared to other races. After their liberation, camp
inmates said they were afraid of Mengele because he might find something in them
that interested him. Mengele killed for science.
Mengele was also a collector. He collected fetuses and beautiful gallstones. One
prison doctor said Mengele thought of prison inmates the same way “he thought of
mice and rabbits”. Strangely Mengele treated Jewish doctors differently and much
better than Jewish inmates; at times he could have a collegial relationship with them
and on other occasions he called them “dogs and pigs”.
A prison doctor said Mengele’s personality was “unfathomable”. He could show
human feelings, such as pity, but could also be brutally sadistic. “Mengele exemplifies
the Nazi biological revolution”; he was a Nazi ideologue and believed this ideological
mission “justified everything”. He treated Jews like laboratory animals and believed
the “the annihilation of the Jews was a provision for recovery of the world and
Germany”.
Doctor Mengele 119

Several factors enabled Mengele’s evil activities. Nazi ideology that characterized
Jews as sub-human and corrosive to society provided a pathetic lie to excuse the
killings of millions of innocent men, women and children. Killing at Auschwitz was
not only permitted, it was its raison d’etre. Nazi genetic determinism provided the
impetus for Mengele’s diabolical experiments. Nazi society made Mengele possible.
A prison doctor who knew him said that if Mengele hadn’t been at Auschwitz he
probably would have been a “slightly sadistic German professor”.
Mengele’s personality, which people found difficult to understand, probably influ-
enced his behavior. He was called schizoid. A schizoid personality disorder was
defined by a lack of interest in social relationships, a tendency towards a solitary
or sheltered lifestyle, secretiveness, emotional coldness, detachment, and apathy.
Affected individuals may be unable to form intimate attachments to others and
simultaneously demonstrate a rich, elaborate, and exclusively internal fantasy world
(Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). In the case of Mengele we see evil as the result
of a combination of individual and situational factors.
Mengele escaped to South America after the war and lived in several countries
He was never brought to justice. He is believed to have died on February 7, 1979
of a heart attack or a stroke while swimming at a vacation resort near Bertioga,
Brazil. He was buried in a suburb of Sao Pãolo under the fictitious name, “Wolfgang
Gerhard.” In 1985, German police, working on evidence they had recently confiscated
from a Mengele family friend in Günzburg, located Mengele’s grave and exhumed
his corpse. Brazilian forensic experts thereafter positively identified the remains as
Josef Mengele. In 1992, DNA evidence confirmed this conclusion. Mengele eluded
his captors for 34 years (Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018). His victims had hoped
for healing by witnessing his trial for the atrocities he committed; that trial never
happened.
Lifton asks the intriguing question of how doctors who have taken an oath to do
no harm can change from healers to killers. In the chapter titled, The Psychology of
Genocide, he identifies factors sufficiently potent to transform physicians from their
previous selves into what Lifton calls their “Auschwitz Self”. The critical role of
racial hygiene ideology and the need to preserve the best of humanity made killing
an element essential to healing. Hitler spoke “of the nothingness… of the individual
human being and of his continued existence in the visible immortality of the nation”.
The goal of biological renewal and national rejuvenation was “nothing but applied
biology”. The world will be healed by removing lesser biological beings. Hitler used
a perverse logic. The Jews were evil and a threat and must be destroyed. “This mission
was the moral equivalent of war; in war one must kill the enemy to preserve one’s
people. To do otherwise would make one a traitor. As moral philosophers use logic
to promote the good, the Nazis used a perverted form of logic to achieve their aims”.
The Nazis took advantage of the power of ritual to augment the mythic significance
of the Third Reich which Hitler said would last a thousand years. Lifton viewed the
selection of arriving prisoners as a ritual which could give participants “a feeling
of truth” and the sense they were making “an exact medical judgment”. The Nazis
acknowledged killing as a necessary but difficult personal ordeal, an “ordeal of
sacrifice” shared by others. This killing was describes as heroic. Initially Jews were
120 9 Evil

shot which was difficult for some of the shooters who saw their victims face to
face. The use of the gas chambers made victims anonymous and eased this so-called
ordeal.
Lifton speculates the Nazi doctors (and I suspect other Nazis) to do their mur-
derous work depended on diminished feeling and numbing oneself to avoid feelings
of guilt for their killing. Lifton also speculates they viewed Auschwitz as a sepa-
rate reality and “anything that happened there simply did not count” (pp. 418–465,
Lifton).

The Roots of Evil

It’s important to understand the complex etiology of immorality and evil if we want
to diminish its likelihood in the future. The Nazi experience reveals a sophisticated,
theoretical methodology that was successful in its promotion of massive evil; its per-
verted employment of theoretical biology and logic was thoughtfully considered for
effectiveness. Although religious and secular moral philosophies have made valuable
contributions in the name of morality, immorality and evil have not been eradicated.
Numerous moral writings, such as the Ten Commandments, have stated it is wrong
to harm innocent people; yet these moral treatises have not prevented torture, mass
killings and other evils.
The prevalence of immoral and evil behavior is a challenge to morality. Both
situational factors and individual personality can contribute to immorality. An art-
work by M. C. Escher, Circle Limit IV, depicts the nebulous outlines of devils and
angels that constitute our being and symbolizes that “humans are both good and
evil entities at the same time” (p. 5, Flescher 2013). The challenge for morality is to
strengthen individual resolve against the forces arrayed against it and avoid situations
that provide the soil where immorality and evil can flourish.
Staub has examined examples of the destruction of large human ethnic or national
groups (genocide) (Staub 1989). The Armenian genocide (1915–1916) was commit-
ted by Turkey, which still denies it was genocide, and claims it was the deportation of
an enemy in time of war. Armenian leaders and Armenian soldiers who served in the
Turkish army were tortured and killed and many other Armenians were either killed
or died of starvation. It is estimated that this genocide resulted in at least 800,000
Armenian deaths.
When the Khymer Rouge under its leader Pol Pot prevailed after a long civil war
it evacuated Cambodian cities and killed “potential enemies”; victims were of the
same social and ethnic group as the perpetrators (“autogenocide”) and were killed
for political reasons. It is estimated two million Cambodians died from execution or
starvation (1975–1979).
In Argentina after the Army took power in a coup it is estimated anywhere from
9,000 to 30,000 people were killed or “disappeared”. Victims were killed because
they were considered left leaning or Communists and felt to be threats to the state.
It is known that some of them were drugged and thrown from helicopters into the
The Roots of Evil 121

ocean where they drowned. Children of victims were taken away without informing
their relatives (Staub 1989).
Staub focuses on the psychological factors that cause genocide. He identifies the
hardships of life and rapid social disorganization due to extreme economic problems,
political or criminal violence, war and rapid social changes as the starting point for
mass killings. People in a distressed society seek to protect themselves, their fami-
lies and their values. A subgroup in the society may be made a scapegoat and new
ideologies may evolve with diminished inhibition toward harming others. Perpetra-
tors become more aggressive and believe their actions are justified. A progression of
harmful acts typically precedes mass killings. This progression is facilitated when
bystanders and other nations remain passive (Staub 1989). Groups of people, such
as nations, have more power to inflict cruelty because they allow a diffusion of
responsibility.
Straub concludes from his study of genocides that “tragically human beings have
the capacity to come to experience the killing of other people as nothing extraor-
dinary”. There can be, especially if a society has a sense of superiority, “a reversal
of morality” that allows killing of devalued others to be seen as good (Staub 1989).
Other causal factors include the ability to conceive of us and them; the ability to
devalue those in the out group; hoping for a better society; making others (not us)
scapegoats which can unify us. Staub speaks of “a continuum of destruction”.
Factors associated with genocide include “deeply engrained negative stereotypes”
of out groups, a cultural sense of superiority, nationalism, a desire for purity and
cleansing, a strong respect for authority and a strong sense of obedience. Straub
points to a long history of anti-Semitism in Germany, difficult life conditions, and a
long authoritarian tradition as etiologic factors in the Holocaust (pp. 19–21, Staub).
Staub has been criticized for his focus on individual psychology and ignoring
the role of government in the perpetration of evil. The force of the tendency to
obedience can facilitate government sponsored evil. Hobbes, believed that in a society
of sufficient size people will be strangers to each other and there will be a reversion
to the state of nature with, “all against all”. In such circumstances one cannot count
on mutual good will to sustain stability. In Hobbes’ time (1588–1679) there were
ferocious religious wars between people of different religions. Hobbes’ advocated a
Sovereign of “almost unlimited power” to maintain stability and prevent evil (pp. 28–
29 and 59, Gert 2010). A government or a strong national leader can potentially
prevent evil or conversely encourage it.

Situational Determinism Versus Individual Responsibility

Milgram and Zimbardo emphasize the importance of situational factors in the genesis
of evil. Milgram defines the conflict in his experiments as between the competing
demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim; two deeply ingrained
behavioral dispositions are in opposition: not to harm other people and the tendency to
obey whom we perceive as legitimate authorities (Milgram 1963). A person entering
122 9 Evil

an authority system sees themselves as no longer acting for their own purposes but
as an agent carrying out another person’s wishes (pp. 212–213, Flescher 2013).
Although situational factors play an important role in the genesis of evil 14 of Mil-
grams 40 subjects (35%) reached a point where they refused to administer additional
shocks. In Zimbardo’s prisoner study only a third of the guards became tyrannical
and there were good guards (pp. 4–8, Zimbardo 1972). In My Lai there were sol-
diers who killed civilians and soldiers who tried to save them. During the Holocaust
there were people who turned in Jews and people who protected them. Yad Vashem
in Israel honors non-Jews who risked their lives, liberty, or positions to save Jews
during the Holocaust. People differ in their moral behavior. Despite Milgram and
Zimbardo’s situational determinism both personal and situational factors must be
considered as relevant to moral behavior.

Conclusion

Evil has been a part of human history for a long time and will not be leaving us
any time soon. Part of the reason for this gloomy assessment lies in the nature of
man. We were sculpted by natural selection, a process that favors the fittest and is
blind to morality. Human nature and various circumstances allow humans to cause
suffering and death to other humans, especially those of a different group. Although
religion, laws and individual conscience may control many of our evil impulses, over
past centuries their power has not vanquished evil. It’s frustrating that for centuries
philosophers have been writing about how man should behave; yet evil remains with
us.
It’s important to recognize morality is vulnerable to immorality and evil. We
should continue to analyze the causes of evil; as noted in this chapter there are many
of them and that alone makes for a gloomy assessment. We should take comfort in
the fact that many, if not most people, try to live a morally valuable life. We should
continue to analyze the nature and etiology of evil and try to develop ways to limit
it.

References

Flack, Jessica C., and deWaal, Frans B.M. 2000. ‘Any Animal Whatever’: Darwinian Building
Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2000; 7 (No. 1 and
2): 1–29.
Flescher, Andrew Michael. 2013. Moral Evil. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes, 28–29 and 59. Cambridge, England and Malden, Massachusetts:
Polity Press.
References 123

Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 1996. Police Battalions: Agents of Genocide in Hitler’s Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Green, Ronald M. 1987. Theodicy. Encyclopedia of Religion. https://www.encyclopedia.com/
environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/theodicy. Accessed 10 Aug 2018.
Holocaust Encyclopedia. 2018. Josef Mengele. United States Holocaust Museum. https://www.
ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007060. Accessed 16 July 2018.
Hume, David. 1738–1740. Treatise of Human Nature, book III.
Lifton, Robert Jay. 2000. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide The
Psychology of Genocide. New York: Basic Books.
Milgram, Stanley. 1963. Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 67: 371–378.
Ruse, Michael. 1988. Response to Williams: Selfishness Is Not Enough. Zygon 23 (4): 413–416.
Shirer, William L. 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon and Schuster.
Snow, C.P. 1961. Either Or. The Progressive 25 (2): 24–25.
Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
United States Naval Academy. 2018. Hugh Thompson. Available at https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_
files/documents/ThompsonPg1-28_Final.pdf Accessed 10 Aug 2018.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Holocaust Theology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust_
theology. Accessed 10 Aug 2018.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Schizoid Personality Disorder. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Schizoid_personality_disorder. Accessed 10 Aug 2018.
Zimbardo, Philip G. 1972. The Pathology of Imprisonment. Society 9 (6): 4–8.
Zimbardo, Philip A. 2004. Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How
Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators. In The Social Psychology of Good and Evil:
Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty, ed. Arthur Miller. New York City:
Guilford Press.
 Part II
Moral Theories
Chapter 10
Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

Abstract A moral theory is a set of concepts, rules and principles that serve as
guides to the resolution of ethical dilemmas; they also purport to tell us how we
ought to behave. Various objectives have been ascribed to the purpose of morality.
These include the minimization of evil, the maximization of the good, fidelity to
moral principles, and the minimization of the harms caused by flawed human nature.
A major problem with moral theories is that in specific circumstances we may believe
in two moral principles, but to honor one of the principles we are forced to violate
the other. This conundrum has been said to cause “irresolvable perplexity”. Topics
addressed include the objective of morality, whether objective moral truth exists, the
origins of altruism, the distinction between a moral obligation and a moral ideal and
other issues that complicate moral deliberation.

Moral Theories

A moral theory, which can be complex and expressed in arcane language, is a set of
concepts, principles and rules that serve as a foundation for moral decision-making.
Moral rules tend to be specific and relatively limited in scope. Moral principles
are more general and serve as the basis for moral rules. Normative (as in “norms”)
ethics is the branch of ethical theory that defines which actions are right and which
actions are wrong; it is the branch of ethics that tells us how we ought to behave.
The application of rules and principles to resolve moral dilemmas must be mindful
of the relevant facts. When there is disagreement values often have to be weighed
against each other in context. This process often involves subjective judgments that
may leave ethical deliberation embroiled in controversy.
The requirements of a moral theory have been said to include clarity, simplicity,
internal consistency and coherence. A rule or principle in a moral theory should
not contradict another of its rules and principles. A moral theory ideally should be
comprehensive and account for the whole range of moral experience (Beauchamp and
Childress 1989). Universality, that a moral standard should apply to every person in

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 127

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_10
128 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

relevantly similar circumstances, is an important consideration. A moral judgment

in one situation should be applied to other relevantly similar circumstances. Gert
advocated a moral theory be publically known and universally applied to all rational
persons (Gert1988).

The Objective of Morality

A reasonable question is, what is the ultimate goal of morality; what is morality
designed to achieve? From a biological perspective some behaviors that appear moral
by our ordinary standards increase a species’ fitness for survival. Examples include
cooperation and altruism which are generally considered important moral values. By
cooperating a group of chimpanzees are more likely to capture and kill a monkey
and obtain the food needed for survival. Cooperating within a group may benefit
individual members. The practical value of altruism, which evolved as a reciprocal
phenomenon, is supported by empirical observations. It has been observed that, if
Vampire Bat A goes hungry, Vampire Bat B, who secured an ample blood meal, will
feed Vampire Bat A. On another occasion when the tables are turned Vampire Bat
A, now the one with an ample blood meal, will feed hungry Vampire Bat B in what
has been called a “tit for tat” exchange (Wright 1995).
Many species of smaller fish, called “cleaners,” remove ectoparasites from larger
fish. The larger fish reciprocate by not eating their smaller cleaners and by protecting
them from predators. Trivers has named this phenomenon “reciprocal altruism,”
which he considers “a symbiosis, each partner helping the other while he helps
himself”. Trivers said, “the natural selection of reciprocally altruistic behavior can
readily explain the function of human altruistic behavior” (Trivers 1971). Other
examples of reciprocal altruism in man include sharing food and implements and
helping in times of danger.
Evolution has not conserved altruism; what has been selected are the emotions that
are a prerequisite for altruism, sympathy and empathy. Animal and human societies
with social controls that support mutual assistance fare better than those dominated
by self-interest. Although some of ordinary morality is a by-product of evolution,
morality is not the aim of evolution because natural selection does not operate with
conscious goals, and is morally blind and purposeless (Steinberg 2010).
Normative ethics provides a code of conduct with the purpose of telling us how
we ought to behave. Moral theories differ in their vision of the goal of morality.
For Gert the primary goal of morality is the minimization of evil (Gert 1988). John
Stuart Mill wrote morality should be based on the principle of utility, or what has
been called “the greatest happiness principle”. Mill holds that actions are right to the
extent they promote happiness and wrong as they produce the opposite. Happiness
is described as pleasure and the absence of pain; unhappiness is characterized by
pain, and the loss of pleasure. Mill is a “utilitarian” whose philosophy focuses on
the consequences of our actions. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant was a
The Objective of Morality 129

“deontologist” whose philosophy promoted fidelity to moral duty and obligation as

more significant than consequences.
Warnock, similar to Hobbes rooted his moral philosophy on his perception of
human nature. He is conscious of “the ills inherent in the human predicament” which
he calls “limited sympathies”. We are predominantly concerned with our own wants,
interests and needs and those of some limited group, such as family, tribe or country
whose interests and ends we are disposed to sympathize. This leaves us prone to
act in a damaging manner to the detriment of persons outside our limited group or
fail to act beneficently to others in need. Warnock’s list of detrimental acts includes
maleficence (inflicting harm), non-beneficence (not aiding those in need), unfairness
and deception.
The goal of Warnock’s morality is “to countervail the deleterious liabilities inher-
ent in (our) “limited sympathies”; this leads him to advise four corrective “good
dispositions” which he calls, “moral standards” or moral principles”. They include
non-maleficence (don’t harm others), fairness, beneficence (aid others) and non-
deception. Morality for Warnock entails correction of our flawed human nature. He
admits an affinity with the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (15881679), calling
his own views, “quassi-Hobbesian”.
Warnock claims the contention of Plato and others that morality is about how we
should live our lives is a “senseless question that has no sensible answer” because
our goals in life depend on our interests and talents; morality is the “propounding
principles to which by and large our conduct should conform in pursuit of our ends”
(Warnock 1971).

Conflicting Principles

There is no objective method that can define which philosophical moral theory should
be preferred. There is wide agreement we shouldn’t harm innocent others, that con-
sequences matter and that there are moral principles we should try not to violate.
When dealing with specific ethical dilemmas we have to use our judgment to decide
which ethical considerations merit the greatest weight. If a decision violates a moral
principle but the consequences of deciding otherwise are worse we might focus on
those consequences. If you were hiding Ann Frank during the Nazi occupation of
Amsterdam and the Gestapo knocked on the door you would be justified in lying
about her hiding in your apartment because your lie might save the life of an innocent
teen age girl. In that instance the value to tell the truth conflicts with possibly saving
an innocent life. We may believe in two principles but in specific circumstances we
may be unable to honor one without violating the other.
Madison Powers in addressing this problem said it is incoherent to imagine “that
there exists a quantitative way to assess the qualitatively incommensurable”. We
can’t calculate the net benefit (or harm) comparing a pregnant woman’s right to
autonomously choose what is done to her body against the harms of destroying
a fetus. The two are incommensurate and their assigned metrics would differ. We
130 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

can compare the treatment response rate of two different drugs in a specific disease
because their metrics are the same, response rate. We can’t apply similar metrics to
qualitatively dissimilar parameters and mathematically select the morally preferable
option.
Powers notes this as a limitation of ethics. Extremely difficult to resolve problems
may shift from the arena of morality to matters of public policy. The solution of the
abortion question, a legitimate moral problem, is now treated as a political matter
of public policy. Powers concludes there is a “limit to moral expertise” because
multiple morally acceptable options” exist and “below the surface of ethical debate
is an inherently political contest” (Powers 2005). Warnock similarly notes the conflict
of valid moral principles can result in “irresolvable perplexity” (Warnock 1971).

Uncertainty and Conceptual Confusion

Ethical deliberation may also be difficult because of uncertainty. In the practice of

medicine, for example, a new treatment or medical device, or a promising but untried
genetic technique may come with the uncertain prospects of major benefit or serious
harm. It can be difficult to achieve consensus in the face of decisions when the
relevant facts are unknown. Medical decisions are often clouded with uncertainty
because a patient’s prognosis may be debatable. If we knew a person was inevitably
doomed we would not inflict the possible side effects of an ineffective treatment; the
problem is, essential information may not be known.
Yet another problem impeding the resolution of moral dilemmas is disagreement
over the meaning of important and relevant concepts. An example is the definition of
death. Arguments over the definition of death, an issue that for centuries eluded con-
troversy, now involve proponents who advocate standard cardiopulmonary criteria,
whole brain criteria and higher brain criteria (Youngner and Shapiro 1999). Attempts
to resolve ethical dilemmas can be intellectually interesting but also challenging and
frustrating with a consensus resolution not always possible.

Challenges to Morality

Moral realism is defined as the belief that at least some moral claims properly under-
stood, are actually true. Moral realists admit some moral claims serve the emotions,
attitudes, and interests; nonetheless, they believe some moral claims are true. Those
who reject moral realism deny that any moral claims are true. The debate is also
complicated because it can be difficult to determine which claims count as moral
(Sayre-McCord 2017).
Several arguments have been made against moral realism. One argument is that
moral claims are our way of expressing emotions or attitudes and controlling others’
behavior; another is that moral claims report facts but those facts are not true.
Morality and Self Interest 131

Morality and Self Interest

Implied in the concept of morality is that it applies to all rational beings. Warnock asks
the interesting and provocative question: could a rational being “just reject morality,
without necessarily evidencing thereby any defect of rationality?” Warnock believes
most moral philosophers would answer his question, No. Warnock is inclined to
disagree. His reason is worth noting.
He points out that some people are “inherently, immutably, and exclusively self-
interested, and so simply not capable of that disinterested appraisal of reasons” and
the “unegoistic concern for others” that morality demands. From this perspective
morality could be viewed as a form of psychological expression and self -interest
rather than a system of reasoning; if that’s true morality as traditionally understood,
is a fraud; what supposedly is good for everybody is promoted by others for their
own self-interest.
Warnock acknowledges a rational person might conclude the application of moral-
ity might be distorted to advance the interests of those dominant in a society and that
morality can be used as a smoke screen concealing that we are being exploited by
others. (Warnock 1971). In many instances deceptive or diversionary moral reasons
are used to conceal the truth of an underlying self or special group interest. A tax
reduction bill explained as being helpful to the poor may be a moral diversion when
in fact the bill will ultimately help the rich. Immoral behavior is often ignored by
people who benefit from that immoral behavior. If the leader of a political party or a
country fosters a person’s financial or political goals that person may be reluctant to
criticize the leader’s immoral behavior. The misuse of morality may cause some peo-
ple to become cynical, but they are wrong to reject credible morality simply because
its use can be immorally perverted.

Values and Morality

I suspect the genesis of immoral behavior has similarities with the genesis of moral
behavior. There is a significant amount of immoral behavior. A television show,
American Greed (CNBC), documents numerous stories of people who believe they
deserve more out of life and resort to schemes that defraud other people, often of
their life savings. Bernard Madoff, a stock broker and financial advisor, damaged
many lives by running the largest Ponzi scheme in history. Innumerable examples of
immoral behavior are recorded almost daily in the media.
Morality involves the selection of important values considered worthy of preser-
vation. Immorality also involves the selection of important values considered worthy
of preservation. The two are largely differentiated by the nature of the selected val-
ues. The immoral person may have selected as their predominant value the desire to
become rich, or perhaps the desire to obtain power. Immoral behavior may become
necessary to honor values of this type.
132 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

Warnock acknowledges the role of self-interest as a challenge to morality and says

a person who rejects morality because it is based on self-interest is not irrational, but
may be wrong. Because the use of morality can be distorted does not invalidate the
benefits of its proper application. Warnock concludes that without the constraints of
morality and its goal “of peace, of justice, of cooperative harmony” things would be
worse.

Other Moral Theories

Descriptive moral theories, also known as comparative ethics, describe how moral
behavior is manifest in different peoples and cultures; it is the study of what people
think is morally correct. Descriptive ethics is an empirical field, though one with
philosophical implications, that is typically the scholarly domain of social scien-
tists such as evolutionary biologists, sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists.
Descriptive ethics studies the values that influence moral behavior in various cul-
tures and how they change over time. It tries to understand the basis for people’s
moral beliefs and matters such as what various societies consider virtuous (Wikipedia
Contributors 2019).
Schweder, a cultural anthropologist, describes cross-cultural variability in moral
judgments. In places in India where he has done research some of the acts people
categorize as “bad acts” seem bizarre moral judgments. Acts considered bad include
a widow eating fish, a woman having a conversation with her husband’s older brother
and parents refusing to sleep in the same bed with their children. Schweder proposes
that on a world wide scale there is a big three of morality. There is an “ethics of
autonomy” based on moral concepts such as rights and justice that is designed to
protect individuals in pursuit of gratification of their desires; there is an “ethics of
community” based on moral concepts such as duty and interdependency that aims to
help individuals find dignity by virtue of their role in society; there is also an “ethics
of divinity” based on moral concepts such as sanctity and sin which aims to maintain
the spiritual side of human nature (Schweder 2007).
Meta-ethics is the study of morality itself; it does not deal directly with normative
decisions but seeks to understand the nature of ethical language, concepts, definitions,
judgments, reasoning, and objectives. Meta-ethics scrutinizes the substance of ethics.
Singer says of meta-ethics, “we are not taking part in the practice of ethics itself, but
are reflecting on that practice as if from a different level”. He also notes, “In arguing
about the nature and basis of ethics, we are asking questions about ethics, not arguing
within ethics. For example, at the level of meta-ethics, we might ask whether there
could possibly be a true or correct answer to these questions within ethics” (Singer
1994a, b).
Moral theories can have arbitrary and confusing elements; their greatest value is
to provide a framework for thinking about ethical problems. All of us will encounter
ethical dilemmas. If your elderly mother is very sick you might be asked to decide
whether to continue treatment. A relative or friend, even a stranger, with kidney
Other Moral Theories 133

failure might ask you to donate one of your kidneys. You may have to ponder whether
a business practice is ethical. Although I’ve written about war, genocide and other
major evils, in everyday life less monumental ethical dilemmas may arise. These have
been referred to as applied ethics. Examples of applied ethics include biomedical
ethics, legal ethics, business ethics and military ethics. More about applied ethics
later. The thinking of important moral scholars, even if there are arbitrary elements
or other problems, can provide a helpful framework as we evolve our own way
of analyzing and implementing moral decisions. It is important to recognize that
moral scholars give you their opinion on how you should behave; you have to decide
whether to take their advice.

Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals

We accumulate obligations for a variety of reasons. We are obliged to obey the law;
we are obligated to pay taxes to the government. We have job and professional related
obligations. We incur obligations because we have signed a contract to make monthly
mortgage payments. We have obligations because we have made promises. We have
obligations to family such as caring for our children. We can incur obligations after
losing a law suit. The list of possible obligations is long and some of these obligations
may be burdensome.
A point of contention is what obligations should be derived from the dictates
of morality as “moral obligations”. Gert and Singer disagree. This controversy is
significant because failure to perform a moral obligation implies immoral behavior.
Gert’s position is at the permissive end of the spectrum of opinions. His moral rules
which include don’t cause death and don’t cause pain focus on avoiding harms to
others. Gert does not put obligations to help others at the core of his moral system. He
categorizes obligations such as helping the hungry and the poor as moral ideals, not
obligations. One of Gert’s moral rules is do your duty; professionals such as physi-
cians, dentists and others who have role related beneficent obligations are expected
to honor these obligations For Gert role specific duties are moral obligations, not
moral ideals.
Gert summarizes his notion of the moral ideals as, “Do those things that lessen
or are likely to lessen the amount of evil suffered by anyone”. Where his moral rules
state don’t kill, his moral ideals state prevent killing. Where his moral rules say don’t
cause evil, his moral ideal says prevent evil. Inflicting harm is a violation of a moral
rule; preventing harm is a praiseworthy moral ideal. Those who work to prevent war
are following the moral ideals. Although Gert says you must always obey the moral
rules, he only encourages people to “act on the moral ideals as much as they can”
(Gert 1988).
Beauchamp and Childress define two types of morality. Their first level consists of
moral standards that bind everyone. Their second level is “a morality of aspiration”
with ideals that do not bind everyone. Those who honor these ideals are praiseworthy
while those who fall short cannot be blamed and should not be coerced. This level of
134 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

morality corresponds to Gert’s moral ideals. They also use the term supererogatory to
refer to actions taken for the welfare of others that are beyond what a moral obligation
requires; they use the terms heroic and saintly for some of these supererogatory acts
(Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Although concepts such as moral obligation and
moral ideals (supererogatory acts) are useful in our ethical reasoning, morality has
a hazy quality and when it comes to specific cases the distinction between a moral
obligation and a moral ideal is not always clear.
Singer argues “Suppose that on my way to give a lecture I pass a shallow orna-
mental pond, and notice that a small child has fallen in and is in danger of drowning.
Would anyone deny that I ought to wade in and pull the child out? This will mean
getting my clothes muddy, ruining my shoes, and either cancelling my lecture or
delaying it until I can find something dry to change into; but compared with the
avoidable death of a child none of these things are significant”. It’s hard to argue
with Singer that in the described instance a moral obligation exists (Singer 1972).
Singer uses this example to derive the principle, “if it is in our power to prevent some-
thing very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral significance, we ought to do it”.
Singer says his principle applies to other situations including aid to those in
absolute poverty. He says absolute poverty is bad because it is associated with hunger,
malnutrition, disease, high infant mortality and low life expectancy. He says the
affluent can reduce some poverty without sacrificing anything of comparable moral
significance and doing that is not just optional and praiseworthy; it is something
“everyone ought to do”. By anything of comparable moral significance he means by
doing something that is itself wrong, or causes something that is comparably bad
or fails to promote some other good of comparable importance. He suggests that a
percentage of one’s income, to aid those in poverty would be reasonable. The funds
to help the poor would come from eliminating non- essential items such as luxurious
cars and fashionable clothes.
Singer has been accused of setting an unduly high standard. His high standard of
obligation has been considered unrealistic because the more demanding an individ-
ual’s obligation of beneficence the less likely people will comply with its demands.
Singer has suggested that it might be more productive to publicly advocate a lower
standard and argued we should strive for donations of a percentage of income, such
as ten per cent, which amounts to more than a token donation and not so high as to
make people miserable.
Singer’s position, which has been referred to as “obligatory beneficence” raises
several concerns. The prospect of being accused of immoral behavior might serve
as a cudgel to pressure some people into doing what they perceive as not in their
best interest. Imposing an obligation on individuals limits their liberty and violates
another ethical principle, the principle of autonomy.
Beauchamp and Childress and others have given a general formulation of when
there is a moral obligation to rescue that also takes account of relative burdens and
benefits. Their general position for situations in which Y is in danger is that Y’s
potential loss must be significant, such as death or dismemberment. X, the actor,
must with high probability be able to perform the necessary rescue. No one at the
Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals 135

time should be better positioned than X to perform the rescue (such as a lifeguard
in the case of a drowning). X’s actions should be associated with minimal or no risk
or burden to X. The benefit to Y should outweigh any harms or burdens to X. When
these criteria are satisfied Y has a moral obligation to help X. They acknowledge,
“the line between a moral obligation and a moral ideal is often unclear” (Beauchamp
2019).
Gert limits moral obligations to avoiding harms; Singer extends moral obligations
to assisting others. Ethicists often disagree with each other which makes it difficult to
call their pronouncements authoritative; nonetheless, the opinion of ethicists can be
valuable because they are typically good at garnering the relevant facts of an issue and
they are trained to rationally analyze ethical dilemmas. However, ethicists—for the
moment leaving aside the definition of an ethicist-are ultimately not authoritative. A
physician who has studied empirical data can most often advise on matters of health
more accurately than the rest of us. If a person has studied an issue, understands the
relevant facts and is rational their authority may be comparable to that of an ethicist.
When I was doing hospital ethics consultations we started every consultation by
stating that we would try to help but our opinions were not necessarily authoritative.
A case example from the field of organ transplantation illustrates the problem of
distinguishing a moral obligation from a moral ideal. A variety of organ exchange
programs increase the number of live donor kidney transplants. In its basic form two
donor-intended recipient pairs (subsequently called pairs) that each have a donor
who is incompatible with their intended recipient simultaneously exchange kidneys.
For example, the donor in pair one who is blood type A donates a kidney to the
recipient in pair 2 who is blood type A and the donor in pair 2 who is blood type
B donates a kidney to the recipient in pair 1 who is blood type B. In this type of
exchange although neither donor is immunologically compatible with their intended
recipient, both pairs benefit because each intended recipient obtains a kidney.
In a different type of kidney exchange, a pair in which donor and intended recipient
are compatible can, by participating in an exchange that is unnecessary for them,
make transplantation possible for another pair in which donor and intended recipient
are incompatible. For example, the donor in pair 1 is blood type O and can donate a
kidney to their intended recipient who is blood type A. In pair 2 the donor is blood
type A and the intended recipient blood type O; in pair 2 the donor and intended
recipient are immunologically incompatible. In the absence of an exchange only the
intended recipient in pair 1 will obtain a kidney.
However, if the donor in pair 1 gives their blood type O kidney to the intended
recipient in pair 2 who is blood type O and the donor in pair 2 who is blood type
A gives a kidney to the intended recipient in pair 1 who is also blood type A both
intended recipients obtain a kidney. What distinguishes this type of paired exchange
is that the donor and intended recipient in pair 1 are compatible and do not need
to participate in an exchange. The provision of blood type O kidneys is significant
because patients with blood type O ordinarily can receive a kidney only from a blood
type O donor and can be considered the worst off because they linger longest on the
transplant waiting list. The O donor in pair one does not have to donate a kidney;
136 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

however, if the O kidney is donated to pair 2 two patients with kidney disease will
benefit.
These, “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” may encounter logistical
problems. There may be a delay in time to transplantation for the compatible couple.
Surgeries may be performed at separate hospitals and the donors and recipients
might find themselves in unfamiliar clinical settings. The originally intended donor
and recipient may be separated making it difficult for families to visit both of their
relatives. Might we think differently if it was important to the compatible blood type
O donor to know that his kidney resided in his wife, not some stranger?
Another objection to “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” is that the
request to participate might be “too manipulative” and coercive. Ross and Woo-
dle object to “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” because of the potential
for coercion the donor may experience as the result of “psychological pressure” to
“participate in the exchange to maximize the number of organs available”.
Despite these concerns a “compatible-incompatible kidney exchange” appears to
satisfy the criteria for a moral obligation. The incompatible recipient is at risk for
the significant loss of good health associated with kidney failure and dialysis. The
pair 1 compatible donor’s kidney is necessary to prevent this loss and has a high
probability of rescuing the incompatible recipient in pair 2. Blood type O kidneys
are in short supply; although a stranger with blood type O might donate a kidney
we can assume none is readily available and the blood type O donor in pair 1 is best
positioned to perform the rescue. The compatible donor, who has already committed
to donating a kidney, accepts no additional medical or surgical risk and we can assume
the compatible recipient gets a kidney as good or better than the one they would have
otherwise received. The added burden to the compatible pair is minimal and certainly
minimal relative to the great benefit to the incompatible recipient. Taking account
of the general criteria proposed for a moral obligation the compatible couple could
reasonably be told they have a moral obligation to participate in the proposed kidney
exchange (Ross and Woodle 2000).
Application of the “veil of ignorance” paradigm of the philosopher John Rawls is
a reasonable way of considering the allocation of resources (Freeman 2019). Rational
people who do not know whether they are destined to need a kidney or who want to
obtain a kidney for a loved one, and also do not know whether they will be compatible
with their intended donor or recipient, would opt for a compatible-incompatible live
donor kidney exchange because it would increase their odds of success.
But there are additional considerations.
If pair 1 does not proceed with the exchange the serious verdict might be they
have, in their decision, acted immorally. A constant irritant in ethical thinking is
the existence of too many respected principles that not infrequently conflict with
each other. Justice Cardoza famously highlighted the principle of autonomy when
he said, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body” (Cardoza 1914). In this case the principle of
autonomy which protects an individual’s decision-making liberty conflicts with the
utilitarian principle to maximize the good. I would view the described compatible-
Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals 137

incompatible exchange as a moral ideal that should be encouraged, but others might
disagree.

Conclusion

Morality is confusing. The definition of morality has been disputed. Various differing
moral theories have been proposed. There may be disagreement over the meaning of
important concepts. In specific instances valid ethical principles conflict with each
other. Respected ethicists debate whether moral truth exists and for certain moral
issues there is exuberant disagreement.
Despite the difficulties we have no choice because ethical dilemmas cannot be
avoided. In specific circumstances we have to gather the relevant facts, take into
account our values, rationally consider the various ethical theories and options and
use our best judgment to come to a conclusion. I have written this book to clarify
the nature of morality and hopefully make the process of ethical deliberation, if not
easier, more understandable.

References

Beauchamp, Tom. 2019. The principle of beneficence in applied ethics. In The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2016/entries/principle-beneficence/. Accessed September 6, 2019.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 1989. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3–24, 199–202,
366–399.
Cardoza. 1914. Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
Freeman, Samuel. 2019. Original position. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sum-
mer 2019 ed, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/original-
position/. Accessed January 22, 2020.
Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Madison, Powers. 2005. Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise. Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal. 15 (3): 305–322.
Ross, Laine Friedman, and Woodle E. Steve. 2000. Ethical Issues in Increasing Living Kidney
Donations by Expanding Kidney Paired Exchange Programs. Transplantation 69 (8): 1539–1543.
Sayre-McCord, Geoff. 2017. Resource document. “Moral Realism”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/
entries/moral-realism/. Accessed November 11, 2018. Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
Schweder, Richard A. 2007. The nature of morality: The category of bad acts. In Biomedical Ethics:
A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology Hanover and Lebanoned,
ed. Steinberg, David, 18–21. University of New England Press.
Singer, Peter. 1972. Famine, Affluence and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–243.
Singer, Peter. 1994a. Ethics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Singer, Peter. 1994b. Practical Ethics, 2nd ed, 229–246. New York and Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press page.
138 10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

Steinberg, David. 2010. Altruism in Medicine: It’s Definition, Nature and Dilemmas. The Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2): 249–257.
Trivers R.L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology 46:
39–43, 35–57.
Warnock, G.J. 1971. The Object of Morality, 71–89. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019. Descriptive Ethics. Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Descriptive_ethics. Accessed April 6, 2019.
Wright, R. 1995. The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary
Psychology. New York: Vintage Books.
Youngner, S., R. Arnold, and R. Shapiro (eds.). 1999. The Definition of Death: Contemporary
Controversies. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Chapter 11
Moral Motivation

Abstract Moral motivation refers to whether a person who makes a moral judgment
subsequently acts accordingly. It has been debated whether a moral judgment is
intrinsically self-motivating or whether pre-existing desires or external factors are
required for a person to act on a moral belief. A spectrum of immoral antisocial
behavior has been described; psychopaths, such as Jeffrey Dahmer, are at the extreme
end of this spectrum. Brain damage, as in the famous case of Phineas Gage, can also
impair moral behavior. In some cases, because immoral behavior is beyond a person’s
control, they should not be considered blameworthy.

Introduction

Philosophers and psychologists have tried to understand what determines whether

a person who makes a moral judgment subsequently acts accordingly, a subject
referred to as moral motivation. To explain moral motivation experimental psychol-
ogists have referred to a person’s mind set when that person makes moral decisions.
Four personality types have been defined: the instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimen-
talist, and personalist (Rosati 2016). The instrumentalist, is morally motivated when
their moral beliefs satisfy their intrinsic desires. This has commonly been called the
Humean view. According to the Humean view moral belief is insufficient for moral
motivation which depends on a preexisting desire or other non-moral factors (Rosati
2016).
A cognitivist, is a person who is motivated by internal cognitive processes and
emphasizes reason when making moral judgments. When a cognitivist feels confident
a moral judgment is correct they are motivated to act consistent with their reasoned
judgment. This has been called normative motivation and implies moral judgments
are a special kind of belief that compels us to act.
The sentimentalist is strongly influenced by emotional feelings. If a moral judg-
ment appeals to sentiments such as compassion and sympathy the sentimentalist will
be motivated to act. The personalist, who believes in the centrality of the individual
person, finds moral motivation rooted in the virtues and a morally good character;
the personalist strives for good behavior for its own sake (Rosati 2016). Although

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 139

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_11
140 11 Moral Motivation

the personal characteristics described may provide insight into the traits that influ-
ence moral decision-making, their use oversimplifies human nature and behavior. A
person can simultaneously have desires, be thoughtful and rational, value individual
virtues and be influenced by their emotions.
Conscience plays an impressive role in moral motivation. A person may have feel-
ings of remorse and discomfort when they commit an act that violates their moral
values, an emotional state commonly known as a guilty conscience. The desire to
avoid the pain of a guilty conscience is a frequent reason people behave morally.
Lawrence Kohlberg considered development of a critical conscience to be an impor-
tant psychological stage in human development and associated it with the capacity to
rationally weigh principles of responsibility. Conscience has also been described as an
intervening sense of obligation based in our emotional attachments. A good
conscience is associated with feelings of integrity and psychological wholeness
(Wikipedia 2018a, b).
What motivates moral behavior is an important question that is appropriately
investigated as an empirical matter. Philosophers have espoused abstract concepts
and theories of moral motivation. Philosophical arguments may create semantic con-
fusion and can be headache provoking; however, they can be useful if they pro-
vide conceptual clarity that guides empirical neuroscience in defining the biological
mechanisms of moral motivation. I will simplify and briefly summarize the moral
motivational theories of internalism and externalism.
A moral internalist speculates there is a necessary internal connection between
moral conviction and moral motivation. Plato, a moral internalist, wrote that being
acquainted with forms of the good such as justice and beauty will, without other
motivation, overcome any opposition. Plato’s view was that moral motivation arises
directly from grasping the presence of moral properties. Anyone knowing the good
would have to pursue it despite any opposing desires. Prinz similarly claims: (1) Moral
judgments consist of emotional attitudes. (2) Emotional attitudes are motivating.
(3) Therefore, moral judgments are motivating (Prinz 2015). Another version of
internalism is that moral judgments are a special kind of belief that generates the
desire to act. Because moral judgments are products of reason they can exert an
influence on rational agents (Kennet and Fine 2008).
A contrary view is taken by the moral (or motivational) externalist who believes
there is not a necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral
motivation. They claim it does not follow that if you understand that you shouldn’t
harm an innocent person that you will necessarily have an over-ridding motivation not
to harm an innocent person. For the externalist moral motivation depends on external
motivating factors, not implied or required by the moral judgment itself; such factors
include preexisting desires, human emotions such as compassion and empathy, a
virtuous character and “wanting what is good for its own sake” (Kennett and Fine
2008). Internalists disagree and claim moral belief itself can generate motivation,
or that moral beliefs reflect desires that facilitate motivation. Rosati provides an
example; a belief that it is right to keep a promise produces a desire to do so (Rosati
2016).
Introduction 141

Roskies refers to empirical evidence from patients with damage to the ventro-
medial part of the prefrontal cortex who, though able to make appropriate moral
and social judgments, are not able to act on their moral beliefs. She takes this is as
evidence that ethical motivation cannot be intrinsically motivated because there is a
neural pathway that connects separate brain regions, one involving moral delibera-
tion and another involving moral motivation; these cases have been called “acquired
sociopathy“ and suggest an intact ability to make moral judgments did not necessarily
entail there would be moral motivation (Roskies 2003).

Amoralists

An amoralist has been described as a rational person who in spite of being capa-
ble of making moral judgments remains indifferent and utterly unmoved to comply
with those moral judgments. The amoralist simply doesn’t care about morality. The
amoralist may believe that killing is wrong but does not see this as being practically
relevant. Williams describes the amoralist as someone who asks, “why is there any-
thing I ought to do?” (Williams 1972). Kennett and Fine suggest the amoralist, unlike
most of us, may simply lack the desire to be a good person (Kennett and Fine 2008).
The amoralist is “a challenge to moral reasoning” and “a parasite on the moral
system because his satisfaction depends on others acting differently”. The society
that benefits the amoralist could not exist if others behaved as the amoralist. Williams
notes the “amoralist intermittently and capriciously does something for somebody
he cares about, because that person needs something”. This he suggests could be
the basis for inching the amoralist into “the world of moral thought from which he
excludes himself” (Williams 1972).
Williams notes “failure to be a moral agent lies (partly) in the fact that he is
only intermittently and capriciously disposed to do so”. His presumption apparently
is, if you carefully examine the life of a murderous gangster, Josef Stalin or other
extremely immoral persons you might be tempted to classify as obviously amoral
you would likely find occasional moral acts. Kennett and Fine claim that while we
can imagine amoralists our imagination may mislead us (Kennett and Fine 2008). If
there are true amoralists they likely would be found amongst psychopaths. According
to Schramme, the psychopath is a person “who entirely rejects morality’s normative
power. Such persons are not simply immoral, but rather amoral, in the sense that
moral rules, norms, and standards have no influence on their behavior” (Schramme
2014).
Although the existence of true amoralists is disputed, the term amoral is often
loosely used to describe the amorality of a specific act or program. For example
“amoral markets” and “the amorality of politics”.
142 11 Moral Motivation

Antisocial Personality Disorders

Immoral behavior has been associated with psychiatric disorders. Antisocial person-
ality disorder is defined as a constellation of socially irresponsible, exploitative and
guiltless behavior. The essential feature of an antisocial personality disorder is said
to be “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others”;
people who merit this diagnosis appear to lack any concern with the rights, inter-
ests, or feelings of their victims (Matthews 2014). This disorder has been associated
with criminality, chronic unemployment, manipulation of others for personal gain,
and failure to develop stable interpersonal relationships. People with an antisocial
personality disorder have a profound lack of empathy, rarely express remorse, and
fail to learn from experience.
Psychopaths fall at the severe and malignant end of the antisocial personality
spectrum. Psychopaths exhibit the absence of moral behavior in the presence of an
otherwise intact intellect. Characteristics that define psychopathy are included in
The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare and Neumann 2010). The checklist
includes pathological lying, a profound lack of remorse and guilt, shallow affect,
lack of realistic long term goals, impulsive and antisocial behaviors, parasitic life
style, and poor behavioral control with impulsivity and irresponsibility (Kiehl 2008).
Psychopaths have been described as people who are in opposition to the interests of
society and are unmoved by moral considerations.
Psychopaths often have a history of chronic and repetitive behavioral problems
beginning in childhood or early adolescence. They may exhibit violent criminal
behavior. Jeffrey Dahmer, also known as the Milwaukee Cannibal and the Milwaukee
Monster serves as a poster boy for psychopaths. He was a sex offender and serial
killer who committed rape, murder and the dismemberment of seventeen men and
boys. In high school he was considered a loner and an oddball. He was described
as apathetic toward social and academic activities and drank alcohol heavily. His
grandmother was the only family member to which he displayed any affection. He
is quoted as saying, “I trained myself to view people as objects of pleasure instead
of people”.
An important question is whether psychopaths have the capacity to be moral or
whether because of some “organic or mental deficit they are incapable of taking a
moral perspective”. Schramme speculates psychopaths suffer from a “lack of moral
sense” because they lack the capacity for empathy which has been called “the cement
of the moral universe”. He defines empathy as a motivating psychological mechanism
that involves “having the feeling of another aroused in ourselves”; it is a shared
feeling, such as anguish and pain. In his final analysis, to be moral means having
the capacity to care about being moral. The implication is that psychopaths may be
morally incapable (Schramme 2014).
In 1978 at age 18 Dahmer committed his first murder. The victim was an 18 year
old hitch hiker named Steven Mark Hicks. Dahme bludgeoned him with a dumbbell
then strangled him to death. Dahmer then took off Hicks’ cloths and masturbated
over his corpse. He dissected the body which he then buried in his backyard. In
Antisocial Personality Disorders 143

November 1987 he killed 25 year old Steven Tuomi, severed his head, arms and legs,
placed them in garbage bags and put Tuomi’s body parts-excluding the head- in the
trash. He boiled the head in an industrial detergent and used the skull as a stimulus
for masturbation.
After Tuomi’s murder he sought new victims in gay bars whom he drugged,
sexually assaulted and then killed by strangulation. From 1978 to 1991 he raped,
murdered and dismembered 17 men and boys. In one instance using his dissecting
knife he slashed the carotid artery of 22 year-old Ernest Miller who then bled to death.
In 1991 he drugged 19 year-old Errol Lindsay, and poured hydrochloric acid into a
whole he drilled in his head; Dahmer then strangled Lindsay, decapitated him and
put his skin in salt water hoping to permanently retain it. On July 16, 1991 Dahmer
had sex with the corpse of a victim. He was eventually arrested in July 1991 and
confessed to 17 murders. He also confessed to necrophilia with several victims and
consuming the hearts, livers and muscles of his victims.
A forensic psychiatrist testified Dahmer was a sexual sadist with antisocial per-
sonality disorder. An insanity defense was rejected by the court and Dahmer was
ultimately sentenced to16 terms of life imprisonment. In 1994 he was bludgeoned
to death by fellow prisoners (Wikipedia Contributors 2020). One doesn’t need an
ethics expert to diagnose Dahmer as grossly immoral.
Philosophers have noted “psychopaths are people who do not accept the guidance
of moral considerations although in principle they would be capable of doing so”.
Schramme writes, “In philosophical ethics, it is sometimes argued that we must give
the amoralist a reason for adhering to morality, or risk endangering the very bases
of morality as an institution of behavioral control” (Schramme 2014). “Psychopaths
have been viewed as a challenge to the justification of morality by in fact asking the
question, Why should I be moral at all? If we cannot give this person a reason to be
moral, it would appear that moral obligations have no secure foundation”. This is an
interesting way of posing the question of why morality is important; but whatever
answer we might give likely would have no effect on the psychopath. However, the
study of psychopaths can be valuable to the extent it illuminates their specific moral
dysfunctions or deficits, which can shed light on the capacities required to be moral
(Schramme 2014).
“On 13 September 1848, Phineas P. Gage, a 25-year-old construction foreman for
the Rutland and Burlington Railroad in New England, became a victim of a bizarre
accident. In order to lay new rail tracks across Vermont it was necessary to level
the uneven terrain by controlled blasting. Among other tasks, Gage was in charge
of the detonations, which involved drilling holes in the stone, partially filling the
holes with explosive powder, covering the powder with sand, and using a fuse and a
tamping iron to trigger an explosion into the rock. On the fateful day, a momentary
distraction let Gage begin tamping directly over the powder before his assistant had
had a chance to cover it with sand. The result was a powerful explosion away from
the rock and toward Gage. The fine-pointed, 3-cm-thick, 109-cm-long tamping iron
was hurled, rocket-like, through his face, skull, brain, and then into the sky. Gage
was momentarily stunned but regained full consciousness immediately thereafter.
144 11 Moral Motivation

He was able to talk and even walk with the help of his men. The iron landed many
yards away” (Damasio et al. 1994).
Gage survived his injury but as “a different man”. Prior to the accident Gage had
been a “responsible, intelligent and socially well-adapted individual”. Soon after the
accident there was “a profound change in his personality”; although he appeared
to have no impairment of speech, intelligence, or movement, he became irreverent,
capricious and lost his respect for social conventions and lost his sense of responsibil-
ity. He used “abundant profanity” and could not be trusted to honor his commitments.
His physician, John Harlow, said, the “balance, so to speak, between his intellectual
faculty and animal propensities had been destroyed”. His friends said, “Gage was no
longer Gage” (Damasio et al. 1994).
No autopsy was performed on Gage. When Harlow learned of Gage’s death about
5 years after Gage died he asked Gage’s family to have the body exhumed so that the
skull could be recovered and kept as a medical record. The family agreed. Gage’s
skull and the iron that had caused his injury and which had been buried with Gage’s
body became part of the Warren Anatomical Medical Museum at Harvard University.
Using neuroimaging techniques available at the time, in a “neuroanthropological
effort” the locus of Gage’s lesion was felt to be the ventromedial region of both
frontal lobes. Damasio et al. noted that other patients with frontal lobe damage had
a compromised ability to make rational decisions in personal and social matters
and were compromised in their processing of emotion (Damasio et al. 1994). That
Gage was able to make moral judgments but unable to behave accordingly supports
moral externalism (Han 2016). We make moral decisions using our brain; therefore
it shouldn’t surprise that brain damage can affect moral behavior.
People who consider morality important may not only disapprove of specific
actions they consider immoral; they may also blame the person(s) who perpetrated
that behavior. Moral blame has been described as a moral emotion with three impor-
tant components: resentment, indignation and guilt. Resentment predominates when
a person is the victim of an act perceived as being immoral. Moral indignation is the
predominant emotion when an act is perceived as wrong. Guilt results when a person
blames themself for doing wrong (Graham 2014). Without entering the philosophic
quagmire of whether people have free will, I will simply say a person should not be
judged morally blameworthy if there is reason to believe they could not have acted
otherwise.
In the case of Phineus Gage I would not blame him for any post accident immoral
behavior because it was obvious that behavior occurred after and because of his brain
injury. Gage was a different person after his injury and unable to normally control his
behavior. Brain damage that effects behavior may not be apparent. Chronic traumatic
encephalopathy, at the time I write, cannot be definitively diagnosed ante mortem.
Aaron Hernandez was a star tight end for the New England Patriots football team.
In 2013 he was convicted of the murder of a friend, Odin Lloyd, and sentenced to life
in prison where he committed suicide in 2017. Subsequently his autopsy revealed
a brain consumed by extensive chronic traumatic encephalopathy. Although other
factors might contribute to his behavior, symptoms that have been associated with
traumatic encephalopathy include social instability, impulsive and at times explosive
Antisocial Personality Disorders 145

behavior, poor judgment, pathological jealousy and paranoia. Hernandez was blamed
for his immoral and criminal behavior but it is plausible that at least some of his
behavior was beyond his control.
Abnormal brain function has also been defined in psychopaths. Studies sug-
gest psychopaths do not comprehend normal moral concepts and can’t differentiate
between moral and conventional transgressions; they see both as annoying restric-
tions that can be ignored (Kennett and Fine 2008). Some psychiatric conditions, such
as schizophrenia, have been associated with an impaired understanding of moral
behavior (Kiehl 2008). We should condemn immoral behavior but we should be cau-
tious about condemning people and be cognizant that some people who act immorally
may have limited ability to control their behavior.

Conclusion

Being able to distinguish between right and wrong is of little value if a person acts
immorally despite knowing they are performing an unethical act. I believe many
of the people who commit fraud, theft, and violent crimes know they are acting
immorally. The various theories to explain what motivates people to move from
moral knowledge to moral action are largely speculative. Neuroscience is studying
moral behavior and will hopefully clarify the involved mechanisms.
I strongly suspect immoral behavior will be with us for a long time.

References

Damasio, Hanna, et al. 1994. The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from the Skull
of a Famous Patient. Science 264: 1102–1110.
Graham, Peter A. 2014. A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 88 (2): 388–409.
Han, Hyemin. 2016. How Can Neuroscience Contribute to Moral Philosophy, Psychology, and
Education Based on Aristotelian Virtue Ethics? International Journal of Virtue Ethics 1 (2):
201–217.
Hare, R.D., and C.S. Neumann. 2010. Psychopathy: Assessment and Forensic Implications. In
Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy, ed. L. Malatesti
and J. McMillan, 93–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kennett, Jeanette and Fine, Cordella. 2008. Internalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and
“Acquired Sociopaths”. In Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality. ed. W.
Sinnott-Armstrong, 173–190. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kiehl, Kent A. 2008. Without Morals: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal Psychopaths. In
Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 119–149.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Matthews, Eric. 2014. Psychopathy and Moral Rationality. In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and
Moral Incapacity, ed. Thomas Schramme, 71–90. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
146 11 Moral Motivation

Prinz, J. 2015. An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism. In Motivational Internalism, ed. G.
Bjornsson, C. Strandberg, R. Ollinder, J. Eriksson, and F. Bjorklund. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Rosati, Connie S. 2016. Moral Motivation. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward N.
Zalta (ed.). Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/.
Accessed 7 Apr 2019.
Roskies, Adina. 2003. Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivated? Lessons from “Acquired
Sociopathy”. Philosophical Psychology 16: 51–66.
Schramme, Thomas. 2014. Introduction. In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, ed.
Thomas Schramme, 1–40. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2018a. Jeffrey Dahmer. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available
at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jeffrey_Dahmer&oldid=866718722. Accessed 1
Nov 2018.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2018b. Conscience. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available at https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Conscience&oldid=866334053. Accessed 7 Apr 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2020. Jeffrey Dahmer. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available
at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jeffrey_Dahmer&oldid=952543094. Accessed 24
Apr 2020.
Williams, Bernard. 1972. The Amoralist. An Introduction to Ethics, 3–12. New York: Harper and
Rowe.
Chapter 12
The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle,
Hume, Kant, Mill, and Nietzsche

Abstract I have selected for discussion five prominent moral philosophers who
have espoused their views on the nature of morality and how to live a moral life. We
can learn from them even though they don’t always agree with each other and are
not necessarily authoritative.
The moral philosophers tell us how they think we ought to behave. We should
study and learn from their moral theories, but ultimately each of us has to evolve a
personal conception of morality and what it means to live a moral life.

Introduction

I have selected for discussion five prominent moral philosophers who have espoused
their views on the nature of morality and how to live a moral life. We can learn from
them even though they don’t always agree with each other and are not necessarily
authoritative.
The moral philosophers tell us how they think we ought to behave. We should
study and learn from their moral theories, but ultimately each of us has to evolve a
personal conception of morality and what it means to live a moral life.

Abstract: Aristotle
Aristotle who lived more than 2000 years ago is considered one of the greatest
moral philosophers. His work has contemporary relevance. Aristotle’s ultimate goal
is living well and human happiness; he emphasized the importance of reason and
virtue in a well-lived life. He considered happiness and human flourishing, which he
called eudaimonia, the supreme good because it is not a means to anything else; it is
the final good. Reason was important to Aristotle because it “activities the virtues of
the rational part of the soul”. Aristotle’s virtues include temperance (self-control),
prudence, justice and generosity.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 147

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_12
148 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Stagira in northeastern Greece. At age seventeen
he was sent to Plato’s Academy where he studied until Plato’s death in 347 BC. At
the request of Philip, King of Macedon, Aristotle moved to the Macedonian capital,
Pella, to tutor the king’s son, Alexander. Alexander would become Alexander the
Great, one of history’s foremost military commanders and creator of the largest
empire in the ancient world.
Aristotle would later move to Athens where he opened his school, the Lyceum.
Aristotle had an incredibly wide range of interests that included logic, mathematics,
philosophy, ethics, psychology, biology, music, medicine, physics, theology, politics,
and history.
Aristotle had a son, Nicomachus, who was named for Aristotle’s father; and
after whom Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is presumably named (Shields 2016).
Aristotle’s ethics were retrieved from the lecture notes he prepared for his teaching
at the Lyceum (Norman 1996). His other treatise on ethics has been named the
Eudemian ethics.
Because Aristotle lived more than two thousand years ago there have been contro-
versial translations and interpretations of his works. Aristotle’s ethics continue to be
studied more than two thousand years after his death. Thomas Acquinas (1225–1274)
synthesized much of Aristotle’s work with Christianity (McInerny and O’Gallaghan
2018). Interest in Aristotle’s virtues continues in contemporary philosophy (Russell
2013).

