International Institute of Philosophy

Institut International de Philo sophie

La philosophie contemporaine
Chroniques nouvelles

par les soins de

GUTTORM FL0ISTAD
Universite d'Oslo

Tome 3
Philosophie de l' action

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague/Boston/London 1982

Contemporary philosophy
A new survey

edited by
GUTTORM FL0ISTAD
University oj Oslo

Volume 3
Philosophy of action

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague/Boston/London 1982

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data ClP

Main entry under title:

Contemporary philosophy.

Added t.p.: La philosophie contemporaine.

Half title: International Institute of Philosophy. Institut international de
philosophie.
English or French.
'A continuation of two earlier series of chronicles, Philosophy in the mid-century
(Firenze 1958/59) and Contemporary philosophy (Firenze 1968), - Pref.
Includes indexes
Contents: v. 1. Philosophy oflanguage, Philosophicallogic / co-editor, G.H. von
Wright. v. 2. Philosophy of science.
-v. 3. Philosophy of action.
1. Philosophy, Modern - 20th century - Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Fl"istad,
Guttorm, 1930- . II. Wright, G.H. (Georg Henrik), 1916- . III. International In-
stitute of Philosophy. IV. Title: La philosophie contemporaine.

B804.C573 190'.9'04 81-3972

AACR2

ISBN 978-90-247-3299-9 ISBN 978-94-015-3948-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-3948-7

Published under the auspices of the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic
Studies and of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, with the support
of UNESCO.

Publie sous les auspices du Conseil International de la Philosophie et des Sciences Hu-
maines et de la Federation Internationale des Societes de Philosophie, avec Ie concours
de I'UNESCO.

Copyright © 1982 by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1982
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Contents/Table des matieres

G. Fl0istad, Preface VII

G. Fl0istad, Introduction 1

R. Tuomela, Explanation of action 15

F. Stoutland, Philosophy of action: Davidson, von Wright,

and the debate over causation 45

J .E. Tiles, Ability, possibility and responsibility 73

J. Raz, The problem about the nature of law 107

E. Bulygin, Norms, normative propositions, and legal

statements 127

R. Martin, On the justification of rights 153

V. Rossvrer, Kant's practical philosophy 187

B. Waldenfels, Sozialphilosophie im Spannungsfeld von

Phanomenologie und Marxismus 219

L. Nowak, On Marxist social philosophy 243

A.M. Fagot, Science et ethique 277

VI Contents

Abbreviations used by some contributors 351

Index of names 353

Index of subjects 362

Preface

This publication is a continuation of two earlier series of chroni-

cles, Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Firenze 1958/59) and Con-
temporary Philosophy (Firenze 1968), edited by Raymond Kli-
bansky. Like the other series, these chronicles provide a survey of
important trends in contemporary philosophical discussion from
1966 to 1978.
The need for such surveys has, I believe, increased rather than
decreased over the last years. The philosophical scene appears, for
various reasons, more complex than ever before. The continuing
process of specialization in most branches, the emergence of new
schools of thought, particularly in philosophical logic and the
philosophy of language, the convergence of interest (though not
necessarily of opinion) of different traditions upon certain prob-
lems, and the increasing attention being paid to the history of
philosophy in discussions of contemporary problems are the most
important contributory factors. Surveys of the present kind are a
valuable source of knowledge of this complexity and may as such
be an assistance in renewing the understanding of one's own
philosophical problems. The surveys, it is to be hoped, may also
help to strengthen the Socratic element of modern philosophy, the
dialogue or Kommunikationsgemeinschajt.
So far, four volumes have been prepared for the new series. The
present chronicles in Philosophy of Action (Vol. 3) follow upon
chronicles in the Philosophy of Language and Philosophical Logic
(V 01. 1) and chronicles in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 2) and
are themselves followed by chronicles in the Philosophy of Mind
(Vol. 4). Each volume contains, as a rule, fifteen chronicles, each
25 pages long. However, this rule has been broken in all volumes.
VIII Pre/ace

In some cases it turned out to be impossible to receive chronicles

in time for the date of publication. In others, the authors, if they
thought it necessary in view of their topic, were allowed to exceed
the allotted number of pages. For these reasons certain philosoph-
ical disciplines, particularly in the Philosophical Logic of Volume
1, and the Philosophy of Action in Volume 3, are covered less sat-
isfactorily than others, apart from the fact that the volumes are
of unequal length. The first two chronicles of Volume 3 are also
partly overlapping.
Most of the chronicles, as to be expected, are written in English,
some in French and one in German. The German contributors, ex-
cept one, thought it necessary to write in English in order to be
read. This is, I think, a most regrettable state of affairs. It indi-
cates that major parts of the philosophical community will no
longer have access to important sources of the history of philoso-
phy in their original version.
The topics surveyed in the four volumes belong squarely within
the Western philosophical tradition and do little justice to philo-
sophies or ways of thinking in other cultures. This should be kept
in mind in the preparation of further volumes. The idea of a trans-
cultural philosophy is still very unclear.
Bibliographical references, with a few exceptions, follow the
pattern introduced in Philosophy in the Mid-Century. The publi-
cations discussed in each chronicle are indicated by reference
numbers in square brackets, corresponding to the order in which
they appear in the text. The bibliographies themselves follow at
the end of each chronicle, arranged in alphabetical order.
The bibliographies are selected by the authors themselves and
contain, as a rule, only those works they took to be of special in-
terest for the topics under discussion.
I am most grateful to a number of persons, who in various ways
have assisted in the preparation of the new series. My thanks are
first of all due to the former president of the Institut International
de Philosophie, Georg H. von Wright, who in addition to writing
the introduction to Part 2, Philosophical Logic, of Volume 1 has
given valuable suggestions concerning the topics to be surveyed as
well as the contributors to all volumes. The former editor of the
Chronicles, Raymond Klibansky, who has devoted much of his
eminent scholarship and his time to the editorial work of the
 Preface IX

earlier Chronicles, provided me with much useful experience. Nils

Heyerdahl, M.A., and Espen Schaaning undertook most consci-
entiously the unpleasant task of reviewing the methods of refer-
ence and the bibliographies to make them comply with the given
model. The secretary of the Institute of the History of Ideas,
Wenche Karin Nesse, has with admirable patience typewritten nu-
merous letters in various languages and otherwise assisted in the
preparations.
My thanks are also due to UNESCO for their financial support
and to Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, for their willing-
ness to publish the Chronicles. The Secretariat of the Institut In-
ternational de Philosophie deserves special recognition for its
most helpful assistance in administrative matters. The Secretariat
has also been responsible for the contact with UNESCO and the
Publisher.
Lastly, I want to thank all the scholars from various countries,
whose contributions have made it possible to complete the new
series of Chronicles.

University of Oslo, May 1981 Guttorm F10istad

Introduction
GUTTORM FLq>ISTAD

Philosophical problems, like everything else, have a history. The

wide range of problems in the philosophy of action has a long and
most remarkable history - in fact much longer and more remark-
able than the modern term 'philosophy of action' itself suggests.
This history certainly goes back far beyond Wittgenstein and Ryle
who, on account of their 'existential behaviourism', are sometimes
mentioned as the founders of modern philosophy of action. That
actions are forms of life or that man is what he is doing, are no
novelties. Aristotle and his follower Spinoza, among others knew
this very well. In some respects it may be said that they knew it
even better than we do, despite the admirable efforts, particularly
in modern analytical philosophy, to explain actions and their logic.
The strength of the older accounts of human action is not to be
found so much in theories of how singular actions are to be ex-
plained and understood, as in the knowledge of various types of
actions and their role within the total field of human experience.
To act is, according to Spinoza, for instance, to interact with the
human community and nature as a whole, thereby increasing the
agent's power of acting and self-determination, and thus contrib-
uting to the emancipation of himself and others form 'external
forces'. This interaction may in fact be called the nature or essence
of man (in clear opposition to the Cartesian view).
This holistic and emancipatory approach to human actions is
also in various ways to be found in modern philosophy, for in-
stance in Marxism and other types of social philosophy. These
philosophies provide particular actions with contextual (or prag-
matic) elements that are essential to an explanation and under-
standing of the actions.

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 1-14.

© 1982, Martinus Ni;hoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
2 G. Fl¢is tad

Modern philosophy of action has also shown great ingenuity in

taking care of and developing in considerable detail another feature
of classical philosophy, that of the synthesizing character of the
philosophy of action with respect to other philosophical disciplines:
the philosophy of action comprises, for instance, philosophy of
mind and body, social philosophy, and the philosophies of lan-
guage, science and ethics. The philosophy of action even 'bridges
the gap' between metaphysics and empiricism (Stoutland).
What then does it mean to explain and understand an action?
The present collection of chronicles gives a variety of answers,
taking care of both the particular and the holistic appraoch to
actions, as well as showing the multitude of disciplines involved in
the philosophy of action.

I. It is a striking although easily understandable feature of one's

explanation of actions that it in some way or another reflects
one's theory of actions or, in a wider perspective, one's anthro-
pology (cf. Tuomela). To be active is generally an essential feature
of man. This larger theoretical background is obviously also present
in the main theories of explanation in analytical philosophy, in the
mental cause theory (Davidson, Danto) and in the non-causal
hermeneutic or teleological theory (von Wright, Taylor). Thus
both types of theory involve one of the oldest issues in meta-
physics and epistemology, the distinction between mind and body,
and as a result run into a good many of the problems connected
with this distinction (cf. Tuomela and Stoutland).
In the philosophy of action this is most obvious in the central
and as yet unsolved problems of the congruence between mere
bodily behaviour and the underlying mental cause or immanent
intention: a mental cause (or attitude), as well as an intention,
may give rise to or be expressed in a variety of bodily movements.
And one and the same bodily movement may embody a variety of
mental attitudes and intentions. To say, as Davidson does, that
mental attitudes together with their corresponding neural processes
are at once the cause both of the intentional behaviour and the
bodily movements does not seem to be a wholly satisfactory
explanation (cf. Stoutland).
 Introduction 3

2. The main issue between the causal and the intentional ap-
proaches to action-explanation concerns the relation of mental
attitudes to the corresponding intentionality of actions. Von
Wright, for instance, holds that actions are to be identified and
explained in terms of their intentionality, whereas Davidson
thinks that actions are to be accounted for in terms of their under-
lying attitudes or mental causes. And he adds that such a causal
approach to actions is the only method that allows for the dis-
tinction between attitudes that cause a certain behaviour and
those that justify it.
Davidson's answer presupposes that it is possible to identify
mental attitudes independently of the intentions or actions they
give rise to. That is a condition for talking about attitudes as
causes. Von Wright denies that such an independent identification
of attitudes is possible. On the contrary, intentions are the way
(certain) attitudes exist and present themselves (allowing for the
possibility that there may be non-intentional attitudes). Actions
are therefore properly understood not be pointing to some 'remote'
and abstract causes, but by interpretation of their intentions.

3. The two approaches reflect, I think, also with respect to this

controversy, different and in the end irreconcilable metaphysical
and epistemological positions. Davidson, to put it crudely, stands
in the tradition of Descartes (cf. Tuomela and Stoutland), and to
some extent also in that of Hume, Kant and Husseri, whereas von
Wright's intentionality approach shows similarity with the tradi-
tion of Spinoza, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Ryle.
The Cartesian tradition is characterized by the separation (or
dualism) of mind and body, of subject and object and of knowl-
edge and ethics. The tradition of Spinoza certainly acknowledges
the possibility of conceptually distinguishing mind and body,
subject and object, and knowledge and ethics, but is primarily
concerned with the unity of these entities. Ontologically speaking,
mind and body, etc. are united: man is his ideas or actions
(Spinoza), or, man is what he is doing (Heidegger, Ryle), or, to do
something, to use language, is a form of life (Wittgenstein). In
these positions, the 'world' is part and parcel of man's way of life.
The 'active' attitudes of the mind, acquired through experience,
exist as object-directed intentionalities in consciousness. That is
4 G. Fl¢istad

the reason why such attitudes are always attitudes towards some-
thing and not mere potentialities for some action or other. Atti-
tudes have as such a definite direction.
This is what Spinoza expressed by saying that the human mind
consists of a complex idea: ideas are always of something. Heidegger
and Ryle point to the same object-dependence of the mind when
stating in effect that man is what he is doing. And 'doing' is
necessarily doing something. And to use language, Wittgenstein
would say, is always to talk about something in a certain way. To
the Cartesians, on the other hand, there is always an I that exists
on its own and need not be involved with objects in the world.
Rather it finds 'itself' in opposition to the world - to which it
occasionally relates itself. Such an I is therefore likely to construe
the world according to its own 'dualistic' position.
Whether or not the discussion between the causal and inten-
tional approaches to action-explanation may be furthered by
arguments from their respective traditions, is of course difficult
to decide. We may, however, get an answer to this indirectly by
considering some of the other elements that enter into and help
constitu te an action and action-explanation. The causal and in-
tentional approaches to action-explanation just mentioned may in
fact be seen to involve a relatively poor anthropology of actions.

4. First: are actions free or are they determined? Or, are actions
both free and determined? Irrespective of where we stand on these
issues - whether we are incompa tibilists, 'hard or soft' determinists
or compatibilists (cf. Tiles) - our answers necessarily affect our
explanation of actions. That actions are to some extent free is
nowadays agreed by most philosophers. And to act freely is to
'act in possession of the power to act otherwise' (Tiles). No action
is therefore necessary, it is merely possible, irrespective of one's
reasons or of the intensity of one's wants and preferences. To be
merely possible is then part of the meaning of an action and essen-
tial to one's explanation of it. And it is of course this feature that
makes it difficult, if at all possible, to capture action-explanation
in the practical syllogism as von Wright attempts.
It is, moreover, the characteristic of being free that makes action
and action-explanation philosophically interesting. Freedom gives
rise, directly or indirectly, to all the well-known problems of
 Introduction 5

action-explanation, such as the role of ability, possibility, and

responsibility (cf. Tiles), moral and legal rights and their justifica-
tion (cf. Martin, Rossvrer), problems concerning the nature of law
(cf. Raz) and the logic of moral language (cf. Bulygin), as well as
problems of the individual and social constitution of action (cf.
Waldenfels), moral problems of science (cf. Fagot) and of the role
of class conflict in social and historical change (cf. Nowak).
I shall pick out some of these topics for a brief presentation and
discussion.

5. The notion of ability and possibility signifies important personal

and social conditions of an action's occurring. Ability comprises,
for instance, power and skill, but is also used to refer to a person's
external possibilities of action. Thus an action may be performed
with more or less power and skill, and under more or less 'friendly'
and 'unfriendly' external conditions (social and others). And it is
quite clear that the meaning of an action differs in the different
cases. Bad mental or physical conditions or bad weather conditions
may turn even a routine action into a heroic performance. An
action performed with adequate skill differs from the 'same'
action performed with less skill. The actions are just not the same
- even if the bodily movements or the observable features in
general are the same. An interpretation taking into account all the
constitutive elements of these 'same' actions necessarily distin-
guishes between them.
Analysis of ability with respect to both its internal and external
references illuminates the notion of responsibility. The analysis
indicates in particular the difficulties in judging the type and
degree of responsibility involved in various types of action. The
analysis raises in general the question of the relation of various
types of action to moral values, including of course problems of
justification (cf. Martin). That the action-guiding moral values
often present the most difficult problems for an interpretation and
explanation of action is obvious. Moral values often transcend all
observable behaviour - even if they are sometimes regarded as
mere attitudes. A few examples may suffice.
6 G. Flr/Jistad

6. To Kant freedom of the will is a supreme moral value, basic to

the mind's ability to act in accordance with the categorical imper-
ative (cf. Rossvalr). Freedom of the will expresses itself in the
mind's obedience to the categorical imperative. The principles of
the freedom of the will says that whatever causal chains the
phenomenal world imposes upon the actions of the mind, the
mind may at any time, by virtue of the spontaneity of its free will,
exercise its freedom and act in accordance with the categorical
imperative.
As is apparent, a moral principle may provide all of a person's
actions with a higher-order intentionality or teleology, that of
exercising his freedom of will and thereby manifesting himself as a
moral being. The 'surface' intention of an action and its results is
then the medium of this moral self-manifestation.
John Rawls's theory of justice, a modern version of Kant's
moral philosophy, exhibits similar features. One of his fundamen-
tal principles of human rights says that social and economic in-
equalities are to be 'arranged so that they are both to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged ... and attached to offices and posi-
tions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity'
(cf. Martin). This principle tells how a just society should be
organized. But it is also a principle both for acting and for judging
the moral quality of our actions within a just society, or with
respect to realizing such a society.
Irrespective of the validity of Kant's and Rawls's moral philoso-
phies, they represent a model that has wide application in action
theory. This model says that actions are to be explained in terms
of a two-level or even multilevel intentionality.

7. Social philosophy of action explains in some detail what this

amounts to. A basic question is, how are actions constituted? Do
they have an individual or social origin? Husserl holds that actions
are constituted by an ego, whereas Marx holds the opposite view
that actions are from their outset social (cf. Waldenfels). That all
actions have a social character irrespective of the role allotted to
the individual is quite clear. The significance of social institution,
of social roles, of language and the communication situation in
general, bars the individual from ever performing actions entirely
of his (individual) making.
 Introduction 7

To act is often (perhaps most often) to act within a social role.

That is to say, one's action is governed by the rules (linguistic and
other) that constitute the role. The intention guiding the action
certainly belongs to an individual. But behind and therefore in-
volved in the intention we find with equal certainty the social
'imperatives' of the role. The presentation of these imperatives,
that is, the social role, may even be the main objective of the
particular action within the role. Such a presentation is at any
rate always a side-effect of one's action and thus essential to a
proper explanation and understanding of it. That doing a job
contributes at the same time to the preservation of such jobs is
all too evident in a time when jobs and whole professions are dis-
appearing or radically changed by new technology.
A similar two-level intentionality is also to be found, for
instance, in acts of negotiation, of using language and acting as a
member of a social class. To participate in negotiation with a view
to solving some conflict is at the same time to reaffirm the exis-
tence of the social institutional practice of solving conflicts by
way of negotiation (instead of violence). To use languagt! for some
definite purpose is at the same time to reaffirm the existence of
that language (in general). And to act as a member of a social class
is to reinforce the existence of that class.
In all these cases one should notice that the higher-level inten-
tionality is present in the 'individual' action from the outset. It is
the social role or institution that makes individual action possible
- and which enables these actions in turn to affirm the existence
of the social role or institution.

8. To act may, however, be much more complicated than these

instances suggest. There are in fact a number of other features that
a general theory of action and action-explanation must account
for. For example, actions are often part of a communication
situation. And they may be what is often called ideologically dis-
torted and performed with a 'false consciousness' (not only in the
Marxian sense). Actions are also in general part of a historical-
cultural process that must be taken into account if we are to
understand them.
To be part of a communication situation means that the inten-
tional meaning of an action is 'dialogically' (or dialectically) con-
8 G. Flrfiistad

stituted. That is to say, although performed by an individual the

action primarily arises out of a common situation. To act in this
sense is like playing a game. An individual's action is guided by
rules common to both players and by the particular move by the
other player, that is, the latter's particular application of the rules
is a response to an earlier action of the former. For actions to be
part of a game or of a communication situation presupposes the
acceptance of a set of common rules. Actions as part of negotia-
tions is a case in point.
A somewhat different dialectical constitution of the meaning of
an action is to be found in the case where someone breaks the law.
One need not be an Hegelian to see that actions of this kind,
directed against a specific law, may be an attack on the entire legal
system, including legal institutions. In the long run such actions
may lead to opposite results: the legal system may be weakened or
it may be strengthened, depending upon the reactions of others to
such actions. And it is difficult to see how an action in breach of
the law can be properly described without taking both of these
responses into account. The legal system is constitutive of the
meaning of such actions.

9. Scientific activity deserves special mention. From the Renais-

sance onwards science represented with few exceptions a highly
monological and authoritarian activity, hardly questioned by any-
body on account of its conspicuous benefit to humanity. In our
century this picture of science has changed, mainly due to the fact
that parts of science have developed into highly questionable or
even destructive activities (nuclear energy, bio-chemical weapons,
genetic manipulation and a wide-scale pollution of nature and the
humand mind).
The ethics of scientific activity has therefore come into focus
(cf. Fagot). It is of course still possible to distinguish, as perhaps
most scientists are still inclined to, between pure and applied
science, between the mere production of knowledge and its appli-
cation in various fields. But in view of the destructive possibilities
inherent in such scientific knowledge, in addition to the fact that a
good deal of scientific activity is conducted by technological
institutions themselves, this distinction has in general become
increasingly difficult to uphold. Ideological conflicts and lack of
 Introduction 9

moral values applicable to humanity at large, make the step from

the destructive possibilities of knowledge to its actual destructive
use alarmingly short. The result of this moral response to scientific
activity is the insistence that this activity not be separated from
moral considerations (cf. Fagot, Tiles), and further, and conse-
quently, that it be construed as a dialogue (or dialectically). This
merely carries into effect what ought to be the ideal of every
scientific activity, namely, to be an integrated part of the culture
at large.

10. Actions as part of a communication situation are sometimes,

perhaps often, ideologically distorted: the intentions guiding the
action are at least twofold: to produce a visible result that is
publicly justifiable and acceptable, and an ideological higher-order
result that is not so easily detectable, but which may well be the
primary objective of the action. A man gives his wife a ten dollar
note. This may of course be part of a daily routine with nothing
more to it. But it may also, in addition, be an act of the economic
suppression of women. Or to ask and fight for higher wages in
industry may be perfectly legitimate as an attempt to get a fair
share of the economy; but it may also be part of a long-term
strategy to destroy capitalist society. Science is also often said (for
instance by Jiirgen Habermas) to function ideologically: scientific
activity is imbued with political and moral values that in no way
follow from its results.

11. To explain and understand actions as part of a cultural-histori-

cal process is perhaps the most difficult task. It is fairly easy to see
that every action, also daily routines, in nearly every respect bears
the stamp of the historical epoch to which it belongs. The skill and
technology, and the modes of thought involved in them are clear
indications. An adequate explanation and understanding of an
action requires therefore, strictly speaking, an account of the
cultural features present in the action. In explaining our own
actions this is easily overlooked - immersed as we are in the cul-
ture of our own age and therefore largely unaware of its historical
character. The case is quite different when we are confronted with
actions belonging to Ancient Greek or Medieval society.
The explanation and understanding of such action within its
lOG. Flr/listad

cultural context is perhaps a manageable task, given the cooperation

of both natural and social and human sciences. But that is not all
there is to it. Actions, or some of them, actually contribute to
cultural progress or change. Such a contribution is part of the
intentional meaning of a number of political, scientific and mili-
tary actions. This diachronic feature of actions presumably makes
it impossible ever to explain actions in any definitive sense. But it
is certainly possible to explain and understand such actions with
respect to their cultural significance to us. Any such explanation,
however, will hardly be unanimously agreed upon. It will depend
inter alia upon one's philosophy (or theory) of history and histori-
cal change.

12. Marxism, as a philosophy of history, perhaps represents the

strongest possible position. The origin of history and historical
change is, according to Marx, to be found in the struggle between
antagonistic classes. The class struggle leads to the liberation of the
working class and thereby to the whole of humanity. However,
this telos of the class struggle is not achieved as it were by accident.
The Marxist scientific theory of history regards historical change
as largely determined by socia-economic structures. That is to say,
the realization of the telos of the class struggle is largely governed
by laws (cf. Nowak).
Marxism is thus, obviously, a highly ambiguous theory of his-
tory, which allows for at least three different interpretations: the
nomological interpretation which emphasizes the laws of history
and consequently diminishes the role of the class struggle; the
praxistic interpretation which emphasizes the significance of the
class struggle and more or less overlooks the conception of laws of
history, and the orthodox interpretation which stresses the signifi-
cance both of the class struggle and of the laws of history, and
thus preserves the ambiguity (cf. Nowak).
These theories of history are supposed to give the ultimate
meaning to actions in all periods of history: the actions of the
working class (in so far as they are guided by objective class con-
sciousness) are part of the liberation of the working class and
thereby of all humanity. The ultimate meaning of the actions of
the ruling class, on the other hand, is suppression of the working
class.
 Introduction 11

Regardless of the validity of these 'scientific' theories of history,

they are highly instructive as to the significance of a philosophy of
history and social change for a theory of action and action-expla-
nation. Those who, like Popper for instance, firmly reject laws of
history or an immanent teleology of historical change, need not go
to the opposite extreme and only take account of singular actions
or of limited sequences of such actions. The history of philosophy
contains a number of philosophies of history and social change.
Suffice it to mention but one of them, the hermeneutic theory of
history.

13. Hermeneutics is generally known as a theory of interpretation

and, clearly connected with this, as a theory of language. Modern
hermeneutics in Heidegger and Gadamer is, however, in addition
and perhaps primarily, a theory of history, that is, a theory of the
transmission of historical meaning (the meaning of historical
actions, literary texts etc.). The transmission itself is of course a
large-scale enterprise in which everyone more or less consciously
partakes. Everyone grows up in a certain tradition, internalizes
habits and moral principles, modes of thought and speech and thus
takes part in the enculturation process. The hermeneutic theory of
history is a theory of how this transmission of historical meaning
is possible. It is a theory of the 'condition for the possibility' of
our experience of, and communication with, the past.
Underlying the hermeneutic theory of history is the conviction
that a rich enculturation process is vitally important for our pres-
ent and future lives. It enriches our present way of being and
consequently the possibilities of our choice of future actions.
Since we are, on this account, supposed to increase our awareness
of our actions and of the possibilities and consequences as we
enlarge our participation in history, the hermeneutic theory may
also quite properly be regarded as a contribution to discussions of
'ability possibility and responsibility' in action.
The hermeneutic theory of history does not, of course, propa-
gate a selective attitude towards history (as did, for instance, the
humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). It is a
general theory, covering all earlier periods and is equally concerned
with the transmission of both the successes and the failures of
earlier human actions. Knowledge and experience of good and bad
12 G. Fh/Jis tad

actions are certainly both necessary constituents of our freedom

of action.
The hermeneutic theory of history is obviously a much weaker
theory than Marx's. This weakness has at least one advantage: it is
easier to defend.

14. Conclusion. As is apparent, the various theories are either com-

prehensive theories (or anthropologies) of action, or theories of
important constitutive elements of actions. But as pointed out
above, due to the close connection between theories of action
and action-explanation, these theories may certainly contribute in
various ways to throw light on action-explanation, including the
controversy between the causal and intentional approach. The
main contributions may be briefly summarized as follows,
(1) Actions originate in individual attitudes or intentions in a
restricted sense only. The social aspects of actions are necessary
conditions for actions arising.
(2) The social and individual aspects of actions cannot be iden-
tified separately. In action they are intimately tied up with one
another.
(3) It follows, moreover, that on account of their social aspects,
actions cannot properly be explained in isolation from their context.
Even simple actions like opening a window may have references to a
wide psychological and social context. These references, although
present in and determining the meaning of the action, are obvious-
ly not always, and are perhaps never, accessible to the observation
and interpretation of bodily movements. The mere opening of the
window may in fact, in certain cases, be a highly insignificant part
of the meaning of the action. The mere intention to open the
window is only the more or less accidental carrier of the 'real' and
more comprehensive meaning. The need, say, for fresh air present
in the intention derives from widely different motives or causes.
(4) The causes thus turning even a simple action into a complex
one are obviously, just like the causes of the ideological distortion
of actions mentioned earlier, not immediately accessible to our
understanding. Those causes (psychological, social, political,
economical, medical or of whatever kind) are presumably identifi-
able, independently of the action that carries the 'ideological'
meaning - and may therefore properly be called causes. Such
 Introduction 13

complex action seems therefore to require both: an interpretation

of the 'observable' intention and a causal explanation of its more
complex meaning. That the ideological causes are identifiable,
independently follows from the fact that the action may be per-
formed without being ideologically distorted.
(5) Actions occur within a context. That is to say, their mean-
ing is constituted by an immediate and a longer-term objective (or
teleology). The contextual or longer-term objective of an action is
variously interpreted by the various sociological theories and
theories of history. Some sociologists (for instance Berger and
Luckmann) think that actions as role-playing are to be conceived
primarily as externalizations of earlier internalized habits and
values. Hermeneutical philosophers of history emphasize actions,
somewhat similarly, as part of a continuing, long-term transmis-
sion of historical meaning, including values. Hermeneutical philos-
ophy regards these transmissions, moreover, as the basis of free
action and of the creative forces in man. If the hermeneutical
philosophy of history may be said to have any ultimate objective
for our actions, it is the formal one of contributing to the quality
of a dialogical community. Actions are dialogically constituted.
(6) Marxism as a substantial utopian philosophy of history also
considers actions to be dialogically constituted; but in a different
sense from that of hermeneutics: for Marxism actions arise out of
a class conflict. Some Marxists think that the dialogical constitu-
tion of actions develops according to economic laws of history,
others that the utopian goal of this development depends to a
large extent on the initiative of the working class and/or their
party representatives.
(7) The methodological principles of action-explanation con-
tained in these theories are obviously so integrated in their
respective theories that they do not, without some qualification,
function properly outside these theories. This is particularly true
of Marxism, but to some extent also of the weaker hermeneutical
and sociological theories. However, as pointed out earlier, both the
causal and intentional approaches to action-explanation seem to
involve a commitment to some larger metaphysical theory. None
of these methodologies of action-explanation seem therefore to be
anthropologically neutral - although they are all offered as
14 G. Flr;istad

descriptions of action. The context of action-explanation stressed

by hermeneutics and Marxist theories makes at least these theories
morally significant. Actions are the medium of moral (including
social and economic) improvement.
Actions are of course in this respect (as in many others) different,
they have different moral values and power to change the course
of history. In Marxist theories actions that arise from an objective
class consciousness (to use the terminology of Lukacs) rank higher
than those that originate merely in an individual's psychological
consciousness. And in hermeneutics a similar distinction may be
drawn between those actions (or historical meanings) that have
social or communal bearing and those that primarily have reference
to the private sphere.
(8) As compared with traditional theories, such as Aristotle's
and Spinoza's, in which the theory of action was part of a total
world-view, both Marxism and hermeneutics are weaker theories:
even Marxism depends heavily on the course of history for the
realization of its ideal society. In neither theory is there any
definite conception of a substance or a God that is attainable in
knowledge and action at any moment. We have long since dis-
covered that our 'absolutes' or our values in general are historically
and linguistically transmitted (as Waldenfels rightly observes).
Marxism and hermeneutics are, on the other hand, stronger
theories of actions than those involved in the methodological con-
troversy between the causal and intentional approaches to action-
explanation. These methodologies represent in fact very modest
positions - certainly too modest to do justice to the complexity
of human actions.
Explanation of action
RAIMO TUOMELA
University of Helsinki

A lively philosophical discussion concerning the nature and the

explanation of human action began in the 1950s due to the
influence of Ry1e and Wittgenstein and others as well as of a
positivistically oriented stimulus-response psychology. Among the
early contributions to this discussion we may mention the central
and influential works by Anscombe [I], Dray [2], Peters [3],
Winch [4], Melden [5], Kenny [6], Davidson [7], and Taylor [8],
to name just a few.
In this survey I shall review some of the central features of the
more recent philosophical discussion, covering roughly the decade
1966-1976, concerning action-explanations. While many of the
earlier contributions centered on the question of whether or not
action-explanations can be causal and nomological (cf. the logical
connection argument of, e.g., Melden [5], the later discussion has
been more varied and contains some attempts to create systematic
theories of action and of action-explanation. This has led philos-
ophers to see better than before that even within the common-
sense 'framework of agency', one can formulate and reasonably
defend quite different philosophical theories of action. One of the
central themes of the present survey will be that action-explana-
tions are highly dependent on the adopted underlying theory of
action and that this accordingly accounts, in part, for the different
views held of their nature.
The topic of action-explanation is very complex and highly
intricate. A brief survey such as this cannot even adequately deal
with all the central issues involved. Our emphasis is going to be on

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 15-43.

© 1982, Martinus Nijho!! Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
16 R. Tuomela

the teleological explanation of simple intentional actions (which

involve some bodily behaviour, broadly understood). Thus we
shall say very little, if anything at all, about the specific features
of the explanation of, for instance, voluntary, deliberate, non-
intentional, and habitual actions as such. Nor will we focus on
complex actions. We shall also not pay very great attention to the
differences in nuance related to such different explanatory factors
as, e.g., emotions, feelings, and sensations. However, the differ-
ences between, e.g., wants and intentions, motives and intentions,
and so on, will be noted and stressed. Finally, many of the finer
issues related to the nature of explanation itself will have to be left
out, for instance, the problem of the logical form of action-expla-
nations and the so-called problem of emphasis belong to these
(see, e.g., Nordenfelt [9] on the former and Achinstein [10] on the
latter).

II

1. Given that action-explanations conceptually depend on the

underlying philosophical action theories, how are we to classify
and identify the latter? In a sense, each philosophical action theo-
rist holds his own unique theory, of course. Fortunately, during
the period of our survey, only a few more or less full-blown action
theories (or sketches of such) have appeared in print and/or have
been discussed to a significant extent. From a systematic point of
view I will group them into the following three classes:
1. mental cause theory;
2. agency theory;
3. hermeneutic theory.
Before discussing the central claims of these three types of
theories, let me roughly indicate what each of them involves. The
mental cause theory analyzes (intentional) actions as movements
caused by certaih kinds of mental events or states (e.g., wants or
willings). Here we may include, for instance, the views of Davidson
[7, 11, 12], Fodor [13, 14], Goldman [15], Alston [16, 17], Danto
[18], Pears [23], Aune [24], Thalberg [21, 22], Sellars [19,20],
and - as a kind of limiting case - the purposive-causal theory of
Tuomela [25]. According to the agency theory, the cause of the
behavior involved in the action is not a mental event or state but
 Explanation of action 17

simply the agent himself (and in this context no further cause is

or, perhaps, can be asked for). R. Taylor [26] and Chisholm [27,
28, 29] are the foremost modern representatives of this old view.
What I have here called the hermeneutic theory could also equally
well be called the non-causal theory or the Neo-Wittgensteinian
theory. According to it, intentional actions are not - and perhaps
(logically) cannot be - caused by any mental events or states.
Rather, the essential thing about an action is that it somehow
consists or involves some bodily movements by which the agent
intends or means or aims at something and/or that the movement
(accordingly) is something which is to be conceived in the context
of some 'meanings', rules, norms or social practices. Of the theories
of action prominent during the last few years, von Wright's [30]
important theory very clearly represents this group. The views of
Melden [5], Malcolm [31], Stoutland [32, 33, 34], and Abelson
[35] are also clear representatives. Other recent examples are
Peters' [36], Toulmin's [37, but cf. 38], Dray's [39], Skinner's
[40], Martin's [41], and Apel's [42] accounts; also see Care and
Landesman [43].
C. Taylor's important goal theory [8, 44, 45] may perhaps also
be fruitfully included in our somewhat heterogeneous category of
hermeneutic action theory, broadly conceived. According to the
goal theory, what makes a movement an action is that the move-
ment is to be characterized and explained by citing a goal rather
than some antecedent (Humean) cause.
When discussing the hermeneutic theory below, we shall mostly
rely on von Wright's theory as it is the most fully developed of the
mentioned accounts. When drawing philosophical conclusions on
the basis of it, we must note that, of course, not all of them need
without further qualification apply to all the other mentioned
examples of hermeneutic theory.

2. Mental cause theory. Let us now go on to a somewhat more

detailed presentation and evaluation of our three basic types of
action theories. First we illustrate two technical concepts. Follow-
ing von Wright [30] we say that the result of my action of opening
the window is the event of the window's becoming open. If in
opening the window I (inadvertently) let in a mosquito, the event
of the mosquito's coming in is called a consequence of my action
18 R. Tuomela

in question. As we shall think of actions as achievements with

certain public aspects, any action will have a logically inbuilt
result. It will also have plenty of consequences. (The distinction
result-consequence is 'theory-laden' and far from unproblematic,
though; cf. Stoutland [32], Tuomela [25].)
Next, following Stoutland's [32] terminology, we make a
distinction between the intention in the action and the intention
of the action. Suppose I pass the salt to my dinner companion just
out of politeness, without any motive or purpose. Then there is no
intention of the action, but there is yet an intention (aim) in the
action, namely that the salt reach my dinner companion (the
result of the action), and that is just the telos in the action. Here,
'intention in' denotes the teleology internal to our understanding
of actions while 'intention of denotes the (external) teleology in
terms of which actions can be explained. There is an intention in
every intentional action; its object is just the result of the action.
There is, however, not an intention of every action, but only of
those actions whose explanation requires a reference to what the
agent was intending to do. To give the intention of an action is to
state what the agent intended to do in the action, viz. the inten-
tion with which he acted. Its object is an action and not a (non-
psychological) event or state (such as a result). (Our present
terminology may be criticized for the reason that it makes the
object of the intention in the action a state or event rather than
an action. That can be avoided by using the phrase 'aim in the
action' instead of 'intention in the action'.)
Now we are ready to give a summary of how the mental cause
theory analyzes an intentional action. More specifically, the fol-
lowing analysis, which uses our above terminology, gives the core
idea that Davidson [7, 12], Goldman [IS], and Alston [16,17],
for instance, take as their point of departure (cf. Stoutland [32]):

(MC) An agent performed an intentional action u

if and only if
(I) the result r or u occurred because of the agent's behavior
(bodily movements);
(2) there was some end the agent wanted (this is the mental
cause theorist's construal of the intention in the act) and
which he believed his behavior will (tend to) bring about;
 Explanation of action 19

and
(3) this want and belief caused the behavior to occur.

Basic actions require a modification of this scheme, but we shall

not discuss them here. There are also other qualifications and
modifications needed to account for some obvious counterexam-
ples. Thus, for instance, the so-called wayward causal chains (to be
discussed below) represent a clear couterexample to the if-part of
(Me), unless causation in (3) is suitably qualified (and/or some
other relevant amendations are made). Further specific criticisms
against (Me) are to be found, e.g., in Stoutland [32, 33, 34J, and
Tuomela [25J, and we shall return to them below.
On (Me) the explanation of action in a sense coincides with the
explanation of the behavior in the action (as clause (3) speaks of
the causation of the behavior in the action). To say that an agent
is on a certain occasion opening a window is to say that his
behavior (in the action) on this occasion is caused by his wanting
some end to which he believes his behavior is (suitably) conducive.
This attribution of action may perhaps explain the behavior but it
does not in any case give an explanation of the action. But we can
make it an explanation of the latter by specifying the agent's want.
For instance, if we learn that the agent wanted to let in some fresh
air we get an explanation of his action. If we indeed accept that
the statement of the agent's opening the window intentionally
serves to explain the agent's 'mere' bodily behavior in the action,
we can then say that explanations of action are, on (MC), only
more detailed explanations of (mere) behavior, and since explana-
tions of behavior are causal so are explanations of action.
It follows that on (Me) a) the internal teleology of actions is
analyzed in terms of causality (cf. clauses (2) and (3» and that
also b) the external teleology of actions - viz. teleological expla-
nations of actions - are analyzed causally (cf. Stoutland [32]).
But a) and b) are too strong, it may be argued. First, a) in effect
reduces the concept of intentionality to the concept of causality,
and that is objectionable (see, e.g., Stoutland [33 J, [34 J for dis-
cussion). Secondly, if only mere event-causation is meant b) is
clearly affected by the existence of wayward causal chains (cf.
Tuomela [25]). There is more to be said concerning the mental
cause theory for it can be modified to escape the latter two con-
sequences. We shall return to it later.
20 R. Tuomela

3. Agency theory. R. Taylor [26] and Chisholm [27,28, 29] have

been the most prominent advocates of the agency theory in recent
years. If we overlook some fine points we can put its basic idea as
follows (cf. Chisholm [28, 29], Stoutland [32]): To sayan agent
intentionally did u is to say that he caused some event to occur
with the intention of making r (or, rather, the event type r in-
stantiates) occur and the event he caused did make r occur. Thus
we have:

(A) An agent performed an intention action u

if and only if
(1) the result r occurred because of his behavior;
(2) the agent aimed at (intended) r (or, rather, the event-type
r instantiated);
(3) his behavior was caused by the agent himself in aiming at
(intending) r.

To say then that an agent intentionally opened a window is to say

that the window opened because of his (bodily) behavior, that he
aimed at that result and that his behavior was caused by something
the agent himself caused in aiming at (intending) the window's
opening. The latter causation is meant by Chisholm to be irreduc-
ible agent causation. But does not the phrase 'in aiming at' just
invoke event-causation?
Because of the existence of intentional actions whose results are
not specifically aimed at, clause (2) must be understood broadly
enough to cover this. We shall not discuss this problem here, nor
shall we consider the exact content of (3) (see, e.g., Thalberg [46]
on this).
The essential feature of the agency theory is, of course, its use
of the notion of agent causality in addition to ordinary event
causality. While the proximate cause of the behavior in the action
is (presumably) some neural event, this neural event is (ultimately)
caused by the agent himself in aiming at the result of the action.
Agent causality is an essentially teleological notion, accordingly,
for it operates exactly in the agent's aiming at an end. We can in
effect say that the intention in the action is just the agent's exer-
cising agent causality.
The agency theory takes the intention in the action to explain
 Explanation of action 21

the behavior involved in the action. Accordingly, the agent's

bodily behavior in his opening the window is explained by saying
that it was behavior aiming at (or by which the agent aimed at) the
opening of the window, and therefore this behavior was caused by
the agent in aiming at opening the window. To attribute an action
to an agent is, then, to explain his behavior but not yet to explain
his action. When we attribute an action to the agent we say that he
is aiming at a result. When we ask for an explanation, viz. a why-
explanation, of his action we in effect ask why he is aiming at that
result. The typical answer to this last question within the agency
theory is given by sepcifying some further end for the sake of
which (or in order to achieve which) the agent performed the
action at hand. In other words, typically a teleological explana-
tion involving some relevant further goal is given to explain the
action.
Furthermore, the agency theorist argues that such a teleological
explanation is not reducible to a causal explanation. Thus in the
agency theory both the intention in the action and the intention
of the action are seen to essentially involve the teleology of agent
causality.
The most basic difficulty related to the agency theory is the
murkiness of the notion of (irreducible) agent causality itself (cf.
Goldman [1 5], Thalberg [46 D. It is hard to make clear sense of the
idea of an agent's causing some neural events to happen in aiming
at a certain result. If, however, this idea is understood the agency
theory seems very attractive and viable.

4. Hermeneutic theory. As we said earlier, the hermeneutic theory

encompasses a great variety of views. One common denominator
to them is the claim that Humean event-causality plays no role in
the analysis of intentional action. Another common feature is the
emphasis on the conceptualization and, especially, ofunderstanding
behavior. It is often claimed, accordingly, that to understand an
item of behavior is to read off from it (in a certain cultural con-
text) the agent's relevant wants, intentions, beliefs, and so on, and
to thereby come to understand and classify behavior as a certain
kind of action. Then, by giving the agent's (further) reason for
the action (or at least for his thinking that he should do it), one
explains (gives further understanding of) it.
22 R. Tuomela

To get a better insight into this kind of hermeneutic theory we

shall now consider in some detail von Wright's theory, which has
been quite prominent during the period surveyed in this paper.
For simplicity, in our presentation of this theory, we shall concen-
trate on [30], although the later works of von Wright contain some
relatively substantial modifications and relaxations of his original
theory (see [47,48,49]).
Perhaps the most central concept in von Wright's action theory
is that of the agent's aiming by his (bodily) behavior at a certain
result. (We may also speak of the agent's intending or meaning by
his behavior a certain end.) This central notion figures in von
Wright's [30] analysis of intentional action as follows:

(H) An agent perfonned an intentional action u

if and only if
(I) the result r occurred because of the agent's behavior,
and
(2) the agent by his behavior aimed at (or intended) the
result r.

(Von Wright in fact relaxes condition (1) for basic actions, but we
shall not discuss that special case here; see, however, the criticism
in Tuomela [25].)
Thus, on (H), an agent intentionally opens the window if and
only if a) the opening of the window is brought about or caused
by the agent's behavior and b) the agent by that bodily behavior
aimed at the window's opening.
In von Wright's theory, to speak of the intention in the action is
to speak of the intentionality of the agent's behavior, viz. the
agent's intending or meaning something by his behavior. There are
two things to be emphasized here. First, the intention in the
action here has both an object and a 'vehicle', namely the behavior.
It is by his behavior that the agent intends the result of an action.
Secondly, the intentionality of behavior in no way derives from
the causal antecedents, or the like, of the behavior. Intentionality
rather is 'in' the behavior, and behavior is normally 'seen' as action.
Intentional behavior resembles the use of language. An agent's
aiming at something by his behavior is to be regarded as closely
analogous with a speaker's meaning something by an utterance.
 Explanation of action 23

Thus both behavior and sentences (and other linguistic items) get
their meaning and are understood in essentially the same context-
and culture-dependent way (cf. Skinner [40]).
In von Wright's theory (as far as (H) is concerned) the bodily
behavior in the action is strictly speaking left unexplained - con-
trary to the mental cause theory and the agency theory. To be
sure, von Wright accepts that the agent's bodily behavior involved
in his opening the window may be causally explained. It is only
that this explanation is in no way connected to (H) nor to the
(teleological) explanation of the agent's action of opening the
window. (See Stoutland [32] for a discussion.)
In von Wright's theory [30] actions, as distinguished from non-
intentionalistically understood behavior, are to be explained
intentionalistically in teleological terms. A teleological explanation
refers to some end of the agent and to some belief that a means is
seen by the agent as conducive towards that end. (Such teleological
explanations do not depend on any objective nomic relationships
between means and ends.) Not any teleological explanation in that
sense will do, however. An acceptable teleological explanation of
action must be 'logically conclusive' (in the sense of the explanans
(broadly) logically entailing the explanandum) in von Wright's
view [30], p. 100). The class of such conclusive teleological
explanations is claimed by him to coincide with the class of
explanations given in terms of practical syllogisms. (For related
theses see, e.g., Nordenfelt [9] and Martin [41].)
The basic form of a (descriptive) practical syllogism is as follows
(cf. [30], p. 96).

(PS) The agent intends to bring about p.

The agent considers that he cannot bring about p unless
he performs action (of the kind) U.
Therefore, the agent sets himself to perform U.

(Here 'p', of course, refers to an end-result the agent aims at.) As it

stands, (PS) need not yet be regarded as logically conclusive. But
given certain qualifications related to so-called normal conditions
and time-considerations it can be so regarded (cf. [30], p. 107),
even if von Wright's notion of logical conclusiveness could be
clearer. (Note that no law-statement occurs in the premises of
24 R. Tuomela

(PS).) When we use (PS) for the purposes of explanation, the ex-
planandum action u (of the kind U) has of course occurred and
the conclusion of (PS) speaks about A's doing an action of the
kind U rather than his only setting himself to do it. The premises
of (PS) can then be said to state the agent's reason for his doing u.
It is, furthermore, a consequence of von Wright's theory that an
agent performed u intentionally if and only if there is a practical
syllogism which in the sense indicated by our (PS) backs it. (The
last mentioned analysans could in fact redundantly be added as a
third condition in (H) to back its second condition, so to speak.)
As said, in von Wright's view, to explain an action means to give
it an 'acceptable' (viz., logically conclusive) teleological explana-
tion, which is claimed to be equivalent to constructing a practical
syllogism (with true premises) for the action-statement in question.
The first premise of (PS) gives a further intended end of the agent
and the second premise tells us what he considers necessary for
this end. Note that the use of, e.g., 'wants' (or some other 'looser'
attitude term) in the first premise of (PS) does not suffice to make
(PS) logically conclusive. In the second premise we need to claim
U to be considered necessary for the end. If it were only regarded
(by the agent) as sufficient or conducive (PS) would lose its
logically binding character. That von Wright's requirement of
logical conclusiveness concerning teleological explanation is too
strict has been argued, e.g., by Kim [50] and Tuomela [25, 51].
For this reason already one has to regard the following statement
by von Wright as at best misleading and strongly exaggerated: 'It
is a tenet of the present work that the practical syllogism provides
the sciences of man with something long missing from their
methodology: an explanation model in its own right which is a
definite alternative to the subsumption-theoretic covering law
model.' ([30], p. 27). It is only fair to say, however, that von
Wright has later modified his views to some extent, but we shall
not discuss these changes here (see [47, 48, 49]).
Other non-causal or hermeneutic theories have not in general
been formulated with quite the strictness of von Wright. Still, they
are basically closely related, as is to be expected. To take an
example, Abelson [35], following the ideas of Peters [3], Dray [2],
and Melden [5], presents a non-causal account in which intentional
(and, broader, voluntary) actions are said to be explainable in two
 Explanation of action 2S

ways. First, we may give a sa-called reason-terminating explanation

by indicating that the action is one that the agent could be ex-
pected to perform under the circumstances (e.g., 'because he
enjoys doing it', 'because it is his habit to do so', 'because Jones
asked him to do it'). This type can be called reason-terminating
because it indicates that no (further) reason can be asked for. The
action is not in need of justification or excuse. Secondly, we may
explain a voluntary action by giving a means-end purposive expla-
nation of it. The most common form of such an explanation is the
familiar 'A did u in order to get p'. This kind of explanation is
reason-giving explanation. Abelson argues that, e.g., explanations
by reference to an emotion or a desire may belong here for they
are connected to reasons and justification. Thus he also rightly
broadens the scope of teleological action-explanations as com-
pared with von Wright's above account (cf. Section IV of this
paper). However, Abelson says very little in detail about what it is
that makes, e.g., reason-explanations work. The suggestion seems
to be that they make the action expectable. But how do they do
it if no dynamic (e.g., causal) principles is referred to?
In general, on a hermeneutic theory of action we just give the
attitudinal or other motivational conditions in terms of which we
derive the understanding of the agent's behavior as the action
which was somehow reasonable or appropriate for the agent to do
on the occasion. The behavior is in this way seen, first, as an
action, and, secondly, in a broader psychological and perhaps
socia-psychological and social context, possibly a normative and
evaluative one. However, a non-causal theory does not attempt to
account for how the behavior item in question really came about,
it does not attempt to give anything like sufficient causal (or other
determining) conditions for it. (To say, e.g., in the manner of
Abelson [35] that an action could be expected is yet far from
giving factual determinants for that action type to be exemplified.)

III

1. We shall discuss below the tenability and the explanatory power

of the theories of action sketched in the previous section and con-
sider some special current topics related to action-explanation. As
26 R. Tuomela

the treatment of action-explanation within the agency theory has

been sketchy and as it has not been much discussed in the literature
(over and above the common criticism concerning the obscurity
and superfluousness of the notion of agent causality itself), we
shall not below say much about it. Rather, we shall concentrate on
the heated debate between the mental cause theorists and the non-
causal (hermeneutic) theorists. Our plan is as follows. First, we
shall discuss the mental cause theorists' arguments for the need of
the notion of causality (and thus arguments against non-causal
theorists) in accounts of action and action-explanation. Secondly,
we shall present and comment on some criticisms that have been
directed against the causal theory and sketch a new type of causal
theory, viz. the purposive-causal theory. Finally, some broader
topical issues will be discussed.
Perhaps due to the earlier criticisms against causal theory in the
literature (by Ryle [52], Melden [5], and others), causal theorists,
at least in the 1960s, tended to concentrate on arguing that the
connection between the relevant mental states (events, episodes)
and actions can be causal, instead of arguing that it must be so (cf.
Davidson [7]). I shall now briefly present some arguments which
can be regarded as giving either direct or indirect evidence for the
presence of a causal connection between (suitable) proattitudes
and the relevant actions.
(1) The causal theorist may accept a functionalist account of
the nature of mental phenomena, an account which conceptually
introduces mental states and events on the basis of 'social practice'
as something causing behavior (including actions) in suitable
circumstances. (Sellars [19, 20], Aune [24], and Tuomela [25],
for instance, have adopted this approach.) Thus, on this account,
to intend that something p means, roughly, being in a dispositional
state with the structure p such that this state, given suitable
internal and external circumstances, will cause the bodily behavior
needed (in the agent's view) for the satisfaction of the intention.
Note that the above functionalist account is not open to the
traditional criticisms directed against volition theories (cf. Ryle
[52], Melden [5], R. Taylor [26]).
On a functionalist account mental events (e.g., wantings,
willings) actualizing mental dispositions may act as efficient event-
causes of behavior, while there at the same time is a conceptual
 Explanation of action 27

('logical') connection between the concepts representing such dis-

positions (e.g., intentions), on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, both the generic action which ultimately satisfies the inten-
tion, and the generic means-actions which are related to the
intention via a practical syllogism (cf. our later discussion of the
so-called logical connection argument). In Tuomela [25] much
effort is devoted to developing this kind of conceptual functional-
ism which, so to speak, conceptually builds causality into our
mental concepts. If this functionalism is acceptable we have a
strong argument for the causal theory of action. It should also be
mentioned in this connection in support of functionalism that
causal idioms are often used when speaking of the coming about
of actions (cf. Gean [53]). To take an example, consider a man
who intends to shoot someone and who in fact happens to shoot
him. This shooting was intentional, in the typical case, only if the
man's intending brought about or caused his shooting. (Of course,
here the question may be raised whether a non-causalist could
somehow legitimately use this kind of causal talk without an ontic
commitment to causes.)
(2) By altering what a person intends, wants or believes, or by
getting him to have new intentions, wants or beliefs, one is often
able to control and manipulate his actions (cf. Gean [53]). In
other words, changes in some suitable mental states and events
may be systematically corresponded to by changes in some relevant
actions. This indicates causal connection (without entailing that
the person is not acting freely). Note that the underlying meta-
physical model of causation here is that a change in a substance
produces another change in the same substance.
(3) For one and the same action we may construe two different
practical syllogisms both with true premises and the same true
action description as the conclusion while only one of these
practical syllogisms is explanatory (see Tuomela [25]). Barring
overdetermination, this difference is indicated by the fact that
only in the case of the explanatory one do we have a true counter-
factual statement of the form: 'Had the agent not intended so and
so and believed so and so he would not, ceteris paribus, have per-
formed the action'. The truth of this counterfactual statement
may be regarded as evidence for the presence of a causal connec-
tion between the mental episode satisfying the premises and the
28 R. Tuomela

action satisfying the conclusion in these circumstances. Gean [53]

has analogously argued on the basis of related kinds of counter-
factual statements for a causal connection.
(4) A related argument is due to Davidson [7]. He makes a dis-
tinction between the (mere) rationalization and the explanation of
an action. One may rationalize a person's doing an action by citing
a reason (such as the conjunction of the premises of our above
non-explanatory practical syllogism) that one has, even if one did
not act on or because of that reason. However, one cannot explain
an action by citing a reason unless the agent acted because of it.
Next, the obvious move is made that this explanatory because-of-
relation indicates the presence of a causal connection. (See, how-
ever, Abelson [35], for a non-causal interpretation of this case
according to which the person's real or explanatory reason is the
reason that suitably relates it to his other actions in a wider
context.)
(5) One may argue that both practical and theoretical inference
requires that the inferring person must have internalized some
principles of inference (such as modus ponens) before he is able to
infer properly. Tuomela [25] argues that this supports the view
that in practical inference a causal process takes place.
(6) One may argue that the concept of the result of an inten-
tional action cannot be elucidated without saying that it is an
event (or state) suitable caused by the agent's behaving (viz. by a
causal process via relevant mental events and bodily behavior).
(See Tuomela [25], p. 226 on this.)
(7) As mentioned earlier, the causal theories of action account
for the possibility of action. That is, they account for the bodily
behavior involved in the action in the special sense of giving a
causal account of the action non-functionally or non-intentionally
described (cf. Tuomela [25]). The hermeneutic theory fails to
satisfy this requirement and does not even accept it as its task. 1
(8) A central criterion of adequacy for (at least deductive)
scientific explanation is that the explanans should give reasons for
expecting the explanandum to be true. An explanatory pattern
which fits this requirement is the cause-effect relationship. It
accounts for the explanandum episode's coming about, and it gives
a good reason to think that an explanandum-episode is to be
expected whenever the explanans is true.
 Explanation of action 29

It has been argued by Gean [53], Hempel [58], Stegmiiller [59],

Brandt and Kim [60] , Tuomela [25] and others that what is required
of scientific explanation in general must also typically be required
of action-explanations, at least of those answering why-questions.
Hermeneutic action theorists, on the contrary, do not seem willing
to consider the discussed requirement central or then they out-
right dismiss it (cf. von Wright [30], Dray [2, 39] and his reason-
able-in-the-light-of-pattern, Stoutland [33], Abelson [35]). This
suggests that different views of explanation itself also are at
stake here (cf. Apel [42]).
Let us emphasize here that, undeniably, there are explanatory
questions that do not necessarily require an account of the ex-
planandum-event's coming about. This is the case when we, for
instance, ask what an agent is doing. Being told that he is X'ing
(e.g., signing a contract) we have classification of his behavior and
hence an answer to the what-question (cf. Levison and Thalberg
[61], Porn [62]). Note also that asking a why-question always
presupposes some classification of the behavior-event in question
and that presenting and answering a what-question does not
exclude asking a why-question.

2. At least considered jointly the above arguments for the central

presence of a causal connection between active mental attitudes
and action seem strong. To be sure, some of the arguments have
been so recently presented that non-causal theorists have not yet
taken the time to try to refute them. In any case, there are some
relevant difficulties for a causal theorist that must now be con-
sidered.
(a) First there is the disposition argument presented by Ryle
[52] and others. According to this argument the mental factors
(wants, intentions, beliefs, etc.) appealed to in action-explanations
are not events (but dispositions or states) and therefore cannot be
causes. As, e.g., Davidson [7] and Gean [53] have pointed out,
first, states and dispositions (or rather the bases of dispositions)
can be regarded. as causal factors (cf. brittleness as a causal factor
of a window's breaking). Secondly, we may even have event-causes
here as, e.g., onslaughts and 'activations' and flights of dispositions
(wants, for instance) are events (see Davidson [7] and cf. (Me».
Sellars [19] regards volitions and Tuomela [25] willings as episodic
30 R. Tuomela

entities introduced according to functionalism, which qualifies

them as potentional causes of actions and makes their existence in
principle a broadly contingent scientific matter.
(b) One of the most discussed arguments against the mental
cause theory is the so-called logical connection argument. Accord-
ing to it, roughly, reason-explanations cannot be causal because
there is a logical connection between wants (intentions) and
beliefs and the action to be explained (see, e.g., Melden [5],
C. Taylor [8], R. Taylor [26], von Wright [30], Abelson [35]).
Causal theorists have either claimed that there is no such logical
connection (see, e.g., Davidson [7]), or that the existence of a
logical (conceptual) connection of a suitable kind is compatible
with the existence of a causal connection (see Sellars [20], Gean
[63], Tuomela [51, 25]).
It think that Gean's [63] recent treatment of the matter is quite
illuminating. He argues convincingly that a causal connection
between suitable mental events or episodes and the relevant action
is compatible with a de dicto necessary connection between the
mental factors and the action in question. It is only a de re
necessity linking wanting and acting that might present a trouble
for a causal theorist. In a relevant simplified but crucial example a
de re necessity could be formulated as follows in a semiformal
notation:

(Ex) (Ey) (x = an event of John's wanting to do X cum

believing so and so in circumstances C, and y = an event
of John's doing X and necessarily)
«Ez) y = z :J (Ew) x = w».