The Ultimate End of Human Action

Aristotle differs from Plato because he views ethics as an autonymous field that does
not require expertise in science, mathematics or any other field. His principle concern
was the nature of human well-being and how to best live life. Aristotle makes a three
step ethical argument: 1. The ultimate end of human action is happiness. 2. Happiness
consists of acting in accordance with reason. 3. Acting according to reason is the
distinguishing feature of all the traditional virtues (Norman 1996).
Similar to Plato and Socrates Aristotle places the virtues as central to a well-lived
life. The virtues are seen as rational and emotional ethical skills. Aristotle listed his
criteria for defining the highest good for human beings as: it is desirable for itself, it
is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for
its sake. Happiness is the supreme good because it is not a means to anything else;
it is the final good.
Aristotle’s schematic formula for designating the ultimate good is: if A is desirable
for the sake of B, then B is better than A; therefore, the highest kind of good must be
one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that B should be our
ultimate end, all other goods should be shown as a means that promote B. Aristotle
The Ultimate End of Human Action 149

vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that, although there
may be exceptions, in the normal course of things a virtuous person will live a life
with friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life
happy, not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal
for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. Some ethical theories simply
state principles and rules or abstract goals such as utility. Aristotle states a more
comprehensive and meaningful goal for his ethics. His ultimate goal is “living well
and human happiness (Kraut 2018)”.
The Greek word for happiness used by Aristotle is eudaimonia which is more
meaningful than the English translation of happiness. Eudaimonia carries conno-
tations of well-being and flourishing; happiness for Aristotle means more than the
psychological state of feeling good (Kraut 2018; Norman 1996). We can assume
Aristotle found his own life a happy one because he said: “a life of pleasant, vig-
orous philosophical contemplation is one of superior eudaimonia and therefore the
best sort of life to have” (Aristotle 340 BC).
There is an arbitrariness to the selection of eudaimonia, or any other end, as the
ultimate goal of morality. The nature of morality requires that its starting premise be
arbitrary and susceptible to debate. Aristotle acknowledged this and was, “acutely
aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting point that is
not itself justified by further reasoning” (Kraut 2018). Aristotle was prescient on this
point. More than two millennium after Aristotle’s death Beauchamp and Childress
write that finding one principle that justifies all other principles or rules “is an arduous
demand that current ethical theory cannot meet”. They say “we cannot rely on any
given theory as an adequate basis for moral justification” (Beauchamp and Childress
2009).

Reason

Reason is important to Aristotle for its human distinctiveness. Aristotle views the
proper function of a human being as the exercise of reason. Reason is the distinguish-
ing feature of all the virtues and “happiness is acting in accordance with reason”.
Using reason well, with virtue over a lifetime defines happiness. “Reason consists
in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul”
(Kraut 2018). It is debatable whether “because a certain activity is distinctly human,
it is therefore constitutive of a good human life” (Norman 1996). In the case of
reason Aristotle may be violating the rule that what is (distinctive reason) does not
necessarily determine what ought to be (act in accordance with reason).
Aristotle provided current day critics a large target when he said slaves and women
possess reason to a lesser degree. In his Politics Aristotle says the proper function
of women is to obey men and the proper function of slaves is to obey their masters.
Aristotle used the dubious fact of decreased rationality to limit the fully human life
to free born male citizens (Norman 1996).
150 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Virtue

A moral virtue has been defined as a trait of character that is morally valuable
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Aristotle’s morality emphasizes the virtues and
therefore merits the designation of a virtue based theory. Aristotle disagreed with
Plato who, in his early Dialogues, said that virtue was a kind of knowledge and vice
a lack of knowledge. Aristotle thought of the virtues as a tendency or disposition, an
appropriate emotional response and not a purely intellectual condition.
The Greek term for Aristotle’s virtue is hexis. Virtue activates itself in action and is
linked to knowledge. To be virtuous both the external performance and proper inter-
nal state must be present (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). A person first becomes
virtuous by imitating another who exemplifies virtuous characteristics and practic-
ing them in their daily lives (Wikipedia Contributors 2019), Quotes from Aristotle
include: “we become just by doing just acts. In our transactions with other men we
become just or unjust. We become brave by doing brave acts. We learn by doing
them. We become habituated to being just or unjust. It makes no small difference,
then whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a
very great difference, or rather all the difference” (Ross 1959).
Aristotle defines two major categories of virtues; virtues of reason (the intellect)
and virtues that do not involve reason but are able to follow the dictates of reason
(ethical and characterological virtues). He divides intellectual virtue into theoretical
reasoning and practical reasoning. Virtues attributed to Aristotle include courage,
temperance (self-control), prudence, justice (fairness), generosity and magnanimity.
Aristotle says before we can individually justify the virtues we have to experience
them as worthwhile. Under the right circumstances this happens in childhood. He
excluded certain emotions, (spite, envy) and actions (adultery, theft, and murder), as
never virtuous and always wrong (Kraut 2018).

Doctrine of the Mean

In his doctrine of the mean Aristotle says in acting on the virtues reason dictates
we avoid both excess and deficiency. This has been interpreted as a sober caution to
exercise the virtues in moderation. However, it has been argued that is not Aristotle’s
intention; Aristotle says we should act as is “appropriate to the circumstances”.
Aristotle believed circumstances vary so much from one another that no series of rules
could solve every practical problem. Although his doctrine of the mean suggested
avoiding both excess and deficiency, Aristotle did not exclude strong feelings in
appropriate circumstances. For example, some circumstances might call for strong
anger while other circumstances might demand mild anger (Kraut 2018).
Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean” has been considered in the context of an antag-
onism between reason and feelings. Plato said reason should temper the emotions;
Hume said reason is the slave of the passions. Aristotle believed our passions should
Doctrine of the Mean 151

never undermine reason. He has been interpreted as perceptively believing emotions

can have a rational component when they are sensitive to the true nature of a situ-
ation and not distorted by irrelevant factors. Aristotle’s summarized his doctrine of
the mean as, “having feelings on the right occasion, for the right reason, to the right
degree and toward the right person”.

Practical Wisdom-Phronesis

Aristotle does not believe learning to achieve the goal of “practical wisdom” can come
from learning theoretical principles; (Norman 1996). Practical wisdom, is concerned
with particulars, not universals; it is not a matter of appealing to rules and princi-
ples. It tells us what to do when confronting ethical dilemmas in the here and now.
Aristotle calls practical wisdom, phronesis. Knowledge of phronesis comes from
practical experience and habituation. A child properly brought up in a moral com-
munity develops proper habits and ethical virtues; when the child is older and when
reason is well-developed they attain a larger picture of human life, their deliberative
skills improve, and their emotional responses are perfected; at that time they develop
practical wisdom (Norman 1996; Kraut 2018). More than two thousand years after
Aristotle said when confronted with ethical dilemmas we are forced to use our best
judgment; I believe the word judgment has a meaning similar to Aristotle’s phronesis.

Bad Decisions: Akrasia

Aristotle assumes that when someone regularly makes bad decisions it is because
of irrational psychological factors. A person’s desires for pleasure, power or some
other external goal overwhelms their desire to act ethically. Aristotle allows that a
happy life must include pleasure. A person who is happy will find pleasure in his way
of life; however, the value of the pleasure is determined by the value of the activity
that brings pleasure. Pleasure in good activities is good pleasure; but pleasure in
corrupt and perverse activities such as crude sensual indulgence is a corrupt pleasure;
therefore, pleasure itself cannot be used as a criterion of value (Norman 1996).
Aristotle calls a person who rejects the virtues as of little, if any, value and refuses
to try to act ethically, evil. Because not everyone can resist disruptive forces he says
a political community needs laws and the prospect of punishment. Aristotle borrows
the concept of internal harmony from Plato and says the life of a good person is
harmonious. An evil person may act unethically and later regret that decision which
adds an element of disharmony to their life. Aristotle seems to recognize that to live
a happy life also requires an element of good fortune (Kraut 2018).
Aristotle psychologically analyzes immoral behavior using the term akrasia. An
akratic person violates reason. Aristotle assumes that when someone regularly makes
bad decisions it is because of irrational psychological factors. Aristotle distinguishes
152 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

two causes of akrasia: impetuosity and weakness. The person who is weak goes
through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but instead of acting in accor-
dance with his reasoned choice, he is influenced by passion. The impetuous person
makes no reasoned choice; he simply acts, influenced by passion. The impetuous
person experiences no immediate internal conflict but may later regret what he has
done (Kraut 2018).

The Moral Philosophers: David Hume

Abstract: David Hume

David Hume was influenced by Newton and advocated a scientific approach to the
study of human nature. He believed all our ideas, including morality, ultimately come
from experience. He rejected belief in God and the immortality of the soul and labeled
them, “popular superstitions”. He defined two types of perceptions: impressions
which are “sensations as well as desires, passions, and emotion” and ideas. He
classified morality as a complex idea. Concerning causation Hume refuted the idea
of necessary connection and said causation was an idea in us, not in the objects
themselves. Hume rejects the existence of moral truth and believes the sentiments of
approval and disapproval are the source of our moral ideas of goodness and badness.
Hume famously summarized his position: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave
of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey
them”.
David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Edinburgh, Scotland to a moderately
wealthy family; he was extraordinarily precocious and entered the University of
Edinburgh at age eleven. He was raised according to strict Scottish Calvinist stric-
tures with prayers and sermons common at home and the university; he later devel-
oped doubts about religion and rejected both those beliefs and organized religion,
garnering a reputation as an atheist and a skeptic.
His family thought he should pursue a legal career but he decided to become a
scholar and philosopher. His three-volume Treatise of Human Nature, (1739–1740)
which was published before he was thirty, according to Hume, “fell dead-born from
the press, without reaching such distinctions even to excite a murmur among the
zealots”; this work is now considered a philosophic masterpiece. Hume’s major
philosophical works are still studied. In addition to Treatise of Human Nature he
also wrote, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding (1748) and Concerning the
Principles of Morals (1751) (Fieser 2019).
Hume worked as a librarian and at the British Embassy in Paris. He also held an
embassy post in the courts of Vienna and Turin. His History of England, published
in six volumes between 1754 and 1762, was a bestseller that provided him financial
independence. Hume died of an intestinal disorder, in 1776. Because of his “danger-
ous” antireligious views Hume was rejected for an academic post at Edinburgh and
later at Glasgow and never obtained an academic position (Morris and Brown 2017).
Philosophy 153

Philosophy

Hume’s major project was the study of human nature. In 1734, at age 23, he started
writing A Treatise of Human Nature (subsequently revised in his Enquires). He
attempted to bring the scientific method to bear on the study of human nature. He
criticized ancient and contemporary philosophers who espoused hypothetical, a pri-
ori theories based on imagination and invention rather on than fact and observation.
He called supernatural metaphysical theories such as the belief in God and the immor-
tality of the soul “popular superstitions” that attempt to overwhelm us with religious
fears and prejudices.
Hume was influenced by Isaac Newton who, discovered the laws of motion,
optics and universal gravitation. Hume’s goal was to apply the scientific method to
reform philosophy and uncover the fundamental laws governing our “mental powers”
(Morris and Brown 2017).

Perceptions

Hume referred to any mental content as perceptions and defined two types of percep-
tions: impressions which are “sensations as well as desires, passions, and emotion”,
and ideas which are “the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning”. Impressions
are related to ideas as feeling relates to thinking. It is the difference between feel-
ing an immediate injury (an impression) and remembering the injury a year later
(an idea). Desires, passions and emotion are referred to as secondary because “they
are essentially reactions or responses to ideas”, which is why Hume calls them sec-
ondary. Impressions and ideas can be simple or complex. Morality is a complex
idea.
Although our thoughts may seem free they “are restricted to compounding, trans-
porting, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and
experience”. Our ideas emanate from external sensations and internal feelings.
According to Hume, “All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from
simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly repre-
sent”. That our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions has been referred
to as Hume’s Copy thesis. Hume is expressing an empiricist position because he
believed all our ideas, including morality, ultimately come from experience (Morris
and Brown 2017).

Necessary Connections

Hume recognizes three principles of association. We associate things because they

resemble each other, because they are contiguous in time and space and because
of causation. The strongest of these associations is causation and the only one that
154 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

takes us “beyond our senses”. In his science of human nature Hume places the idea of
causation, or necessary connections “in us”, not in the relevant objects themselves.
Before Hume many believed that if effect Y always followed action X that there
was a “necessary connection” between X and Y and that some power mediated the
connection between X and Y. Hume said, “When we find that one kind of event is
constantly conjoined with another, we begin to expect the one to occur when the
other does. We suppose there’s some connection between them, and don’t hesitate
to call the first, the cause, and the second, the effect. After we’ve experienced their
constant conjunction, habit determines us to expect the effect when the cause occurs
“and that some power mediates the connection” (Morris and Brown 2017).
Hume explains the mistaken belief of a necessary connection by the natural ten-
dency we have to impute subjectively perceived qualities to external things. A com-
mon, but mistaken, notion is that necessity resides within the objects themselves.
Hume’s theory of causation had two articulations: “A cause is an object, followed
by another, where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar
to the second” and in another iteration, “a cause is an object followed by another,
and whose appearance always conveys the thought to the other”. Hume refuted the
notion of necessary connections, invisible powers or that causal associations reflect
God’s willing that one action is followed by another. Hume locates “the source of
the idea of necessary connection in us, not in the objects themselves”. An associative
connection in our mind generates the false notion of a necessary connection (Morris
and Brown 2017).

Moral Philosophy

Philosophers who preceded Hume proposed various moral theories, including self-
interest theories. In common with Hume, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) believed
morality should be based in human nature. Hobbes focused on the dark side of
human nature and claimed people were naturally motivated by self-interest, a state
referred to as psychological egoism. Hobbes said, “of the voluntary acts of every man
the object is some good to himself”. Although Hobbes emphasized the egoistic aspect
of human nature, Gert argues that Hobbes did not endorse psychological egoism.
Hobbes’ primary practical concern was political; he wanted to prevent civil war.
Hobbes like Hume had negative feelings about religion and considered it dangerous to
civil peace. Hobbes’ proposed solution was a general agreement to install a coercive
power he referred to as the Sovereign. The Sovereign would make and enforce the
laws necessary for people to live together peacefully. Hobbes would authorize the
Sovereign to inflict punishment for immoral and unjust behavior (Gert 2010).
Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) agreed with Hobbes that people were basically
self-interested and unruly; he also observed they were susceptible to flattery. Man-
deville believed people could be fooled into behaving virtuously by dispensing praise
and blame. Morality was thus cynically conceived as a clever tool to tame human
behavior.
Moral Philosophy 155

Hume rejected moral theories based on self-interest. He believed this left two
options as the basis of morality: rationalism and sentimentalism. Hume concluded
the sentiments of approval and disapproval are the source of our moral ideas of
goodness and badness.

Rationalism Versus Sentimentalism

Hume views morality and moral sentiments (emotions) as a product of human nature.
Morality is an idea that is ultimately derived from the observation of human behavior.
Hume rejects the existence of moral truth and believes the sentiments of approval
and disapproval are the source of our moral ideas of goodness and badness. Moral
judgment does not rest on a lofty perch; it is relegated to the human plain of usefulness
and agreeability.
Hume agrees with Hobbes that our own good is dependent on the maintenance of
society but rejects theories that our approval of justice, humanity and benevolence
is based on self-interest; we approve of virtuous character traits not because they are
useful to us personally (self-love) but also because of their benefits to others. Our
moral sentiments are derived from our capacity to respond sympathetically to others.
Hume rejects reason as a motivating moral force partly due to its use by religion
to serve the interests of, as he put it, “popular superstition”. Hume also rejected the
notion we have a unique moral sense implanted by God. Hume rejected the notion
of reason as a motivating force. He said, “reason alone can never be a motive to any
action of the will and by itself it can never oppose a passion”. When reason figures
in an action it is always because of an existing desire. Reason may tell us smoking
causes lung cancer, but we won’t stop smoking unless we first have the desire to stop
smoking. Moral ideals may motivate us to perform or refrain from an action but that
is because “morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions”. Hume rejects
the rationalist ideal of the good person as someone whose passions and actions are
governed by reason. Hume famously summarized his position: “Reason is, and ought
only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them” (Morris and Brown 2017).
Hume did not totally reject reason; he said reason plays a role in moral thinking.
It helps us understand the consequences of human actions and character; but moral
claims are not statements of fact. Hume expresses skepticism about statements of
facts: “I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought
not”. This move from is to ought is illegitimate. For Hume there is no moral truth to
be discovered by reason. Reason results in factual claims, not moral claims. Moral
judgments cannot be factually true or false; their approval is a function of their
useful and agreeable features. Hume maintains “morality is determined by sentiment.
It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the
pleasing sentiment of approbation and vice the contrary” (Norman 1998a). Hume
adopts sentimentalism, a philosophical theory that views emotions and desires as the
primary source of moral knowledge.
156 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Hume’s sentimentalism, refers to the moral sentiments as feelings of approval or

disapproval, praise or blame, esteem or contempt; he describes moral sentiments as
“calm forms of love and hatred”. Sympathy, also referred to as humanity or fellow-
feeling, is the basis of his moral sentiments. Hume’s notion of sympathy does not
refer to empathic feelings for someone in distress. It does not mean compassion.
Hume defines sympathy as an independent human capacity to be moved or affected
by the happiness and suffering of others; he defines sympathy as a psychological
mechanism that explains how we come to feel what others are feeling; it is not itself
a feeling, sentiment. or moral value. Sympathy is the source of moral approval or
disapproval. Norman criticizes Hume because he does not address the problem of
ethical conflict and provides no solution to the resolution of problems when two
conflicting options both provide moral value (Norman 1998a).
Hume, who could be called a virtue theorist, agreed with Plato and Aristotle that
morality was mostly about virtues and vices; we praise people because of their virtues
and blame them because of their vices. Hume defines as virtues that which is useful
or agreeable to either their possessor or to others. He differs from Plato and Aristotle
in including the value of virtues to others. Hume’s list of virtues useful to their
possessor includes discretion, industry, frugality and good sense. Virtues useful to
others include beneficence, justice and fidelity. Qualities agreeable to their possessor
include cheerfulness, courage and tranquility. Qualities agreeable to others include
politeness, decency and modesty (Norman 1998a).
Hume’s moral perspective is to decide whether a person’s character traits are
good for everyone. He says, “every quality of mind, which is useful or agreeable to
the person himself or to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages
his esteem, is admitted under the honorable denomination of virtue or merit”. We
approve of character traits and actions such as benevolence, humanity, justice and
political allegiance because we sympathize with their benefits that are useful to us
and society.
There are similarities between Hume and the more modern philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844–1900). Both philosophers denied the existence of moral knowledge.
Hume seemed to take this in stride (Norman 1998a). Nietzsche was more vociferous
and is famous for his uncompromising criticisms of traditional morality, religion,
and conventional philosophical ideas. He announced “the whole of our European
morality” is destined for “collapse” (Anderson 2017a). Nietzsche also said, “There
are no moral facts whatever” and “Moral facts have this in common with religious
judgment that it believes in realities that do not exist” (Norman 1998a).
Although to some extent we resemble other human beings to some degree, we
resemble some people more than others. Hume’s “associative principles” note that
we are able to respond more strongly with a relative or someone with whom we have
a specific relationship. This practical acknowledgement conflicts with the position
that morality should function according to fixed standards.
Hume’s emotivist position that what goes by the name of morality, and gets labeled
good or bad, simply reflects our feelings is difficult to refute. Our emotions are
complicated and do not guarantee they will serve as guide to the most appropriate
choices. From a practical perspective, despite Hume’s view that motivation comes
Rationalism Versus Sentimentalism 157

from the emotions, we often have no options and must confront ethical dilemmas
and make choices. We can turn to other philosophers for guidance or we can adopt
personal moral values without demanding sacrosanct moral truth.
There will always be a role for reason because our moral decisions are best made
with knowledge of the relevant facts and the consequences of their relationships.
Hume says we are motivated by our sentiments, but often we are motivated by
necessity because there are ethical dilemmas we can’t avoid. If confronted with
a choice for the primary agent of moral motivation, reason or emotion, I would
cautiously differ with Hume and give priority to cold, thoughtful reason.
Morality is a human concept, what Hume would call an idea. It is not an object
that can empirically be weighed and measured and made to release correct answers.
Life presents many challenges and moral dilemmas is one of them.

The Moral Philosophers: Immanuel Kant

Abstract: Kant
Immanuel Kant was a deontologist who favored rules and principles over conse-
quences. He believed man had free will and emphasized the important role of reason
to decipher the moral law.
Kant’s categorical imperatives, his supreme moral principle includes, “Act only
on the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law” and in another formulation, “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in that of any other, never solely as a means but also as an end”.

Immanuel Kant

The Prussian philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) lived in Konigsberg, East

Prussia. He taught at the University of Konigsberg until his retirement in 1796. Kant
is considered a classic deontologist because his moral philosophy is largely based
on whether an action is itself right or wrong rather than on its consequences.
Kant accepted the possibility of metaphysics, which he defined as knowledge
that does not depend on experience (Kant 1781). Kant referred to metaphysics as,
“cognition after which reason might strive independently of all experience”. Kant
also wrote, “Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of reason,
which soars far above the teachings of experience” (Rohlf 2018). Kant has had a
major impact on moral philosophy, but he has been said to have written some of the
“most complex texts in the history of philosophy”. Out of compassion for the reader
I will simply focus on his moral philosophy.
158 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Kant believed there is a single fundamental principle of morality on which moral

duties are based. He called this the moral law. Human reason gives itself the moral
law. The moral law is not imposed; it is laid down by every rational agent by himself.
Kant says our knowledge and consciousness of the moral law is a fact of reason.
Every human being has a conscience, a grasp of morality and we hold our selves
morally accountable; therefore, morality does not need to be justified or “proved by
any deduction”; it’s simply a fact that morality has authority over us. For Kant it is
a common sense belief that establishes the fact of morality (Rohlf 2018).
Kant’s moral philosophy entails several suppositions. He believes that nature is
purposive and that reason must exist for a higher purpose than happiness. For Kant the
object of morality is to make the world better by transforming the natural world into
the highest good. He believes in the principle of human autonomy and presupposes
we are free because we have the ability to do otherwise. Freedom is a condition of the
moral law because, “were there no freedom the moral law would not be encountered
in ourselves”. Moral blame applies only to people who, at the time, have it in their
power to control their actions (Rohlf 2018).

The Categorical Imperative

Kant calls the moral law the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is
Kant’s supreme principle. A categorical imperative commands that a person acts in
some way, unconditionally. Kant’s categorical imperative is derived from reason but
also takes into account human desires and inclinations. A categorical imperative is
the law of an autonomous will, the self-governing reason in each person (Johnson
and Cureton 2018). His categorical imperatives is the form in which the commands
of the moral law are expressed (Norman 1998b). Kant’s ultimate goal is to transform
the natural world and realize the highest good which is a world in which there is
complete virtue and complete happiness.
Kant’s Categorical Imperative states, “Act only on the maxim whereby you can
at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. Another formulation
states, “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any
other, never solely as a means but also as an end”. Norman interprets the phrase,
“not treating people only as means but as ends”, as we should have concern for the
interests of others who have their own interests, and because persons have dignity.
Using a person solely as a means has been interpreted as involving them in “a scheme
of action to which they would not in principle consent” (O’Neill 1986). Kant was
trying to convey in this formulation the need to respect persons, their liberty and their
autonomy. In a Lectures on Ethics, Kant declared, “There is nothing more sacred in
the wide world than the rights of others” (Norman 1998b).
A Universal Law 159

A Universal Law

Kant said the test of the moral permissibility of a maxim is whether it could be
willed as a universal law. Norman likens Kant’s universality to people in judging
the rightness of an action asking, “what if everybody did that?” (Norman 1998b).
Two aspects of Kant’s concept of universality are consistency and impersonality. A
universal maxim that applies to one person in one situation should apply to others
in relevantly similar situations. A reason for performing an action must be a reason
for anyone to perform the same action in relevantly similar circumstances (Norman
1998b).
Using a maxim that could not be a universal law illustrates the concept of a
maxim as a universal law. The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what you want
generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the universalized version
that all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when doing so gets them what they
want. This involves conceiving of a world in which everyone knows that no practice
of honoring one’s word exists. It is inconceivable that a person could get what they
want by lying in a world where everyone knows everyone lies; therefore, the maxim
of lying to get what a person wants can’t be a universal law and is immoral (Johnson
and Cureton 2018).
In another example stealing could not be universalized because if it were, property
would cease to exist and stealing would become impossible (Norman 1998b). Kant
also required that a maxim not contradict itself.

Duty

Another central concept for Kant is “duty for its own sake”; he thought that duty was
a manifestation of the inner spiritual state of the person. Duties enumerated by Kant
include: (1) the duty to refrain from suicide (2) the duty to refrain from making false
promises (3) the duty to help others. Norman speculates Kant was influenced by his
Christian Lutheran upbringing which emphasized fulfillment of the obligations of a
person by his position in the world (Norman 1998b).

The Moral Philosophers: John Stuart Mill

Abstract: John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill rejected Kant’s intuitionism and claimed that morality should be
justified by our external observations and experience. Mill’s utilitarian theory stated
the worth of our actions depended on their consequences. Because each person desires
happiness it is an important criteria of morality. The centerpiece of his principle of
160 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

utility is, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”. Mill extended his concept of
happiness beyond the simple psychological state of feeling happy to include what
he called the higher pleasures; these include mental, aesthetic, and moral pleasures
such as artistic enjoyment, intellectual inquiry, imaginative work, and devotion to a
cause.
Morality is a concept developed and elaborated by humans that seeks to define
the proper employment of values of such extreme importance that they merit our
allegiance and protection. Religious and secular moral philosophers strive to define
what those values ought to be and how they should relate to each other. Immanuel
Kant believed our minds have the capacity to intuit the moral law for ourselves;
John Stuart Mill disagreed with Kant and other so-called “intuitionists” and claimed
that morality should be justified by our external observations and our experience.
Mill believed the worth of our actions depended on its consequences, specifically its
ability to maximize happiness.

John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was a polymath who had a profound influence on
nineteenth century British thought. He wrote on logic, epistemology, economics,
religion, current affairs, metaphysics, political philosophy, the philosophy of sci-
ence, and morality. His father, James Mill, was a prominent thinker and a demanding
father. Mill worked for the East India Company, a job that left ample time for his philo-
sophical writings. Elected in 1865, he served one term as a member of Parliament.
He acquired his superior erudition in the absence of a university education.
Mill “felt first-hand the stifling effect of Victorian judgmentalism and the oppres-
sive norms of propriety” following his “scandalous affair” with Harriet Taylor, a
married woman whom he subsequently married after her husband’s death. Harriet is
said to have collaborated with Mill on some of his writings (Macleod 2018).
Mill’s major works are still taught at universities around the world. They include:
On Liberty (1859), which includes his “harm principle” that “the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others”; The Subjection of Women (1869), in
which he compared the legal status of women to the status of slaves and argued for
equality in marriage and under the law. In his most significant treatise on morality,
Utilitarianism (1863), he defined the major principle of his moral theory, the principle
of utility, as: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”. That is the centerpiece of Mill’s
moral philosophy (Heydt 2018).
Mill was a religious skeptic and philosophically committed to naturalism, the
belief that only natural laws and forces operate in the world; he rejected the super-
natural. Mill believed our mind was part of nature and that our best methods to
explain the world are those employed by the natural sciences. Anything that we can
John Stuart Mill 161

know about human minds comes from treating them as part of the causal order as
investigated by the empiric sciences, rather than as special entities that lie outside
science. Mill believed “The mind is to be known by observation, experience and
by reasoning which takes place on the ground of such observations”. He disagreed
with “theists who hold that our minds have been given to us by an omnipotent and
benevolent God for the purpose of comprehension, and idealists who hold that the
mind has a formative role in constructing the world” (Macleod 2018). In this respect
he differed sharply from Kant.
The conflicts in moral philosophy between Kant and Mill can be understood in
their contemporary political context. Mill took Kant’s categorical imperative as get-
ting its moral force in the absence of any external standard and believed this would
be used to foster the social and political status quo. Mill believed that Kant and
other “intuitionists” enabled people to “ratify their own prejudices”. Mill’s utilitar-
ianism evaluates moral claims by appealing to the external standard of pain and
pleasure. It considered each individual as someone capable of suffering and enjoy-
ment. Utilitarianism was more appealing to radicals who wanted political change
(Heydt 2018).
Mill believed our actions were determined by a combination of our character,
desires and circumstances; but said “we had ‘moral freedom’ because we are able to
change our character and desires, if we wish”. It seems contradictory to acknowledge
our actions are determined and simultaneously claim our character and desires an
exception. Mill responds to this criticism using an observation: “If we examine
closely, we shall find that this feeling, of our being able to modify our own character if
we wish, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of”.

Utilitarianism

Prior to Mill the earliest iteration of utilitarianism was on a religious basis. Religious
utilitarians wanted to solve the problem of harmonizing the interests of individuals
who desire happiness, with the interests of society. They found their answer in God
who can sanction either eternal punishment or eternal rewards; God guarantees that
an individual’s self-interest lies in virtue and furthering the happiness of others.
In the late-eighteenth century secular versions of utilitarianism became associated
with various reform movements. The principle of utility with its commitments to
happiness as the only intrinsically desirable end and to the moral equivalency of the
happiness of other individuals was used as an instrument of reform. Jeremy Bentham
(1748–1832) an English philosopher and political radical, and incidentally a friend
of Mill’s father, used the principle of utility as a device of political, social, and legal
criticism. Bentham’s interest in the principle of utility was not primarily for moral
reasons as much as it was from concern about legislative and legal reform (Heydt
2018).
There is a difference between theoretical reasoning and practical reason. Theo-
retical reason is concerned with what there is reason to believe; for Mill “the general
162 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the test by which they
should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind”. Mill said,
“happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which
to judge all human conduct” (Macleod 2018). Mill calls practical reason, the art of
life. Concerns relevant to practical reason and moral decision-making include the
moral rules, prudence, and aesthetics. Prudence refers to actions that maximize an
individual’s utility. Mill argues the contemplation of aesthetics, such as art and poetry
offers methods for moving beyond egoism to facilitate selflessness, compassion and
wider identifications of the self with others.
In Utilitarianism (Mill 1863) Mill provides a three part “proof” of his principle
of utility:
1. If everyone desires happiness for its own sake, then happiness is desirable as an
end in itself. This portion of his proof is called “desirability”. This is how Mill
stated his position:
“The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of
the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it
is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.
If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in
practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it
was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that
each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This,
however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all
which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness
is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate
of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and
consequently one of the criteria of morality” (Mill 1863).
Mill’s argument that happiness is desirable as an end and the sole evidence possible
to prove that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it subtly reflects the
influence of Mill’s belief in empiric science. There is however a serious problem with
Mill’s argument; because something is desired does not mean it is morally desirable.
Phrased differently, what people want, is not necessarily what they ought to want.
If everyone in tribe A desired the extinction of everyone in tribe B that would not
establish the morality of the desire to kill everyone in tribe B.
The development of a consistent system of morality which achieves a general
consensus is an extremely difficult task; no such system exists today. Mill quite
reasonably said, “ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof”. The inability to
prove its ends necessitates a moral system without at least some impossible to prove
arbitrary elements. Mill’s main arbitrary element was to base his morality on what
he thought everyone wanted, and he observed that to be happiness (Macleod 2018;
Norman 1998c).
Mill’s morality presents practical problems. It’s not always possible to predict
which decisions will lead to happiness and which will lead to regret. Will editing the
Utilitarianism 163

human genome enhance human happiness or lead to regrettable misfortune? Cur-

rently the answer to that question remains open to debate. If we want to maximize
happiness we need to know how to measure happiness, a task of enormous diffi-
culty, especially if happiness is defined as more than simply a psychological state of
pleasure?
In Mill’s case happiness was perhaps, an unfortunate choice of words because it
suggested Mill had fashioned a hedonistic morality, “worthy of swine”. Although
Bentham was a utilitarian, Mill thought Bentham was overly focused on quantity,
not quality. Mill responded to his critics by extending happiness beyond the simple
psychological state of feeling happy to what he called the higher pleasures, as distin-
guished from the lower pleasures (food, drink and sex). Mill claimed if people could
experience the higher pleasures they would be preferred over the lower pleasures
(Norman 1998c). Mill’s higher pleasures include mental, aesthetic, and moral plea-
sures such as artistic enjoyment, intellectual inquiry, imaginative work, and devotion
to a cause.
2. The second point in Mill’s proof is that nothing other than happiness is desired
as an end in itself. Mill must make good his claim that happiness is the sole test
of right and wrong. He acknowledges that many of our actions are not desired
for their own sake, but as a means to something else. We buy gasoline, not for its
own sake, but as a means to get somewhere. We may drive to the grocery store,
not for its own sake, but to get food. Norman says Mill must show that every
sequence of means and ends halts at happiness.
Mill accomplishes this by saying we have to look at human life as a whole; that
things we desire such as music or health as a means to happiness are actually part of
happiness. Although this adds depth to Mill’s notion of happiness, Norman worries
that anything described as a means to happiness would automatically be re-described
by Mill as an ingredient of happiness. This is how Mill establishes, “exclusivity”,
the second part of his proof that happiness is exclusively desired (Norman 1998c).
Mill states: “The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is
desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The
principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music for instance, or
any given exemption from pain, as for example, health, is to be looked upon as means
to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They
are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are part
of the end” (Mill 1863).
Mill did not consider the various pleasures as solely a means to happiness; he said
they have value in themselves and are part of happiness (Heydt 2018). There has been
considerable discussion of Mill’s use of the words happiness and higher and lower
pleasures. Different interpretations of happiness include achieving a unity with or
knowledge of God, called “transcendental happiness” and from Aristotle happiness
is “a life which gives a person what cannot be taken away, namely, self-respect” (Uyl
and Machan 1993).
3. If happiness is the only thing desirable as an end in itself then general happiness
is the proper end of conduct (Norman 1998c). Mill claims that “each person’s
164 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, a good to the
aggregate of all persons”. He calls the latter principle, “impartiality” and claims
each person’s happiness is equally desirable (Macleod 2018). Mill claims that
by demonstrating desirability, exhaustiveness and impartiality he has proven his
principle of utility.
It does not necessarily follow that if everyone desires happiness for themselves that
all persons are entitled to happiness. The closest Mill comes to justifying happiness
for all persons is when he says we mature in a social environment and psychologically
think in terms of collective rather than individual interests (Norman 1998c).
A serious objection to Mill’s principle of utility is that “it is exacting too much to
require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general
interest of society”. Mill wrote: Ethics is supposed to tell us what our duties are, “but
no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of
duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other
motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them”. To do the
right thing, in other words, we do not need to be constantly motivated by concern for
the general happiness. The large majority of actions intend the good of individuals
(including ourselves) rather than the good of the world. Yet the world’s good is made
up of the good of the individuals that constitute it and unless we are in the position of,
say, a legislator, we act properly by looking to private rather than to public good. Our
attention to the public well-being usually needs to extend only so far as is required
to know that we aren’t violating the rights of others (Heydt 2018).
Mill said that we do not need to attend constantly to the general happiness. Despite
his claims about maximizing happiness he accepted practical limits to moral obli-
gations. He said “It is not good that persons should be bound, by other people’s
opinion, to do everything that they would deserve praise for doing. There is a stan-
dard of altruism to which all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it
which is not obligatory, but meritorious. These non-obligatory behaviors have sub-
sequently been called by others, moral ideals”. He added “it is nevertheless a sign
of moral progress when the happiness of others, including the happiness of those we
don’t know, becomes important to us” (Macleod 2018).
The term consequentialism has been applied to theories that state “actions are right
or wrong according to the balance of their good and bad consequences. The right
act produces the best overall result, as determined from an impersonal perspective”.
The most prominent consequentialist theory is the principle of utility; that we should
aim for the maximal balance of positive value over disvalue, as championed by
Bentham and Mill. Measuring various forms of happiness and subtracting elements
of unhappiness using a complex notion of happiness and considering the net effect
on a significant number of people is extremely difficult and perhaps impossible.
A criticism of utilitarianism is that it fails to provide an account of duties. A
teleological theory, such as utilitarianism, is one that says an action can be deemed
right or wrong based on its consequences. A deontological theory says that some
actions are intrinsically right or wrong and we have a duty to perform them or refrain
from them. Such duties as noted by W. D. Ross include keeping promises, telling the
Utilitarianism 165

truth and fair distributional justice. Ross and others claim utilitarians, by focusing
on consequences, lose sight of these duties which are valid in their own right. For
example, they attach no ethical significance to who gets the benefits of happiness.
Though they are not the object of major emphasis, Mill acknowledges the validity
of moral rules because experience has shown them to be useful and they may have
favorable consequences in specific cases or generally. (Norman 1998c).
Beauchamp and Childress distinguish between act and rule utilitarians. The rule
utilitarian in contrast to the act utilitarian will not only consider utility but will
also take into consideration the violation of a moral rule that may have a negative
effect over time. Mill might be best characterized as an act utilitarian. I favor moral
flexibility and the determination in specific situations of the relative merits of both
utility and adherence to moral rules (Beauchamp and Childress 1994).
The principle of utility in some situations conflicts with important moral rules.
People with advanced kidney failure who require dialysis have a lowered quality
of life and often a shorter life span. Using a lottery to select healthy kidney donors
who will be required to donate a kidney would maximize the net good, in this case
health. This hypothetical program would violate the moral rule of respect for personal
autonomy which states people have the right to determine what is done to their own
body. In the case just described personal autonomy would likely win out over utility.
In the United States you can’t take a kidney without permission from the donor.
And to protect the financially vulnerable it’s illegal to sell an organ for a valuable
consideration.
Most people develop a sense of morality before they are old enough to read the
moral philosophers. Our moral sense is transmitted by family, friends, religious and
secular teachers, and personal experience. Few people learn how to behave morally
in daily life from the moral philosophers. The work of moral philosophers has its
most important application in the field of applied ethics. The ethical dilemmas of
various disciples are important and can present complex and difficult challenges. For
guidance we refer to the moral philosophers for the moral principles, rules and other
relevant considerations that may lead us to a just resolution. Part of Mill’s legacy is
our focus on the consequences of moral decisions.

The Moral Philosophers: Friedrich Nietzsche

Abstract: Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche’s contemporary philosophers believed morality needed a secular ground-
ing independent of religion. Nietzsche disagreed and said this was not possible.
Nietzsche rejected the idea reason can lead to the justification of moral truths and
believed “there are no moral facts whatever”. Nietzsche interpreted morality as a
social phenomenon that changes over time. He spoke of a slave morality character-
ized by love, kindness, and sympathy as a reaction against the success of others and in
reality an expression of “submerged hatred” and “the vengefulness of the impotent”.
166 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Nietzsche views morality as a mask, of an underlying condition, and as deceptive

and dishonest. Morality has been used as a form of camouflaged ideology, reflecting
the views and interests of a dominant class and that psychologically, morality can be
confining and oppressive to the human spirit.

Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche (1844–1900) was a German philosopher who was born in the Prussian
Province of Saxony. His father was a Lutheran minister. His initial field of study was
philology; at age 24 he was appointed Chair of Philology at the University of Basil.
He was the youngest person ever to hold that position. He had many talents and was
also a poet, cultural critic, Latin and Greek scholar and music composer.
Nietzsche was influenced by Ludwig Feuerbach’s, The Essence of Christian-
ity, with its argument that people created God, and not the other way around. Because
of his criticism of Christianity Nietzsche had difficulty obtaining university positions.
His many works include: Human, All Too Human (1878), The Gay Science (1882),
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), and On the
Genealogy of Morals (1887).
Nietzsche is most famous for his criticism of conventional European morality and
its foundation in Christianity. His aim was to undermine religious faith, and its valued
concepts such as altruism and moral responsibility. Philosophers of the time felt that
morality needed a secular grounding independent of religion. Nietzsche disagreed
and said this was not possible. He also said that morality had been harmful and its
corrosive effects had to be removed. He claimed European morality was destined
for collapse and made his shocking statement, “God is dead” as a way of saying
Christianity had become unbelievable (Anderson 2017b).
Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth (1846–1935), with whom he had a tumultuous rela-
tionship, married the anti-Semitic Bernhard Forster. Despite Nietzsche’s hostility
towards anti-Semitism and nationalism, Elizabeth twisted Nietzsche’s work and
falsely tried to associate his work with fascism and Nazism.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche introduced the concept of the Übermensch,
who is out of proportion to humanity (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). The Über-
mensch is an advance over man as man is an advance over the apes. The fictitious
Zarathustra proclaims the will of the Übermensch is to give meaning to life on earth,
and admonishes his audience to ignore those who promise other-worldly fulfillment.
Hitler more than likely became familiar with Nietzsche during his time in Vienna
when quotes by Nietzsche were frequently published in German. The Übermensch
has been mistranslated as Superman which probably explains why the term was fre-
quently used by Hitler and Mussolini to refer to the so-called “Aryan race”. Because
the Nazis made selective use of Nietzsche’s philosophy, this association caused Niet-
zsche’s reputation to suffer following World War II (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a,
b). The Princeton philosopher Walter Kaufman would later debunk the claim that
Nietzsche had any significant affinity with Nazi ideology (Kaufman 1974).
Friedrich Nietzsche 167

Nietzsche had various health problems including failing eyesight, insomnia, infec-
tions and migraine headaches. On January 3, 1889 he had a mental breakdown.
Subsequently he wrote bizarre, deranged letters to his friends. He was incapacitated
and cared for, at first by his mother, then by his anti-Semitic sister Elizabeth. The
cause of his terminal illness was never firmly established though it was speculated
he had a retro-orbital meningioma (Anderson 2017b); it was also speculated he had
been infected at a brothel and developed tertiery syphilis (Wikipedia Contributors
2018a, b).

Philosophy

Nietzsche was a philosopher with provocative ideas who, because of our various
perspectives and interests, rejected the notion of objective moral values; the closest
one could get to objectivity is the accumulation of various perspectives. This view has
been referred to as Perspectivism. Nietzsche also rejected the idea reason can lead to
the justification of moral truths. Nietzsche had an interest in psychology and viewed
morality as a social phenomenon that changes over time. For Nietzsche, “there are no
moral facts whatever”. He also had an interest in history which motivated Nietzsche
to study the historical and social history of the origins of our moral ideas. More
important to him was the value of morality. He said, referring to moral values, “the
value of these values themselves must be called in question” (Norman 1998d).
Nietzsche defined two forms of morality: noble morality and slave morality. Noble
morality was characterized as good-bad. It expressed life affirming characteristics
such as courage, physical and mental strength and pride of the type seen in a war-
rior aristocracy or a privileged class. In noble morality good refers to these noble
characteristics. Over time the characteristics of noble morality were internalized and
became character traits; for example, courage for a society with a privileged military
class and magnanimity for a society with a wealthy class (Anderson 2017b). Bad
refers to those constitutionally inferiors who lack noble characteristics. In the good
and bad distinction of noble morality the “bad” group is not necessarily blamewor-
thy. Nietzsche says this pattern of assessment was common in Mediterranean, late
Greek and Roman society. Intermediate between noble and slave morality Nietzsche
mentions the “priestly” mode. This group repudiates physical and mental pleasures
for the inner spiritual life and suffering.
Slave morality (not confined to literal slaves) is given a good-evil distinction and
is exemplified by Christianity and common poor and lowly people who were driven
by the “herd instinct”. This group values humility, meekness and suffering rather
than virtues such as pride, strength and success. Slave morality makes a special
virtue of self-denying and self-sacrificing altruism and the subordination of one’s
interests and desires (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). In his good-evil distinction
evil refers to people who pursue their self-interest and violate the interests or well-
being of others. Good is used in reference to altruistic and egalitarian concern for
the welfare of others. Nietzsche rejects slave morality.
168 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Noble morality is seen as dominant in the ancient world and slave morality in the
modern world. Norman believes Nietzsche’s historical scheme is an oversimplifica-
tion; nonetheless, it has value because it frees us from the notion of a fixed value
system for all times (Norman 1998d).

Psychological Nietzsche

Noble morality values courage, strength, power and pride. In contrast, slave morality,
reflecting Christian ethics, values love, kindness and sympathy and concern for the
welfare of others. According to Nietzsche slave morality was born out of “resent-
ment” and a reaction to noble morality. It is a way to get back at the adherents of
noble morality who see themselves as strong and good. Slave morality, motivated by
vindictiveness, ultimately became the dominant morality, and was accepted by the
masters themselves. Nietzsche explains we got from noble morality to slave morality
by a “slave revolt in morality”. If slave morality, a new way of thinking, spread that
would accomplish a “radical revaluation” and would discredit the values of noble
morality (Anderson 2017b). Nietzsche was a critic of what he called slave morality.
The psychological appeal of slave morality is its reaction against the success of
others. It speaks of love, kindness, and sympathy but, in reality, Nietzsche said it
is an expression of “submerged hatred” and “the vengefulness of the impotent”.
Nietzsche writes, “once the social structure is secured against external threats, it
is the fear of one’s neighbors that creates new perspectives of moral valuations”.
Values once “cultivated and fostered” are “felt to be dangers”. “Everything that lifts
the individual above the herd causes fear in his neighbor and is from now on called
evil”. “It is a form of revenge against their superiors and a way of humiliating” and
“poisoning the happiness of the fortunate—the once proud nobles who gloried in
their superiority” (Neitzsche 1886).
For Nietzsche, Christian values are dishonest and not what they seem to be; in
fact they are the opposite of what they appear to be. He supports this contention by
referring to “the brimstone, hellfire, and damnation diatribe” often used in Chris-
tianity (Anderson 2017b). Adherents of slave morality concealed their true beliefs
from themselves and others. For Nietzsche these moral values are a symptom of an
underlying condition, imagined revenge and the vengefulness of the impotent (Nor-
man 1998d). Nietzsche sees morality as a mask, of an underlying condition, and as
deceptive and dishonest.
Nietzsche, discusses the evolution of morality and asks how man evolved from
an animal governed by instinct to having developed long term responsibility for its
behavior, equivalent to what he called, “the imposition of a social straight jacket”. He
relates the origins of guilt to the notion of debt. If you fail to pay a debt there may be
social or legal sanctions and calls for compensation. The notion of punishment was
eventually extended from material debt to the violation of socially accepted norms.
This in turn is internalized as wrongful action the agent could have controlled and “a
Psychological Nietzsche 169

negative assessment of the guilty person’s sense of worth”. In this context Nietzsche
speaks of “moralized guilt” (Anderson 2017b).
Morality has also been made possible, over an immense period of time, by the
“harshest and cruelest punishments” to tame man’s instincts. Punishment is rooted
in anger and vengeance and the desire to hurt those who have hurt us. Nietzsche
speculates punishment provides some kind of compensation to victims; he cynically
adds that human beings take a positive pleasure in the infliction of pain. Punishment
has also been used and has eventually been linked to the development of a bad (or
guilty) conscience, a form of self-punishment.
Nietzsche argued against pity and compassion. People’s assessment from the
outside that a person’s suffering must be bad might be both “misguided and wrong
because it risks robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive
of their suffering”. People might find something meaningful in their suffering and as
such “dismiss in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition
as vulnerable and finite creatures” (Anderson 2017b).
Primitive ideas of anger and vengeance eventually were tempered by the idea
of justice. Nietzsche states that conquerors have assisted the process by imposing
restraints and calls them “the originators of noble morality”. An additional masochis-
tic factor in the development of altruistic ideals such as self-denial and self-sacrifice
is “the satisfaction of imposing on oneself the power one cannot impose on others”.
Nietzsche’s theory of the evolution of morality includes religion: “Guilt before
God” is described as a “thought that becomes an instrument of torture”. Nietzsche’s
theory of the evolution of slave morality includes anger, vengeance, punishment, the
torments of a guilty conscience and the fear of God (Norman 1998d).

Values

Nietzsche was so firm in rejecting traditional values questions have arisen over
whether he had a positive philosophy to replace what he had discarded. He believed
nature was always valueless until we bestowed value on nature; this is a subjective
notion that we create value. Nietzsche praised many values but, unlike other moral
theories, did not derive them systematically from foundational principles.
Neitzsche said: “What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power
in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of
weakness”. The will to power is one of Nietzsche’s central ideas. Following World
War II Nietzsche’s “will to power” was interpreted, to the detriment of his image, as
“might makes right” which suggests the desire to dominate others. Although most
philosophers state a precisely articulated thesis followed by a carefully defended
argument Nietzsche’s writing has a chaotic quality that increased the likelihood of
misunderstanding (Anderson 2017b).
Neitzsche used the phrase “will to power”; its misinterpretation helped the Nazis
claim affinity with Neitzsche’s philosophy. Some philosophers have interpreted “will
to power” more kindly than the dominance of others. Norman suggests all Nietzsche
170 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

meant by “will to power” was that everyone wants to shape the world to bear the
imprint of their agency and that is supposed to be what is good about power (Norman
1998d). Nietzsche’s other values include the affirmation of life as a possible rejection
of nihilism, honesty, “the irreplaceable value of art” and the “free spirit confining
conventions of society, religion, or morality” (Anderson 2017b).

Nietzsche and Marx

Nietzsche and Karl Marx have in common the questioning of morality by examining
its social origins. For Marx moral ideas can function as ideology. Morality can be a
reflection of a society’s underlying economic structure. Marx refers to the bourgeois
class which owns the means of production and the proletariat working class. There
is a spurious concept of the “general interest” in which the working class is asked to
obey the law and follow an altruistic morality in the name of the common good; the
common good which in fact is the good of the dominant class. There is an obvious
relationship between Nietzsche’s noble and slave moralities and the morality of
opposed social classes. Hume’s idea of justice, as protecting the ownership rights of
the aristocracy, is another example of morality protecting the rights of a dominant
class, the landowning aristocracy (Norman 1998d).

Nietzsche on the Nature of Morality

Nietzsche says, there is no objective morality, only various moral perspectives. He

believes morality changes over time and is influenced by historic, economic, and
social factors; it may also be influenced by fear. Moral theories may be subject
to misinterpretation, especially when they emanate from less than clearly coherent
philosophers. Morality has been used as a form of camouflaged ideology, reflecting
the views and interests of a dominant class. Psychologically, morality can be con-
fining and oppressive to the human spirit. It certainly stands as an effective way to
influence and control behavior.

Conclusion

The positions of these five moral philosophers reveals significant differences on

important questions. Kant, a deontologist, says morality emerges using innate reason
and what is important are moral rules as expressed in his categorical imperatives.
Mill, a utilitarian, says morality is a function of the consequences of an action. Hume
claims morality is not the result of reason or consequences; it is a reflection of our
Conclusion 171

inner passions. Nietzsche defines morality as manipulative and lacking in objective

truth. That these impressive, venerable philosophers, blatantly disagree on the basic
nature of morality suggests the nature of morality remains unsettled.

References

Aristotle References

Beauchamp, Tom L., and Childress, James F. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed, 31–32,
371. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kraut, Richard. 2018. Aristotle’s Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2018
Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/
aristotle-ethics/. Accessed April 7, 2019.
McInerny, Ralph, and O’Callaghan, John. 2018. Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/
entries/aquinas/. Accessed April 7, 2019.
Norman, Richard. 1996. The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Russell, Daniel C. 2013. The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Shields, Christopher. 2016. Aristotle. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle/. Accessed
January 7, 2019.
W. D. Ross. 1959. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Written c. 340 BC, 28–29. London: Oxford
University Press.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019. Aristotelian Ethics. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available
at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Aristotelian_ethics&oldid=871182250. Accessed
January 13, 2019.

Hume References

Anderson, R. Lanier. 2017. Friedrich Nietzsche. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer
2017 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/
entries/nietzsche/. Accessed 8 April 2019.
Fieser, James. 2019. David Hume. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002.
Available at https://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed 8 April, 2019.
Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes: Prince of Peace. Cambridge, England and Malden MA: Polity Press.
Morris, William Edward, and Brown, Charlotte R. 2017. David Hume. The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Spring 2017 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2017/entries/hume/. Accessed 8 April, 2019.
Norman, Richard. 1998a. The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
172 12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant …

Kant References

Johnson, Robert, and Cureton, Adam. 2018. Kant’s Moral Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Spring 2018 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2018/entries/kant-moral/. Accessed November 27, 2018.
Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Translated by Norman Kemp
Smith. Available at www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/kanti-critique-pure-
reason-2nd-preface.pdf. Accessed November 27, 2018.
Norman, Richard. 1998b. Kant: Respect for Persons in The Moral Philosophers, 2nd ed, 70–91.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, Onora. 1986. Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems. In Introduction to
Philosophy, ed. John Perry and Michael Bratman. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rohlf, Michael. 2018. Immanuel Kant. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer
2018 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/kant/.
Accessed November 29, 2018.

Mill References

Den Uyl, Douglas, and Tibor R. Machan. 1993. Recent Work on the Concept of Happiness. American
Philosophical Quarterly 20: 115–134.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 1994. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heydt, Colin. 2018. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Resource Document. The Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. Available at https://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed December 3,
2018.
Macleod, Christopher. 2018. John Stuart Mill. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed.
Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/mill/. Accessed
December 5, 2018.
Mill, John Stuart. 1863. Utilitarianism Chap. 4. of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility
is Susceptible. Available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter4.
html. Accessed April 9, 2019.
Norman, Richard. 1998c. The Moral Philosophers. An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Nietzsche References

Anderson, R. Lanier. 2017. Friedrich Nietzsche. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Summer 2017 ed, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/
entries/nietzsche. Accessed April 10, 2019.
Kaufman, Walter A. 1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist Princeton. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Neitzsche, Friedrick. 1886. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Marianne Cowan. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company.
Norman, Richard. 1998. The Moral Philosophers. An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press.
References 173

Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Friedrich Nietzsche, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.
wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Friedrich_Nietzsche&oldid=874913073. Accessed December
29, 2018.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Influence and Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche, Wikipedia,
The Free Encyclopedia. Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Influence_and_
reception_of_Friedrich_Nietzsche&oldid=875039146. Accessed December 31, 2018.
Chapter 13
Principlism

Abstract Proponents of principlism advocate the employment of moral principles

to resolve ethical dilemmas. A set of prima facie binding principles offered for use
in biomedical ethics is a popular example of principlism. These principles include
respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice; the requirements of
these principles is discussed. A significant problem with principlism occurs when
two respected relevant ethical principles conflict and we are unable to honor one
without violating the other.

John Rawls a liberal American political philosopher developed a theory of justice

he thought could be widely accepted and help insure political stability. A broadly
useful concept from Rawls is a hypothetical device he calls the original position in
which everyone decides matters of justice from behind a veil of ignorance as if still
in the womb and not knowing what they will find when they emerge into the outer
world.

Introduction

Rather than an appeal to religious ethics or to another moral theory adherents of prin-
ciplism, advocate the use of moral principles to resolve moral dilemmas. Beauchamp
and Childress have been leading advocates of the use of ethical principles in moral
decision-making. Their book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, has had multiple edi-
tions and addresses moral problems arising in biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and
Childress 2009).
Beauchamp and Childress advocate four prima facie binding moral principles:
Respect for Autonomy, Nonmaleficence, Beneficence and Justice. Their principles
are not absolute. They are prima facie binding which means each of the principles
is subject to being overridden by another moral principle. Theories consisting of
multiple prima facie principles were initially called impartial-rule theory and now
are more simply referred to as principlism (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 175

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_13
176 13 Principlism

Principlism is grounded in common moral theory. Beauchamp and Childress claim

that, “all persons living a moral life grasp the core dimensions of morality”. They
are “so widely shared they form a stable social agreement”. Although I have found
Beauchamp and Childress’ work thorough and valuable and personally agree that
it’s wrong to kill and wrong to steal, and so forth, there is a theoretical problem in the
derivation of common morality. It is based on what everybody, or almost everyone,
believes. There was a time when everyone believed the earth was flat, and they, as we
now know, were wrong. (For further discussion of Common Morality see Chap. 14).
Gert and Clouser, who also ground their moral philosophy in common morality,
have criticized principlism as not having a direct imperative to achieve a moral
goal that is supported by its principles. They claim its principles often conflict with
each other, are not related systemically and are not integrated into a single moral
theory. They also claim principlism lacks the capacity to guide action. It simply
provides “names, checklists or headings, for values worth remembering”, values to
consider when confronting a moral dilemma”. Principlism is also permissive because
it provides no directive guidance when principles conflict, leaving moral agents free
to act as they wish (Clouser and Gert 1990).
Beauchamp and Childress respond that Gert and Culver’s rules are a level less
abstract than their general principles which effectively include the same rules. They
also note that Gert and Culver’s ethics, in the absence of an adequate explanation,
make no provision for doing good- except encouraging moral ideals, and focus only
on avoiding harms (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
Although Beauchamp and Childress claim their principlism is universal Walker
disagrees and says additional principles are needed to capture cultural variability. He
quotes Richard Shweder, an anthropologist, who has worked in India and claims that
there are three ethics: the ethics of autonomy, the ethics of community and the ethics
of divinity. In other words, four principles fail to capture the full range of relevant
ethical principles (Walker 2009).