This schematic statement expressing a de re necessity is quite

strong and few theorists would be willing to accept it (whatever
'necessarily' exactly is taken to mean). Note, furthermore, even in
this de re statement y and x are still non-identical and distinct
events.
(c) The mental cause theory in its 'standard' form requires that
the proattitudes playa double role in both accounting for inten-
tionality and causing behavior. (Note, the purposive-causal theory
denies this; see Tuomela [25] and below). This double role is a
source of difficulties, one of the toughest of which is that due to
 Explanation of action 31

the so-called (internal and external) wayward causal chains (see

the discussion in, e.g., Chisholm [27], R. Taylor [26], Goldman
[15], Davidson [64], Stoutland [33], Woodfield [65], and Tuo-
mela [51 ,25] ). Consider an example by Chisholm: (i) a certain man
desires to inherit a fortune; (ii) he believes that only if he kills his
uncle will he inherit a fortune; and (iii) this desire and this belief
agitate him so severely that he accidentally runs over and kills a
pedestrian who, unknown to the nephew, is none other than the
uncle. Our agent does not intentionally kill his uncle, even if con-
ditions (1), (2), and (3) of (MC) can be taken to be satisfied. This
counterexample thus shows that the analysans of (MC) does not
give a sufficient condition for intentional acting.
Mental cause theorists and their critics have discussed various
types of wayward causal chains but the basic difficulty in all of
them seems to be how to characterize causation taking place 'in
the right way'. Davidson [64] takes the problem to be insur-
mountable, Goldman [15] makes it a scientific one. Woodfield
proposes, essentially, that we require that the desire-belief pair
initiates and sustains a desire to do X (the means-action), which,
after joining forces with a belief that the time is ripe, gives rise to
an internal state that controls the performance of X (Woodfield
[65]). Tuomela [51,25] proposes that, basically, it is the pur-
posive causation (in distinction to mere causation), and hence
acting on the operative conduct plan, that is missing in wayward
causal chains. In Tuomela's purposive causation (to be discussed
below) it is the agent's intending (willing) to do by his bodily
behavior whatever is thought by him necessary for satisfying the
purpose in question that plays a central role and accounts for the
element of control Woodfield emphasizes. This notion basically
solves the problem: in the case of wayward causal chains the prob-
lematic item of behavior is something by which the agent intended
to satisfy the purpose. (This notion of willing cannot be reduced
away while it yet is naturalistic enough.) Woodfield's and Tuome-
la's solutions are rather similar, but a detailed comparison will
have to be left for another occasion.
The hermeneutic theory does not seem to have any particular
(internal) difficulty in handling wayward causal chains. For in-
stance, in von Wright's theory the notion of the agent's intending
by his behavior a result has been argued to take care of the prob-
32 R. Tuomela

blem (see Stoutland [33] for a discussion). The analogous notion

in condition (2) of (A) in Section II would seem to save the agen-
cy theory from this difficulty. The question then is whether all
these theories which solve the problem by means of some irre-
ducible intentional-teleological notion pay too high a price for it.
A standard mental cause theorist would, of course, be willing to
claim this.
(d) Stoutland [33] claims that the analysans of (MC) does not
give a necessary condition for intentional acting, either. He argues
that, given (MC), the agent will act on a pro attitude only if the
attitude is the causally strongest one at the time of acting. But, he
claims, an agent may well act on an attitude which is not causally
strongest at the time. I find Stoutland's last claim badly supported
but for lack of space I will not here discuss this matter further.
Note that, in any case, the hermeneutic theory certainly claims
that the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) of (MC) is not a necessary
condition for intentional acting.
(e) The final central problem related to the mental cause theory
is related to the existence and role of psychological laws. In gener-
al, mental cause theorists have committed themselves to some kind
of regularity or backing law account of causality. For instance,
Davidson [66], Danto [18], and Tuomela [25] explicitly require
the existence of (but not the knowledge of) backing laws in their
analyses of singular causation. This is the first reason for the im-
portance of laws. The second reason is that, in general, mental
cause theorists accept some kind of nomological model of explana-
tion, such as Hempel's [58] (cf. Davidson [7], Gean [53], Gold-
man [15], Danto [18], Tuomela [25]. Thus, at least standard
mental cause theorists characterize intentional actions by refer-
ence, among other things, to the existence of causal laws, and in
explaining them some may even require the specification of the
laws (see Tuomela [25], Ch. 9 for a somewhat different account).
There are two ways in which laws may be involved in the analy-
sis of causality and in explanation. First, one may require that
there be relevant psychological laws relating attitudes to action.
One may either require the laws to be couched in exactly the same
vocabulary as the pro attitudes and actions or one may allow re-
descriptions in different (usually more 'general') psychological
terminology. Let us speak of covering law theory in both of these
cases. Secondly, one may think that only physical types (univer-
 Explanation of action 33

sals) account for causality and that hence only physical laws may
back singular causal claims. This view is held by Davidson [66,67] .
We call it the oblique theory.
In the literature one can find many claims against the concep-
tual possibility of psychological laws. They are usually related to
one or more of the mentioned claims against causal theory, to
the freedom of the will and/or of action, or to the holistic and
'open' nature of the mental (see, e.g., Dray [2], R. Taylor [26],
von Wright [39], Davidson [67], D. Taylor [68]. We shall not
here discuss these arguments, which typically share one common
fault: they assume that one can find a priori arguments against the
possibility of nomological 'reason-psychology' (see, e.g., Gean
[53], Church1and [69], Pears [23], Beckermann [70], and Tuo-
me1a [25] for a rebuttal of some such a priori arguments against
psychological laws. The paper by Churchland [69] (criticized by
Martin [41]) must be emphasized here. It presents a constructive
approach, which argues for the existence of the required kind of
covering laws.
Stoutland [33,34] presents forceful criticisms against David-
son's action theory, which accepts the oblique view of causation
in conjunction with a denial of the possibility of psychophysical
laws. Consider the claims that I) an agent's attitude are reasons for
his acting and that 2) they cause his behavior. In Davidson's theo-
ry 1) and 2) have no determinate and lawful connection. In par-
ticular 2) cannot be true because 1) is, which connection would
surely be desirable. Other difficulties follow as well, but even the
mentioned one is grave enough for Davidson. (Note: if one accepts
the possibility of psychophysical laws the oblique theorist need
not get into trouble here.)
This ends our discussion concerning the difficulties the standard
version (MC) of the mental cause theory faces. I think that the
above arguments have shown it (as well as all 'tougher' causal ac-
counts) to be in great difficulty.

3. While the' prospects for the standard mental cause theory may
look grim, other, improved versions of this theory may yet tum
out to be viable. We have claimed earlier that the purposive-causal
theory of Tuomela [25] will fare better. We shall below outline
this theory.
34 R. Tuomela

The purposive-causal theory can in a sense be regarded as a rath-

er special 'intentionalistic' version of the mental cause theory. Yet
it is in important ways different from the standard mental cause
theory (cf. Davidson) and it seems to avoid at least the major
criticisms directed against the latter while retaining many of its
attractive features. Tuomela [25] argues that human actions (per-
formances) are to be regarded as sequences of events involving as
conceptually necessary components I) an event realizing a propo-
sitional attitude, 2) a bodily behavior event, and 3) a result event
(or state). In the case of intentional action the propositional at-
titude in question is the agent's (effective) intending. The inner
mental event instantiating it is called a willing or, in Tuomela's
technical terminology, a trying (not to be confused with overt at-
tempting, of course). This functionalist notion of trying (willing)
seems to avoid the classical difficulties associated with volition
theories of action (see, e.g., Melden [5] , Taylor [26] ).
From a conceptual point of view we may then represent a sin-
gular action u by the sequence (t, ... , b, ... r), where t = trying,
b = (maximal) bodily event, and r = result. More exactly, t repre-
sents the agent's trying (causally effective intending) to now do by
his bodily behavior whatever he regards as necessary for satisfying
the purpose (the propositional content) involved in the intending
that t represents. Intendings are partly characterized in terms of
wantings, extrinsic (e.g., duties) and intrinsic (e.g., primary de-
sires). In other words, intendings, though irreducible, are wantings
(in a broad sense) playing a certain, potentially executive and con-
trolling role.
Tuomela employs the technical notion of a conduct plan to
represent an agent's plan for acting (see [25] , Ch. 7). We shall not
here explicate it except by saying that formally it is a generaliza-
tion of the concept of the practical syllogism (or, better, the
premises of the practical syllogism). Thus, for instance, the con-
junction of the premises of (PS) is a conduct plan. Given this
notion we can state the general condition of Tuomela's purposive-
causal theory for a singular action u being intentional: An agent
performed an action u intentionally if and only if there was a
conduct plan (of the agent) such that the agent purposively
brought about u because of this conduct plan. This condition is
meant to be broadly factual nomic statement (rather than a re-
 Explanation of action 35

ductive analysis of intentionality). In it the central, so far unex-

plicated notion is that of the agent's purposively bringing about u
because of a conduct plan. The contained purposive-because-of-
relation receives different explicates in the case of different action
types in Tuomela's theory (see Ch. 10 of [25]). In any case, it is
always at least in part a causal notion. In the case of simple bodily
actions (e.g., arm raising) it can simply be called a (non-Humean)
relation of purposive causation (or final causation, if you like),
which holds between the wi1ling-event t and the overt behavior
(in this case b simpliciter).
Tuomela [51,25] defines the notion of purposive event-causa-
tion in technical terms to guarantee that the purposive direction
and control of action are adequately maintained in the course of
the agent's acting. We might here even speak of cybernetic causali-
ty, for purposive causation takes into account the feedback com-
ing from the agent's interaction with the world (cf. our earlier dis-
cussion of wayward causal chains).
How does this purposive-causal theory look when regarded as
an instance of (MC)? Because of the complex and a posteriori
nature of the notion of conduct plan a strict comparison cannot
be made. As a first approximation we can, however, say the fol-
lowing. Clause (1) of (MC) can be kept intact. As to clause (2),
let us pretend that it represents the agent's conduct plan (this is
a clear simplification). Then (2) is acceptable within the purpos-
ive-causal theory, given that the agent's wanting plays the role of
intending (viz. 'intends' can be substituted for 'wants'). An agent's
acting on a want entails his forming an intention to act so that he
believes the want will become satisfied (cf. Stoutland [33], Tuo-
mela [25]). Clause (3) becomes acceptable if similarly 'intending'
can be substituted for 'want' (meaning 'wanting') and if causation
is understood to mean purposive causation (viz. 'purposively
cause' is substituted for 'cause').
In the purposive-causal theory the intention in the action
amounts to the agent's willing or trying to do by his bodily be-
havior whatever is required (in his opinion) to satisfy the inten-
tion (purpose) in question. This account of the role of intention
in the action does not reduce it to the role of causality as David-
son's theory does. In fact, this view resembles both the account
given by the agency theory and also von Wright's theory. We may
36 R. Tuomela

almost say that the purposive-causal theory is what we get from

the agency theory when we substitute purposive causation (and
generation) for agent causation.
How does the purposive-causal theory account for the explana-
tion of action? First, as to the explanation of the 'mere' behavior
in the action there is no essential difference as compared with the
standard Davidsonian (Me). As to the explanation of action there
are two essential sources of difference. The first is simply that the
purposive-causal theory employs purposive causation instead of
'ordinary' causation. The second is that in the purposive-causal
theory an (intentional) action is ontically regarded as a sequence
b = (t, ... , b, ... , r), whereas standard mental cause theory does not
include the relevant want (and belief) as any kind of component
in the action (Thalberg's [22] account, however, does).
It follows that as the information that t purposively caused b
has already been used when classifying the agent's behavior as an
intentional action one cannot, on pain of circularity, explain u
merely by stating that. Yet u can be explained by referring to the
agent's operative conduct plan at the moment of acting, for that
conduct plan typically gives a fuller characterization of t and em-
beds it in the constellation of the agent's (other) conative and
doxastic attitudes, perhaps emotions and feelings, and so on.
In the purposive-causal theory explanations of action are made
by reference to the agent's operative conduct plan. This makes
these explanations teleological, for a conduct plan typically men-
tions the agent's (further) goal (or goals), or at least it indicates
that the agent is inclined to behave in a certain direction or men-
tions some related broadly teleological matter. As conduct plans
also, one way or other, involve the agent's relevant intending(s),
we may here speak about intentional-teleological explanations of
action (cf. below).2
As to the comparative tenability and adequacy of the different
types of action theories let me finally say the following. The
choice (in my personal view at least) has to be made between the
agent cause theory, the purposive-causal theory and - in spite of
our strong criticisms - some version of the hermeneutic theory,
granted that our analysis has covered the initially viable alterna-
tives. 3 We shall not here go into a further comparison. Recall,
however, that the basic difficulty associated with the agent cause
 Explanation of action 37

theory seems to be the philosophical obscurity of the notion of

agent causality itself (for a formal account of it see POrn [62] ).
The purposive-causal theory has not yet been properly criticized
and evaluated in the literature, and weI will suspend our judge-
ment concerning its plausibility. The basic difficulty associated
with the hermeneutic theory is that it lacks a dynamic (e.g.,
causal) principle accounting for the coming about of action in
rerum natura and explaining the factual possibility of intentional
behaving.

IV

Our fmal remarks concern the scope of the teleological explana-

tion of intentional actions, more or less irrespective of which of
the basic philosophical theories of action is correct. There seems
to be a far-reaching consensus about the intentional character of
the teleological explanation of intentional action, at least in the
sense that somehow reference has to be made to the agent's cona-
tive and doxastic attitudes and to how the agent views or sees
reality. Thus, for instance, Davidson [7], Taylor [44], Norden-
felt [9], Beckermann [70], Abelson [35], and Tuomela [25]
have expressed theses to the effect that all (proximate) mental
explanations (at least those answering why-questions) of inten-
tional actions are in some broad sense intentional-teleological ex-
planations. Although we shall not here make detailed comparisons
between these authors' view, some general comments are due.
Charles Taylor [44] argues that we usually think of teleological
explanations as explanations by fmal causes (but cf. Taylor [8]).
We account for what happens by that 'for the sake of which' it
happens and thus by reference to a further goal. Most of us agree
with this (although our philosophical analyses of such teleological
explanations may greatly differ). But what about when we explain
behavior by, for instance, a relevant internal feeling or sensation?
Taylor wants to extend the term 'teleological' to cover such cases
as well. This is justified because central to all teleological explana-
tion is the idea that the agent whose behavior is being explained is
bent in a certain direction or towards a certain consummation.
This idea is present in all cases of explanation by motive (desire,
38 R. Tuomela

feelings, sensation, emotion, perception, personality trait, etc.),

Taylor (I think correctly) argues. Motives explain only when they
involve this idea of (dispositional) inclination.
Motives may explain both intentional action and other behav-
ior. In the case of intentional action reference to the agent's in-
tentions (rather than merely proattitudes) has to be made some-
how, Nordenfelt [9] and Tuomela [25] argue. This leads them to
detailed models of intentional-teleological explanation, which we
cannot discuss here. It should be emphasized, however, that Nor-
denfelt's [9] work contains a detailed classification not only of
explanations by means of proximate mental factors but also of
explanations in terms of both normative (rules, principles, duties,
etc.) and non-normative external factors.4
A potentially fruitful area of investigation, to which rather little
systematic attention has been paid, is the explanation of action in
terms of social factors such as norms, roles, duties, as well as (sym-
bolic) challenges. To the extent they have been discussed, they
have usually been treated analogously with the internal determi-
nants we have mostly been concerned with above. Many theorists
thus speak of extrinsic (as distinguished from intrinsic) wants, in-
tentions, and other attitudes. They are supposed to take into ac-
count the social factors referred to (cf. Nordenfelt [9], Hollis
[76], Tuomela [25]). Contrary to such views, von Wright [49]
wants to see the explanations of social and communicative actions,
and more generally institutionalized practices, as forming a differ-
ent type of explanation. As a detailed systematic philosophical
investigation of these matters has barely begun yet, we shall not
go deeper into this area here. (For interesting beginning, see, e.g.,
Harre and Secord [77], Bennett [78], and Porn [62].)

NOTES

1. At this point it may be mentioned that the causal theory fits well with
empirical scientific psychology. To mention just a few examples of cog-
nitivistic psychological theories concerned with intentional actions, the
views on the explanation of action of, e.g., Freud, Lewin, Tolman, and
also modern information processing psychology can be regarded as com-
patible with the mental cause theory (for discussion, see Sherwood [54],
Dennett [55], Newell and Simon [56], Turner [57], Alston [16, 17],
Fodor [14] ,and Tuomela [25]).
 Explanation of action 39

One interesting feature of the mentioned psychological theories is

that they do not, after all, account for how the bodily behavior in the
action comes about. Rather they only try to say something about the
determination of action tendencies, 'locomotions', intentions, or the
like. As emphasized by Alston [17] and Tuomela [25], giving a full ac-
count of the bodily and other overt aspects of actions is a very compli-
cated task which, furthermore, may be taken to lie beyond the scope of
psychology (as ordinarily conceived). Yet that account perhaps is possible
in principle, which is what the causal theory of action is concerned with.
2. Tuomela [25] presents a question-theoretic approach to explanation and
defends some theses concerning intentional-teleological explanations of
intentional actions. His most central claims are as follows. First, as to
their formal-logical nature such explanations are nomological arguments
of a certain exactly specified sort (see [25], Chapter 9 and 12). Roughly,
if determinism is true they are so-called e-arguments (which are deductive)
and if indeterminism is true they are so-called p-arguments (which are in-
ductive). Secondly. if something is an in-order-to-type intentional teleo-
logical explanation then it is also a because-of-explanation. Thirdly, an ex-
planation is a because-of-type intentional-teleological explanation if and
only if it is a reason-explanation. Fourthly, an explanation is a purposive-
causal explanation of an intentional action if and only if it is an inten-
tional-teleological because-of-type explanation of that action. Thus the
because-of-relation is analyzed in terms of purposive causation (and gener-
ation).
The first of the above points cannot be further discussed here. The
second is a thesis central to the causal theory of action. As purposive
causation (and generation) is both a teleological and a causal notion it is
not so difficult to see that its presence (see our earlier discussion) will
make this thesis true. The truth of the third of the above points also very
much hangs on the need for causality in intentional-teleological explana-
tions. As the notion of purposive causation (and generation) is defined
with reference to the notion of the agent's operative conduct plan, it can
be seen even on the basis of our earlier comments that the fourth of the
above points holds true (see [25] , Chapter 8 for detailed argumentation).
3. Note that our decision to restrict ourselves to three main types of theories
has meant practically leaving out of consideration the so-called performa-
tive or responsibility theory advocated by e.g., Hart [71], Austin [72],
and Feinberg [73]. For a criticism of this view see Shaffer [74].
It may also be pointed out here that we have not specifically dis-
cussed the type of theory, which we might call the nomological theory
of action, advocated by, e.g., Brandt and Kim [60], Churchland [69]
and Audi [75]. This theory requires, e.g., want-action laws to exist. It
resembles closely the mental cause theory but does not require mental
factors to be event-causes.
4. To indicate what kind of components a schema for the intentional-tele-
ological explanation of intentional actions may be regarded as having we
40 R. Tuomela

may mention Nordenfelt's [9] basic schema (a kind of practical syllo-

gism), which, in spite of its simple nature, is claimed by the author to be
applicable to all the explanations of the mentioned kind.
(1) A intend to bring aboutP
(2) A believes that he is in situation C
(3) A believes that he cannot bring about P in C unless he does F
(4) A can do F.

Therefore, A does F.
(For criticism, see Tuomela [25] .)

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Philosophy of action: Davidson, von Wright,
and the debate over causation
FREDERICK STOUTLAND
St. Olaf College, Minnesota

Philosophy of Action was an active field in the decade under re-

view. Renewed interest in this area among so-called analytic phi-
losophers was due largely to Wittgenstein [I] and Ryle [2], and
their influence dominated the work done in this area in the fif-
ties and early sixties by such philosophers as Anscombe [3],
Peters [4], Winch [5], Melden [6], and Kenny [7], all of whom
opposed a causal theory of human action, attacking not only be-
havioristic and physiological accounts of the causation of action
but traditional philosophical theories which saw volitions, motives,
beliefs, etc., as causes of action. Although allowing that it may not
always be wrong to speak of the causation of action, they rejected
the claim that Humean or nomic causation - causation under-
stood as a lawful relation between distinct events - is essential to
the understanding or explanation of intentional action. While
there were important differences among these philosophers, they
were unanimous in rejecting a causal theory of human action, and
this rejection was overwhelmingly dominant as the decade began.
By the end of the decade the situation had changed, so that if
there is now a dominant position, it is the causal one. But this is
too simple, for the present situation is interestingly complex. The
causal theories differ widely, even on fundamental issues, as do the
alternative positions, which continue to have vigorous defenders.
And while the two points of view remain opposed, there is a
striking convergence on a number of issues, a convergence fur-
thered by philosophy of action ceasing in two senses to be an

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3. pp. 45-72.

©1982, Martinus Niihoff Publishers. The Hague/Boston/London.
46 F. Stoutland

isolated subject: (1) the analytic tradition has lost its self-con-
scious identity and now reaches out in significant ways to the con-
tinental tradition - just as that tradition is more receptive to the
analytic tradition; (2) philosophy of action is pursued as an in-
tegral part of Epistemology and Metaphysics, which have regained
their central position in philosophy.
There is no better way to illustrate these themes than to discuss
the work of Donald Davidson and G.H. von Wright. Davidson has
been the most influential figure in the renaissance of the causal
theory. In a series of papers (Davidson [8,9, la, 11, 12, 13] he
has set out a causal theory of action, defended it against criticism,
and gradually modified it in the direction of the convergence
mentioned above. Every recent systematic development of the
causal theory is indebted to Davidson (Goldman [14] , Davis [15] ,
Tuomela [16]. Von Wright's contribution has been to develop in a
systematic way the Wittgensteinian point of view, a contribution
which is distinctive and important, for even while that point of
view was dominant it was seldom developed as a systematic
philosophy of action. Von Wright has also been notable for
reaching out to the continental tradition, and both he and David-
son have brought theory of action into the context of wider is-
sues in Metaphysics and Epistemology.

II

The central issues in recent philosophy of action have been two.

The first is to characterize the intentionality of action - to ex-
plain how intentional action differs from bodily movements which
do not constitute action. Behavior is present in both instances; the
issue is to distinguish behavior which is intentional from behavior
which is merely bodily movement. 'Behavior' here is used as a
neutral term, ranging over the physical movements by which per-
sons perform intentional actions - as when by nodding his head a
man gives a signal - as well as the physical movements which do
not constitute action - as when a man's head nods simply because
he is falling asleep - which we may call 'mere behavior.' The in-
quiry is into what distinguishes behavior which is intentional from
behavior which is mere behavior.
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 47

The focus here is on intentional behavior, not only because for

it we may give reasons or be held responsible, but also because it
is only by reference to intentionality that we can mark off human
action generally from mere behavior. Not all human action is in-
tentional - it may be inadvertent, done in ignorance, etc. - but
whenever there is action, intentional or unintentional, there is in-
tentional behavior; only relative to intentionality can acts an agent
performs be distinguished non-arbitrarily from behavior that oc-
curs independently of action. Whenever a person acts uninten-
tionally, therefore - for example by mistakenly turning off a
light - there is some act he did intentionally, like turning a switch
in a way he thought would tum on a fan; without some inten-
tional act his movements constitute mere behavior.
The second central issue is to characterize explanations of in-
tentional action. Such explanations characteristically make refer-
ence to reasons for acting: if explanation of behavior makes refer-
ence to factors that have nothing to do with a rationale for the
agent's behavior, then it is not intentional. Thus my belief that I
am on a precipice may serve to explain the perspiration on my
hands, but perspiring is not behavior I engage in for reasons, and
hence it is not intentional. On the other hand, my belief that I am
on a precipice may lead me to step back; here my belief serves as
a reason for my stepping back, which is therefore intentional be-
havior. The issue is to characterize this kind of explanation, which
we may call 'intentional explanation,' by specifying how it differs
from the explanation of mere behavior and, in particular, whether
it differs by involving no reference to causality.

III

A causal theory of action takes the concept of causality as central

to both these issues. To the first it argues that the concept of in-
tentional behavior is a causal concept in the sense that behavior is
intentional if and only if it is caused in certain ways. To the
second it argues that all acceptable explanations of intentional
behavior are causal - in particular that when we explain an agent's
behavior by giving his reasons for acting as he did, we specify the
causes of his behavior, so that reasons are causes of a certain kind.
48 F. Stoutland

Indeed, a causal theory sees these two claims as necessarily con-

nected: intentional behavior just is behavior that can be explained
in terms of a person's reasons for acting, and to cite a person's
reasons for acting is to cite certain causes of his behavior.
In 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', which began the renaissance
of the causal theory, Davidson affirmed both of these claims. He
argued that behavior was intentional if and only if it was caused
by those of the agent's beliefs and pro attitudes (this term being
introduced to cover such 'volitional facotrs' as desires, motives, a
sense of obligation - anything that disposes an agent to act) in the
light of which the behavior appeared (to the agent) reasonable or
justifiable. Thus my opening a door is intentional if and only the
behavior which resulted in the door's opening was caused by at-
titudes and beliefs which make that behavior appear reasonable
- perhaps my desire to get a bat out of the house and my belief
that opening the door would accomplish that. That the desire and
belief were in themselves reasonable (or the belief true) is not
relevant, only that the action was a reasonable thing to do given
the desire and belief, so that they can be understood as reasons for
the action. If the belief and the desire did in fact cause the be-
havior, then the behavior was intentional; to explain the behavior
one simply cites the actual desire (or other pro attitude) and be-
lief which caused it.

IV

The main argument Davidson gave for a causal theory of action is

that it alone enables us to make sense of the notion of an agent's
acting for a reason. That notion assumes a distinction between an
agent's acting and having reasons and his acting because of those
reasons. One may justify an act by citing reasons an agent had
even if he did not act because of them, but one cannot explain his
act unless he acted because of those reasons. This 'because', Da-
vidson ([8], p. 188) argued, must be causal: an agent acts because
of (or for) reasons, that is beliefs or pro attitudes (for simplicity
I shall refer to both of these collectively as 'attitudes'), only if
they cause his behavior. If on a given occasion an agent has an at-
titude but it does not cause his behavior, then the agent has a
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 49

reason but he has not acted because of it; only if the attitude
caused his behavior did he act because of it, and only then will
the attitude be a sufficient condition of his behavior's being in-
tentional.
Another reason for the necessity of causality, which is more
implicit than explicit in Davidson, is to account simply for the
occurrence of the agent's behavior. (Cf. Davidson [13], p. 44)
The causal theory sees attitudes as playing a dual role: not only do
they account for the intentionality of behavior and figure in its in-
tentional explanation, but they explain the occurrence on that oc-
casion of the behavior of which intentionality if predicated. The
proximate cause of this behavior is muscle movements, caused in
turn by neural processes, but the ultimate causes are the same at-
titudes which constitute the behavior's intentionality (though, as
we shall see, Davidson identifies these attitudes with a sub-set of
the neural processes). Thus the causal theory offers a causal ex-
planation for what we may call the 'congruence' between the oc-
currence of behavior and the performance of an intentional act;
behavior which is intentional is caused to occur by the same at-
titude which constitute it as intentional.

v
To defend the causal theory Davidson had to deal with the so-
called 'logical connection argument', which was a persistent theme
among anti-causalist philosophers. That argument was many sided
(Stoutland [17] but its thrust was that reasons for action could
not be causes since reasons and actions lacked the logical inde-
pendence required for the causal relation in the Humean or nomic
sense. Thus it was argued that my desire to open the door could
not be a cause of my opening the door because that desire -like
any desire - could be understood only in terms of its object,
which was the very action it was supposed to cause. But 'the very
notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect
are intelligible without any logically internal relation of the one to
the other' (Melden [6], p. 52).
Davidson's reply was that this argument confuses events with
their descriptions. Descriptions have logical relations to each
50 F. Stoutland

other, events do not; causation is a relation that holds between

events, however described, not between descriptions. From 'he
got sunburn because of overexposure to the sun' - there surely
is a logical connection between 'overexposure to the sun' and
'sunburn' - it does not follow that overexposure to the sun can-
not be a cause of sunburn.
This rejoinder is adequate against many forms of the logical
connection argument, which was often used as a philosopher's
stone, though lying back of the argument is a deeper issue about
the nature of attitudes generally. Davidson' reply assumes that
they are events, conceptually distinct from human behavior and
its wider context, and that a sharp distinction can be drawn be-
tween attitudes as described and the descriptions we apply to
them. Davidson's reply shows, in other words, that he is working
here with a 'Cartesian understanding' of attitudes as mental
events, which are inner in the sense of being conceptually distinct
from behavior and its wider context (cf. Malcolm [18)). Indeed,
this Cartesian understanding of the attitudes is central to any
straightforward causal theory of action, and this was the sig-
nificant issue implicit in the logical connection argument. We
shall return to this matter, for the rejection of Cartesianism is
central to von Wright's view.
The distinction Davidson drew between events and their des-
criptions is more complex than I have indicated. Though assert-
ing that causation is a relation holding between events however
described, he nevertheless argued that causality was inseparable
from causal laws and that causal laws necessarily involve descrip-
tions. ' ... Where there is causality, there must be a law; events
related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws ...
Causality and identity are relations between individual events no
matter how described. But laws are linguistic, and so events can
instantiate laws ... only as those events are described in one way
or another.' (Davidson [12] , pp. 80 f., 89)
Davidson's position on the relation of causality to causal laws
is a significant departure from the usual Humean or nomic view of
this matter, however. For what is distinctive about his version of
the causal theory of action is that it avoids commitment to what
Dray has called the 'covering law model' of explanation (Dray
[ 19)), which is a development of Hume's view on causation. The
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 51

covering law model requires that in order for event A to cause

event B there must be a law 'covering' events of types A and B
- that is, a law to the effect that events (described as) of type A
are always followed by events (described as) of type B. To assert
that A causes B, therefore, presupposes a causal law in which both
'A' and 'B' appear. Thus we could not assert that a person's desire
to get rid of a bat and his belief that the way to do it is to open
the door caused his opening the door unless we were prepared to
assert a law which contained the descriptions 'desire to get rid of a
bat', 'belief that the way to do it is to open the door', and 'open-
ing a door'. If the covering law model is correct, then, the causal
theory will stand or fall with the possibility of formulating causal
laws in such intentional or psychological terms.
Debate over the causal theory of action had tended to turn on
this issue. Defenders of the theory argued that intentional ex-
planations of human behavior presuppose causal laws in inten-
tional terms which 'cover' behavior and the explanatory attitudes.
That we do not normally mention such laws was held to be no ob-
jection, for the laws were implicit, and in any case difficult to
formulate (cf. Hempel [20]). Critics of the theory argued that
there were no laws of the required kind, that the covering law
model was, therefore, incorrect, which implied that the causal
theory of action should be abandoned.
Davidson holds that this whole debate is beside the point, for a
causal theory of action does not stand or fall with the covering
law model - with the possibility of formulating causal laws con-
necting attitude descriptions with behavior descriptions. Indeed
Davidson argued that there were not - and in his later papers,
that there could not be - any causal laws in intentional terms.
To avoid the covering law model Davidson construes the causal
theory's claim that attitudes cause behavior whenever it is inten-
tional in an oblique sense (cf. Stoutland [21]). This means deny-
ing that there are causal laws connecting attitude descriptions with
behavior descriptions, while affirming that the attitudes and the
behavior also have purely physical (non-intentional) descriptions
and that it is the latter which are connected by causal laws. ' ...
When events are related as cause and effect, they have descriptions
which instantiate a law ... [But not] every true singular statement
of causality instantiates a law' (Davidson [12] , p. 89). Thus 'want-
52 F. Stoutland

ing to get the bat out' is an attitude description of an individual

event which also has a physical description - presumably neuro-
logical - and it is only when described as a physical event that the
attitude figures in causal laws.
Affirming that attitudes also have purely physical descriptions
is to affirm that attitudes are identical with physical (neural)
events, and Davidson is thus committed to a version of identity
materialism. There is no identity (or lawful connection either)
between types of attitudes and types of physical events, but only
between tokens of the types (hence the term 'token materialism').
Each individual attitude is identical with a physical event, but no
law determines which type of physical event it is identical with
(Davidson [12] calls this 'anomalous monism'). Only at the
physical level do we fmd causal laws; so, although reasons are
causes, no causal laws need connect reasons and actions. Genuine
causal laws connect the physical events to which the attitude de-
scriptions happen to apply with behavior described non-inten-
tionally.
This separation of the causal theory of action from the covering
law, model, made possibly by Davidson's construing the causal re-
lation of attitudes and behavior in an oblique sense, is, I believe,
the main reason for the renaissance of the causal theory. Although
the separation has not been universally endorsed by advocates
of the causal theory (Pears [22] , esp. Ch. 5), it served to strength-
en it by eliminating a most vulnerable aspect. At the same time it
raised a new difficulty, but this is better taken up after discussing
von Wright's theory.

VI

Von Wright regards the concept of causality - whether Humean or

as in Davidson's oblique theory - to be inessential both to the in-
tentionality of behavior and to intentional explanation. His central
thesis is that an agent's behavior is intentional if and only if an
agent intends (aims at, means) something by his behavior. If the
agent's behavior is intended to result in a certain outcome (or be
of a certain form), then it is intentional, and whether or not this
is so, von Wright argues, is independent of the causal history of
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 53

the behavior (von Wright [23], esp. Ch. III).

Von Wright's locution 'intend by one's behavior' encapsulates
a general approach to intentional behavior for which the funda-
mental difference between intentional behavior and mere behavior
is in the way they are perceived, understood, or described. Inten-
tional behavior is behavior perceived and understood in terms of
the intentional attitudes of agents - in terms of the meaning it
has for the agents who engage in it. Human beings acquire by vir-
tue of their participation in the complex practices and institutions
that make up a 'life community' ([23], p. 114) the ability to
perceive, understand and describe behavior not merely - indeed
not primarily - as physical movement but as action which con-
forms to rules or roles, which fulfills intentions or desires, which
realizes ends, in short which is done for reasons. Behavior thus
acquires intentional descriptions, not (primarily) because it is
interpreted in that way, but because it is perceived in intentional
terms, because it presents itself to agents on an intentional level.
On that level it is capable of intentional explanation, for agents
who behave intentionally are not just 'emitting' behavior; they are
behaving and are perceived to behave as agents who aim at ends,
fulfill desires, conform to law, act for a variety of reasons. Their
behavior is perceived under the aspect of intentionality, and it is
just being perceived - and hence understood and described - in
this way which constitutes its intentionality and makes it possible
to give intentional explanations of it.
Fundamental to this is von Wright's emphasis on the way inten-
tional descriptions of behavior are compatible with a wide range
of descriptions of mere behavior. Thus buying a ticket to a concert
can involve great diversity in the movements of hands, feet, head,
etc. Normally those movements are not described in this way be-
cause we do not perceive them as mere movements (cf. Malcolm
[18] , Ch. 3). Our perceptions and hence our descriptions are, von
Wright argues, in terms of how this mere behavior is understood
by the participants - an intention to go to the concert, a belief
that one must buy tickets in advance, an understanding that these
pieces of paper constitute money or tickets, etc. These movements
constitute the intentional act of buying a ticket just because they
are perceived and understood in this way by the participants; our
description of what goes on presupposes complex attitudes on the
54 F. Stoutland

part of the participants, and they constitute the agent's behavior

as his intentional act.
Explanations of intentional behavior, von Wright argues, also
presuppose this level of perception, understanding, and descrip-
tion. There can be no rationale for mere behavior; the movement
of a hand is not something for which a reason can be given, unless
the movement is perceived or understood as intentional behavior
- as turning a handle, opening a door, buying a ticket - thus as
understood as related to an agent's intentions, beliefs, or other
attitudes, as understood under the aspect of intentionality. To ex-
plain the agent's behavior we specify what these attitudes are, re-
lating them as necessary to his further beliefs, desires, duties,
wants, and so on.

VII

Much intentional behavior takes the form of what con Wright

calls a 'performance', where the behavior is perceived and under-
stood in terms of some outcome that it brings about - for exam-
ple, a door's closing, a ticket's being bought, a man's being injured.
This outcome von Wright calls the result of an act (cf. von Wright
[24] , Ch. III). The result of an act is a logical criterion of the act's
having been performed. Thus if an agent intentionally opens a
door, the result is that the door opens, for if an agent opened a
door it follows logically that a door opened. Perceiving the result
of the act, then, is necessary for perceiving the agent's intentional
behavior.
But the result of the act is also that which the agent intended
(or aimed at) by his behavior. Not every outcome of an agent's
behavior constitutes an intentional act. Opening a door may in-
volve a diversity of mere behavior - using the hands (left or right),
a foot, a shoulder - and we describe this as a case of someone's
opening a door, not primarily because that is what is brought
about, for many things are brought about we do not describe as
acts of the agent, but because the agent intended by his behavior,
whatever it was, that a door open. His behavior is perceived as the
intentional behavior it is in terms of what he intends by it, that
is, in terms of the result of the act.
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 55

Von Wright takes results to be not acts but events (or in the
case of preventive acts, the negation of events); that an intentional
performance necessarily has a result which the agent intended by
his behavior does not mean that every act is done with some fur-
ther end in view. An agent may open a door with no particular
purpose in mind; but in intentionally opening a door his behavior
is aimed at the event of the door's opening. Moreover, even if he
fails at that, we will still understand his behavior in terms of its
result, for we will perceive him as trying to open a door - that is
what he intended by his behavior in spite of its failing to have
that outcome.
Von Wright emphasizes that a result is not caused by the act
whose result it is. A result is rather that in terms of which we
perceive the unity of diverse behavior as making up the individual
intentional act. At the same time results do have causes and ef-
fects. The result of the act is caused by the agent's mere behavior
(except for basic acts; see Section XI below): it is the movements
of his body which cause the door to open. Results also have ef-
fects, which von Wright calls the consequences of an act. If in
opening a door I let in a fly, a fly's coming in is a consequence
of my act of opening the door. But if in opening the door I in-
tended to let in the fly, then my behavior can be understood as
an act of letting in a fly, and that act has as its result that a fly
come in. The same event, then, will be result or consequence ac-
cording to whether or not the event is understood as logically
constitutive of the act. Results are outcomes of behavior which
enter into our perception and understanding of that behavior as
intentional action, whereas consequences are outcomes which do
not thus enter in (cf. Stoutland [25]).

VIII

Although defenders of the causal theory may feel uncomfortable

with the ways ,in which von Wright's view, as so far presented, is
expressed, they may think that it is not so much wrong as incom-
plete in that it fails to specify the essential role of causation. Their
claim would be that there are no grounds for intentional descrip-
tions of an agent's behavior in terms of his attitudes unless those
56 F. Stoutland

attitudes caused his behavior. Grant that what makes an agent's

behavior an instance of intentionally opening a door is that by
his behavior he intended the door to open; it is only because his
attitudes caused the behavior which resulted in the door's opening
that he can be described as intending that by his behavior.
It is this claim which von Wright rejects. Although he clearly
thinks that attitudes do not in fact cause behavior, his arguments
are directed rather against the view that causation is necessary for
the intentionality of behavior or its intentional explanation. The
best way of approaching these arguments is to consider his discus-
sion of the practical syllogism. For von Wright a practical syl-
logism consists of premisses which set forth the agent's intention
in acting and his belief about the means necessary to attain that
intention, and a conclusion which sets out the agent's action,
which is explained by the intention and belief set out in the prem-
isses.

S intends to get rid of a bat.

S believes he cannot do that unless he opens a door.
S opens a door.

In Explanation and Understanding von Wright took two things to

be central about this syllogism: (1) its validity as an explanation is
dependent not on whether opening the door is adequate to the
end but only on whether the agent believed it to be and (2) the
inference is logically valid, so that given the agent's intention and
belief it follows logically that he is opening a door. This first
point, suggested to him by Charles Taylor's The Explanation of
Behavior (Taylor [26]), means that what is at issue here is not the
agent's mere behavior but his behavior as understood under the
aspect of intentionality. The second point represents his attempt
to reform and defend anew the logical connection argument; it
implies, von Wright argued, that the practical syllogism does not
represent a causal inferences, for if it did it would not be valid
unless there were a premiss setting forth a lawful, but logically
contingent, connection between the agent's intentions and beliefs
and his behavior. This syllogism is valid without any such law, and
the inference is not therefore causal. This means, he argued, that
we are justified in giving an intentional description and explana-
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 57

tion of the agent's behavior in tenns of his attitudes without

being committed to a causal relation between them.
The syllogism as it stands, as von Wright recognized, not logical-
ly valid, for persons do not necessarily act on their intentions, but
he argued that it can be refined into a logically valid inference
(von Wright [23, 27]). These refinements need not concern us,
especially as von Wright no longer thinks the inference is logically
valid (von Wright [28]), which means that he has fonnally given
up defense of the logical connection argument. This is not a major
shift, however, for von Wright continues to think that the deeper
significance of the argument remains: the connection between the
premisses and the conclusion of the practical syllogism, even if it
does not amount to logical necessity, is not causal but conceptual,
a matter of the way in which our understanding of the agent's at-
titudes and our understanding of his behavior are necessarily con-
nected.
Von Wright never maintained that the premisses of the practical
syllogism logically entail the occurrence of any mere behavior.
What they entail is how we must understand whatever behavior
the agent was engaged in - that is, what result we must under-
stand his behavior to have, what he was intending by his behavior.
Here a person's body is moving in certain ways, with all sorts of
effects: his feet move, disturbing the dust; his hands move; his
coat sleeve twists; a handle turns, causing a door to open. Nonnal-
ly there is no difficulty; we just see an agent opening a door and
describe his behavior straightaway in intentional language. 'In the
nonnal cases we say off-hand of the way we see people behave
that they perfonn such and such actions ... Many of these actions
we ourselves know how to perfonn; those, and others which we
cannot do, have a familiar 'look' or 'physiognomy', which we
recognize.' (von Wright [27], p. 51). But we may be in doubt,
and if so we may consider his behavior in the light of some further
intention he may have and of how he conceives his behavior as
directed to it. If his intention is to get rid of a bat and if he be-
lieves he has to ,open the door to do that, then opening a door-
or at least trying to - must be his intentional behavior. That
'must' is not logical, von Wright now thinks, for it is logically
possible to ascribe correctly an intention or belief to an agent who
displays no behavior at all or who displays behavior that makes no
58 F. Stoutland

sense even in the light of intentions and beliefs. Yet a conceptual

connection remains, for given that there is behavior, the premisses
of the practical syllogism supply the concepts in terms of which
we must understand the agent's behavior if it is possible to make
sense of it at all, and this understanding is independent of what-
ever causes the behavior.
The practical syllogism is, therefore, in the first instance a for-
mal representation of what goes on when we must inquire into the
intentionality of an agent's behavior, asking what he intends or
means - if anything - by his behavior. But the practical syllo-
gism is also a scheme for the explanation of an agent's intentional
behavior. Given that he is opening a door, why is he doing that?
An adequate explanation is that he thinks it necessary to get rid
of the bat. This fits the usual scheme for an explanation because
given the premisses about the agent's belief and intentions we are
able to infer the behavior whose explanation we seek, and thus
knowing the agent's beliefs and intentions we know his reasons
for acting. We do not, however, know why the particular move-
ments occurred, for this explanation is intentional, and there is
no intentional explanation of mere behavior. The attitudes enter
the picture as explanatory only when the behavior is already un-
derstood under the aspect of intentionality, and under that aspect
mere behavior drops out in the sense that whatever behavior the
agent is engaged in will be perceived as his intentional action, and
it is of the latter that the attitudes provide an explanation. 1

IX

We should consider how von Wright might reply to Davidson's

argument that only causation enables us to distinguish between
attitudes which justify and those which explain an act. That
argument presupposes that it is possible to identify an agent's
attitudes independently of identifying his intentional behavior,
for only thus could we distinguish attitudes an agent has which
cause his behavior - and thus on Davidson's theory account for
its intentionality - from those which do not. But von Wright
denies that such independent identification of attitudes and in-
tentional behavior is possible.
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 59

Von Wright would grant that an agent may have attitudes which
do not explain his behavior, what he denies is that we could iden-
tify those that might explain - in whatever sense - his behavior
and at the same time identify his intentional behavior in a manner
sufficiently independent of detennining his attitudes to raise the
question whether the one is the cause of the other. For if we are
in doubt whether the agent's behavior is, say, opening a door (Is
that what those mysterious movements are intended to be?), then
we need to consider, in the way represented in the practical syl-
logism, what attitudes might account for his behavior. But to
establish that he has those attitudes, we must already understand
his behavior as intentional, for only behavior understood as in-
tentional can be evidence for attitudes, since the evidence for an
agent's attitudes consists not in his mere behavior, but in his be-
havior understood as intentional - as an act of saying something
(and not merely uttering sounds), as an act of doing something
(and not merely making movements). But to understand his be-
havior as intentional means precisely to understand it in the light
of the attitudes which explain it, so that the question of explana-
tion has to be raised before causation can even enter the picture.
We may be mistaken in this, of course, either by misidentifying
his intentional behavior - he is not trying to open a door but
test his grip - or by misidentifying his attitudes - his intention
is not to let the bat out but let the fly in - but the mistake can be
corrected neither by reference to causal laws nor by a grasp of
oblique causation at work. We will rather have to make further
observation of his behavior, question him, in general seek out the
wider context of his behavior. Once the matter of intentionality
is settled, a causal question may be raised, but it will now be re-
dundant to determining intentionality as well as to the intentional
explanation which both Davidson and von Wright regard as logical-
ly sufficient for intentionality.
It is at this point that the logical connection argument plays the
role referred to earlier in rejecting the Cartesian understanding of
attitudes. Von Wright does not regard attitudes as mental events
conceptually distinct from intentional behavior and the wider
context of behavior. On his view attitudes have a 'global charac-
ter': their truth conditions are not what occurs at a particular time
or place (whether mental events or neural) but the wider history
60 E Stoutland

of the agent's behavior, what has gone before, what will come lat-
er. '... Intentionality is not anything 'behind' or 'outside' the
behavior. It is not a mental act or characteristic experience ac-
companying it ... The behavior's intentionality is its place in a
story about the agent.' (Von Wright [23] , p. 115)
This view derives from Wittgenstein (cf. Stoutland [29]), and it
is not, despite appearances, behaviorism. For behaviorism in all
its classic forms understood behavior to be what was left over
after intentionality was stripped off (with intentionality being
construed in a Cartesian way), and behavior in this sense is what
we have been calling 'mere behavior'. Behaviorism then tried to
account for intentionality by reference to dispositions to behave
(with 'behave' again being understood in the 'mere behavior'
sense). Von Wright, on the other hand, assumes that the agent's
behavior and its wider history, which provide the truth conditions
for attitude ascriptions, are precisely intentional behavior, and it
is only behavior under the aspect of intentionality to which at-
titudes are conceptually connected. Von Wright rejects any con-
ceptual connection between attitudes and mere behavior, and that
is tantamount to rejecting behaviorism.
Here we touch the deepest root of the disagreement between
von Wright and Davidson (though Davidson's later work urges us
to be cautious in overdrawing it). It is a disagreement between one
who accepts and one who rejects Wittgenstein's critique of Car-
tesianism. That critique seems to me Wittgenstein's most profound
and important contribution to philosophy, but it is profound and
important precisely because it affects so many issues in philoso-
phy. The disagreement over the logical connection argument,
therefore, is only a symptom of differences which are extraordi-
narily complex and which touch on the deepest issues in Episte-
mology and Metaphysics. A disagreement of this scope is not one
for which either side has reasonable hope of a compelling argu-
ment (cf. von Wright [23], p. 32).

x
While Davidson's and von Wright's views in one sense represent
polar opposites, Davidson defending the view that causation is
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 61

essential to the intentionality and explanation of behavior, von

Wright arguing the contrary, Davidson's recent work suggests
that his views are closer to von Wright's than this contrast sug-
gests. Whereas in 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' he argued that
the causal theory of action does not require commitment to
causal laws in intentional or psychological terms, in later papers
(esp. [12, 13, 30]) he has gone beyond this to argue that there
cannot be any such laws - that all causal laws must be in purely
physical terms. His argument for this raises a number of signifi-
cant issues and shows striking affinities to von Wright's discussion
of the practical syllogism.
The best way of approaching it is to consider how we might
establish which attitudes account for an agent's behavior on an
occasion. It would be natural to assume that a causal theory sees
this in terms of a hypothesis about which attitudes caused the
behavior. On the covering law version this requires appeal to a
causal law connecting the behavior and attitudes, and this will
presume having established a causal law of the form: 'Agents who
have attitudes of this type will always act in this kind of way.'
But, Davidson writes, 'There are no serious laws of this kind ...
Psychological phenomena ... are not, even in theory, amenable
to precise predictions under deterministic laws.' ([ 13], pp. 45,52)
One of Davidson's arguments for this is similar to von Wright's,
namely, that such laws presume we can identify an agent's in-
tentional behavior independently of knowing his attitudes. This
is not the case, he argues, for the same behavior may constitute
different intentional acts depending on the agent's attitudes.
There can be no hypothesis about the causes of an agent's behav-
ior unless that behavior has been interpreted in the light of his at-
titudes, and this interpretation is so complex that it rules out
causal laws in intentional terms (Davidson [30], pp. 717 ff.).
Davidson's main argument rests on the claim that any ascrip-
tions either of attitudes or of intentional behavior must be modi-
fiable in the light of what we may later discover about the agent.
The reason for this is that 'if we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes
and beliefs, or usefully to describe motions as behavior, then we are
committed to finding, in the pattern of behavior, belief and de-
sire, a large degree of rationality and consistency.' ([ 13], p. 50)
Rationality and consistency must in particular be sought not
62 F. Stoutland

only in the agent's past and present attitudes and behavior but in
his future ones as well. Thus let us say we ascribe to an agent the
desire to get rid of a bat and the belief that they way to do it is
to open the door. Later he says he is fond of bats. If this is true,
we may have to withdraw our ascription to him of a desire to get
rid of the bat. He might have newly acquired a fondness for bats,
but it might be he is misusing the word 'fond' and really means
'afraid.' Perhaps he says, 'I'm fond of bats and that is why I try
to get rid of them,' and as we try to make sense of him it occurs
to us that he is misusing the word 'fond.' Or perhaps he believes
that fondness toward bats requires getting them out of the house.
And so it goes, our ascriptions never being final, always open to
modification in terms of what is to come, as we seek to interpret
the agent as rational and consistent.
Interpreting agents as rational and consistent so far as possible
in their attitudes and behavior over time is for Davidson a pre-
condition of treating them as capable of intentional behavior at
all, and apart from it, therefore, there is nothing but mere behav-
ior. Ascribing attitudes and intentional behavior to persons neces-
sarily means a kind of unended openness to modification in the
light of what may be discovered in the future. This simply rules
out the possibility of causal laws in intentional terms: we could
formulate them only when all the evidence was in, and that would
mean when all intentional behavior had ceased. Similar considera-
tions, he thinks, rule out the possibility of any laws connecting
intentional with physical terms; all causal laws must be entirely
in physical terms.
The similarity of this to von Wright's approach to the practical
syllogism is clear, with both philosophers emphasizing the 'dia-
lectical' relation between determining an agent's intentional be-
havior and determining his attitudes. 2 Does this mean that David-
son has abandoned the causal approach?
The question is complex. On the one hand, Davidson has always
rejected the applicability of the covering law model to intentional
behavior, and his recent papers simply strengthen this rejection
(cf. esp. [11]). Implicit in this rejection, it seems to me, is the
idea that intentional explanations are not causal in form. Neither
the inference from the premisses of an explanatory scheme to the
behavior nor the considerations which show the correctness of
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 63

such a scheme tum on causal considerations. That is the point von

Wright makes about the practical syllogism, and I think Davidson's
argument that causal laws are non-intentional only strengthens it.
Davidson, however, continues to maintain that causation plays
a role, for even if the inference from explanatory premises to be-
havior is not causal in form, the scheme does not count as an ex-
planation - as opposed to a justification - unless the attitudes
caused (in the oblique sense) the behavior. And that is the point
of his attack on the logical connection argument: all the concep-
tual connections that obtain - and must obtain - between atti-
tudes and behavior, argued for by both von Wright and Davidson,
do not rule out causal connections 'underneath' at the physical
level.
I have discussed von Wright's reasons for thinking that causation
is redundant for distinguishing explanation and justification, and I
shall not pursue this complex issue further. In Section IV above,
however, I indicated another role the causal theory of action as-
signed to causation, namely, to explain the congruence between
the occurrence of mere behavior and the agent's intentional ac-
tion, and it may well be that this is Davidson's fundamental moti-
vation for insisting on causation in an account of action (cf.
Stoutland [29]). His oblique theory of causation clearly allows
attitudes to play the dual role of determining intentionality and
causing mere behavior: it is the attitude descriptions which figure
in intentionality, and the physical events to which those descrip-
tions apply which cause the mere behavior. Since it is the very
same event which is described intentionally as an attitude and
physically as neural, it appears that we have an explanation of
the congruence between intentionality and the occurrence of the
mere behavior. There seems to me, however, to be a deep diffi-
culty with the oblique theory just at this point.

XI

Davidson's oblique theory of the causal nature of attitudes entails

that attitudes cause mere behavior not because they are attitudes
but because they are (also) physical (neural) events. To describe
an event as an attitude, therefore, is not to describe it in terms of
64 F. Stoutland

its causal powers; its causal powers are due to its being physical,
not to its being an attitude.
The difficulty that arises is that Davidson cannot allow an
explanatory relation between the causal powers of attitudes and
the fact that they are attitudes. It is, on the one hand, because
they are attitudes that they account for the intentionality of be-
havior (or figure in intentional explanations); it is, on the other
hand, only because they are identical with physical (neural) events
that they cause behavior. But that any individual event should be
both a specific attitude and a specific physical event - that is,
that the same event should have both the attitude description and
the physical description it does have - is something for which
there cannot, on Davidson's grounds, be an explanation. For if
there were an explanation, it would take this form: an event
which has this (type of) attitude description would also have,
under such and such conditions, this (type of) physical descrip-
tion. But that would be a law, and if attitude types are connected
by law to physical types, then - this relation being transitive -
attitude types would be connected by law to mere behavior types,
and we would be back with the covering law model, to which the
oblique theory has been offered as an alternative.
To avoid the covering law model, therefore, Davidson must hold
that there is no explanation why an attitude causes the mere
behavior it does. But now the theory is no longer functioning to
explain the congruence between mere behavior and the agent's
intentionality, for there is no explanation of why the agent's
mere behavior occurred on the occasion of his acting intentionally.
The theory allows that the agent's attitudes caused his behavior,
but it does not and cannot allow any explanation of why they
caused it on the occasion of his acting in terms of those attitudes.
Saying his attitudes caused his mere behavior is no more satis-
factory than simply saying neural events did, though simply
saying the latter does not explain congruence, for it leaves it open
why the neural processes caused his mere behavior congruently
with his having whatever intentional attitudes he had on that oc-
casion. While affirming that the agent's attitudes did cause his be-
havior, the theory offers no explanation why they caused it then
in accordance with his attitudes, for that those attitudes caused
what they did is a matter of the unexplainable fact that they
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 65

happened to be on that occasion also identical with certain physi-

cal events. Given the oblique theory affirming that the agent's
attitudes caused his mere behavior is not, it would appear, any
explanation of congruence. (For more details cf. Stoutland [21]
where it is argued that this difficulty also affects Davidson's use
of causation to distinguish explanation from justification.)

XII

The problem of congruence would appear to be particularly acute

for von Wright since his non-causal view of intentionality yields
no account at all of the occurrence of the agent's mere behavior.
On his view an agent acts intentionally when he intends a result
by his behavior - that is, by the movements of his body, whatever
they are - but this intention does not cause those movements;
they are presumably caused by muscle contractions and neural
impulses. Opening a door can, as we have seen, involve a diversity
of mere behavior, but there are limits to this diversity. Unless
relevant behavior occurs at the right time, there will be no behav-
ior by which an agent intenris a result and nothing to be perceived
under the aspect of intentionality.
The causal theory's attempt to explain congruence by assigning
a dual role to attitudes is rejected by von Wright. His view is
rather that no explanation at all is required for congruence, and
that it is not, therefore, incumbent on a theory of action to offer
one. He develops this view while discussing what he calls the
'counterfactual element' in action. To act, he writes, 'is to inter-
fere with the course of the world, thereby making true something
which would not otherwise (i.e., had it not been for this inter-
ference) come to be true of the world at that stage ofits history.'
([ 31] , p. 39) Act descriptions, therefore, make explicit reference
to the event which was the result of the act and implicit reference
to the event which would have obtained had there been no action;
formulation of the latter takes the form of a counterfactual con-
ditional, and hence the 'counterfactual element' in action (cf. von
Wright [23] , pp. 71 f., 129 f.).
For non-basic acts - acts done by doing domething - this
proceeds straightforwardly. When I intentionally open a door, the
66 F. Stoutland

result - the door's opening - is caused by my (mere) behavior, so

that had I not acted, the door would have stayed closed (the coun-
terfactual element in the act). If this were not so, if, for example,
the door would have opened anyway, perhaps as a result of a
hidden mechanism operating just at that time, then it would not
be true that I opened the door; rather the door opened 'by itself,'
my action having nothing to do with it. What I did was try to open
the door, perhaps by pushing toward a door that was opening
anyway. In such a situation my intentional behavior is reduced to
those acts by the doing of which I tried to perform the act whose
result would have occurred even if! had not acted (cf. von Wright
[23], p. 127).
The limit of this kind of reduction, however, is basic acts, for
they are, by definition, acts not done by doing another act (cf.
Danto [32]), and it is with basic acts that the problem of con-
gruence becomes crucial. For with basic acts the agent's (mere)
behavior does not cause the result, since the result of a basic act
just is that the agent's behavior take a certain form. The basic act
of putting my hand on my head, for example, has as its result
that my hand be on my head, which is not caused by my behavior
but just a form my behavior takes.
Given this, and given von Wright's view that my behavior is not
caused by my attitudes, it follows that the results of my basic
acts are always causally independent of my intentional action;
their causes are muscle movements and neural processes. The
issue is whether an explanation need or can be given as to why
that physical causation operates congruently with my intentional-
ly performing basic acts.
Von Wrights thinks that no explanation need be given. One can
imagine cases where my hand goes to my head even though I
have not intentionally put it there. And one can imagine cases
where I try to put my hand on my head but it doesn't move. If
these cases happened too frequently, von Wright argues, we
could not act. If my hand went to my head frequently indepen-
dently of my intentional action, I would lose the opportunity
for that act because, like the door closing by itself, this result
would occur whether or not I acted, which would eliminate the
counterfactual element in action. If my hand frequently failed
to reach my head even when I attempted to put it there, I would
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 67

no longer have the ability to perform that act. Action, writes von
Wright, depends upon 'not too frequent discrepancies' between
the occurrence of the events which are the results of basic acts
and the performance of those acts ([31] , p. 132).
But von Wright will not go beyond affirming that the possibility
of intentional behavior depends upon this congruence obtaining.
That it obtains, he writes, is 'nothing to be surprised at. For, it is
a condition which the world must satisfy if we are to entertain
our present notions of action and agency.' ([31] , p. 132)
I have argued elsewhere [29] that this view is not satisfactory
- that it is surprising that this congruence obtains between in-
tentionality and the occurrence of the relevant behavior, given
that the behavior occurs as a result of neural causes, which are in-
dependent of the agent's intentionality. At the same time David-
son's view seems to me also unsatisfactory. Some have suggested
that the approach called 'functionalism' is able to resolve this
problem (Tuomela [16]); I shall conclude with a few comments
on this view and its relation to the work of von Wright and David-
son.

XIII

Functionalism is currently the most discussed approach to phi-

losophy of action among analytic philosophers, Hilary Putnam and
Daniel Dennett probably being its most influential advocates (Put-
nam [33], Dennett [34, 35]). Its central thesis is that attitudes
should be construed as functional states of a person. This notion
receives a technical articulation by reference to Turing machine
programs, but an informal description is enough for our purposes.
To characterize a state functionally is to characterize it in terms
of the role it plays in a system; its identity as a kind of attitude
is constituted by its function in the system. Thus to say that a
certain belief is a certain functional state is to say that anything
- regardless ,of its features, physical or otherwise - that played
the same functional role would be the same belief and anything
which did not play the same role would not be the same belief.
Though some philosophers have appealed to versions of func-
tionalism in defense of identity materialism (Armstrong [36]), it
68 F. Stoutland

is generally seen as an alternative to it, precisely because the same

role can be instantiated in a variety of physical (or even non-
physical) systems provided they are functionally equivalent. On
the other hand, it is quite compatible with Davidson's token
materialism, because on the assumption that the functional
systems in question are physical, the role will be embodied in
some physical state or other, even if there is no correlation be-
tween type of role and type of physical system.
Neither Davidson nor von Wright has shown sympathy for func-
tionalism, and I believe the reason is that functionalism has usually
been construed as a thesis about the meaning of attitude terms.
Construed in this way, however, functionalism seems committed
to something like a covering law theory about the role attitudes
play in intentional behavior. To define 'belief in terms of its
functional role in a system requires correlating kinds of belief
with kinds of mere behavior - even if the correlation is complex
- and this is rejected by both von Wright and Davidson.
Putnam ([33], esp. Ch. 21), however, explicitly rejects func-
tionalism as a theory of meaning; to say belief is a functional
state is not to define 'belief but to offer a theory of it on the
same order as saying that heat is kinetic energy (which is not to
give a definition of 'heat'). Dennett (cf. [35], esp. pp. xv ff.)
also rejects functionalism as a thesis about the meaning of at-
titude terms, adopting what he calls 'token functionalism,' which
construes particular mental states as particular functional states
but allows no identification of kinds of mental states with kinds
of functional states (as would be required if this were a theory of
meaning).
The question then is how functionalism as something other than
a thesis about the meaning of attitude terms is related to von
Wright's and Davidson's approaches. A distinction Dennett ([ 35] ,
Ch. 1) makes between three kinds of 'stances' we can take toward
an 'intentional system' may shed some light on this.
By an 'intentional system' 'Dennett means, roughly, anything
capable of intentional behavior. An intentional system is one
'whose behavior can be - at least sometimes - explained and
predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and
desires (and hopes, fears, intentions, hunches ... )' ([35], p. 3).
To give an intentional explanation of a system's behavior is to
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 69

adopt what Dennett calls an 'intentional stance' toward the sys-

tem. To adopt the intentional stance is to presume that is behavior
is rational in the sense that we can explain its behavior by con-
sidering it as being performed for reasons. Both von Wright and
Davidson, therefore, have been developing the various implications
of what Dennett calls the intentional stance.
But we can also adopt either the 'physical stance' or the 'design
stance.' When we adopt the physical stance we seek to explain and
predict behavior in terms of the system's physical structure and
what we know about the laws of nature which govern physical
processes. When we adopt the design stance we rely on 'the sys-
tem's functional design, irrespective of the physical constitution
or condition of the innards of the particular object.' ([35] , p. 4)
In terms of this distinction it seems clear that Dennett regards
functionalism as a theory that belongs to the design stance not to
the intentional stance (and of course not to the physical stance),
so that theories about the intentionality of behavior such as we
have been discussing are not directly involved in the issues to
which functionalism speaks.
But to what issue does functionalism speak? I believe it speaks
to the issue of the causation of mere behavior; it is an attempt to
offer a theory. about that, and it has many interesting things to
say. But it can speak to what I have called the problem of con-
gruence only if there are significant correlations between the
design stance and the intentional stance - correlations short of
meaning correlations but stronger than accidental correlations.
It is just this correlation that Dennett has recently expressed
doubts about:

There need not, and cannot, be a separately specifiable

state of the mechanical elements for each of the myriad
intentional descriptions, and thus it will not in many
cases be possible to isolate any feature of the system at
any level of abstraction and say, 'This and just this is
the feature in the design of this system responsible for
those aspects of its behavior in virtue of which we ascribe
to it the belief that p.' And so, from the fact that both
system S and system T are well characterized as believing
that p, it does not follow that they are both in some state
70 F. Stoutland

uniq uely characterizable in any other way than just the

state of believing p ([35], p. 26).

If there are reasons to doubt this correlation, however, then func-

tionalism, for all its suggestiveness for inquiries in Psychology, is
not a contribution either to a theory of the intentionality of be-
havior or to the problem of explaining the congruence between
intentionality and mere behavior. The latter is an unresolved is-
sue which remains on the agenda of future work in the philosophy
of action, one whose resolution will require far reaching investiga-
tions that touch on the deepest issues in Epistemology and Meta-
physics.

NOTES

1. Although holding that the practical syllogism is a paradigm of explanation

of intentional behavior, von Wright does not think it adequate to the range
of explanation of action, something he has emphasized in more recent
essays. Indeed he has argued that the practical syllogism should be seen as
expressing primarily the 'internal determinants' of action, which should be
contrasted with 'external determinants,' characteristically 'symbolic
challenges' such as complying with a request or obeying an order. More-
over, we can ask why an agent has the intentions he has; the answer will
take us ultimately to one or another of two main types of 'determinants
of intentions,' namely wants and duties (von Wright [28]). These various
types of explanation involve factors not captured by the scheme of the
practical syllogism. It remains the paradigm, however, for even these
diverse explanations turn, von Wright thinks, on conceptual rather than
causal considerations.
2. The main difference between the two is as much as anything in the wider
philosophical setting of their work. Von Wright's work is, of course, re-
lated to Wittgenstein, but it is also set in the context of the 'Hermeneutic'
tradition from Dilthey to Gadamer [37] and the Frankfurt school (cf. esp.
von Wright [23], Ch. I). This aspect of Davidson's work is indebted
primarily to Quine, especially his thesis of the 'indeterminacy of radical
translation' (Quine [38], esp. Ch. 2). But whereas there is a great differ-
ence between Quine and, for example, Gadamer in their style and the
kinds of examples they discuss, the fundamental issues they are dealing
with are significantly similar, and in many ways the 'indeterminacy of
translation' and the 'hermeneutic circle' are two ways of making the same
point (and it is interesting that their two main works were both published
in the same year). I believe that an appreciation of this is going to further
greatly a convergence between the analytic and the continental traditions
in philosophy.
 Davidson, von Wright, and the debate over causation 71

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Armstrong, D.M. [36] A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London 1968.
Danto, A. [32] Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965).
Davidson, D. [8] Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In Care and Landesman
(Eds.), Readings in the Theory of Action. Indiana 1968. Originally
in The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963).
[9] Agency. In Binkley et al., Agent, Action, and Reason. Toronto
1971.
[10] How Is Weakness of the Will Possible. In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral
Concepts. Oxford 1969.
[11] Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays on Freedom of
Action. London 1973.
[12] Mental Events. In Foster and Swanson (Eds.), Experience and
Theory. Amherst 1970.
[13] Psychology as Philosophy. In S.C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of
Psychology. London 1974.
[30] The Material Mind. In P. Suppes et al. (Eds.), Logic,Methodology
and Philosophy of Science, IV. North-Holland 1973.
Davis, L. [15] Theory of Action. Englewood Cliffs 1979.
Dennet, D.C. [34] Content and Consciousness. London 1969.
- [35] Brainstorms. Bradford 1978.
Dray, W. [19] Laws and Explanation. In History. Oxford 1957.
Gadamer, H.G. [37] Wahrheit und Methode. Tiibingen 1960.
Goldman, A. [14] A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Oiffs 1970.
Hempel, C.G. [20] Aspects of ScientifiC Explanation. New York 1965.
Kenny, A.J.P. [7] Action, Emotion, and Will. London 1965.
Malcolm, N. [18] Problems of Mind. New York 1971.
Melden, A. [6] Free Action. London 1963.
Pears, D.F. [22] Questions in the Philosophy of Mind. London 1975.
Peters, R.S. [4] The Concept of Motivation. London 1958.
Putnam, H. [33] Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2.
Cambridge 1975.
Quine, W.V.O. [38] Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.) 1960.
Ryle,G. [2] The Concept of Mind. London 1949.
Stoutland, F. [17] The Logical Connection Argument. In N. Rescher (Ed.),
Studies in the Theory of Knowledge. Oxford 1970.
[21] Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action. Synthese. Forthcoming.
[25] Von Wright's Theory of Action. In Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy
of Georg Henrik von Wright, The library of living Philosophers.
Forthcorning.
[29] The Causation of Behavior. In Hintikka (Ed.), Essays on Wittgen·
stein in Honor of G.H. von Wright, Acta Philosophica Fennica 28
(1976).
Taylor, C. [26] The Explanation of Behavior. London 1964.
Tuomela, R. [16] Human Action and Its Explanation: A Study on the
Philosophical Foundations of Psychology. Dordrecht 1977.
72 F. Stoutland
Winch, P. [5] The Idea ola Social Science. London 1958.
Wittgenstein, L. [1] Philosophical Investigations. Oxford 1953.
von Wright, G.H. [23] Explanation and Understanding. Ithaca 1971.
[24] Norm and Action. London 1963.
[27] On So-Called Practical Inference. Acta Sociologica 15 (1971).
[28] Determinism and the Study of Man. In Manninen and Tuomela
(Eds.),Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Dordrecht 1976.
[31] Causality and Determinism. New York 1974.
Ability, possibility and responsibility
J.E. TILES
University of Reading

To hold a person responsible for an event or state of affairs is to

allow that it would be appropriate to praise or blame, punish or
reward, him for (his part in) that event or state of affairs. Philo-
sophic discussion of the general conditions, under which a man
may be held responsible, is usually conducted against the back-
ground set by the problem of whether, if we believe determinism
to be true, we can consistently continue to hold people responsi-
ble. In considering the work done on that problem, this chronicle
follows the surveys of the previous decade by Boyce-Gibson [1]
and Ofstad [2], but is somewhat narrower in scope than either.

Determinism will here be taken to be the belief that

(D) For every event (including every human action) there are
antecedent conditions which are sufficient under the
natural laws governing the world to bring about that event.
In other words, there are conditions which necessitate that
event - make it impossible for it not to have occurred - so
that it could not have not occurred.

This belief threatens our entire practice of holding people respon-

sible, 'if he could not have helped it' - if he could not have done,
or been expected to do, anything other than he did. This is ex-
pressed in the 'principle of alternative possibilities':

(PAP) A person is not to be held responsible for what he has done

if he could not have done otherwise - if he could not
have not done what he did.

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 73-105.

©1982, Martinus Nijho!! Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
74 J.E. Tiles

Incompatibilists believe that the truth of (D) and the acceptance

of (PAP) entails that men can never be held responsible for what
they do. They comprise (what, following William James, are
called) hard determinists, who subscribe to (D), and libertarians,
who, anxious that men should be held accountable for their ac-
tions, feel compelled to deny (D). Hard determinists and liber-
tarians fmd themselves in unlikely alliance against compatibilists,
who hold that the truth of (D) does not entail the impossibility
of holding people responsible. A compatibilist who in addition
subscribes to (D) is known as a soft determinist. This terminology
is largely standard, although Ayers [3] uses 'determinism' to apply
to incompatibilism.
Early attempts to reconcile determinism with responsibility
(e.g. Hobbes and Hume) rejected (PAP). This principle appeals to
what in scholastic terms is the liberty of indifference: 'to act free-
ly is to act in possession of the power to act otherwise' (Kenny
[4], p. 122). To Hume indifference seemed to entail 'a negation
of necessity and causes' (Treatise II iii 2). The only freedom re-
quired for a man to be held responsible is the liberty of sponta-
neity: 'we are free in doing something if and only if we do it be-
cause we want it' (Kenny, ibid). There is no obvious incompatibili-
ty between the liberty of spontaneity and determinism: wants
belong to the causal nexus, both contributing to the determina-
tion of human actions, and in turn being determined by condi-
tions antecedent to their formation. During the period to be
surveyed here, Frankfurt [5] offered a defense of this version of
compatibilism. His efforts will be examined in Section I.
In recent years it has been more common for compatibilists to
accept (PAP) and to seek some interpretation of it that would
show how (D) and our practice of holding people responsible are
in only apparent conflict. One such interpretation (Section II) re-
applies an Aristotelian approach and interprets (PAP) as making
responsibility incompatible with some but not all determining
factors. A far more common interpretation (Section III) takes
'He can do (could have done) otherwise' to refer to a power,
which like a skill or ability may exist (and the responsibility con-
tinue) where certain external determining circumstances remove
the possibility of its exercise. Compatibilists, who feel it would
be unconvincing or metaphysically distasteful simply to say this
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 75

and no more, then analyse this power to do otherwise by means of

the conditional expression, 'He will do (would have done) other-
wise, if he had wanted.' This analysis has long been the focus of
skirmishing between compatibilists and incompatibilists (Section
IV). But all of these compatibilist approaches face the objection
raised by Bramhall against Hobbes (Vol. V of Molesworth's edi-
tion of Hobbes' works): can a man be held responsible for what
depends on his wants if, as determinism implies, his wants are
not of his own making? The work done on the relation between
a man and his wants (Section V) was certainly among the most
original and interesting of the decade.

I. CRITICISMS OF (PAP)

Frankfurt launched his attack on (PAP) by imagining situations in

which we would be prepared both to hold a person responsible
for what he had done and to grant that he could not have done
otherwise. One such situation involves Jones who is unaware that
he is under the control of Black. Black can anticipate when Jones
will not decide to do A and can make sure (by some means: direct
coercion, drugs, hypnosis, manipulation of Jones' nervous system)
that Jones will decide to do A and carry out his decision. When
Jones decides without interference from Black to do A, it is not
the case that he is able to decide and do other than A. Neverthe-
less, in this case, Frankfurt suggests, we could hold Jones responsi-
ble for doing A (e.g. he might stand trial if A were an assassination
attempt).
Such fanciful examples are not meant to undermine our belief
that in some circumstances a man is not responsible for what he
does because he just could not help it; rather they indicate that
(PAP) does not correctly state the principle involved. We might
attempt a reformulation after considering our willingness not to
hold Jones responsible when Black does interfere: Is this because
the conditions which eliminate any possibility of Jones' doing
other than A are the very same conditions which cause him to do
A? Perhaps we should formulate a new version of (PAP) which
exempts a man from responsibility if he acts because of (the very
same) conditions which prevent him doing otherwise. Blumenfeld
76 J.E. Tiles

[6] endorses a reformulation worked out along these lines, but

Frankfurt is forced to reject such an idea because this is to say
that we cannot hold a man responsible whenever his action was
causally determined, and makes the determinist thesis clearly
incompatible with responsibility. Rather it is Frankfurt's aim to
argue that any acceptable reformulation of (PAP) will resolve the
issue in favour of compatibilism. (Van In wagen [7], which falls
outside the period of this chronicle, offers three further formula-
tions which are said to leave the issue unresolved.)
Frankfurt suggests that for us not to hold Jones responsible
for doing A we must be convinced that what Jones 'really wanted'
did not in any way contribute to his doing A. (What Frankfurt
might mean by 'really want' is set out in [8], and discussed below
in Section V.) He is not responsible for doing A if he did A 'only
because he could not do otherwise'. Suppose then that Black
misjudges Jones and interferes to ensure Jones does A, but Jones
was already about to decide to do A. There were two independent
sets of conditions sufficient to bring about Jones doing A (i.e.
overdetermination). Frankfurt would (it is clear from [8], p. 20,
n. 10) have us hold Jones 'fully' responsible for doing A. Blumen-
feld ([6], p. 344) suggests this sets Frankfurt apart from 'tradi-
tional soft-determinist views'. But what, if anything, sets Frank-
furt apart from other compatibilists is that rather than seek an ac-
commodating interpretation of the liberty of indifference, he in-
sists that the liberty of spontaneity is sufficient for responsibility.
Those who would hold the liberty of spontaneity is not suffi-
cient for responsibility might argue that the case of Black and
Jones together overdetermining what Jones does should not be
understood in the way Frankfurt suggests. We do not hold Jones
responsible because he did what he (really) wanted, but because
Jones could have done otherwise. True, the only alternative pos-
sibility was for Jones to do A as Black's instrument, but as Black's
instrument Jones would not have done A; Black would have done
A acting through Jones. If the rOle of Black in the example is
taken by purely natural forces which come into play only if Jones
is about to decide against doing A (see Blumenfeld [6], p. 341,
n. 3) then if Jones does A without the natural forces in play we
are correct to hold him responsible. This is because, although the
alternative to doing A was to do A in the grip of purely natural
 Ability. possibility and responsibility 77

forces, to do A in the grip of such forces is not to do A, so Jones

could have not done A, i.e. he could have done otherwise.
Nesbitt and Candlish [9], who also argue that the incompatibil-
ist position is based on a misunderstanding of (PAP), agree that,
'If no other course was within his power, he did not do anything
.. .' (p. 323), but claim that (PAP) states a condition under which
people may be excused. He could not have done otherwise in
(PAP) means he 'had good or overwhelming reasons to do what he
did' (p. 330); this functions as an excuse, 'and a man can be ex-
cused only for what he does' (p. 323). For determinism to be in-
compatible with responsibility in a way which does not equivocate
on, 'he could not have done otherwise,' it would have to entail
that everyone always has a good reason for what he does (p. 330),
which it evidently does not. But the threat which people have
seen in determinism is not that everyone always has an excuse
for what he does, but that no one will ever do anything. As Yol-
ton ([ 10] , p. 71) puts it, 'One who denies human freedom is in
one fundamental sense of 'action' denying that there are any ac-
tions.' (Cf. Glover [ 11 ] , pp. 54-61.)
One upshot of this line of argument is yet another suggestion
for what is wrong with (PAP) as formulated above: the sugges-
tion that a man's actions may be divided into those for which he
enjoyed the liberty of indifference and those for which he did not
obscures the rationale of the principle. It is only that for which a
man enjoys the liberty of indifference which can strictly be called
his action, and a man can be held responsible only for what strict-
ly can be called his action. The persuasiveness of (PAP) derives
from its pointing to a necessary condition of something genuinely
counting as a man's action.
Frankfurt in his tum would insist that the liberty of spontanei-
ty offers a perfectly adequate account of what may strictly be
called a man's action: Jones does (strict sense) whatever issues
from Jones' (real) wants. Neither (PAP) nor the liberty of indif-
ference is required to isolate the class of Jones' actions. Here,
however, Frankfurt also faces Kenny's ([41, p. 143) contention
that the

liberty of spontaneity entails the two way power that is

part of the liberty of indifference. Something can only be
78 J.E. Tiles

done because it is wanted, if it is something one has an abil-

ity not to do. One must have the ability not to cp, if one is
to cp because one wants to.

While it may be true that the liberty of spontaneity does not pri-
ma facie conflict with (D), if Kenny is right, its entailing the
liberty of indifference means that a compatibilist will still have to
seek some way to show that (D) and (PAP) together do not re-
quire the abandonment of our practice of holding people respon-
sible.

II. THE NEGATIVE VIEW OF FREEDOM

A compatibilist who follows Hume will feel constrained to deny

the liberty of indifference because it seems to involve 'a negation
of necessity and causes'. The belief that the liberty of spontaneity
does not involve such a negation traditionally rests on treating
wants as part of a mental mechanism determining action. Such an
account of wants has fallen into widespread disfavour because it
seems to require there to be conscious desires and impulses where
there clearly are none: many, if not most, of the things we think
ourselves as having done willingly were not preceded by even
fleeting experiences of desire or impulse directed toward those
actions (Kenny [12], p. 91). Such an account of spontaneity,
moreover, fails to explain why we sometimes hold people re-
sponsible for negligence, where because negligent acts are unin-
tentional there is no question of desires or impulses.
A different compatibilist strategy lies in treating the liberty of
spontaneity as involving a limited 'negation of necessity and
causes'. The approach to the voluntary and involuntary taken by
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics IlL 1 suggests that the claim,
'Jones did A because he wanted to,' may be taken not as iden-
tifying a (mental) cause of what Jones is said to have done, but
rather to rule out certain causes or circumstances (compulsion,
ignorance) which would otherwise preclude Jones from respon-
sibility. Compatibilism would thrive on this strategy if it could
be argued that the causes and circumstances ruled out by spon-
taneity do not exhaust all the kinds of determinism there are.
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 79

The requirement of the liberty of indifference in (PAP) could

express a similar limited negation of necessity and causes. This
is, at any rate, the approach Morton White takes to the condition
'He could have not done A.' According to White, when we claim
a person should be held responsible for doing A because, 'he could
have not done A,' we are saying it was possible for him not to have
done A in the presence of some state of affairs, a state of affairs
expressible in the form 'He was P'. In other words, 'He could
have not done A' is elliptical. If we accept White's suggestion that
'He could have not done A,' requires expansion, his argument
proceeds ([13], p. 255), by limiting us, somewhat arbitrarily, to
only two ways of expanding it. One way is to expand it into a
statement of compossibility.

Possible (He was P & 'V He did A),

which is equivalent to a denial of necessity,

'V Necessary (He was P :J He did A);

the other way involves a statement of a causal conditional,

Necessary (He was P :J 'V He did A) & Possible (He was P).

The former is to be preferred because it is weaker than (is entailed

by, but does not entail) the latter ([ 13] , p. 257).
The analysis in terms of an expansion into a com possibility
statement, however, fails to capture the view which, as White puts
it, 'equals 'He did A freely' with a sentence that denies a causal
necessity, for example, with a sentence like 'He was not caused
to do A by duress" ([ 14], p. 309). One may, of course, deny
that being under duress caused a man's action by claiming it was
possible for him to be under duress and still not do A. Ayers
([3], pp. 156-157) and Flew ([15], pp. 234-235), both make
this claim about a man threatened with a gun. But often when
the claim, 'He was not caused to do A by P' is made, what is
claimed is that it is false that he was P, while it may well be pre-
supposed that
80 J.E. Tiles

Necessary (He was P :J He did A).

Mayo's analysis of the 'central function of 'can' statements' ([ 16] ,

p. 274) fits White's general position better on this point. Accord-
ing to Mayo, 'can' indicates that a certain proposition 'lacks con-
clusion-status in some (not necessarily specific) argument' (p.
274). If one wants to insist on a person's responsibility for doing
A, by claiming, 'He could have not done A,' one must be prepared
to reject at least one premise in a range of arguments having the
form:
Necessary (He was P :J He did A);
He was P;
Therefore he did A.
(The first premise of such an argument requires, in conformity
with White's analysis, necessity; for no one who accepts 'He did A'
and 'He was P' can reject the material conditional, 'He was P :J
He did A.') Although a claim using 'can' need not be directed at
a specific argument, Mayo contends that the claim is not com-
pletely general; 'the ordinary claim ... is still relative to certain
sorts of argument' (p. 275), i.e. anticipates only a limited range
of values for P.
White argues that when the incompatibilist insists that for a
man to be held responsible for A, nothing may necessitate 'the
choice that led to his doing A' ([ 14] , p. 315), he makes the con-
dition that expresses the liberty of indifference totally unusable.
We can never be certain that a decision to A was not necessitated
by antecedent conditions we may, perhaps, have overlooked,
under some natural laws we may yet discover. Rankin ([ 17] ,
p. 404) also demands of a theory of responsibility that it 'yield
criteria for distinguishing between actions for which we are re-
sponsible and those for which we are not,' and chides the liber-
tarian position of Chisholm [18] for cutting itself off from such
criteria. (See also Frankfurt [8], p. 18.)
The demand for such criteria is reasonable, although the in-
compatibilist can claim to have presented us with a dilemma
which, if it is not resolved, either pre-empts or seriously con-
strains the search for such criteria: either we give up the practice
of holding people responsible for actions or give up looking for
such criteria within a determinist framework. The incompatibilist
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 81

may argue, moreover, that the negative approach can offer, at

best, criteria without a rationale. White as much as admits this
when he claims that because his 'negative view of freedom' sug-
gests no constraints on what are substitution instances of P, choice
of these must rest on a culture-relative moral decision as to 'what
constitutes a good excuse' ([ 14] , p. 312).
White's phrase 'culture-relative moral decision' suggests he sees
little scope for the rational evaluation of the practice of any given
society in assigning responsibility. It would seem, however, that
holding people responsible for what they 'could not help' is ir-
rational to the extent that it is pointless. Glover ([ 11], pp. 62-73),
however, observes that the principle of not blaming when it is
pointless to do so will not go far enough: There are situations in
which (praise or) blame could well have an effect but we would
nevertheless regard it as unjust (even to consider it appropriate)
to employ it. Glover, thus, agrees with White that whether to hold
a person responsible in certain circumstances is a moral question.
But regarding moral matters as subject to some rational con-
straints, Glover seeks a theoretical framework for evaluating such
constraints in what White would call a 'positive view of freedom,'
in particular, in the view examined in the following section.

III. ABILITY VS. POSSIBILITY

The 'negative approach' tries to reconcile the liberty of indiffer-

ence with determinism by treating 'the power to act otherwise'
as a possibility not ruled out by some limited list of necessitating
factors. In addition to the shortcoming mentioned above, this
approach offers no further insight into the two pressures which
were seen at the end of Section I above to prevent the compatibil-
ist from ignoring (PAP). The liberty of indifference seems (1) to
be a condition for something to be claimed to be an agent's action,
(2) to state a condition presupposed by the liberty of spontaneity.
If one reflects on these pressures, it appears the move from 'pow-
er' to 'possibility' may have been too quick. Within the web of
possibilities it is those the agent is thought to control, to have
within his power, which are taken to be his responsibility, to
determine the scope of his actions. And Kenny's argument for (2)
82 J.E. Tiles

went, 'Something can only be done because it is wanted, if it is

something one has an ability (sc. has within one's power) not to
do.'
A human being may plead that some action, A, was beyond his
power or control, if he lacked the ability (skill, intelligence, ex-
perience) to do A, or he lacked the opportunity (spatio-temporal
location, awareness of the situation) to do A. We do not hold a
man responsible for failing to save a drowning child if he cannot
swim, or if, able to swim, he is miles from the scene. The dis-
claimer, 'I wasn't able to do anything about it,' may be used to
point out one's lack of skill or the lack of opportunity to exer-
cise what skills one has, and it is common in discussing the issues
raised by compatibilism to treat 'ability' as covering both the
factors (internal to the agent) of skill, intelligence, etc. and those
(external to the agent) of opportunity. In terms of 'can' and
'could have' this is Austin's ([19], p. 229) 'all-in' sense of 'can'.
(See Kenny [4], pp. 130-144.)
If the 'could have' in (PAP) is understood as the past tense of
the 'all-in can', then it is clear why (PAP) states a condition of
something's being a man's action: Where a man lacks the ability
to prevent A occurring, A cannot be said to be his doing. Where
a man lacks the ability to avoid being a causal factor in the occur-
rence of A, A cannot be said to be his doing. Furthermore, it is
only when a man has both the ability to be, and the ability to
avoid being, a causal factor in the occurrence of A that we appeal
to his wants to explain what he did.
The notion of power in general should not trouble a determin-
ist. It is only by forming concepts of the causal powers of objects
that we can trace the causal chains in events around us. An object,
moreover, continues to have a power even when circumstances
prevent its exercise. Men (and higher animals, Kenny argues [4],
pp. 52 ff.) have the two-way abilities or powers - to do or not do
- referred to in the liberty of indifference, but if something pre-
vents the exercise one way, because perhaps the agent was deter-
mined to exercise the other way, this need not remove the two-
way power. This suggests another common compatibilist strategy:
determinism is compatible with the liberty of indifference be-
cause the causal factors, which determine which of the power to
do or not do will be actualized, do not remove the two-way power
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 83

which is a condition of responsibility.

For a philosopher who finds talk of the power or ability not to
A (the 'all-in' could have not Ad) disquieting, there is an analysis
of the relevant sense of 'can' which replaces talk of power or
ability with a conditional statement:

(C) He can (is able to) A is equivalent to He will A, if he tries

(chooses, wants).

It should, moreover, be emphasized that the strategy, with or

without this conditional analysis, is independent of the 'negative
approach' to the liberty of spontaneity. Wants could on this
strategy be the causal factors which determine which of the power
to do or the power not to do will be actualized. (If the conditional
analysis is used, it could be taken to involve a causal conditional.)
The difficulties with mental mechanisms which the negative ap-
proach tried to avoid, can just as well be avoided by treating
wants as physiological states under a mental description. (For
this see the work of Davidson [20, 21 and 22], and Stoutland's
contribution to this volume.) The adequacy of (C) will be treated
in the next section, but before turning to that, we must consider
general incompatibilist moves to block this strategy.
One objection proceeds this way: the compatibilist is trying
to argue that Jones' ability not to A may coexist with conditions
S2 which determine (i.e. necessitate) Jones' Aing. These condi-
tions are, by hypothesis, determined by further prior conditions
Sl which existed before Jones was even born, and hence were
beyond Jones' control. If Jones' Aing was determined by con-
ditions Sl which Jones did not control, his control over his Aing
is illusory; therefore the control Jones must have to be held re-
sponsible for Aing requires the truth of physical indeterminism.
(See Anscombe [23], p. 26.) To this Kenny ([4], pp. 153-154)
replies that part of what conditions Sl determine may well be that
S2 is a condition within Jones' control. To argue that what is
brought about by factors beyond Jones' control must also be
beyond Jones' control is as fallacious as saying that the descen-
dants (e.g. Jones' children) of people who are not Jones' descen-
dants (e.g. Jones' grandparents) cannot be Jones' descendants.
Nevertheless, it is tempting to agree that Jones is able not to A
84 J.E. Tiles

at time t2 only if it is not made necessary at some prior time t I

that Jones will A at t2. And determinism seems to require that if
Jones does A at t2 this was because of conditions existing prior
to t2 which necessitated his Aing. (Kenny finds this principle in
an argument used by Wiggins [24].) But to set up the temptation
in this way begs the question against the compatibilist who wants
to claim that the ability not to A at t2 is (like the skill required
to A) not removed by anything which prevents ist exercise (Kenny
[4],p.155).
The temptation may, however, be reinforced by the following
argument: where Jones is determined by antecedent conditions
under laws of nature to A at t2, for Jones not to A at t2 would
be for Jones to violate a law of nature. So if Jones is able not to
A at t2, he is able to violate a law of nature. Again Kenny ([ 4] ,
pp. 155-156) seeks to fault the argument pattern which the in-
compatibilist uses:

Jones can (cannot) do X;

Doing X is doing Y;
Therefore Jones can (cannot) do Y.

The schema is valid if it is logically necessary that doing X is

doing Y, but not if doing X is doing Y in a particular instance.
If Jones can hit the dart board and on a particular occasion he
hits the dart board by hitting the bull (so that hitting the dart
board on this occasion is hitting the bull), it does not follow that
Jones can hit the bull. This counter-example uses 'can' in the
sense of 'has the skill to'. It is true that there is a sense of 'Jones
can X', i.e. 'There is no external physical impediment to Jones'
doing X' in which it would appear the pattern is valid (Bradley
[25], pp. 209-211 addressing Kenny [12], pp. 100-103), but
Kenny's counter-example has only the limited objective of show-
ing that the compatibilist does not have to accept the argument
pattern if his strategy involves using a 'can' that behaves like 'has
the skill to'.
 Ability possibility and responsibility 85
I

N. THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS

To secure the compatibilist position using the strategy outlined in

the previous section requires more than showing how incompatibil-
ist arguments fail to take the strategy seriously. It remains to be
shown how the power to do other than A can co-exist with fac-
tors which necessitate the doing of A. To do this it is common
for compatibilists to appeal to the conditional analysis (C) (above,
Section III). Thus they will argue that it is clear that it may both
be true that Jones was determined to do A and that Jones would
have not done A if he had chosen (wanted, tried). The variety of
versions of the analysis (choosing, wanting, trying) reflects the
failure of compatibilists to agree on which condition will be least
problematic for their purpose. It is, however, widely acknowl-
edged that Jones' choosing (wanting or trying) to A may actually
in some cases interfere with Jones'success in Aing. This difficulty
is avoided by not specifying what Jones must choose (want, try)
to do in order to succeed in Aing. The analysis simply requires
there to be something which if Jones were to choose (want, try)
it, would lead to his success in Aing.
The incompatibilist has two avenues of attack. One is to raise
the question Bramhall used against Hobbes: in order to have the
power or ability to A, must it not be true (in addition to the con-
dition that Jones will A if he chooses) that Jones must also have
what amounts to the liberty of indifference with regard to his
choice? Must he not also be able to choose otherwise? This ave-
nue will be explored in Section V below. The other avenue is to
attack the adequacy of the analysis head on.

a. The aftermath of Austin

The decade prior to that under review here was much exercised
with J.L. Austin's [19] attack on the version of compatibilism
based on the conditional analysis. The debate Austin stirred up
spilled over into the decade chronicled here. Austin criticized
Moore [26] for running together two quite distinct theses: one,
the supplementation thesis, proposing that,

(S) 'He could have done A' is always elliptical for the con-
ditional,
86 J.E. Tiles

'He could have done A, if he had chosen;'

the other, the analysis thesis (C), proposing that 'He could have
done A' means 'He would have done A, if he had chosen'. These
two theses, Austin maintained, are distinct, incompatible and
false.
Austin produced powerful arguments against the assumption
that the 'if' which appears in the supplementation thesis signals a
true conditional form. Such 'pseudo-conditionals' as 'I can if 1
choose' - unlike true conditionals - do not entail their contra-
positives, and do by themselves entail their consequents. The same
tests applied to the 'if' of (C) left uncertain results and apart from
hints, Austin's arguments against taking 'He can A' as a condi-
tional consisted in rebutting the arguments offered by Nowell-
Smith [27] for the analysis.
Pears ([28], pp. 386-391) evaluates the arguments against
Nowell-Smith and (pp. 379-386) develops a hint left by Austin
for a direct argument against (C): the analysis requires, 'He will A
if he tries,' to entail, 'He can A', which it does, but as 'He will A,'
entails, 'He can A,' the 'if he tries' may be superfluous or replaced
by anything. Pears also extracts an argument from Ayers ([3], p.
128) (based on the same assumption) against the converse, viz.
against, 'He can A' entailing, 'He will A, if he tries.' The argument
is that if the entailment holds then evidence for, 'He can A,'
would be evidence for, 'If he tries, he will A.' But the truth of,
'He will A,' is evidence for, 'He can A,' but not for the conditional
'If he tries, he will A,' since trying sometimes interferes with suc-
cess.
Both of these arguments depend on the assumption that suc-
cessful Aing is sufficient to establish ability to A, which Pears
rejects on the grounds that success without the appropriate 'ini-
tiating factor' (e.g. trying) does not count as ability: consistent
success without such a factor would only establish the agent's
body possesses a peculiar power. Thalberg ([29], pp. 190-191)
argues that for us even to think of what the person did as 'success'
we must assume something about his 'conative attitude', i.e. in
some way he intends or is attempting to do it.
While (C) may be correct and correctly regarded as involving a
genuine conditional, it is a further question whether the condi-
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 87

tional reflects a causal relation between effort, desire, or choice

and action. Thalberg, along with Kenny ([4], p. 147), supports
the view that (C), although correct, does not involve a causal con-
ditional. The relation between trying or choosing and sinking a
putt is not that between striking the ball and its tumbling into
the cup ([29], p. 200). Trying to fit the former into the pattern
of the latter gives the 'absurd result that you bring it about that
you sink a putt by first desiring or trying to sink it' ([29], p. 202).
Ayers offers a similar argument. One does not test one's ability
to A by trying to A in the way one tests a conditional, 'If P then
Q,' by bringing it about that P. This 'simply follows from the
truism that in order to do something it is not always necessary
to do something else first' ([3], p. 145).
Davidson, who endorses the view that the analysis (which for
him expresses the 'freedom to act') requires a causal conditional,
replies that Ayers' truism only proves that the antecedent of the
conditional, 'cannot have as its main verb a verb of action' ([30] ,p.
144). The correct antecedents for (C) are states or events, 'which
are not themselves actions or events about which the question
whether the agent can perform them can intelligibly be raised.
The most eligible such states or events are the beliefs and desires
of the agent that ... provide an account of the reasons the agent
had in acting .. .' ([30], p. 147). The issue at this point turns into
whether an explanation of an action in terms of reasons fits the
pattern of explanation of an event in terms of causes. (See Tuo-
mela's contribution to this volume.)
A compatibilist, on the other hand, does not need to insist that
(C) requires a causal conditional. This emerges from a response to
Austin's argument against choices as causes. Austin thought it
'patently wrong' to conclude that 'choosing to do the thing is
sufficient to cause me inevitably to do it' ([ 19), p. 211) and later
(p. 218n) pictured a golfer who, possessed of the ability and the
opportunity to sink a short putt, tries and misses. Austin claimed
from this that 'the traditional beliefs enshrined in the word 'can'
actually conflict with determinism because, 'according to them
a human ability or power or capacity is inherently liable not to
produce success, on occasion, and that for no reason .. .' Thalberg
([29], p. 192) rejects this claim as a non sequitur. Because there
was no cause sufficient to make the golfer unable to sink the
88 J.E. Tiles

putt, it does not follow that some cause (slight nervous tension, an
imperceptible ridge in front of the cup, etc.) was not responsible
for the failure. This response illustrates well the compatibilist
strategy which (C) is meant to support: antecedent conditions
which may prevent the exercise of a person's ability do not neces-
sarily remove the ability.

b. The supplementation thesis

(C) makes choice (desire, attempt) a condition of the exercise of
the ability which is relevant to responsibility. The incompatibilist
will find it tempting to insist that choice (desire, attempt) are
really conditions of the possession of the relevant ability and
press the claim that 'Jones can A' is always short for 'Jones can
A, if he chooses,' i.e. (S). A more subtle application of this idea
will be followed in the next sub-section, but as it is clear (S)
poses a direct threat to the compatibilist strategy of Section III,
several responses to the thesis and its threat will be examined
first.
Ayers, for example, tries to show how unacceptable it would be
to apply the principle to all powers. He calls the generalized ver-
sion, 'actualism' which he characterizes as, 'the doctrine that
nothing ever has the power to do what it does not actually do'
([3], p. 89). An actualist would insist that 'This car can travel at
100 m.p.h.' must be supplemented by, 'if taken out of the garage,
properly fuelled, driven with the throttle open, etc. and that
these conditions are necessary for the existence of the power.
The car cannot be said to have the power unless it actualizes it.
As we are ordinarily prepared to attribute powers categorically
to objects which are not actualizing them, actualism, as Ayers
observes, involves 'sweeping consequences for our ordinary talk
of potentiality.' To block the doctrine, Ayers ([3], pp. 52-53,
84-89) presses a distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic
properties of a thing. Dirty spark plugs, which would prevent the
actualization of a power to do 100 m.p.h., is an extrinsic proper-
ty: a change in this 'circumstance' does not affect our assessment
of the car's powers. The size of engine, however, is an intrinsic
property; changing this would change the 'nature' of the car
(its nature being constituted by its powers). Against the charge
that the distinction itself depends on the truth of the thesis it is
 Ability. possibility. responsibility 89

called on to support, Ayers acknowledges that support which

avoids a circle of this kind is impossible and denies that such
support is called for. The best that can be achieved is a clear un-
derstanding of 'the hardly deniable difference' between claiming a
car can do 100 m.p.h. if differently driven and claiming it could
if differently constructed ([3], p. 87).
Ayers ([3], pp. 97-99, 123-124) also draws on Austin's distinc-
tion between true and pseudo-conditionals. To claim a car could
do 100 m.p.h. if the spark plugs were clean does not entail that if
it cannot do 100 m.p.h., then the spark plugs are not clean, but
it does entail that it can do 100 m.p.h. Since (S) does not, thus,
employ a true conditional it does not follow from it that powers
are ascribed hypothetically rather than categorically. (Ayers, how-
ever, rejects another of Austin's arguments for this conclusion as
based on a dubious point about the use of the subjective in En-
glish. See Ayers [3], p. 124, [31] and [32] in response to Gallop
[33].)
Not everyone, however, is prepared to follow Austin in treating
(S) as involving a pseudo-conditional. Stroup [34] argues that (S)
can be treated as involving a material conditional because there is
a sense of 'choose', namely, 'to act in accordance with preference,'
according to which the contrapositive of 'He can, if he chooses,'
viz. 'If he cannot, then it is not the case that he chooses' is sensible
and necessarily true. Williams [35], however, argues that this
sense of 'choose' is not relevant to the issue Austin was addressing.
Among the senses of 'choose' Stroup unearths from the Oxford
English Dictionary, the one for which Austin's tests do show that,
'He can, if he chooses,' is a pseudo-conditional, is, Williams claims,
the relevant sense.
Davidson also appears to wish to treat (S) as involving a material
conditional. He argues that 'He can, if he chooses,' does entail
its contrapositive, 'in the formal and vacuous way a contradiction
entails anything at all' ([30], p. 143). This is not spelled out, but
it appears that Davidson is simply pressing a material conditional
into service witllOut argument. This emerges from his rejection of
Austin's claim that (C) and (S) are incompatible: Young ([36],
p. 21) observes that if Austin is correct to claim that (C) and (S)
are both false and incompatible, they would have to be contraries;
but it is not obvious they are. Davidson goes further and claims
90 J.E. Tiles

that if (C) is accepted, the conditionals involved in the two theses

are in fact 'logically equivalent' ([30], p. 142). This is presumably
because if we take, p = 'He can A', q = 'He chooses', and r = 'He
A's', and then use (C), 'p = (q ~ r)', as allowing the substitution of
'q ~ r' for 'p' in (S), 'q ~ p', we get 'q ~ (q ~ r)' and this is sup-
posed to be equivalent to 'q ~ r'.
Now for Davidson to claim that 'q ~ r' entails 'q ~ (q ~ r)',
(S) has to be read as involving a material conditional, as the truth
of 'q ~ r' must be sufficient for the truth of 'q ~ (q ~ r)'. To this
Davidson is, at least, entitled, as he has conceded to Austin that
(S) does not involve a causal conditional ([30], p. 142). However,
to claim that 'q ~ (q ~ r)' entails 'q ~ r' Davidson has to read (C)
as involving the material conditional as well, for the falsity of q
must be sufficient for the truth of 'q ~ r'. This he cannot do and
hold that (C) involves a causal conditional. Reading (S) as in-
volving a material conditional, the most Davidson can claim is
that the conditional of (S) follows from that of (C). This weaker
relation might be thought to be sufficient for Davidson's pur-
poses, but it is far from clear that anything which follows from the
causal conditional of (C) in this 'formal and vacuous way' (and
instance of P ~ Q ~ P, where Q is arbitrary) is what aroused philo-
sophical interest in the first place.
The actualist, according to Ayers ([ 3 ], p. 95), 'borrows his
rhetoric' from the ordinary uses of such expressions as 'He can,
if he wants (tries, chooses)'. Reading this as a material conditional,
as Davidson suggests, means such expressions convey no more than
is conveyed by 'He can'. Do they convey any more? Ayers sug-
gests such pseudo-conditionals provide an idiomatic way of as-
serting something to be a necessary condition of the actualization
of a power, not, as the 'metaphysical determinist' would have it,
'a sufficient condition for the existence of the power' ([ 3] , p. 99).
(It seems more likely, however, that a 'metaphysical determinist'
would treat each such conditional as stating a necessary condition
of the existence of the power, i.e. regarding the 'if as an ab-
breviated 'only if.)
On another page ([3], p. 101), Ayers laid the basis for a dif-
ferent account of pseudo-conditionals which caught the eye of
both Pears and Kenny. Ayers suggests that in a sentence like 'This
lorry can do 70 m.p.h., if it is not loaded' it would be helpful to
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 91

take the 'if clause as modifying the description of the action (do
70 m.p.h.) rather than the whole main clause. This removes the
temptation to think (along actualist lines) that the power to do
70 m.p.h. ceases to exist when the lorry is loaded, but still reflects
the feeling that to say a lorry can do 70 m.p.h. unloaded is not to
claim as much for its power as to say it can do 70 m.p.h. loaded.
Pears gave this idea extended discussion with the aim of show-
ing that when the 'if clause governs the subordinate verb ('do 70
m.p.h.') in this way, it expresses, 'an ordinary conditional connec-
tion between the S-[performance-specifying] factor mentioned in
the antecedent and the action of the subordinate verb' ([28],
p. 257). What Pears in fact argues is that it expresses a conditional
relation between the S-factor and the ability to do 70 m.p.h. This
is because Pears gives the pseudo-conditional a curious logical form
([28], p. 262), in which there are separate occurrences of 'power'
and 'can':

This lorry has a power such that the task of doing 70, if it is
70 without a load, is a task it can do.

The subordinate conditional is said to be a genuine conditional

because this form entails a form in which the subordinate con-
ditional is contraposed:

This lorry has a power such that the task of doing 70, if
it is a task it cannot do, is 70 with a load.

One consequence of this way of representing the logical form of

the pseudo-conditional is that Pears feels entitled to treat an S-
factor as a necessary condition for the existence of an ability (cf.
[28], p. 369), precisely what Ayers wished to avoid.
One does not have to reject the logical form which Pears pro-
posed in order to avoid this consequence. To apply a contraposi-
tion test correctly, one must apply it to the conditional on its
own, not in the context of some complex sentence. Moreover, it
is far from clear that the claim that a lorry can do 70 m.p.h., if it
is unloaded entails it cannot do 70 m.p.h. if it is loaded. This may
be an implicature in some contexts, but not even that in the
mouth of a cautious tester who has not tried the lorry when
92 J.E. Tiles

loaded. There is, thus, no reason to think that Ayers' proposal

leads to an analysis in which pseudo-conditionals behave, for all
that matters, as real conditionals.
Kenny, ([4], pp. 140-141) suggests extending Ayers' proposal
to cover 'He can A, if he chooses.' Choosing is not a condition of
his ability, but specifies the act he is able to do, viz. he is able to
A at will. Someone who can weep at will (e.g. an actor) has a
different ability from one who can only weep when moved. Pears,
however, points to a number of examples where applying Ayers'
proposal in this way would be difficult. There is only one way to
resign ~ by choice ~ so 'He can resign, if he chooses' cannot add a
specification to the act. Since choice, consent or some special
kind of conative pro-attitude must be present for a person to
resign, marry or pay a debt, Ayers' suggestion, that pseudo-con-
ditionals involving these verbs express a necessary condition of
actualization of an ability, appears to be a better general account.
But given that they express a logically necessary condition, how
could they be used to convey information? Pears improves on
Ayers in this way: 'my choosing is being put forward as the only
absent, or possibly absent necessary part of the total sufficient
condition of performance' ([ 28] , p. 268).

c. The Chisholm-Lehrer Argument

If we were to read the supplementation thesis as allowing us to
conclude from 'Jones can A' that

(l) Jones can A only if he chooses (tries, wants),

and (I), in spite of Ayers, as stating a necessary condition of the

existence of an ability, then if we add the additional assumption,

(2) Jones cannot choose (try, want),

(C) can be shown to be false. For the analysis requires 'Jones can
A' to be true whenever,

(3) If Jones chooses, he will A,

 Ability. possibility and responsibility 93

is true. But the latter may be true while the former false, where
it is the case that Jones cannot choose, i.e. (2), and his choosing
is a necessary condition of his being able to A, i.e. (1). (1) does
not even have to be generally true. If there is one case where
choosing (or whatever occurs in (C), wanting, trying, etc.) is a
necessary condition of being able to A, and the man is unable to
choose, the analysis fails. This argument may be further weakened
in two different directions.
In a 1964 review of Austin's papers, Chisholm [37] concluded
that although Austin failed to refute (C) conclusively, an argument
along the above lines would succeed. A corrected version of an
argument which Chisholm thought would work appeared in Aune
[38]. In it Chisholm requires only the weaker assumption that

(1 ') Jones will A only if Jones chooses.

Assumption (2) is unaltered and we are meant to conclude that

although, 'If Jones chooses, he will A' may be true, 'Jones can A,'
is false. Although it may appear from the arguments reviewed in
Section III above that this argument begs the question, it in fact
amounts to pressing Bramhall's objection that the ability to
choose must not be left out of the account of the ability to A,
and this objection still needs to be answered.
Aune, ([38], pp. 192-193), dismissed this argument as em-
ploying a sense of 'ability' (able to choose) irrelevant to the issue
of compatibilism. The relevant sense is that tied to voluntary ac-
tions. But according to Aune, whatever sense one may attach to
talk of the ability to choose, will, etc., it is not the sense of
'ability' which occurs in voluntary abilities such as being able to
rescue, or refrain from killing, someone. Aune's contention that
the abilities to choose, will, etc. are not voluntary abilities is not,
it will be seen in Section V below, a universally shared view.
Lehrer ([39], pp. 195-197) stated the argument in a form
which avoids the issue of whether choosing is a voluntary ability.
He took the argument as set out two paragraphs above and gener-
alized it to apply to any form of conditional analysis ('He can A')
is equivalent to 'He will A, if C'). He made the assumption tan-
tamount to (1),
94 J.E. Tiles

(1") Jones can A, only if C,

and the assumption, weaker than 2, that

(2") C does not obtain.

Aune [38] rejected this version of the argument because Lehrer

failed to establish that the two suppositions, (1") and(2") are
consistent with

(3") Jones will A, if C.

Not to provide such a proof, Aune claimed, begs the question,

since someone who accepted the analysis would take the equi-
valence of (3") and 'Jones can A', together with the inconsistency
of 'Jones can A' with (I") and 2") as proving the inconsistency of
those assumptions with (3 ").
Lehrer replied that in order to meet Aune's challenge he had
simply to point out that it was 'logically possible that as a result
of my not willing, not choosing, or not undertaking some action,
I might loose any of my powers'([40], p. 31). It is not quite as
easy to illustrate this possibility as Lehrer imagines: a person is
offered a dish of assorted candy and he will take a red sugar ball
if he chooses, but is unable to because of a pathological aversion
to anything which reminds him of drops of blood. This, however,
illustrates Chisholm's argument, not Lehrer's; it is not the failure
to choose a red ball (his simply not choosing one) that removes
the ability to take a red one. He is ex hypothesi unable to take
one because unable to choose one. Lehrer claims in response to
an objection of this kind that as choosing to take a red ball would
in these circumstances result in the man taking one, choosing is a
sufficient condition of taking one and hence of being able to
take one, so that not choosing is a necessary condition of not
being able to take one. But apart from failing to show that choos-
ing is a necessary condition of being able, this response assumes
without an argument to refute Austin, that, 'He can A, if he
chooses,' involves a genuine rather than a pseudo-conditional.
Something like Lehrer's more fanciful example is needed to
provide the required illustration of an ability being removed by a
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 95

failure to choose. If it can be assumed that some (demonic) being

can tell whether a person, X, is about to do A voluntarily (has
chosen to A, but not yet done it) and can remove X's power to
do A by temporarily paralysing him or imposing external con-
straints on him if he does not choose to do A, then X's choice is
a necessary condition of his ability to do A. (Cf. Lehrer [40],
p. 32 and Anscombe [41], pp. 154-155.)
Goldman and Davidson produced arguments to show that there,
nevertheless, must be something suspicious about Lehrer's argu-
ment, for it can be generalized to provide a refutation of a con-
ditional analysis of any dispositional property. In place of a being
who paralyses or restrains a person, Goldman ([42], p. 199n)
imagines a magician who alters the molecular structure of a lump
of sugar so that it is insoluble until someone places it in water, at
which point he returns the lump to its normal structure allowing
it to dissolve. Outside of water it is true that if placed in water it
will dissolve, but false that it is soluble. Davidson ([30], pp. 144-
145) imagines the converse situation, a lump of sugar which is
normal outside of water (its structure renders it soluble) but such
that the act of immersing it in water alters its structure to render
it insoluble.
Anscombe, however, denies that Lehrer's argument may be
applied with equal force to the conditional analysis of disposi-
tional statements. Not only is a person's being able to A (the con-
dition of his responsibility for A) not a disposition, general power
or capacity ([ 41] ,p. 151), the application of the argument involves
taking a certain molecular structure as a sufficient condition of the
sugar's insolubility and to do this is already to abandon the con-
ditional analysis ([41], p. 149). But this attempt to extend
Lehrer's argument does show clearly, Anscombe argues, that the
argument is open to a charge of equivocation. Indeed, Aune sug-
gested this in [43]. If (1 "), (2") and (3") look consistent, it
remains to be shown that the sense of 'able' or 'can' which appears
in (l ") is that which the analysis is trying to capture.
Anscombe sets herself the task of fIlling this lacuna in the argu-
ment: The defender of (C) has to maintain that if (1") is read with
what he believes to be the relevant sense of 'can' or 'able', then
(1 "), (2") and (3") are inconsistent. But if these are inconsistent,
then from any two of them the contradictory of the third can be
96 J.E. Tiles

derived. That is, for example, from (3"), 'If Jones chooses, he will
A,' and (1 "), 'If Jones does not choose, he is not able to A,' we
can infer that Jones will choose to A. (This inference requires
substituting, 'If Jones chooses, he will A', for, 'Jones is able to A,'
in (l") in accordance with (C).) But since this, and all the other
inferences we can make, if (l "), (2") and(3") are inconsistent, are
clearly invalid, the incompatibilist has to accept that (l "), (2")
and (3") are consistent and that his analysis fails ([41] , pp. 154-
155). All the compatibilist has to accept in order to be caught by
this argument is that choice might be a necessary causal condition
of what he regards as the ability relevant to responsibility. This,
it would seem, he has to accept, if choice is a causal condition at
all ([ 41], pp. 153, 157).
The compatibilist, we observed above in Subsection IVa, does
not have to treat the analysis as involving a causal conditional, nor
does the strategy outlined in Section III stand or fall with (C).
Without (C), however, reductionist moves to replace talk of pow-
ers by conditional statements cannot proceed in a straightforward
way. So to maintain that Jones' power or ability not to A may co-
exist with factors which necessitate Jones' Aing would seem to re-
quire a fairly strong metaphysical commitment to powers. This is
the position Ayers is happy to develop in [3] . Others who espouse
compatibilism developed in this way are likely to find such meta-
physical commitment distinctly uncomfortable.

v. THE ABILITY TO WANT OTHERWISE

Whether a compatibilist follows Frankfurt, Hobbes and Hume in

resting responsibility on what issues from an agent's wants or
desires (liberty of spontaneity) or attempts to analyse the power
or ability to do otherwise in order to do justice to the liberty of
indifference, he faces Bramhall's worry: if an agent is unable to
want other than what he in fact wants, how can we hold him
responsible for what depends on his wants?
One response a compatibilist can make, we have seen (Aune
[38], pp. 192-193, cited above, Subsection IVc is to brush
aside abilities to want or desire as irrelevant because they cannot
count as voluntary abilities. This short way with the problem
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 97

might be reinforced by adopting an actualist attitude to wants or

desires (above, Subsection IVb): no one has the power to want
what he does not actually want. The consequences of this limited
variety of actualism for our ordinary talk are not as sweeping as
the more general thesis about action in general, but we do speak
of people being unable to try, to care, or even to want. (At least
some of these ways of talking are acknowledged by the category
of 'emotional capacities' in Bronaugh's taxonomy of senses of
'can', [44], p. 124.)
Rather than rejecting as nonsense this part of our ordinary
speech habits, a compatibilist could adopt a limited version of
the strategy which White (above, Section III) followed: certain
causal factors operating on a person's desires (e.g. hypnosis, or
those producing pathological aversions or desires) preclude re-
sponsibility; other causal factors (previous experience of boredom,
anticipation of mild discomfort) do not. This is, indeed, the way
Young ([36] , pp. 35-37) argues, but as with the general version
of this approach to responsibility, we are left with no principle
by which we might correct our list of factors which preclude
responsibility. To say, as Young does (p. 36), 'we have empirical
evidence of great weight to substantiate the contrast' between the
two kinds of causal factors is only to say that we make a distinc-
tion; it is not to provide us with a foundation for justifying or
explaining that distinction.
The conditional analysis of ability offered at least a first step
toward an understanding of our practice in holding people respon-
sible. That step leads straight to the present difficulty over the
ability to desire, but someone, who felt the conditional analysis
represented progress, might well be tempted to try the same
manoeuvre again:

X can (is able to) want to A is equivalent to X will want to

A, if X wants.

If X wants what? Perhaps, if he wants to want to A. This is not at

all as unpromising a move as it might at first seem.
In an article, [8] , which followed his attack on (PAP), Frank-
furt advanced the thesis that what distinguishes persons from
other creatures is to be found 'in the structure of a person's will'
98 J.E. Tiles

(p. 6). Many creatures have desires and motives, but only a person
can have a 'second order volition,' that is a want that a certain
desire should 'be his will,' should be, that is, 'the desire that moves
him effectively to act' (p. 10). It is characteristic of a person to
be capable of wanting the desire that moves him effectively to
act to be, for example, the desire to be free of the smoking habit,
rather than the desire to have another cigarette. It is characteris-
tic of a person marching into battle to be capable of being ashamed
that rather than being motivated by courage and patriotism, he
is, as he knows himself to be, motivated by a fear of being caught
and hung as a deserter.
Frankfurt uses the notion of a higher order volition to dis-
tinguish between freedom of action, '(roughly, at least) the free-
dom to do what one wants to do,' and a person's freedom of will,
'(also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want'
([8], p. 15). The roughness that arises from including 'freedom'
and 'free' in the dejinienda might, perhaps, be ironed out by
applying the conditional analysis. In the second case, for example,

X is free (or able) to want to A is equivalent to X will want

(first order) to A if X has the second order volition that the
(first order) want to A be what moves him to A.

Consistent with his previous attack on (PAP), Frankfurt insists

that neither freedom of action nor freedom of will are necessary
for moral responsibility ([ 8], pp. 18-20). Rather, Frankfurt dis-
tinguishes between freedom to act and doing something freely,
and again between freedom of the will and doing something of a
free will. Doing something freely is doing it because one wants to,
and doing something of a free will is doing it because of a will
which is the will one wants. Moral responsibility 'does entail
that a person did what he did freely, or that he did it of a free will'
(p. 19). The 'or' in this passage is well advised: doing something
of a free will is not on its own a necessary condition of (moral)
responsibility, for we do hold offenders responsible even where it
is clear they acted, through weakness of will, against their 'better
judgement.' But Frankfurt does not explain how or whether we
can distinguish between such cases and those pathological states
where it is clear a person is the helpless victim of his desires or
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 99

aversions and where we are therefore loath to hold him responsible.

Frankfurt is, at least, clearly committed to the position that if
an agent's second order volitions endorse a desire which moves
him to act, then the agent is to be held responsible for the act.
If the desire is planted in the agent by an external source (e.g.
the machinations of Black, see above Section I) and the second
order volition endorses it, then the agent and the external source
are each fully (although not solely) responsible for the act ([8],
p. 20, esp. n. 10). This, however, only pushes the difficulty
raised in Section I back a stage: Why should the agent be held
responsible if his second order volition is implanted in him (by
Black or by purely natural forces)?
At stake is a moral issue of considerable difficulty: Frankfurt
must accept that a person whose upbringing in severely deprived
circumstances has formed even his second order volitions into
something antisocial, has no basis for a plea of diminished re-
sponsibility, as long as this person's second order volitions en-
dorse his effective desire. This is not to side with those (e.g.
Walker [45], pp. 288-290) who are inclined not to hold victims
of a ghetto upbringing responsible, merely to point out that
Frankfurt has not dealt with the strongest consideration which
inclines people to the opposite view.
Frankfurt's picture of the 'structure of a person's will' is clearly
an advance on the over-simple models of human motivation com-
monly used in philosophical discussion. Jeffrey's work [46],
which treats preference as a propositional connective shows that
Frankfurt's theory can be developed using a subtle logical instru-
ment. Nevertheless Watson argues that the feature on which
Frankfurt builds his theory, 'is not the fundamental feature of
either free agency or personhood' ([47], p. 217). A higher order
volition, according to Watson, is not the notion required to elu-
cidate the sense in which some of a person's wants may be said
to be more his own than are others, nor to elucidate the sense in
which a person may be said to be unfree with respect to his own
will.
In place of Frankfurt's hierarchy of desires Watson appeals to
'independent sources of motivation' ([47], pp. 209, 219). One
such source is the agent's 'motivation system ... that set of con-
siderations which move him to action' (p. 215). The items of this
100 J.E. Tiles

system can be compared in terms of strength, 'as measured by

their effectiveness in action' (p. 207). The other major source is
the agent's 'volitional system ... that set of considerations which
when combi.'1ed with his factural beliefs ... yields judgments of
the form: the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things
considered, is a' (p. 215). The motivation system produces the
agent's strongest desire, the valuational system produces what he
thinks he has the best reason for doing, and the two do not neces-
sarily coincide. Because of this possibility, 'a person may be ob-
structed by his own will' (p. 213). The person is to be identified
with his values, which, following Plato, are determined by the
person's rational capacities. For Frankfurt, rational capacities
only make the formation of second order volitions possible ([ 8] ,
pp. 11-12), such capacities do not form a source of motivation to
be identified with the person.
Measured against the phenomena each theory is supposed to
reflect, Watson's has this clear edge over Frankfurt's: When de-
ciding what to do, agents 'do not ask themselves which of their
desires they want to be effective in their actions' (unless, perhaps,
in the grip of religious or moral self-examination), 'they ask them-
selves which course of action is most worth pursuing' (p. 219).
Watson also belabours what for Frankfurt is a theoretical pos-
sibility in order to argue that the hierarchy of desire is not what is
fundamental. It is possible for a creature to have only first order
desires and no second order volitions ('a wanton,' [8], p. 11),
and also possible for a creature to have a second order desire
which is not a volition: a doctor may want (in order better to
understand his patient) to have a desire (an addict's craving) for
heroin without wanting that desire to move him to take heroin
(p. 9). An agent could, Watson observes, have both first and
second order desires and no second or third order volitions: he
'may not care which of his second order desires wins out' ([ 47] ,
p. 218). As Frankfurt is aware ([8], p. 16), this possibility arises
at each level of an indefinitely extended hierarchy. The separation
of desire and volition on the second level, 'stands at the margin
of preciosity' (p. 9), but someone could in theory obsessively re-
fuse to identify himself with any of his desires until he formed a
desire of the next higher order; this would lead 'toward the
destruction of a person' (p. 16). Frankfurt suggests that the pro-
 Ability. possibility and responsibility 101

cess is just terminated when a person 'decisively identifies himself

with one of his first order desires,' (ibid.) - i.e. he just forms a
second order volition and is done with it. This, Watson com-
plains, is either lame or shows the hierarchy is unable to explain
why we reckon some of a person's desires are peculiarly his 'own'
([47],p.218).
What makes a desire an agent's 'own' for Watson is its leading
to what the agent judges to be the best thing for him to do. But
while acknowledging that the relation between a person's values
(Plato's reason) and motives (Plato's appetites) is 'intricate'
(p. 213) Watson allows Plato's over-emphasis on their indepen-
dence to distort his own theoretical picture. Frankfurt's desire
hierarchy may not give Watson the structure he requires, but a
hierarchy based on quantification over desires might better reflect
the relation between a person and those of his desires which
obstruct him. That reason, or sound judgement, may oppose the
strongest desire in the interest of the best possible satisfaction
pattern for all a person's desires is one possibility explored in
Tiles [48], but represents by no means the only possible form
that intricate relation may take.
Watson believes his approach arms the compatibilist against
Bramhall's worry. Traditionally the compatibilist faces the chal-
lenge: how does one distinguish between ordinary responsible
people whose wants are ex hypothesi determined and patho-
logical cases (kleptomaniacs and dipsomaniacs) whom we are
reluctant to hold responsible? According to Watson the latter
are distinguished from the former because their wants are 'more
or less radically independent of the [ir] evaluative systems' ([ 47] ,
p. 220). The same, however, can be said of weak-willed people
and Watson, thus, leaves us with no justification for holding at
least some such people responsible. Frankfurt, it was observed
above, had the opposite problem; he could explain why we hold
the weak-willed responsible but not why we do not hold the so-
called pathological cases responsible.
In defense of his resting responsibility on what amounts to the
liberty of spontaneity Frankfurt correctly observes, 'the assump-
tion that a person is morally responsible for what he has done
does not entail that the person was in a position to have what-
ever will he wanted' ([8] , p. 19). As Neely puts it, 'our desires ...
102 J.E. Tiles

are not under our immediate voluntary control; one does not in
general get rid of a desire or acquire a new one simply in virtue
of desiring to do so' ([49], p. 51-52). But Frankfurt overlooks
the importance of the long term development of a person's will.
As Aristotle taught, a person's will (prohairesis) is governed by
dispositional states (hexeis) and even where what issues from a
disposition of the will is now beyond the control of the agent,
the formation of the disposition is itself something the agent
can control and modify over time. It is, Jeffrey claims ([ 46] ,
p. 379), the possibility of embarking on a project of modifying
preference over time which gives sense to the claim that a man's
(first order) preference for smoking can co-exist with a (second
order) preference one day not to prefer to smoke at all.
A theoretical basis for distinguishing between ordinary weak-
ness of will and pathological cases could be established if the
control over his wants, which a person requires in order to be
held responsible, were formulated in such a way as to acknowledge
this crucial fact about human psychology. In an article falling out-
side the period of this chronicle, Foley ([50], p. 427) provides a
formulation of compatibilism which includes the requirement that
at some time prior to the time, t, when the question of a person's
freedom arose, the person was able to bring about his having at
t different values and desires. Neely's discussion is alive to this
crucial fact as well, for he quotes Mill on the formation and self-
control of character. But when he lists ([49] , p. 34) the explana-
tory elements involved in discussions of freedom, namely, cir-
cumstances, skills, beliefs and desires, neither Mill's 'character',
nor Aristotle's disposition (hexis) receives the mention it deserves.
Perhaps the most interesting and promising development of
the decade here under review has been the trend, highlighted in
this section, toward discussing the problems of responsibility in
terms of models of human motivation which do more justice to
the complexity of their subject. Arguments for the compatibilist
position have also produced valuable contributions to the anal-
ysis of the concepts of capacity, power and ability, but it is only
by concentrating on the capacities peculiar to human agents that
we can reasonably hope to derive understanding of, and principles
by which to evaluate, our existing practice of holding people
responsible.
 Ability, possibility and responsibility 103

Acknowledgment

John Cottingham, Martha Klein and Mary Tiles pointed out a

number of errors and obscurities in the penultimate draft of this
chronicle and assisted greatly my attempts to remove them.