Conflicting Principles

A significant problem with principlism is that of conflicting principles. There are

too many principles. An elderly alert woman was diagnosed with a chronic form
of leukemia; her daughter who was aware of the diagnosis requested her mother
not be informed of her diagnosis because that would make her mother anxious and
depressed. Even though her illness could be managed, she was a nervous person and
informing her she had leukemia likely would inflict psychological harm.
The principle of autonomy dictates the woman has a right to the truth concern-
ing her illness; the principle of nonmaleficence calls for the avoidance of inflicting
harm. A physician who has diagnosed a patient with widespread cancer and a fatal
prognosis faces a similar problem. In these circumstances respect for autonomy and
nonmaleficence conflict with each other and it can be difficult to decide which prin-
ciple to honor. In the past medical paternalism might have prevented the revelation
Conflicting Principles 177

of bad news; currently, as respect for autonomy has become more important, patients
are likely to be honestly informed. Other conceptually similar situations associated
with conflicting principles occur frequently.
Gert and colleagues have described their method of resolving the problem of con-
flicting ethical values: “Moral rules can be violated if, in a specific case, another
moral rule takes precedence. We first describe the act using the morally relevant fea-
tures—and only the morally relevant features—and then estimate the harms resulting
from everyone knowing that everyone is allowed to violate that moral rule in this
kind of circumstance versus the harms resulting from everyone knowing that no one
is allowed to violate the moral rule in these circumstances. It is on the basis of this
two-step procedure that an impartial rational person decides whether or not to pub-
licly allow such a violation” (Gert et al. 2000). Although this sounds logical, aside
from being a cumbersome approach to the problem, the conclusions from this type
of reasoning are likely to be subjective.
Madison Powers in addressing this problem said it is incoherent to imagine “that
there exists a quantitative way to assess the qualitatively incommensurable”. We
can’t calculate the net benefit (or harm) comparing a pregnant woman’s right to
autonomously choose what is done to her body against the harms of destroying a
fetus. The two are incommensurate and any assigned metrics would differ. We can
compare the treatment response rate of two different drugs in a specific disease
because their metrics are the same, response rate and degree of response. We can’t
apply similar metrics to qualitatively dissimilar parameters and mathematically select
the morally preferable option. Simply stated, you can’t compare apples and oranges
(Powers 2005).
Another approach to the problem of conflicting values has been called specifi-
cation. Beauchamp and Childress admit that their “prima facie principles do not
contain sufficient content to address the nuances of moral problems”. Specification
is a way to add “more specific action guiding content” (Richardson 2000). Speci-
fication must remain consistent with the original guiding principle and some cases
may require progressive specification. The principle of respect for autonomy would
be violated if a physician deceived a patient. To get around this problem in a spe-
cific or exceptional case a physician might specify the norm and claim, “A patient
should not be deceived unless deception is necessary to save the patient’s life”. This
specification might have to be further specified with “except when the patient is a
Jehovah’s witness who would need a blood transfusion”. The ethical dilemma in
this example is one of conflict between the principles of autonomy and beneficence.
Conflicts between ethical principles occur commonly; a thoughtful moral agent will
struggle to find the best ethical compromise. The term specification may give that
process a name and add content to a rule, but offers nothing more than arbitrarily
narrowing a rule as a matter of convenience. Specification simply adds substance to
a rule; but this does not adequately substitute for the reasoning of a thoughtful moral
agent (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
The terms weighing and balancing have also been used in the context of difficult
moral dilemmas when moral principles and rules conflict. I will speak more about
this type of problem in the chapter on applied ethics (see Chap. 15). Suffice it to
178 13 Principlism

say some ethical dilemmas can be difficult if not impossible to resolve and tend to
occur when we believe in two ethical principles and are unable to honor one without
violating the other. That is the major problem associated with principlism (Walker
2009).

The Value of Principlism

My respect for the work of Beauchamp and Childress is due to their clear explica-
tion of important ethical principles, including the requirements of each principle.
Although they are writing about biomedical ethics their four principles have broader
relevance.

Respect for Autonomy

Respect for the autonomous choices of persons means individuals who possess the
capability to deliberate and act on their self-chosen desires and plans should control
the choices they make without the interference of others. Respect for personal auton-
omy was advocated by both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Kant said that all
persons have unconditional worth and the capacity to carve out their own personal
destiny. Kant also said to treat a person otherwise might be using them as a means
to someone else’s goals.
Cognitively challenged individuals, prisoners and others may be unable to act
autonomously. People may be able to act autonomously when making certain choices
but be unable to act autonomously when making other more complex choices. Ques-
tions of decision-making capacity may require the advice of a mental health profes-
sional and in some instances a legal determination by a court. When appropriate, a
person may use their autonomy to delegate decision-making to another person.
As a physician I considered it a responsibility to honestly inform patients of the
relevant medical facts. In an earlier era physicians behaved in a paternalistic fashion
and might lie to patients, telling them they had inflammation when in fact they had
cancer. Paternalism in medicine, in the United States and many other countries, is
now generally rejected.
When my father developed colon cancer I confronted a dilemma. Over the years
he had repeatedly told me if he got cancer he wouldn’t want to know his diagnosis.
I had to decide whether to tell my father he had colon cancer, as was my customary
practice with patients, or honor his oft stated wish not to know.
I decided to respect his wishes and asked his surgeon if he would tell my father
he had a benign polyp. The surgeon complied with my request. About twenty years
later when the likelihood of a recurrence of his cancer had long past I told my father
the truth. He was not upset that we lied to him. I tell this story to illustrate that
life is complicated and the circumstances surrounding moral decision-making so
Respect for Autonomy 179

varied that ethical principles often meet practical limits. When I directed an ethics
consultation service at a major medical center my colleagues and I, well aware of
ethical principles, encountered many situations with gut-churning, difficult to resolve
dilemmas. Ethical principles are important and can be helpful but they don’t solve
all problems and we often have to resort to common sense and our best judgment.

The Principles

Autonomy

A voluntary decision is not necessarily an autonomous decision. An autonomous

decision must be intentional, made with understanding and without controlling or
manipulative influences. Beauchamp and Childress recognize there are gradations
of understanding and independence and only insist the person making decisions be
“substantially autonomous”. In the medical arena autonomy is respected by requiring
“informed consent” prior to research, procedures and other medical interventions.
Understanding is an important component of autonomy. A person should under-
stand the central facts when they purchase a mortgage or agree to a medical proce-
dure. Autonomous behavior should also be free of coercion, excess persuasion and
manipulation. Manipulation is most often related to how information is presented
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009). (See The Power of Language in Moral Psychology,
Chap. 5).

Justice

A precise definition of the principle of justice is hard to pin down but generally
speaking justice deals with the distribution of rights and responsibilities in a society.
It deals with the “fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is owed and
due a person”. The term distributive justice is used when referring to the distribution
of goods in a society. The principle of justice is intended to deal with issues such
as wealth inequality, access to health care, and rationing in the face of scarcity. This
use of the word justice should not be confused with criminal justice.
Beauchamp and Childress describe the formal principle of justice as, equals should
be treated equally and unequals should be treated unequally (p. 242 Beauchamp and
Childress 2009). Stated in this very general manner is of limited value. A variety
of options have been suggested to add material content to the principle of justice.
These include the options of an equal share to each or distribution according to:
1. need 2. effort 3. contribution 4. merit 5. free market exchanges and sometimes
other factors. In many countries including the United States concern exists because
180 13 Principlism

of increased inequality in the distribution of wealth. Issues of justice often have a

significant political dimension.
Several theories have been proposed to answer questions related to justice. Utili-
tarian theories advocate the maximization of social utility. Libertarian theories favor
the protection of property rights and individual liberty. They favor the free market
and object to the state taking anyone’s personal property to benefit another. Com-
munitarian theories focus on community values and decision-making in accordance
with a society’s values. Egalitarian theories suggest that people should receive an
equal distribution of at least some, though not necessarily all goods.

John Rawls and Justice

John Rawls (1921–2002) was a liberal American political philosopher who was on the
Harvard University faculty for more than 30 years. He served in the infantry during
World War II and was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War. He lost his Christian faith
after seeing many deaths in combat and learning of the horrors of the Holocaust. The
Vietnam conflict stimulated Rawls to analyze the defects in the American political
system that led it to ruthlessly prosecute what he believed was an unjust war. Rawls
was also aware of the injustice of society and how much randomly depended on
the circumstances of your birth- for example, whether you were born into a wealthy
family or to a family that consisted of a single African American mother. His writings
include A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples
(1999), and Justice as Fairness (2001).
Rawls’ problem was how to develop a basic law that could be accepted in a diverse
democratic society; he believed that to ensure the stability of a liberal democratic
society there needed to be a core set of beliefs that everyone could accept. He advo-
cated a set of beliefs all could accept because he thought that would help to ensure
political stability. These beliefs would be “freestanding” and exist independent of any
political party or religion. Basic rules of cooperation that all citizens could reasonably
endorse is the foundation of Rawl’s theory of Justice.
Rawls’ central idea was that cooperation should be fair to all citizens; he regarded
all persons as free and equals. His theory was called, “justice as fairness”. He believed
that accidents of birth such as being born rich, white, and male provide no reason
to be favored by social institutions. He was an egalitarian. He said “all social goods
are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone’s
advantage”. Rawls rejected utilitarianism.
Rawls’ first principle of justice is that all citizens should have equal rights and
liberties with the qualification that the liberty of one person should not infringe the
liberty of another. His second principle was that social and economic inequalities
need to satisfy two conditions. Employment positions should be open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity: “Since class of origin is a morally arbi-
trary fact about citizens, justice does not allow class of origin to turn into unequal
opportunities for education or meaningful work”.
John Rawls and Justice 181

Rawls’ “difference principle allows inequalities of wealth and income, so long

as these will be to everyone’s advantage, and specifically to the advantage of those
who will be worst off.” Rawls advocated “the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged
members of society.” This does not mean that everyone must get the same shares.
The fact that citizens have different talents and abilities can be used to make everyone
better off (Wikipedia Contributors 2018).
Communitarians react negatively to Rawls’ concept of a just society. In a commu-
nitarian society community values and their virtues have moral value and determine
collective obligations. A communitarian approach in the Netherlands is expressed
by their values: care for the elderly, the handicapped and psychiatric patients (Ten
Have and Keasberry 1992). Communitarian theories stand in contrast to theories like
Rawls’ views that are based on rights (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
An interesting and broadly useful concept from Rawls is a hypothetical device he
calls the original position in which everyone decides principles of justice from behind
a veil of ignorance as if still in the womb and not knowing what they will find when
they emerge into the outer world. The aim of the veil of ignorance is to eliminate
irrelevant facts from decision-making. This “veil” is one that blinds people to all
facts about themselves so they cannot tailor principles to their own advantage: Acting
under a veil of ignorance decision-makers do not know their race, ethnicity, gender,
age, income, wealth, natural endowments, or other irrelevant characteristics. Rawls
thought this approach would be fair and acceptable to all and would be fundamentals
of the terms of their association (Wikipedia Contributors 2018). The veil of ignorance
in Rawls’ words: “…no one knows his place in society, his class, position or social
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties
do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance”.
Rawl’s notion of a veil of ignorance can also be useful in resolving moral dilem-
mas. If, for example, you have to decide on the moral or material value of a proposed
law or policy you can avoid introducing your personal bias by considering it, to the
extent possible, behind a veil of ignorance (Wenar and Rawls 2019).
Most philosophical theories that state how we ought to behave cannot be empiri-
cally tested because their concepts are not easily subject to empirical investigation.
Rawls states the objectives of his moral philosophy. He wants to calm frustrations
and rage in society and lessen the sharp divisions between societies. These goals are
theoretically observable. His ideas remain hypothetical but if his principles of jus-
tice could be instituted it would be possible to measure their effects and objectively
determine whether his philosophy achieved its goals.
Many moral philosophers accept as their formal principle of justice, “equals
should be treated equally and unequals should be treated unequally”. Rawls, a polit-
ical philosopher, keeps it simple and says, with the single exception of when there
is benefit to all, everyone should be treated equally.
182 13 Principlism

Beneficence

The principle of beneficence refers to the moral obligation to act for the benefit
of others. Beneficence is not mentioned in Gert’s common morality which restricts
morality to the avoidance of harms. Rules of beneficence do not have to be followed
impartially and we can be more generous to those with whom we have a special
relationship. There are limits to the requirement of beneficence; we are not obliged
to engage in extreme generosity that would result in financial hardship, nor are we
required to benefit those we do not know if that would hinder meeting obligations to
family and friends.
The line that separates beneficent obligations from moral ideals can be blurry and
open to controversy. There are obviously role obligations we have to our children
and other family members, other obligations we may have related to our jobs and
profession and we have obligations to prevent harm.
Because resources are limited two technical parameters have been used to measure
and compare the cost of providing benefits. These are cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) and cost benefit analysis (CBA). Both CEA and CBA employ monetary terms.
However CEA measures benefit in non-monetary terms such as, in health care and
quality adjusted life years (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).

Nonmaleficence

Nonmaleficence is the principle not to inflict harm. This concept requires interpreta-
tion because harm or the prospect of harm may be justified by the prospect of benefit.
In biomedicine subjects subsumed under the heading of nonmaleficence include with-
holding and withdrawing treatment, futility decisions, physician assisted suicide and
euthanasia.

Conclusion

Although moral philosophers have proposed various solutions, the challenge of deter-
mining how moral dilemmas should be resolved has not been definitively settled. The
employment of moral principles is useful because they define considerations appro-
priate to moral discourse. Autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice are all
morally relevant and their characteristics have been carefully defined. Other guiding
moral principles have been offered, for example, the biblical Golden Rule: “Do unto
others as you would have them do onto you”.
Conclusion 183

Although moral principles are valuable because they define relevant ethical con-
siderations, principlism is limited because its principles may conflict with each
other. There is often disagreement concerning which principles should predominate.
Proponents of principlism admit they don’t have a solution to this problem.

References

Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. New
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clouser, K.Danner, and Bernard Gert. 1990. A Critique of Principlism. The Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 15 (2): 219–236.
Gert, B., C.M. Culver, and K.D. Clouser. 2000. Common Morality Versus Specified Principlism:
Reply to Richardson. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23: 308–322.
Powers, Madison. 2005. Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise. Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal 15 (3): 305–322.
Richardson, Henry S. 2000. Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting Bioethical Principles. Journal
of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (3): 285–307.
Ten Have, Henk, and Helen Keasberry. 1992. Equity and Solidarity: The context of Health Care in
the Netherlands. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17: 463–477.
Walker, Tom. 2009. What Principlism Misses. Journal of Medical Ethics 35: 229–231.
Wenar, Leif, John Rawls. 2019. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In Spring 2017 ed., ed.
N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/. Accessed April
11, 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. A Theory of Justice. Wikipedia. Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=A_Theory_of_Justice&oldid=872354413. Accessed 27 December 2018.
Chapter 14
Common Morality

Abstract Common morality theory states that all persons who are serious about
living a moral life already grasp the core dimensions of morality. These moral norms
include don’t kill, don’t cause pain, don’t disable, don’t deprive of pleasure, and
don’t deceive. The norms that all morally serious persons presumably share has been
called, common morality.

That most people believe certain moral rules are valid does not establish their truth.
Common morality violates the philosophical premise that a normative statement
cannot be derived from purely factual premises. What is, is not necessarily what
ought to be. The notion of a common morality as “recognized in social settings
around the world and through time” has been disputed. Many different “local moral
worlds” such as cultures and religious groups have been said to have their own
common values.
The objective of morality is considered worthy of discussion. Suggested objectives
of morality include to, counteract the tendency to have limited sympathies toward
others and to reduce our liability to suffer harm from others.

Introduction

Morality is itself not an object you can see, feel or in other ways empirically examine.
Morality reflects a collection of values that reside in and are shaped by the human
mind. Moral values are subject to hierarchical ordering that varies depending on
the relevant circumstances and how those circumstances are interpreted. Because
all minds don’t think alike controversy exists over the nature and objective truth of
morality and explains why there are various differing moral theories.
Philosophical moral theories are concerned with how people ought to behave and
what values they should honor. Their principles and rules can be abstract. The works
of moral philosophers are not every day reading for most people. It’s difficult to
gauge how much moral philosophers influence individual behavior; I suspect their

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 185

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_14
186 14 Common Morality

influence is limited and less than that of religion, education and experience. Although
at work for centuries, moral philosophers, have not eliminated evil.
In September 2003 the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal devoted an entire issue
to the subject, “Is There a Common Morality?” In his introductory article Veatch
described the concept of “common morality” as an exciting and important devel-
opment in ethical theory. Common morality theory states that “all morally serious
humans” have an awareness of certain moral norms. These purportedly universally
shared insights are that normal humans in some manner know there is something
wrong with actions such as lying or killing innocent people. Veatch suggested these
insights might provide the raw and foundational data to construct ethical theories
(Veatch 2003).
The basic claim of common morality is that all normal humans in all places and
times believe that “some behaviors are in some sense, generally wrong; and that other
behaviors are generally right”. Strong suggests that not all normal humans must agree
with this statement, only a very high percentage which was not specifically stated
(Strong 2009). Veatch also allows for occasional exceptions; common moral theorists
claim there is “some primitive, pre-theoretical insight that is shared by all normal,
morally serious persons”. Moral philosophers who have shared this view include
Gert and his colleagues, Beauchamp, and Childress (Veatch 2003).
Beauchamp and Childress describe the principle of common morality: “Since
virtually everyone grows up with a basic understanding of the institution of morality,
its norms are readily understood. All persons who are serious about living a moral
life already grasp the core dimensions of morality. They know not to lie, not to steal
property, to keep promises, to respect the rights of others, not to kill or cause harm
to innocent persons, and the like. All persons serious about morality are comfortable
with these rules and do not doubt their relevance and importance…. We will refer to
the set of norms that all morally serious persons share as the common morality. The
common morality contains moral norms that bind all persons in all places; no norms
are more basic in the moral life” (p. 3, Beauchamp and Childress 2001).
Strong has characterized common morality as “a core set of moral precepts con-
cerning which all of us agree” (Strong 2009). Common morality is not a moral theory,
though a moral theory could in some way incorporate the precepts of common moral-
ity. Because, by definition, common morality is widely accepted, this “core morality”
could serve as the foundation of moral theories.
Beauchamp defines the “common morality” as, “the set of norms shared by all
persons committed to the objectives of morality”. He claims “virtually all people
grow up with an understanding of the basic demands that morality makes on every-
one”. Beauchamp’s common moral rules are similar to Gert’s rules (see below). He
lists his common moral rules as: 1. “Don’t kill;” 2. “Don’t cause pain or suffering to
others;” 3. “Prevent evil or harm from occurring;” 4. “Rescue persons in danger;” 5.
“Tell the truth;” 6. “Nurture the young and dependent;” 7. “Keep your promises;” 8.
“Don’t steal;” 9. “Don’t punish the innocent;” and 10. “Treat all persons with equal
moral consideration”. Character traits he recognizes as relevant to common morality
include: non-malevolence, honesty, integrity, fidelity, conscientiousness, trustwor-
thiness, and kindness (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). The common morality has
Introduction 187

predominantly been directed toward avoiding evil rather than achieving the good by
assisting others (Strong 2009).
Gert, Culver and Clouser have also developed a moral system rooted in common
morality. Their intention is “describing and justifying the moral system that is actually
used, often unconsciously, by thoughtful people in making their moral decisions and
justifications”. They claim they are not creating new moral rules but simply describing
and justifying the moral system actually used by thoughtful people. They claim they
are discovering, not creating.
Gert and his colleagues believe morality does not change over time and every
person subject to moral judgment knows what morality requires; they exempt from
moral judgment those who are truly ignorant of what morality requires. They empha-
size the public nature of their moral system which should be understood and accepted
by all rational persons.
Their morality does not emphasize principles; it focuses on moral harms. The
morally relevant features of each of their moral rules is said to be unique and inde-
pendent of the others. They believe, correctly, there may not always be one right
answer to a moral dilemma with several different views morally acceptable. They
also believe no moral system will arrive at a unique right answer to all disputes.
Because they hold there may be no unique right answer to a moral question they
allow for compromise or accepting a majority view (Gert et al. 2000).
Gert’s ten moral rules are: 1. Don’t kill. 2. Don’t cause pain. 3. Don’t disable. 4.
Don’t deprive of freedom. 5. Don’t deprive of pleasure. 6. Don’t deceive. 7. Keep
your promise. 8. Don’t cheat. 9. Obey the law. 10. Do your duty (Gert 1988).
Gert, Culver and Clouser devised a two step procedure to determine when a moral
rule can be violated. They allow their moral rules can be violated if, in a specific case,
another moral rule takes precedence. “We first describe the act using the morally
relevant features—and only the morally relevant features—and then estimate the
harms resulting from everyone knowing that everyone is allowed to violate that
moral rule in this kind of circumstance, versus the harms resulting from everyone
knowing that no one is allowed to violate the moral rule in these circumstances. It
is on the basis of this two-step procedure that an impartial rational person decides
whether or not to publicly allow such a violation” ( p. 313, Gert et al. 2000). This
methodology is cumbersome and it’s not obvious its mathematics would achieve the
desired goal.

A Critique of Common Morality

Belief, even when near universal, does not guarantee truth or appropriateness. People
once believed the earth was flat which we now know is false. Common morality
purports to describe how people think and act morally. There is, however, a difference
between giving lip service to a moral rule and actually following it. Most people
would acknowledge it’s wrong to lie; nonetheless, people lie frequently (Kessler
188 14 Common Morality

et al. 2019). If you pay attention to history and follow the news you could justifiably
also write about the common immorality.
There are theoretical criticisms of common morality. Common morality violates
the philosophical premise that a normative statement cannot be derived from purely
factual premises. An “ought” cannot necessarily be derived from an “is”. The dis-
pute over whether a universal morality exists over time and cultures is not critically
relevant to the truth of common morality because one cannot simply equate what is,
with what ought to be.
Another reason to be critical of common morality theory is its circular reasoning.
It begins with the premise that all “morally serious persons” believe in the same moral
truths; anyone who denies the immorality of lying, killing or another “moral truth”
can be deemed, not morally serious. Beauchamp and Childress also include only those
people who “are serious about moral conduct” and omit from consideration “amoral,
immoral or selectively moral persons”. Proponents of common moral theory can
insulate themselves from criticism because anyone who disagrees with a common
moral rule can arbitrarily be dismissed as not being a “morally serious person”.
The rules of common morality may be suited to questions of how people should
generally behave but provide limited assistance when struggling with complex ethical
dilemmas. Beauchamp and Childress’ book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, does
better in this regard.
I have discussed the flaws of common morality but it has a unique feature worth
consideration. Moral theories previously discussed make contributions which are
typically presented as exhortations on how we should behave. Common morality
differs because it doesn’t tell people how they ought to behave; the foundation of
common morality is what people in fact already believe, beliefs other people likely
had in the distant past. The common morality rules of Gert and Beauchamp are not
inconsistent with the beliefs of most other moral philosophers.
The beliefs of common morality probably existed in the distant past; they probably
have stood the test of time; their persistence suggests they served a useful purpose.
For that hypothetical reason I am reluctant to totally reject the value of common
morality.

Are Moral Rules Really Universal?

Turner finds the notion of a common morality, “recognized in social settings around
the world and through time” unpersuasive (Turner 2003). He believes many different
“local moral worlds” such as cultures and religious groups that have common values
have been over looked and that a plurality of moral concepts and practices exist that do
not support the existence of cross-cultural and trans-historical universal moral norms.
It has been suggested that there might be group specific common morality or perhaps
common morality limited to specific countries, cultures or religious groups (Strong
2009). If moral commonality can’t be documented as universal and is common only
when limited to smaller groups such as a specific religious or ethnic group the notion
Are Moral Rules Really Universal? 189

of a universal common morality theory would require modification and the force of
its underlying premise of universality significantly diminished.
Turner cites various cultures that protect patients from mental distress, while other
cultures are honest out of respect for personal autonomy. In one country autonomy
may be respected by truthfully telling a person they have metastatic cancer; in a
different country your cancer may be described as inflammation to protect you from
a reactive depression. He notes that even if basic moral principles exist, they could
easily be interpreted differently “at different levels of practice and policy”. For exam-
ple, with regard to the legalization of physician assisted suicide different accounts
can be found of the relationship of individual liberty and the public good (Turner
2003).
Beauchamp claims his views have been misinterpreted by Turner. Although
Beauchamp believes in the common morality he also distinguishes particular moral-
ities such as Jewish norms in the Talmudic tradition, professional moralities and
moral ideals (Also see Chap. 6).

The Objectives of Morality

The innate -not the pragmatic- truth of isolated moral rules or norms such as don’t
kill and don’t lie cannot be proven. Beauchamp pragmatically suggests moral norms
can be justified if the norms are best suited to achieve the objectives of morality
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001). This is significant because it introduces an empir-
ical element to the discussion of morality. If morality has a specific objective we
can, at least theoretically, judge whether a moral theory facilitates the achievement
of that objective.
Similar to Hobbes, Warnock believes the reason for morality is to “counteract
the tendency to have limited sympathies toward others” and to reduce our liability
to suffer harm from others (Strong 2009). Beauchamp has defined the objective of
morality as,” promoting human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause
the quality of people’s lives to worsen”. He says: “Centuries of experience have
demonstrated that the human condition tends to deteriorate into misery, confusion,
violence, and distrust unless norms of the sort I listed earlier—the norms of the
common morality—are observed. When complied with, these norms lessen human
misery and preventable death”. For Beauchamp the object of morality is to pre-
vent or limit problems of indifference, conflict, hostility, scarce resources, limited
information, and the like (Beauchamp and Childress 2001).
The selection of a moral objective would be arbitrary, controversial and difficult
to demonstrate as preferable to competing objectives. There are a variety of possible
moral objectives, not all praiseworthy. An extreme and undesirable example-though
an actual one-, was the Nazi moral objective to have an Aryan master race control
a nation, the Third Reich, that would last a thousand years. For many Germans this
once had the force of an important moral objective. This goal was met but that horrific
190 14 Common Morality

achievement didn’t last. Had the moral rules at the time been universally understood
in Germany there might never have been a Third Reich.
Does acceptance of the common moral rules necessarily signify belief in their
truth? There is an alternative explanation. People don’t want to be killed, injured or
made to suffer. People don’t want to be victims of theft. Morality can be interpreted
as a self-protective message to others: don’t do this to me! Phrased differently: “Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you”.
I will end this discussion with quotes from Tom Beauchamp that explains any
confusion that arises from reading a book on the nature of morality: “Conscientious
and reasonable moral agents understandably will disagree with equally conscientious
persons over moral weights and priorities”, and, “The moral life will always be
plagued by forms of conflict” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001).

Conclusion

It’s not unreasonable to use as the basis of a moral theory rules that are easy to
understand. Common moral theory is easy to understand because it is what most
people presumably already know. Unfortunately, though common morality rules may
be given lip service they are often not followed. History has shown that the availability
of moral theories does not guarantee moral behavior. Unfortunately, human nature
is flawed and immoral behavior will not leave us any time soon.

References

Beauchamp, Thomas L., and James F. Childress. 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed, 3.
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules, 157. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gert, B., C.M. Culver, and K.D. Clouser. 2000. Common Morality versus Specified Principlism:
Reply to Richardson. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23: 308–322.
Kessler, Glenn, Rizzo, Salvador and Kelly, Meg. 2019. President Trump has made 13,435 false or
misleading claims over 993 days. The Washington Post. October 14, 2019.
Strong, Carson. 2009. Exploring questions about common morality. Theoretical Medicine and
Bioethics 30: 1–9.
Turner, Leigh. 2003. Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the “Common
Morality” Presumption in Bioethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13: 193–218.
Veatch, R.M. 2003. Is There A Common Morality? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13: 189–192.
 Part III
Practical Ethics
Chapter 15
Applied Ethics: Organizations

Abstract The often dense and arcane writings of theologians and moral philoso-
phers might create the impression morality is an obscure, esoteric subject, but that
is not the case. Applied ethics addresses a variety of moral issues which have practi-
cal significance. Morality is a vital discipline that can affect multiple aspects of our
lives. There are many forums for the discussion of ethical dilemmas. The dilemmas
of applied ethics do not always lead to consensus. Professional associations, insti-
tutions, organizations and governmental agencies often develop a code of ethical
behavior that is intended to be binding on its members. The failure to respect an ethi-
cal rule of engineers that they “shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of
the public” resulted in one of the worst accidents in the United States space program,
the Challenger Disaster. Ethical questions and ethical dilemmas occur frequently.
The uncertainties and controversies of ethical theories might tempt us to avoid eth-
ical deliberation, but many ethical dilemmas cannot be avoided. Ethical questions
related to data breeches, the Challenger disaster, the Goldwater Rule, and the right
to refuse blood transfusion are discussed.