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The problem about the nature of law
J. RAZ *
Oxford University

It is characteristic of philosophical disciplines that among their

major concerns is the clarification and delimitation of their own
subject matter. The theory of knowledge attempts to clarify the
nature of knowledge, the philosophy of logic examines the defini-
tion of logic, moral philosophy reflects on the nature and bound-
aries of morality and so on. Since the identity of such disciplines
depends on the identity of their subject matter, preoccupation
with their own self-identity is typical of many philosophical in-
quiries. Philosophy of law is no exception. It too is partly engaged
in an investigation of the nature of law and of the boundary of
the legal and thus it is perennially reflecting upon its own nature. 1
The persistence of such self-reflexive questioning is testimony
to the importance of formulating precise questions and of choos-
ing one's starting point. The inability of philosophers to agree on a
common answer is partly due to differences in their perception of
the nature of the problems involved in the question. Such differ-
ences reflect themselves in differing unstated assumptions and un-
conscious starting points chosen in answering the philosophical
questions concerned. In this article I shall describe and comment
upon three current approaches to the question of the nature of
law. To explain them and justify my comments I shall have to
venture some remarks towards a theory concerning the nature of
law but these will be, in the context of the present article, both
incomplete and incidental to the main task of clarifying the prob-
lem about the nature of law.

* Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford.

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 107-125.

© 1982, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
108 J. Raz

1. THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH

Both among the classical exponents of legal philosophy2 and

among its modern practitioners3 one finds philosophers who took
the inquiry concerning the nature of law to be an attempt to de-
fine the meaning of the word 'law'. The linguistic approach was
boosted by the anti-essentialist spirit of much of modern analyti-
cal philosophy and in particular by its tendency in its early years
to regard all philosophical questions as linguistic questions.
Recently philosophers have grown dissatisfied with the lin-
guistic approach, and I introduce it first only to dismiss it by
surveying some of the flaws and defects associated with it. The
first and most common response to the linguistic approach is
that philosophers are not lexicographers. This, though true, is
obviously incomplete. What then are philosophers of law after?
The answer will be found in our examination of the other two
approaches to be discussed below. Yet even while allowing that
the final verdict on the linguistic approach must await the emer-
gence of a viable alternative we can examine the internal weakness
of the linguistic approach itself.
Traditionally those who adopted the linguistic approach con-
centrated on the word 'law'. They encountered the overwhelming
problem that that word is used in a multiplicity of non-legal con-
texts. We have laws of nature and scientific laws, laws of God and
of thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation
of 'law' has to account for its use in all these contexts and equally
clearly any explanation which is so wide and general can be of
very little use to legal philosophers.
Only on one assumption can the explanation of 'law' hope to
provide the answer to the legal philosopher's inquiry into the
nature of law. That assumption is that the use of 'law' in all con-
texts but one is analogical or metaphorical or in some other way
parasitical on its core meaning as displayed in its use in one type
of context and that that core meaning is the one the legal philo-
sopher has at the centre of his inquiry. Unfortunately, the assump-
tion is mistaken. Its implausibility is best seen by examining the
most thorough and systematic attempt to provide an analysis of
'law' based on this assumption, that proposed by John Austin in
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. For the failure
 The problem about the nature of law 109

of Austin's analysis does not depend on his espousal of a general

command model of law. Quite independently of the shortcomings
of the command theory Austin was doubly wrong. First, there is
no reason to regard discourse about purely theoretical laws, like
laws of nature, as parasitical extensions of discourse about purely
practical laws, such as legal rules. Secondly, when considering
purely practical laws there seems no reason to give legal rules and
their special features preferred status compared with that of, e.g.,
moral laws.
The fate of the linguistic approach is not yet sealed. The expla-
nation of the meaning of the word 'law' has little to do with
legal philosophy ,4 but it is possible that the meaning of some
other terms is closely associated with the concerns of legal philo-
sophers. The most promising candidates are 'legal' and 'legally'.
They are not used in theoretical contexts and in practical contexts
seem to be excluded from moral and all other usages apart from
those which directly concern legal philosophy.
'Legally' is, inter alia, a sentence-forming operator on sentences.
The claim that its semantics explains the nature of law amounts
to saying that 'legally p' is the general form of all legal statements.
To examine the claim one should consider the five types of sen-
tences standardly used to make legal statements.
First, some other legal operators such as 'It is the law that ... '
and 'According to law .. .' are roughly synonomous with 'Legally
.. .'5. The main other legal operator 'There is a law that .. .' though
not synonomous with 'legally .. .' can be explained by its use.
'There is a law that p' is logically equivalent to 'Legally, there
is a rule that p'.
Second, 'legal' can be defined in terms of 'legally'. 'x has a
legal duty' (or 'a legal right' or 'legal authority', etc.) is logically
equivalent to 'Legally, x has a duty' (or 'a right' or 'authority',
etc.). Similarly 'This is a legal transaction' is logically equivalent
to 'Legally this is a transaction', and so on.
Third, purely legal predicates are predicates such as 'a mort-
gage', 'a share', 'a copyright', 'fee simple' which, we intuitively
judge, are used only to make legal statements. Any sentence con-
taining a purely legal predicate should, therefore, count as a legal
sentence even though it does not display the form 'Legally p'.
However, any sentence 'p' containing a purely legal predicate is
110 J. Raz

logically equivalent to 'legally p'. For example, 'He has the copy-
right' is logically equivalent to 'legally he has the copyright'.
Fourth, semi-legal predicates are predicates which are normally
used to make legal statements but which can also be used in other
contexts. 'Ownership', 'marriage', 'contract' are semi-legal. 'They
make a contract', 'They are married', 'He owns the house', 'The
house is his' are normally used to make what we intuitively judge
to be legal statements. But my son is right in saying that his books
are his, even if in law they are mine, and Marian Evans could quite
sensibly regard herself as G.H. Lewes' wife, not merely consider
that she deserves to be. In contrast, if it is not the case that accord-
ing to law one has the copyright then it is not true that one has
the copyright, however much one deserves to have it. Given these
facts about semi-legal predicates it is clear that the condition
specified above respecting legal predicates does not apply to them.
Sentences containing semi-legal predicates are not logically equi-
valent to the sentences resulting from them by prefixing 'legally'
to them.
At the same time it is true that any legal statement made by
the use of a sentence 'p' containing a semi-legal predicate is
logically equivalent to the statement standardly made by the use
of 'Legally p'.
Fifth, legal statements are often made by the use of ordinary
deontic sentences where the content of the sentence and the con-
text of its utterance indicate that it is used to make a legal state-
ment (e.g., 'It is prohibited to park here'). Here again all one can
say is that when such a deontic sentence 'p' is used to make a
legal statement the statement thus made is logically equivalent to
the one standardly made by 'Legally p'.
Consideration of the first three points may suggest that all sen-
tences standardly used to make legal statements are, or are logical-
ly equivalent to, sentences of the form 'Legally p'. The fourth and
fifth points, however, disprove any such suggestion. It is true
that all the foregoing observations strongly suggest that all legal
statements can be expressed by sentences having the form 'legal-
ly p', yet this judgment is based on an intuitive notion of 'legal
statement' which is not itself explained by reference to 'legally'.
One may therefore conclude that any theory of the nature of law
must observe the Linguistic Condition:
 The problem about the nature of law III

LC: All legal statements are statable by the use of sentences of

the form 'Legally p'.

But one must at the same time reject the claim that the theory of
the nature of law is simply an investigation of the meaning of
'legally'.
This claim is also defeated by an independent argument. The
argument above shows that not all the sentences frequently used
to make what we intuitively judge to be legal statements can be
analysed in terms of 'legally'. It can also be shown that not all the
statements standardly made by the use of sentences of the form
'Legally p' are intuively judged to be legal statements in the sense
relevant to legal philosophy. 'Legally p'-sentences can be used to
make statements of religious law or of intemationallaw or indeed
of the law of some other kinds of powerful social associations but
the credentials of such statements as legal statements in the rele-
vant sense (whatever that may be) is not a question which philo-
sophers will allow to be settled by the appropriateness of the use
of 'legally' in such cases. To say this is essentially no more than to
reassert that philosophy is not lexicography.

2. THE LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE

The upshot of the discussion so far is that linguistic considerations

impose a constraint on the acceptability of legal theories but that
the inquiry into the nature of law is not a study of the meaning of
any term or family of terms. What then is the object of such an
inquiry? Many legal philosophers start from an unstated basic in-
tuition:

BJ: The law has to do with those considerations which it is

appropriate for courts to rely upon in justifying their
decisions.

I have left the formulation vague because it is meant to capture a

common basic intuition. Many legal philosophers accepting the
basic intuition as an unconscious starting point regard their task
as refining it to yield a philosophical theory of the nature of law
112 J. Raz

which is in fact an elaboration of the basic intuition.

It may be thought, and the thought may have influenced vari-
ous philosophers, that the basic intuition is justified by the lin-
guistic approach (or perhaps even by LC). It may be thought, in
other words, that 'legal rules' and 'legal facts' mean the same as
'the considerations that it is appropriate for courts to rely upon'.
But this cannot be accepted on the strength of linguistic usage.
The case of constitutional conventions in English Law provides a
good counter-example. 6 In England constitutional conventions
constitute a major part of the English constitution regulating as
they do the relations between the organs of government. An
example is the convention that the monarch is not entitled to
refuse royal assent to a bill properly passed by Parliament. Accord-
ing to most standard theories of English constitutional law one
defining feature of conventions is that they are not considera-
tions on which courts can base decisions. If this is so then accord-
ing to the basic intuition they are not legal rules. This indeed was
Dicey's view and it is shared by many other legal theorists. But
this conclusion cannot be supported by linguistic usage, since
many native English speakers would not hesitate to dub various
conventions 'legal rules'. Having rejected the linguistic approach
above, it will be clear that I am not presenting the case of con-
stitutional convention as a refutation of the basic intuition, but
merely as a refutation of the suggestion that it is necessitated by
the linguistic approach. In fact it is at odds with facts about lin-
guistic usage and although it is compatible with LC it is by no
means justified or required by it.
I shall assume, and will say a little below to justify the assump-
tion, that BI is true. This still leaves unexplained the question why
it should have been taken by so many as an unexamined assump-
tion which serves, mostly unconsciously, to define their own sub-
ject and thus gives shape to their theories. If I am right in suggest-
ing that many tended to regard BI as justified by linguistic usage
this provides a partial explanation for the willingness to adopt BI
without further questioning. But since this belief is so evidently
ill-founded there must be additional reasons, if only to explain
why legal philosophers were so myopic in their perception of
linguistic usage. The explanation is simple. Most theorists tend to
be by education and profession lawyers and their audience often
 The problem about the nature of law 113

consists primarily of law students. Quite naturally and impercep-

tibly they adopted the lawyers' perspective on the law. Lawyers'
activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or potential.
They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft docu-
ments, conclude legal transactions, advise clients, etc., always with
an eye to the likely outcome of possible litigation in which the
validity of the document or transaction or the legality of the
client's action may be called into question. From the lawyer's
point of view the law does indeed consist of nothing but consider-
ations appropriate for courts to rely upon. 7
The lawyer's perspective consists of the unquestioning accep-
tance of BI as the starting point for legal philosophy and as de-
termining its subject matter. But perhaps BI need not be accepted
unquestioningly. Perhaps it can be justified by more fundamental
assumptions. Therefore, accepting BI does not commit one to
accepting the lawyer's perspective.
Kelsen can be taken as an instructive example of a philosopher
who adopts the lawyer's perspective without being aware of this.
That if he did so he was unaware of this would probably be
generally conceded. Indeed most of Kelsen's interpreters either
did not notice or underplayed the point. This is quite natural.
Kelsen himself says he is following a combination of the linguis-
tic approach and the institutional approach: 'Any attempt to de-
fine a concept must take for its starting point the common usage
of the word denoting the concept in question. In defining the
concept of law we must begin by examining the following ques-
tions: Do the social phenomena generally called law present a
common characteristic distinguishing them from other social
phenomena of a similar kind? And is this characteristic of such
importance ... that it may be made the basis of a concept ser-
viceable for the cognition of social life?,g But in fact Kelsen is
merely paying lip-service to what he regards as a proper method-
ological procedure. He never seriously examined any linguistic
evidence and he assumed dogmatically, and in the face of all the
glaring evidence to the contrary, that law is the only social insti-
tution using sanctions (other than divine sanctions).9
The clue to the methodological approach he was. in fact pur-
suing is in his insistence that legel theory must be a pure theory.
He regarded it as doubly pure. It is pure of all moral argument and
114 J. Raz

it is pure of all sociological facts. We shall return to the purity

from morality below. For the time being let us concentrate on
purity from social facts. By this Kelsen indicates his belief that
the analysis of legal concepts and the determination of the con-
tent of any legal system depends in no way at all on the effects
the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve
examination of people's motivation in obeying the law or in
breaking it. The picture of law dictated by the methodology of
the Pure Theory is of law in the books, of an analysis of law using
as the raw material only law reports and statute books. Now the
only possible justification for legal studies to ignore the social
realities behind the law is a conception of law and legal studies
which concentrates on the lawyers' perspective.
On the assumption that Kelsen embraces the lawyers' perspec-
tive it is easier to understand why Kelsen was tempted by two of
his best known doctrines. If the law consists of considerations
appropriate for courts to rely upon then it is tempting to regard
all laws as addressed to courts. Furthermore, if one thinks of
every law as determining the result of a (class of) potential dis-
putes then it is tempting to regard every law as stipulating a
remedy (Kelsen says that every law stipulates a sanction but his
notion of a sanction is wide enough to cover all remedies except-
ing declaratory judgments). After all every litigation is about the
applicability or non-applicability of certain remedies. I am not
suggesting that these doctrines are plausible nor that they are
necessitated by the lawyer's perspective, merely that they are
made comprehensible on the assumption that Kelsen endorsed
this perspective.
The basic intuition says that law has to do with reasons for
courts' decisions. It does not say that all the considerations that
courts may rely upon are legal considerations. Nor does it reject
such a view. Kelsen himself however rejected it. He regarded law
as consisting of enacted law, case law and customary law and he
acknowledged that there are other considerations on which
courts may rely. These are extra-legal considerations. So far as
the law is concerned the courts are left with discretion when the
law runs out and other considerations come into play. Kelsen's
reasons for such a position have nothing to do with BI. They
derive from the other aspect of the purity of legal theory: its
 The problem about the nature of law 115

purity from moral considerations.

For Kelsen it is self-evident that legal theory is free of all moral
considerations. Given his essentially emotivist theory of ethics
this is a prerequisite for legal theory to be 'scientific'. But this
argument, quite apart from its dependence on a particular view
of the nature of morality, is clearly misconceived. The task of
legal theory is clearly to study law. If law is such that it cannot
be studied scientifically then surely the conclusion must be that
legal theory is not 'a science'. One can even accept the conclu-
sion that if the law does involve moral considerations and there-
fore cannot be studied scientifically, then legal theory will study
only those aspects of the law which can be studied scientifically.
What one cannot conclude is that since only morally neutral con-
siderations can be studied scientifically therefore the law is such
that its study does not involve moral considerations.
Since Kelsen has no good reason to insist that legal theory
should be free from moral considerations, he has no good reason
to delimit the law in the way he does. He is aware that courts do
rely on moral considerations. He regards enacted law, case law and
customary law as exhausting the content of the law even though
he is aware that courts quite appropriately rely on moral consider-
ations not incorporated in legislation, custom or precedent. I
remarked above that BI does not require that such considerations
shall be taken as law. But since BI postulates that at least some of
the considerations appropriate for courts are legal, it imposes a
burden on anyone who claims that some such considerations are
not legal to explain what difference between them and legal con-
siderations makes them non-legal and why. Kelsen has no such
explanation. The logic of his own doctrines can be used against
him: if enacted and case law can be represented as instructions
for courts to apply sanctions in certain circumstances so can those
moral considerations which it is appropriate for courts to rely
upon. If all the considerations which guide courts in applying
sanctions are legal considerations, why are not moral considera-
tions which do so part of the law even if they are not incorporated
in legislation, precedent or custom?
Legal theory in America has always been dominated by the
thought that law is just what the courts do. American theorists
not only embraced the lawyers' perspective but jumped to the
116 J. Raz

conclusion that all the considerations which courts may use are
legal. The most sophisticated and accomplished representative of
this tradition is R.M. Dworkin who in a series of articles during
the last 15 years developed a theory of law out of a theory of
adjudication.lo In fact he developed a theory of adjudication and
regards it willy nilly and without further argument as a theory of
law. Dworkin points out that judges must use moral considerations
in addition to enacted and case law. He argues that the moral con-
siderations which they should use are those which belong to a
moral theory justifying the enacted and case law binding on them,
i.e., that moral theory which constitutes the ideology of the law. l l
One may agree or disagree with this theory of adjudication. Either
way one has to ask a separate question, namely, which of all these
considerations constitute the law? Dworkin, however, does not
pause to ask this question. He unquestioningly assumes, without
ever stating the assumption or providing any reason for it, that all
the considerations which courts legitimately use are legal consider-
ations.
Dworkin's identification of a theory of adjudication with a
theory of law looks, however, very natural from the lawyer's
perspective. Lawyers' activities, as we saw, revolve, directly or
indirectly, round litigation in the courts. From the lawyer's per-
spective all the considerations pertaining to judicial reasoning are
equally relevant. A lawyer has to concern himself not only with
legislation and precedent but also with other considerations
relevant to judicial reasoning. A lawyer, therefore, fortified in
virtue of BI with the knowledge that the law has to do with
judicial reasoning finds no reason from the perspective of his
own professional preoccupations to stop short of identifying the
theory of law with a theory of adjudication.

3. THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

I have suggested that from the lawyer's perspective in the disagree-

ment between Kelsen and Dworkin the latter must be declared
winner. But we have also seen that neither the basic intuition BI
nor the linguistic constraint LC contributes to this verdict. They
are compatible with both Kelsen's and Dworkin's theories of
 The problem about the nature of law 117

law. 12 It is the lawyer's perspective which delivers the verdict.

Yet there is something inherently implausible in adopting the
lawyer's perspective as one's fundamental methodological stance.
There is no doubting the importance of the legal profession and
of the judicial system in society. It is entirely appropriate to make
them the object of a separate study and to regard legal theory as
that study. It is, however, unreasonable to study such institutions
exclusively from the lawyers' perspective. Their importance in
society results from their interaction with other social institutions
and their centrality in the wider context of society. The law is of
interest to students of society generally, and legal philosophy,
especially when it inquires into the nature of law, must stand
back from the lawyer's perspective, not in order to disregard it,
but in order to examine lawyers and courts in their location in
the wider perspective of social organization and political insti-
tutions generally.
The institutional approach has had many representatives in the
history of legal philosophy. Its influence on English legal philoso-
phy is due principally to the influence of John Austin (who com-
bined it with the linguistic approach). He, following Bentham,
first explains the nature of the political system and then proceeds
to explain the nature of law by placing it within the political
system. H.L.A. Hart is a prominent practitioner of this approach
today.13 In his discussion of the emergence of secondary rules
and of the minimum content of natural law, as well as in his dis-
cussion of the separateness of states, he examines the law as in-
volving the emergence of new kinds of political institutions,
both legislative and judicial, against the context of social and
political needs. 14
The institutional approach, subjected to the restriction of LC,
seems much superior to its two rivals. The linguistic approach
though useful as imposing restrictions and suggesting insights is
bound to yield inconclusive results. The lawyer's perspective
though based on a sound intuition is arbitrary as an ultimate
starting point.
The institutional approach strives to present an analysis of a
central political institution which, since its analysis conforms to
LC, should be accepted as the analysis of law. From its point of
view BI is a justifiable consequence and the disagreement indicated
118 J. Raz

above between Kelsen and Dworkin is resolved in favour of Kel-

sen. In order to illustrate this last point I shall deviate from the
purely methodological reflections of these pages to indicate in
broad outline some of the features of a theory based on the in-
stitutional approach, features relevant to the issue between Kelsen
and DworkinY
From the institutional point of view the basic intuition is the
starting point for further critical reflection. It is entirely plausible
to regard the notion of law as bound up with that of a judicial
system but what are the essential characteristics of a court and
why are they important to the political organization of society?
Three features characterize courts oflaw:

1) They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them.

2) They issue authoritative rulings which decide these dis-
putes.
3) In their activities they are bound to be guided, at least part-
ly, by positivist authoritative considerations.

The first point does not imply that courts of law do not engage in
other activities than settling disputes. They often administer
estates and bankruptcies, conduct the affairs of certain categories
of people, etc. The first point simply asserts that however many
other activities law-courts engage in they are courts because,
among other things, they strive to settle disputes. This point when
juxtaposed with BI, can be read as saying that it is as courts, i.e.
as settling disputes, that they are crucial to our understanding of
law. But I am not at all confident that this is so. It seems more
plausible that what is crucial for the existence of law are the other
two features of law courts (features which can be and in many
legal systems are shared by other, though perhaps less important,
institutions). However, I shall not argue this point here.
The second limb of the above definition of a court of law, i.e.
that it issues authoritative rulings, may seem self-evident. A few
words of explanation concerning the sense of 'authoritative'
rulings may nevertheless be called for. First, let me make clear
that both here and below I am using 'authoritative' as short for
'claimed to be authoritative', i.e. by the court or person con-
cerned or the organization to which they belong or which they
 The problem about the nature of law 119

represent. There is no suggestion that the claim is morally war-

ranted. A court's opinion on the merits of a dispute is authorita-
tive and binding in a way in which my opinion is not, not because
I have no opinion on such disputes (which I sometimes have), not
because my opinion is not an expert's opinion (which it may be),
nor again because courts never err (they sometimes do). The
reason is that the court's very utterance of its opinion is claimed
by it to be a reason for following it whereas my utterance of my
opinion is not claimed to be a reason for following it. At best it
amounts to informing the persons concerned of the existence of
reasons which are themselves quite independent of my utterance.
The need for the third limb of the definition, that courts of
law be, at least partly, guided by authoritative positivist consider-
ations, is clearly seen by contemplating its negation. There are
forms of arbitration in which the arbitrator is instructed merely
to judge the merits of the case and to issue a just judgment, with-
out being bound to follow any authoritative positivist standard.
We can imagine a purely moral adjudication taking the same form.
Positivist considerations are those the existence and content of
which can be ascertained without resort to moral argument. 16
Statutes and precedents are positivist considerations whereas the
moral principles of justice are not. A moral adjudicator will rely
in his deliberation on the existence of positivistic standards but he
is not bound to regard them as authoritative. But one does not
have a court of law unless it is bound to take as authoritative
some positivist standards such as custom, legislation or precedent.
So much we can learn from our intuitive understanding of the
nature of courts of law as a political institution. How can we use
this understanding as a base on which to anchor a complete doc-
trine on the nature of law? The clue is in the emergence of au-
thoritative positivist considerations as crucial to our conception
of courts of law which, in accordance with BI, provide the insti-
tutional key to the nature of law. We can formulate an additional
constraint on an adequate doctrine of the nature oflaw.

AP: Law consists only of authoritative positivist considerations.

An analogy with personal action will help to explain the point. It

is possible to distinguish between a deliberative and an executive
120 J. Raz

stage in a person's attitude to the prospect of a certain action. The

deliberative stage in which the person considers the merits of al-
ternative courses of action terminates when he reaches a conclu-
sion as to what he should do. It is followed by an executive stage
if and when he forms an intention to perform a certain act. In
the executive stage he is set to act if and when the occasion ar-
rives. When an intention is formed deliberation will terminate,
though it may be restarted and the intention suspended or even
revoked. Sometimes the intention will harden into a decision, in-
dicating reluctance to re-open deliberation. In any case the exis-
tence of an intention indicates that the question what to do has
been settled and that the person is ready to act.
Not every action is preceded by both stages or by one of them.
Sometimes one just acts without prior deliberation or intention.
Sometimes one or the other stage exists without the other, and
very often when both exist the boundaries between them are
extremely fuzzy. Yet the general distinction is of great impor-
tance since just as the deliberative stage is necessary for people
to be able to form considered views on the merits of alternative
courses of action, so the executive stage is necessary to enable
people to plan ahead, to determine themselves to act in advance
of the occasion for the action. For large organizations a distinc-
tion between deliberative and executive stages is essential to secure
planned and efficient institutional action. In institutions such
division often includes a division of responsibility between differ-
ent persons. Some will be responsible for deliberating and de-
ciding, others for executing those decisions. In general, social
cooperation either negative (people refraining from hurting each
other) or positive can be viewed as a form of social action decided
upon by some social institutions and carried out by individuals.
Some societies allow individuals a share in deciding on their
schemes of cooperative action and other plans. But even they have
to distinguish between the deliberative stage where individuals
contribute to the decision-making process and the executive stage,
where perhaps those very same individuals are bound to observe
those decisions.
In the deliberative stage the question what is to be done is open
to argument based on all sorts of considerations. Reasons of a
moral character will often dominate. Once the matter has been
decided to the satisfaction of the social institution involved, its
 The problem about the nature of law 121

appropriate organ will formulate 'the social intention', i.e., it

issues an authoritative instruction. Since this instruction represents
the conclusion of the deliberative stage and belongs itself to the
executive stage it will be identifiable without resort to further
moral argument. Those belong by definition to the deliberative
stage. Only positivist considerations can belong to the executive
stage. Furthermore executive considerations are authoritatively
binding. Those subject to them are not, normally, allowed, by the
social institution concerned, to challenge or query their validity
or conclusiveness. To do so is to reopen the deliberative process
and unless there are limitations on the freedom with which this
can be done the considerations cannot be regarded as executive.
So long as argument is free the executive stage has not been
reached.
Executive considerations are therefore authoritative positivist
considerations. This brings us back to the definition of courts of
law. It included the fact that they are guided in part by authori-
tative positivist considerations and that they issue authoritative
rulings (which being issued by the action of members of the court
are themselves authoritative positivist rulings). This suggests that
the law consists of the authoritative positivist considerations
binding on the courts and belongs essentially to the executive
stage of the political institution (the state, the church, etc.) of
which it is a part. The resulting picture has the courts applying
both legal (i.e., authoritative positivist) and non-legal considera-
tions. They rely both on executive and deliberative reasons, yet
the law belongs to the first kind only.
The two stage picture presented above may make one surprised
with a doctrine by which the courts are guided by considerations
belonging to both stages. But the surprise is due merely to the
oversimplification in the representation of the two stages above.
Consider again the case of the individual. A person may stagger
the process of decision-making, moving towards the 'pure' execu-
tive stage in several separate steps. First, for example, he decides
to act on the balance of economic considerations and to discount
considerations of prestige. Then he decides that one of the half
dozen alternatives open to him is to be rejected since at least one
of the others is better supported by economic considerations, etc.
The law often proceeds in a similar way. On many issues statutes
represent but the first step towards a 'pure' executive stage. They
122 J. Raz

may have to be supplemented by delegated legislation and perhaps

even by further administrative action. Sometimes litigation reaches
the courts in matters which have not reached a 'pure' executive
stage in the matter at issue and the courts have to resort to non-
legal, i.e., non-executive considerations to resolve the dispute.
Even this picture is oversimplified. It suggests, e.g., that the sur-
vival of a deliberative stage down to the adjudicative level is always
to be regretted. This is far from the truth. It is often advantageous
for a person while forming a general intention in advance (I'll stay
the night in Nottingham) to leave the precise details to the last
moment (I'll choose an hotel when there). The same kind of
reasons suggests that often, especially when dealing with very
broad categories, it is better not to fix too inflexibly the precise
details in advance. It is better to settle for executive reasons, i.e.
laws, which fix the framework only and leave the courts room to
apply deliberative reasons within that framework.
Be that as it may, our concern here is not to comment on vari-
ous law-making policies but on the nature of law. Our analysis
yielded only one element: the law consists of authoritative positi-
vist considerations enforceable by courts. Clearly not all the con-
siderations which meet this condition are part of the law. Other
conditions have to be added. However, the fact that law consists
of considerations enforceable by courts (as required by BI) which
are authoritative and positivist is suggested by the definition of a
legal court and is supported by the common distinction between
the two functions of the courts as law-makers and law-appliers
which roughly coincides with the distinction between cases where
the law is unsettled and those where it is not. It is further sup-
ported by the fact that any analysis of law based in part on this
feature focuses on a distinction of paramount importance to social
organization, i.e., the distinction between the deliberative and the
executive stages.

4. IS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY VALUE FREE?

The analysis outlined above is intended to show how at the level

of highest philosophical abstraction the doctrine of the nature of
law can and should be concerned with explaining law within the
 The problem about the nature of law 123

wider context of social and political institutions. It shows how

the lawyers' perspective is an arbitrary starting point for legal
philosophy, disregarding the wider political context in which the
law is moored. It also shows how from this point of view the in-
clination to identify the theory of law with a theory of adjudica-
tion and legal considerations with all those appropriate for courts
is based on a short sighted doctrine overlooking the connection
of law with the distinction between executive and deliberative
considerations.
It may be thought that the arguments of the last section sup-
port legal positivism against natural law. But this is not so. It is
true that positivists do generally regard legal considerations as
authoritative and positivist. l ? But they are not the only ones.
The theories of several prominent natural lawyers conform with
all the features contributing to a doctrine of the nature of law
mentioned above. l8 There still remains the general question
about the moral character of the doctrine of the nature of law.
Is it a moral doctrine based on moral considerations or not?
Clearly a theory of adjudication is a moral theory. It concerns
all the considerations affecting reasoning in the courts, both legal
and non-iegal. In pronouncing which extra-legal considerations
have force and how much weight is due to them it is engaged in
moral argument. When the doctrine of the nature of law is iden-
tified with a theory of adjudication it becomes itself a moral
theory. The question what is the law of England is identified with
the question which considerations should courts rely upon. This
is clearly a question of political morality, at least inasmuch as it
concerns the content of one or the other of the extra-legal con-
siderations. For example, the question whether an English court
today is entitled to declare a ministerial regulation null and void
on the ground that it violates human rights is clearly a moral and
political question. It is a question one may expect an answer to
from a complete theory of adjudication which specifies all the
considerations judges should use and their force. If a theory of
adjudication is a theory of law, if all the considerations to be
used by courts are legal considerations, then the theory of the
nature of law is a moral theory.
A different conclusion emerges if one follows the arguments
presented above based on the institutional approach. Since law
124 J. Raz

belongs to the executive stage it can be identified without resort

to moral arguments, which belong by definition to the deliberative
stage. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for identi-
fying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any
other evaluative argument. But it does not follow that one can
defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using
evaluative (though not necessarily moral) arguments. Its justifica-
tion is tied to an evaluative judgment about the relative impor-
tance of various features of social organizations and these reflect
our moral and intellectual interests and concerns.

NOTES

1. H.L.A. Hart has repeatedly commented on this feature of legal philoso-

phy. Cf. Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1953, and The
Concept of Law, Oxford 1961,Ch.1.
2. Cf., for example, John Austin's treatment of the question in The Pro-
vince of Jurisprudence Determined, 1832.
3. For reasonably sophisticated discussions of the linguistic approach cf.
G. Williams 'The Controversy Concerning the Word "Law''', in Philoso-
phy, Politics and Society, 1st series, ed. P. Laslett, Oxford 1967, and R.
Wolheim, 'The Nature of Law', Political Studies (l954), p.128.
4. Lon Fuller (see especially his The Morality of Law, New Haven 1964,
revised edition 1969) represents an interesting line. He is totally un-
interested in the special features of legal systems. His theory is best
seen as an inquiry into some putative features of practical laws generally,
whether legal or not. In following this line he may have been influenced,
consciously or unconsciously, by the linguistic approach focusing on
'law'. If the philosophy of law is the study of 'law' then why bother
with any fmer demarcations. It should instead study all kinds of prac-
tical laws.
5. Note that 'The rule is legally valid' is logically eqUivalent to 'Legally,
the rule is valid'. In equating 'legally .. .', 'According to law .. .' and 'It
is the law that .. .' I do not mean to deny that there are stylistic and
conversational differences between them which make one or the other
of them more appropriate than the others in different contexts. Being
here concerned merely with their semantic properties I shall disregard
such differences and use 'legally' even in contexts where one of the
others will be conversationally more apposite.
6. The classical discussion of constitutional conventions is in A.V. Dicey,
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London 1885.
For an interesting recent discussion see G. Marshall and G.C. Moodie,
Some Problems of the Constitution, London 4th ed. 1967, esp. Ch. 2.
 The problem about the nature of law 125

7. My 'Sociological' generalizations should be regarded as crude approxima·

tions to the truth. E.g., there are specialist constitutional lawyers who
advise on the application of constitutional conventions. But such excep-
tions to the general rule do not affect the thrust of the argument.
8. General Theory of Law and State, New York 1945, p. 4 and see further
pp. 5, 14 f.
9. It is not my claim that law does not resort to sanctions, merely that
sanctions play a major role in informal social norms and in non-legal
organizations as well. See further my Practical Reason and Norms, Lon-
don 1975, pp. 154-162; H. Oberdiek, 'The Role of Sanctions and Coer·
cion in Understanding Law and Legal Systems', Am. J. of Juris (1977).
10. Most of Dworkin's articles are collected in his Taking Rights Seriously,
London 1977. See also his 'No Right Answer' in P.M.S. Hacker and J.
Raz (eds.),Law, Morality and Society, Oxford 1977.
11. Cf. 'Hard Cases' in Taking Rights Seriously. See also my explanation and
criticism in 'Prof. Dworkin's Theory of Rights', Political Studies (1978).
12. It is arguable that further linguistic evidence may provide support for one
or the other theory. I believe, however, that the linguistic evidence in it·
self without the backing of theoretical considerations is likely to remain
indecisive. Cf. my The Authority of Law, Oxford 1979, Ch. 3.
13. See his The Concept of Law; and 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law'
in Kiefer and Munitz (eds.), Ethics and Social Justice, New York 1970.
14. See generally on Hart's theory of law P.M.S. Hacker, 'Hart's Philosophy
of Law' in Hacker and Raz, Law, Morality and Society. For critical dis-
cussion of relevant aspects of Hart's theory see J.M. Finnis, 'Revolution
and Continuity of Law' in Simpson (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
Oxford 1973; R.M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch. 2; J. Raz,
The Authority of Law, Chs. 5,9.
15. I have further discussed these ideas in Practical Reason and Norms,
Ch.4 and in The Authority of Law, Ch. 3.
16. Note that it is not required that the standard will be capable of being
applied without recourse to moral argument. A statute instructing the
courts to act as if they are moral legislators is a positivistic standard.
17. Though see for doubts as to whether Hart conforms with this condition:
Soper 'Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Dispute',Mich. L. Rev. (1977), p. 473, and D. Lyons 'Principles, Positi·
vism and Legal Theory - Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously', Yale L.J.
(1977), p.415.
18. See, e.g., L. Fuller, The Morality of Law and J.M. Finnis, Natural Law
and Natural Rights, Oxford 1979.
Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements
EUGENIO BULYGIN
University of Buenos Aires

1. INTRODUCTION

Two major events characterize the development of legal philoso-

phy in the decade 1966-1976: first, the increasing interest of legal
theorists in deontic logic and the subsequent attempts to capitalize
upon the insights achieved by deontic logicians for the clarifica-
tion of legal reasoning and the analysis of legal concepts;! second,
the powerful attack launched by Ronald Dworkin against the
hitherto prevailing trend in legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism.
Both issues are much too complex to be treated summarily in
a short article. Instead, I shall try to pick out one problem which,
being a central topic of legal philosophy, has much troubled
deontic logicians, and also has some bearing on Dworkin's theo-
ries. The problem I propose to discuss in this paper is the well-
known ambiguity of deontic expressions; unlike imperatives
which are normally used to issue commands or prohibitions,
deontic sentences, i.e. sentences in which occur such deontic
terms as 'ought', 'may', 'obligatory', 'forbidden', 'permitted',
etc., are typically ambiguous: the same string of words like 'it is
obligatory to keep promises' or 'smoking is prohibited here' can
be used to issue a prescription (a command or a prohibition),
and also to state that a certain prescription exists or that some-
thing is obligatory or forbidden according to a given norm or set
of norms. In the first case the deontic sentence expresses a norm;
in the second case, a (descriptive) proposition about norms,
which will be called normative proposition.
Most philosophers share the opinion that norms lack truth-
values: the~' are neither true nor false, but they can be obeyed

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 127-152.

©1982, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
128 E. Bulygin

or satisfied. On the other hand, normative propositions are clearly

true or false, but not being prescriptions at all, they cannot be
obeyed nor disobeyed.
Are these categories mutually exclusive? Can one and the same
expression share both properties, i.e. be prescriptive and descrip-
tive at the same time? If they are exclusive, are they also jointly
exhaustive? Is every occurrence of a deontic sentence either an
enunciation of a norm or an expression of a normative proposi-
tion? As we shall see, the answers to these questions are far from
being clear.

2. THE LOGICAL DISCUSSION

The revival of deontic logic in modem times and its systematic

pursuit by logicians begins from the publication of G.H. von
Wright's [66] classic paper 'Deontic Logic'. This revival took
place in a moment when there was a fairly established opinion
that norms, being disguised imperatives, lack truth-values and
hence no logical relations obtain between them (cf. Dubislav
[20], Jorgensen [35] and Ross [55]). Strangely enough, in the
first systems of deontic logic we find no discussion of the prob-
lem of how to understand its expressions: as referring to norms
or to normative propositions. Most logicians writing on deontic
logic in the 1950s and early 1960s seem not to have been aware
of this problem. On the whole, it seems that the idea was to offer
a logic of norms, but the formulas were usually treated as express-
ing propositions which are true or false. This is what happens in
particular with von Wright's first paper on this subject. In 1957
[67] he writes in the preface to his Logical Studies referring to
it: 'Philosophically, I find this paper very unsatisfactory. For one
thing, because it treats of norms as a kind of proposition which
may be true or false. This, I think, is a mistake. Deontic logic
gets part of its philosophic significance from the fact that norms
and valuations, though removed from the realm of truth, yet are
subject to logical law. This shows that logic, so to speak, has a
wider reach than truth.'
It would probably be a mistake to treat of norms as a kind of
true or false propositions, but this does not preclude the possibili-
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 129

ty of interpreting deontic expressions as propositions about

norms, i.e. as normative propositions. Von Wright's remark seems
to indicate that he was not aware of this possibility at that stage
(probably because he overlooked the above-mentioned ambiguity)
and took it for granted that deontic logic should be a reconstruc-
tion of logical relations between norms. Yet his contention that
logic has a wider scope than truth certainly needs a justification
in view of the fact that such notions as logical consequence and
consistency are usually defined in terms of truth.
A detailed discussion of the problem of the ambiguity of deon-
tic expressions is to be found in von Wright's Norm and Action
(von Wright [68], cf. also Weinberger [63 D. In this book von
Wright makes a clear distinction between norms and normative
statements or norm-propositions, and emphasizes the ambiguity of
deontic sentences: one and the same sentence can be used for ex-
pressing both of them. But instead of eliminating this ambiguity of
the ordinary language, von Wright decides to retain it in his sym-
bolic language. So he builds only one symbolism instead of two,
but his calculus admits of two interpretations: a prescriptive in-
terpretation, in which deontic expressions are norms, and a de-
scriptive interpretation, where they express normative proposi-
tions. 'The 'fully developed' system of Deontic Logic is a theory
of descriptively interpreted expressions. But the laws (principles,
rules) which are peculiar to this logic, concern logical properties
of the norms themselves, which are then reflected in logical prop-
erties of norm-propositions. Thus, in a sense, the 'basis' of Deontic
Logic is a logical theory of prescriptively interpreted 0- and P-
expressions' (von Wright [68], pp. 133-134).
Von Wright's statement of the problem is very clear, but his
solution is far from being satisfactory. In the first place, he does
not say how the two interpretations of deontic logic are related,
and so it is not clear why the logic of normative propositions
should reflect the logical properties of norms. In the second place,
if there are any logical relations between norms, then why not
elaborate a logic of norms directly?
Von Wright's idea that there is at least a theoretical possibility
for the construction of two logics - a logic of norms and a logic
of normative propositions - proved to be fruitful. It was devel-
oped by C.E. Alchourr6n [l, 2] who tried to show that: (i) von
130 E. Bulygin

Wright's first system of deontic logic is a substantially correct

reconstruction of the logical properties of norms, and (ii) the
logic of normative propositions (Le. assertions that certain states
of affairs are prohibited, obligatory or permitted according to a
given set of norms, that is, a normative system, differs from the
logic of norms on several important points), and (iii) that the two
logics are isomorphic in a very special case, viz. when the norma-
tive system in question is complete and consistent, two require-
ments which cannot be assumed on logical reasons alone. These
ideas were further developed in Normative Systems (Alchourr6n
and Bulygin [3)).
The thesis that there are logical relations between norms and
therefore the logic of norms is in some sense more basic than or
prior to a logic of normative propositions is shared by many dis-
tinguished philosophers (cf. Weinberger [65] and Kalinowski
[36]), but opinions differ considerably about the foundation of
this thesis. Some authors tend to think that the interpretation
of deontic logic as a logic of norms presents no difficulty; either
because they believe that norms are true or false (Kalinowski
[36] and Rodig [54)), or because they just substitute another
pair of values (valid and invalid) for truth and falsity (Kalinowski
[36], Schreiber [54] and Ross [58)). Both proposals are rather
problematic from a philosophic point of view. The idea that
norms are true or false is often based on an analogy with Tarski's
T -condition:
A norm N is true iff n (where N is the name of the sentence
expressing the norm n). For instance, the norm 'Killing is pro-
hibited' is true if and only if killing is prohibited.
Behind this idea lies a correspondence theory of truth; Tarski's
explicit intention was to reconstruct this theory, which can be
traced back to Aristotle. Now it is clearly not sufficient to point
out the analogy; what is needed is to show what sort of facts make
norms true. They cannot be empirical facts; so one must probably
postulate the existence of some sort of moral or otherwise norma-
tive facts. This would lead to a rather complicated ontology. In
any case, without a detailed elaboration of a theory capable of
giving an account of specific normative facts, the contention
that norms have truth-values remains without support. Even less
satisfactory is the procedure of substituting validity for truth.
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 131

It is not a question of replacing one term by another; what is

needed is to show that the concept of validity behaves in a similar
way - in all relevant respects - as the concept of truth.
But even if we agree, as most logicians and philosophers do,
that norms lack truth-values, the question whether there are logi-
cal relations between norms still remains open. There might be
after all a grain of truth in von Wright's remark that the scope of
logic is wider than that of truth. 2 But it requires a justification
that must be more than a simple mention of certain formal analo-
gies between truth and validity.
In any case, there are many authors who reject the idea of a
logic of norms. A paradigmatic case is that of Manfred Moritz
[42, 43,41] who maintains that deontic logic can only be inter-
preted as a logic of normative propositions. But if deontic expres-
sions are normative propositions, why should they differ in any
significant way from other propositions? After all, logicians are
only interested in the form, not in the contents of a proposition.
So deontic logic, interpreted in this way, seems to lack any specif-
ic interest: it is just an 'ordinary' logic applied to norms. Such
is the conclusion drawn by Moritz and even if it is not commonly
shared by deontic logicians, it is not easy to see how to escape it.
The main argument against the possibility of a logic of norms
is this. Logical analysis is the reconstruction of certain logical or
conceptual relations that obtain between propositions, i.e. certain
abstract entities, which are usually regarded as meanings of de-
scriptive (true or false) sentences. If there is to be a logic of norms,
these must be a sort of conceptual, proposition-like entities, i.e.
normative sentences must have a specific prescriptive meaning.
Now the difference between norms and descriptive sentences
seems to lie not in the meaning, but in the illocutionary act per-
formed by the speaker: one and the same proposition, e.g. ex-
pressed by the sentence 'John takes off his hat' can be used on
different occasions to make an assertion ('John takes off his hat.'),
to ask a question ('Does John take off his hat?'), or to issue a
prescriptio.(l. ('John, take off your hat!' or 'John should take off
his hat'). The meaning of the sentence is the same in all these
examples, but what is done while uttering the sentence is differ-
ent. Therefore it is only on the pragmatic level of the use of a
language that we can distinguish between norms (prescriptions),
132 E. Bulygin

assertions (statements), questions, conjectures, etc. (cf. Lewis

[39], p. 49; Reichenbach [51], pp. 337 ff.; and also von Wright
[68] , p. 94). There is no such difference on a semantic level. So
norms are the result of a certain use, viz. the prescriptive use of
language.
It is important to stress that the various linguistic and non-
linguistic devices used to indicate what is done with a sentence
(full stop, exclamation and interrogation signs, a certain inflexion
of the voice, a characteristic gesture) do not form part of the
meaning of the words uttered. They show what the speaker is
doing in uttering certain words, but in doing it he does not say
what he is doing. So these devices do not contribute to the con-
ceptual content of the words uttered. 3
If this is so, then it is clear that there can be no logical relations
between norms. If one wants to speak of a logic of norms, one
must accept that norms are abstract entities which are not lan-
guage-dependent,4 i.e. that there are sentences with a specific
prescriptive meaning, an assumption of strong platonic flavor,
that is hard to swallow for many empiricist-minded philosophers.
So we are faced with a difficult dilemma: either we reject the
idea of a logic of norms and maintain that deontic logic can only
be conceived of as a logic of normative propositions, or we must
make the strong ontological assumption of norms as abstract, con-
ceptual entities, independent of any use of language. In the first
case, we must be prepared to explain the peculiar features of
deontic logic (unless we abandon altogether the idea of a deontic
logic as a specific branch of logic). In the second case, we must
offer a plausible justification for such an assumption, i.e. we must
elaborate a theory of meaning that would embrace prescriptive
meanings, that is, norms as abstract entities.
The best developed theory that chooses the second horn of the
dilemma is that of Castaneda [16], whose practitions are the
'prescriptive' counterpart of propositions. But most writers feel
inclined to accept the first horn; even von Wright [69] himself
accepted later that deontic logic is, after all, a logic of normative
propositions.
But then what about the peculiar features of deontic logic?
Can a logic of normative propositions be developed as an inter-
esting branch of logic on its own merits?
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 133

I shall not try to give a full answer to this difficult question,

but only make a few informal remarks in order to indicate what
kind of answer seems to me most appropriate.
Normative propositions are usually expressed by elliptic sen-
tences, stating that a given state of affairs p has a certain norma-
tive status (is prohibited, permitted or obligatory) according to
some unspecified normative order. This means that in this order
there is a norm to the effect that p is prohibited (permitted,
obligatory). But what does it mean to say that a norm exists or
is a member of a set of norms? As there are different kinds of
norms, there are also different answers to this question. A special
but very interesting case is that of legal norms. Legal norms have
temporal existence: they begin to exist at a certain moment and
they cease to exist at some later moment. The temporal existence
of legal norms can be analyzed in terms of membership of a given
legal order. A legal order is a dynamic order, i.e. a temporal se-
quence of changing sets of norms. To each temporal point (at
which some norm is introduced into the order or removed from
it) corresponds a certain set of norms. A norm can be a member
of different sets and, as long as it is a member of some set, it
belongs to or exists in the order. Norms come into existence
through acts of promulgation by competent authorities (and also
as a result of a firmly established practice, in which case it is im-
possible to fix an exact moment of the beginning of its existence)
and they cease to exist when they are either explicitly or tacitly
derogated (cancelled). A tacit derogation takes place when the
norm enters into a conflict with a more important norm. There
are many different hierarchical criteria regarding the relative im-
portance of norms; so a norm Nl may be more important than
N2 because N 1 has been issued by a higher authority, or because
it has been promulgated on a later date, or because it attaches a
less severe punishment to the same offence, etc.
The introduction of norms into a legal order and their removal
from it are governed by certain criteria concerning the raticnality
of the acts of promulgation and derogation, that in a broad sense
may be called logical. So a logic of normative propositions can be
viewed as a calculus of normative systems or dynamic orders. As
such it would be both an autonomous branch of logic and a field
of research of great practical interest, at least for legal norms.
134 E. Bulygin

The development of a logic of dynamic systems in the sense

sketched above, falls outside the period we are considering in this
paper, but some pioneering work has been already done in several
writings published during the decade 1966-76. 5
The discussion of the problem of the ambiguity of deontic ex-
pressions led to a significant clarification of this rather intricate
issue. Most deontic logicians accept now the distinction between
norms and normative propositions and acknowledge its theoretical
importance. In particular, almost all of them accept that the two
categories are mutually exclusive (no deontic sentence can express
both a norm and a normative proposition at the same time) and
many of them agree that they are also jointly exhaustive, in the
sense that every deontic sentence (or better, every occurrence of a
deontic sentence) either expresses a norm or a normative proposi-
tion, but not both.

3. THE LEGAL DISCUSSION

The ambiguity of deontic sentences did not pass altogether unno-

ticed by legal philosophers, but it took a very considerable time to
get at a clear formulation of the issue and even now there is no
consensus among them about the logical status of legal statements.
The first to mark the distinction between norms and normative
propositions - as in so many other matters - was Bentham [11].
He distinguished the 'authoritative imperative' from the unau-
thoritative formulations to be found in books 'written not by the
legislator but by private individuals' on the one hand, and also
between directly imperative expressions (explicit commands)
and indirectly (declarative) expressions, like 'it is not permitted to
any man to export corn'. When such expressions occur in a stat-
ute, the legislator is 'speaking as it were in the person of another
man who is considered as explaining the state which things are
in, in consequence of the arrangements taken by the legislator
([ 11], pp. 152-155).
In Kelsen's work appears the crucial distinction between Rechts·
norm and Rechtssatz. Rechtsnorm is issued by the legislative
authority; it is neither true nor false, but valid or invalid and
efficacious or not efficacious. Rechtssatz is formulated by legal
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 135

science; it is descriptive and not prescriptive, hence it is either true

or false, but is neither valid nor invalid, nor can it be obeyed or
disobeyed. So far it seems that Kelsen's distinction reflects exactly
the difference between norms and nonnative propositions; but un-
fortunately this proves to be an illusion. For Kelsen insists that
Rechtssatz is an 'ought-sentence' (Sollsatz) and this is not merely
a grammatical category: it is an ought-sentence according to its
meaning. This idea plays an important role in Kelsen's theory be-
cause of the distinction between the factual and the normative
sciences which rests precisely on this point: the propositions of a
normative science are ought-sentences and not 'is-sentences'. So
this feature of legal sentences cannot be explained away.
There are two kinds of 'ought' according to Kelsen: the pre-
scriptive ought of the nonns and the descriptive ought of the pro-
positions of legal science. The contention that there are descrip-
tive ought-sentences is far from being clear. One could think that
the descriptive ought is something like Hare's [28] 'inverted com-
mas use', which is a mention and not a use of the term 'ought'.
But Kelsen rejected emphatically all attempts to interpret the
relation between a Rechtssatz and the corresponding Rechtsnorm
which it describes in terms of the distinction between mention
and use. 6 Hart [31] suggested that Kelsen's distinction between
propositions of a nonnative science of law and the legal norms is
similar to that of an interpreter of a foreign language and the ex-
pressions he has to translate. Suppose a German officer issues a
command to some English prisoners of war: 'Stehen Sie auf!' and
the interpreter translates 'Stand up!'. In this case it would be
equally wrong, according to Hart, to say that the interpreter has
given a command (for he has no authority to do it) and to say that
he just mentioned the command given by the officer, as if he said
'The officer has commanded you to stand up'. The interpreter
reproduces the command, conserving its prescriptive force, but
this prescriptive force stems from the officer, not from him.
Hart's analogy is interesting, but, as it stands, not very illuminat-
ing. According to Kelsen the task of a science of law is to describe
the law, not only to reproduce it and it is not clear how the re-
produced command of the interpreter can be said to be descrip-
tive, unless we agree that both translations ('Stand up!' and 'The of-
136 E. Bulygin

ficer has commanded you to stand up') are equivalent. But this
would mean to analyze it in terms of mention and use.
Two interesting and rather similar attempts to explain the nor-
mative character of legal propositions in Kelsen have been made
recently by Raz and Nino [44]; but they fall outside the scope
of this survey.
A clear formulation of the distinction was made by Scandina-
vian philosophers. As far back as 1941 I. Hedenius [32] made the
distinction between 'genuine' and 'spurious' legal sentences, which
corresponds exactly to norms and normative propositions. A few
years later the same distinction was carefully elaborated by Alf
Ross [56]. Legal norms are, according to Ross, directives, i.e.
'utterances with no representative meaning but with intent to
exert influence' (p. 8), whereas propositions of what Ross calls
the doctrinal study of law are assertions, i.e. utterances with re-
presentative meaning. Hence norms are neither true nor false,
but normative propositions have truth-values. What are the nor-
mative propositions about? In Ross' analysis they refer to 'hypo-
thetical future decisions [of the courts] under certain conditions'
(p. 41). This predictive analysis of legal propositions is absolutely
independent of the distinction between the two kinds of senten-
ces, sentences expressing norms and those expressing normative
propositions. But in practice, the rejection of the predictive analy-
sis of legal statements by many legal philosophers that did not
share Ross' legal realism obscured the importance of the other
distinction. The most influential author in jurisprudence during
the period 1966-1976 that we are considering was H.L.A. Hart. In
Hart [30] we find a parallel distinction between legal rules and as-
sertions about law, but these are of two different though related
kinds: the external and the internal statements. 'When a social
group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords an opportuni-
ty for many closely related yet different kinds of assertion; for it
is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an ob-
server who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the
group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct' (p. 86).
Hart also distinguishes between different kinds of external
statements: (i) those merely recording the regularities of behaviour
on the part of those who comply with the rules; (ii) those record-
ing in addition the regular hostile reaction to deviations from the
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 137

usual pattern of behaviour, and (iii) those also recording the fact
that members of the society accept certain rules as standards of
behaviour (p. 87). All three types of external statements are state-
ments of fact, but they differ according to different kinds of fact
that they describe. The two fIrst types describe certain actions,
but the third describes a much more complex social fact, viz. the
fact that a given rule exists, i.e. is accepted by a social group. This
is exactly what we understand by a normative proposition.
Hart contrasts the external statements of fact with internal
statements made by those who accept and use the rules as guides
to conduct, i.e. by those who adopt an internal point of view. 7 At
fIrst sight the difference between external and internal statements
seems to lie on the pragmatic level: internal statements are made
from an internal point of view, i.e. by those who accept the rules,
and external statements are made from an external point of view
by those who do not accept the rules. This last remark requires a
qualifIcation. Of course, one need not reject the rules in order to
be able to make external statements; the acceptance of the rules
is irrelevant for the external point of view. 8 But one cannot make
internal statements without accepting the rules of the system. So
acceptance of the rules is a necessary feature of the internal point
of view and therefore also a necessary condition for making in-
ternal statements.
Is there any logical difference between these two kinds of legal
statements? External statements are statements of fact, internal
statements are not about any fact at all. What are they about?
The typical form of an internal statement is, according to Hart
[30], 'It is the law that .. .' which is analyzed in the following
terms: ' ... an internal statement manifests the internal point of
view and is naturally used by one who, accepting the rule of
recognition and without stating the fact that it is accepted, applies
the rule in recognizing some particular rule of the system as valid'
(p. 99). So an internal statement is about validity of a rule and to
say that a rule is valid is to use a rule of recognition, and this im-
plies the acceptance of the rule declared valid and that of the rule
of recognition. This is so because the rule of recognition is a gen-
uine norm: it not only provides a criterion for the identifIcation
of the rules of the system, but prescribes that they are obligato-
ry.9
138 E. Bulygin

Hence to say that a rule is valid (in this normative or prescrip-

tive sense) is tantamount to saying that it is obligatory or binding,
i.e. that it is obligatory to do what the rule prescribes. The expres-
sion 'is valid' is, in this use, semantically redundant, exactly in the
same way as is redundant the expression 'is true': to say that the
sentence 'The door is open' is true amounts to saying that the
door is open; similarly, to say that the rule 'one must keep one's
promises' is valid, at least involves saying that one must keep
one's promises. Thus it becomes clear that the assertion 'This rule
is valid' is not a statement of fact, but a prescription. Hart [301 is
quite explicit on this point: 'The use of unstated rules of recogni-
tion by courts and others, in identifying particular rules of the
system is characteristic of the internal point of view. Those who
use them in this way thereby manifest their own acceptance of
them as guiding rules' (p. 99; italics mine).
But if this is so, then Hart's terminology is confusing, for in-
ternal statements are no statements at all; they are disguised pre-
scriptions (applied norms or claims and requests based on rules).
They are, of course, not identical with rules; it is one thing to give
a rule (e.g. when a legal authority issues a command) and quite
another to use a rule already given. But they share with rules an
important property: both are prescriptive and neither is a state-
ment of fact and therefore both lack truth-values. One cannot
maintain that internal statements are prescriptive or normative
and at the same time true or false, unless one is prepared to ac-
cept the existence of certain peculiar facts, that would make them
true, viz. moral or otherwise normative facts that they are about.
Hart would certainly not accept that there are such normative
facts; hence his internal statements cannot be true nor false. lo
It is true, of course, that in ordinary discourse we often say of
a deontic sentence that it is true or false, and as we easily shift
from a prescriptive use of such sentences to a descriptive one, it
may give the impression that one and the same sentence is both
normative and true or false. But this is not more than an illusion.
Imagine the following dialogue: A father decides, before leaving
his house, to order his child to bed at 9 p.m. and tells so the baby-
sitter, but he forgets to give the corresponding command to the
child. At 9 p.m. the babysitter says: 'You ought to go to bed now'
and the child replies 'It is not true'.
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 139

If the child takes the babysitter's remark to be a piece of in-

formation about his father's command, then his answer is per-
fectly meaningful, and, on at least one interpretation, also cor-
rect. But if the babysitter wanted to order him to go to bed (and
chose this particular form of words), then the reply is out of place.
For if the sentence 'You ought to go to bed' is a prescription, then
it is equivalent to the imperative 'Go to bed!', which clearly can-
not be answered by 'It is not true'. It is possible and indeed most
likely that the babysitter wanted to do both things, viz. to remind
the child of his father's command and to order him to go to bed.
If this is so, then she performed, simultaneously, two different
speech acts: one of giving an information and one of commanding.
An appropriate answer could be in this case: 'No, it is not true
that father ordered me to go to bed at 9, so I shall not obey your
order' and the child's reply may just be an elliptic form of this.
What this example shows is precisely the ambiguity of deontic
expressions and the practical difficulty of finding out which
speech act or speech acts have been performed on a given occasion
(which is an empirical question). But it certainly does not show
that prescriptive ought-sentences can be true or false.
There also are, of course, statements of validity that are genuine
descriptive propositions; they occur when somebody by saying
that a particular rule is valid only means that it satisfies certain
criteria of validity, without expressing acceptance of the rule (nor
the rule of recognition). E.g. when by saying 'This statute is valid'
he only records the fact that it has been duly enacted by the legis-
lature. But this would be an external statement of fact. This state-
ment is of the third type, for it states the fact that a given rule
satisfies the criteria of identification provided by the rule of
recognition (which is more than merely recording regularities of
behaviour), but it does not imply the acceptance of the rule of
recognition as a binding rule, nor that of the rule declared valid;
it merely records such acceptance by members of the group. On
the contrary, the utterance of an internal statement ascribing va-
lidity to a particular rule implies such acceptance: ' ... a person
who seriously asserts the validity of some given rule of law, say, a
particular statute, himself makes use of a rule of recognition which
he accepts' (Hart [30], p. 105).
It seems, by the way, that this ambguity of the term 'valid' and
140 E. Bulygin

hence of statements of the form 'This rule (statute, contract) is

valid' remained unnoticed by Hart; at least he does not mention
the possibility of factual validity-statements and always speaks
of them as internal statements. But as we have already pointed
out the internal statements ascribing to a rule are no statements
at all. They are disguised ways of spelling out the rule or of making
claims based on it. To say, e.g., that this contract is valid (in this
normative sense) is tantamount to saying that you must do what
this contract stipulates; it is to prescribe a certain conduct, but it
does not describe anything at all. Now if a positivist account of
the law consists of describing the law as it is and not as it ought
to bell and internal statements are not descriptive, but prescrip-
tive, it follows that in a positivist account of the law there is no
room for internal statements. A consequent positivist can describe
the law only by means of external statements. Of course, in de-
scribing the law he must, if his description is to be complete, give
an account of the internal aspect of the rules, but this can very
well be accomplished by means of external statements, provided
he uses external statements of the third kind, not restricting his
interest to record regularities of behaviour alone. But there is no
need to utter internal statements in order to give a full account
of the internal aspect of rules: the third type of external state-
ments can very well do this job.
Hart [30] does not deny this and his attack concentrates on
the predictive theory of law which only makes use of the first
two types of external statements. ' ... we can if we choose occupy
the position of an observer who does not even refer in this way
to the internal point of view of the group. Such an observer is
content merely to record the regularities of observable behaviour
in which conformity with the rules partly consists and those fur-
ther regularities, in the form of the hostile reaction, reproofs, or
punishments, with which deviations from the rules are met' (p.
87). 'If however, the observer really keeps to this extreme ex-
ternal point of view and does not give any account of the manner
in which members of the group who accept the rules view their
own behaviour, his description of their life cannot be in terms of
rules at all, and so not in the terms of the rule-dependent notions
of obligation and duty. Instead it will be in terms of observable
regularities of conduct, predictions, probabilities, and signs'
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 141

(p. 87). 'What the external point of view, which limits itself to the
observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way
in which the rules function as rules in the lives of those who nor-
mally are the majority of society' (p. 88; italics mine).
These quotations show clearly that Hart's attack concerns only
the predictive theory based on external statements of the first two
kinds. But Hart is guilty of an omission: he does not say what
happens if the observer is less extreme and uses external state-
ments of the third kind. Could he not give a full account of the
internal aspect of rules and the use of normative language by
those who accept them?
In this way Hart gives the impression (though he never asserts
it explicitly) that one must use internal statements in order to
give an account of the internal aspect of rules, which would be
plainly false. It is interesting to notice, however, that some of
Hart's Oxford colleagues consider that he uses a normative (and
not a purely descriptive) concept of law and that consequently
internal statements should playa very important role in the ana-
lysis of law.
Raz [48] maintains, e.g., that Hart 'insisted on the importance
of internal statements to the analysis of law'. This assertion is,
of course, ambiguous; if what Raz means is that the analysis of
law requires taking into account internal statements used by
judges and other officials and even private citizens, then we agree.
If, on the other hand, he wants to suggest that one must use in-
ternal statements in order to analyze the law, then he is radically
mistaken. There are some other references to Hart that corrobo-
rate the second interpretation. Thus Raz opposes Hart's theory to
'reductivist interpretation of legal statements' by Bentham and
Austin, according to which 'legal statements are synonymous with
statements about what certain people commanded or willed ...
Professor Hart, while accepting the sources thesis, mounted a
most formidable criticism of reductivism. He argued that legal
statements are deontic or practical. They are used to demand and
justify action and thus function in discourse and argument in ways
which no theoretical statement could' (Raz [48] in Raz [49],
p. 52). Here Raz seems to equate legal statements with internal
statements, as if external statements were not legal at all. And we
find here the same ambiguity: I do not think that Bentham and
142 E. Bulygin

Austin ever pretended to reduce sentences expressing demands or

claims, such as they are usually used by those who accept the
rules of law, to statements of fact about what certain people com-
manded or willed. What they wanted to do is to reduce the theo-
retical statements of those who wish to describe the law of a given
society to factical statements. And in the same way as no theoret-
ical statement can perform the job done by practical utterances,
so no practical utterance can replace a theoretical statement made
by those who do not want to express their acceptance of the law,
nor make claims based on it, but simply pretend to describe - in a
scientifically neutral fashion - the law as it is and not as it ought
to be. In other words, Bentham's concern was with statements of
what in the Continental tradition is called legal science (Rechts-
wissenschaft) or doctrinal study of law, and in this aspect Hart
fully agrees with his great predecessor.
Finnis [23] seems to share this 'normative' interpretation of
Hart's theory: 'Thus Hart gives descriptive explanatory priority
to the concern and evaluations (and consequently to the language)
of people with an 'internal point of view', viz. those who do not
'merely record and predict behaviour conforming to rules' or at-
tend to rules 'only from the external point of view as a sign of
possible punishment', but rather 'use the rules as standards for
the appraisal of their own and other's behaviour' (p. 12).
One has the impression that this coincidence is rather signifi-
cant and that at least part of the blame for this misinterpretation
of Hart's theory must fall on its author.
There certainly are many writers who would call themselves
'legal positivists' and make use of a normative concept of validity
and therefore make internal statements. This is what Bobbio [12]
has called in a very illuminating article legal positivism as ideolo-
gy. Ideological positivists claim that every positive law is morally
binding. This form of positivism must be sharply distinguished
from positivism as an approach, whose main contention is that
it is possible to describe the law of a country as it is, without
making any valueiudgement about it, i.e. without stating how it
ought to be. This is exactly the point of view of an external ob-
server who, without committing himself to the acceptance of the
law, describes it by means of external statements of the third kind.
This is the positivism of Bentham and Hart.
It was Alf Ross [57] who in a very remarkable though little
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 143

known paper called attention to the fact that many legal philoso-
phers who regard themselves as positivists in this second sense
and reject the positivism as ideology, nonetheless use the norma-
tive concept of validity and therefore not only describe the law,
but also utter disguised prescriptions; for to say that a norm is
valid (in the normative sense) is to claim that it is morally binding.
Ross accused Kelsen of being a quasipositivist of this kind. The
question whether Kelsen is or is not a quasipositivist need not
worry us here; but what is absolutely clear is that Hart explicitly
rejects positivism as ideology and would only suscribe to positiv-
ism as an approach. Now if Hart admitted, as Raz suggests, that
the analysis of law requires the use of internal statements and can-
not be made in terms of external statements alone, then he cer-
tainly would be a quasipositivist in Ross' sense. I think that this
would be a very unfair interpretation of Hart's ideas.
To sum up our discussion of Hart's theory: The distinction be-
tween norms and normative propositions - though it is not ex-
plicitly discussed by Hart - lies not only behind the pair of con-
cepts rules and assertions about rules, but also behind the classi-
fication of assertions into internal and external statements. Ex-
ternal statements are statements of fact, descriptive of certain
social facts and hence true or false regarding them. Internal state-
ments are not factual, but normative; they are disguised prescrip-
tions based on rules and hence neither true nor false. So there are
two basic kinds of legal sentences: those expressing norms (rules
and internal statements) and those expressing normative proposi-
tions (external statements about norms). It follows that a descrip-
tive theory of law (legal positivism) can only consist of external
statements. Internal statements are often used by members of the
group, as well as by judges and other officials, but would be com-
pletely out of place in a purely descriptive, positivist, account of
the law.
How would Hart answer to our two questions regarding the
norms and the normative propositions? Though he does not use
this terminology, it is clear that norms (rules and the so called in-
ternal statements) and normative propositions (external state-
ments) are mutually exclusive. No statement can be internal
and external at the same time. But are they also jointly exhaus-
tive? This is not so clear. In my interpretation they are indeed
144 E. Bulygin

exhaustive, for internal statements - being prescriptive and nei-

ther true nor false - are a kind of norms. But I am not sure that
my interpretation reflects correctly Hart's own views. It might be
argued that internal statements are 'sui generis', neither norms,
nor normative propositions; for in spite of being prescriptive they
are also true or false. In any case, this seems to be the position of
most of Hart's Oxford colleagues. And Hart himself neither af-
firms nor denies that internal statements have truth-values. His
terminology (statements) suggests that they are true or false, but
his characterization of their function implies that they are not.

4. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

Although Hart's main contribution to legal philosophy, The Con-

cept of Law, was published before the period we are considering,
I thought it convenient to discuss his ideas at length, not only be-
cause Hart was the most influential legal philosopher of that
period, but also because it is impossible to grasp the full extent
and the significance of Dworkin's attack on positivism without
a clear understanding of what Hart actually said and what is im-
plied by his theories. This is so not only because it is Hart's
theory, as it is presented in The Concept of Law, that Dworkin
regards as a paradigmatic case of a positivistic conception of law
and chooses as a target for his attacks, but also because Dworkin
is much more indebted to Hart (or rather to a misinterpretation
of Hart) than is commonly assumed.
Dworkin's [21] ideas about a General Theory of Law and the
role of positivism have been exposed in several papers published
between 1967 and 1977, most of which were reproduced in a
volume appearing in 1977 [22]. In my discussion I shall be most-
ly concerned with one of his latest and most brilliant papers:
No Right Answer?, because here Dworkin argues in greater detail
about the nature of legal statements or propositions of law (as
Dworkin calls them). They play a very prominent role in his ar-
gument against legal positivism.
In the whole of Dworkin's work we find not the slightest men-
tion of the distinction between norms and normative proposi-
tions; this shows clearly that he does not regard it of any impor-
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 145

tance for the analysis of legal statements. Indeed his propositions

of law are neither norms nor normative propositions, though it
is not easy to say what they are. He never gives an explicit defini-
tion of propositions of law, but there is sufficient material in his
papers, especially in No Right Answer?, to identify their main
properties. This will be our next task.
Propositions of law play such an important role in Dworkin's
arguments against legal positivism because they function, accord-
ing to him, in such a way as to preclude the occurrence of 'gaps'
in the law. Now one of the main contentions of positivism is, ac-
cording to Dworkin, that there are cases for which there is no
right answer in the law and hence judges have discretion to decide
in either way such hard cases. It is this contention that Dworkin
tries to show to be false with an argument based on an account of
legal statements.
He [22] gives several examples of propositions of law that con-
tain what he calls dispositive concepts: 'Tom's contract is valid',
'Tim is liable in law for the damage his act has caused', 'lim's con-
duct on such and such occasion constitutes a crime' would be typ-
ical propositions of law. Now if such a proposition is true, then
'judges have a duty, at least prima facie, to decide some claim
one way'; 'if it is false, then they have a duty to decide the same
claim in the opposite way' (p. 59). Here we find already the two
main properties of legal statements. On the one hand they are
normative (prescriptive), on the other hand they are either true
or false.
Propositions of law are normative because they are a direct
source of duties or obligations. ' ... it is a consequence of the pro-
position that the contract is valid that a judge has a duty to en-
force it, and a consequence of the proposition that the contract
is not valid that he has the duty not to enforce it .. .' (p. 63). They
are used 'not simply to report in a neutral way that certain events,
comparable to the ball landing in a certain area, have occurred, but
as an argument in itself that certain legal consequences, and in
particular, official duties, follow from these facts' (p. 64).
In this Dworkin's propositions of law are direct descendants of
Hart's internal statements. But they playa much more important
role than their ancestors. Internal statements are only one kind
of legal assertions, but Dworkin's propositions of law occupy a
146 E. Buiygin

monopolistic position. There seem to be no room for any other

kind of legal statement in Dworkin's thought. In this he is more
close to Raz than to Hart.
Like Hart's internal statements propositions of law are distin-
guished from legal rules, i.e. prescriptions issued by the law-maker,
which are neither true nor false. But though propositions of law
are true or false, they are not identical with external statements.
This is shown clearly by Dworkin's opposition to any intent to
reduce legal statements to statements descriptive of certain social
facts, like issuing of commands by the sovereign (p. 70 ff.) in the
style of Bentham and Austin. Moreover, Dworkin does not even
mention the possibility of external legal statements.
However, unlike Hart's internal statements and like Raz' legal
statements Dworkin's propositions of law are either true or false.
But what are they true of? What are the facts, if any, that make
them true?
It is extremely difficult to find an answer to this question in
Dworkin's writings. It is clear that propositions of law are not
true regarding any social (empirical) fact, for then they would be
external and Dworkin is anxious to show that this is one of the
typical mistakes of positivism (p. 70 ff.). Perhaps they are true
of certain moral or normative facts? Dworkin [22] contemplates
this possibility in the following terms: 'Suppose, for example,
there are moral facts, which are not simply physical facts or facts
about the thoughts or attitudes of people. In that case a proposi-
tion of law might be true in virtue of a moral fact' (p. 77). But he
decides not to rely on this argument: 'I shall not, in this essay,
try to make plausible the idea that moral facts exist ... (p. 70).
Instead he argues that there are some facts beside hard (Le. em-
pirical) facts. In particular, he maintains the existence of facts of
normative consistency. Are then legal statements true in virtue of
such facts of normative consistency? This seems to be Dworkin's
answer to the question. 'A proposition of law, like the proposi-
tion that Tom's contract is valid, is true if the best justification
that can be provided for a body of propositions of law already
shown to be true provides a better case for that proposition than
for the contrary proposition that Tom's contract is not valid, but
is false if that justification provides a better case for that contrary
proposition than for it: (p. 82). But this can hardly be considered
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 147

a satisfactory answer to the question.

Leaving aside the extremely problematic idea that there is al-
ways such a thing as the best justification for every body of pro-
positions of law, to say that a political theory provides a better
case for a proposition than for its contrary, amounts to stating
that it is compatible with that theory, whereas its contrary is not.
But this would be a perfectly nonnal proposition about compatibil-
ity between a political theory and a proposition of law; it would
be an external proposition, for there would be nothing normative
about it. Moreover, Dworkin's criterion of truth could at best
function once there is already a body of propositions of law that
are established to be true; but how is the truth of these proposi-
tions established? It cannot be the same criterion, for this presup-
poses already that there is such a body of true legal statements.
In other words: in order to show that a proposition of law is true
we must compare it with 'the political theory that provides the
best justification for the settled law' (p. 83); this presupposes ob-
viously the existence of the settled law, but how is this settled law
identified? Certainly not by the same criterion, for then it would
lead to an infinite regress. Whether there is some other criterion
for the truth of the propositions that belong to the 'settled law' is
a mystery Dworkin prefers not to reveal.
To make things even more difficult, Dworkin [22] suggests
that propositions of law are, after all, not true nor false in any
ordinary sense, but only assertable as true: 'Law is an enterprise
such that propositions of law do not describe the real world in
the way ordinary propositions do, but are propositions whose as-
sertion is warranted by ground rules like those in the literary
exercise. A proposition of law will be assert able as true, under
these ground rules, if a sovereign has issued a command of a cer-
tain sort, or if officials have adopted rules of a certain fonn in a
certain way' (p. 74), or if it 'provides a better fit with the political
theory that provides the best justification for propositions of law
already established' (p. 75).
The result of our search for properties of propositions of law is
really puzzling. They are not rules, nor external statements. They
are normative (prescriptive), but at the same time they are true or
false. They are true or false, but there may be no facts that make
them true: neither social, nor moral, nor facts of normative con-
148 E. Bulygin

sistency. They are true or false, but at the same time they are not
quite true nor false, but only assert able as true or false. They have
common properties with norms (their normativity) and with nor-
mative propositions (truth-values), but they are identical with
neither of these two categories.
The fact that Dworkin ignores the distinction between norms
and normative propositions leads to a curious result: his proposi-
tions of law have properties of both, even if these properties are
incompatible. So according to Dworkin the pair of concepts
norms - normative propositions are neither jointly exhaustive, nor
even mutually exclusive.
This explains the apparent invulnerability of Dworkin's posi-
tion. None of his critics have succeeded in refuting his theory,
because it is invulnerable to any partial attack; but the very same
fact that makes his theory invulnerable, makes it also indefensible:
as his propositions of law have incompatible properties they are
inintelligible.
The failure of Dworkin's critics lies in the fact that they have
not taken notice of the incompatibility of the properties that he
ascribes to his propositions of law. And this happened probably
because they paid little attention to the conceptual distinction be-
tween norms and normative propositions.

5. CONCLUSIONS

It is not easy to trace the conceptual distinction between norms

and normative propositions; it took considerable time until lo-
gicians concerned with deontic logic came to a clear view on that
subject. But once the ambiguity of deontic expressions was de-
tected, practically all deontic logicians have made use of this con-
ceptual distinction, however different their views on the nature of
norms and on the nature of normative propositions considered
separately.
It seems that in legal philosophy exactly the opposite occurred.
On the one hand, philosophers of law such as Hedenius and AIf
Ross arrived much earlier than logicians at a clear formulation of
the distinction, probably because they were more familiar with
deontic sentences. But later this important insight was lost. AI-
 Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements 149

though Hart does not discuss this problem explicitly, it is still

possible to trace this distinction in his work. But his successors
preferred to abandon it altogether. The result - as the case of
Dworkin clearly shows - could not be more disastrous. I am in-
clined to think that legal philosophers will have to rediscover this
crucial distinction without which no clear treatment of normative
language is possible.

NOTES

1. The main books falling into this period are Ross [58], Capella [15],
Tammelo [60], Weinberger [64], Bobbio [13], Alchourr6n and Buly-
gin [3], Wagner and Haag [42], Tammelo and Schreiner [61], and
Mokre and Weinberger [40] .
2. Aqvist proposed several interpretations of deontic logic that gave rise to
various systems of atheoreticallogic.
3. Cf. Reichenbach [51], pp. 337 ff., and Hare [28] who confines the
logical relations to phrastics.
4. Cf. Alchourron and Bulygin [8] where we use the term 'norm-Iekton'
for this meaning.
5. Cornides [18] ,Alchourron and Bulygin [4,5] , Weinberger [65] ,Hanson
[27] , and Reisinger [52]. Cf. among more recent publications Alchour-
r6n and Bulygin [6,7] and Alchourron and Makinson [8] .
6. An interpretation of Kelsen along these lines has been proposed by Gol-
ding [24] ;see also Bulygin [14].
7. 'It is important to distinguish the external statement of fact asserting
that members of society accept a given rule from the internal statement
of the rule made by one who himself accepts it' (Hart [22] , p. 244).
8. ' ... an external statement of fact which an observer of the system might
make even if he did not accept it' (Hart [22] , p. 99).
9. Cf. Raz [45] : The rule of recognition imposes an obligation on the law-
applying officials to recognize and apply all and only those laws satis-
fying certain criteria of validity spelled out in the rule .. ,', and Hacker
[25]: 'So a rule of recognition is a rule imposing a duty upon judicial
officials to exercise their adjucative powers by applying laws satisfying
certain criteria,'
10. Raz seems to accept normative facts; cf. [47].
11. Hart [29] holds this to be the characteristic feature of legal positivism
that he shares with Bentham and Austin.
150 E. Bu/ygin

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On the justification of rights
REX MARTIN
University of Kansas

The concept of rights, long a staple of political thought, has under-

gone a revival since the Second World War and has again been sub-
ject to critical examination by philosophers. Indeed, the dozen
or so years from 1966 to the present have seen an unusual number
of important studies in the theory of rights. This philosophical
interest has coincided with an increased awareness of rights, and
their problematic character, both in the national political arena
and in the world of international affairs. Witness the various rights
movements of the sixties and seventies and the passage of civil
rights legislation, with attendant judicial and bureaucratic moni-
toring, on the domestic side; internationally we have had the two
United Nations Covenants (1966, entered into force 1976), the
Helsinki agreement, the recent Belgrade and Madrid conferences,
the rights movement in Socialist states, and of course the Carter
administration's expressed concern for human rights.
The present paper is a critical review of philosophical work on
the justification of rights, from roughly 1966 through 1976. My
principal concern will be with issues bearing on the normative
foundations of two kinds of rights: basic moral rights, under
which I include human rights, and constitutional rights.
I would refer the reader interested in a more extended study of
recent work on the analysis of rights per se to the survey article,
covering the period 1963-1978, by Martin and Nickel [78]. Here
I shall offer only as complete an account of the concept of rights
as is required to make intelligible the issue of the justification of
rights.
My paper falls naturally into several sections. Section 1 takes up
recent attempts to ground rights in the notion of interests; here

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 153-186.

© 1982, Martinus Niihoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
154 R. Martin

two philosophers will be considered in some detail: Joel Feinberg

and David Lyons. Section 2 surveys alternative programs for the
justification of rights. Here the focus will be on John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Nozick. A bibliography listing what
I take to be the most important works in the area of justification
of rights, including everything cited in the essay, is appended. (A
more comprehensive listing of such work is found in the biblio-
graphy, covering the years 1947-1977, by Martin and Nickel [77] .

1. INTEREST THEORIES

Several recent theories have tended to regard interests (or benefits

or welfare) as the main justificatory theme in a theory of rights.
But the somewhat similar notion that rights are essentially con-
nected with needs - an idea advocated by Kaufman [58] and Tra-
nljJy [118] and criticized cogently by McCloskey [80] - has re-
ceived considerably less support. This relative neglect is interest-
ing in itself because the notion of needs would appear to be es-
pecially congenial to Marxist philosophers. However, since Marx-
ists have been unwilling to give rights much, if any, standing in
their theories, this particular motif - needs - has not been given
a parallel treatment.
During the period of this survey the main studies of Marx on
rights are Bloch [8], Gould [43] (Ch. 5), Hook [55], Kaufman
[58], Lowith [60], Prezetacznik [96], Sichel [113], and Szabo
[115]. The general tendency within Marxism - to see rights as
transcended in the higher stages of classless society - is well laid
out in Schedler [110]; see also Tadic [116]. Interestingly, the
most extensive recent monographic study of Marx's theory of
needs - by Heller [52] - scarcely mentions rights at all, see in
particular pp. 60-{5l, 123-124. (And see also the essays by Mac-
pherson, Nielsen, and esp. Springborg in Fitzgerald [33].) Ac-
cordingly, I will confine my attention here to the development of
interest theories of justification, beginning with Feinberg's theory.

l.l Valid claims and the interest principle

Feinberg analyzes rights as claims, typically as valid claims. In his
account, rights as valid claims have two distinct dimensions: they
 On the justification a/rights 155

are claims to something and, as claims on the specific duties of as-

signable people, they are claims against someone. A right in the
full or proper sense is both these things; it is a merger of the two
dimensions. (For Feinberg's analysis of the concept of rights see
esp. [27], pp. 253-257, and [28], pp. 64-67.)
Now, given this analysis Feinberg thinks that much can be
learned about the nature and value of claims by attending to the
activity of claiming (see [26], [27], esp. pp. 249-252). And this
emphasis on claiming has led some writers (e.g., David Lyons
[70], pp. 8, 11-12) to locate Feinberg, along with Wasserstrom
[119] and Hill [53], among those who see rights as an important
social currency, as a way of demanding one's due. It is further
alleged, in this interpretation, that the capacity to assert oneself
augments self-respect and, where such claiming is a widespread
social practice, ultimately serves the end of amplifying human
worth itself. It is concluded, then, that some conception of hu-
man dignity underlies Feinberg's notion of rights as valid claims.
On this interpretation it is the concern of rights with human digni-
ty that principally justifies them.
There are several reasons for not accepting this as an account of
the justification of rights in Feinberg's theory. The more basic
notion for Feinberg is having a claim: to have a claim is to be in a
position to make a claim. Claiming is the main function of rights
in Feinberg's view; and self-respect is, no doubt, one thing that
results from so acting. It would be a serious confusion, though, to
think that this result justifies one's having a valid claim, for the
validity of the claim was antecedently established, presumably on
other grounds. When claiming is not so grounded it loses its justi-
ficatory moorings; it could then become, in some cases, a form of
self-aggrandizement or bullying. In any event, claiming rights has
a somewhat ambiguous moral result, as Feinberg himself has re-
cently suggested (see [31], pp. 32-33): overscrupulous concern
with rights could serve the purposes not just of human dignity
but also of a querulous and narrow morality. Most important, the
account of justification I am disputing has tended to blur together
two distinct levels of rights theory: it has confused the function
of rights, in this case the activity of claiming, with their justifica-
tion.
Feinberg does not hold the view that what makes a claim valid
156 R. Martin

is some feature of the activity of claiming or its results. Rather,

he emphasizes, when talking about what provides justificatory
force, the notion of legal and moral principles. Thus, 'To have a
right is to have a claim to something and against someone, the
recognition of which is called for by legal rules or, in the case of
moral rights, by the principles of an enlightened conscience'
([29], pp. 4344).
Now, Feinberg's idea that rights are valid claims allows him to
treat a moral right and a legal right as parallel in character: both
are rights in the same sense. But what differentiates them, as the
quotation above suggests, is the kind of norm from which they
derive validity. It is by reference to moral rules and principles
that claims to something are adjudged to be morally valid; and
moral duties are involved in moral claims against. Correspondingly,
for legal rigl1ts, legal rules and principles determine the validity of
claims to - and legally created duties are invoked in legal claims
against. Human rights are a special class of moral rights, differing
from other moral rights, largely, on the point of universality. They
attach to all persons simply because of the moral rules themselves
without consideration of any undertakings, express or implicit, or
of special relationships to others in which such persons might
stand (see Feinberg [28] , pp. 84-85). Some human rights may be
full-fledged moral rights; others - the ones he calls 'manifesto'
rights - lay claims to things which are not fully practicable at
present; hence these claims are at best only emerging or proto-
rights (see [27], p. 255; [28], p. 67).
My argument so far is that Feinberg invokes legal and moral
principles as the nonnative ground of rights. The issue, then, be-
comes to determine what in his view is the peculiar rights-ground-
ing content of these principles. Feinberg's answer appears to be:
benefits and interests.
Feinberg develops this 'interest principle' [29] , p. 51) in several
of his recent articles ([29, 30, 31, 32]). His main contention is
that only beings that have (or can have) interests of their own can
have rights. Beings that fulfill self-assigned functions or activities,
that have a good of their own and some degree of awareness of it,
are definitely of the right sort to have rights and other beings,
that clearly differ from them in these crucial respects, are not.
What follows from this, then, would be a certain assignment or
 On the justification of rights 157

distribution of rights to animals or living persons, for example,

but not to rocks or plants or machines. But the 'interest principle'
serves not merely to identify the category of rights-eligible beings;
it also serves to indicate what rights are to be distributed. Indi-
vidual animals might have few rights (perhaps the right not to suf-
fer or be treated cruelly); normal persons will have many. There
is, however, no one-to-{)ne correspondence between specific in-
terests and specific rights (see [30], p. 352). Moreover, only the
very basic interests - those 'whose satisfaction is indispensable
to a decent life' [30], p. 355), those 'undeniable benefits' ([32],
p. 106) - can ground rights in the really hard cases of constitu-
tional adjudication or moral reasoning. In all cases, though, rights
as valid claims are justified be reference to morally (or legally)
beneficial interests.
Bernard Mayo's account [79] of rights in terms of claims is
somewhat less complex than Feinberg's. According to Mayo 'a
right is just a claim' (p. 75). By 'claim' Mayo seems to mean an
instance of the action of claiming. Thus Mayo seems to have
succumbed to the temptation that Feinberg resisted, namely the
equation of the normative considerations which justify claims
with the act of claiming. Nonetheless, Mayo is willing to allow
that rights are justifiable claims and indeed that every right is a
claim for something that is in one's interest, although he regards
both these qualifications as 'otiose' (p. 76). Another theory very
like Feinberg's in important respects, especially as regards the
issue of justification, is developed by Neil MacCormick [71, 72] :
for MacCormick the main justifying element is put in terms of
'goods' rather than, more narrowly, of interests or benefits.
Several interesting criticisms of Feinberg's account of rights as
valid claims have appeared. Nelson [89] questions the parallel
Feinberg sees between moral and legal rights; James [56] chal-
lenges the distinction Feinberg draws between legal rights and
mere legal privileges. Regan [105] criticizes Feinberg's 'interest
principle,' especially as regards the exclusion on logical grounds of
plants and mere things from holding rights. And Young [122]
raises issues that bear directly on the normative foundations of
moral and thereby human rights, in particular, when he calls into
doubt the very notion of 'objectively correct moral principles'
(p.66).
158 R. Martin

One important difficulty in Feinberg's discussion of what

justifies rights is that the appeal to interests as the normative
ground of rights threatens his differentiation of moral from legal
rights, that is, where those are said to differ principally as regards
the kind of norm that confers validity. For instance, the constitu-
tional right to life (as found in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution) and the human right to life (as
found, for example, in article three of the UN's Universal Decla-
ration of 1948) can both be represented as grounded in the same
basic interest or 'undeniable benefit.' Thus, if we consider simply
constitutional rights, leaving aside the many legal rights that deri-
vatively stem from them, and compare basic legal rights with so-
called basic moral or human rights, it is not clear that we can
significantly differentiate their grounds of justification. And if
this is so, then these rights can no longer be said to differ as legal/
moral. More generally, where we regard interests and benefits as
the peculiar rights-grounding element in norms, both legal and
moral, then, at least for those norms that state the basic interests,
the distinction of moral from legal is lost and is replaced by a
more fundamental characterization of such norms as simply those
that state basic interests. Of course, we could say that all such
norms are moral norms. But this would equally effectively threat-
en Feinberg's differentiation of legal from moral rights in that it
would treat constitutional rights as necessarily grounded in moral
norms, thus turning them into moral rights as distinct from legal
ones.
Another difficulty becomes evident as well. We know from
Feinberg that interests are themselves psychologically or biologi-
cally rooted: in desires, wishes, wants, needs, and in a being's
capacity to conceive a want or need as a part of its own good.
But not all desires, wants, needs would be affirmed, reflectively,
as part of a given creature's own good. More important, not every
desire could be morally approved. There must, then, be a way to
incorporate interests and benefits, initially conceived psycholo-
gically or biologically, into the broad range of moral considera-
tions and to coordinate them with such considerations. What
results would be a moral theory of interests and benefits. And in
terms of such a theory it ought to be possible to identify for any
basic moral right both a distributional motif (that the interest in
 On the justification of rights 159

question is held as vital by all persons) and a justificatory motif

(that the interest is endorsed as morally important and can be
coordinated with a host of moral considerations). Such a theory
is precisely what Feinberg's account of the justification of rights
most conspicuously lacks. If we had such a theory, it is likely
that the other problem, that of providing a secure basis for dif-
ferentiating moral from legal rights, could be effectively addressed.
But the absence of the theory merely serves to accentuate the dif-
ficulty here.
It is clear, then, that a general and more complex moral theory
is required to make good Feinberg's rather limited account of the
justification of rights. The most likely candidate, in view of Fein-
berg's emphasis on benefits and interests, would be some version
of utilitarianism, although other moral theories might serve as
well, especially if values such as autonomy were to be assigned a
high justificatory weight.

1.2 Rights and the general welfare

The capacity of utilitarianism to provide a normative grounding
for moral or for constitutional rights is, however, open to doubt.
Historically, the utilitarian tradition has not been especially
hospitable to the notion of basic rights, in particular those that
can be held by individuals against governments. Bentham charac-
terized rights of this sort - so-called natural rights- as nonsense,
and utilitarian philosophers have tended up to now to follow his
lead in dismissing or, more commonly, downplaying the notion
of basic moral rights. Thus, the very comprehensive survey by
Brock [10] of recent work in utilitarianism indicates a notable
lack of interest in the topic of rights and their justification by
utilitarian philosophers. Indeed, Brock's only significant mention
of rights comes at the point where he sketches two arguments,
one by Rawls and the other by Dworkin, to the effect that utili-
tarianism cannot accomodate the notion of basic rights of indi-
viduals (see [10], pp. 268-269). A similar contention has recently
been advanced by Hart [49] .
One typical response by utilitarian philosophers, e.g., Narve-
son [86, 87], has been to accept such a contention but to deny
that it bespeaks a grave defect in utilitarianism. The standard move
here has been to give rights a subordinate place in utilitarianism by
160 R. Martin

arguing that all valid rights can readily be explicated in terms of

a more basic notion - that of enforceable duties - which can it-
self be accounted for by reference to such superordinate values as
aggregate benefit or general welfare.
In a variation on this theme, David Lyons [63] attempted to
restate Bentham's theory of legal rights, saying that to have a
right, for Benthem, is to be the direct or intended or qualified
beneficiary of an obligation. Thus, Lyons' preferred interpreta-
tion of Bentham was that 'rights correlate with beneficial duties'
([63], p. 179). For criticisms of Bentham's view, and of Lyons'
interpretation, see H.L.A. Hart [45,46,47]. The issues involved
in beneficiary theory - respecting whether the status of right-
holder can be captured without loss by the notion of a beneficiary
- are well laid out in Kearns [59] ; but see also MacCormick [71,
72], Marshall [76], and Schiller [112].
It is possible, however, to move away from this standard utili-
tarian account of rights as duty-based. Recent work by David
Lyons constitutes an interesting exploration of the possibilities
for such a move within traditional utilitarian theory.
He argues, first, that one cannot conceive the right of a person
simply and invariably as a logical correlate of the beneficial obli-
gations of others toward him (see Lyons [64], [65], p. 125, and
[70], pp. 8-10; also Martin and Nickel [78], Section 1); it fol-
lows from this that one cannot employ the standard utilitarian
pattern for justification, whereby rights are justified through the
medium of justifying logically correlated duties. He argues, sec-
ond, that utilitarian foundational values, such as the general wel-
fare, are compatible with the possession of basic moral or con-
stitutional rights by individuals (see Lyons [66,67,69] and [70],
pp. 6-8). The second argument here will particularly concern us
in this paper.
Lyon's main device is to shift the focus of attention from Ben-
tham, who did not countenance the idea of basic moral rights, to
J.S. Mill, who did. Indeed for Mill, Lyons says, 'moral conduct
essentially involves respect for moral rights and obligations ([as]
part of the logic of the moral concepts)' (Lyons [70], p. 7; see
also [66], p. 105).
One difficulty with traditional benthamite utilitarianism,
Lyons argues, is that it does not allow for rights that are indepen-
 On the justification of rights 161

dent of actual (official or popular) enforcement and, hence, for

rights one could argue from. Another and more serious problem,
in Lyon's view, is that in the benthamic approach considerations
of general welfare ('the greatest happiness of the greatest number')
are thought to exercise an absolute monopoly in justificatory
arguments; it would follow, then, that in any given instance one
could not use the notion of basic moral rights as having any in-
dependent effect in matters of justification. For there is no way
such a right could be allowed to block, let alone override, a sound
welfare argument.
One notable feature in his shift from Bentham to Mill is Lyon's
reliance on the notion of rule utilitarianism. We find this, for
example, when he says that a right is justified, for Mill, by refer-
ence to a 'rule calculated to secure some benefit or liberty' for an
individual (Lyons [70], p. 7). We find it also in his requirement
that moral rights and obligations are to be modeled on 'ordinary
social rules'; that is, they are to be conceived as relatively simple
rules which take into account and thereby impound not just the
utility of the course of conduct to be regulated (either to be pro-
moted or to be prevented, as the case may be), but also the costs
of such regulation, subject only to the proviso that these costs
are justifiable. (See Lyons [66], pp. 112-116, and compare with
Lyons [62].) Even so, Lyons does not regard the notion of rules
per se as playing a decisive role in establishing the compatibility
of utilitarianism with basic moral rights (see in particular [69],
pp.11-12).
Much more important is his contention that utilitarianism is
not a maximizing theory. On Mill's view, at least, one is not com-
mitted to 'holding that one is always morally bound to produce as
much happiness ... as possible' (Lyons [66], p. 103; see also pp.
112-l14andLyons [67],pp.119, 125-126).
The crucial distinction Lyons wants to extract from Mill is that
which holds between expediency and morality. Expedient or use-
ful conduct would be conduct that tended to maximize human
happiness - or, if not that, tended at least to promote the general
welfare significantly. What principally differentiates morality from
expediency, Lyons argues, is the necessity of justifying sanctions.
For sanctions always constitute a cost which must be subtracted,
so to speak, from the regulation of conduct, either to promote it
162 R. Martin

as expedient or to deter it as drastically inexpedient.

Sometimes legal sanctions (the most costly in terms of the nega-
tive utilities involved) can be justified but sometimes only public
disapproval can be or, in the least costly case, pangs of conscience.
Thus Mill finds out whether a given act is morally wrong, as dis-
tinct from legally wrong, by calculating whether internal sanctions
for such an act could be justified on utilitarian grounds (see Lyons
[67], p. 123). Hence, a type of inexpedient act is morally wrong
if a coercive social rule - that is, one which invokes guilt feelings,
and perhaps other non-legal sanctions against it - would be war-
ranted.
The realm of morality is principally a realm of obligations.
Lyons says, following Mill, 'The justification of a coercive social
rule establishes a moral obligation, breach of which is wrong'
(Lyons [66], p. 109). What makes a wrong act a specifically un-
just act is that it violates the right of another - where a right is
said to exist, as a type of expedient act, under a rule that allows
society to 'protect' the benefit or the liberty involved through
moral sanctions the cost of which is justifiable on utilitarian
grounds. (See Lyons [66], pp. 123-124, and Mill, Utilitarianism,
Chapter 5, paragraphs 24-25.)
All unjust conduct, conduct violating a right, is morally wrong
and is as such a breach of obligation. It does not follow here for
Lyons, however, that rights can never be overridden but only
that they can never be morally overridden except by a more
stringent right or a more stringent obligation. (See [67], pp. 125-
127,andalso [66],p.115.)
Two features of Lyons' account, one of which he makes quite
explicit, acquire importance at this point. First, there is his claim
that it would be a 'mistake' to think that 'Mill's principle of utility
itself lays down moral requirements' [66], p. 113). The standards
which that principle endorses, as ultimate ends of conduct, are
themselves nonmoral but intrinsic values. (See Lyons [67], pp.
127-128.) In short, Lyons conceives the utilitarian values such a
general welfare or human happiness as wholly amoral in character.
Thus, he contends, rights can block welfare arguments, for the
latter have no direct moral standing as such.
Lyons next wants to argue (and this brings us to the second
point I alluded to above) that, though 'Mill's utilitarianism allows
 On the justification of rights 163

direct appraisal of particular acts,' it is not clear that Mill's 'com-

mitment to the end of happiness necessarily involves subordina-
tion of all other values' (Lyons [66], pp. 118-119). Another way
of stating Lyons' point would be to say that utilitarianism is not a
theory of action, but a theory of ends, and as such does not imply
any particular action as an action required to be done. Thus, if
we are not required to maximize happiness (or even try), not re-
quired to do that expedient act, among viable alternative courses
of action, which has the best net effect in terms of benefits, then
we could hardly be required to let an obligation go, or let a right
down, even when doing so would yield a greater net benefit. We
reach the conclusion, then, that basic moral rights are compatible
with the goal of general welfare.
Sometimes Lyons seems to venture a somewhat stronger thesis,
concerning not compatibility but justification: the thesis that the
rules establishing basic moral rights are themselves to be justified,
and presumably can be, by appeal to the standard of human hap-
piness - itself a nonmoral, ultimate, intrinsic value. (See Lyons
[66], pp. 109 fL, and [67], pp. 126-128.) It is worth noting, in
this regard though, that Lyons is not so much concerned to show
that rights taken generally, can be grounded on recognizably
utilitarian doctrines as he is to show that the notion of basic moral
rights, is compatible with the utilitarian goal of human happiness
or general welfare. Other theorists have advanced similar claims,
in particular, Braybrooke [9], Haworth [50], and Scanlon [109].
Several criticisms worth noting could be made of Lyons' theory.
The notion of rights, in particular basic moral or human rights,
requires some sort of distributional principle. In Lyons' case that
principle is supplied by the notion of interests, specifically 'vital'
or 'important' interests (see [67],pp.126-127). But it is not clear
that the standard of general welfare would in fact support the
assignment of rights to individuals simply in respect of interests
they have, let alone to all individuals across the board.! This may,
then, provide one reason for Lyons' rather cautious and gingerly
handling of the question whether rights can actually be grounded
Uustified) in theories that are 'recognizably' utilitarian.
It is also questionable whether the compatibility thesis is as
strong as Lyons would like to make it. His key claim is that wel-
fare arguments as such cannot directly override rights. But Lyons
164 R. Martin

does allow that a welfare argument would be used to rank the

stringency of relevant obligations and rights that might govern
proper conduct on a given occasion. If the net benefit was clearly
a high one, then some right or obligation would definitely be
picked out as having the required stringency and it would govern
conduct in that case (see Lyons [66], pp. 114-115). This amounts
to saying that the working of rights and obligations is responsive
to net benefit considerations of the sort emphasized by Act Utili-
tarians and, further, that the right or obligation which most nearly
conforms to the standard of general welfare on that occasion will
be made the properly applicable one.
It could be replied that at most a given welfare argument, one
which brings the consequences of action under direct inspection
in the light of the principle of aggregate benefit or general welfare,
would help establish the stringency of a given rights-rule (or a rule
of obligations) in relation to other such rules. In a particular case
the point of applying the principle of utility is merely to contri-
bute to a ranking of 'the opposing obligations' and is not to de-
termine directly the choice among alternative actions on that
occasion. 'Our conception of the moral obligations would be re-
fined' and it is this resultant clear ranking of obligations which
directly determines the proper course of action to take in each
case. (See Lyons [66], p. 115; he cites Mill, Utilitarianism, Chap-
ter 2, end, and Chapter 5, paragraphs 32-33, 37).
This reply, if sound, would allow that the theory of welfare
could conflict, on occasion but in a strong way, with the theory
of morality. It would seem, however, that in the long run the
ranking and weighting of obligations could be so adjusted as to
conform to the standard of aggregate benefit; so there is no con-
flict of principle. More important, neither in this reply nor in the
earlier discussion of stringency is it established that welfare re-
quirements can never override rights. For, since Lyons specifies
that some obligations do not involve attached or corresponding
rights ([67], p. 123; [69], p. 7) it follows that welfare arguments
could override rights on occasion, albeit indirectly, by significantly
shifting the weight to an obligation to which no right was attached.
This is the sort of conclusion which Lyons' compatibility thesis
was meant to avoid.
There is also some question whether rights and obligations are,
 On the justification of rights 165

as Lyons contends, morally fundamental. Every rule that estab-

lishes a right (as a benefit or liberty justifiably secured by sanc-
tions) or establishes an obligation is itself a compound of two ele-
ments: a benefit to be sought - or a disbenefit to be avoided -
and a justified associated cost (the sanction). Rights and obliga-
tions may be conceptually basic to morality, a doubtful claim (as
Hart [45] has pointed out), but it does not follow even then
that rights, for example, cannot themselves be analyzed into a
stable set of benefits (or liberties) in which the cost of sanctions
has been taken into account.
It could be replied here that rights are more than simply stable
sets of benefits and costs, even when justified. The peculiarity of
rights and obligations in Lyon's account is that they, unlike the
goal of general welfare, set requirements for action. This is why
rights can override other rights and obligations but welfare argu-
ments cannot. A right not overridden has to be respected; one is
morally required not to violate it. And one is required to act so
as to keep his obligations (again, when these are not overridden).
Lyons thinks that for Mill the moral concepts themselves (that
is, rights and obligations) 'provide schemas for evaluating conduct
from a moral point of view' ([ 69] ,p. 11; see also pp. 12-15). And
presumably the requirement for action is a feature - one might
say a conceptual detail - of these schemas of morality. The ques-
tion we need to answer, then, is whether anything intrinsic to
utilitarianism provides a reason or basis for the selection and in-
corporation of schemas of precisely this sort.
The standard utilitarian answer has been that a requirement
for action is built into the theory of welfare. There is, surely, for
utilitarians a requirement that one is to follow that expedient
course (or rule) of action, among equally viable alternative ones,
which has the best long run net effect in terms of benefits (or
which minimizes disbenefits, if that is the issue). The requirement
here is not one of morality; rather it is a requirement set by means/
end reasoning. For where the end sought (general welfare) can be
most economically achieved by a course of action A, a course not
otherwise ineligible, then one does, must do, A. The requirement
in question is that of a hypothetical imperative and belongs ul-
timately to the theory of the practical syllogism. This requirement
for action is transitive to the theory of morality. And this is how a
166 R. Martin

requirement for action finds its way into rights and obligations in
the first place. In short, the requirement for action from which we
started, that found in the theory of morality (where the ends are
those identified as rights and obligations), was generated by a
prior requirement, that we are required to act so as to serve the
end of general welfare. (But let us allow for the sake of argument
here that we are not required to maximize general welfare.)
If this is so and if utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory (in
which consequences of action are directly appraised as to their
bearing on aggregate benefit) I do not see how one can avoid the
view that welfare arguments can sometimes override rights alto-
gether. For by allowing that utilitarianism is a theory of action
- a point seemingly necessary to any full account of rights and
obligations within utilitarian morality - we have removed Lyons'
principal reason for saying that arguments from welfare cannot
directly override rights. 2

2. CONTRACT THEORY

One of the main emphases during the period of this survey has
been the view that interest theories, in particular utilitarianism,
cannot provide an adequate account of rights. That this concern
has foundation is perhaps clearer from the previous section; in
the present section I shall examine some alternatives to interest
theory as a justification of rights.
The dominant figure in this respect is John Rawls, whose book
[98] develops an explicitly nonutilitarian theory of justice. Rawls
is very careful to identify and explicate certain contract elements
in his theory and to link it with the contractarian tradition, es-
pecially with the later form that the tradition had assumed in
Rousseau and Kant. Others whose theories fit into this frame-
work, to some degree, are Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick.
Although these approaches can all be characterized as contract
theories, it would perhaps be better to describe them simply as
nonutilitarian theories of justification. Other theories developed
in the period under review have largely dispensed with the con-
tract motif altogether, but they have in common' with it a pre-
vailing non utilitarian commitment. Thus, Stanley Benn, who had
 On the justification of rights 167

earlier [4] relied on the notion of an 'equal consideration of hu-

man interests,' later attempts to ground rights on Kantian ideals
of self-respect, the value of human beings, and the value of auto-
nomy (see Benn [5, 6]). And Milne [84] draws on Hegelian ideal-
ism, especially its British form in Green and Collingwood, for the
normative foundations of rights. Another motif has been a straight-
forward emphasis on human dignity or worth as a grounding
principle (see, for example, several of the essays in Gotesky and
Lazlo [42], in particular the one by H. Spiegelberg).
Some of the issues that separate interest theories from non uti-
litarian theories of justification have been brought out in an in-
teresting way by Mackie [75] and by Murphy [85] . Since the most
distinctive and coherent of the nonutilitarian theories is the con-
tract theory, this theory will be the focus of my remarks in this
paper. In the sections that follow I will first discuss Rawls and
then, much more briefly, Dworkin and Nozick.

2.1 A theory ofjustice and rights

Rawls' book has been widely acclaimed, in part as a 'substantive
contribution to the search for an adequate basis for a political
philosophy of rights' (Clark and Gintis [12], pp. 302-303). Yet
it is worth noting that Rawls nowhere discusses rights as his main
topic. His book contains, for example, no section devoted to
rights,3 no entry for 'rights' or for 'human rights' or for 'moral
rights' in its justly celebtrated index (but there are three page
citations under 'natural rights'). And, though the discussion of
his views has been copious (for relevant bibliography, see 'preface'
to Rawls [98]; and also Fullinwider [36], and Wellbank [120)),
surprisingly few articles have been concerned principally with
Rawls on rights (among these few are Frankel [35], Michel-
man [83], and Nelson [88)). Even the books devoted to Rawls
(Barry [2], Daniels [13], and Wolff [121)) are notably reticent
as to his views on rights specifically. It is, perhaps, not surprising
then that incidental discussions in the literature have revealed a
considerable variety of opinion about what Rawls has had to say
on basic moral rights and their justification. One point, though,
does not seem open to dispute: Rawls holds that utilitarians
characteristically regard basic rights as 'a socially useful illusion'
([98] , p. 28) and do subject them to 'the calculus of social in-
168 R. Martin

terests' (p. 30; see also p. 207). Thus utilitarianism would allow
the sacrifice of some people's rights to liberty or opportunity if
doing so would raise the level of (total or average) well-being in
a society. One important motivation for Rawls' theory, then, is
to provide a secure grounding for rights.
In this brief survey of Rawls' theory I will try to provide a map
of its main details and some idea of how the theory bears on
basic rights and their justification. We could conveniently divide
Rawls' theory into a four-part structure. The first and topmost
part concerns the so-called primary goods. The second part con-
cerns the formulation of the principles of justice and the choice
of a particular set of such principles over alternative ones. (Rawls'
preferred set, which he calls the 'two principles of justice,' would,
he thinks, be chosen in the 'original position.') The next part con-
cerns the institutionalizing of the (two) principles of justice in
what Rawls calls the 'basic structure' of a society. The last part
then would concern the actual workings of a society so organized
and, in particular, some of the background institutions and sub-
ordinate arrangements that would crop up in such a society - or
at least in any such society under modem conditions. Interesting-
ly, Rawls refers to rights at each of these four levels.
The primary goods are goods which, presumptively, any ra-
tional person would want, whatever his plan of life or value orien-
tation might be. These goods are divided by Rawls into (a) the
social primary goods - liberty, opportunity and powers, income
and wealth, the bases of self-respect - and (b) the natural ones -
health and vigor, intelligence and imagination (see [98], pp. 62,
303). Since the desire for such goods is a rational desire of all men,
it bespeaks no partiality or prejudice toward a particular person
or culture or a given style of life to list them as things valued.
Accordingly, it is permissible to acknowledge the desire for these
things even under the severe constraints imposed on persons in
the 'original position' by the 'veil of ignorance' (which is in part
a screen against particularity and partial values). Indeed, we can
view the deliberations of persons in the original position respecting
justice as an attempt to define and select preferred principles for
allocating or arranging the social primary goods among individuals.
It is interesting to note that sometimes Rawls included rights
among these primary goods (e.g., [98], p. 62, and [100], p. 536)
 On the justification of rights 169

and sometimes he does not (e.g., [98J, p. 303). In my judgment

the listing of rights at this level is confusing and dispensable, al-
though there is an interesting question (to which we will return)
why Rawls would tend to include them.
The original position poses a complicated design problem: we
want to lay a number of constraints on the deliberations there.
The point of the constraints is to provide for a 'fair' procedure of
deciding, so that whatever is decided on, as a principle for distrib-
uting social primary goods, that principle is a just one. Rawls
argues that under conditions of extreme uncertainty, in which
there are no objective bases for judging probabilities, two prin-
ciples would be formulated and selected as the preferred prin-
ciples. These principles, rationally chosen and developed in a
'fair' deliberative procedure, are principles of justice.
The important thing, for our purposes, is that the first principle
is usually stated by Rawls as itself identifying a right. For example,
in his standard statement of the two principles, the first is said to
require that 'each person is to have an equal right to the most ex-
tensive total system of liberties compatible with a similar system
of liberty for all' ([98J , p. 302; see also pp. 60 and 250). I would
suggest, then, that the Rawlsian first principle states a basic moral
right. And whatever justification attaches to the two principles,
as justification through a choice procedure that is both fair and
rational, attaches ipso facto to this basic moral right.
The second principle, however, is not formulated by Rawls as
a right. Rather, it is characteristically rendered in somewhat differ-
ent terms: 'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least ad-
vantaged ... and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity' ([98J, p. 302;
see also pp. 60 and 83).
The two principles, as they emerge from the original position,
are exceedingly abstract. Just as the primary goods belong to
what Rawls calls a 'thin' theory of the good (see [98J, p. 396) so
the two principles constitute a 'thin' theory of justice. They re-
quire to be embodied. Justice is, or should be, a virtue of society,
specifically of its 'basic structure.' Included in that structure
would be a society's political system and its economic system.
Each of these in tum would be made up of a set of structural
170 R. Martin

elements or institutions.
The intuitive idea is that a just society conforms to the two
principles by building them into its basic structure: institutions
are set up which, when operating together, give results that tend
to satisfy the two principles over time. These institutions, then,
represent a set of middle principles standing between the two prin-
ciples and the actual operation of a society. The main political
institution for Rawls is the constitution, which lays down the
form of government; associated with it are a number of back-
ground institutions, such as procedures for campaigning, voting,
organizing government, and so on. The main economic institu-
tion he envisions is the market (a system for allocating resources,
pricing, coordinating demand, etc.); associated with it are back-
ground institutions which serve goals such as antitrust regulation,
full employment, equal opportunity, and transfer or welfare pay-
ments. The background institutions check tendencies in the main
institution which might over time take it away from its original
seated disposition; they not only keep the main institution on
track, and it them, but also they remedy its deficiencies, as regards
justice. The result is that the 'ongoing institutional processes are
... constrained and the accumulated results of individual trans-
actions continually corrected' (Rawls [102], p. 159; see Rawls
[ 102, 103] for elaboration of his theory of the basic structure).
Rawls repeatedly talks of the two principles, in particular the
first one (Equal Basic Liberties), as assigning rights and duties (see,
for example, [98], pp. 54, 58, 84, 131). But this is inexact. The
two principles assign rights and duties by means of the basic struc-
ture. Rawls thinks, for example, that the inclusion of a bill of
rights within the constitution is one important way in which the
first principle of justice could be institutionalized in a given so-
ciety. So, the constitution (or some other feature of the basic
structure) assigns determinate rights to individual persons; what
the first principle does is 'govern,' or better justify, the business
of assigning equal basic rights to individuals. (See [98], p. 61, and
the argument of Ch. 4.) Basic structure rights, at least those at-
taching to the main institution(s), are conceived by Rawls as
analogous in a variety of ways to natural rights. (See Rawls [98],
Ch. 8, n. 30, pp. 505-506.)
The last level in Rawls' theory of rights concerns the legitimate
 On the justification of rights 171

expectations of individual persons. We can assume that these ex-

pectations would include those established at the higher levels, as
secured by justice. Thus constitutionally protected political and
personal rights as laid down in the basic structure of a society
would be legitimate expectations of individuals in that society.
And, as well, other legitimate expectations would grow up in
and around the operation of the various institutions in the basic
structure (for example, the highly detailed list of rights that have
grown up around the institutions of trial by jury or of private
ownership of property or of equality of opportunity). But we
could also follow a line of devolvement away from the institutions
of the basic structure. And here we would encounter a vast variety
of subsidiary institutions and practices, of private associations and
cooperative ventures. Nonetheless, expectations would attach to
the operation of these subsidiary elements and, insofar as the in-
stitutions and practices in question were compatible with justice
or loosely derivative from it, the expectations would be legitimate
ones, as secured or enframed by justice. Thus we can speak of sub-
sidiary rights, as distinct from basic structure rights, of many
sorts: rights under this contract or that, of particular organiza-
tional structures, of family life (to a degree), and so on. In general
Rawls encompasses these rights under the heading of fairness or
fair play. (See [98], Sections 10, 14, 17, 18 - esp. p. 112 - 38,
and 48.) They are all institutional rights justified primarily by
their relationship to elements in the basic structure rather than
directly by the two principles of justice themselves. In the absence
of reasonably just institutions we would, of course, have to turn
to the two principles, but these could cover only the clear cases
(that is, practices grossly unjust, like slavery, or obviously fair,
like a nonexploitative and voluntary cooperative arrangement or
agreement). Since my concern in this paper is with basic moral
and constitutional rights and their justification I will have no more
to say about these subsidiary institutional (or practice) rights.
I have schematically represented Rawls' method of justifica-
tion as proceeding from the top down. Thus, the top level (de-
liberation in the original position about the rational and fair
distribution of social primary goods) is used to justify the basic
moral right stated in the first principle of justice; and the first
principle of justice is used in turn to justify the constitutional
172 R. Martin

rights that are built into the basic structure of a just society. But
Rawls adds an important control on this procedure by requiring
that the justifying principle be matched with certain considered
jUdgments (either in the form of maxims or of paradigm cases)
which exhibit or help exhibit the moral character of that which
is to be justified (the 'subject' of justification). For example, de-
termination of the constitutional right of persons to be free from
the injuries of 'cruel and unusual punishment' would involve not
just the two principles of justice and their grounds (the primary
goods of liberty and opportunity and of self-respect) but also
considered judgments about punishment and practices associated
with it historically (including such matters as mutilation as a form
of corporal punishment, public execution and other forms of
capital punishment, harsh treatment of those not judged guilty
or of those judged insane, the aims of punishment, relevant
maxims as to what is legally just, and so on.) Rawls calls this
matching procedure the method of reflective equilibrium.
In the application of the method a certain amount of to-ing
and fro-ing normally results, with adjustments made in the initial
formulation of the justifying principle (or in its range of exten-
sion) as well as in our considered judgments. The goal of the
method is to bring the two levels, that of justifying principle and
of the practice to be justified and the material relevant to it, into
alignment. And it is this peculiar sort of coherence between prin-
ciples and considered jUdgments that satisfies the standard of
justification in matters of justice and hence of rights. (Rawls dis-
cusses his method in [98], esp. Section 9 and also pp. 20-21, 111,
120,182,432; for his important endorsement of 'wide' reflective
quilibrium, see Rawls [99] . Useful discussions are found in several
of the essays in Nielsen and Shiner [91] ,in Daniels [13] , esp. the
essays in part two, in some of Daniel's own papers [14, 15, 16],
and finally in Grice [44] , in Nielsen [90] , and in Snare [114] .)
Rawls' account of the justification of rights is subject to most
of the criticisms that can be made, more generally, of his theory
of justice. (The books on Rawls cited at the beginning of this
section provide a reliable indicator of the nature of such criti-
cisms, esp. the essays in Daniels [13].) Some criticisms, however,
can be made specifically of his theory of rights.
 On the justification o/rights 173

Rawls' conception of rights is opaque. He does not attempt an

analysis of the concept and though he uses the term 'rights' freely
he does so without explication. The context is usually unhelpful.
Rawls' failure to deal with the analytic issues poses an obstacle to
his program as a justification of rights.
I would suggest that a right for Rawls is an individual's legiti-
mate expectation as to what he would receive in a just institu-
tional distribution of social primary goods. (See Rawls [98],
p. 313.) The justification of a right, then, would involve estab-
lishing the legitimacy of the expectation within the framework of
higher-to-lower-level justification described above.
On this reading, liberties as social primary goods could be called
rights - not in the original position but, rather, under arrange-
ments imposed by justice. One of Rawls' standard pairings of
primary goods, rights and liberties (see [98], p. 62), would con-
form to this usage, though the pairing is confusing since it mixes
those things that are primary goods in the original position with
things that could be included only prospectively. At the same
time the reading gives us a reason why Rawls was not inclined to
treat the second principle of justice as itself a basic moral right
or to regard the pattern of just distributions of wealth and social
position as a pattern of rights. It is this: though specific liberties
can be secured to any given individual (since all share in the basic
liberties equally), specific economic or social standings cannot.
In economic matters individuals float between an upper and a
lower limit (both determined by the Difference Principle, the
principle that inequalities of wealth and social position must be
arranged so that the prospects of the least advantaged group are
maximized). Thus no given individual has a legitimate expecta-
tion of receiving any particular distributive share and, hence, can-
not be said to have a right to a particular share. Even the minimum
level established by the Difference Principle does not define the
legitimate expectation of any given individual (not even those who
form the group of the least advantaged); rather the expectation is
that of a 'representative' or ideal-type individual. (See [98], esp.
Chs. 2 and 5.) Accordingly, Rawls characteristically withholds the
term 'rights' in his discussion of the second principle and its appli-
cations.
Rawls' approach here is markedly different from his handling of
174 R. Martin

the fIrst principle and its applications. This brings us to a second

line of criticism. Melden claims that Rawls has no place in his
theory for moral rights (see Melden [82], pp. 89-90, 103, and esp.
112) and that the rights mentioned in the two principles of justice
are actually political rights (see Melden [82], pp. 108-110). Now,
I would grant that the liberties mentioned or contemplated in the
fIrst principle are, by and large, political ones (as Rawls makes
clear [98] , p. 62). It does not follow from this, however, that the
fIrst principle, the Principle of Equal Basic Liberties, is not itself a
moral right. Indeed, since the fIrst principle is formulated in the
original position, as a principle for the design of the basic structure
of a just society, it is prior to any society; it cannot, then, be re-
garded as a political right but rather as a prescription for political
rights. And as a prescription it is moral, not political, in character;
or so I have argued.
There is, though, a point to Melden's criticism that I would like
to bring out. Let us say, for reasons already given, that the fIrst
principle states a basic moral right: that each person ought to have
available the most extensive system of equal basic liberties com-
patible with a similar system of liberty for all other persons. But
what are these liberties?
Now, one could reply that the fIrst principle does not actually
specify the liberties in question; it speaks merely of 'equal basic
liberties.' The specifIcation of liberties occurs at the point of the
design of the basic structure of a society (perhaps with the help of
the method of reflective eqUilibrium). But this is to suggest that
the fIrst principle has no essential content of liberties, leaving the
determination of 'equal basic liberties' to time and circumstance.
It becomes, then, merely formal; the first principle says, in effect,
once the basic liberties are determined in the constitution they
are to be equal for all citizens. But if the meaning of 'equal basic
liberties' cannot be fIxed initially, then the fIrst principle offers
inadequate guidance as to precisely what liberties are to be insti-
tutionalized. The first principle, and with it, the original position,
ceases to be the 'Archimedean point' (the phrase is Rawls', in
[98] , pp. 260-263) for the critique and design of the basic struc-
ture of society.
But one could also reply that Rawls' first principle of justice is
not a general principle of liberty; it does not establish liberty in
 On the justification o/rights 175

gross or in the abstract. Rather, it establishes a particular 'list' of

basic liberties; it identifies a specific set of liberties which are to
be acknowledged as held equally by all. (This particular answer
has been suggested in Hart [48]. The interpretation of the first
principle as specifying a list of basic liberties is made clearer,
Rawls says, in his [101] and in revisions made for the German
edition of his book.) The relevant liberties are, Rawls tells us,
rights of citizenship and of the person [98], esp. p. 61; also Sec-
tion 32): such things as the right to vote, freedom of speech and
assembly, liberty of conscience, the right to own personal proper-
ty, freedom from slavery, from arbitrary arrest and seizure, and
so on. They are standard civi1liberties (or rights). The problem I
see here is to determine how in the original position these specific
liberties would be established, in particular, such institutional
rights as the right to vote or to own property.
This problem is, I think, a serious one for Rawls' theory of
equal basic liberties as rights. If the entire range of such liberties
is meant to be included in the first principle, it is difficult to see
how each and every one of them could be formulated from the
perspective of the original position - and difficult to see how the
formulations could be specific enough to 'govern the assignment
of rights and duties,' in Rawls' phrase [98] , p. 61). But if some or
even a few basic liberties are by and large specified at a further
stage, say, the design of the basic structure, then the first principle
lacks essential content and stability.4

2.2. A Postscript

The theories developed by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick

are subject to at least one of the criticisms raised against Rawls.
For neither one provides much in the way of an analysis of the
concept of rights. Dworkin, who likes to travel 'ontologically
light,'S provides a minimal characterization of rights:

Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals.

Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective
goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what
they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a suffi-
176 R. Martin

cient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon

them ([23], p. xi).

And simply because rights are individuated aims which can 'trump'
arguments from general welfare or aggregate benefit, Dworkin
argues that rights are to be justified on non utilitarian grounds.
Nozick begins his book ([93], p. ix) with the claim that 'indi-
viduals have rights, and there are things no person or group may
do to them (without violating their rights).' Even so, there is no
clearcut account of the concept of rights in his theory. As with
Rawls, the concept remains opaque. We can say little more than
that Nozick, to a much greater extent than Rawls, tends to iden-
tify rights with liberties (and, perhaps, with opportunities). In-
terestingly, Dworkin is concerned to rebut the view that indi-
viduals have a right to liberty in general (or in the abstract). On
this point, he could be taken as critical of Nozick (see Dworkin
[23], Ch. 12).
The other criticism I made of Rawls, that the conception of
the original position makes it difficult for him to specify the full
range of liberties contemplated in his first principle of justice, is
accommodated by Dworkin and by Nozick in significantly dif-
ferent ways. Dworkin [20] argued that the 'deep theory' implicit
in Rawls' contractarian notion of the original position is the view
that each individual has a right to equal concern and respect. This
right, then, becomes the basis of Dworkin's own theory. However,
in subsequent writings (in [21] and thereafter) Dworkin moves
away from the Rawlsian contract apparatus, as a justificatory
mechanism, and adopts instead a method familiar from juris-
prudence: the 'constructive' model for developing background
principles, in which the judge or legal scholar examines the rele-
vant body of law and precedent in order to construct 'a scheme of
abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent justifica-
tion for all common law precedents and, so far as these are to be
justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as
well' ([23], pp. 116-117).
A further innovation introduced into Dworkin's theory, as it
currently stands, is his claim that the right of each individual to an
equality of concern and respect normatively grounds not only
moral and constitutional rights but also utilitarian values like wel-
 On the justification of rights 177

fare and prosperity. In this way, then, the ultimate level of justifi-
cation is nonutilitarian (but not antiutilitarian). However, the
justifying principle is not similarly neutral with respect to rights
theory, for the principle is itself represented as a right, and is
presumably the basic moral right. Hence, no account of the justi-
fication of that right is provided in Dworkin's theory. And since
Dworkin provides, in his constructive model, no level of justifica-
tion beyond that of the ultimate constructive principle this diffi-
culty is not easily remedied.
Dworkin's theory is developed in a series of articles ([ 19, 20,
21,22, and 25]). Its fullest treatment is in his book [23], which
incorporates the first three of these articles and includes as well
two chapters on rights (Chs. 12 and 13) never before published.
An important appendix [24], in which Dworkin replies to recent
critics, has been added to the book. For discussions of Dworkin's
theory see the issue of the Georgia Law Review (1977: Vol. 11,
No.5) devoted to Dworkin and, as well, others of the critics
mentioned in Dworkin [24]; see also Blackstone [77], MacCor-
mick [73], Regan [104], Richards [106] , and Martin and Nickel
[78] ,end of Section 1 and beginning of Section 2.
Egalitarian theories of rights have also been propounded by
John Mackie (emphasizing the equal 'right of persons progres-
sively to determine how they shall live,' [75], pp. 355-356), by
Alan Goldman [41], in which the idea of a 'fundamental right of
equal consideration of interests' is developed in a contractarian
framework, and by Alan Gewirth [37,38,39]. An issue of Ethics
(1976: Vol. 86, No.4) was devoted in part to a discussion ofGe-
wirth's views; see also Gewirth [39] ,pp. 367-368.
Robert Nozick (in his book [93]) appears to repudiate the no-
tion of a social contract altogether; nonetheless, many of his ana-
lytic devices have resonance with ideas of a state of nature and of
the trade offs people would engage in if they relied on a huge net-
work of bilateral contracts between individuals to regulate their
conduct, ideas which derive from Hobbes and especially Locke
and belong thereby to the earlier history of the contract tradition.
What Nozick does, in effect, then, is move the center of gravity
of contract theory back to an earlier stage, that of a Lockeian
178 R. Martin

state of nature. Nozick simply assumes rights at this stage and then
argues that the kinds of rights men have at this point are the only
basic moral rights they are going to have: no new rights can be
generated, for example, by a social contract whereby individual
natural rights are transferred to a social organ or grouping. What
we justify in a theory of rights, then, is not new levels or kinds of
rights but, rather, particular patterns and rearrangements that ac-
cord with rights men already have.
Even though Nozick avoids problems in the Rawlsian notion of
an original position by setting up his theory in this way, one could
still conveniently view Nozick's principles as susceptible of being
generated (and hence justified) in a deliberative procedure very
like that of Rawls' original position.6 Here the participants in the
original position would unanimously opt for a public principle
that says each does what he wants and is able to, on his own or
with others if he prefers, that each person can exploit opportuni-
ties and talents to the best of his abilities, providing that the liber-
ties of individuals are not violated in the process. Voluntary con-
duct that does not violate the like liberties of others is an allowed
liberty in this system; one is entitled to follow such lines of con-
duct. Rights then flow out to cover the entire system of allowed
liberties - or entitlements, as Nozick prefers to call them (see
[93], esp. pp. 225n, 238; see Martin and Nickel [78], Section 1,
for discussion of the analysis of rights as entitlements).
In this system, it is explicitly allowed, as one of the entitle-
ments people have, that individuals can own property, subject
only to the proviso that this appropriation or acquisition of a
previously unowned thing does not thereby worsen the position
of others who are no longer at liberty to use that thing (see Nozick
[93], p. 178). Individuals can develop their holdings as they see
fit and are able to. They have full control of what is to be done
with their property. Sometimes the actions or the holdings of in-
dividuals will impinge adversely on others, restricting the latter's
opportunities, holdings, etc. When this happens contracts for
compensation should be struck. Individuals can cooperate to
prevent predatory invasions (through force, fraud, theft, etc.) of
their holdings or to secure fulft11ment of fair contracts for com-
pensation. Individuals can transfer their holdings as they see fit.
The resulting economic inequalities are just.
 On the justification of rights 179

This is a society that lets people do what they can with liberty
and opportunity, wealth and position. No end points or patterns
of distribution are mandated. The main point of Nozick's theory
is to suggest the moral stringency of allowed liberties (see Thom-
son [117]) and to argue that the actual patterns which result from
the exercise of allowed liberties, whatever those patterns are and
subject to the constraint imposed by the entitlements of others,
are just. Needless to say, the theory has room for a number of
basic moral rights - irreducible natural rights - but almost none
for constitutional rights as such.
Much of the criticism of his theory concerns whether Nozick
has established that there is a basic moral right to acquire proper-
ty holdings and to transfer them in the ways he has described (see
Nozick [93], Ch. 7). For criticism and discussion of this issue see
Becker [3], Gibbard [40], Held [51], Lyons [6S], Mackie [74]
(pp. 172-lS0), and O'Neill [94] .
The main lines of Nozick's theory of rights are presented in
his [92], and especially [93]. For more general criticism of the
theory, see Arrow [1], Danielson [17], Danley [18], Holmes
[54] , Ryan [107], Scanlon [IDS] , and Scheffler [111] . It should
be noted as well that issues of several journals have been devoted
to a discussion of Nozick's views; see here Arizona Law Review
(1977: Vol. 19, No.1), Ethics (1977: Vol. 87, No.2), Political
Theory (1977: Vol. 5, No.2), and Western Political Quarterly
(1976: Vol. 29, No.2).
It would appear that none of the various accounts we have ex-
amined in this paper fully succeeds. Perhaps the significant thing
is that the most imposing of these theories of the justification of
rights, Lyons' reworking of traditional utilitarianism and Rawls'
of contract theory, are themselves reconstructions. This suggests
that much work needs to be done to render traditional ethical
theories fit for the job of justifying rights, or to take basic moral
and constitutional rights and develop an adequate and distinctive
justification for them. We can expect that the next decade in
philosophy will be occupied with this task as well as with the
parallel one of providing a suitable analysis of the concept of
rights. 7
180 R. Martin

NOTES

1. The importance of a distributional principle for a theory of rights is an

idea lowe to some remarks by Margaret Holmgren.
2. It should be noted that I have interpreted Lyons, not as endorsing the
positions he has discussed, but as attempting to present them sympathe-
tically, in an effort to explore the limits of utilitarianism. Such an inter-
pretation is, of course, congenial to the program of the present section;
it happens as well to be the interpretation Lyons himself prefers. I
should add that the account I have given of Lyons' explorations must be
regarded as an interim one and will require revision in the light of some
of his subsequent work (e.g., see Lyons [61]).
3. I am indebted for this observation to Joel Feinberg, in conversation.
4. My views on Rawls have been sharpened by discussions with friends and
colleagues, in particular, Joseph Pichler, Prakash Shenoy, Janet Sisson.
5. The happy phrase is Nielsen's [90] .
6. This particular idea was suggested to me by some remarks of Joseph
Pichler's. A similar suggestion is found in Pazner [95] .
7. I appreciate the suggestions provided by some of the principals men-
tioned in this paper. I am especially indebted, for recent comments, crit-
icism, and general conversation about rights, to Gerry MacCallum, Jim
Nickel, and Carl Wellman.
I was also greatly aided, in bibliographical matters, by two research
assistants, Nancy Kaul and Karen Bell. Their contribution and that of
a research grant (3566-20.0038), both provided by funds from the Uni-
versity of Kansas, are gratefully acknowledged.
In the writing of this paper I drew, sometimes verbatim, on Martin
and Nickel [78] and on Section 3 of my paper, 'Rawlsian Economic
Justice and the Proper Bounds of Government Regulation.' In N. Bowie
(Ed.), Ethical Issues in Government, pp. 114-132. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1981.

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Kant's practical philosophy
VIGGO ROSSVflER
University of Tromsq,

The third post-war decade of Kant-scholarship follows a period of

intense research in Kant's practical philosophy. The main works
of Mary Gregor, Josef Schmucker, Lewis White Beck and Dieter
Henrich, all of whom break new ground in the study of Kant's
moral philosophy, were completed already before 1965.
Together with Paton, the dean of modern Kant-scholarship,
whose commentary on the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
(Grundlegung) was published in 1947, and Tonelli, whose main
contribution to the study of Kant's pre-critical philosophy was
published before 1955, these authors cover the central topics of
Kant's ethics. Gregor's study is a commentary on the Metaphysik
der Sitten (M.d.S.), and White Beck's central work is a commen-
tary on the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (K.d.p.V.). Schmuk-
ker's contribution is a detailed analysis of Kant's pre-critical
ethics, whereas Henrich in the course of several articles discusses
most of the fundamental concepts in Kant's moral philosophy.
To fmd a similar renewal in the study of Kant's moral philo-
sophy, one must go back, via names like Klaus Reich, Ebbinghaus
and Bohatec, to the period around the turn of the century, re-
presented by the works of Cohen, Hegeler and Hagerstrom.
One effect of the post-war renewal was to bring into focus the
immense complexity of Kant's writings in moral philosophy. It
was shown that the period from about 1765 to about 1800 was
marked by a continuous effort to come to an understanding of
the fundamental ethical concepts; at the same time it became
clear that they do not belong to one and the same ethical doc-
trine. This also made it clear that the extensive material of (pre-
viously published and unpUblished) notes and reflections from

Contemporary philoiophy. A new mrvey. Vol. 3, pp. 187-217.

©1982, Martinui Niihoff Publiiheri, The Hague/Boiton/London.
188 V. Rossvc£r

Kant's hand was highly relevant for an adequate grasp of the devel-
opment of his moral philosophy.
Another effect of this renewal was to direct the interest in
Kant's philosophy into new channels. It was now thought worth-
while to interpret the concepts of Kant's mature moral philosophy
on the basis of his earlier attempts at finding definitions and
justifications for them, and to connect Kant's practical philosophy
with his theoretical philosophy in its different stages before and
after the Kritik der rein en Vernunft (K.d.r.V.).
We are now entering a period where the question of the unity
of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy has become im-
portant again, and where it is Kant's theoretical philosophy that
is being interpreted in the light of his practical philosophy. This
renewal brings the modern Kant-scholarship into contact with
the hermeneutic presuppositions of Fichte and Hegel, the last
grand masters of Kant's philosophy.
In this article I shall comment upon some developments in the
more recent history of the understanding of Kant's practical
philosophy, the period 1966-76. I shall restrict my comments to
seventeen works that have one thing in common: they all tackle
some of the most deeply problematic aspects of Kant's practical
philosophy.
Because of this criterion of selection, which can be handled in
a subjective way only, a number of articles and books of high
quality will not be commented upon.
My comments on the commentators are divided into four
parts, with each part concentrating on a basic concept: 1. the
categorical imperative, 2. the moral will, 3. the highest good and
4. practical reason. But of course, in each of these parts there
will be reference to the other three.
As a guide to the non-specialist, I try, at many places, to sharp-
en the picture of an author's line of thought by noting its presup-
positions or by indicating alternative lines of thought.

1. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATNE

The realization that Grundlegung does not in every way represent

Kant's mature critical philosophy has not made the commenta-
 Kant's practical philosophy 189

tors tum to other and more representative works in order to for-

mulate the main points of Kant's doctrine about the categorical
imperative.
One reason for this is that the second chapter of Grundlegung
contains the most detailed analysis of the categorical imperative
ever given by Kant. This analysis introduces several new formula-
tions of the categorical imperative, but the nature of the analysis
is by no means clear. Students of Kant have always asked if the
so-called derived formulas of the categorical imperative are meant
to be transcendental reformulations of the original one, or only
anthropological illustrations. Are they meant to be synthetic a
priori judgements even if they are not pure a priori judgements
like the universal formula of the categorical imperative, or are
they less precise anthropological formulations.
Even if questions like these are important for any interpreta-
tion of the categorical imperative both as a principle of evaluation
(our knowledge of the good) and as a principle of execution (our
power to do the good), still the question of the status of the
derived formulas has not been given a satisfactory solution. It
represents the greatest challenge for the modem Kant-scholar.
According to T.e. Williams [1], the reason this problem has
not been solved is that Kant actually is doing two things at the
same time. One the one hand he gives an analysis of the concept
of an absolute obligation, on the other hand he tries to formulate
advise for moral conduct.
On the one hand we have the 'analytic' strain, in which, ac-
cording to Williams, Kant formulates the basic presuppositions
on which morality must rest, on the other hand we have the
'ethical' strain, where Kant formulates moral principles that are
practically useful as guides to moral conduct.
The basis for both strains is the so-called universal formula of
the categorical imperative: 'Act only on that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.' which is a formal principle or a principle stating
the formal lawfulness of the categorical imperative. The univer-
sal formula together with the three derived formulas represent
the 'ethical' strain (p. 36). The three derived formulas are: (1)
'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through
your will a universal law of nature' (the formula of natural law),
190 V. Rossv{Er

(2) 'So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in
the person of every other, always at the same time as an end,
never simply as a means' (the formula of man as end in himself),
and (3) 'So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-
making member in a universal kingdom of ends' (the formula of
the kingdom of ends).
The corresponding analytic strain consists of the three follow-
ing formulas: (1) Rational will must be subject to universal law,
(2) Rational will must exist as an end in itself, and (3) Rational
will must not merely be subject to universal law but must also be
the source of this law. The formulas belonging to the 'analytic'
strain lead up to Kant's formulation of the supreme principle of
morality: 'So act that your will can regard itself at the same time
as making universal law through its maxim', which is usually re-
ferred to as the formula of autonomy. This supreme moral prin-
ciple expresses the experience of being morally obligated, which
is not theoretical, but can only be grasped within moral activity.
The consciousness of the moral law arises, according to Wil-
liams, not from a direct apprehension of the purely formal prin-
ciple of the categorical imperative itself, but through the cate-
gorical commands of this law in the context of the ends and pur-
poses of human agents as they conduct their lives. This does not
mean, however, that we can dispense with the need for moral
guidance. What is expressed in the formula of autonomy, the
spontaneous activity of pure practical reason, does not in itself
enable the moral agent in every situation he finds himself to know
immediately how he ought to act. It does, however, render super-
fluous the traditional interpretation of the categorical imperative
as a precise logical criterion for the correctness of our moral ac-
tions. Indeed, the purely formal categorical imperative as ex-
pressed in the universal formula is logically incapable of being
used as a test of the moral value of particular acts in concreto
(p. 135). This makes us see the point of the derived formulations
of the categorical imperative in Williams' interpretation. They are
practically useful in that they call the agent to view his maxims
in relation to objective ends, i.e. ends that are universally valid,
and teach him not to attend to his own selfish interests. Still, by
seeking in particular situations to base one's actions on the point
of view of how a purely rational being would act, one presupposes
 Kant's practical philosophy 191

the validity of the universal formula. Therefore, the purely formal

principle of the categorical imperative, in contradistinction to the
subsidiary principles, is practically useful in that it states the es-
sential nature of moral acting. That is, it enables the moral agent
to adopt an attitude of will which is conductive to moral living.
It makes it possible for him to use the derived principles, e.g. the
formula of natural law, as an aid to moral living (p. 128).
Williams' view on the matter is in many ways satisfying. But in
commenting upon the difference between the 'analytic' and the
'ethical' strain, he comes to disputable conclusions. Admitting
that the formula of autonomy can be expressed as an imperative,
and therefore as belonging to the 'ethical' strain, he states that
considered within this context alone, it adds nothing to the uni-
versal formula, and is irrelevant to Kant's theory (p. 30). The
significance of the difference between the two formulas becomes
apparent only when they are viewed as belonging to the 'analytic'
strain of the argument.
In order better to grasp the point of Williams' interpretations
we shall contrast it with another view, which sees a fundamental
difference between the universal formula of the categorical im-
perative and the formula of autonomy even within the 'ethical'
strain. According to this point of view, the universal formula can
only be a means of evaluating already given maxims, by asking
whether they conform to the principle of a purely formal law-
fulness. On the other hand, the formula of autonomy represents
a more articulate principle of evaluation - it is also a means of
creating moral maxims. This means that the maxims based on
selfish interests (sensuous or given maxims) are turned into a new
type of moral maxims - by taking the happiness of other persons
into account.
If we accept this difference between the universal formula and
the formula of autonomy regarded as principles of evaluation,
several consequences follow for the relation between the 'analytic'
and the 'ethical' strain.
First of all, the connection between the 'analytic' and the
'ethical' strain must be more intimate than Williams is prepared
to accept. The ethical meaning of the formula of autonomy
extends, but depends on the meaning of the universal formula,
and this extension can only be explained by reference to the
192 V. Rossv(£r

intermediate formulas of natural law and man as an end in himself.

Therefore, there seems to be an ethical strain contained in
Kant's argument different from the 'ethical' strain Williams is
trying to establish. This different ethical strain represents an
analysis which shows how the abstract universal formula is forced
to reveal its material content.
Williams realizes that the consciousness of an autonomous rea-
son does not arise in vacuo, but only in the context of ends and
purposes, which present themselves before us. He does not stress,
however, the corresponding insight that our autonomous reason,
in order to explain its own origin as the principle of a sensuous
causality, must itself refer to ends, i.e. to man as end in himself
and the kingdom of ends. These ends, as conditions of the realiza-
tion of autonomy in the world of the senses are, therefore, at the
same time the concrete measuring rods which we must refer to in
order to explain the full ethical meaning of the categorical im-
perative itself.
This interpretation may prepare for a better grasp of Williams'
own understanding of the derived formulas of the categorical
imperative as subsidiary principles. According to Williams, the
formula of natural law assumes in K.d.r.V. prominence as the
criterion which men use for judging the moral value of their ac-
tions. The test thus proposed by Kant is that of an appeal to an
objective end, an end that is valid for all rational beings, i.e. a
'system of nature'. This is no purely formal test, but one in
which the agent seeks to reach a conscientious decision as to
whether a system of nature would be possible if everyone acted
on a certain maxim. If we could make clear what is meant by
'system of nature' it would be possible to decide whether or not
a particular act would be consistent with this end. In Williams'
opinion, what is demanded for moral living is that an agent make
an imaginative projection of the possible effects of his proposed
actions in the context of a system where other rational agents,
each with his own personal ends and purposes co-exist with him.
In this view, an agent is able to will an action, only when there
is no contradiction in the will, that is, when there is no contra-
diction between doing the act and 'seeing' that the act ought not
to be done.
The test involves an imaginative projection by the agent in
 Kant's practical philosophy 193

which, while discounting as far as possible his own personal in-

clinations and desires, he seeks to reach a conclusion, or 'seeing'
as to whether his proposed action would be consistent with the
objective end and with other agents' making it their principle to
act in the way which he is considering (p. 123).
Williams admits that his conception of the ethical strain goes
against the traditional interpretation at the cost of introducing
a subjectivistic element. Thus, for instance, we might assume a
situation in which two men act on the maxim 'I will tell a lie to
avoid personal embarrassment but only if it will cause no harm or
hurt to myself or to others'. It is possible that one may tell a lie
to a common friend under these circumstances, fully believing
that his act could become a universal law of nature, while the
other, possessing as he does, a deeper understanding of his friend's
nature and susceptibilities, might decide that it is morally wrong
to do this (p. 124).
But Williams wants to insist that Kant's ethical doctrine con-
tains a subjectivistic element, even if this may appear to run coun-
ter to Kant's insistence on the objectivity of moral value. In his
opinion this appearance is dependent upon a superficial view of
objectivity as the apprehending of moral value existing indepen-
dent of human agents.
This last claim, however, is not obvious. The view we sketched
earlier, the alternative version of the ethical strain of Kant's ar-
gument represents a non~ubjectivistic interpretation of his moral
doctrine, without referring to moral value independent of human
conduct. In accordance with Kant's statement that the derived
formulas are based on analogy, this alternative view stresses that
the full meaning of the formal moral law must itself be recon-
structed by reference to the form of finite moral conduct.
Also Wolfgang Bartuschat [2] takes the problem of the derived
formulas of the categorical imperative up to new consideration.
He regards them as attempts to reformulate the moral law (which
in the universal formula is formulated from the standpoint of
pure reason) from the standpoint of the sensuous agent.
According to Bartuschat, the demand for such reformulations
of the purely formal lawfulness of the categorical imperative is
created by the dialectic of exceptions which is discussed at the
end of the first chapter of Grundlegung, and which functions as
194 V. Rossv(£r

an introduction to the second chapter.

We have a strong tendency to doubt or deny the universal valid-
ity of the categorical imperative, not in general, but in the par-
ticular case. In this way we try to bring the moral law more in
accord with our wishes and desires. The basis for this tendency is
not totally wrong, however. We have a legitimate need for sen-
suous happiness. But if we give in to this natural dialectic of
making exceptions to the moral law, we may corrupt the very
consciousness of the universality of the law.
According to Bartuschat, the point of the derived formulations
of the categorical imperative is to eliminate the natural dialectic
which threatens our moral consciousness with corruption. Refor-
mulations of the moral imperative within the limits of the sen-
suous faculty of desire, may make the strong universality of the
moral law clear to finite human beings in such a way that the
tendency to make exceptions is conquered.
But no formulation of the categorical imperative from the
standpoint of the sensuous agent can dig up the roots of the dia-
lectic of exceptions. It is impossible to reformulate the intention
of an unconditional moral obligation within the limits of a purely
sensuous faculty of desire. Bartuschat shows that if this is Kant's
point about the derived formulas, his project is unsuccessful, at
least in the second chapter of Grundlegung. This lack of success
may, however, as Bartuschat himself suggests, be the key to the
problem of justifying the categorical imperative, treated in the
third chapter of Grundlegung and in the Dialectic in K.d.p.V.
According to Bartuschat, Kant bases his formulations of the
derived formulas on the need to convince the sensuous will of
the validity of the moral synthesis. This is to attribute to Kant
a very strong kind of argument, especially since Kant according
to his own statements, in the first and second chapter of Grund-
legung, argues according to the analytic method, i.e. by presup-
posing the validity of the categorical imperative for the sensuous
reason. One thing is to convince our sensuous will of the validity
of the moral synthesis; quite another thing is to convince our pure
reason of its sensuous presuppositions. Our pure reason which
recognises the categorical imperative can only be convinced of
the validity of this idea, by seeing it maintained as unconditioned
by virtue of the form of our sensuous way of acting. The latter,
 Kant's practical philosophy 195

more humble task is most important, and may come closest to

Kant's actual way of thinking in the second chapter of Grund-
legung.
John R. Silber [3] points out that the derived formulas of the
categorical imperative are misunderstood if we look upon them as
rules for the application of the moral law. There can, according to
him, be no rule for the application of the moral law, instead the
law must guarantee its own application. Indeed, the moral law
must be understood as a principle which itself specifies the proce-
dure of judgement in an act of moral schematism. To see the point
about the derived formulas, therefore, one must focus upon the
faculty of judgement, which stands as a creative link between any
theory and its application.
Silber's interpretation explains Kant's statement that there is
only one categorical imperative. Moreover, it leads him into a
new position as regard the traditional puzzle: How many formula-
tions of the categorical imperative are there in the second chapter
of Grundlegung? According to Silber this question is misleading
since the number of formulations is actually indeterminate. In
the act of judgement by means of which the goal of the moral
person is determined as the material object of volition by refer-
ence to the moral law, one is moving from the abstract to the
concrete, not from the concrete to the abstract, which is how the
mind works in the theory of knowledge. Therefore the number of
formulations is as unlimited as sensibility is diverse (p. 206).
Silber also seems to escape the subjectivism which is a product
of distinguishing between an analytic and an ethical strain of
Kant's argument. The formula of natural law, the formula of man
as end in himself, and the formula of the kingdom of ends speci-
fies the procedure for making intuitive the demand of the moral
law in term of maxims of moral judgement.
According to Silber, Kant does not have the problem of relating
the categorical imperative to the moral context: it emerges from
it. Kant's problem is rather to make clear what the demand actual-
ly involves. Therefore, the universal formula of the categorical
imperative presupposes the moral context. If we do not presup-
pose the categorical imperative as a principle of the human will,
the universal formula would not express any obligation at all.
That is, it would not express the form of moral judgement for a
196 V. Rossva:r

being which is tempted to reject all rational determining grounds

in action.
Here, Silbert carefully formulates a presupposition which his
own interpretation does nothing much to explain. A possible
solution is reflected, however, in his own figures of speech. The
argument in Grundlegung moves according to Silber, from the
abstract to the concrete. To move from the abstract to the con-
crete may be understood as arguing regressively from the presup-
posed existence of a moral causality in man's sensuous nature to
the a priori principles of this causality. The derived formulas, ac-
cordingly, are not established by a formal deduction from the
universal formula, regarded as a premiss which does not already
presuppose the validity of the moral law; instead this very presup-
position is being reconstructed by means of the different derived
formulas. Silber's procedural interpretation of the derived formu-
las overlooks that the status of the universal formula is itself
exhibited by the reconstructive derivation of the derived formulas.
These formulas not only express the moments of a unitary proce-
dure of judgement, but reconstruct the full meaning of the moral
law itself.
If we accept this alternative explanation of the derived formulas
I think we can see more clearly how in the formula of natural law,
the moral law guarantees its own application by referring to the
faculty of judgement. But only the first formula can do this.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Silber finds it difficult to ex-
plain the formula of man as ends in himself on the basis of his
own interpretation. Rather than write about treating mankind as
an end in itself Kant should have written about putting oneself in
thought in the place and the point of view of others. In this way
the agent will understand the values and needs of other beings and
by moving out beyond himself, will limit his tendency to concen-
trate upon the fulfillment of his own needs to the neglect of the
needs and legitimate desires of other persons (pp. 215-216). But
Silber finds that Kant has not made the procedural content of
the formula of man as an end in himself very clear.
Bernard E. Rollin [41 approaches the problem of the status of
the derived formulas by stressing that according to Kant there
is only one categorical imperative. This means that we must find
one concept which is capable of explaining both the nature of
 Kant's practical philosophy 197

the categorical imperative and the way this unitary nature can be
expressed in different ways in the derived formulas.
This concept is the concept of rationality, defined as necessity
and universality. Not only does it play an imprortant role in the
theoretical philosophy, it is the central one also when it comes
to accounting for the status of lawfulness in the practical philo-
sophy.
For a rational being the only consideration that can serve as a
rule of moral action is the question of its rationality, and to de-
cide if a given action is rational is simply to ask if it is in accor-
dance with the basic feature of all rationality, namely universalisa-
bility.
One effect of Rollin's interpretation is to direct our attention
to the universal formula of the categorical imperative, as stating
the principle of the argument from which the derived formulas
are produced. The requirement that a rational being submit an
action to the criterion of universalisability is precisely the univer-
sal formula of the categorical imperative (p. 64).
According to Rollin there is no need to interpret any of the
derived formulas by reference to Kant's theory of teleological
laws. The formula of natural law, for instance, can be derived
directly by means of the parallel between the activity of the
rational being qua rational being in the practical and the scien-
tific sphere, and therefore by means of an analogy between the
concept of law in the practical and the concept of law in the
theoretical philosophy, the remaining formulations being depen-
dent upon this argument. Kant does not have to introduce new in-
sights in order to explain the deduction, his only concern is to
explain what is already contained in the universal formula.
Here one must comment upon Rollin's concept of deduction.
He states that in order to deduce the formula of man as end in
himself we may combine the hypothetical argument from the
nature of rationality with the empirical fact of the rationality of
human beings. By a simple modus ponens argument the fact that
human beings are bound by the moral law is then justified (p.
67). The nature of Kant's argument, in the second chapter of
Grundlegung is not, however, fully clarified by this. Rollin's
logical deduction only confirms the identity of the derived formu-
las with the universal formula by virtue of the rule of reflection
198 V. RossvaJr

which is the basis of the analogy. This leaves the transcendental

character of the argument unexplained.
A recent attempt to break new ground in the interpretation of
the categorical imperatives comes from M. Shalgi [5]. He starts
his discussion by criticising three tenets in the current interpreta-
tion: (a) that the several formulations given of the categorical im-
perative by Kant are not of equal bearing, especially the universal
formula which conveys a meaning different from that of the
others; (b) that the final factor in distinguishing the moral from
the immoral is an intuitive-subjective one; and (c) that immorality
reveals itself in a clash between the end which is the objective of
the maxim and a certain end ofreason (p. 181).
According to Shalgi, the problem for any interpretation which
tries to reject the traditional formalistic interpretation of the cat-
egorical imperative is that it must justify a material view of the
moral foundation by looking for ends as objectives of moral ac-
tions to implement the material element.
The result usually is that a distinction is made among the
several formulas of the categorical imperative, assigning to those
which do not refer to some end, the role of determining morality
(the moral motive), and those which do refer to some end that of
determining legality, i.e. that which should not be done even if
done with a proper motive. Even if Shalgi's analysis is primarily
meant as a criticism of T.e. Williams' interpretation, it is also
directed at Paton.
According to Shalgi, a distinction between the derived formulas
based on the distinction between proper motive and legality does
not reflect Kant's own statement of the differences between the
formulations of the categorical imperative. The point Kant makes
is that while the universal formula is the expression of a formal,
abstract idea, the other refer to intuition and present us with
analogies. They present us with those aspects of the moral law
which show themselves when the abstract principle gains reality
(p. 184). Even if there are differences between the various derived
formulas, this only concerns their clarity and preference, not their
meaning. As analogies they are in essence the self-same abstract
principle of morality. As criteria, they contain nothing more nor
less than the one principle, differing only in method.
The problem of distinguishing moral from immoral actions,
 Kant's practical philosophy 199

therefore, cannot be solved by referring to ends established by

means of teleological laws. Kant does not use teleological lan-
guage. What Kant says is that it is not enough that the maxim can
be universalized, be made a law of nature, or become part of the
system of a kingdom of ends, in order to be judged moral. We
must also be able to will it to become so. The possibility of this
volition is the touchstone for passing judgements on our maxims.
The categorical imperative is usually referred to a formal test of
morality. Therefore it is astonishing that Kant included in it an
element of volition (pp. 184-186).
This volitional element is different from the phenomenal will,
which is directed to some end which is to be produced, either
prescribed by reason or by inclination. In contrast to the phenom-
enal will, the object of this volition is to sanction the universal-
ized maxim as a law. It is directed towards the determination of
the moral law, not towards moral action. In the end, however,
this correct insight leads Shalgi in an unexpected direction. Ac-
cording to Shalgi, the final factor for such a moral will is the
nature of the rational, intelligible, being. The relevant question
in a situation calling for a moral decision is whether, as a rational
self, one can will one's maxim transformed into a law governing
this self, or, if one can will it qua homo noumenon.lfthis is impos-
sible, because it is contrary to the essence of such a self, say,
involving self-deceit, or taking a promise differently by different
selves in a noumenal world which does not admit of individuality,
the action cannot be regarded as morally possible (p. 189).
Shalgi interprets the reference to an end in the formula of man
as end in himself, as a reference to the intelligible being, but in
this formula only negatively. The positive concept of noumenal
man is not a substitute for any end under the categorical impera-
tive, neither man as end in himself, the kingdom of ends, a system
of nature, nor freedom. For us as phenomenal men, it is the pro-
jected idea of ourselves as rational; being rational we are noumenal.
Shalgi maintains that Kant could not make man qua homo
noumenon the direct criterion for morality, since morality is not
imposed on us by reason of the value of the homo noumenon, but
by reason of morality's universal and absolute character. But it
can only be tested by reference to an absolute value which emerges
from the principle of rational willing of universal laws.
This must mean that the impossibility to will immoral rules
200 V. RossvCEr

because they are incompatible with what we take homo noume-

non to be , cannot be expressed by means of the categorical im-
perative as a principle. This is not only a surprising conclusion, it
also seems to elevate the moral evaluation to a level above human
autonomy.
Kant's justification of unconditional moral willing is the con-
cept of autonomy, which refers to a positive causality of purely
rational nature. But this causality does not have any reality
apart from being a sensuous causality in a sensuous faculty of
action. That is, the intention of the moral will is maintained in
the activity of restricting our selfish interests and extending them
with a view to the happiness of other persons regarded as ends in
themselves. This seems to be one of Kant's main points, since he
formulates the principle of autonomy on the basis of the formula
of man as end in himself. Even if the moral will is directed towards
the determination of the moral law, this does not establish it as
an agency above the universal lawfulness. According to the con-
cept of autonomy, the law, which is being determined by the
moral will, is itself the principle of this determinative activity.

2. THE MORAL WILL

In his commentary to Grundlegung, Peter Paul Wolff [6] , sums up

what is right in this work by first of all mentioning Kant's analy-
sis of the nature of rational agency (Wolffs treatment of the con-
cept of autonomy is discussed pp. 25 ff.). According to Wolff this
is one of the most troublesome concepts in Kant's practical philo-
sophy. Difficulties arise because one tends to imagine the will as
an elusive faculty of the mind. Since to give up this concept is
to give up the notions of responsibility and action, Wolff is faced
with a dilemma: either to find a new interpretation or make
Kant's analysis befogged by a most unwelcome presupposition of
moral agency.
His solution is that 'will' is not a name of a mental faculty, it
is not a name of anything at all. It is rather a term whose appro-
priate use is as a component of such phrases as 'to have a will'.
Kant's claim that to have a will is to be capable of being moved by
reason rather than by natural causes, must be understood in this
 Kant's practical philosophy 201

context. Freedom, therefore, is not a property of the will, one

which it might conceivably lack or lose upon occasion. The will
is simply a kind of causality, but rational causality, causality
through reason, rather than non-rational or de facto causality
(p.216).
Wolffs solution does not, however, prevent other troublesome
problems concerning the notion of being moved by reason from
arising. Kant's doctrine that our will is good if I can will that the
maxim of my action should become a universal law, is often inter-
preted to mean that the goodness of our will depends upon our
being able to will the maxim of our actions as a universal law.
But the maxim which one person is able to will as a universal
law, another person may not be able to so will, or he may be able
to will its opposite. On the other hand, we may interpret the
use of the word 'will' in another way: My will is good if the
maxim of the action can hold good as a universal law .
R.K. Gupta [7] argues that only the last-mentioned alternative
makes Kant intend an autonomous and objectivistic ethics. Never-
theless, he insists that on the basis of Grundlegung also the first,
non-autonomous and non-objectivistic interpretation can be de-
fended (p. 153). This means that two widely different versions of
what it is to be moved by reason can be justified on the basis of
Grundlegung. But to be moved by reason in the subjectivistic
sense is still, from the objectivistic point of view, to be the victim
of a causality that does not belong to the pure reason.
Gupta's careful confrontation between a subjectivistic and an
objectivistic interpretation of rational willing makes it clear why
we are well advised to distinguish between anthropological, ra-
tional and fo rma lis tic interpretations of Kant's practical philo-
sophy.
An objectivistic interpretation is mainly rational and formalis-
tic. Gupta shows that the price one has to pay for defending
Kant's moral philosophy as an objectivistic, autonomous doctrine,
is that one cannot at the same time say what the good is. The cat-
egorical imperative only states that something is morally good be-
cause it is morally good, not that it is morally good because it is
something else. Therefore, even if the objectivistic interpretation
can most easily be defended on textual grounds, it cannot give a
non-circular explanation of moral goodness.
202 V. RossvfEr

The subjectivistic interpretation is mainly anthropological but

also formalistic. The anthropological interpretation of Kant's
moral philosophy wishes to explain the morally good in terms of
human nature. The formalistic interpretation tries, when it repre-
sents a subjectivistic standpoint, to explain the good will in terms
of logical consistency. These distinctions throw some light on our
previous discussion of the derived formulas of the categorical im-
perative. Both Bartuschat and Williams are trying to explain what
the morally good is and both try to do so in anthropological
terms, most likely in order to avoid cirCUlarity. Even Shalgi's
rational and non-formalistic interpretation may be seen as such an
attempt, this time by reference to man's noumenal nature. Silber,
on the other hand, seems to stress the circular nature of Kant's
moral enterprise.
Jeffrie G. Murphy [8] deems it necessary to save Kant's charac-
terisation of morality from circularity. According to him Kant
cannot make the value of the rational being depend upon that
being's possession of a good will. If we assume, as it is common
to do, that the value of the rational being as an end depends upon
the possession by that being of a good will, there is a circularity
involved since good will and rational nature are identical.
However, Kant seems able to avoid this circularity, since he
seems to admit that even though the good will is the only thing
morally good in itself, it may not be the only thing which is an
end in itself of absolute worth. According to Murphy, the formula
of man as end in himself permits an interpretation which makes
the rational being an end in itself with absolute moral worth,
without being morally good in itself at all (p. 80).
Seeing the formula of man as end in himself in this way as the
introduction of a new value seems to be confirmed by what Kant
says elsewhere. He does not say that the value of the rational
being depends upon its possession of a good will, on the contrary,
he states that the value of the rational being derives from its
freedom. According to Murphy, then, the value of the rational
being derives from its freedom, that which renders it capable of
being moral. The value that this gives to a rational being is dignity.
But the avoidance of circularity is only apparent. The meaning
of freedom cannot be explained without reference to moral no-
tions. Murphy states that there seems to be only one way to patch
 Kant's practical philosophy 203

up Kant's doctrine so that the characterisation of morality will not

be circular. Kant has strictly speaking two technical meanings of
'free will'. He distinguishes between free Willkur (arbitrium),
which is the freedom of choice or the spontaneous self-activity of
persons, and free Wille, which is autonomy or acting on the basis
of a universallaw of reason.
Only if the characterisation of morality of a rational being de-
pends upon his possessing of a free Wille is Kant's account cir-
cular. However, Murphy makes a case that it is free Willkur and
not free Wille which confers dignity upon man, to save Kant's
characterisation of morality from circularity. According to Mur-
phy, man's dignity will not then derive from his capacity to be
moral, but from his self-legislative capacity to choose any course
of action (be it moral, immoral, or non-moral) rather than having
it forced upon him by sensuous inclinations (p. 83).
Murphy is not the only one who attempts to analyse Kant's
concept of morality in this anthropological fashion. If Murphy
lays heavy stress on the concept of free Willkur, Hardy E. Jones
goes even further.
Hardy E. Jones [9], suggests that in spite of Kant's use of the
word 'Wille' in the fITst sentence of the first chapter of Grundle-
gung, it is really Willkur he speaks about. The only way to defend
Kant's statement that the only thing that can be said to have an
unconditional value is the good will is to interpret this as a state-
ment about the good Willkur.
According to Jones, two reasons support this claim. First, the
Wille is in a sense, always good; its very nature as the source of
the moral law insures that all rules derived from it will be per-
fectly rational and morally acceptable. Since it could not be bad,
it is not this will which one develops in striving to be virtuous.
Secondly, everyone who is a rational agent possesses a Wille, or
self-legislating will. It is obvious, however, that not everyone has
a good will. If everyone had a good will, everyone would be vir-
tuous. But although everyone has a capacity for virtuous action,
human beings vary notoriously in moral character (p. 133).
Even if Jones' interpretation seems reasonable, his distinction
between Wille and Willkur as legislating and active will respec-
tively, is not fully satisfactory. The legislative will or Wille is al-
ways legislative on the basis of maxims pertaining to particular
204 V. Rossv(£r

situations, and therefore a determining factor every moment of

my moral life. It is constantly trying to create moral universality
in our sensuous maxims, and therefore constantly striving. This
activity, which is the good Wille, also conditions the free activity
of the Willkur. This means that the distinction between Wille and
Willkur is basically a distinction between different ways of regard-
ing the same activity. The good Willkur always presupposes the
good Wille as a condition, but the good Wille does not produce
its determining grounds in advance of the activity of the Willkur.
Neither is it in agreement with Kant's doctrine to say that if
everyone had a good Wille everyone would be virtuous. The good
will does not always succeed in its fight against sensuous inclina-
tions and evil intentions via its Willkur. This enables us to evalu-
ate Murphy's [8] defence for his own interpretation. Murphy
points out that if we take free Wille as necessary for responsibility
we find that Kant is involved in something like the Socratic para-
dox at the level of freedom. Intentional wrongdoing would be an
indication that freedom was lacking. The consequence of taking
this view seriously is that we could not legitimately hold a person
responsible for an intentional wrong action: Commission of such
an action would in itself be sufficient excuse to absolve the agent
from any blame (p. 84).
But even if the existence of morally wrong actions does indi-
cate that freedom is lacking, it would still be possible according
to Kant to hold the agent responsible. Such actions show that
the causality of freedom is not effective in man's faculty of desire
considered as a whole, which is the reason why we blame him.
However, in order to make this alternative view explicit and more
satisfactory one must, among other things, show how autonomy is
compatible with natural causality and the existence of evil actions;
which is no easy task, even according to Kant.
Peter Paul Wolff [6] argues that Kant gives no answer to the
question why being self-legislative constitutes a ground of uncon-
ditional obligation to the law one has legislated. The reason for
this unclarity as Wolff sees it, stems directly from Kant's com-
mitment to two incompatible doctrines.
On the one hand, Kant believes that there are objective, sub-
stantive, categorical moral principles which all rational agents,
insofar as they are rational, acknowledge and obey. If this is true,
 Kant's practical philosophy 205

then the notion of self-legislation seems vacuous, according to

Wolff. On the other hand, Kant believes that rational agents are
bound to substantive policies only insofar as they have freely
chosen those policies. But if this is true, then one must give up
the belief in objective substantive principles and recognize that
the substance or content of moral principles derives from collec-
tive commitments to freely chosen ends (p. 181).
According to Wolff, Kant is right that all rational agents are
bound by objective laws, but those laws are purely formal criteria
of the rationality of policies. They suffice only to rule out incon-
sistent policies, not to rule in any particular consistent ones. Kant
is also right that men are bound by substantive policies only inso-
far they have legislated those policies themselves, but he is wrong
to think that those substantive policies would necessarily be willed
by all rational agents insofar as they are rational.
Wolff's formalistic approach is conditioned by an anthropologi-
cal conception of the origin of our practical commitments. The
highest principle of practical reason therefore is consistency. For
reason to be practical, man must be moved by a conception of
general policies. From this follows, according to Wolff, that con-
sistency in the realm of practical reason means only the con-
sistent application of policies that one has adopted together with
the adoption of consistent policies (p. 217). To have a will means
to be capable of being moved by reason, and to be moved by
reason in the last analysis means to be moved by the truth of a
proposition.
In this way Wo1ffs interpretation amounts to a denial of the
Kantian conception of practical autonomy. One essential point
of this conception is that practical reason cannot be explained by
means of logical consistency, i.e. by means of theoretical reason.
Of course, practical reason cannot adopt logically inconsistent
policies. But the crucial point about the adoption of policies by
practical reason is that the free choice of policies is in itself con-
ditioned by categorical moral principles which all rational agents
acknowledge and obey.
Practical reason determines us to adopt individual maxim
which, in addition to being mutually consistent, also must realize
an a priori end, i.e. man as end in himself. This basic determining
206 V. Rossvaer

ground for practical reason cannot be fully analysed in terms of

consistency, but is the basis for practical consistency. One can
imagine a society whose members would seem to share our theo-
retical reason without ever really understanding the pre-supposi-
tions and implications belonging to the human institution of
regarding another human being as an end in himself.
In his thesis, Maximilian Forscher [10] shows that the concept
of autonomy has a long and complicated development, and that
the origin of this concept is able to throw light on the relation
between anthropological, formal and rational elements in Kant's
ethics.
The understanding of man as agent and not the abstract concept
of man as noumenon belonging to a natural cosmic order, should,
according to Forschner, be taken as the point of departure for
Kant's moral teachings.
The first important stage in Kant's pre-critical opposition to
the ethical objectivism represented by the philosophers belonging
to the Leibniz-Wolff school is to launch 'an anthropological turn'
and the point of this revolution is to insist that the good cannot
be regarded as the expression of a moral perfection outside man,
but as a concept which applies to man by virture of his capacity
for action. Moral perfection must be regarded with a view to the
realization of subjective goals, not with a view to the formal har-
mony of parts in a whole (a universe) created and maintained by
God (p. 640.
This position, which makes the moral good dependent upon the
human agent and his intentions, culminates according to Forsch-
ner in the doctrine of the good as belonging to the rational will as
its form, and is, therefore, itself the consequence of an anthro-
pological point of view. In this perspective, anthropological,
rational and formal aspects tend to unite in an all-encompassing
doctrine of man as a moral agent.

3. THE HIGHEST GOOD

The concept of the highest good is highly important in Kant's at-

tempt to create a systematic basis for his theory of morals. It
shows the synthesis of morality and nature from the point of view
 Kant's practical philosophy 207

of the finite agent, which makes it a most paradoxical concept.

According to many commentators the concept of the highest
good as the synthesis of morality and happiness as an end for
moral action does not belong to the central core of Kant's think-
ing. It is even by some considered to be inconsistent with Kant's
main doctrine that the good lies in the will's form. Still, with a
view to the reinterpretation and reconstruction of Kant's concep-
tion of moral philosophy, this concept is probably the most prom-
ising one.
Klaus Dusing [11] underlines the importance of the concept of
the highest good, since the highest good, according to him and
contrary to the traditional interpretation, is a necessary conse-
quence of Kant's mature moral philosophy. He makes a point of
distinguishing between two different theories of the highest good
in Kant: one earlier theory, and one which can only be understood
on the basis of the earlier one.
The earlier theory, which Kant adheres to for example in
K.d.r.V., makes the highest good the foundation of ethics. In the
mature theory, by contrast, the concept of highest good does not
belong to the foundation of moral philosophy, but expresses the
application of the pure morality on the finite human will. Ac-
cording to the latter theory, to refer to the highest good as an end
and aim for moral activity cannot explain what morality is; it is,
however, presupposed as an unconditional and necessary end for
the moral activity of the human will as a finite will (p. 33).
The proposition to promote the highest good is, according to
Dusing, a valid a priori ethical proposition. But only the effort
to try to realize the highest good, not the actual realization of
it, is demanded. Therefore, the value of the effort to realize the
highest good is still dependent upon the moral law as determining
ground. The highest good is not a new determining ground; it is
still subordinated to the moral law as the ultimate ground of
determination.
In Yirmiahu Yovel's [12] account, the concept of the highest
good is shown to be more complicated, but also more contro-
versial than Dusing makes it out to be. Yovel distinguishes be-
tween two stages in Kant's moral philosophy. The first stage is
represented by the categorical imperative, which instructs us how
we should act. The second stage is represented by the imperative
208 V. Rossvcer

to promote the highest good, which gives morality a definite

content by asserting what should be realized. The last stage re-
flects a double need of reason, first, that the sphere of action be
totalised, second that determinate action requires ends. The last
requirement reflects our subjective needs as human beings, accord-
ing to Yovel, which makes it problematic to see how it can be the
basis of a moral imperative.
Yovel states that the second stage must be included in the first.
Kant's moral theory is not exhausted by the demand to act from
universalisable maxims only. But the transition from the first
stage to the second is not continuous. Yovel's position, therefore,
is that the imperative to realize the highest good is not derivable
from the concept of the pure will as such.
Yovel maintains that the ideal of the highest good emerges
from a philosophical consideration of various empirical factors,
such as man's need for happiness, his equally natural interest for
the effects of his actions, and, more fundamentally, the empirical
conditions of the world upon which he must act. But if we accept
Kant's claim that it is the moral law which grants the recognition
of these needs, then the moral law cannot be identified by the
mere categorical imperative, but must be a higher type oflaw.
Yovel's position here is not necessarily a consequence of a for-
malistic interpretation of the categorical imperative. The problem
of the deduction of the proposition to promote the highest good
is probably the most difficult problem in the study of Kant's
moral philosophy, and the one that has been given the least satis-
factory solutions. Yovel's interpretation makes the concept of
the highest good a most interesting one; the stress on man's subjec-
tive needs as the basis for a moral imperative, however, makes it
seemingly impossible to deduce it.
By contrast, DUsing [11] sees no great problem concerning the
derivation of the concept of the highest good. But Dusing does
not see the highest good as based on the needs of the specifically
sensuous will; his point is that the highest good is necessary to
give the finite will a direction. The finite need seems to be a need
for moral guidance; it does not arise from the sensuous will as sen-
suous, but from the moral consciousness being finite. For this
reason DUsing's conception of the highest good approximates the
totality of ends which is presupposed in the derivation of ends
 Kant's practical philosophy 209

which are themselves duties in M.d.S. (p. 31).

Yove1 attacks the curtent approach to the highest good which
tends to reduce its empirical aspect to the concept of happiness
alone, and gives the idea a decidedly ahistorical connotation. Even
if this is correct as far as Kant's earlier conception of the highest
good is concerned, in the later stages the theory departs consider-
ably from the earlier one. Firstly, the highest good no longer re-
mains a separate, transcendent world, but becomes the consum-
mate state of this world, to be realized through a concrete devel-
opment in time. Secondly, the progressive power of history is as-
cribed to a hidden cunning of nature, but also to the conscious
work of practical reason. Thirdly, the concept of happiness loses
its central position, and is replaced by nature in general as the
empirical component of the highest good (p. 240).
Yove1 sees this as reflected in the transformation of the concept
of hope. Instead of referring to reward alone, it also refers to the
successful embodiment of morality itself, i.e. to the possibility of
historical progress.
According to Yovel's interpretation, to realize the highest good
means to imprint the demands of the moral idea upon the totality
of our empirical environment, transforming the patterns of our
psychological dispositions, our social and political institutions, as
well as the surrounding physical and ecological systems insofar
as they relate to the sphere of human needs and human interests.
The result of the whole critical system is to transport the meta-
physical interest, in its search for ultimates and totalities, from
the deviant cognitive path to its genuine expression in moral
history. Thus the ideas of the highest good and history, far from
being marginal, become the systematic apex of Kant's critical
endeavour (p. 241).
One might distinguish between to main views as to the ultimate
meaning of Kant's moral philosophy, both based on the concept
of the highest good. According to the first, Kant's system culmi-
nates in a conception of history based on the reflections of prac-
tical reason. According to the second, Kant's system culminates
in a practical metaphysics which justifies the postulates of the
existence of God and man's immortality.
The latter position is defended both by Keith Ward [13] and
Allen W. Wood [14]. They see Kant's ethics as a religious ethics
210 V. Rossvc£r

or as a moral religion. The metaphysical context which makes

Kant's view of the nature of morality intelligible, and which re-
mained constant throughout Kant's life, is, according to Ward,
the idea of a universal moral reason manifesting itself in empirical
reality, but somehow rendered ineffective in the actual conduct of
men, so that they are involved in a constant moral struggle marked
by ignorance and failure. It is only within such a context of de-
mand, ignorance and reconciliation that the doctrine of the cate-
gorical imperative emerges in its true complexity. It holds out the
hope of a reunion of appearance and reality, of empirical happi-
ness and attainment of human perfection through the successful
pursuit of virtue. This speculative account of reality, however, is
not based on theoretical reflection on the order and contingency
of the world, but on our moral experience (p. 173).
Whereas Ward seeks to justify his interpretation by giving an
analysis of the development of Kant's ethical views, Wood sees
the religious aspects of Kant's moral philosophy in the form of
his moral arguments as well. The characteristic feature of Kant's
moral argument, says Wood, is the attempt to establish certain pre-
suppositions for our rationality which we cannot deny without
being led to an unwelcome conclusion about ourselves as moral
agents. The arguments which justify the postulates and the moral
faith are, in the last analysis, not based on the logical inconsisten-
cy of judgements, but on practical inconsistency. This interpreta-
tion makes it possible to overcome some of the traditional objec-
tions against Kant's conception of the highest good. Assume that
I deny either the existence of God or a future life. If I deny either
of these, then I cannot conceive the highest good to be possible
of attainment. But if I deny that it is possible to attain the highest
good, then I presuppose or imply that I will not pursue the highest
good, or I commit myself not to pursue it. But if I do not pursue
the highest good, then I cannot act in obedience to the moral law.
Therefore, by denying the existence of God and a future life, I
have presupposed or implied that I will not obey the moral law,
or I have committed myself not to obey it. But if I do not obey
the moral law, then I am a Bosewicht, a scoundrel. This presum-
ably is an unwelcome conclusion about myself, and one that I
cannot tolerate (p. 29-30). A moral argument of this form is a
reductio ad absurdum practicum.
 Kant's practical philosophy 211

Kant's rational defence of faith is therefore an integral part of

his mature philosophy, and grounded in his conception of man's
nature as both finite and rational. In such a being, faith and rea-
son are not only compatible with each other, they require each
other.
Wood sees not only the argument in K.d.p.V., but also in Re-
ligion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion), as
based on an absurdum practicum. According to him, the argument
in Religion reopens the whole question of man's moral perfectabil-
ity, and the discussion of radical evil and grace, even if it is in-
complete and contradictory, is an attempt to give a more complete
conception of the moral faith than the one given in K.d.p.V.
In this respect there is a difference of interpretation between
Wood and Olivier Reboul [15]. Reboul makes a point of distin-
guishing rather sharply between the moral faith in K.d.p.V. and
the theory of religion within the bounds of reason.
The moral faith in K.d.p.V. is a product of practical reason,
and in the last analysis also a belief in practical reason. The reli-
gion which is analysed in Religion, however, is a particular reli-
gion, the christian faith, in contrast to other historical religions.
It is not, like the moral faith in K.d.p.V., created by reason itself.
However, the christian religion seems the most likely choice if we
want to find a religion which, even if it is not created by reason,
still fits within the limits of the human reason. This means that
the christian religion can be interpreted as a symbol of the pure
morality (p. 176). This interpretation seems to some extent to
explain the discrepancy Ward [13] finds between Kant's deeply
religious ethics and the humanistic terminology in which this
ethics is expressed. But, according to Ward, this is a feature that
characterizes all of Kant's moral philosophy. He is always trying
to say what on his own terms are unsayable, even if in Religion
and the Opus Postum this tendency reaches a high point (p. 166).
The strength of Reboul's interpretation lies in his attempt to
show how Kant's approach to the religious concepts in Religion
is determined by the one single problem: the problem of evil.
Even if Kant introduces the concept of religion in order to solve
the problem of the highest good, in Religion the context is the
deliverance from evil. In this work the good is no longer defined
in terms of virtue and happiness, but in term of salvation and re-
212 V. Rossvcer

conciliation (p. 163). The reason for this change is the existence
of the radical evil as a positive reality. The radical evil is a power
which according to Kant has its origin in its opposite, in the hu-
man freedom. Reboul's analysis shows how Kant's discussion of
freedom leads from the concept of transcendental freedom, via
the practical freedom or autonomy, up to the conception of free-
dom as liberation. Freedom as liberation is the postulate of free-
dom connected with the imperative to promote the highest good.
These concepts together constitute a perspective which makes it
possible to recognize and articulate, in philosophical terms, the
deep paradox of the existence of evil as a positive feature of
man's own freedom. The depth of Kant's practical philosophy
is that he recognizes this paradox. Without autonomy, and with-
out autonomy regulating our freedom of choice, man could not
be evil: Freedom of choice and practical reason are indispensable
for each other, but also contradictory. Reboul's use of these con-
cepts in connection with the problem of evil, seems to give a de-
fence of Kant against the accusation of Ward, that Kant is never
able to provide an intelligible account of the relation between
practical reason and the freedom of choice of human beings. The
defence, however, is not so much in a new analysis of the con-
ceptual relations of Wille and Willkur as in a new conception of
what Kant is trying to prove and exhibit by means of these con-
cepts.