Introduction

Applied ethics addresses a variety of moral issues which typically have direct practi-
cal significance. The subject matter of applied ethics may involve any of the numerous
issues that arise in various disciplines and situations. Ethical matters may insinuate
themselves in the context of medicine, business, engineering, politics, journalism,
the law, scientific research, education and other endeavors.
In daily life we will all, from time to time, confront ethical dilemmas. The often
dense and arcane writings of theologians and moral philosophers might create the
impression morality is an obscure esoteric subject, but that is not the case. Morality is
a vital concept with particular characteristics that has insinuated itself into multiple
aspects of our lives. Morality is a powerful idea; it influences how people feel and
how they behave. It can make us feel good; it can make us feel indignant; it can make
us feel guilty. It is a potent influence on our decisions and the way we live our lives.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 193

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_15
194 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

The phrase, “this is a moral issue” is often used to make a case for the importance
or seriousness of a problem. What identifies a problem as an ethical problem is
the presence of values enmeshed in a dilemma that are thought to be of extreme
importance and worthy of protection. Sometimes these values conflict with each
other forcing the difficult task of placing them in a hierarchy of importance. The
relative importance of moral values can change depending on the circumstances.
In the absence of a specific objective, moral values are not amenable to empiric
proof; this can leave ethics tinged with varying degrees of subjectivity and contro-
versy. Ethical issues that become matters of discussion typically involve circum-
stances where a consensus position is elusive. Applied ethics may be associated with
an objective. A profession or an organization may devise a code of ethics to protect
its reputation, dignity and effectiveness. When there is an objective, at least theoret-
ically, it can empirically be determined whether an ethics policy achieves its desired
goal. This chapter will focus on ethics in organizations.

The Approach to Ethical Dilemmas

An understanding of the facts is critical to the appropriate resolution of ethical dilem-

mas. Applied ethics covers varied terrain; advice from people who understand the
relevant subject matter is important (Dittmer 2019). The background knowledge
required to analyze a specific ethical problem depends on the domain of the prob-
lem. If there is a complex ethical dilemma related to the field of electrical engineering,
the technical analysis of an electrical engineer should inform the discussion. If the
ethical issue involved permissible risks for astronauts it helps to have advice from an
aerospace engineer. If the issue was the wisdom of employing the gene editing tech-
nique called CRISPR-Cas 9, input from a geneticist familiar with the technique and
its potential benefits and dangers would be vital. If the ethical problem was whether
to continue treatment of a patient with a devastating brain injury a neurologist or
neurosurgeon’s opinion concerning the patient’s prognosis would be important.
In applied ethics the involvement of appropriate technical experts is important
but not necessarily sufficient. The field of applied ethics is best considered a mul-
tidisciplinary endeavor. Ethical problems have varied dimensions, some not readily
apparent. An ethical dilemma may involve social, psychological, religious, economic,
political and other considerations. Philosophers may contribute to ethical discussion
because of their analytic skills and their knowledge of the general principles and the-
ories of moral philosophy; however, the people on ethics committees or otherwise
involved in applied ethics are often not philosophers.
There are many forums for the discussion of ethical dilemmas. These problems
may be discussed in the public media or specialty journals. A few of the journals that
publish articles on a variety of ethical issues include: The Hastings Center Report,
The American Journal of Bioethics, The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, The
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, The Journal of Law, Medicine,
and Ethics, The Journal of Medical Ethics, The Journal of Business Ethics, and the
The Approach to Ethical Dilemmas 195

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. Also available are ethics conferences,

courses, lectures and books. Many professional societies devote time to ethics.
The nature of ethics can keep absolute certainty at a distance. There is often no
agreement on how values in conflict should hierarchically be ordered. There may
be disagreement over the meaning of basic concepts, such as when is a person dead
and the point at which human life begins. New technologies create new questions.
Many ethical dilemmas include elements of uncertainty. For these and other reasons
the dilemmas of applied ethics are not always easily resolved. We should find some
comfort in the fact that on a daily basis, probably unconsciously, we make many
appropriate decisions with moral content. The difficult decisions consume more
time, energy and emotion and for those reasons seem more prevalent.

Professional Ethics

Professional associations, institutions, organizations and governmental agencies

often develop a code of ethics that, at least in theory, is binding on its members.
A few examples: The Society of Professional Journalists has a code of ethics that
says, “Ethical journalism strives to ensure the free exchange of information that is
accurate, fair and thorough. An ethical journalist acts with integrity” (Journalists
Code 2019). The American Medical Association (AMA) has a code of ethics for
physicians. The AMA code defines “the essentials of honorable behavior for the
physician”. It says, “As a member of this profession, a physician must recognize
responsibility to patients first and foremost” (AMA Code 2019).
The American Bar Association (ABA) has an ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers (ABA Code 2019). The Code is “designed to be adopted by
appropriate agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession
and as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the
required minimum standards stated in its Disciplinary Rules”.
The American Red Cross (ARC) has a Code of Business Ethics and Conduct
that includes prohibitions against disclosing confidential information or creating or
appearing to create a conflict of interest with the ARC (ARC 2019). Other profes-
sions and organizations have codes of behavior designed to protect or promote the
dignity and honor of their respective profession or organization. The various reli-
gions teach their moral values (see Chap. 7). It is difficult to avoid the wide net of
ethical expectations that permeate both the secular and religious worlds.
Professional codes of ethics should not automatically be accepted as morally
adequate. These codes may not have been subject to public scrutiny; they may be
less complete and authoritative than claimed and may not satisfy the full range of
moral requirements. Professional codes of ethics may also be skewed toward the
interests of their respective profession (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
Some behaviors have been defined as blatantly unethical. Examples include
romantic and sexual relations between a physician and a patient, research performed
in the absence of proper informed patient consent and undeclared improper conflicts
196 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

of interest. This type of uncontroversial unethical behavior is typically codified as

professional ethics. What is more interesting, though often frustrating and difficult
to resolve, are the many controversial and disputed ethical problems that dot the field
of applied ethics.

Applied Ethics: Organizational Cases

I will discuss three cases, involving business, engineering and psychiatric ethics,
that hopefully will impart a sense of some of the problems that can be classified as
applied organizational ethics.

Business Ethics: Data Breaches

Many well known companies have suffered the breach of personal customer data.
Corporate victims include Target, JP Morgan Chase, Sony, Home Depot, Kmart,
Neiman Marcus, Yahoo and others. Tens of millions of users were affected in these
breaches. In October 2017 Yahoo said that all 3 billion of its user accounts had
personal data hacked (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a).
The ethical dimensions of data breaches might not immediately be apparent;
however, analysis of the relevant facts reveals a number of related ethical questions.
Buttrick et al. noted the lack of interest in ethical issues caused by technology related
privacy violations. Businesses that acquire personal data are in a position of trust
that comes with an obligation to protect the data they hold. Organizations have
an ethical obligation to examine their responsibilities to both prevent and repair the
consequences of data breaches. Data hacking has been facilitated because companies
did not adequately monitor their digital systems and did not detect hacking and
other vulnerabilities. Defining the ethical obligations of organizations entrusted with
personal information which, if stolen, can be misused is an important task (Buttrick
et al. 2016).
Lawyers, who traditionally have had to safeguard confidential client paper doc-
uments, have recognized new responsibilities in the age of digital technology and
the Internet. In October 2018 the American Bar Association (ABA), Standing Com-
mittee On Ethics And Professional Responsibility, released a report on, Lawyers’
Obligations After an Electronic Data Breach or Cyberattack. The ABA recognized
law firms were prime targets for hackers, giving lawyers an ethical responsibility to
make reasonable efforts to protect confidentiality when communicating client infor-
mation using the Internet. The ABA opinion considers a lawyer’s responsibility to
prevent a cyberattack and a lawyer’s ethical obligations following a data breach.
Lawyers are advised to be knowledgeable about and competent with the technol-
ogy they employ; the ABA opinion says they also have an obligation to monitor their
technology for data breaches. When a breach is detected they should act promptly to
Business Ethics: Data Breaches 197

stop the breach and mitigate its consequences. A post breach investigation is advised
to confirm the breach has been corrected and to accurately disclose to a client what
occurred. Discretion and client approval is recommended before disclosure of the
breach to law enforcement. Although a breach should be reported to a current client
no direct guidance was given on a lawyer’s obligation to notify a former client
(American Bar Association 2018).
In addition to the economic losses suffered by customers and the breached com-
panies, the affected companies suffer damage to their brand’s image. In 2016 several
hospitals had to pay hackers “ransomware” to retrieve patient data. The loss of impor-
tant patient data can be a serious harm. It is more difficult to sympathize with users of
the Ashley Madison website. A 2015 breach of the website was potentially harmful
to both subscribers and their families. Ashley Madison is a website that facilitates
discrete sexual affairs with the questionable justification, “because life is short”.
A significant percent of data breaches are due to unsuspecting people who respond
to messages from strangers and unknowingly reveal their passwords or click on sus-
picious links. Education on keeping passwords private, changing passwords periodi-
cally and guarding inappropriate access to computers has been advised to make data
breaches more difficult (Buttrick 2019).
Although hackers have moral and legal responsibility for their acts the law has
not adequately responded to data breaches. Relevant laws vary by state and provide
few national legal standards. A few states have had no laws regarding consumer
notification following a data breach. The law elsewhere can vary by state. Some
states require notification when a breach has been identified; other states require
notification only if there is reason to believe harm will result from the breach. When
a security problem has been detected a procedure called responsible disclosure has
been advocated. Responsible disclosure is differentiated from full disclosure because
the problem is disclosed only after a period of time that allows the vulnerability to be
corrected (Wikipedia Contributors 2019b). Though some companies that have been
hacked have offered customers free protection from monitoring companies such as
Equifax; consumers who have been harmed by data breaches may have difficulty
obtaining adequate compensation (Buttrick 2019).
Computer hacking with data breaches is but one of innumerable examples of
matters entwined with ethical content that demand consideration from an ethical
perspective. When you read your daily newspaper or watch the news be alert to
stories that call for moral analysis. You might be surprised by how common they are.

Engineering Ethics Case: The Challenger Disaster

Professional organizations frequently have a code of ethics that states the values
of the organization and informs its members about what they should and should
not do. This is appropriate because general ethical rules and principles may not
specifically address matters relevant to a specific profession. The American Society
of Mechanical Engineers and the National Society of Professional Engineers have
198 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

in common a Fundamental Canon in their respective society’s code of ethics. That

canon says: “Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the
public in the performance of their professional duties”. The failure to respect that
canon resulted in one of the most distressing disasters of the United States space
program.
On January 28. 1986, a frigid day, spectators at Cape Canaveral and millions
of horrified television viewers watched the Challenger Space Shuttle disintegrate 73
seconds into its flight. Fire and smoke engulfed the shuttle. All seven astronauts were
killed; one of those on board was civilian astronaut, Christa McAuliffe, a high school
teacher from New Hampshire. She had been selected by President Reagan’s Teacher
in Space Project and prior to the flight was seen on television and had become a well-
liked celebrity. President Reagan was slated to give his State of the Union address;
one of his main topics was to be education and he was expected to mention the shuttle
carrying the first teacher in space.
A committee independent of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Rogers Commission, named after its chairman, former secretary of state
William P. Rogers, was set up to investigate the cause of the accident and recommend
corrective action. The investigation began with the collection of Challenger debris
by the United States Navy.
Solid rocket boosters attached to Challenger provided the additional thrust
required for the shuttle to escape the earth’s gravitational pull and achieve orbit.
A booster was attached to each side of the shuttle’s external fuel tank. Each booster
weighed two million pounds. Once ignited the solid rocket booster could not be
turned off or controlled. The booster had seven hollow cylinders to hold the solid
rocket fuel. O-rings were used to seal the booster’s joints; the O-rings were vital
because they were designed to prevent hot combustion gasses from escaping. A fail-
ure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seal properly would allow hot combustion
gasses to leak from the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. If the O-rings
failed there would be “a conflagration of gasses liberated by the shuttle’s external
tank” which would cause the shuttle to break up.
It was known for months there were potential problems with the O-rings which
were not corrected; also, prior to the launch of Challenger there had been insufficient
low temperature testing of the O-ring. A particular concern was the potential loss of
O-ring resilience when it was exposed to cold temperatures. Another concern was
the shuttle’s relatively limited previous testing. The company contracted to build the
solid rocket boosters and O-rings was Morton Thiokol.

Pressure to Launch

NASA was under political pressure to launch Challenger; the launch date had already
been delayed several times and NASA management had become impatient with
the technical delays that operating such a complex machine required. A successful
launch would help NASA managers justify funding for the Shuttle program. They
Pressure to Launch 199

also wanted Challenger launched so they could get the launch pad ready for their next
mission. There was also pressure because of competition from the European Space
Agency (Engineering Ethics 2019). Additionally, there was pressure to have a teacher
in space when President Reagan gave his State of the Union speech. Because of its
prior successes NASA management was said to have developed a careless attitude
towards warnings from the engineering community. Sally Ride, a member of the
Roger’s Commission and the first female in space leaked a document that showed
NASA was aware that cold weather could damage a critical component (the O-ring)
of the solid rocket booster. Richard Feynman, a Nobel Prize winning physicist and
a member of the Rogers Commission, discovered a lack of technical understanding
in NASA’s high ranking managers (LaVone 2016).

The Fatal Decision

The night before the scheduled launch in a conference call with NASA managers
Roger Boisjoly, a Morton Thiokol engineer, warned NASA to cancel the launch
because of the forecasted cold weather and the possibility the O-rings would lose
their ability to seal the joints of the solid rocket booster. Boisjoly had, six months
earlier, in a memo to R. K. Lund, Morton Thiokol’s VP of Engineering, warned that
problems related to erosion of the O-rings should be fixed as soon as possible to
prevent a problem that could cause the loss of human life. Another Morton Thiokol
engineer, Bob Ebeling, also tried to stop the Challenger launch. In 1986 Boisjoly
told National Public Radio, “We all knew if the seals failed, the shuttle would blow
up” (NPR news 2016).
NASA’s George Hardy told Morton Thiokol, “I am appalled. I am appalled by
your recommendation”, referring to Morton Thiokol’s wish to delay the launch.
NASA manager Lawrence Mulloy, who was under pressure to launch Challenger,
told the Morton Thiokol engineers, “My God, Thiokol, When do you want me to
launch? Next April?” NASA staunchly opposed the idea to wait. Thiokol’s VP of
engineering, R. K. Lund was hesitant to override his engineer’s advice. Lund, said
Jerald E. Mason, VP of operations at Morton Thiokol “suggested that Lund put on
his” “management” rather than his “engineering hat”.
NASA asked Lund and Mason of Thiokol whether they could prove, without a
doubt, that the forecasted cold temperature posed a high enough risk to the shuttle
that NASA should postpone liftoff again. The O-rings in previous flights had shown
erosion but retained their seal; they had never been tested at the cold temperature
predicted for the day of the planned launch. The engineers therefore could not prove
without a doubt the flight should be postponed. The Thiokol engineers answered, No.
The Thiokol engineers, despite their serious doubts, were unable to convince NASA
not to launch and succumbed to the pressure to launch (LaVone 2016). The question
that should have been asked was whether it could be proven without a serious doubt
the shuttle mission would be safe.
200 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

The Thiokol engineers, Boisjoly and Ebeling suffered significant depression over
the failure of their warnings to stop the disastrous launch of Challenger. Boisjoly
subsequently testified about the faulty Challenger booster O-rings. He was called
a whistle blower and was shunned and threatened by his colleagues. He was later
vindicated when in 1988 the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence awarded him its annual Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. He
subsequently became a sought after expert on forensic engineering and corporate
ethics.
Richard Feynman felt NASA’s explanation of the Challenger disaster and the
O-ring problem was designed to obscure the truth by using complex graphs and
explanations. He performed a simple experiment that was seen on national television.
He placed an O-ring in a cup of ice water and demonstrated that at 32° the O-ring
had lost its resilience and pointed to that as the cause of the shuttle disaster. This
defeated NASA’s attempt to obscure the reason for the Challenger disaster. Feynman
in the final sentences of his report said. “For a successful technology, reality must
take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”
Although company loyalty is important-in this case to both Morton Thiokol and
NASA—it should not be allowed to override the engineer’s responsibility to the pub-
lic. “Single minded pursuit of a goal is not something to advocate to engineers, whose
impact on the safety of the public is so very significant”. Irresponsibility, whether
due to company loyalty or the pursuit of an important goal can have unfortunate
consequences as was seen in the launch of Challenger (Engineering Ethics 2019).
The decision in this engineering project to cave under pressure and launch Chal-
lenger despite serious concerns was a violation of the engineer’s ethical code to hold
paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their pro-
fessional duties. The anxiety and predictions of the engineers proved well-founded.
Rupture of a joint in a recovered solid rocket booster was detected as engineers had
predicted. The destruction of the seals during the burn of the rocket boosters and the
release of hot gases melted the metal on the external fuel tank with the combustion
of two million liters of fuel.

The Ethics of the Challenger Disaster

Perhaps it might have been more uplifting to have presented a case in which adherence
to a profession’s ethical principles saved lives rather than the Challenger case in
which lives were lost because an ethical principle was ignored. The lesson is the
same. Ethics is important. The application of ethics is widespread and, with some
exceptions, express a group consensus opinion on the values that are important to an
enterprise and deserve respect and protection.
This case illustrates the violation of the professional code of ethics of engineers.
What was paramount gave way to what was expedient. Part of the implicit social
contract all engineers have agreed to, as stated in the ASME code of ethics, is to
hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in their performance of
The Ethics of the Challenger Disaster 201

their professional duties”. “Although company loyalty, (in this case to NASA), is
important, it must not be allowed to override the engineer’s obligation to the public.

Psychiatric and Political Applied Ethics: The Goldwater

Rule

Mental health professionals have expressed serious concern about the mental health
of President Donald Trump. They have cited increased mental instability, loss of
touch with reality, unpredictable behavior, and unbridled hedonism. A retired Harvard
Medical School psychiatrist, Lance Dodes, called Trump a sociopath who “lies and
cheats as a way of life”, “can give up reality in exchange for his wished for belief”,
lacks empathy, is paranoid, narcissistic and a sociopath (Devega 2017).
It is problematic to evaluate comments from health care professionals about a
patient they have never examined. A controversial ethical principle of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA), which has informally been referred to as the Goldwa-
ter Rule, is “that it is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless
he or she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization
for such a statement”.
Prior to the presidential election of 1964 FACT magazine purchased the names of
12,356 psychiatrists from the American Medical Association (AMA) and asked them
whether presidential candidate Barry Goldwater was psychologically fit to serve as
President of the United States. FACT published that of the 2417 psychiatrists who
responded 1189 said Goldwater was psychologically unfit to be President. Psychia-
trists described Goldwater as “paranoid”, having a “God like self-image” and being
“a dangerous lunatic”. Goldwater successfully sued FACT for libel. This episode
was embarrassing to the APA which added the Goldwater Rule to its principles of
ethics in 1973 (Lee 2017a, b).
Kroll and Pouncey disagree with the Goldwater rule on the grounds that much
can be learned from a person’s speech and activities in the absence of a personal
interview and that psychiatrists have a responsibility to speak out about political
leaders’ behaviors that strongly suggest psychopathology”. Psychiatrists who violate
the Goldwater rule are subject to, being required to obtain additional education, or
suspension or expulsion from the APA (Kroll and Pouncey 2016; Pouncey 2018).
The physical and mental health of the President of the United States is important
because of the President’s tremendous powers. The ability to assess a President’s
health is limited because no independent, unbiased and objective program of periodic
medical evaluation is required. This is a concern because there is a long history of
lies about the health of United States’ presidents. For example, Vice-Admiral Ross
T. McIntire, who served as Franklin Roosevelt’s personal physician from 1933 until
Roosevelt’s death, proclaimed him to be in “excellent condition for a man of his age”.
The truth was that Roosevelt had extremely high blood pressure and congestive heart
failure (Steinberg 2014).
202 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

The question raised by the APA policy is should psychiatrists be permitted to

publically speak about their evaluation of a United States Presidential candidate or
President they have not examined in order to prevent possible harm to the country.
This raises the factual question of the accuracy of psychiatric evaluations of persons
who have not been professionally examined. If psychiatrists were allowed to speak
out about political figures they have not examined would there be a risk that some
psychiatrists in the future might make damaging politically motivated, unsubstanti-
ated attacks against other politicians. I suspect the APA rule was designed to protect
itself from embarrassing attacks like those against Barry Goldwater.
The ethical problem in this case pits the dangers of a psychiatric conclusion on
a patient who has not been examined against the rights of mental health workers,
who are citizens with First Amendment rights, to speak out. Sometimes a difficult
ethical problem can be solved without directly confronting the conflicting ethical
principles. In this case the unanswered question is the mental health of the President
of the United States. Interstate truck drivers, airline pilots and workers in occupations
that could present hazards to the public are required to have periodic examinations
to demonstrate they can adequately perform their jobs. The President of the United
States can launch nuclear weapons that kill millions of people. If it was required that
an independent, objective medical commission periodically and comprehensively
examined the President the ethical dilemma of the Goldwater rule would become
moot (Steinberg 2018).

Hospital Ethics Policy: The Right to Refuse Blood

Transfusion

I heard this upsetting story from one of our ophthalmologists. An 89 year-old woman
who had for many years been a patient of our clinic was scheduled for removal of a
cataract in her left eye. On the day of the planned surgery she was given a form to sign
indicating, if needed, she would accept a blood transfusion. I later learned this was
standard policy written years earlier for clinic patients scheduled for surgery. The
woman said she was a Jehovah’s witness and could not accept a blood transfusion.
Her surgery was cancelled.
This was an upsetting story because cataract surgery rarely necessitates a blood
transfusion and I thought this elderly woman should have had her cataract removed
without having to agree to blood transfusions that violated her religious beliefs.
The initial basis for the clinic policy seemed reasonable. Surgeons did not want
a patient to die if they inadvertently severed a blood vessel and death occurred
simply because a patient refused blood transfusion. The conflict here was between
a patient’s autonomy and religious belief and a physician’s sense of obligation to
prevent a possible unnecessary injury or death.
We were able to find a reasonable compromise. The old policy was cancelled
and replaced with a policy that did not require anyone to agree to blood transfusion.
Hospital Ethics Policy: The Right to Refuse Blood Transfusion 203

Except in the case of an emergency no physician was required to operate on a patient

who would not accept blood transfusions. The revised policy has worked well.
Ethical questions and ethical dilemmas occur frequently and can be impossible
to avoid. The uncertainties and other problems of ethical theories might tempt us to
avoid ethical deliberation, but life can be complicated making that impossible. The
compensation is that ethical dilemmas force us to think about interesting, mentally
challenging and practical moral dilemmas.

Conclusion

Much of this book has been devoted to a theoretical examination of morality. At last
we have reached the point of revealing its practical importance; how should we try
to resolve ethical dilemmas?
In all cases the relevant facts should be noted and the moral question defined as
precisely as possible. The question in the Jehovah’s Witness case could have been
phrased as, how can we reconcile a patient’s right to autonomously decide what is
done to their own body and respect her religious beliefs with a surgeon’s right to
avoid harm (bleeding to death) and doing good (improving vision). Three principles
are in play “autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence” (see Chap. 13). The case
also involves religious belief (see Chap. 7) and because the patient must give signed
informed consent to accept the risk of dying from a lack of blood the law plays a role
(see Chap. 8). In prior years the physician’s paternalistic approach would have been,
if you want your cataract removed you must agree to accept a blood transfusion; in
this case the culture of medicine had moved closer to respecting patient autonomy
(see Chap. 6). The hospital culture proved willing to accept a compromise and change
its policy (see Chap. 11).
In this case a solution was possible, but that is not always true with ethical dilem-
mas. Because bleeding was unlikely in this case nonmaleficence was a lesser issue.
But the policy affected other more serious cases where patients might bleed to death
if a vessel was unintentionally severed, sometimes even when blood transfusions
were given. This was resolved by allowing surgeons to decline to operate on patients
who refuse blood transfusions, except in an emergency.
The Challenger Shuttle disaster illustrates the vulnerability of morality. Expe-
diency, was allowed to trump public safety, a significant moral value, with dire
consequences (see Mill Chap. 12).
Moral deliberation requires acquisition of the relevant facts and definition of the
nature of a dilemma. The involved values should be identified and after considering
the circumstances a decision made about which values take precedence. This process
may benefit from discussion and the advice of others, such as an ethics committee.
This chapter focused on ethics that involve organizations, but the approach is similar
when an ethical dilemma primarily involves individuals (see Chaps. 16 and 17).
204 15 Applied Ethics: Organizations

References

ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 2019. Available at https://www.americanbar.org/

content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_migrated/mcpr.pdf. Accessed
February 8, 2019.
American Bar Association. 2018. Lawyers’ Obligations After an Electronic Data Breach or
Cyberattack. Formal Opinion 483. October 17, 2018.
AMA Code of Medical Ethics. 2019. Available at https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/
files/corp/media-browser/principles-of-medical-ethics.pdf. Accessed February 8, 2019.
American Red Cross Code of Business Ethics and Conduct. 2019. Available at https://www.
redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/enterprise-assets/pdfs/m35440072_Code_of_Business_
Ethics_and_Conduct.pdf. Accessed February 8, 2019.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buttrick, Hilary G. et al. 2016. The Skeleton of A Data Breach: The Ethical and Legal Concerns, 23
Rich. J. L. & Tech. 2. http://jolt.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/volume23_article2_Buttrick.
pdf.
Devega, Chauncey. 2017. Harvard psychiatrist Lance Dodes: Donald Trump is a “sociopath” and
“a very sick individual”. Available at https://www.salon.com/2017/09/12/harvard-psychiatrist-
lance-dodes-donald-trump-is-a-sociopath-and-a-very-sick-individual/. Accessed February 9,
2019.
Dittmer, Joel. 2019. Applied Ethics, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-
0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/, January 28, 2019. Accessed January 29, 2019.
Engineering Ethics. 2019. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster. Department of Philosophy
and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University. NSF Grant Number
DIR-9012252. Instructor’s Guide. Available at http://ethics.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/
7/2017/04/Shuttle.pdf. Accessed February 5, 2019.
Kroll, Jerome, and Claire Pouncey. 2016. The Ethics of the APA’s Goldwater Rule. The Journal of
the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 44 (2): 226–235.
LaVone, Michelle. 2016. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster. Online Space Safety Mag-
azine. Available at http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-disasters/challenger-disaster/.
Accessed February 5, 2019.
Lee, Bandy X. 2017a. Psychiatrists Warn About Trump’s Mental State New York Times Letter to
the Editor December 1, 2017.
Lee, Brandy X. 2017b. The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.
NPR (National Public Radio) news. 2016. Challenger Engineer Who Warned of Shuttle Disaster
Dies. Available at https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/21/470870426/challenger-
engineer-who-warned-of-shuttle-disaster-dies. Accessed February 6, 2019.
Pouncey, Claire. 2018. President Trump’s Mental Health-Is it Morally Permissible for Psychiatrists
to Comment? NEJM 378: 405–407.
Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics. Available at https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp.
Accessed February 8, 2019.
Steinberg, David. 2014. President Franklin D Roosevelt (1882–1945) and Doctor Frank Howard
Lahey’s (1880–1953) Dilemma: The Complexities of Medical Confidentiality with World leaders.
Journal of Medical Biography 24: 50.
Steinberg, David. 2018. Should POTUS Undergo Independent Medical Evaluations? Boston Globe
Magazine. May 27, 2018.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019a. Yahoo! data breaches. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yahoo!_data_breaches&oldid=880860599. Accessed Jan-
uary 30, 2019.
Wikipedia Contributors. 2019b. Responsible disclosure. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Responsible_disclosure&oldid=876587989. Accessed Jan-
uary 31, 2019.
Chapter 16
Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

Abstract An explication of biomedical ethics illustrates the ubiquity and variabil-

ity of moral concerns in biology and medicine and provides insights useful when
confronting practical moral issues in other fields. Currently almost every hospital in
the United States has a hospital ethics committee. Ethics consultation has become
a routine part of United States hospital based healthcare. Ethical dilemmas often
can be viewed from multiple perspectives; important insights are less likely to be
overlooked if an ethics consultation service is multidisciplinary and includes people
with varied training and backgrounds. Reasons for ethical dilemmas in biology and
medicine include: novel technologies, conceptual controversies, conflicting princi-
ples, scarce resources, prognostic uncertainty, and cultural differences. Examples of
ethical dilemmas in biomedicine are presented. An ethics consultation service can
be helpful, but should not be considered authoritative in the resolution of morally
complex conundrums.

Ethics Consultation

I have chosen biomedical ethics consultation as a paradigm of practical applied ethics.

I selected biomedicine because it is the area of my most extensive involvement
with applied ethics. As a practicing physician I could not avoid medicine’s often
complicated moral dilemmas; after I founded the ethics program at our medical center
I encouraged colleagues to share their ethical problems with our ethics consultation
service. My years of doing ethics consultations proved intellectually challenging,
often interesting and sometimes frustrating. My explication of biomedical ethics
hopefully will illustrate the ubiquity and variability of moral concerns in biology
and medicine and provide insights useful when confronting moral issues in this and
other arenas.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 205

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_16
206 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

Hospital Ethics Consultation Services

In a 1981 survey only one percent of the hospitals in the United States were found to
have a hospital ethics committee. In 1992 The Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations required that hospitals have a mechanism to address
ethical issues arising in the care of patients (Courtwright and Jurchak 2016). Ethics
consultation services have become prevalent and widely accepted; a survey reported
in 2007 found 65% of hospitals with 1–99 beds, 92% of hospitals with 100-199
beds, 97% of hospitals with 300–399 beds and 100% of hospitals with 400 or more
beds provided an ethics consultation service. Currently almost every hospital in the
United States has a hospital ethics committee (Courtwright and Jurchak 2016). Ethics
consultation has become a routine part of U.S. hospital based healthcare (Fox et al.
2007).
The function of an ethics consultation service should be to understand the nature
of a request for help and work toward a meaningful response. A significant percent
of ethics consultations do not involve philosophically challenging ethical dilemmas.
Hospital ethics consultation services were surveyed to gauge their explicit goals. The
reported list includes: intervening to protect patient rights, resolving real or imagined
ethical conflicts, improving the quality of patient care, increasing patient and family
satisfaction, educating staff about ethical issues, preventing ethical problems, meet-
ing a perceived need of the staff, providing moral support to the staff, suspending
unwanted or wasteful treatments, and reducing the risk of legal liability (Fox et al.
2007).
Over time the size of hospital ethics committees has slowly increased to a mean
of 17 members. The percentage of physicians has declined to 30.8% and the per-
centage of nurses increased to 22%. Although the percentage of community mem-
bers increased to 13.1% a substantial number of hospital ethics committees had no
community members (Courtwright and Jurchak 2016).
Ethical problems often can be viewed from multiple perspectives; important
insights are less likely to be overlooked if the ethics consultation service includes
people of varied backgrounds. Our ethics consultation service was multidisciplinary
and included physicians, nurses, social workers, chaplains, mental health specialists,
lawyers, administrators and when available a community representative. It’s impor-
tant to select as members of an ethics consultation service people who are thoughtful
and willing and able to consider and weigh various points of view; a person with
rigid beliefs would not be appropriate to fill this role.
The essential nature of a problem may differ from what is, at first, explicitly stated.
Simply talking with someone who is morally distressed and allowing them to share
their concerns can be helpful. Sometimes reassuring a person they’re doing the right
thing can be therapeutic. Other consultations can be more demanding.
The ethics consultation service I directed classified ethics consults into three types:
consults that could be completed by simply answering a few basic questions, con-
sults requiring conversations with healthcare providers and, often the most stressful,
Hospital Ethics Consultation Services 207

consults that included hospital outsiders such as patients, relatives and others with a
stake in the consult outcome.
We promptly responded to consult requests and had a small team of 2–3 mem-
bers do the initial consultation; a hospital is a busy place and at times only one
or two people were available to perform a consultation. We only required that the
person requesting the consult believed they had an ethical concern and otherwise
accepted every request. All our ethics consultations were presented at a monthly
ethics committee meeting and a written report of each consultation was filed with
hospital administration. When considered to be of educational value a copy of the
consultation was placed in the patient’s medical record.

Reasons for Biomedical Ethical Dilemmas?

Several factors are responsible for biomedical dilemmas. These include:

Novel biotechnologies typically become available prior to a full understanding of
their prudent employment. The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) permit
a baby to have as many as five different people who could be considered a parent:
the egg donor, the sperm donor, the surrogate mother who carries the baby, and the
couple that adopts the child. ARTs have raised numerous questions. Should a well
beyond child bearing age 69 year old woman use a donated egg to become a mother?
Should sex and other genetic selection factors, for example eye color, be permitted?
Is it wise to allow young women sell their eggs? Should fertility clinics use ARTs for
people demonstrated to be irresponsible parents? How can we best avoid the serious
problems associated with multiple births?

Conceptual Disagreements

The meaning of basic concepts such as when life begins is disputed. Is it at conception,
or is it later? There is persistent debate over the definition of death, which is a serious
matter if you are considering organ retrieval for transplantation or when you want to
remove artificial ventilation.

Conflicting Principles

The problem with moral principles is there are too many of them. In the 1980s a
patient had tested positive for the HIV virus that causes AIDS. He told me he was
bisexual. His wife, who was in the waiting room, did not know he was bisexual and
did not know he was HIV positive. I thought his wife should know her husband could
208 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

transmit a potentially fatal disease. He refused permission to inform his wife who
was in the waiting room.
His refusal created a conflict between a patient’s right to medical confidentiality
and the duty to prevent harm. After a stressful discussion the patient gave permission
to inform his wife. What happened next was uncomfortable, though memorable. My
patient tried to reassure his wife and said, “don’t worry, I’ll be fine”. She venomously
looked at him and said, “what makes you think I don’t want you dead!”

Scarce Resources

We confront difficult triage decisions when there are insufficient Intensive Care
Unit beds. A chronic shortage of organs for transplantation has resulted in ethical
dilemmas related to organ allocation. Many newly developed drugs are extremely
expensive and decisions must be made concerning their appropriate use.

Prognostic Uncertainty

A family wants their relative’s treatment continued and may say, “do everything”,
while the healthcare team believes treatment is futile. What odds of recovery would
justify continued treatment? This question is made more difficult because of the
limits of our prognostic accuracy?

Cultural Differences

Cultural differences can complicate the care of patients from different cultures and
religions. Some cultures believe medical decisions should be made by the family,
others accept a more expansive view of personal autonomy. Some orthodox Jews do
not accept neurological criteria of death “brain death”.

Reasons for Ethics Consultation

The type of ethics consultations seen can vary depending on the nature of an insti-
tution’s patient population. Loyola University Medical Center reported on ethics
consultations on sick hospitalized patients; 44.2% of these patients ultimately died.
Almost half (47.4%) were in an Intensive Care Unit, 28.8% were on a general medical
Reasons for Biomedical Ethical Dilemmas? 209

ward and 23.7% were on a specialty ward such as an oncology unit or a bone mar-
row or heart transplant unit. Common patient diagnoses were malignancy, infection,
neurologic disorders and pulmonary disease.
Loyola ethics consultations were varied and involved do not resuscitate orders,
advance directives, patient autonomy, surrogate decision-making, treatment deci-
sions, patient decision-making capacity, informed consent, the goals, benefits and
burdens of treatment, quality of life issues, end of life issues, palliative care, medical
futility. withdrawing and withholding treatment, and conflict resolution.
The Loyola ethics consult service clarified the medical facts, therapeutic options
and the nature of ethical issues. They also provided education on ethical and policy
issues and gave support to patients, families, and healthcare providers. They tried to
resolve conflicts by facilitating meaningful communication (Wasson et al. 2016).
Ethics consultation at the Massachusetts General Hospital also involved a sick
patient population. Patients on average were 65 years old, were receiving a median
of two life sustaining treatments and almost 90% were considered either seriously or
critically ill. More than half of their ethics consults were on patients in an Intensive
Care Unit. Of patients who had ethics consultation 51.6% died in the hospital. Only
14.2% of patients who had ethics consultation were discharged to their home.
The vast majority of ethics consultations were requested by house staff, nurses
or an attending physician (92.6%). The most common reasons for ethics consulta-
tion were confirmation or moral support for the appropriateness of actions (41.9%),
surrogate decision-makers who wanted more interventions than health profession-
als considered warranted (41.3%) and the need to clarify a patient’s values and
preferences (32.3%).
Some of the services provided by ethics consultants were commenting on the
appropriateness of treatment plans (67.4%), identifying and resolving interpersonal
conflicts between clinicians and surrogates (42.3%), clarification of patient values
and preferences (27.4%), and the identification of appropriate surrogates (21.6%)
(Robinson et al. 2017).
The Loyola and Massachusetts Hospital data are reasonably similar and reflect
the ethical problems that arise when caring for a sick hospitalized patient popula-
tion. Although there are ample exceptions, the majority of ethical dilemmas found in
these cases have previously been resolved by general practice standards, legal cases,
and hospital policies. It has been accepted that, when appropriate, treatment can be
stopped or withdrawn, that patients capable of decision-making have the right to
determine what is done to their body, that within reason advance directives should
be honored, and that a surrogate decision-maker is required for seriously demented
patients. These issues are now largely matters of explanation, education, communi-
cation and, at times, persuasion. Typically, most members of ethics committees are
clinicians who are experienced dealing with clinical procedures and can function
on ethics committees without extensive additional training. Ethics consults can be
thought provoking and challenging when they involve novel or unresolved questions.
I will illustrate this point with three cases.
210 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples

A Lobe of Liver for Their Physician

Our liver transplant team requested an ethics consultation for advice concerning a
patient who needed a liver transplant. The patient was a physician with advanced life
threatening liver disease who had been on the transplant waiting list for five years.
He had asked the transplant service to evaluate two of his patients as potential live
liver donors. Each had expressed a willingness to donate to their doctor a lobe of
their liver for transplantation (Steinberg and Pomfret 2008).
The physician said the two prospective donors were motivated by gratitude for his
help over the years and the doctor thought that should justify their organ donation.
He argued that if organ donation was a legitimate expression of gratitude in other
relationships, it should also be permitted as the expression of similar feelings of a
patient towards their physician. He worked in a small town and the prospective donors
were said to have become aware of his plight “through the grapevine”. One of the
prospective donors believed the physician had “saved her life”; the other patient was
religious and wanted to do “good deeds”.
A lobe of liver can be taken from a living donor because liver tissue can regenerate.
Live liver donors are carefully evaluated but there can be operative complications
and there have been occasional troubling deaths of healthy liver donors.
Physicians have a fiduciary relationship to their patients that implies a trust that
they will act in their patients’ best interests. When physicians advance their per-
sonal needs within the physician–patient relationship, they risk creating a conflict of
interest and violating that trust. Boundaries have been established to prevent such
transgressions (Rodwin 1995; ACS 2004; ACP 2008; Snyder and Leffler 2005).
Several reasons have been given for creating boundaries in the physician–patient
relationship.
The “inherent power differential” between physician and patient leaves the patient
vulnerable to exploitation. Patients’ judgment may be clouded because of their depen-
dence on the physician and because they may have an “idealized” view of their
physician. Patients may undergo “transference”, a process by which emotions orig-
inally associated with one person, such as a parent, are sub-consciously shifted to
another person such as their physician, causing the physician to be seen as parent-like.
These attitudes enhance patient vulnerability and make meaningful patient consent to
actions that benefit the physician problematic. Although patients warrant protection
the physician’s life, which, in this case, is at stake, is also important.
A well accepted patient-physician boundary prohibits romantic relationships and
sexual contact between physician and patient. Reasons given for this boundary are
“physician gratification inappropriately becomes part of the professional relation-
ship” and “the patient’s trust that the physician will work only for the patient’s
welfare is violated”. The establishment of a professional boundary is not without
controversy. Appelbaum and colleagues have expressed caution about boundaries
that restrict intimate relationships between physician and patient because they are an
Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples 211

intrusion by society on individual liberty and must be both justified and consistent
with legal protections (Appelbaum et al. 2001).
Instead of a general prohibition of patient-to-physician organ donation, a more
flexible, case-by-case approach could be considered. This would take into account
the nature and intensity of a particular patient–physician relationship, the risk of
the procedure and the likelihood that a patient’s decision has been inappropriately
influenced. However, determinations of this type are subjective, difficult to make
accurately and unlikely to avoid the troubling public perception that physicians are
exploiting vulnerable patients and cynically violating the primacy of the patients’ best
interests which is widely advocated by their own professional medical associations.
Organ donation from a patient to their physician raises complex ethical questions.
Would personal freedom unjustly be limited and potential patient donors unfairly
denied the gratifications of altruism if patient-to-physician organ donation was pro-
hibited? Does the nature of the physician–patient relationship make fully autonomous
donation decisions impossible, and if that is the case, is the injustice of a less than
fully autonomous decision mitigated because a life will likely be saved? Ethics cannot
readily weigh qualitatively different parameters against each other. In this case the
principles in conflict were autonomy and beneficence. Principlism lacks a formula
to determine what compromise in patient autonomy is justified by the opportunity
to save a person’s life. In this case a troubling ethical decision could not be avoided
because the physician’s patients and putative donors either would or would not be
evaluated.
A strong argument can be made that organ donation from patient to physician is
ethically dubious because donation decisions will be inappropriately influenced and
the negative public perceptions of this practice will ultimately result in more harm
than good. Our judgment was that sustaining a noble version of the physician–patient
relationship, avoiding cynicism about medicine’s professed value of the primacy of
patient welfare and maintaining trust in the medical profession should, in the long
run, facilitate the goals of medicine and outweigh the value of occasionally helping a
colleague in need of an organ. In this case we recommended that a physician should
not receive an organ for transplantation donated by one of their patients.
This did not feel like an easy decision and I can’t be certain it was the correct
decision. I had spoken at length with the sick physician, liked him and could only
hope a liver could be donated from another source. The transplant team accepted our
recommendation and his patients were not considered as potential donors (Steinberg
and Pomfret 2008).

The Case of the Unresponsive Hermit

An 86-year-old woman did not answer the door for Meals on Wheels; she was found
on the floor unresponsive. The woman had no known relatives or friends and there was
no one who knew anything about her values or beliefs. Studies in the hospital showed
a large mass in her pelvis and multiple nodules in her lungs; these findings were
212 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

consistent with metastatic disease. A consulting gynecologic oncologist concluded

she had widespread cancer, that there was unlikely to be a meaningful response to
treatment and advised comfort measures only.
The primary physician agreed she should be kept comfortable but felt uneasy
about making this decision on a patient who was not capable of decision-making
and had no surrogate decision-maker. A psychiatrist suggested the physician ask the
court to appoint a legal guardian; other physicians suggested comfort measures only
was so clearly the right thing to do that a legal guardian was unnecessary.
This case was subsequently discussed by Dan Brock, a highly regarded philosophy
professor (Brock 2007). He correctly assumed the patient was not able to make
medical decisions and there was no significant likelihood she would recover that
capacity. The relevant ethical issue was who should make the decision to remove her
life supports.
There were significant conceivable drawbacks to the physician assuming that
responsibility as well as drawbacks to a court ordered guardian. If a physician
assumed responsibility under these circumstances the possibility existed that in the
absence of a known surrogate to advocate for the patient there might be a potential for
abuse, such as not exploring all treatment options, or discrimination against a patient
who lacked funds or belonged to a minority group. A court appointed legal guardian
would involve a time consuming and perhaps costly process and the designated
guardian might not be capable of serving effectively.
Cases like this are not rare and Brock suggested the hospital develop a procedure
to manage problems of this sort such as having the chief of service or an ethics
committee review the case and make the decision. An ethics committee agreed with
limiting treatment to comfort care and the patient died peacefully.

Request for Futile Treatment

A 53 year old man had liver failure due to hepatitis C; during an evaluation for a
liver transplant he was found to have liver cancer. He was also discovered to have
metastatic lesions in his lungs as well as kidney failure. He had to be moved to
an Intensive Care Unit because he required intravenous medication to maintain his
blood pressure. The patient’s physicians concluded he was extremely ill, did not have
the capacity to make treatment decisions, and continued treatments to prolong his
life were futile.
The patient’s family wanted continued treatment of his hypotension, dialysis and
even cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if that became necessary. They said that
was what the patient would have wanted if he was alert enough to express his wishes.
He had once demanded life support for an infant son who was dying and the child
miraculously recovered; the family was hoping for a miracle and knew the patient
would want to have continued treatment. The patient’s son asked, “How can you be
absolutely certain my father won’t miraculously recover”?
Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples 213

Lawrence Schneiderman, M. D. discussed this case in our ethics publication;

he said there is uncertainty in medicine and agreed a miraculous recovery cannot
be absolutely ruled out, though “it is not a realistic possibility”. He said continued
treatment would cause the patient discomfort and the wish for a miracle could not be
imposed on physicians as a goal of medicine. He distinguishes the words treatment
and care. Although treatment may be futile, care is never futile. The family persisted
in their desire for the physicians to do everything. The family was given a date all
treatment would be withdrawn and the opportunity to transfer the patient or seek
court intervention. They chose to do neither and the patient died peacefully with his
family present (Schneiderman 2007).
Burns notes discussions of futility can be grouped into four categories: attempts to
define medical futility, attempts to resolve the debate with the use of empirical data,
discussions that cast the debate as a struggle between the autonomy of patients and
the autonomy of physicians, and attempts to develop a process for resolving disputes
over futility (Burns 2007).
I have found ethics consultations concerning medical futility difficult to resolve.
I was even unable to precisely define futility in a medical context. Does a one in a
thousand chance of recovery merit the designation, futility? Or should it be one in a
hundred? An answer to this question would be arbitrary and subject to uncertainty.
I wanted to write a hospital policy on futility but never did because I found it futile
to try to write a policy on an entity I couldn’t define. Burns seems to agree and
says, “I long ago abandoned definitional attempts at futility”. He ultimately adopted
a procedural approach. He found, “attempts to define futility as illusive, for such
attempts only expose and exacerbate a clash of values and fail to provide an ethically
coherent ground for limiting life-sustaining treatments” (Burns 2007).

Other Biomedical Ethics Consultations

The pervasiveness of moral concerns in biomedical ethics illustrates that it is a

characteristic of the nature of morality to insinuate itself in various endeavors and
aspects of our lives. Biomedical ethics is only one example of applied ethics. Morality,
despite its hazy essential nature, is very influential and has various applications.
What follows is a brief synopsis of a few of the biomedical dilemmas that have
prompted ethics consultations we received over the years. It is beyond the scope
of this book to discuss them individually. They are presented to unveil the nature
of morality and applied ethics. These concrete examples of the nature of moral
concerns in biomedicine are accompanied by ethical concerns relevant to business
ethics, journalism ethics, political ethics, military ethics and so on.
1. A 63 year old man requires dialysis for kidney failure. His son has agreed to
donate a kidney to his father. His father was unexpectedly just diagnosed with
a blood disease, a form of myelodysplasia, with a median survival rate of 5–
12 months. The transplant surgeon wants to know whether it is ethical to remove
214 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

a kidney from the son when there is uncertainty about how long his father will
live to benefit from the donation?
2. A patient with a serious neurologic disorder is on a randomized drug study; he
doesn’t know whether he is taking the study drug or a placebo. The patient, in
confidence, tells the neurologist’s, nurse a friend is a chemist who is going to
analyze his pills and tell him whether he is taking the study drug or a placebo.
The nurse asks whether she should violate her promise of confidentiality and
alert the neurologist?
3. A 52 year-old man with kidney failure is scheduled to get a kidney for trans-
plantation from his 48 year-old brother. His brother who is mentally challenged
with an IQ of 70 has agreed to donate a kidney. Two days before the planned
transplant the surgeon has second thoughts about whether it’s ethical to remove
a kidney from a mentally challenged person.
4. A 32 year-old man with congenital heart disease suffered severe brain damage
following two episodes of cardiac arrest. The likelihood of any meaningful
recovery was thought to be extremely low. His doctor and his family agreed
that stopping all treatment was in his best interest. The patient’s wife, who is
his legal surrogate decision-maker, was emotionally distraught and unable to
accept her husband’s grim prognosis. She wanted “treatment continued and
everything done”.
5. A 60 year-old school bus driver freely admitted to drinking excessive alcohol. He
says he does not drink before driving the school bus in the morning. He enrolled
in a detoxification program and claimed he had stopped drinking. However, in
the past his periods of sobriety were brief. His doctor asks whether she should
violate patient confidentiality and tell the school that one of their bus drivers is
an alcoholic?
6. A surgeon removed a malignant tumor from the right kidney of a 46 year-old
woman. The pathology report was interpreted as showing clear surgical margins
and complete resection of the tumor. X-ray studies also revealed no evidence
of remaining tumor. The patient sought a second opinion at another institution.
Their pathologist interpreted the resection margins as possibly positive. The
patient became very anxious and wanted her surgeon to remove the entire right
kidney to avoid any doubt all of the tumor had been removed. The surgeon was
confident the entire malignancy was removed and believed it would be medically
unethical to remove what he considered a normal kidney. The surgeon was
concerned the patient’s anxiety caused her to want an unnecessary operation;
he believed removal of the kidney would be immoral.
7. A 94 year-old man had alcoholic cirrhosis and bleeding from his esophagus. At
his family’s request his gastroenterologist told him he had a benign fatty tumor;
this was a lie because he had esophageal cancer. His family said if he knew the
truth he would become upset, retreat to his room and drink excessively. In the
past the patient had said if he had a serious diagnosis, “don’t tell me!”. The
patient’s internist felt uncomfortable caring for a patient who was being lied to.
8. An 81 year-old man was bleeding profusely because his body was inappropri-
ately making a powerful antibody to a clotting factor called Factor 8. He was
Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples 215

receiving standard treatment with an FDA approved medication, NovoSeven.

The blood bank director requested an ethics consultation because his budget
for blood related products at the time was $75,000 a year. NovoSeven for this
patient was costing $106,569 a day, with no end in sight. The patient was in a
managed care program and the hospital would not be reimbursed for the drug.
The blood bank director felt uncomfortable spending so much money on a single
patient and depleting resources that could be used for other patients.
9. A cardiac surgeon was continuing to treat a 70 year-old man who had suffered
multiple medical disasters. He heard that nurses were talking behind his back,
saying treating this patient was futile and immoral. The surgeon wanted to know
how to best deal with this unpleasant situation.
10. A team of multiple physicians heroically saved the life of an extremely sick man.
Report of the case by the media would show the hospital in a very favorable
light. The patient was grateful for the care he received and gave the hospital
permission to report his story. The Director of Communications and Marketing
became concerned because if the media was alerted it would likely be revealed
that the patient abused alcohol and cocaine. She worried that any publicity
would be good for the hospital but bad for the patient.

Moral Expertise

I had two careers in medicine, one as a clinician who practiced internal medicine,
hematology and oncology, and a second career as the director of a medical ethics
program, an ethics consultation service and editor of an ethics publication. In some
ways the nature of these two disciplines overlap and in other ways they differ. I will
use this comparison as a gateway to a discussion of the nature of moral expertise.
The knowledge base and experience required to function as a physician probably
exceeds that of the typical medical ethicist. A cardiologist, surgeon or gastroen-
terologist spends four years in medical school and several additional years in gen-
eral and specialty training. My initial ethics training decades ago was a relatively
short, but excellent, Intensive Bioethics Course at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at
Georgetown University.
Requirements for ethics committee membership at the Massachusetts General
Hospital include review of a collection of relevant articles, single day classroom
courses and observational learning (Robinson et al. 2017). The requirement for mem-
bership in the committee I directed was reading a short book on ethics and ethics
consultation. Masters degree programs in biomedical ethics have become popular.
216 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

American Society of Bioethics and Humanities

The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has defined the per-
sonality characteristics of healthcare ethics consultants: “ethics consultants must be
approachable and must feel comfortable working with patients, families, and health-
care professionals alike. They must be empathetic and able to interpret and respond
to others’ verbal and nonverbal cues, yet remain objective and avoid partiality. They
must be able to communicate with people who are not familiar with contempo-
rary healthcare systems and must use language that is accessible to people from
many backgrounds. Ethics consultants must also possess strong analytical and criti-
cal thinking skills and be able to think and respond promptly to situations that change
incrementally over time. In crises, stakeholders’ emotions change quickly, clinical
statuses change abruptly, and courses of action must shift—all of which require very
quick thinking and a deliberative frame of mind” (Bruce et al. 2017).
ASBH has defined Core Competencies for ethics consultants. These include the
ability to: 1. Identify the nature of the value, uncertainty, or conflict that underlies the
need for healthcare ethics consultation. 2. Access relevant ethics literature, policies,
guidelines, and standards. 3. Establish healthcare ethics consultation expectations
and determine whom to involve. 4. Use institutional structures and resources to
facilitate the implementation of the chosen option. 5. Communicate and collaborate
effectively with other responsible individuals, departments, or divisions within the
institution. 6. Facilitate formal meetings. 7. Document and communicate healthcare
ethics consultations. 8. Identify systems issues and delegate follow-up. 9. Evaluate
the healthcare ethics consultations and provide quality improvement. 10. Effectively
run a healthcare ethics consultations service. 11. Listen well and communicate inter-
est, respect, support, and empathy to involved parties. 12. Educate involved parties
regarding the ethical dimensions of the consultation. 13. Elicit the moral views of the
involved parties. 14. Represent the views of the involved parties to others. 15. Enable
the involved parties to communicate effectively and be heard by other parties. 16.
Recognize and attend to various relational barriers to communication (Bruce et al.
2017).
For each listed Core Competency there is advice concerning related activity, pit-
falls and tips. ASBH also provides helpful information for healthcare ethics consul-
tants, a list of relevant journals, and advice on how to search the Internet. ASBH
has also established a Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification Program that pro-
vides credentials that endorse an ethics consultant’s knowledge of key concepts in
healthcare ethics and affirms expertise, competence, and an ethics consultation skill
set.
These ASBH resources are detailed and should be read by members of health care
ethics committees. Much of the ASBH material deals with procedural matters. An
ethics consult service that follows the ASBH resources should be able to accurately
identify the nature of an ethical problem, provide education concerning accepted
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities 217

practices, laws, guidelines, hospital policies and relevant literature. An ethics con-
sultation service that follows these guidelines can facilitate effective communication
and resolve conflicts. But do these valuable contributions constitute a profession?
The category of profession is ambiguously defined (Schwab 2016); with that qual-
ification the ASBH appears to be moving toward the professionalization of health
care ethics consultation (Yarmolinsky 2016). The ASBH Clinical Ethics Consultation
Affairs Committee has authored a code of ethics focused on individuals who provide
health care ethics consultation in clinical settings (Tarzian et al. 2015). Elements of
this code of ethics include: be competent, preserve integrity, manage conflicts, main-
tain confidentiality, contribute to the field, communicate responsibly and promote
just health care.
Despite the potentially valuable work of an ethics consult service I have a signifi-
cant reservation related to consultations that involve philosophically complex ethical
dilemmas. The methodology for resolving these dilemmas is limited. Research in
clinical ethics can be performed if there is an empirically verifiable objective. If you
want to study the consequences of permitting physician assisted suicide that is pos-
sible (Sullivan et al. 2000). If you want to study the morality of physician assisted
suicide that is not amenable to empirical proof. Many of these dilemmas are the result
of conflicting valid ethical principles. These principles come in different metrics and
when in conflict, cannot be readily weighed one against the other.
Beauchamp and Childress advocate four major ethical principles; they are respect
for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. They acknowledge, “princi-
ples do not themselves resolve conflicts among principles and derivative rules”. They
add that “no framework of guidelines could reasonably anticipate the full range of
conflicts” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009).
Madison Powers has ascribed the nature of fundamental ethical disagreements
as due to differences in “background assumptions” and to our inability to compare
qualitatively distinct parameters (Powers 2005). He notes it is incoherent to imagine
“that there exists a quantitative way to assess the qualitatively incommensurable.”
There is no generally accepted method for performing the calculus that weighs the
destruction of potential human life against the benefits of having a child free of disease
or disability. Powers concludes there is a “limit to moral expertise” because multiple
morally acceptable options” exist and “below the surface of bioethical debate is an
inherently political contest” (Powers 2005). Moral issues such as abortion have not
been resolved in society and by necessity have become a contentious matter of public
policy. Morality has limits that suggests caution to an ethics committee that considers
its pronouncements authoritative.
Although I am cautious that in some cases the authority of ethics consultants
is limited, it is also true that in the case of an ethically egregious action an ethics
consultation service might have to be definitive and strident in its protest and actions.
218 16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics

Conclusion

There is no shortage of moral dilemmas. Although I have focused on biomedical

ethics moral conundrums arise in daily life and in most human endeavors. Methods
for resolving these dilemmas exist for many, though not all of them.
We give morality attention, not because it yields incontrovertible truth; it garners
our attention because in life we are forced to make choices. Most of us struggle to
make the best decisions possible. We may turn to “ethicists” for help. An ethics con-
sultation service can provide advice and reasons for that advice but when it comes
to deciding what is morally correct the nature of morality frowns on claims of infal-
libility. An ethics consultation service can be very helpful but is not necessarily
authoritative on morally difficult issues, not to mention that members of an ethics
committee can disagree with each other. Magnus has said that clinical ethics consul-
tation “has been exposed to little empirical scrutiny”. He refers to scrutiny based on
outcome measures such as stakeholder closure and satisfaction, but does not mention
moral accuracy (Magnus 2015). Ethics consultants should do their best to explain
and convince but in morally complex cases they probably should be reluctant to usurp
decision-making authority from those who seek help.