4. PRACTICAL REASON

As John R. Silber [3] points out, Hegel still is the most effective
of Kant's critics. Several of Hegel's arguments against the formal-
ism in Kant's moral philosophy are still, in many quarters, ac-
cepted as a matter of course. We ought, therefore, to look at
some of the details of Hegel's criticism of Kant.
According to Silber, Hegel's criticism presupposes that prac-
tical reason does not form maxims by working on man's sensuous
maxims, but is itself capable with immediacy of creating moral
maxims. Hegel tries to show that all moral laws given by such a
reason must be contingent, i.e. they must be dependent upon
qualifications which concern the particular situation to show their
real meaning.
 Kant's practical philosophy 213

Since the moral reason according to this interpretation cannot

create its own moral laws, the only way it can function in a moral
context is to demand that purely formal criteria are satisfied.
Hegel understands the categorical imperative as the pure form of
universality, Le. a mere tautology of consciousness over and
against the content. The inner ethical essence has no content. All
that is offered is a criterion for the suitability of the content to
be law, the criterion being that reason must not contradict itself.
Since the categorical imperative offers only a criterion of self-
consistency for the suitability of content to be law, it is according
to Silber easy for Hegel to prove that this criterion is inadequate.
Employing a tautology as the evaluator of morally correct action
is to emply a criterion that is quite indifferent to truth and un-
truth. When we reflect upon this we see that when a law which is
itself indeterminate is made determinate, it will have an acciden-
tal content, it will be a law made by a particular individual, con-
scious of a particular, accidental content. Then caprice is made
into law.
Accordingly, Hegel's criticism amounts to that if the moral law
has a defmite content, it will lack universality, but if it has the
universality it will fail to have a determinate content (p. 227).
But as Silber insists, Kant and Hegel are in agreement that reason
alone does not give substantive law.
Up to the present day, however, Hegel's criticism has prevented
Kant's concept of practical reason from getting the attention it
deserves. Hegel's interpretation in fact implies that in Kant's prac-
tical philosophy reason does not function as a principle of execu-
tion for moral action, but only as a principle of evaluation. Hegel's
interpretation also implies that moral reasoning is a question of
logical deduction, whereas Kant insists upon our ability to form
new moral maxims by working upon the sensuous ones in order
to explain moral universality and practical consistency.
Perhaps the best way to justify Kant's conception of a practical
reason is to refer to the doctrine of the fact of reason. This doc-
trine shows that the Hegelian interpretation is way off the mark.
The Hegelian interpretation is that reason is in conflict with sensi-
bility, and because of this falls into inconsistency, whereas the
doctrine of the fact of reason implies that the moral law can only
be justified via the causality which is constituted by reason in the
214 V. Rossva?r

sensuous faculty of desire.

The imperative force which is the basis of the moral can, can-
not, according to Kant, be justified by reference to an idea, e.g.
the idea of freedom. On the contrary, the real validity of this idea
must itself be justified by reference to the influence of the law as
an already established fact.
The consciousness of moral necessity is only possible on the
premiss that reason is given in connection with the sensuous
faculty of desire.
One can escape this conclusion, however, if one gives Kant's
doctrine: You can because you should, an anthropological inter-
pretation.
Karl-Heinz Ilting [16] explains the formula: You can because
you should, by stating that it is because every human being is
able to sacrifice his life on the basis of moral reasoning, that Kant
can prove the reality of the moral law and moral freedom. But to
appeal to the fact that every human being is capable of sacrificing
his life on the basis of moral reasoning, is to appeal to anthropolog-
ical fact about human nature. For this reason Ilting accuses Kant
of making a naturalistic fallacy in a broad sense of the term (p.
114). Kant attempts to explain the categorical imperative by re-
ferring to how we in fact experience moral coercion. Ilting's in-
terpretation, however, is misleading because the doctrine of the
fact of reason is meant to reveal that only a Sol/en which is al-
ready in force as a practice can explain the normative character
of the categorical imperative. Kant's argument is not anthropolog-
ical or naturalistic; on the contrary, it shows that what makes
the moral law a categorical imperative cannot be based on any
theoretical truth about human beings.
Ilting's position is criticized by Apel who replaces this anthro-
pological interpretation by a transcendental one.
Apel's [17] point is that the categorical imperative can be de-
fended as being a necessary condition of social intersubjectivity.
That is, it can be shown to constitute a necessary condition of
communication in a public language. Also Wolff [6] sees the prob-
lem of ethical obligation as connected with communication in
language. He states that in order for a community of agents to
bind themselves to a set of laws, some genuine communication
would be necessary. Out of that collective deliberation, there
 Kant's practical philosophy 215

might issue a unanimous commitment to a substantive policy or

practice, governed but not determined by the formal constraints
of consistency. The communication would be essential rather than
acc~dental because in its absence no substantive policy would
acquire the status of law (p. 185).
According to Apel, however, the categorical imperative must be
established even for this collective deliberation to be possible. The
possibility of communication in itself presupposes the validity of
the substantive moral law .
The conditions for any collective deliberation to come to unani-
mous commitment to a substantive policy, is that the categorical
imperative is already accepted. And the very deliberation of the
parties in question shows that they accept the categorical impera-
tive, whatever they say, since the categorical imperative is a con-
dition for maintaining a dialogue between different speakers in a
community.
According to Apel Kant's description of the moral law as a fact
of reason comes close to stating such a condition. Whoever does
not accept this principle drops out of the discussion, and the con-
dition for valid argument is not fulfilled (p. 421 f.).
It is, however, doubtful if one can conclude from the doctrine
of the fact of reason, that it represents a condition of rational ar-
gument in the sense Apel is suggesting.
The fact of reason suggests that the categorical imperative is
maintained by nothing other than its own use as an imperative
by sensuous beings. This is the ultimate non-theoretical condition
for the categorical imperative. Apel's support, however, for his
thesis that every possible communication is conditioned by the cat-
egorical imperative presupposes that this factual use ofthe categor-
ical imperative in our maxims is itself conditioned by the im-
perative of acting according to this idea as an even higher condi-
tion. Whereas the anthropological interpretation says too little,
the transcendental interpretation of the fact of reason proves too
much.
Wolffs and Apel's discussion of Kant's practical philosophy by
asking questions about communication in language is in agreement
with Kant's own concept of the highest good as man's social and
historical creation. Therefore, they are bringing the problems of
the practical philosophy into its right perspective, making it pos-
216 V. Rossvcer

sible to see the importance of Kant's practical philosophy for the

theoretical philosophy.
Generally speaking, the discussion of Kant's practical philoso-
phy has not yet reached a level where its most interesting aspects
are brought forth. Compared to the discussion of Kant's theoreti-
cal philosophy, the discussion of his practical philosophy still has
a long way to go. To take one example, whereas the recent discus-
sions of the problem of transcendental arguments in K.d.r.V. has
greatly deepened our understanding of Kant's theoretical philoso-
phy, the discussion of the transcendental arguments in his practi-
cal philosophy has just begun.
I have no doubt that the analysis of the kind of arguments that
Kant makes use of, both in justifying the derived formulas of
Grundlegung and in his deduction of the imperative to promote
the highest good, will throw light on his concept of a transcenden-
tal argument, as it is applied in his practical philosophy, but also as
it is applied in his theoretical philosophy. It will also make it easier
to see the importance of Kant's critiques for the problems sur-
rounding the concept of philosophy itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Apel, K.-O. [17] Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die

Grundlagen der Ethik. Transformation der Philosophie, Band II.
Frankfurt a.M. 1973.
Bartuschat, W. [2] Das Problem einer Formulierung des Kategorischen Impe-
rativs bei Kant: Das Problem der Sprache. Ed. Hans Georg Gadamer.
Munchen 1967.
DUsing, K. [11] Das Problem des hochsten Gutes in Kants praktischer Philo-
sophie. Kant-Studien 62 (1971):5-42.
Forschner, M. (10] Gesetz und Freiheit: Zum Problem der Autonomie bei
I. Kant. Munchen und Salzburg 1974.
Gupta, R.K. (7] Kant's Groundwork of Morality. Studi Internazionali di
Filosofia (Torino) 3 (1971):111-161.
flting, K.-H. [16] Der naturalistische Fehlschluss bei Kant. Rehabilitierung
der praktischen Philosophie, Band I. Freiburg 1972.
Jones, H.E. [9] Kant's Principle of Personality. Madison and London 1971.
Murphy,J.G. [8] Kant: The Philosophy of Right. London 1970.
Reboul, O. [15] Kant et Ie probleme du mal. Montreal 1971.
Rollin, B.E. [4] 'There is only One Categorical Imperative'. Kant-Studien
67 (1976):60-72.
 Kant's practical philosophy 217

Shalgi, M. [5] Universalized Maxims as Moral Laws: The Categorical Impera-

tive Revisited. Kant-Studien 67 (1976):172-191.
Silber,l.R. [3] Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics. The Review of Meta-
physics 28 (1974):197-236.
Ward, K. [13] The Development of Kant's View of Ethics. Oxford 1972.
Williams, T .C. [1] The Concept of the CategoricalImperative. London 1968.
Wolff, R.P. [6] The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's Ground-
work of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York 1973.
Wood, A.W. [14] Kant's Moral Religion. Ithaca 1970.
Yovel, Y. [12] The Highest Good and History of Kant's ThoughLArchiv filr
Geschichte der Philosophie 54 (1972) :23 8-283.
Sozialphilosophie im Spannungsfeld von
Phanomenologie und Marxismus
B. WALDENFELS
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum

1. HISTORISCHE AUSGANGSLAGE

Der Sozialphilosophie geht es ahnlich wie der Sprachphilosophie;

sie hat mehr und mehr den eng gesteckten Rahmen einer regio-
nalen Disziplin und vollends den einer spezifischen Methodologie
durchbrochen. Das Prinzipiengefiige, das einstmals unter dem Titel
einer Ersten Philosophie auftrat, erweist sich zusehends als selbst
schon sozial und sprachlich durchwirkt und andert damit sein Aus-
sehen. Sowohl auf der Stufe des natUrlichen Weltlebens wie auf
der Ebene der philosophischen Reflexion gewinnt die alte Bestim-
mung des Menschen als eines 'animal sociale' an neuer Durch-
schlagskraft. Ein Individuum, das schon fertig da ist und sich erst
sekundar auf Andere bezieht, erweist sich ebenso als Chimare wie
die Position eines einsamen Denkers, der sich iiber die Sozialwelt
erhebt. An diesem Umdenkungsprozess, der an den Grundfesten
der neuzeitlichen Bewusstseinsphilosophie riittelt, haben Phiino-
menologie und Marxismus ihren gehOrigen Anteil. Allerdings dif-
ferieren deren Ausgangspunkte und Wegrichtungen ganz erheblich.
Marx begibt sich mit aller Entschiedenheit auf den Boden der Ge-
sellschaft. Zwar entsteht und entwickelt sich diese nur im konkre-
ten Zusammenspiel der Individuen; dennoch gewinnt sie sehr bald
an ein gewisses Ubergewicht. Neuere Versuche, der Individualitat
starker Raum zu schaffen, erklaren sich nicht bloss durch die Reak-
tion auf verhartete politische Verhaltnisse, sie verraten auch ein
theoretisches Defizit, das durch einen einseitgen Riickgriff auf den
friihen Marx schwerlich zu beheben ist. Bei Husserlliegen die Dinge
eher umgekehrt. Sein Versuch, die Sozialitat selbst noch in einem

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 219-242.

©1982, Martinus Nijho!! Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
220 B. Waldenfels

prasozialen Ego zu verankern, fiihrt in die Engpiisse eines transzen-

dentalen Solipsism us, ungeachtet aller Versuche, die Sinnstruktu-
ren am Ende einer transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat zu iiberant-
worten. Die Nachfolger Husserls haben auf verschiedene Weise
versucht, diesem Dilemma zu entgehen, indem sie das transzenden-
tale Ego verleiblichten und es so von vornherein in einen sozialen
Zusammenhang hineinstellten. Marxisten und Phiinomenologen
tragen also an kontraren Nachfolgelasten, die einem Interesse fiir-
einander fOrderlich sind. Es wiire zuviel behauptet, wollte man
sagen, dass die beiderseitigen Bemiihungen, die soziale Lebens-
praxis zum Angelpunkt aller Oberlegungen zu machen, einfachhin
konvergieren. Doch zumindest treffen sie sich in einem gemein-
samen Problemfeld, das neben unausweichlicher Wechselkritik
auch einen fruchtbaren Austausch zulasst.
Die Kontakte zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus reichen
weit zuruck. Zu erinnern ist an den fruhen Lukacs, der in seiner
Heidelberger Zeit mit den Ideen von Husserl und Kierkegaard be-
kannt wurde, und an die Ankliinge an Lukacs, die in Heideggers
Sein und Zeit zu finden sind (vgl. Goldmann [I]). Zu erinnern ist
ferner an die Anfange der Kritischen Theorie, an Marcuses fruhe
Heidegger-Adaptionen (wiederabgedruckt in: Marcuse u. Schmidt
[2) und Horkheimers und Adornos kritische Abgrenzungen gegen
Husserl. Vor allem aber bleibt das Frankreich der Nachkriegsjahre
zu erwahnen, wo Philosophen wie Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Hyppo-
lite und Tran Duc Thao Phiinomenologie und Marxismus mitein-
ander zu vereinbaren suchten. 1
Wenngleich diese alteren Versuche ihre deutlichen Spuren hin-
terlassen haben, hat sich in zwischen einiges geandert. Gegeniiber
einer vorschnellen Synthese iiberwiegen die differenzierteren An-
naherungen, die nun nicht mehr iiber den schmalen Grat einer
existentialistisch verengten Phiinomenologie verlaufen und nicht
mehr einseitig auf den friihen Marx zugeschnitten sind. Noch be-
vor das Aufkommen des sog. Strukturalismus ein verandertes
Klima schuf und Althusser seine neue Marx-Interpretation vor-
legte [6, 7], hatte Merleau-Ponty in Les aventures de la dialec-
tique (1955) und in verschiedenen Aufsatzen (s. Signes, 1960)
den institutionellen und symbolischen Charakter jeglicher histo-
rischen Aktion hervorgehoben und damit den. anonymen Struk-
turen grosseres Gewicht eingeraumt. Dass damit auch die universa-
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 221

listische Geschichtsauffassung ins Wanken kommt, ist eine Konse-

quenz dieser Gewichtsverlagerung; immerhin kommt Merleau-
Ponty hier trotz vermehrter kritischer Einwande Marx' eigenen
Intentionen naher als in seinen Anfangen, wo er einen direkten
Kontakt suchte. In Deutschland haben sich mit dem Abebben
des 'Positivismusstreits' (Adorno u. a. 1969 [8)), der mit einer
Antinomie von totalisierender Dialektik und empirischer For-
schung zu enden drohte, dank der Bemuhungen von jungeren Ver-
tretern der Kritischen Theorie (vgl. Habermas [9], Apel [10] )
neue Spielraume erOffnet, in denen die Phanomenologie, vor
aHem in der von Gadamer entwickelten hermeneutischen Gestalt,
einen eigenen, wenngleich beschrankten Platz erhalt. Der Abbau
starrer Fronten geht allerdings soweit, dass die Gefahr einer Ver-
wasserung der theoretischen Ansatze nicht ganz von der Hand zu
weisen ist. 2

2. ALLGEMEINE ENTWICKLUNGSTENDENZEN

Ich beginne mit einer allgemeinen Obersicht uber neuere Ent-

wicklungstendenzen und ihre Voraussetzungen. Dabei wahle ich
phanomenologische Ansatze als Bezugspunkt und behandle
marxistische Entwicklungen nur insoweit, als sie ausdrUcklich
phanomenologische Fragestellungen aufgreifen oder doch deut-
lich mit ihnen korrespondieren.
Die neueren Entwicklungen in der phanomenologischen Sozial-
philo sophie stUtzen sich durchweg auf eine breite Kenntnis und
differenzierte Alfswertung der Werke klassischer phanomenolo-
gischer Autoren. Die massgebenden Texte liegen seit langerer Zeit
vor; doch einige neuere Editionen und Publikationen haben die
Textbasis erweitert, manch Alteres kommt erst aHmahlich zur
vollen Auswirkung. Was zunachst Husserl [13] angeht, so sind
in zwischen drei umfangreiche Nachlassbiinde zur Phiinomenolo-
gie der Intersubjektivitiit erschienen, herausgegeben von I. Kern
[13].3 Vieles, was in der 'V. Cartesianischen Meditation' skizzen-
haft geblieben ist, erfahrt hier eine detailliertere Ausarbeitung, und
wichtige LehrstUcke wie Leiberfahrung, Ausdrucksdeutung, Ein-
fUhlung und Apprasentation, primordiale Reduktion, soziale Akte
oder die Theorie des Gemeingeistes und die Monadologie zeigen
222 B. Waldenfels

deutlicher ihren Werdegang. Die vorpradikative Form der Fremd-

erfahrung gewinnt an Gewicht und wird in den spaten Manuskrip-
ten der 30er Jahre zuriickverfolgt bis auf die Vorstufe einer teleo-
logisch ausgerichteten Triebstruktur. Es lassen sich daraus Ansatze
gewinnen, das egologische Fundament der Husserlschen Inter-
subjektivitatslehre aufzusprengen; fUr Husserl selbst bleibt aller-
dings die egologische Grundorientierung letzten Endes verbindlich.
Fruhe Alternativen innerhalb der Sozialphanomenologie werden in
Erinnerung gerufen durch Schelers Nachlassnotizen zu Sein und
Zeit, die M. Frings dem Band Spate Schriften [15] beigegeben hat.
Scheler stellt hier Heideggers 'Daseinssolipsismus' ein uberindivi-
duelles Dasein gegenuber; das Feld der Auseinandersetzung ist
allerdings eine metaphysisch orientierte Anthropologie, der Heid-
egger sich mehr und mehr zu entziehen trachtete. 4
Was die franzosische Phanomenologie betrifft, so haben Mer-
leau-Pontys anhaltende Bemuhungen, Phanomenologie und Hu-
manwissenschaften in einen fruchtbaren Austausch zu bringen, in-
zwischen auch ausserhalb des Mutterlandes (vielleicht mehr als
dort selbst) Beachtung gefunden, vor aHem auch bei Vertretern
der Sozialwissenschaften. 5 Ricoeurs Aufsatze zur Hermeneutik
[20] gewinnen in unserem Zusammenhang einige Bedeutung, weil
hier Herausforderungen seitens der Semiologie, der Ethnologie
(Levi-Strauss) und der Psychoanalyse aufgenommen und benutzt
werden zur Unterminierung einer Bewusstseinsphilosophie, die den
Sinn des Erlebens direkt zu erfassen glaubt. Die symbolische Be-
schwerung des Sinnes bedeutet zugleich dessen soziale Veranke-
rung und institutioneHe Brechung. Weiterhin ist auf das eigen-
willige, eruptive Schaffen von Levinas hinzuweisen. Fur ihn, einen
fruhen kritischen Schuler und Interpreten Husserls und Heid-
eggers, spielt das Problem des Anderen von Anfang an eine ent-
scheidende Rolle. Nach Totalite et infini (1961) legt er nun ein
zweites grosses Werk vor, dessen Titel Autrement qu'etre ou au-
dela de l'essence [21] bereits die Absichten des Autors kenn-
zeichnet. Es geht urn einen Ausbruch aus den Fesseln einer Onto-
logie, die in der Etablierung einer Gesamtordnung ihre Herr-
schaft ausubt und aIle Andersheit unter das Gesetz des Selben
stellt. Ein Sagen (dire), das sich dem unmittelbaren Anspruch des
Andern stellt und in einem standigen Ent-sagen. (dedire) und
Wieder-sagen (redire) seine zeitliche Struktur entfaltet, entzieht
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 223

sich dem Gesetz des Schon-gesagten (d6ja-dit). Daraus resultiert

eine urspriingliche An-archie, die aIle geseIlschaftliche Ordnung
kritisch begrenzt. Mann kann diese vertiefte Form der Phanomeno-
logie (vgl. Strasser [22]) lesen als Korrektiv gegen aIle Versuche,
das Subjekt in bestehende Sozialordnungen einzugemeinden. So
gesehen bedeutet der Ubergang zum Andern keinen Fluchtweg aus
dem Sozialen, sondern eher eine Bresche. Was all den genannten
Versuchen gemein ist, das ist das Bestreben, die Phanomenologie
an ihren Rand zu fUhren. Die sozialphilosophischen Konsequen-
zen dieser Dezentrierung oder 'Enteignung' (Merleau-Ponty) des
Bewusstseins liegen auf der Hand, das Soziale ist kein blosses Kon-
stitut mehr, sondern unumganglicher Boden jeglicher Sil)nkonsti-
tution.
Diese Einsicht gilt auch fUr Sartre, obwohl er - anders als die
erwahnten Autoren - der Hegelschen Dialektik treu bleibt und in
einem Prozess standiger Totalisierung und Detotalisierung eine Ver-
mittlung von Besonderem und Allgemeinem sucht. Inzwischen hat
er das alte Projekt einer Flaubert-Monographie [23] verwirklicht.
Das regressiv-progressive Verfahren, das er in seiner Question de
methode (1960) anvisiert und einer Synthese von Existentialismus
und Marxismus zuordnet, wird hier an einem konkreten Gegen-
stand erprobt. In einem we it ausholenden hermeneutischen Ent-
wurf werden Formen der Gesellschaft des vorigen lahrhunderts
an der Lebensentwicklung eines signifikanten Individuums abge-
lesen. Marxschen Anspriichen gemass bleibt bei allen Einzeler-
scheinungen eine gesellschaftliche Gesamtperspektive im Blick.
Allerdings lasst die enge Nahe zur Critique de la raison dialectique
Zweifel aufkommen, ob der altere individualistische Ansatz, der
von individuellen Entwiirfen ausgeht, wirklich iiberwunden ist.
In eine erheblich andere Richtung weist schliesslich der Versuch
von M. Henry der in seinem Marx-Buch [24] entgegen szientis-
tischen, existentialistischen, hegelianisierenden, aber auch ent-
gegen strukturalistischen Deutungen bei Marx eine 'Metaphysik
des Individuums' entdeckt. Das 'wirkliche Individuum' wird hier
nicht als partikuHire Instanz einem Universellen entgegengesetzt
oder eingegliedert, mit ihm verbindet sich vielmehr die Vorstel-
lung einer Immanenz des Lebens, die in ihrer RealWit auf gemein-
same Praxis angelegt ist. Das Okonomische erscheint dann als
'ontologische Entfremdung', als 'Entfremdung des Lebens', und
224 B. Waldenfels

die Kritik daran hat nicht eine Teleologie des Universalen zum
Massstab, sondem das 'konkrete phiinomenologische Leben' des
Individuums, Arbeitszeit, Bedilrfnisse etc. (Bd. II, S. 33). Die
wiederholten Hinweise auf Husserl sind mehr als beiliiufig; eine
Phanomenologie des Leibes, der Zeit, der Arbeit bildet einen tra-
genden Bestandteil dieser Marx-Exegese, die den Historischen Ma-
terialismus als transzendentale Theorie der Geschichte zu er-
weisen sucht.
Wenden wir uns nun der amerikanischen Szenerie zu, so betre-
ten wir den Schau platz , wo die Sozialphiinomenologie in den
letzten Jahren ihre reichste Wirksamkeit entfaltet hat. Die beiden
entscheidenden Wegbereiter waren A. Schiltz und A. Gurwitsch.
Gurwitsch hat sehr frilh, iihnlich wie Sartre, doch wohl unabhiingig
von ihm, eine nicht-egologische Bewusstseinskonzeption entwik-
kelt, die den transzendentalen SoIipsismus von generellen Struk-
turen her unterUiuft (vgl. den entsprechenden Beitrag in [25]). Die
nunmehr post hum verOffentlichte Habilitationsschrift: Die mit-
mensch lichen Begegnungen der Milieuwelt [26] zeigt die sozial-
philosophischen Wurzeln dieses Denkens. In kritischem Anschluss
an Scheler und Heidegger und unter starkem Einbezug der Gestalt-
theorie wird die 'natilrliche Umwelt' auf ihre Strukturen hin be-
fragt, deren Wiederholbarkeit und konkrete Allgemeinheit jeden
rein individuellen Erfahrungsbezug hinter sich liisst. In der Analyse
der Mitwelt findet sich eine ausdrilckliche Bezugnahme auf M. We-
bers Unterscheidung von alltiiglicher Routine und unalltiiglichem
Charisma. Gurwitsch hat diese fruhen Materialien spiiter direkt
nicht mehr verwendet, doch seine Reflexionen zu Themenbil-
dung, Relevanz und Interesse hatten einen nachhaltigen Einfluss
auf A. Schiltz, dem er auch wissenschaftstheoretisch sekundiert
(vgl. [27]).
Schutz konnte sein grundlegendes Werk Der sinnhafte Aufbau
der sozialen Welt (1932), in dem er erstmalig Ideen von Husserl,
Max Weber und Bergson zu einer origin ellen These verarbeitet,
noch vor seiner Emigration abschliessen. Spiitere Aufsiitze wurden
nach seinem Tode zu drei Biinden Collected Papers (1962, 1964,
1966, deutsch: Gesammelte Aufsatze, 1971) zusammengestellt.
Alles andere blieb Fragment. Das gilt einmal filr die Reflexionen
ilber das Problem der Relevanz [28}. Dieses Problem wird hier
erstmalig systematisch in Angriff genommen; es wird unterschie-
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 225

den zwischen thematischer Relevanz, Auslegungsrelevanz und Mo-

tivationsrelevanz, worin sich die Problemsituation, der abrufbare
Wissensvorrat und die Interessenrichtung der Handlung wider-
spiegelt. Der soziale Bezug bleibt hier allerdings systematisch aus-
gespart. Anders in dem grossangelegten Werk iiber Strukturen der
Lebenswelt [29], das Th. Luckmann, gestiitzt auf Nachlassma-
nuskripte, verfasst hat. Der vorliegende erste Band geht aus von der
Lebenswelt in ihren raumlichen, zeitlichen und sozialen Struktu-
ren und untersucht systematisch das Wissen von der Lebenswelt,
wobei dieses Wissen schliesslich auf seine gesellschaftlichen Be-
dingungen bezogen wird. Ein kiirzlich verOffentlichter Brief-
wechsel zwischen Schiitz und Parsons [30] zeigt hinterdrein noch
einmal deutlich, wie und warum Schiitz sich von der etablierten
Soziologie absetzt.
Der Deutungsarbeit von Autoren wie M. Natanson, R.M. Zaner,
P. Berger und Th. Luckmann ist es zu verdanken, dass SchUtz
einen immer spiirbareren Einfluss ausiibt. Unter dem Titel Die gesell-
schaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit [31] beschreiben die
beiden letztgenannten Soziologen eine gegenliiufige Bewegung,
die sich zugleich als Externalisierung des Sinnes in Institutionen
und Legitimierungsinstanzen und als Internalisierung des Sinnes
im Zuge einer Sozialisierung der Individuen darstellt. Die Gesell-
schaft erscheint im dialektischen Wechselspiel zugleich als objek-
tive und subjektive Wirklichkeit. Der phanomenologische Ansatz
von Husser! und Schiitz wird ergiinzt durch eine Institutionen-
lehre, die auf Durkheim und GeWen verweist, und durch die Rol-
lentheorie von Mead. Philosophisch kann dieser Versuch aller-
dings nicht recht Uberzeugen; die in Anspruch genommene Dia-
lektik kommt iiber einen Blickwechsel kaum hinaus und die
wiederholte Berufung auf Marx beMlt einen sehr formellen Cha-
rakter.
Das genannte Werk ist in mehrfacher Hinsicht signifikant, ein-
mal was die enge Beziehung von philosophischer Reflexion und
wissenschaftlicher Forschung angeht. Die Philosophie wird hier
nicht nur als methodologischer Helfershelfer aufgeboten, sondern
sie ist in den materialen Untersuchungen gegenwartig, die einen
eigenen Stil annehmen. Es handelt sich nicht mehr urn eine blosse
Empirie der Tatsachen, da die SinnentwUrfe und Sinndeutungen
der beteiligten Subjekte seIber mit zum Thema der Forschunr
226 B. Waldenfels

gehoren und eine 'beteiligte Beobachtung' gefordert ist, die den

wissenschaftlichen Erkliirungsprozess stiindig an seine vorwissen-
schaftlichte Basis zuriickbindet. Alltagliche Lebenspraxis, wissen-
schaftliche Forschung und philosophische Reflexion lassen keine
strenge Gebietsabgrenzung mehr zu, die verschiedenen Zugangs-
weisen sind einander kooperativ und nicht eindeutig hierarchisch
zugeordnet. Merleau-Pontys diesbezUgliche Vorstellungen finden
hier eine Bekraftigung, und altere Forschungsweisen, etwa der Ge-
stalttheorie oder der Umweltforschung, gewinnen neu an Gewicht.
EinfUhrungswerke wie das von Roche [32] und zahlreiche Sam-
melbande, so etwa die von Natanson [17, 33] (vgl. auch dessen
Aufsatzsammlung [34]), Psathas [3] und von Sprondel und Grat-
hoff [35] herausgegebenen, beleuchten den Zusammenhang von
phanomenologischer Philo sophie und phanomenologisch inspi-
rierten Sozialwissenschaften zur GenUge. 6 Gleichzeitig hat sich
die schon von SchUtz angebahnte Beziehung zum symbolischen
Interaktionismus von G.H. Mead, zum Pragmatism us und zu einer
von Max Weber ausgehenden Gesellschaftsanalyse (vgl. Williame
[38]) weiter verstarkt. Die von Gouldner geforderte 'reflexive
Soziologie' ist kein Privileg der Phiinomenologen. Als ein Schmelz-
tiegel dieser verschiedenen EinflUsse erweist sich die Ethnometho-
dologie; Autoren wie A. Cicourel und H. Garfinkel [39] haben
sich hier Einsichten von Husserl und SchUtz fUr ihre besonderen
Belange zunutze gemacht. 7 Allerdings regen sich bei strengeren
Phiinomenologen wie etwa Luckmann (s. Natanson [17], Bd. I,
S. 143 ff.) Bedenken gegen einen 'neueren Empirismus', der die
allgemeinen Lebensweltstrukturen in konkrete Kontexte auflost
und den Gegensatz von Wissenschaft und Alltagserfahrung nahezu
einebnet.
Doch fehlt es selbst bei phanomenologisch orientierten Philo-
sophen und Sozialwissenschaftlern auch nicht an Bedenken, die
sich gegen SchUtz' eigenen Entwurf richten. Zum einen halt
SchUtz an seiner alten These fest, dass der Sinn sich ursprUnglich
in der Reflexion auf das eigene Leben konstituiert und sich erst
durch Verstehensprozesse Andern vermittelt; der Verweis auf
eine Reziprozitiit der Perspektiven, auf eine soziale Wissensbildung
oder auf sprachliche Vermittlungen kommt zu spat. Das Beharren
auf dem alten Titel einer 'verstehenden Soziologie' bleibt mit
Zweideutigkeiten behaftet, sofern immer noch der neukantia-
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 227

nische Ansatz durchscheint, wo in erkenntnis- und wissenschafts-

theoretischer Absicht dem naturwissenschaftlichen Erkliiren ein
Pendant an die Seite gestellt wird. Zum andern ist Schutz in
seinen spiiteren Jahren von Husserls transzendentalem Idealismus
abgeruckt, hat aber mit dem deskriptiven Programm einer 'konsti-
tutiven Phiinomenologie der naturlichen Einstellung' keinen Aus-
weg angeboten, der sich mit Husserls Radikalismus messen liesse
(vgl. hierzu die kritischen Beitrage in Sprondel und Grathoff
[35] , S. 1 ff., 26 ff. sowie Williame [38], S. 114 ff.). Damit er-
kliirt sich der wiederholte Ruckgriff auf Husserl selbst bei denen,
die seiner Losung nicht beipflichten.
Es beruht gewiss nicht nur auf mangelnder Kenntnis, sondern
auch auf sachlichen Grunden, wenn marxistische Autoren dort,
wo sie auf die Phiinomenologie reagieren, sich Yorwiegend auf
Husserl, zumal auf seine Krisis-Abhandlung beziehen. Der Kampf
gegen die Blickverengungen des natiirlichen Bewusstseins und gegen
einen Objektivismus in der Wissenschaft, der den Subjekten ihre
eigenen Produkte entzieht, die phiinomenologische Epoche als
Bruch mit der naturlichen Einstellung, das Insistieren auf eine
Einheit von theoretischer Orientierung und praktischer Lebens-
ausrichtung, das historische Krisenbewusstsein und schliesslich die
universalhistorische Perspektive, das alles sind Motive, die we-
nigstens aufs erste einen stiirkeren Widerhall wecken als das
deskriptive Eingehen auf die typischen Formationen der AUtags-
welt. Die Kontakte selbst sind eher sporadisch und laufen auch
in verschiedene Richtungen, einige Kontakstellen und Beruh-
rungsfelder, die sich in den letzten Jahren herausgebildet haben,
seien kurz erwiihnt.
In den USA erscheint seit 1968 die Zeitschrift Telos mit zahl-
reich en Aufsiitzen aus dem Grenzbereich von Phiinomenologie
und Marxismus. Ihr Herausgeber P. Piccone ist stark beeinflusst
von E. Paci, dem Begrunder der wichtigen Zeitschrift Aut-Aut,
deren Leitung inzwischen yon A. Rovatti ubernommen wurde.
Paci hat mit seiner Schrift uber Funktion der Wissenschaften und
Bedeutung des Menschen [41] einen eigenen Ton angeschlagen.
Er geht hier uber Sartre und Merleau-Ponty ausdrucklich auf den
spiiten Husserl zuruck und liest die Krisis mit Marxschen Augen,
indem er den Objektivismus der Wissenschaften gesellschaftlichen
und okonomischen Fetischisierungsprozessen anniihert. Die be-
228 B. Waldenfels

freiende Wirkung der Epoche, die Husserl hervorhebt, gewinnt re-

volutionare Bedeutung im Hinblick auf eine Selbstbefreiung des
menschlichen Subjekts, die an seine genuinen Bedurfnisse an-
knupft und ihm seine eigene Lebenswelt zuruckgibt. Unuberseh-
bar sind die Impulse, die auch von Gramscis Philosophie der Praxis
ausgehen. Rovatti [42] gehort zu denen, die diese Oberlegungen
fortsetzen; seine phanomenologische Lekture des Marxschen Kapi-
tal steht im Gegensatz zu Althussers 'Szientismus', der uber die
Subjekte hinweggeht und den Marxismus seiner - wie es heisst -
praktisch-philosophischen Grundlage beraubt.
1m osteuropaischen Bereich ist einmal die Praxis-Gruppe zu
nennen, die sich 1964 in der Zeitschrift Praxis ein publizistisches
Organ und in der Sommerschule von Korcula ein Diskussionsfo-
rum schuf; beide Unternehmungen mussten inzwischen eingestellt
werden (vgl. Petrovic [43]). Die Phanomenologie ist hier vor-
wiegend in ihrer Heideggerischen Variante vertreten. In Polen ha-
ben A. Schaff und L. Kofakowski den Boden fUr einen kritischen
Marxismus bereitet. Die 1974 gegrundete Zeitschrift Dialectics
and Humanism lasst innerhalb eines marxistischen Rahmens
Raum fUr eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Phanomenologie. In
der Tschechoslowakei hat J. Patocka 8 eine Kontinuitat zur Vor-
kriegstradition aufrechterhalten, bekanntlich nicht ohne Muhe.
Ohne seinen Einfluss ist die Dialektik des Konkreten von K. Kosik
[45] nicht zu denken. In diesem bedeutsamen Werk wird die Kon-
zeption einer offenen Dialektik und einer produktiven geschicht-
lichen Praxis entwickelt, in die wichtige Elemente der Husserl-
schen Konstitutionslehre und, allerdings kritischer, Heideggersche
Themen eingeschmolzen sind. Schliesslich hat sich urn Lukacs
herum eine 'Budapester Schule' gebildet, innerhalb derer A. Heller,
M. Vajda und G. Markus philosopisch besonders hervorragen. Es
spiegelt sich hier die grossere Aufgeschlossenheit fUr phanomenolo-
gische Frageweisen wider, die Lukacs in seinen spiiten Schriften
Zur Eigenart des Asthetischen und Zur Ontologie des gesellschaft-
lichen Seins [46] an den Tag legt. 9 Einige der erwahnten Autoren
und viele der im folgenden zu behandelnden Probleme finden sich
wieder in den vier von Waldenfels, Broekman und PaZanin hera us-
gegebenen Banden zu Phiinomenologie und Marxismus [4], in
denen Phanomenologen und Marxisten aus westlichen und ostli-
chen Landern einen gemeinsamen Gesprachsboden suchen.
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 229

3. SPEZIFISCHE PROBLEMFELDER

Abschliessend mochte ich das Augenmerk auf einige besondere

Problemfelder lenken, in denen sich neuere Forschungsschwer-
punkte abzeichnen. Die Problemfelder sind komplex und nicht
selten mit heterogenen Bestandstucken besetzt, und wo Ande-
rungen auftreten, haben sie nicht die Form spektakularer Um-
brii che , sondern langsamer Verschiebungen, die allerdings urn so
nachhaltiger sein konnten. Es zeigt sich, dass manche Fragen, die in
der polemischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Phanomenologie eine
solche Rolle gespielt haben und teils noch spielen, in den Hinter-
grund treten. Die Verflechtung von egologisch konzipierter Phano-
menologie und verstehender Soziologie erweist sich in beiden
Richtungen als untauglich, die neuen Fragen aufzufangen. Das Ge-
wicht verschiebt sich auf soziale Prozesse und Strukturen, inner-
halb derer die Subjekte ihren Platz einnehmen und einen Sinn zu-
standebringen. Damit rucken Phanomenologie und Marxismus
naher iusammen, auch dart, wo weiterhin Anlass zu theoretischen
Auseinandersetzungen besteht.

3.1. Lebenswelt und Alltag

Das Thema des Alltags ist in den letzten Jahren explosiv hervorge-
treten. Nicht nur in der Soziologie, sondern auch in der Ethnogra-
phie, der Linguistik, der Historie und der Literaturtheorie haufen
sich Untersuchungen uber Alltagswissen, Alltagshandeln, Alltags-
sprache und Alltagsriten, und es fallt nicht leicht, dass Knauel
wissenschaftlicher und ausserwissenschaftlicher Motive zu ent-
wirren. tO Theoriestiicke von Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, Wittgen-
stein, M. Weber, Marx und Lukacs finden sich in einem Kontext
wieder, der einige Jahre vorher nicht zu erahnen war. Bei aller
Verschiedenheit zeichnen sich einige gemeinsame Grundlinien abo
Dart, wo die Idee des Alltags eine gehorige Stosskraft entwickelt,
handelt es sich nicht bloss urn die Erschliessung eines neuen For-
schungsbereichs, sondern urn eine deutliche Anderung des Status
philosophischer . und empirischer Theorien. Alltagserfahrungen
haben eine eigene Valenz. Ihre Sinnstrukturen und Regelungen er-
schliessen sich dem Theoretiker nur, wenn er - sei es auch noch so
distanziert - an sie anknupft und an ihnen parti_zipiert, so wie
jeder, der eine Sprache analysieren will, sie zuvor lernen muss. An
230 B. Waldenfels

die Stelle 'von beobachtendem Subjekt und Gegenstand tritt das

komplexere Verhaltnis von Subjekt und Gegenspieler', wie Haber-
mas pragnant formuliert ([ 9], S. 189). Trotz verschiedener Be-
wertung des Alltags, die vom Vertrauen auf einen Common sense
liber eine neutrale Sichtnahme bis zur Kritik an bornierten Ver-
haltnissen reicht, herrscht die Uberzeugung vor, dass die alltag-
liche Lebenspraxis, der einst so genannte Bereich der 'Sitte', der
Ort ist, wo tiefgreifende Anderungen anzusiedeln sind. Das Miss-
trauen gegenliber grossen L6sungen, den Aufschwiingen Einzelner
oder den politischen Haupt- und Staatsaktionen, spiegelt die zuneh-
mende Erfahrung wider, wie sehr Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte
in die Anonymitat von Praktiken und Techniken eingesenkt sind
und wie wenig der Sinn frei verfligbar ist. Es gibt Anzeichen daflir,
dass sich nicht nur der Umgang mit wissenschaftlichen Methoden
andert, sondern auch die Auffassung des Politis chen im weitesten
Sinne. Der Widerstand gegen einen Methodenzwang weitet sich
seIber aus zu einem Kampf gegen den Institutionenzwang. Es
scheint mir keine Frage, dass hiermit phanomenologische und
marxistische Aspirationen entscheidend getroffen sind. Auf diese
Zusammenhange werde ich mich beschranken miissen, obwhol es
verlockend ware, eine Verbindung etwa zu Wittgensteins Lebens-
formen, zu Barthes' semiologischer Erforschung von Alltags-
my then, Foucaults Archivstudien und seiner Diskurstheorie oder
zu Kuhns und Feyerabends Revolutionierung der Wissenschafts-
geschichte herzustellen. Ich knlipfe in meiner klarenden Oberschau
zunachst bei Husserl, dann bei Marx an.
In seiner Krisis-Abhandlung rlickt Husserl die Alltagsproblema-
tik in den weiteren Horizont einer transzendentalen Theorie der
Lebenswelt, die auch den eigentlichen Problemtitel abgibt.l1 Die
Lebenswelt ist nicht Gegenstand direkter Beschreibung, sondern
einer methodischen Riickfrage. Kants auf Rousseau gemlinzter
Anspruch lasst sich auch hier anwenden: es geht nicht darum, auf
einen frliheren Zustand zUrUckzugehen, sondern auf altere Schich-
ten zurUckzusehen. Die Lebenswelt erhalt dabei verschiedene
Funktionen. In ihrer Anschaulichkeit ist sie Boden und Horizont
aller wissenschaftlichen und technischen Konstruktionen; in ihrer
Relativitat gibt sie den Leitfaden ab flir den Einstieg in die tran-
szendentale Sphare der Sinnkonstitution; in ihrer synthetischen
Totalitat erscheint sie als Einigungsinstanz aller historischen Kul-
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 231

turwelten und beruflichen Sonderwelten. Die Lebenswelt ist damit

von vornherein verschiedenen Vermittlungen unterworfen. Alles
Gegebene ist nur verstandlich als konstituiertes Sinngebilde, es
unterliegt universalen Strukturregeln und ist in seinem Werden auf
universale Zweckideen hingeordnet. Ais Disziplin, die zugleich
transzendental und eidetisch angelegt ist, richtet die Phanomenolo-
gie ihre Wissenschaftskritik gegen einen Objektivismus, der das
Sinnfundament der Erfahrung vergisst, gegen einen Empirismus,
der die eidetisch-strukturalen Voraussetzungen unterschlagt, und
gegen einen Technizismus, der die eigene Geschichte und ihre Ziel-
strebigkeit vernachlassigt. In ihrer konkreten Gestalt umfasst die
Lebenswelt auch noch die Gebilde der Wissenschaft; die Alltiig-
lichkeit in Form von 'alltiiglicher Lebenswelt', Alltagserkenntnis',
'Alltagswahrheit', oder wie es sonst heissen mag, markiert inner-
halb der Lebenswelt den Bereich einer Erfahrung, die nicht aus
kilnstlich methodischen Massnahmen erwiichst, und auch der
Gegensatz zwischen 'alltiiglich Erforderlichem' und 'einbrechen-
dem Neuen' fiillt in den Bereich einer Lebenswelt, die seIber ihre
offenen Horizonte hat. Die Differenz von Alltagswelt und spezi-
fischen Sonderwelten wird unterlaufen durch die grundlegendere
Unterscheidung zwischen dem Leben in der Welt, an der auch
die Wissenschaft teilhat, und einer Aufkliirung dieses Lebenszu-
sammenhangs, die den Ubergang von der natilrlichen in die tran-
szendentale Einstellung voraussetzt. Der 'verachteten Doxa' wird
gegenilber der objektiven Episteme der Wissenschaften ihr Recht
zurilckgegeben, doch dies geschieht, indem die Doxa sich in die
hohere Episteme einer transzendentalen Vernunftwissenschaft
und einer von ihr geleiteten Vernunftpraxis verwandelt. Die tra-
dierte Alltagsempirie hat das erste, aber nicht das letzte Wort;
ihre Selbstverstiindlichkeiten und Begrenzungen werden durch-
brochen im Zuge einer universalen, normierenden Kritik, die
eine zunachst im Verborgenen wirkende Vernunftteleologie ilber
sich selbst aufkliirt und ihr so zum offenen Durchbruch verhiIft.
Bei Schiltz findet, wie schon angedeutet, eine erhebliche Blick-
verengung und Blickverschiebung statt. Die methodische Zurilck-
haltung, die Schiltz ilbt und in der er den Schwierigkeiten eines
transzendentalen Solipsismus zu entkommen hofft, hat sachliche
Konsequenzen. Schiltz begnilgt sich mit einer 'Ontologie der
Lebenswelt', die doch filr Husserl nur eine Anfangsstufe bildet,
232 B. Waldenfels

und er lasst die transzendentale Grundlegung auf sich beruhen. Die

Alltagswelt (common sense world, world of daily life) tritt nun,
nachdem die Lebenswelt sich von ihrer transzendentalen Folie
abgelost hat, in den Mittelpunkt als die 'ausgezeichnete Wirklich-
keit' der Lebenspraxis, die sich von den 'mannigfachen Wirklich-
keiten' auch von denen der Wissenschaft, Kunst, Philo sophie und
Religion, abhebt. Die Alltagswelt pluralisiert sich zu historisch und
geseUschaftlich differenzierten Alltagsmilieus, die nicht mehr
durch eine Vernunftgeschichte zusammengehalten werden und da-
mit auch der kritischen Perspektive verlustig gehen. Als Barriere
gegen eine historistische Auflosung in eine Typenvielfalt bleibt
nur der Ruckgang auf universale Strukturen, deren Rahmenwerk
empirisch aufzufiiUen ist. Der Vorteil, dass der Alltag damit einer
empirischen Detailforschung zuganglich gemacht wird, wird be-
zahlt durch den Verlust der Husserlschen Tiefendimension und
ihrer Universalitat. Gewiss ist Husserls Losung empfindlicher Kri-
tik ausgesetzt, und es findet sich bei Schutz einiges, was diese
Kritik vorantreiben konnte, doch dann mussten radikale Alterna-
tiven angeboten werden, die sich wirklich mit Husserls Losung
messen konnen. Sofern dies nicht geschieht und ein theoretisches
Vakuum bleibt, scheint Schutz marxistischen Ansatzen ferner zu
stehen als Husserl mit seinem transzendentalen Idealismus und
auch als M. Weber, der mit Nietzscheschen Augen die Auflosung
einer substantieUen Geschichtsvernunft konstatiert und auf Wert-
konflikte gerat, die durch pure Zweckrationalitat nicht auszu-
raumen sind (vgl. hierzu die von der Bachelardschen Wissen-
schaftstheorie gepragte Kritik von Hindess [51] , Kap. 1-3).
In den marxistischen Theorien des Alltags uberwiegt dessen ge-
sellschaftliche Funktion gegenuber der epistemologischen Funk-
tion, und die kritische Perspektive ist ein fundamentaler Bestand-
teil der jeweiligen Theorie. Das Pendant zum Husserlschen Ruck-
gang auf die Lebenswelt ist der Rekurs auf den 'wirklichen Lebens-
prozess', wo die Menschen 'ihr eigenes Leben taglich neu machen'
(Deutsche Ideologie). Dieser Alltag ist unter den Bedingungen
einer WarengeseUschaft gekennzeichnet durch Schein und Zwang,
und eine Befreiung des Alltags ist nur zu erwarten, 'sob aId die
Verhaltnisse des praktischen Werkeltagslebens den Menschen tag-
taglich durchsichtig vernunftige Beziehungen zueinander und zur
Natur darstellen' (Kapital, Bd. I). Marx hat in seinen okono-
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 233

mischen Schriften den Alltag vorwiegend von seinen institutionel-

len Bedingungen her thematisiert; neuere Versuche zielen dahin,
die Perspektive der Subjekte, die diesen Bedingungen unterworfen
sind, Deformationen am eigenen Leibe erfahren und gemeinsam
Anderungen initiieren konnen, sHirker zu berlicksichtigen. Hieraus
ergeben sich vielfache Berlihrungen mit der Phanomenologie. Die
Versuche seIber laufen aufverschiedenen Bahnen, und die Konzep-
tion des Alltags ist keineswegs einheitlich.
Ais erster hat H. Lefevbre die Alltagsproblematik aus marxisti-
scher Sicht aufgegriffen. In seiner Kritik des Alltagslebens, die
kurz nach dem 2. Weltkrieg erschien und in ihrer dramatischen Zu-
spitzung noch ein Reflex des von ihr bekampften Nachkriegs-
existentialismus ist, bildet der Alltag den Schnittpunkt zwischen
gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnissen und individuellen Bedlirfnissen.
Ausgehend yom Kontrast zwischen Elend und Reichtum, zwischen
Gewohnlichem und Aussergewohnlichem setzt Lefevbre die Veran-
derungskrafte im Alltag an. In seinem neuen Werk La vie quoti-
dienne dans la monde moderne [52] ist eine Ernlichterung einge-
treten; die Alltaglichkeit hat sich verandert, indem das Subjekt
mehr und mehr zu einem Objekt der gesellschaftlichen Organisa-
tion geworden ist. Auch dieser erneute Versuch, die 'demlitige
Vernunft des Alltagslebens' zu beschworen, bleibt weitgehend
rhapsodisch, getragen von Apen;us.
Praziser angelegt ist das Kapitel liber 'Die Metaphysik des all-
taglichen Lebens' bei K. Kosik [45]. Die Alltaglichkeit ist hier
in erster Linie die 'Gliederung des individuellen Lebens im Rah-
men jeden Tages'; sie hat ihre eigene Erfahrung und Weisheit, und
das Aussergewohnliche und Feiertagliche gehort zunachst mit
hinzu. Die Abspaltung des letzteren resultiert aus einer Mystifi-
zierung, die in der Entgegensetzung von Alltag und Geschichte
einen entfremdeten Alltag schafft, die 'Religion des Alltagslebens'
(Marx). Heideggers Philo sophie der Sorge wird der Vorwurf ge-
macht, dass sie diese Mystifizierung mitmacht, statt sie zu durch-
schauen. Die Ambivalenz der Alltaglichkeit ist schliesslich in ihr
selbst angelegt, sofern sie die wahre Wirklichkeit zugleich enthlillt
und verhlillt. Uberspringen lasst sie sich nicht, ohne dass sich die
Wirklichkeit entleert.
Den geschlossensten und differenziertesten Versuch verdanken
wir schliesslich A. Heller [48, 53]. Die Autorin setzt Gedanken
234 B. Waldenfels

des spiiten Lukacs fort und definiert das Alltagsleben als 'die Ge-
samtheit der Tiitigkeiten der Individuen zu ihrer Reproduktion,
welche jeweils die Moglichkeit zur gesellschaftlichen Reproduktion
schaffen' ([ 48], S. 24). Triiger dieses Prozesses ist der 'konkret
Einzelne', der eine bestimmte Stellung in der Gesellschaft ein-
nimmt; so gesehen ist das Alltagsleben nicht nur Spiegel der histo-
risch-gesellschaftlichen Prozesse, sondern 'geheime Hefe der Ge-
schichte' (S. 25). Die Art und Weise, wie die Gesellschaft in der
Tiitigkeit des Einzelnen gegenwiirtig ist, differiert im Laufe der Ge-
schichte. Das entfremdete Alltagsleben ist eine Kampfstiitte, da-
durch gekennzeichnet, dass der Einzelne in seiner Partikularitiit
verharrt, und nur insofern hat die Auffassung des Alltags als Kon-
sumtionssphiire und Privatleben ein gewisses Recht. Die Dynamik
der Geschichte lebt davon, dass der partikuliire Einzelne sich zum
Individuum fortbildet, d.h. zu einem Wesen, das ein bewu{3tes
Verhiiltnis zum Gattungsmiissigen entwickelt. Arbeit, Sprache,
Moral, Politik und Recht, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Philo sophie und
auf anfiingliche Weise auch die Religion sind die objektivierenden
Miichte, die diesen Prozess vorantreiben und ein 'Austreten' aus
dem Alltag ermoglichen. Doch dabei sind Alltagsleben und nicht-
alltiigliche Tiitigkeiten und Denkformen nicht durch 'eine chine-
sische Mauer' voneinander geschieden; 'die gattungsmassigen Ob-
jektivationen fUr sich gehen stets yom Alltag aus und munden
stets in den Alltag ein' (S. 107), mit Husserl konnte man von
einem 'Einstromen' sprechen. So betrachtet ist die alltiigliche,
'natiirliche Einstellung' - wie es in ausdrucklicher Anspielung
auf Husserl heisst (S. 268 f.) - Fundament aller ubrigen Ein-
stellungen. Die Art und Weise, wie hier dem Alltagsbewusstsein
sein Recht gelassen und es dennoch uber sich selbst hinausgehoben
wird, hat - bei aller Verschiedenheit - in der Tat einiges mit
Husserls Theorie gemein. Demgegenuber bewegt sich der Versuch
von Th. Leithiiuser [54], Phanomenologie, Psychoanalyse und
Marxismus zu einer kritischen Hermeneutik des Alltags zu ver-
einen, in einem engeren Radius, wenn er beim Alltagsbewu{3t-
sein ansetzt, dieses als fragmentarisch, borniert und verdinglicht
begreift und wenn er die phiinomenologische Analyse eines Hus-
serl und Schutz nur als Reflex dieser verzerrten Bewusstseins-
weise gelten lasst. Das Alltagsbewusstsein entpuppt sich hier nur
als mystifiziertes Klassenbewusstsein.
Soziaiphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenoiogie und Marxismus 235

Die entscheidenden Unterschiede der verschiedenen Konzep-

tionen liegen also darin, wie das UnalWigliche charakterisiert ist,
das mit dem AllHiglichen kontrastiert, und ob und wie ein Aus-
bruch auf der AllHiglichkeit vorgesehen ist. Die folgenden Pro-
bleme fiihren uns noch mehr an diese Unterschiede heran.

3.2 Typik und Relevanz

Bei der Analyse Ie bensweltlicher Strukturen spielen Typik und
Relevanz eine entscheidende Rolle. Typik bezeiehnet die konkrete
Allgemeinheit, die im Wahrnehmen und Handeln strukturierend
am Werk ist und darin zum Ausdruck kommt, als was uns etwas
oder jemand wiederholt begegnet. Durch Typisierung entsteht eine
Welt der Vertrautheit. Die Relevanz kommt ins Spiel, sofern jede
typisierende Deutung selektiv ist und sich unter dem Antrieb ent-
sprechender Interessen Bedeutsames von Nichtbedeutsamem
scheidet. Auf diese Weise kommt es zur Organisation eines Er-
fahrungs- und Handlungsfeldes, das immer ein bestimmtes Relief
zeigt. Dieses Feld ist kein abgegrenzter und geschlossener Bereich;
denn das Atypische wird zwar beiseitegesetzt, das Irrelevante an
den Rand des Bewusstseins gedrangt, doch beides ist damit nieht
ein fUr allemal ausgeschieden. In Problem- und Krisensituationen
kann 'Neuartiges' (Schiltz [28], S. 108) durchbrechen, das sich
keinem vorhandenen Schema fUgt und somit eine Umstrukturie-
rung des Feldes erzwingt (vgl. hierzu Abschnitt 2 u. 3 in Sprondel
und Grathoff [35]).
Diese Uberlegungen bewegen sich auf der mittleren Ebene kon-
kreter Ordnungen, also zwischen rein en Wesensstrukturen und em-
pirischen Tatsachen. Sie sind Anlass fUr empirische Untersuchun-
gen von Normalisierungs- und Anomalisierungsprozessen, die zum
Beispiel in der medizinischen und juridischen Praxis eine ent-
scheidende Rolle spielen. Auch die Ethnomethodologie und ver-
wandte Forschungsarten befassen sich mit solchen Alltagsprak-
tiken, deren Kontextbezogenheit und 'Indexikalitat' (Garfinkel)
der strengen Regelhaftigkeit Grenzen setzt. Es zeiehnet sieh hier
so etwas ab wie eine 'Poetik' des Handelns, die nicht mit vorge-
fassten Zielen arbeitet, sondern sieh mit der Zielsetzung, die in
der Handlung seIber stattfindet, mit der Definition von Situa-
tionen und ahnlichen befasst. Marxistische Autoren find en in
diesem Feld einen Ansatzpunkt fUr ihre kritische Analyse. Typi-
236 B. Waldenfels

sierungsprozesse haben als solche einen eminent praktischen Bezug

und sind ein Feld fUr die Ausubung von Herrschaftszwangen. Ste-
reotypisierung bedeutet eine systematische Beschrankung der Er-
fahrungsmoglichkeiten, Marx' Begriff der 'Charaktermaske' lasst
sich fUr eine Kritik der Rollenverteilung nutzen, und Schutz'
'sozial auferlegte Relevanz' entpuppt sich auch als sozial er-
zwungene Relevanz. Entsprechende Erwagungen finden sich nicht
nur bei Heller und Leithauser, sondern auch in Bourdieus ethnolo-
gisch fundierter Theorie des Praxis [55] oder in Srubars Versuch.
Schutzsche Kategorien fUr eine Theorie sozialer Lebens-Welten bei
Marx zu nutzen (in: Waldenfels [4], Bd. 3 u. 4). Doch die Schwie-
rigkeiten liegen woanders. Wie ist das Durchbrechen der vertrauten
Alltagswelt zu denken und wie gehen Repetitionen in Inventionen
uber? Die gangige Losung, die von Husserl uber marxistische Auto-
ren bis zu Habermas reicht, lautet 'Universalisierung'. Doch was
ist davon zu erwarten? Entweder handelt es sich urn ein abstrakt
A llgemeines , das nur den Rahmen abgibt fUr konkrete Entwurfe
und diese unerklart lasst. Die Berufung auf invariante Strukturen
krankt unter diesem Mangel, und das fUhrt zu dem Disput, ob und
wieweit Husserls Lebenswelt geschichtlich konzipiert ist (vgl.
Landgrebe [56], Pazanin [57], bes. Abschnitt 5). Oder man zielt
auf ein konkret Allgemeines und macht aus dem Neuartigen ein
Hoheres und Umfassenderes. Doch diese Losung stosst sich an der
Tatsache, dass selektive Deutungssysteme Alternativen verkorpern,
die sich ebensowenig zu einer einheitlichen Gesamtstruktur zu-
sammenschliessen wie Einzelsprachen sich nicht einer kunftigen
Universalsprache zuordnen lassen. Ein moglicher Ausweg aus die-
sem Dilemma bestunde darin, dass man auf Transformations- uno
Ubersetzungsprozesse rekuriert, in denen die Differenzen gewahrt
bleiben. Uberlegungen, die im Bereich des sogenannten Struktura-
lismus bei Foucault und Althusser entstanden, weisen in eine ahn-
liche Richtung, ebenso die Paradigmen-Theorie von Th. Kuhn. Fur
den Marxisten spitzt sich dies auf die Frage zu, wieweit Hegels aufs
Ganze gehende Geschichtsteleologie in Konflikt gerat mit der Pro-
duktivitat gesellschaftlicher Praxis. In dieser Frage gibt es keine
eindeutigen Fronten zwischen Phiinomenologen und Marxisten.

3.3. lnteraktion und Kommunikation

Geht man von beweglichen Strukturen einer sozialen Lebenswelt
Sozialphilosophie zwischen Phiinomenologie und Marxismus 237

aus, so ergeben sich Moglichkeiten, ein 'Zwischenreich des Dialogs'

(Waldenfels [58]) zUriickzugewinnen und eine 'dialogische Phiino-
menologie' (Strasser [59]) zu entwickeln, die nicht mehr auf eine
egologische Fundierung angewiesen ist und nicht mehr zum me-
thodischen Individualismus M. Webers ihre Zuflucht nehmen muss,
wenn sie eine Hypostasierung des Gesellschaftlichen vermeiden
Will. 12 Soziales Handeln besteht dann nicht mehr bloss darin, dass
das Handeln des Einzelnen sich seinem Sinne nach am Verhalten
anderer orientiert, sondern es bedeutet gemeinsames Handeln,
und Kommunikation besagt dann nicht mehr bloss Weitergabe
eines Sinnes, sondern gemeinsame Sinnbildung in der Verflech-
tung eigenen und fremden Verhaltens. Dies setzt voraus, dass die
Subjekte sich von vornherein in dialogischen Strukturen bewegen
und kommunikativen Prozessen ihr Selbstsein verdanken. Merleau-
Ponty hat hier friihzeitig entscheidende Akzente gesetzt, indem er
auf die leibliche Koexistenz - eine 'intercorporeitite' - zuriick-
ging und auch das sprachliche Geschehen darin fundierte. 13 Inso-
fern er auf einem 'gemeinsamen Boden' beharrt, der aller indivi-
duellen Aneignung vorausgeht, trifft er sich mit Vorstellungen,
wie sie Volosinov [63] schon on den 30er Jahren zusammen mit
Bachtin innerhalb des russischen Formalismus entwickelte, in
einer Schrift iiber Marxismus und Sprachphilosophie, die erst
seit kurzem einem weiteren Publikum zuganglich geworden ist. 14
Hier Mfnet sich ein reiches Forschungsfeld, das weit liber die
Grenzen von Phanomenologie und Marxismus hinausgreift. Zu er-
innern ist an die Interaktions- und Konversationsanalysen, die A.
Strauss, E. Goffman oder R. Turner im Gefoige Meads unter-
nehmen, an die Untersuchungen, die sich an Eriksons Begriff der
Identitat anschliessen, an die angelsachsische Sprechakttheorie,
an Diskursanalysen, wie die von J. Kristeva - mit einem Textmo-
dell arbeiten, an die vielfaItig ausgerichteten semiotischen For-
schungen und an anderes mehr. Die Phiinomenologie setzt hier,
auch dort, wo sie gegeniiber ihren Anfangen umgelernt hat, be-
sondere Akzente: etwa, indem sie gegenliber einem drohenden
Linguismus an der Differenz zwischen sprachlichen und ausser-
sprachlichen Strukturen festhalt, die leibliche Verankerung aller
Sinn- und Selbstbildung betont, den nicht-verbalen Hintergrund
der Rede einbezieht, und fUr die offenen Horizonte und die Viel-
deutigkeiten jeglicher Sinnbildung empfanglich bleibt, wahrend
238 B. Waldenfels

der Marxismus besonders darauf beharrt, da{3 die Resultate, die

durch Mikroanalysen zutage treten, in sich selbst bereits geseU-
schaftlich vermittelt sind.