References

American College of Surgeons. 2004. Relation of the Surgeon to the Patient. in American College of
Surgeons Statements on Principles. Chicago: ACS. Section I. http://www.facs.org/fellows_info/
statements/stonprin.html#pre. Accessed 12 Aug 2008.
Appelbaum P. S., Jorgenson, L. M., and Sutherland, P. K. 2001. Sexual Relationships Between
Physicians and Patients. American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics. Chicago:
AMA. VIII. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html. Accessed 12 Aug 2008.
Beauchamp, Tom L. and Childress, James F. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 373. New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brock, Dan. 2007. The Case of the Unresponsive Hermit. in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. David Steinberg M.D, 208–210. University
Press of New England.
Bruce, Courtenay R, Hardart, George E, Chanko, Barbara L, et al. 2017. Clinical Ethics Consultation
Affairs Committee of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. Resources for Devel-
oping Advanced Skills in Ethics Consultation. Available at http://asbh.org/uploads/publications/
Resources_for_Ethics_Consultation.pdf. Accessed 19 Feb 2019.
Burns, Jeffrey, M.D. 2007. Does Anyone Actually Invoke Their Hospital Futility Policy? in Biomed-
ical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed David
Steinberg M.D. 266–268. University Press of New England.
Courtwright, Andrew, and Martha Jurchak. 2016. The Evolution of Hospital Ethics Committees in
the United States: A Systematic Review. The Journal of Clinical Ethics 27 (4): 322–340.
Fox, Ellen, Sarah Myers, and Robert A. Pearlman. 2007. Ethics Consultation in United States
Hospitals: A National Survey. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (2): 13–25.
Magnus, David. 2015. Clinical Ethics Consultation: A Need For Evidence. The American Journal
of Bioethics. 15 (1): 1–2.
Powers, Madison. 2005. Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise. Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal 15(3): 305–322.
References 219

Robinson, Ellen M., Wendy Cadge, Kimberly Erler, et al. 2017. Structure, Operation, and Experience
of Clinical Ethics Consultation 2007-2013: A Report from the Massachusetts General Hospital
Optimum Care Committee. The Journal of Clinical Ethics. 28 (2): 137–152.
Rodwin, M. A. 1995. Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System. American Journal of Law & Medicine 21: 241–57.
Schneiderman, Lawrence J. 2007. Family Demand for Futile Treatment. in Biomedical Ethics: A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed David Steinberg M.D.,
264–266. University Press of New England.
Schwab, Abraham. 2016. The ASBH Code of Ethics and the Limits of Professional Healthcare
Ethics Consultations. American Journal of Medica lEthics 42: 504–509.
Snyder, L, and Leffler, C 2005. For the Ethics and Human Rights Committee. American Col-
lege of Physicians. Ethics Manual, 5th edn. Philadelphia: ACP. http://www.acponlineorg/ethics/
ethicman5th.htm#phys. Accessed 12 Aug 2008.
Steinberg, David, and Elizabeth A. Pomfret. 2008. A Novel Boundary Issue: Should A Patient Be
An Organ Donor For Their Physician? Journal of Medical Ethics 34: 772–774.
Sullivan, Amy D., Katrina Hedberg, and David W. Fleming. 2000. Legalized Physician-Assisted
Suicide in Oregon-The Second Year. The New England Journal of Medicine 342: 598–604.
Tarzian, Anita J., Lucia D. Wocial, The A.S.B.H. Clinical, and Ethics Consultation Affairs Com-
mittee. 2015. A Code of Ethics for Health Care Ethics Consultants: Journey to the Present and
Implications for the Field. American Journal of Bioethics 15 (5): 38–51.
Wasson, Katherine, Anderson, Emily, Hagstrom, Erika et al. 2016. What Ethical Issues Really Arise
in Practice at an Academic Medical Center? A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Clinical
Ethics Consultations from 2008 to 2013. HEC Forum 28: 217–228. available at https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10730-015-9293-5. Accessed 15 Feb 2019.
Yarmolinsky, Rachael. 2016. Ethics for Ethicists? The Professionalization of Clinical Ethics
Consultation. AMA Journal of Ethics 18 (5): 506–513.
Chapter 17
The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality
and Applied Ethics: Conclusion

Abstract Many disagreements characterize the nature of morality. I briefly sum-

marize these conflicting viewpoints. Is morality rooted in reason or the emotions?
Is morality a form of objective truth or is it false and oppressive? How should we
confront moral evil and moral uncertainty? The answers to these difficult questions
comes not only from moral philosophers but also from respected role models such
as family, teachers, clergy, friends and experience.

Moral Disagreement

My review of the moral philosophy of a few of history’s most influential philosophers

revealed a disconcerting fact: they often disagree with each other and over long
periods of time there has evolved no consensus among philosophers. Kant accepted
morality as a fact he called the moral law; the moral law was to be known by reason.
Hume and Nietzsche disagreed with Kant and denied the existence of objective moral
truths. Kant believed in the primacy of reason. Hume denigrated reason and said it
was the slave of the passions. For Kant morality would bring happiness; for Nietzsche
morality was oppressive and stifling to the human spirit. Kant imagined a world in
which there is complete virtue and complete happiness. Hobbes believed human
nature was controlled by self-interest and feared civil war.
Differences also exist between deontological and utilitarian theorists. Deontolo-
gists, such as Kant, base morality on adherence to rules and principles. Utilitarian’s,
such as Mill, emphasize consequences, such as the maximization of the good, how-
ever defined. Beauchamp and Childress include beneficence, the moral obligation
to act for the benefit of others, as one of their four operative moral principles. Gert
omits beneficence and limits his version of morality to the prevention of harm; he
relegates beneficence to a moral ideal. Disagreement also exists between religious
and secular philosophers.
The Sophists of the fifth century Greek world were itinerant teachers. Protagoras,
one of the most prominent Sophists, was aware of cultural diversity and considered
morality as a set of shared human conventions that provided community cohesion
(Norman 1998). This idea is referred to as moral relativism. Moral relativism is

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 221

D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_17
222 17 The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics: Conclusion

“the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular
standpoint” such as a culture or a historical period. Norman claims every philoso-
phy contains an inappropriate ideology that reflects the limited perspective of the
philosopher’s social class (Norman 1998).
Moral relativism has been associated with the denial of valid universal moral
values. It has been criticized because it makes unacceptable any universal moral
standard and praised because it promotes tolerance and the understanding of other
cultures. A major objection to moral relativism is that it implies, “anything goes”.
For example in previous years slavery could be justified as a cultural norm in the
American south (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018).

The Nature of Morality

Morality is an idea, an abstract concept; it is not an object that can be examined. We

cannot know the specifics of morality the way we can know a tree, an animal, a car, or
some other physical object. We cannot know whether moral knowledge is correct in
the same manner we can determine whether Einstein’s theories are correct. Morality,
has no physical substance to feel or see; we can only know it’s a man-made concept
that refers to what we should highly value and how we ought to behave. The term
morality is malleable and can lend itself to different specifications. It should not be
surprising that people have differing values and standards of behavior.
Because of these disagreements it has been suggested the role of moral philoso-
phers be limited to clarifying the meaning of terms and the reasons for acting in
a certain way. Some philosophers don’t want to act as self- appointed experts and
believe that people should decide for themselves what constitutes a good life.
How do I reconcile a view of morality as simultaneously questionable, yet impor-
tant? The best answer I can offer is that we have no choice; with rare exceptions we
live in communities and interact with other people. Fortunately, the majority of day
to day moral decisions are easily made and require little, if any, thought. It may not
even occur to us that we are making a moral decision. We know not to injure or kill
an innocent person. We know not to steal, lie or cheat. If we want to live a peaceful
and meaningful life it’s important to live harmoniously with others. Both morality
and people are imperfect and life is filled with uncertainty. When the truth of a moral
argument is unclear we should proceed with faith in our best instincts.
Despite centuries of moral philosophy the world remains plagued with immoral
behavior. I suspect most people and most governments who behave immorally are
not acting out of moral ignorance. We have probably reached the limit of the practical
benefits we can expect from additional moral theories. We need to focus our attention
on ways to increase compliance with the appropriate moral behavior whose essence
has for centuries been described in various moral theories.
Evolution and Values 223

Evolution and Values

Evolution has provided the capacity to recognize values as extremely important and
worthy of protection and preservation. This mechanism was conserved by natural
selection because it provided a reproductive and survival advantage. Certain behav-
ioral values recognized as extremely important became known as moral values. The
selection of which values should be considered moral values and how they should
be hierarchically ranked are questions that helped spawned the religious, secular
and professional enterprise of morality. The selection of values did not necessarily
conform to what our ordinary morality would consider moral. A person who valued
wealth or extreme power might, to achieve that goal, engage in activities we would
consider immoral.
Although I’ve referred to moral philosophers we interact with a variety of moral
role models. We learn about morality from our parents, other relatives, teachers,
religious leaders, friends, and we learn from our experience. Despite their erudition
and carefully argued theories I suspect only a small portion of our individual moral
behavior is motivated by moral philosophers. Moral philosophers often write using
arcane language, their arguments can be tortuous and difficult to follow. Relatively
few people read the moral philosophers.
Despite these considerations moral philosophers have had a significant impact by
teaching us how to think about morality. Moral philosophers have made significant
practical contributions in the arena of applied ethics. Philosophical commentary has
clarified and influenced thinking on a variety of perplexing issues. In our practical
arguments we often employ moral concepts and arguments developed by moral
philosophers.
The teachings of moral philosophers deserve our attention while keeping in mind
they are offering their opinion on how we should behave; they are not authoritative.
We also need to recognize that a moral dilemma may have more than one correct
answer and for some dilemmas there may be no obviously correct answer. In the end,
we must make our own moral judgments.

Natural Selection

Natural selection has provided the capacity to recognize certain values as important
and worthy of protection and preservation; however, natural selection, the process
that sculpts our brain’s neural circuits functions blind to morality. A chimpanzee
who coordinates with other chimpanzees when hunting doesn’t cooperate because
it’s the moral thing to do; he cooperates because he recognizes cooperation increases
the likelihood he will eat dinner.
Evil exists because evolution is indifferent to morality and does not forbid evil.
We depend on human psychology (conscience), religion, culture, and the law to
ward off evil; nonetheless, people commit fraud, rob, assault, murder, start wars, and
224 17 The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics: Conclusion

commit genocide. There is a need for greater compliance with the basic moral rules
which have already been established. Instead of arguing over methods it would be
worthwhile to try to define a consensus objective for morality.
Morality silently delivers another important message; it not only directs our per-
sonal behavior, it also sends a message to other people telling them what they should
and should not do to us. Hence the popular aphorism, “Do onto others as you would
have them do to you”.

What Is the Origin of Morality?

There is no way to confirm the specifics of what happened in the very distant past.
I will use my imagination and speculate the birth of morality happened when one
of our very remote ancestors indignantly said, “You ate my lizard and seeds! You
shouldn’t do that!”.

References

Moral Relativism. 2018. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. Available at
https://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed 16 Jan 2018.
Norman, Richard. 1998. The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Index

A Armenian genocide, 120

Abolitionists, 103 Artha, 94
Acquired sociopathy, 141 Aryan race, 166
Act and rule utilitarians, 165 Ashramas, 94
Act utilitarian, 165 Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Aggression, 23–25 (ARTs), 207
Ahimsa, 95 Atheism, 79
Akrasia, 151 Atheist, 79, 152
Alpha male, 16 Atheistic scientists, 79
Alpha male chimpanzees, 19, 22 Auschwitz, 117, 120
Al-Qaeda, 90 Autonomous rational will, 42
Altruism, 13, 14, 20, 91, 128, 164 Autonomy, 175, 179, 189
Altruistic, 91
Altruistic punishment, 42
American Bar Association (ABA), 195, 196 B
American Eugenics Society, 33 Beauchamp, 175, 186, 189
American Medical Association (AMA), 195 Beauchamp and Childress, 134, 165, 176,
American Psychiatric Association (APA), 186, 221
201 Behaviors, 77
American Red Cross (ARC), 195 Benedict said, 67
American society of mechanical engineers, Beneficence, 175, 182
197 Bentham, 163
Amoral, 141 Bernard Gert, 4
Amoralist, 141 Bernard Madoff, 131
Analects, 90, 91 Bernat, 54
Anarchist, 100 Bhagavad Gita, 94
Andrew Jackson, 103 Bible, 86
Anti-gay law, 71 Biological, 12
Anti-semitic, 103 Biological antecedents, 11
Anti-semitism, 115, 116, 121 Biological foundation of mind, 11
Antisocial personality, 142 Biomedical dilemmas, 207
Antisocial personality disorder, 142, 143 Biomedical ethics, 205
Apathy, 119 Blood transfusions, 86
Applied ethics, 133, 193–195, 205, 223 Book of proverbs, 83
Applied organizational ethics, 196 Brahmins, 95
Aristotle, 100, 147–151 Buddha, 87
Armageddon, 86 Buddhism, 77, 87
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 225
D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1
226 Index

Buddhist ethics, 87 Conflict management, 6

Butler act, 86 Conflict resolution, 22
Confucian, 91
Confucian ethics, 91–93
C Confucianism, 77
Callahan, 78 Confucius, 90–92
Campbell, 4 Conscience, 25, 27, 140, 158, 169
Cannabalism, 23 Consequences, 164
Cannibalism, 38 Consequentialism, 164
Caring, 16 Conventionality thesis, 102
Caste system, 95 Cooperation, 19, 22, 128
Categorical imperative, 158 Cooperative behavior, 17
Catholic theology, 100 Co-operative sociality, 5, 19
Causation, 153, 154 Cost benefit analysis, 182
Cause, 154 Cost-effectiveness analysis, 182
CE, 87 Criteria of morality, 162
Challenger, 198–200 Crusaders, 80
Challenger disaster, 200 Crusades, 80
Challenger space shuttle, 198 Cultural anthropologists, 65
Characteristics, 12 Cultural diversity, 15, 221
Charles B. Davenport, 33 Cultural evolution, 68
Charles Darwin, 12 Cultural relativism, 7
Cheetahs, 18 Cultural relativity, 73
Childress, 175 Cultural survival, 73
Chimpanzee, 16–18, 39, 128 Cultural system, 77
Chimpanzee adoptions, 17 Culture, 63, 64, 67, 72
Chimpanzee behavior, 40
Chimpanzee society, 39
Chimpanzee war, 39 D
Christian faith, 85 Dao, 91
Christian fundamentalists, 86 Darwinian forces, 7
Christianity, 77, 85 Data breaches, 196, 197
Christian science, 85, 86 David Hume, 4, 49, 111, 152
Christian scientists, 85 Dawkins, 12, 32, 33, 79
Christopher Boehm’s, 5 Day of resurrection, 88
Chronic traumatic encephalopathy, 144 Dead donor rule, 54
Clarence Darrow, 86 Define culture, 64
Code of ethics, 194, 200 Defined culture, 64
Cognitivist, 139 Define morality, 6
Common Era, 83 Definition of death, 55, 130
Common morality, 15, 68, 176, 185–188 Definition of morality, 5, 6
Common morality theory, 185 Definition of religion, 77
Common moral theory, 176 Definitions of culture, 63
Communitarians, 181 Deir Yassin, 84
Communitarian theories, 180, 181 Deontological theory, 7, 164
Community, 78 Deontologist, 129
Community concern, 22 Descriptive ethics, 132
Compatible-incompatible exchange, 137 Descriptive moral theory, 132
Compatible-incompatible kidney exchange, Dharma, 87, 94
136 Disinterested objective morality, 14
Compendium, 83 Distributive justice, 179
Compromise of 1850, 103 Divine moral law, 81
Conflicting principles, 176, 177 Dogmatic skeptics, 7
Index 227

Dogs, 103 Extra-moral factors, 46

Dominance hierarchy, 16 Extra-moral framing factors, 52
Duty, 159, 165

F
E Fairness, 5, 6
Effect, 154 Fantasy world, 119
Egalitarian, 180 Female genital cutting, 72
Elephants, 16 Female genital mutilation, 71, 72
Embryo adoption, 53 Firefly, 38
Embryo donation, 53 First Crusade, 80
Emotion, 48, 49, 128, 155 Flack and de Waal, 6
Empathy, 16, 142 Food sharing, 19
Empirical content, 4 Footbridge dilemma, 50, 51
Engineer’s ethical code, 200 Formal principle of justice, 179, 181
Framing, 52
Enlightened, 87
Free-soilers, 103
Epistemological moral skeptics, 7
Fugitive slave act, 103
Ethical dilemmas, 193
Fundamentalism, 90
Ethical obligations, 196
Ethical precepts, 89
Ethical problem, 194
G
Ethical theory, 127
Gabriel, 87
Ethicists, 5, 135 Gage, 143, 144
Ethics, 77, 127 Gemara, 83
Ethics and religion, 79 Gender dysphoria, 55
Ethics consultants, 215 Gene, 12, 14
Ethics consultation, 217 Generations, 12
Ethics consultation service, 205, 206 Genes, 12
Ethics consult service, 216 Genetically modified organisms, 53
Ethics if divinity, 132 Genetic mutations, 12
Ethics of autonomy, 64, 132 Genocide, 121
Ethics of community, 64, 132 Gert, 5, 57, 68, 79, 109, 128, 133, 135, 154,
Ethics of divinity, 64 176, 182, 187
Eudaimonia, 149 Gestapo, 103
Eugenics, 33, 34 God, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88–90, 100, 112,
Eusociality, 13 155, 161, 166
Euthanasia, 34 God’s kingdom, 86
Evil, 5, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 151, Goldwater rule, 201, 202
168 Graham, 34
Evolution, 12, 32, 37, 41, 42, 86, 128, 223 Gratitude, 21
Evolution and ethics, 41 Groom, 19
Evolutionary biologist, 15 Grooming, 17, 20
Evolutionary biology, 12 Group cooperation, 17
Evolutionary inclinations, 8 Group selection, 13
Evolutionary influence, 8 Guilt, 25, 27, 144
Evolutionary process, 32 Gunas, 94
Evolutionary psychology, 45
Evolutionary theory, 32
Evolution of guilt, 24 H
Evolution of morality, 168 Halakha, 83
Externalism, 140 Hamas, 90
Externalist, 140 Happiness, 160–164
Extramarital intercourse, 103 Herbert Spencer, 32
228 Index

Heuristic, 56 Islam, 77, 87, 88, 90

Heuristics, 48, 56 Islamic fundamentalism, 89
Hexis, 150 Islamic fundamentalists, 89
Hindu ethics, 94 Islamic law, 88
Hinduism, 77, 95 Islamic piety, 88
Hindu morality, 95 Islamic terrorist attack, 90
Hindu philosophy, 94 Islamic terrorists, 90
Hindus should avoid the five Yamas, 94 Islamic theology, 88
Hobbes, 100, 121, 154, 221
Holocaust, 116, 121, 122
Homosexuality, 69, 71 J
Homosexuals, 71 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 90
Honor killing, 70 Jane Goodall, 17
Hospital ethics committee, 206 Jeffrey Dahmer, 142
Hospital ethics consultation, 206 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 86, 202
H.udūd punishments, 89 Jeremy Bentham, 161
Human brain, 46 Jerusalem Talmud, 83
Human evolution, 86 Jesus, 85
Human nature, 153, 155 Jewish ethics, 81, 83
Hume, 111, 152–156, 221 Jewish law, 83
Humean, 139 Jewish religious law, 83
Hume’s copy thesis, 153 Jews, 103
Hume’s emotivist, 156 Jihad, 90
Hunt cooperatively, 18 Jihadism, 90
Huxley, 40, 41 Jihadists, 90
Joan of Arc, 80
John Kemeny, 4
I John Rawls, 136, 180
Imbeciles, 33 John Stuart Mill, 128, 160, 178
Immanuel Kant, 49, 128, 157, 178 John T. Scopes, 86
Immeasurables, 87 Joint commission on accreditation of health
Immoral, 3, 7, 37 care organizations, 206
Immoral act, 6 Josef Mengele, 117
Immoral behavior, 38, 131, 133, 151 Joyce, 5, 6
Immorality, 7, 38, 80 Judaism, 77, 81
Impartial-rule theory, 175 Judgment, 129, 151, 179
Incest, 14, 52, 53 Juhad, 90
Incest taboo, 52 Junzi, 91
Inclusive fitness, 13, 51 Justice, 22, 25, 41, 169, 175, 179–181
Indian removal, 103
Indian removal act, 103
Individual selection, 14 K
Infanticide, 38 Kahneman, 48, 51
Inherited, 12 Kama, 94
Innate truth of morality, 4 Kant, 49, 157, 158, 160, 161, 221
Inquisition, 80 Kantian philosophy, 7
Instrumentalist, 139 Karl Marx, 170
Internalism, 140 Karma, 87
Internalists, 140 Khymer Rouge, 120
Interpersonal and societal relationships, 6 Killing, 38
Intuitionists, 160 Kin selection, 13, 41
Involuntary sterilization, 33, 34 Kluckhohn, 64, 72, 73
ISIS, 90 Kshatriyas, 95
Index 229

L Moral ideas, 167

Lack of interest in social relationships, 119 Moral indignation, 25, 42, 144
Language, 48, 51 Moral internalist, 140
Law and morality, 99, 101, 102, 106 Moral intuitions, 27, 48, 49, 55
Lawyer’s ethical obligations, 196 Moral issue, 193, 194
Learned adjustment, 16 Moralistic aggression, 20, 25
Legal naturalism, 99 Morality, 3–5, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25,
Legal naturalists, 100 37, 42, 49, 79, 80, 84, 110, 130, 132,
Legal positivism, 99, 101, 102, 106 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 166, 193,
Legal positivist, 101–105 222
Legal theories, 99 Morality and the law, 102
Legitimate authority, 104 Moralized guilt, 169
Leonard Katz, 6 Moral judgment, 46, 155, 221
Li, 92 Moral knowledge, 4, 155
Liberal eugenics, 34, 35 Moral law, 81, 158, 221
Libertarian theories, 180 Moral motivation, 139
Limit to moral expertise, 217 Moral nihilists, 7
Lives not worth living, 34 Moral objective, 189
Ludwig Feuerbach’s, 166 Moral obligation, 57, 133–136, 164
Moral philosophers, 65, 68, 193, 223
Moral philosophy, 157, 222
M Moral principles, 6, 127, 129, 175
Madison Powers, 217 Moral property, 4
Magnus, 217 Moral psychology, 8, 45, 46
Mangala Sutta, 87 Moral realism, 130, 131
Marx, 170 Moral realists, 130
Masada, 82 Moral relativism, 15, 66–68, 221
Medicalization of killing, 117 Moral responsibility, 87
Memes, 65 Moral rules, 127, 133, 187
Mengele, 117–119 Moral sense, 24
Meta-ethics, 132 Moral sentiments, 48, 155, 156
Metaphors to illness, 56 Moral skepticism, 7
Metaphysics, 157 Moral skeptics, 6–8
Milgram, 112, 113, 121 Moral theory, 127, 129, 133
Mill, 128, 160–164, 221 Moral truth, 4, 112, 155
Mishnah, 83 Moral values, 194, 223
Mississippi, 103 Morphological liberationism, 55
Moksa, 94, 95 Morton Thiokol, 198
Monkeys, 18 Muhammad, 87–89
Moore, G.E., 4 Multiculturalism, 66
Moral, 112, 140, 149 Multidisciplinary, 194
Moral aggression, 24 Muslim, 88, 89
Moral beliefs, 7 Muslim legal theory, 88
Moral blame, 144 Muslims, 88
Moral character, 7 Mutual grooming, 16, 17
Moral claims, 155 Mutual obligations, 19
Moral commonality, 188 My Lai, 115, 116
Moral confabulations, 46 My Lai massacre, 116
Moral disagreements, 4
Moral expertise, 215
Moral facts and moral truths, 7 N
Moral heuristics, 56 NASA, 198, 199
Moral ideal, 58, 78, 79, 133–135, 137, 164, National society of professional engineers,
182 197
230 Index

Naturalism, 160 Pancasila, 87

Naturalistic fallacy, 14 Patient-physician boundary, 210
Natural law, 85, 100, 101 Perceptions, 153
Natural law legal theories, 101 Personal autonomy, 178
Natural legalism, 101 Personalist, 139
Natural selection, 12–14, 32, 34, 38, 41, 42, Perspectivism, 167
79, 128 Peter Singer, 5
Nature of morality, 6 Peterson, 5
Nazi, 120 Phineas P. Gage, 143
Nazi concentration camps, 103 Phronesis, 151
Nazi Germany, 33, 103 Physician–patient relationship, 210
Nazi ideology, 119 Pinker, 6, 7
Nazi police battalions, 114 Plato, 140, 147–151
Nazis, 119, 166 Political anarchism, 99, 100
Near immortality of the gene, 13 Political anarchists, 100
Negative eugenics, 33 Political terrorism, 79
Neitzsche, 169 Pol Pot, 120
Nietzsche, 112, 156, 166–169, 221 Populations, 12
Nirvana, 87 Positive eugenics, 33
Niyamas, 94 Practical moral skeptics, 7
Nobel Prize Sperm Bank, 34 Practical reason, 162
Noble and slave moralities, 170 Pranidhan, 94
Noble morality, 167, 168 President Jackson, 103
Nonmaleficence, 175, 182 Principle of justice, 179
Non-violence, 95 Principle of utility, 128, 160–164
Normative, 127 Principles, 175
Normative ethics, 128 Principlism, 175, 176
Normative motivation, 139 Prinz, 67, 68, 140
Northern, 103 Profession, 216
Novel biotechnologies, 207 Professional boundary, 210
Nternalism, 140 Professional codes of ethics, 195
Nuremberg laws, 103 Professional ethics, 196
Prophecies, 77
Protagoras, 221
O Psychological egoism, 154
Obedience, 112, 113 Psychological inclination of obedience to
Obedience to authority, 112 proper anthority, 16
Objective morality, 170 Psychopaths, 141–143
Objective moral truths, 221 Public policy, 130, 217
Objective moral values, 79, 167 Punishment, 169
Objective of morality, 189 Purushartha, 94
Object of morality, 158, 189 Pyrrhonian skeptics, 7
Obligation to obey, 104
Obligatory beneficence, 134
Oral Torah, 83 Q
Organ exchange programs, 135 Quran, 87–90
Organizations, 77
Organ transplantation, 135
Origins of morality, 11 R
O-rings, 198–200 Rabbi Hillel, 83
Rabbinic Judaism, 83
Rabbinic literature, 83
P Racial, 103
Palliative sedation, 53 Racial hygiene, 33
Index 231

Rape, 38 Singer, 133, 134

Rawls, 22, 175, 180, 181 Skeptics of morality, 4
Rawl’s theory of Justice, 180 Slave-holding, 103
Reason, 139, 140, 149–151, 155, 157, 158, Slave morality, 167–169
221 Sober and Wilson, 6
Reciprocal altruism, 20, 38, 128 Social Darwinism, 31, 32, 35
Reciprocally altruistic behavior, 128 Social Darwinists, 32
Reciprocal relationships, 20 Social fact thesis, 102
Reciprocate, 20 Social practice, 101
Reciprocation, 21 Society for biodemography and social biol-
Reciprocity, 6, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27 ogy, 33
Reichstag, 103 Sociobiology, 45
Religious community, 78, 79 Sontag, 56
Religious ethics, 86 Sophists, 221
Religious terrorism, 90 Southern, 103
Ren, 91 Spack, 55
Repository for germinal choice, 34 Specialism, 56
Respect for authority, 16 Specification, 177
Responsibility, 47 Spencer, 32, 35
Riggs v. Palmer, 105 Spiritual, 77
Ritual forms, 94 Spotted hyenas, 18
Robert K. Graham, 34 Steinberg, 55
Robert M. Veatch, 5 Stigma, 66
Rogers commission, 198 Stigmatized groups, 66
Ross, W.D., 164, 165 Street, 7
Rules and principles, 16 Subjectivism, 111
Ruse, 38, 41, 110 Sudras, 95
Ruse and Wilson, 5 Sunnah, 87, 88
Survival and reproductive advantage, 14
Swadhyaya, 94
S Sympathy, 16, 156
Sanca, 94
Sanctified places, 77
Sangha, 87 T
Santosha, 94 Talmud, 81, 83
Scopes monkey trial, 86 Tapas, 94
Scopes trial, 86 Ten commandments, 14, 16, 78, 81
Secular ethics, 78 Tennessee’s, 86
Secular morality, 78, 79 Terminal sedation, 53
Secular philosophical ethics, 86 Texts, 77
Self-interest theories, 154 That man is able to know, 87
Self-styled moralist, 8 The essence of christianity, 166
Sentimentalism, 155, 156 Theologically based ethics, 7
Sentimentalist, 139 Thics consultation, 206
Separability thesis, 102 Thomas Acquinas, 85
Sex, 19 Thomas Aquinas, 100, 101
Sex selective, 72 Thomas Henry Huxley, 40
Sexual cannibalism, 13 Thomas Hobbes, 129, 154
Shariah, 88, 90 Tikkun Olam, 82
Shariah law, 88, 89 Torah, 81–83
Sharia law, 90 Treatise of Human Nature, 152
Sharing food, 18 Trivers, 38, 128
Shweder, 64, 69, 176 Trolley and footbridge dilemmas, 49, 50
232 Index

Trolley dilemma, 49–51 Vinaya, 87

Truth of morality, 4 Virtue, 85, 148–150, 156
Tversky and Kahneman, 52 Virtue based theory, 149
Tzedakah, 81 Virtue ethics, 91, 93
Virtue, obligation, 5
Virtue theorist, 156
U
Übermensch, 166
Ultimate truths, 14 W
United States Congress, 103 Warnock, 129–131
Universality, 127 Whole brain death, 54
Universal law, 159 Williams, 38
Universal moral truths, 7 Within group selection, 14
Universals in moral systems, 6 Word framing, 58
Untouchables, 95 Word framing effect, 52
US Supreme Court Judge Potter Stewart, 6 World views, 77
Utilitarianism, 160–162, 164, 180 World War II, 166
Utilitarians, 161, 165, 221
Utilitarian theory, 7, 159, 180
Utility, 164 X
Xi, 91

V
Vaisyas, 95 Y
Value-laden propositions, 54 Yi, 92
Values, 194
Varnasramas, 94
Veatch, 55, 186 Z
Vedas and Upanishads, 94 Zhi, 92
Veil of ignorance, 136, 175, 181 Zimbardo, 113, 114, 121