3.4. Deskription und Kritik

Eine letzte Frage betrifft das Verhiiltnis von Beschreibung und Kri-
tik; dies ist eine mehr als methodische Frage, da die kritische Per-
spektive mit dariiber befindet, wie die Lebens- und Alltagswelt
konzipiert wird. Schon gar nicht lassen sich Beschreibung und Kri-
tik auf Phanomenologie und Marxismus aufteilen. Marxisten wer-
den sich besonders dagegen wenden, dass Machtfragen hinter einer
rein en Deskription verschwinden oder dass die Kritik ihren Weg
nimmt iiber eine blosse Bewusstseinsveranderung. Phanomenolo-
gen beharren umgekehrt darauf, dass eine Ideologiekritik bodenlos
bleibt, wenn sie nicht von einer Zugehorigkeit zur Tradition aus-
geht, in der die 'Ideologie' zuniichst eine integrative Rolle spielt,
bevor sie eine Verschleierungsfunktion iibernimmt (vgl. Ricoeur
und O'Neill in Waldenfels [4], Bd. 1 u. 3). Ausserdem, wenn die
Universalisierungstendenz sich angesichts kontingenter Deutungs-
systeme als fragwiirdig erweist, so auch eine Kritik, die mit soleh
universalen Anspriichen operiert. Spezifische Rationalitaten haben
ihre eigenen Formen der IrrationaliHit und erfordern eine spezi-
fische Weise der Kritik, die etablierte Formen von ihren Riindern
her aufsprengt, ohne eine totale Uberschau zu suggerieren. Die
beriihmte Unterscheidung von Marx: die Welt verschieden inter-
pretieren - die Welt veriindern, verliert an Gewicht, wenn sich
zeigt, dass Deutungen seIber praktisch geartet sind und veriindern-
de Praxis umgekehrt iiber Umdeutungen verliiuft.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Zur Geschichte dieser Auseinandersetzungen und ihren Nachwirkungen

in der Gegenwart vgl. Dallmayrs Beitriige in den Sammelbiinden von
Psathas [3] und Waldenfels [4], Bd. 1, ferner Zecchi [5], Bd. 2, S.
106 ff.
2. Ein Uberblick iiber die verschiedenen gesellschaftstheoretischen Ansatze
findet sich bei Bernstein [11]; Teil 3 behandelt die Phiinomenologie und
Hermeneutik, Teil 4 die Kritische Theorie. Zu letzterer vgl. auch die
Monographie von Jay [12] .
Sozia/philosophie zwischen Phiinomen%gie und Marxismus 239

3. Eine allgemeine Ubersicht iiber den Stand der Nachlassveroffentlichungen

von Hussed, Heidegger und Scheler vermittelt der Band Phiinomenolo-
gische Forschungen [14].
4. Vgl. auch den Gediichtnisband zu Scheler [16]; er enthiilt u. a. Beitriige
von Heidegger, Gadamer, H. Kuhn, Plessner, Landgrebe, Theunissen und
Gehlen und bringt im Anhang ein Werk- und Literaturverzeichnis.
5. Der programmatische Vodesungstext 'Les sciences de I'homme et la pM-
nomenologie' erschien inzwischen auf englisch (s. Natanson [17] ,Bd. I)
sowie auf deutsch, ausfUhrlich kommentiert von A. MtHraux, in den Vor-
lesungen I [18]. Vgl. femer den Sammelband Merleau-Ponty und das
Problem der Struktur in den Sozialwissenschaften, herausgegeben von
Grathoff u. Sprondel [19].
6. Was die Einwirkung der Sozialphiinomenologie auf Psychologie und
Psychiatrie angeht, so verweise ich auf die Handbuchartikel von Kisker
[36] und Blankenburg [37] .
7. Ein gutes Dokument fUr diese Theorienverflechtung ist die von Biele-
felder Soziologen herausgegebene Aufsatzsammlung [40], mit Beitriigen
u. a. von H. Blumer, A. Cicourel, H. Garfinkel, G. Psathas, J. Mathes und
F. Schiitze.
8. Jungst erschien auf franzosisch seine Prager Habilitationsschrift [44],die
schon friihzeitig das folgenschwere Thema der Lebenswelt aufgreift und
dabei auch Einfliisse des Prager Linguistenkreises verarbeitet.
9. Vd. die entsprechenden Beitriige in Lukacs, Heller u.a. [47]; besonders
hervorzuheben ist der Dialog zwischen Marxismus, Existentialismus und
Phiinomenologie, den M. Vajda uns vor Augen fiihrt; vom gleichen Autor
stammen zwei ungarisch verfasste Husserl-Monographien (Eingeklammerte
Wissenschaft, Budapest 1967, An der Grenze von Mythos und Ratio, Bu-
dapest 1968). Weitere Hinweise zur Budapester Schule finden sich in der
EinIeitung von H. Joas zu Heller [48] .
10. Versuche zu einer differenzierten Behandlung des Themas bietet der Auf-
satzband von HammerichjKlein [49]; vgl. die Beitriige der Herausgeber,
von N. Elias und vor aHem den Aufsatz von R. Grathoff, der sich aus-
driicklich auf die Phiinomenologie und die Differenz von Lebenswelt
und Alltagswelt bezieht.
11. Vgl. hierzu die grosse Monographie von Brand [50] , der die LebensweIt in
ihrer Verwiesenheit auf das Ich als 'konkretes Apriori' darzutun versucht.
12. Vgl. hierzu auch die Vorrede von Theunissen [60] zur 2. Auflage seines,
1965 erschienenen, gewichtigen Werkes Der Andere, wo sich neben
selbstkritischen Bemerkungen Hinweise auf mogliche Vermittlungen von
Transzendentalphiinomenologie, Dialogphilosophie und kritischer Gesell-
schaftslehre finden.
13. O'Neill [61, 62] bedient sich MerIeau-Pontyscher und Marxscher Gedan-
ken bei dem Versuch, den Blick der Soziologie auf relevante Lebenszu-
sammenhiinge zUrUckzulenken; der Titel einer 'wild sociology', den er
fUr sich in Anspruch nimmt, erinnert an Merleau-Pontys 'pensee sauvage'.
240 B. Waldenfels

14. Hier finden sich auch schon wichtige Uberlegungen zu einer Ideologie des
Alltagslebens (vgl. 2. T., 3. Kap.).

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On Marxist social philosophy
LESZEK NOWAK
University o[ Poznan

There is no other way to present the nature of a system of thought

except to assume some interpretation of it and explain the routes
leading to it. That is why it is better to reveal the former and the
latter clearly than to 'smuggle' them in, in the guise of descriptive
reports. This creates, of course, the risk of presenting a false pic-
ture. But such a risk always occurs, because one always adopts
some interpretation of the content and origin of the presented
doctrine; at most one can be unaware of it. Furthermore, in order
to present the nature of a doctrine in its basic features, one has
consciously to permit distortions, in abstracting from secondary
trends and accidental circumstances. Historical truth is included,
therefore, not in an exact description without any subjective dis-
tortion, but in some possible distortion. Similarly, physical truth
is not captured by the exact description of the phenomenon of
gravitation, but by the free-fall law which abstracts from the re-
sistance of the air, permitting in this way some distortion of the
phenomenon in question.!

I. Philosophers have merely given different interpretations of the

world, but the point is to change it - this is the best known of
Karl Marx's aphorisms. The aphorism reveals not only the basic
intention of Marxism but also its basic theoretical difficulty. The
latter originates from the simultaneous acceptance of the two
values advanced by Marxism from the outset. One is concerned
with reality: it should be radically changed and this change will be

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 243-275.

© 1982, Martinus Nijho!! Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
244 Leszek Nowak

carried out by the working class. And the second of the values
concerns Marxism itself: it is not accidental that Marxism precisely
says the first thing to the masses, because it is the scientific theory
of the historical process. Those two values - social messianism
and the intrinsically scientific nature of the theory - lie at the
foundation of the Marxist understanding of the world. How is the
scientific theory of history possible, from which it would follow
that the liberation of the working class is the liberation of the
whole of humanity? - this is the fundamental problem of Marxism.
This problem was neither clearly formulated nor clearly solved
by the creators of Marxism. They have provided only some of the
elements of its solution. And the intellectual history of Marxism
is, to a great extent, the history of the controversy between two
approaches to the problem: the first assumed the idea of the
liberation of the working class and established a model of science
in such a way as to allow this idea to be justified in a scientific
manner; whereas the second assumed a definite model of science
and advanced a social programme of a type which could be based
on the scientific theory of history. The social history of Marxism,
however, is the history of victories won by a third orientation:
that which combined the ideas of social messianism and of the
intrinsically scientific nature of the theory, without any theoreti-
cal justification, but because of practical necessities of a different
nature.

2. The lack of a clear formulation and solution of this problem

already led to certain serious ambiguities within the framework of
Marx's and Engels' social philosophy. In some contexts they
pointed to the contradiction between the forces of production
and the relations of production, in others to the struggle between
the antagonistic classes, as the basic mechanism of historical
change. The contradiction between the forces of production and
the relations of production (and also derivative contradictions,
between the economic base and the politico-legal superstructure,
etc.) can be expressed in the form of a social law - the social
programme is yet to be defined. The idea of the class struggle im-
mediately provides the programme of the liberation of the work-
ing class - whereas it is still unknown which social law substanti-
ates it.
 On Marxist social philosophy 245

The classics of Marxism themselves attempted to cope with this

difficulty, saying that class struggle is the 'manifestation' of the
objective contradiction between the forces of production and the
relations of production. However, it was not clear: this contra-
diction does not entail the conflict of interests between the two
antagonistic classes. The development of technology is usually
connected with the interests of the class of owners of means of
production - by means of it the class is able to gain more sur-
plus product. And the change of the hitherto dominant relations
of production is usually connected with the interests of the new,
growing class of owners - this class aims at establishing new rela-
tions of production, to their own advantage. But if this is so, then
the interests of the exploited class cannot be defined in terms of a
contradiction between the forces of production and the relations
of production at all. Nor did the suppositions made in the classics
fit the historical facts. It was not, after all, slaves who caused the
establishment of feudalism, but their owners, who changed the
relations of production in order to achieve higher profits and, by
doing this, transformed slaves into feudal peasants and them-
selves into feudal lords. Similarly, the passage to capitalism took
place not as a result of class struggle of peasants against feudals,
but as a result of the comming into being of the new, industrial
branch of economy that generated the new social system of antag-
onistic classes: bourgeoisie - proletariat. It was bourgeoisie, not
peasants, who fought with feudals in order to abolish the feudal
relations of production and their corresponding superstructure. 2

So, where is the origin of the idea that the driving force behind
historical change is the class struggle between the antagonistic
classes (slaves - their owners, peasants - feudal landlords, etc.)?
One may conjecture that it has been advanced as the justification
for the postulated model of socialist revolution which was to oc-
cur, according to the founders of Marxism, as a result of the strug-
gle between the two antagonistic classes of the capitalist system:
the bourgeoisie and the working class. In order to justify the
planned and promised model of this revolution, the general thesis
was put forward that the mechanism of the transition from one
socio-economic formation to another always consists in the strug-
gle between the antagonistic classes. Perhaps this idea can be based
246 Leszek Nowak

on Marxist social theory - though up till now it has not been

proved. The fact remains, however, that it was not proved by the
founders of Marxism, who simply added this idea to the body of
the laws of historical materialism. As a result, in the classical
works themselves historical materialism was already theoretically
heterogeneous. It was compsed of the doctrine of the class strug-
gle, substantiating the idea of the working class as the liberator of
humanity, and of the theory of historical development. This
basic ambiguity of the Marxism of Karl Marx has led to the three
fundamental trends in the interpretation of historical materialism.
The first perpetuates the ambiguity of the original version (there-
fore I shall call it orthodox), the two others seek to overcome
this ambiguity - either proposing the idea of the class struggle
and giving up the conception of the laws of history (the praxistic
trend), or putting forward the conception of the laws of history
and diminishing the role of the class struggle to that of modifier
of the course of history (the nomological trend).

3. Historical experience since the turn of the century has shown

clearly that the working class is far from being the revolutionary
force - left to itself it produces only the trade-unionist conscious-
ness. That lack of revolutionary consciousness was explained by
the political doctrine of social democracy as the best proof that
the socio-economic conditions indispensable for the transition
to socialism have not yet matured. On this subject, the political
doctrine of Leninism said completely the opposite: one should
not wait for the working of the laws of history, but should utilize
all resistance of the masses (including non-workers), originating
from any source, against the bourgeois state, and carry out the rev-
olution on the rising wave of social movement. The revolution
can be carried out only on the condition that the various mass
aspirations are channelled and this may be achieved only by a
well-organized, disciplined party which is directed by a homo-
geneous ideology. It is to take over state power and then to intro-
duce socialist relations of production. Socialism is to be intro-
duced; to expect that it will arise out of capitalism on the strength
of economic laws is sheer optimism.
This political controversy was not reflected simply on the
theoretical level. It is true that on the one side the political pro-
 On Marxist social philosophy 247

gramme of social democracy was based on the nomological inter-

pretation of historical materialism, known today as the 'Marxism
of the second International'. In the framework of this system of
thought, one referred to those ideas in the classics which revealed
the driving force of the laws of history; these ideas were applied
and developed. In this picture of history the class struggle ap-
peared instead as an important but secondary factor, as the real-
ization of necessary regularities. On the other side, however, his-
torical materialism as interpreted by Lenin belongs entirely to
the orthodox line - Lenin is repeating the main theoretical am-
biguity of the founders of Marxism. His justification for the polit-
ical programme refers directly to the doctrine of the class strug-
gle, but he supplements it - following Marx - with the theory of
the historical process based primarily on the idea of contradiction
between the forces of production and the relations of production.
The course of the revolutionary movement has created, then,
the demand for a theory which stresses the class struggle as the
basic mechanism of history and reinterprets the whole Marxian
social philosophy as being the justification of the act of revolu-
tion. And such a theory was found - it was the praxistic inter-
pretation of Marxism of G. Lukacs. 3
For Lukacs the view that the socialist revolution is to be car-
ried out on the strength of the objective regularities expresses
only the mystified situation of an individual living in a bourgeois
society. Such an individual refers to the social reality which he
(together with others) has created as if it were an unfamiliar phe-
nomenon of 'nature', governed by powerful 'laws'. The individual
can aspire not to the abolishing of those 'laws', but at most
to the passive utilization of them for his egotistical advantage,
thus to the further isolation of himself from other individuals,
to the deepening of the atomization inherent in capitalist society.
This false consciousness of society is also seen in the theoretical
doctrine of social democracy, eschewing what for authentic
Marxism is fundamental and what was emphasized so strongly by
Leninism - the dialectics of the revolutionary process.
It is the social class which can be the subject of the revolution-
ary process and, by the same token, the real subject of history. It
is such a social class which, owing to its position within the social
structure, attains both the consciousness of its own particular
nature (i.e. of its position) and the consciousness of the social
248 Leszek Nowak

whole. Because of this, the social class - actual subject of history

- can perfonn global practices and transform the whole socio-
economic order. The revolutionary praxis of such a class implies,
therefore, abolition of the 'object fonn of social life', and aboli-
tion of so-<:alled social 'laws'. During the revolutionary period it
becomes clear that these 'laws' govern at most isolated behaviour
of the human individual, but are themselves subject to the revo-
lutionary praxis of the real historical force.
Has the working class - asks LukAcs - attained that conscious-
ness of the social whole which enables the class to play the role of
the actual subject at the present time? It may seem that it has not
- as it does not generate the revolutionary consciousness itself.
But this is a mere appearance, because the consciousness of the
historically active class is never inherent in it - it forms, and
does so precisely in the course of the revolutionary process. That
is why the current consciousness of the workers should be care-
fully distinguished from the potential consciousness of the prole-
tariat, that is, from the 'limit' consciousness which the class would
possess, if the revolutionary process were completely realized. The
activity of the Party, even if not justified at a given historical mo-
ment by the current consciousness of the workers, is after all legit-
imized by the potential consciousness of the proletariat; it ex-
presses the latter and introduces it into the empirical working
class.
Within this perspective the Russian revolution presents itself
not 'as an historical anomaly, nor as the beginning of a different
branch of social development, but as the establishment of a socie-
ty of the new type. Formation of the socialist society in Russia
turns out to be legitimized not because it comes under 'objective
laws' of history, but since it is the result of the class struggle car-
ried on by the actual subject of history.
Lukacsism was the actual philosophy of Leninism, giving a
systematic justification for Lenin's political programme. At the
same time, however, Lukacs's philosophy was evidently at variance
with the philosophy of Lenin - the latter repeated Marx's ambi-
guities. Hence Lukacsism opened the praxistic interpretation of
Marxism, while Leninism, i.e. the philosophy of Lenin, belonged
to the orthodox trend in Marxism.
In that way the twenties brought the division of Marxist social
 On Marxist social philosophy 249

philosophy into nomological, orthodox, and praxistic trends. The

fIrst was ideologically related to social democracy, while the
second - to communists.

4. Of those three interpretations, only the orthodox one was able

to play the role of the ideology of the new socialist society. The
nomological interpretation was not proper for that purpose,
simply because in its light the rising of that society appeared to
be an historical anomaly. Contrary to appearances, this role
could not be played by the praxistic interpretation either, since
it stressed too much the role of the masses. Soviet society became
transformed into a Stalinist type system, where the control of the
means of coercion, the means of economic production and the
means of intellectual production was in the hands of the same
category of people. As this category alienated the masses, the
presently so-<:alled faults and deviations of the Stalinist period
advanced further and further. It is quite obvious, then, that the
Lukacs conception of the historical subject as being able to
abolish the established social order, with its petrifIed objective
'laws', could not be accepted by people introducing a new order
of that kind. For automatically - and, as it turned out, indepen-
dently of the intention of Lukacs himself - there arose the ques-
tion of who was to be the new subject of history, having at his
disposal the true consciousness of the new social whole. To answer
that it was civic society, or some part of it, would necessarily in-
fringe on the interests of the then controllers of the means of
coercion, production and indoctrination. At most they could
ascribe the true consciousness of the new social whole to them-
selves. But even this did not lie in their interests, since it would
mean that the Stalinist type authority would take on full respon-
sibility for everything that occurs within the society. This is the
reason why - despite some marginal tendencies of the kind (con-
demned after all by Stalin himself) - they never recognized them-
selves as the subject of history able to destroy and establish social
regularities. They preferred to act simply as the exponents of the
interests of society.
That is why the Stalinist interpretation of historical material-
ism, which for some decades was playing the role of the offIcial
ideology of the socialist societies, was again the orthodox inter-
250 Leszek Nowak

pretation. After all, it combined all the nomological driving forces

with praxistic ones in a particular mechanical way. Thus within the
given socio-economic system the forces of production spontane-
ously develop, inducing appropriate changes in relations of pro-
duction. This takes place until the moment when the new produc-
tive forces have 'matured' - then comes the period of the class
struggle. From this moment the ruling class becomes the reaction-
ary barrier which can be abolished by the new class in the course
of conscious political struggle only. What were the new produc-
tive forces that led to socialism, that is, what was the 'steam en-
gine' inducing socialist relations of production? What socialist
relations of production were coming into being within capitalist
society? Why is it the working class, and not the capitalists, who
are interested in the further development of the forces of produc-
tion? - For questions of this kind the answers were not provided
in Stalinist social philosophy. Such questions were not even put.
This social philosophy already had the character of a pure ideolo-
gy in the Marxian sense - it was used to cover the essence of the
new society, not to reveal it as science does.
The praxistic elements of Stalinism were used to substantiate
the possibility of building socialism in a single economically back-
ward country: it is the creative activity of the masses that it able
to set a peasant country onto the road of economic progress.
They also justified the slogan of the class struggle against the ku-
laks, and rationalized political terror - presumably the class
struggle is going to sharpen as the building of socialism advances.
Whereas, by doing all this, the authorities acted as realizers of laws
of history. So, the direct rationalization was provided for them by
the praxistic, and the indirect one by the nomological elements
of the Stalinists doctrine. And in the specific conditions of the
Stalinist system, nobody even asked how these elements are re-
lated to each other - raising such a question would itself have
constituted proof of political disloyalty.
In this way Marxian social philosophy in the socialist countries
became unified for many years. Of the three lines of interpreta-
tion, only the orthodox one was continued, in a specifically
mechanistic and eclectic manner after all. This was nothing sur-
prising, as it played mainly the role of pure ideological rationali-
zation for the Stalinist system.
 On Marxist social philosophy 251

II

1. The retreat from Stalinism, which took place in different peri-

ods in different socialist countries, led to reactivation of the two
lines of interpretation of historical materialism which had previ-
ously declined - the praxistic and the nomological - and also to
considerable changes of the orthodox line.

2. Stalinism was the social system in which nothing depended on

the individual, where the individual depended for everything on
external forces unknown to him. This explains the complete lack
of anthropological problems in the Stalinist version of Marxism.
And it explains also the outburst of problems of this kind after
the famous political changes occurred in the socialist countries.
The praxistic line of interpretation of Marxism was revindicated
in Poland (from the middle fifties to 1968), Yugoslavia (until
recent times), Czechoslovakia (the sixties) and Hungary (the
sixties until the middle of the seventies).
This neopraxistic orientation referred explicitly to the praxism
of the young Lukacs or similar conceptions of Gramsci (Kolakows-
ki [14], p. 80; Kosik [18]. p. 328; Supek [43], p. 7), neverthe-
less differing considerably from classical praxism. The key-point
of neopraxism, which expressed its basic intention, was the idea
of the continuation of the socialist revolution, for the realization
of the Marxian humanistic ideals which had been trampled on by
the Stalinist system. Marxism was not only to define the ideal, but
also to express man's aspirations and hopes to achieve it. Accord-
ing to neopraxism, Marxism was to be the expression of social
praxis aiming at realization of the ideal and was to make this
movement self-conscious. In this way, for the second time in the
history of Marxism, the category of praxis appears as the central
category of its social philosophy. Not, this time, in order to
rationalize the revolutionary praxis that had already taken place,
but to prompt praxis which could continue on the plane of social
life the political changes which had already been initiated.
NeopraXism also referred to classical praxism, among other
things, in that it aimed at the complete interpretation of Marxian
philosophy. It charged the Stalinist version of Marxism with
ruining the real essence of the Marxian philosophical breakthrough.
252 Leszek Nowak

For Marxism is not traditional materialism which recognizes the

existence of the objective being as the point of departure for
building a system. Engels, announcing the controversy material-
ism - idealism as the basic theoretical opposition for philosophy,
proved only that he did not understand the authentic Marxian
standpoint, since it is characteristic of the latter that it makes a
revolutionary change in the tradition concerning the understand-
ing of the subject-object relation, equally opposing all views which
emphasize the ontic priority of the objective being over the human
subject. And it is not important whether that objective being is
'material' or 'ideal'. Instead it is important that such a notion of
being is not an objective but a mystical one, since the only con-
cept of existence that may be invented by man refers more or less
directly to his own praxis. Existence is not an absolute charac-
teristic of something, but a relative one; it expresses the definite
relation of what is considered to our activity.
According to the neopraxist ontology, what there is reduces to
human praxis and to what resists it. Properly conceived, material-
ism does not proclaim the existence of the 'being in itself, not
because such a statement is false, but because it is nonsense. Both
to assert the existence of the 'being in itself', and to deny it,
means the same. It means - to be involved in pre-Marxian meta-
physics. Properly conceived, materialism can state instead that
'the strength of the experienced resistance does not define the
complete possibility of resistance to be overcome by human activ-
ity, so that there always is the possibility of not yet experienced
resistance' (Kolakowski [14], p. 52).
Materialism understood in this way does not state an absurdity:
that matter is 'created' by man's activity. Such a thesis, operating
with what for us is an inaccessible notion of being 'in itself,
would be just as metaphysical as Engels' thesis of materialism.
Neopraxistic materialism has as little in common with the materi-
alism of Engels (and Stalin) as with objective idealism. For it as-
sumes the reversal of the subject-object relation: it is not the sub-
ject of an object of a special kind, but it is the object which is
defined by means of referring to the subject's activity.
Only a materialist standpoint of this type is dialectical in the
proper sense of the terms, since it is not characteristic of the
being (comprehended as the resistance our praxis meets) that it
 On Marxist social philosophy 253

lasts, but that it becomes. For, so conceived, being constantly

changes, since our praxis changes over time. Being, for neopraxism,
means the field of social activity, and that field changes according
to changes social praxis undergoes. The question whether 'nature
in itself exists beyond the horizon created, on every single occa-
sion, by the state of people's activity cannot be meaningfully
answered; furthermore, none of its other characteristics (e.g.,
that 'quantitative changes' lead to 'qualitative' ones) can be de-
scribed in a way which makes sense. This is why Engels' dialectics
of nature is a kind of philosophical misunderstanding, which re-
sults from succumbing to the influence of non-Marxian material-
ism. Any dialectics can only be the dialectics of society, simply
because the only notion of nature we are able to operate meaning-
fully is that of 'human nature'. In this sense it may be said that
'in the whole universe man cannot find a well so deep that, when
he leans over it, he would not discover his own face on the bot-
tom' (Kolakowski [14] , p. 80).
According to neopraxism, the category of praxis also consti-
tutes the foundations of the theory of cognition. Man is the work-
ing being, only secondarily does he pursue cognitive activities.
Cognition is secondary with respect to social practice in the sense
that it assumes that conceptualization of the world which was
formed in the course of the history of the productive activity of
mankind. We classify things into species in such and such a way
not because species exist 'in themselves' and we merely reflect
them - the Leninist theory of reflection is the same distortion
of the original Marxian philosophy as Engels' dialectics of nature.
We distinguish such and such species because our conceptual ap-
paratus emerged in the course of human history 'as a result of the
eternal dialogue between man's work and the resistance coming
from the object' (Kolakowski [14], p. 57). As a result, not only
the reflection theory but also the classic definition of truth, at
least in its Aristotelian version, cannot be maintained. For it as-
sumes the 'accordance' of judgement with reality in itself, while
the notion of truth can relate human language with 'human reali-
ty', which appears to us as being classified in the way social
history imposed.
Neopraxism radically revised the Stalinist interpretation of
Marxism in the field of philosophy and entirely overturned it in
254 Leszek Nowak

the field of historical materialism. It is a different matter that

neopraxists did not realize that the Stalinist version of historical
materialism was the electic combination of praxis tic and nomo-
logical sources of change, and treated it as the simple continuation
of the nomological interpretation of Marxian social philosophy.
According to neopraxism, the question presenting the key-prob-
lem of social philosophy is not to be read: 'is the historical process
governed by necessary regularities?', but is to be formulated thus:
'why does it seem that people are mere agents or executors of .. ,
'making of history" (Kosik [19], p. 143).4 The answer to this ques-
tion is the following: people are afraid to take responsibility for
their own work, i.e. social history, and readily create or accept
myths of any kind that take the responsibility off their shoulders.
So they are inclined to believe that history is the fulfilment of
the hidden plans of Providence, of the Absolute or of Historical
Necessity. All these doctrines perform the same social function -
they permit people to believe that by doing what they have been
doing, they have been realizing some higher purposes. All those
doctrines are, as far as their core is concerned, theoretically
identical: they all treat man's activity as fulfilment of the super-
human Rule; whether this Rule is understood 'idealistically' or
'materialistically' is without any significance.
The Marxian conception of history, read properly, is opposed
to all these doctrines to the same degree. Its fundamental idea is
that history is created by man - in history there is nothing more
than human praxis which is 'the determination of human being as
the process of forming reality' (Kosik [19] , p. 137). Hence 'Histor-
ical reality is not only what is rare and exceptional; not only what
factually is, but also what tomorrow can be if we become com-
mitted in a defmite manner' (Markovic [32] I p. 51). History is
then such and only such as it is made by people. And what people
do depends - among other things - on what they want to do, on
what their aspirations and hopes are. It also depends on the extent
to which they believe in the possibility of realizing their plans,
that is, on the degree to which they have liberated themselves
from the overpowering belief in the myth of historical necessities.
It is particularly during revolutionary periods that this myth dis-
appears. This is not accidental - revolutionary praxis is not subor-
dinated even to statistical regularities; 'political action 'destroys
 On Marxist social philosophy 255

the laws of great numbers', and cannot be just governed by a so-

ciologicallaw' (Markovic [31] , p. 337).
That history is created by people, means also that it has no
transcendental meaning; it is neither realization of the plans of
Providence, nor the progress of Liberty, nor fulfilment of Histor-
ical Necessity.

In history, man realizes himself.... The sense of history is

in history: in history man explicates himself, and this
historical explication, amounting to the process of forming
man and humanity, is history's only sense (Kosik [19], p.
145).

So, history has as much sense as we give to it. And we give sense
to our history, not in acts of understanding but in our praxis.
Our activities have sense if they are referred somehow to values.
For neopraxism, a main value of this sort, coming from Marx's
Economico-Philosophical Manuscripts, was the value of the
emancipation of man.
All historically known societies inevitably created a divergence
between man's conditions of existence and his essence, so they
caused the alienation of people and made their self-realization
impossible. Communism is the movement which is going to abol-
ish this difference between existence and essence. It is praxis
striving for the elimination of alienation through the creation of
social conditions of the sort in which man's existence and essence
may be identical. The decisive point here is the transformation
of the basic range of social practice, namely economy: 'the final
and complete liquidation of alienation will be brought about
through the human evolvement of work, through people finding
in work the satisfaction of their own passions and interests' (Al-
masi [I] , p. 129).
There are, however, no necessary, iron laws which would guar-
antee that the liquidation of alienation, i.e. the abolition of the
difference between the essence and existence of man, must take
place. Whether or not this will happen depends on people them-
selves.
The best evidence that the idea of abolishing alienation is only
'a conscious plan which, projected into the past, makes it com-
256 Leszek Nowak

prehensible' (Kolakowski [16] ,p. 237), is the history of socialism.

The take-over of power by the communist parties did not liquidate
alienation, though nationalization reduced one of its sources. One
must, however, distinguish the negative abolition of private prop-
erty from the positive one. The former is accomplished by tak-
ing over political power and enacting appropriate legal rules,
whereas the latter is a kind of social process constituting the real
nature of the building of socialism. Only the latter implies 'the
radical restructuring of everyday life' and 'thus the abolition of
alienation' (Heller [6], p. 43). Therefore, one must distinguish
the political revolutionary movement leading to revolution in the
narrow sense (that is, to the overthrow of bourgeois authority),
from total revolutionary praxis. Only the latter means revolution
in the proper sense, revolution conceived as

a radical abolition of old social relations and their replace-

ment by new and more human relations in which the area
of human freedom has expanded and the prospects of a
richer and fuller life for every individual have increased
(MarkoviC [32] , p. 42).

If the building of socialism ends with revolution in the narrow

sense, then this leads to the distortion of the idea of socialism of
the type which took place in the Stalinist period. The cadre of
revolutionaries becomes transformed into the power elite, thus re-
taining 'one of the needs dominant in bourgeois society: the need
for power' (Heller [7] , p. 72). In this way, a society was created
which was not yet socialist because:

The liquidation of capitalist private property in itself does

not yet mean the creation of a socialist type of property
relationship. Property relations are not juridical relations
and their essence is not possession, but the main feature
determining their character is who has the actual power to
manage, control and make decisions concerning my work,
and the results of my work, and therefore, concerning me
(Vilmos [46] ,p. 297).
 On Marxist social philosophy 257

In the society in question, some significant features of capitalism,

appearing only in changed form, have also been preserved. First of
all this concerns control over work and its products, which are
accumulated in the hands of the power-holders. Furthermore, the
conflict between authority and the citizen, and the system of
needs, etc., characteristic of bourgeois society, have been pre-
served in a new type of society. Since all this results from the
lack of total revolutionary praxis, the fully socialist revolution
cannot confine itself to taking over power, that is, to revolution in
the narrow sense:

It must abolish private ownership of the means of produc-

tion, but must not allow any other social group (for in-
stance the bureaucracy or technocracy) on some other
basis (for instance on the basis of the monopoly of politi-
cal power) to control objectified work and appropriate a
major proportion of the surplus value (Markovic [32], p.
53).

The basic feature of total revolutionary praxis which alone can

bring about socialism, meaning the true socialist revolution, is its
mass character. It must be done by the masses, not by the hierar-
chy of authority. And the authentic participation of people in
the process of the creation of new forms of social life is the best
means of abolishing alienation. In this process 'the role of the in-
telligentsia as the proletariat's main and indispensable ally is be-
coming more and more important'; at the same time, however,
'nobody can replace the working class in its revolutionary role'
(Stojanovic [41], p. 209). Another feature of total revolutionary
praxis is its totality - it occurs in all fields of social activity. In
particular, it must go beyond the liberal ideals gained in bourgeois
revolution. Nevertheless, the realization of political democracy,
freedom of speech, etc., is necessary, since they are historical pre-
conditions of true socialist revolution. And - finally - total rev-
olutionary praxis must be permanent:

the victory of total revolutionary movements cannot be

fixed at some definite point in time (Heller [7], p. 72);
the constant transformation of society ... is necessary if
258 Leszek Nowak

[humanisation and the abolition of alienationJ is to be at-

tained, and in many respects such changes will be of an es-
sential, qualitative nature (Markus and Hegedus [34], p.
113).

Only a revolutionary process of that kind can lead to the transfor-

mation of the alienated man of the early stage of socialism into
the real man of socialism, who fulfils himself as a free, creative
being of praxis (Petrovic [38]).
What is most important is the following: there are no 'laws of
history' which guarantee that the present socialist societies must
develop in the direction of communism, i.e., into social systems
without alienation. Everything depends on people themselves;
all this must be carried out - it must all be the result of total
revolutionary praxis. An obstacle in its way are the actual inter-
ests which have brought it about that socialist societies still have
some autonomous sources of alienation.
One such basic interest is the monopolization of economic
functions in the hands of the state apparatus - 'in the one-sided
system of instructions from above, minimum scope was left for
individual initiative and individual decision. The workers and local
leaders - foremen, managers - faded into mere executors of in-
structions ' (A1masi [1], p. 126). The consequence of this is the
overgrowth of centralization, state control of unions, etc. Al-
though the majority of criticisms of this kind were directed
against so-called statism, there were also criticisms of the self-
government system:

The forms of self-government, established long ago, have

still not been able to get out of the ghetto of small social
groups and to develop into an integral system of self-
management. This accounts for the hybrid system: self-
management at the base and strong Statism at all higher
levels of social organization' (Stojanovic [42] , p. 389).

Obstacles of this kind can be abolished only by conscious human

activity, which cannot manage without revolutionary theory. And
Marxism, obviously in the neopraxist interpretation, was advanced
for this role. The practical problem of Marxist social theory con-
 On Marxist social philosophy 259

sists, therefore, in the comparison of all available possibilities

with the accepted anthropological ideal, the critical analysis of
the actual state of affairs, and the deliberate choice of that pos-
sibility which provides the greatest hope for fulfilment of the
ideal - obviously, on the condition that people are made aware of
this and prompted to exactly such a choice. Hence

theory of that kind 'does not 'conform' to the existing

ne.eds of the masses, needs already formed or in the process
of formation ... but develops and takes shape in the orga-
nized - structured - mass movements themselves' (Heller
[7], p. 72).

It is imperative that this task is undertaken - without it total

revolutionary praxis, and hence the emancipation of man, is im-
possible. The present socialist systems, left to themselves, will
develop towards economic optimization, whereas 'To identify
ourselves with this wholly economic sense of revolution means
today a complete abandonment of any revolutionary position, an
approval, as a matter of fact, of the consumer society' (Vilmos,
[46], p. 296). That is why revolutionary social science should
put forward the programme 'not only of optimization but also of
the humanisation of social relations' (Markus and HegedUs [34],
p. 131). The central point in this programme should he that of
the participation of the working class in making economic de-
cisions, thus democratization of productive units, socialist democ-
racy guaranteed by the masses.

3. Neopraxism, so reconstructed, is obviously the ideal type of

the interpretation of Marxism under consideration; the works
of particular authors fall under this ideal type only approximate-
ly. And so, for example, the above outlined philosophical founda-
tions of the neopraxist interpretation of historical materialism
have been developed particularly by Polish Marxists from the so-
called 'anthropological schoo1' (Compare Baczko [2]), or Yugo-
slav Marxists centred around the periodical Praxis, whereas the
so-called Budapest school was rather of a sociological orienta-
tion (compare Markus [33] or HegedUs [5]. There were, natural-
ly, differences of views. For instance, Kolakowski assumes in his
260 Leszek Nowak

works implicitly the positivist conception of science (Kolakowski

[ 16) , p. 227 ff.),S which leads to the view that the act of making
history meaningful, or the formulation of a social programme,
lies beyond science, whereas for Markus and Hegedus activities
of this kind are scientific in nature, but in the sense of a non-
positivist conception of science (Markus and Hegedus [34), p.
130 ff.). Similarly, not all neopraxists agreed with the classical
definition of alienation, which originates from the works of the
young Marx - e.g., Tordai tried to make the definition of aliena-
tion more general in order to include further evolution of Marx's
views (Tordai [45), p. 27 ff.). A separate place is occupied by Lu-
kacs' new social ontology (Lukacs [24)), developed in the sixties.
His views changed significantly from radical anti-naturalism at
the beginning of the twenties to moderate anti-naturalism. Nature
is already not the 'historic category', but a definite form of mo-
tion of matter. Society is also a definite form of motion of mat-
ter, but it possesses ontic peculiarities that give it its exceptional
place in the objective world. The fundamental ontic peculiarity
of society is the purposefulness of human work - the principle
of teleology is what is not shared by nature. It would seem that
the Lukacs of the sixties, as compared to the Lukacs of the be-
ginning of the twenties, was more a stranger to himself than
were the majority of neopraxists.
Nonetheless, the basic trend of the neopraxist interpretation of
Marxism may be presented thus: the exposition of the praxistic
elements of Marxian historical materialism, joined with the elim-
ination of the nomological ones; the reinterpretation of the
philosophical assumptions of Marxism justifying this step; the
drawing of far-reaching ideological conclusions concerning the
ideal of the communist society, and political ones concerning the
way in which it can be fulfilled.
Neopraxism was the third wave of messianism in Marxism. The
first was the young Marx's doctrine. Marx had not yet elaborated
historical materialism, did not yet know what the content of his
philosophy would be, but knew already that 'philosophy cannot
be realized without abolition of the proletariat and the proletariat
cannot abolish itself without realization of philosophy', and had
already been ascribing to the proletariat the mission of the libera-
tion of humanity. Historical materialism was elaborated only later
 On Marxist social philosophy 261

in order to find a justification for this programme. Since Marx's

own laws concerning the determination of the relations of produc-
tion by the forces of production, etc., did not justify this pro-
gramme, he added to them, ad hoc, the doctrine of the struggle
between antagonistic classes as the driving force of historical
change. In this way, Marxian historical materialism referred, in
different applications, to two different sets of ideas contained in
the classical works - nomological or praxistic. The young-Marxian
messianism was not justified clearly on the basis of the theory of
history elaborated by the mature Marx. The young Marx was
univocal, the mature Marx still desired the same ideal, but could
not make any coherent synthesis of the messianistic ideals of his
youth with his own theory of history. And he remained basically
ambiguous.
The second wave of messianism in the history of Marxism was
the conception of the subject of history by the young Lukacs.
Just as what was conceived of by the young Marx was the expres-
sion of social aspirations of the working class in the conditions of
bourgeois society, so what the young Lukacs conceived of was the
expression of the need for rationalization of the Russian revolu-
tion. In order to do that, Lukacs had to eliminate all the nomo-
logical elements of the Marxian writings, making a univocal and
coherent system of social philosophy.
The third wave of messianism in the history of Marxism was
neopraxism itself. It did not sanction the status quo, but subjected
it to ideological criticism, in order to satisfy values contained in
the works of the young Marx; hence the characteristic anthro-
pological colouring of neopraxism. 'History is made by people',
in the terms of Geschichte und KlassenbewulUsein, meant: the
Russian revolution is legitimized historically since it was carried
out by the actual subject of history. The same formulation, in
terms of the neopraxists' works, meant: the Russian revolution,
the Yugoslavian revolution etc., is only the first step which is
indispensable but not sufficient; the further realization of Marxian
ideals requires total revolutionary praxis; communism is not a
'historical necessity'; however, it is possible; everything that is
an object of the aspirations of the masses is possible. Praxism
was the expression of triumph, neopraxism - only of hopes.
The neopraxist interpretation of Marxism was subjected to
262 Leszek Nowak

sharp theoretical criticism: it was charged with historically invalid

division of the views of Marx and Engels, arbitrary elimination of
the problems of the philosophy of nature or the philosophy of
science from Marxism, and uncritical borrowing from certain non-
Marxist trends. The end of this conception was brought about,
however, by famous political events in Poland and Czechoslovakia
in 1968, and well-known administrative measures undertaken in
Yugoslavia and Hungary in the first half of the seventies.
Marxian messianism was defeated theoretically - because the
socialist revolution was carried out as the realization of objective
regularities of a quite different nature from those Marx established
in order to justify it scientifically. The messianism of Lukacs was
defeated practically - the newly established socialist society did
not accept it as its ideology. And, in the same way, neopraxism
was defeated; it lacked understanding of the new objective regular-
ities, and therefore underestimated the resistance of social matter.
For the third time in the history of Marxism it became known
that in order to change the world it is necessary to understand it.

4. During the same period as that of the neopraxistic interpreta-

tion of Marxism in the tradition of the young Lukacs, Gramsci
and Bloch, an opposing trend was being developed which referred
more or less explicitly to the traditions of Marxism of the Second
International. b As the former exposed praxistic elements in the
heritage of Marxism, so the latter emphasized nomological ele-
ments in it. That is why we shall call this trend - which came
into being after Stalinism was rebuffed, and has lasted to the
present time - the nomological interpretation of historical ma-
terialism.
The classical formulation of this trend was presented by O.
Lange. The theoretical core of historical materialism is to be com-
posed of three laws. The first states that the relations of produc-
tion adjust themselves to the state of the forces of production;
that is why they together constitute an internally balanced unity.
Similarly, the superstructure, that is, the conscious social rela-
tions together with social ideas, is by its very nature adjusted to
the economic base. This is what is stated by the second basic law.
Both these laws have a static nature, they determine conditions
for the internal harmony, the internal balance, of the social
system. The answer to the question as to how the system develops
is provided by the third law, called the law of the progressive
 On Marxist social philosophy 263

character of the forces of production. It says that man develops

the forces of production because of his biopsychic nature. The
development of the forces of production forms the first dialectical
contradiction - between society and nature. Forming his artificial
material environment, man creates a contradiction between hither-
to existing behaviour and impulses originating from this environ-
ment. The contradiction is solved through the change of behaviour,
that is, the change leading to the new forces of production. This
creates, however, new stimuli, thus a new contradiction, etc. In
this way the second dialectical contradiction forms - that be-
tween the new forces of production and former relations of pro-
duction. The solution consists in the creation of new relations of
production adjusted to the new forces of production. And this
leads to the third contradiction - that between the new relations
of production, thus the new economic base, and the previous su-
perstructure. And again in this case the solution is provided by
the formation of a new superstructure adjusted to the new base.
Therefore, changes in the forces of production indirectly cause
the disturbance of the internal balance of the social system and
the transformation of it into the next, different system (Lange
[25], Ch. I).
Lange also elaborated philosophical foundations for his inter-
pretation of historical materialism, proposing a definite interpre-
tation of dialectics in terms of cybernetics (Lange [6]). He in-
troduces the notion of an ergodic development, that is, a develop-
ment the course of which becomes independent from the initial
state of the system. Changes of such a system strive monotonically
or oscillatorily for accordance with the definite law of develop-
ment (the directive function), independently of the state of the
system at the beginning of the process. And the development of
socio-economic systems is, according to Lange, such an ergodic
process.
It follows from this that those of man's activities which are
discordant with the direction of social development are vanishing.
Even though each of the activities was subjectively defined by the
aim and knowledge of the person, even so, objectively, those of
them which are anti-functional with respect to the direction of
the development of the system are disappearing. 7 It is no wonder,
therefore, that the notion of praxis does not play any significant
264 Leszek Nowak

role in Lange's interpretation of historical materialism. The in-

terests of the ruling class - maintains Lange - constitute only
an 'additional factor' which strengthens the conservative charac-
ter of the relations of production and the superstructure. And
similarly for the exploited class, whose interests are one of the
additional factors supporting social development. And, conse-
quently, the driving force of history is constituted by the dia-
lectical contradictions discussed above, while the class struggle
is to be explained by them. This is a consistently nomological
interpretation of historical materialism. 8
The neonomological interpretation of historical materialism was
influenced not only by the tradition of the 'Marxism of the Sec-
ond International', but also by contemporary sources of inspira-
tion originating from related social sciences. In the historical
literature, particularly Soviet, research was carried out on the so-
called Asiatic system, peculiarities of the historical development
of the Slavs, peculiarities of the rise of capitalism in Russia, etc.
In research in economics, some social peculiarities of systems
formed in the Third World were revealed. In sociology, especially
Polish, numerous empirical studies concerning the formation and
state of Polish society produced a large body of factual material.
From these sources of inspiration there also originated some
general theoretical points, some of which are of interest for social
philosophy.
Thus the position according to which the Asiatic system was a
separate socio-economic system is becoming widespread (e.g.,
Warga [47], p. 360 ff.; Lange [25], p. 52; Kozyr-Kowalski and
Ladosz [22], p. 66 ff.). In this way the old position interpreting
the system in question as a type of slavery or feudalism is loosing
theoretical and ideological influence. The conception was in-
vented according to which the Third World societies fall under a
new socio-economic system. Its characteristic feature is the union
of simple commodity production with state capitalism. This leads
to the alliance of the petite bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Hence
the ruling class in societies of this kind will be the fusion of small
property and state authority (Kalecki [11] ).9
Sources of inspiration of this kind have produced the result
that, within the neonomological interpretation of historical ma-
terialism, the view has been adopted that the basic Marxian laws
 On Marxist social philosophy 265

are universally valid - and the universal social form is therefore a

socio-economic system; however, the variety of historical condi-
tions gives rise to the fact that the same laws, acting in different
'initial conditions', do not give the same historical results. That is
why social development is multidirectional. Thus 'the socio-eco-
nomic formations do not proceed one after another with iron con-
sistency, but ... there are certain types of formational systems
which, in the history of particular societies, occurred in some
basic variants' (Wiatr [48], p. 122). And so, for example, the
quoted author proposes four variants. The first one, which ap-
pears~ in European countries of the Mediterranean region, consists
in the following sequence of formations: slavery, feudalism, capi-
talism, socialism. It is the classical scheme in the sense that precise-
ly this scheme constituted the basis for the Marxist theory of
history. Nevertheless, 'as far as its range is concerned, this variant
constitutes more an exception than the general rule' (ibid., p. 122).
The second variant, typical for oriental societies (but also Egypt),
consists in the following formations: primitive communism,
Asiatic slavery (the state bureaucracy was there transformed into
landowners), feudalism, capitalism, socialism. The third variant,
typical for Slavian and German territories, consists in the sequence:
primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. Also
a fourth variant is admitted, appearing in different regions of the
world, which does not include the capitalist formation.
The trend in the interpretation of historical materialism now
under discussion has not worked out any theory of socialism;
however, some more or less partial theoretical proposals and
programmes were advanced. One should mention here in particu-
lar the ideas of O. Lange.
Socialism was created - according to Lange - as the outcome
of a special historical coincidence,l° among the foremost features
of which were the economic backwardness of Tsarist Russia and
the weakness of the working class as opposed to the prevailing
peasant element. This led to the bureaucratic system which as-
sumed control of economic life, thus combining the political
functions with management of the economy; no way of control-
ling the system has been established. It carried out intense indus-
trialization, which undoubtedly corresponded to the needs of
Soviet society and other East-European countries, leading to the
266 Leszek Nowak

immense increase of productive forces. 'However, as a result of

that increase of productive forces, there arose contradictions be-
tween the centralistic and bureaucratic system of the state manage-
ment of the national economy and the needs of the further devel-
opment of productive forces' (Lange [29], p. 255). The central-
istic-bureaucratic relations of production became an obstacle to
the further development of production, and the atrophy of scien-
tific and cultural life endangered the development of technology.
'Stalinism became the brake of social progress' (ibid., p. 255),
that is why it had to be abolished.
The further development of socialism requires the introduc-
tion of the division between political authority and management
of the economy. The latter should be based on workers' self-
governing bodies in the factories, at the same time retaining the
system of planning of the main directions of economic develop-
ment. Also, some forms of co-operatives and peasant self-gov-
erning bodies should be introduced (Lange [30], p. 264 ff.). The
basic issue is one of creating effective forms of social control over
the economy, effective not only in the economic sense:

in socialism 'the most important matter is not so much

achievement of optimal economic efficiency ... but securing
personal freedom' (Lange [27], p. 136)

wrote Lange in 1938; he also remained faithful to this idea later.

(Kowalik [21] ,p. 997).

5. The orthodox trend was, and is, decidedly dominant as far as

scientific production is concerned. In particular, in the area of
Marxism pertaining to the interpretation of historical material-
ism, by far the majority of textbooks give an orthodox account.
This is related to the fact that, since the Stalinist period as well,
the orthodox interpretation of Marxist social philosophy - thus
the one which stresses the praxistic trend as well as the nomolog-
ical,. in the tradition of the classics - has still been recognized as
officially obligatory. And even though it does not mean already
today that the other interpretations of historical materialism are
forbidden, nevertheless, both the doctrine of the laws of historical
change and the doctrine of the class struggle alike belong to the
 On Marxist social philosophy 267

canon of the official presentation of this theory.

Similarly, as in the classical works themselves, these two theoret-
ical trends remain unrelated in the works of their successors in
the orthodox trend. First, the law of the necessary accordance of
the relations of production with the character of the productive
resources is lectured on, without reference either to the notion
of social class, or to the notions which are defined with its help;
and it is stressed that the law concerned points out the fundamen-
tal conditions of functioning and development of society (for
example Sheptulin [44], p. 294 ff.). Then, however, it appears
that next to the conflict of productive resources and production
relations, something else lays claim to the role of the basic source
of the development of social history: 'one cannot comprehend
any phenomenon, any social change, without relation to classes
and in isolation from their mutual relations and the struggle be-
tween them' (ibid., p. 313). This latter thesis is at the same time
falsified, of course, by the former - because there are social
phenomena which can be comprehended without consideration
of a 'relationship with the masses': the phenomena of accordance
- and also discordance - of production relations with the charac-
ter of productive resources, as formulated by this author. The
orthodoxy of the interpretation of historical materialism, thus
the mechanical combination of the Marxian laws with the doc-
trine of class struggle as the driving force of history, has further
consequences. In the popular approach to historical materialism,
there 'seem ... to function ... 'at least two languages: the language
of macrostructures' and 'the language of actions'. In the language
of macrostructures such social systems are described as: base,
superstructure, social existence, social consciousness etc. A sepa-
rate language is the language of actions. With its help one charac-
terizes the practice of individuals, in particular man's work .... the
relative autonomy of both languages is manifested by the fact
that there is not ... any set of 'translating rules' of one language
to the other' (Klawiter [12], p. 5).1l The orthodox interpre-
tation of historical materialism is therefore bilingual, where-
as the other two are monolingual: the praxistic interpretation
applies consistently the language of actions, and the nomolog-
ical the language of macrostructures. Uniting both these trends
leads also to eclecticism in the solution of particular theoret-
ical problems. This is a typical example: it is asserted that a
268 Leszek Nowak

sense of history has two aspects: objective and subjective. 'The

objective aspect of the meaning of history is identical with its
immanent logic (lribadjakov [9), p. 54). Whereas, 'the subjec-
tive' aspects of the meaning of history is quite different from
the objective one, in that it is connected with the activities of
man laying the foundations of history' (ibid., p. 57). Then it
is stated that 'men's social consciousness, their social and his-
torical ideas ... are determined by their objective social and his-
torical life, and are a reflection of this life, though they are not
always in accord with the objective logic of history' (ibid., p.
57). So, it appears from this that objective and subjective mean-
ing simply crisscross each other: some processes are objectively
meaningful, and the others are not meaningful subjectively (surely
- for people participating in them). The author does not state
this, but two completely different things. On the one hand, he
proclaims, in the spirit of the nomological interpretation, that 'it
is a mistake to think that, between the conscious activities of men
setting tasks for themselves and the objective logic of history,
there is a kind of abyss. When historical aims coincide with the
requirements of the objective logic of history ... then from a 'spon-
taneous process' history turns into a consciously directed process.
Only in this sense can people 'introduce' meaning into history'
(ibid., p. 58); so history is meaningful for people in as much as
they recognize its objective logic. On the other hand, he asserts,
in the spirit of the praxistic interpretation, that the real sense
of history is the one which people give to it in the course of the
class struggle, because 'class struggle has always been the real
driving force in history' (ibid., p. 57).
Of course this does not mean that in the framework of the
orthodox approach there appear no serious attempts to co-or-
dinate the praxis tic and nomological trends. For the orthodox
current has undergone considerable transformation since Stalinist
times, as far as theoretical matters are concerned. Undoubtedly,
it is still fulfIlling the iedeological functions, but it is also true
that within its framework interesting theoretical ideas have ap-
peared, written with the conviction that, for genuine Marxism,
both the conception of the objective laws of social development
and the conception of class struggle as the driving force of history
are indispensable. I will discuss briefly the serious attempts which
have been made to relate these ideas; 'serious' - that means car-
 On Marxist social philosophy 269

ried out in some way other than simply calling 'the law of class
struggle' the law of historical development.
And so, without renouncing the Marxian formulre about the
determination of the superstructure by the base, etc., an attempt
was made to interpret the notion of base and superstructure as
the assumed phenomena of the sphere of man's actions. For
example, A. Schaff points out that the base does not affect the
superstructure directly, but by way of a certain system of 'fil-
ters', allowing for selective passage and at the same time directing
the impulses coming from base to superstructure. Those filters are
man's environment and the socially and historically formed char-
acter of individuals. In this way 'base cannot remain in any rela-
tion to superstructure without people, who are the founders of
both and who are always an intermediate link between any of
their relations' (Schaff [40] , p. 58). On the other hand, S. Rainko
accepts that historical materialism assumes a two-layer social
existence. It is to be composed of a level of actions and a level of
'natural-historical process'. The latter can resolve itself neither to
the set of any actions - individual or group - nor to their prod-
ucts, and is subordinate to regularities different from those of the
level of actions. 'On the level of actions consciousness is deter-
minative. Whereas, on the level of historical process, it is the de-
termined phenomenon according to the formula about the de-
fining role of social existence in relation to consciousness. There,
in order to explain the action, we have to refer to the content of
consciousness of the acting subject. Here these contents them-
selves subsequently become the object of explication' (Rainko
[39], p. 23). They are at the same time connected by two rela-
tions: of generating and determination. 'Practice creates history,
but determines it and defmes the level of 'the natural-historical
process" (ibid., p. 24). Both these levels are objects of the study
of historical materialism, which can resolve itself neither to the
theory of praxis nor to the theory of macrostructures. And the
matter is so very important that - and this is not clearly stated
by the author - the class struggle is carried evidently on the first
level, whereas the Marxian regularities act on the second level.
In spite of what can be judged in essence about the pertinence
of these conceptions, they constitute evidence that the orthodox
current of Marxism does not have to unite with theoretical eclec-
270 Leszek Nowak

ticism, that it can be coupled with both 'univocal' interpretations

of historical materialism. In the framework of this approach there
are also ideas which prove that orthodoxy does not have to be ac-
companied by ideological conformity. A. Schaff stressed that 'the
experiences of the socialist revolution point out that there is no
automatic liquidation of the different forms of alienation after
abolition of the institution of the private ownership of the means
of production, even as regards economic alienation (Schaff [40],
p. 273). He also pointed out the real difficulties concerning the
liquidation of alienation in socialism, which originate from the
fact that socialist society is subject, like all contemporary socie-
ties, to such civilizational trends as, for example, constant compli-
cation of institutional structures, which undermines the possibili-
ty of realization of the postulate of the dying of the state, in-
cluded in the legacy of the classics of Marxism. There are also
special obstacles in the way of abolishing alienation which origi-
nate from the durability of some institutions established in the
initial stage of the development of socialism - here belong vari-
ous restrictions on the freedom of creativity. Meanwhile, such
restrictions are discordant with Marxian ideals and are admissible
only temporarily (ibid., p. 22). The Soviet scientist A.K. Kurylov,
who also remains in the framework of the orthodox interpreta-
tion of Marxism, states clearly and distinctly that socialism, as
a matter of fact, is still a system of social inequality. For the
social revolution is establishing only the basic principles of equali-
ty, whereas equality is not introduced by any bills, it can only be
established in conjunction with the real process of social develop-
ment. The socialist society develops from the capitalist, there-
fore it must be superior to the latter, and this means, among
other things, that it must retain and extend the bourgeois democ-
racy, which is not only 'the fraud of the masses', but also the
pain of those masses. Meanwhile, socialist society has not resolved
yet all the problems related to equality of rights in the political
field (Kurylow [39] , p. 200). It depends, however, first of all, on
the economic sphere. Whereas at present 'social ownership assumes
equality in the disposal of all means of production and inequality
in sharing the product of social work ... As long as the principle
of personal material interest in the results of the work of society
is in force, social equality is not possible' (ibid., p. 46). On the
 On Marxist social philosophy 271

other hand, the introduction of equality cannot be carried out

automatically because historical experience shows that in the de-
velopment of socialist society there appear certain characteristic
contradictions, which lead to many unfavourable phenomena,
including the phenomena of new social differentiation, parasitism,
etc. Only from the historical perspective can one notice the gener-
al trend of the decrease of social differentiation, in the course of
approaching the classless society. As far as the developmental per-
spective is concerned, one should adopt clear and distinct criteria
for designating a society as communist: the political form will be
that of 'communist self-ruling body', and its basic task will be to
secure the rights of the individual and his free creative activity in
the social interest; such a political form 'will secure society from
anyone who would like to use the authority conferred on him by
the society for his own egoistic interests' (ibid., p. 209).

III

History is worth just as much as those lessons are worth which

can be drawn from it here and now. The basic conclusion in the
present context, in my opinion, is as follows: all the three inter-
pretive trends of Marxist social philosophy discussed here -
praxistic, nomological and orthodox - are leading today, in the
works of their best representatives, to the same ideological pro-
gramme, in spite of the great divergence of theoretical assump-
tions of which they originate. Even if one departs from the praxis
idea which is establishing the existence of reality - as in the case
of Kolakowski, or from the idea of cybernetic ergodic processes,
according to which social development is to come - as in the case
of Lange, or finally if one is trying to combine the idea of objec-
tive social development with the anthropological conception of
the human individual - like Schaff, one reaches the same ideolog-
ical programme: the economy should be controlled by the
workers themselves; all restrictions on democracy should be
abolished; the initiative of the masses should be trusted. Some-
one who understands the theoretical gap between Kolakowski
and Lange, about which I could provide only a limited idea in
this short account, will find it a really surprising phenomenon. I
272 Leszek Nowak

can see only one possibility for a Marxist explanation of that phe-
nomenon: all three theoretical orientations, in the works of their
best representatives, express in different ways the same thing -
the genuine interest of people living in socialist society.

NOTES

1. This results from an idealizational interpretation of Marxian methodol·

ogy. See Nowak [35].
2. I am using here the findings of P. Buczkowski [4] . See also Nowak [36] .
The presentation of the initial model of the adaptive interpretation of
historical materialism is included in Nowak [36] .
3. It is worth adding that the author who was ahead, by twenty years, of
Lukacs' main theoretical findings, especially those of a philosophical
nature, was Stanislaw Brzozowski [3], p. 103 ff.
4. I am assuming here the usual convention that the underlining in quota-
tions comes exclusively from the authors of the texts quoted.
5. This was pointed out by S. Morawski in the work of Kolakowski and
Morawski [17], p.IO.
6. Concerning connections of this trend with the tradition of Kautsky-
Cunov-Buharin, compare Kowalik [20] ,p. 754 ff.
7. I am using here the analysis of the ideas of Lange included in Kmita's
work [13] ,p. 165 ff.
8. A different interpretation of the ideas of Lange was presented by Hoch-
feld [8] ,p. 220.
9. Kalecki also presented an interesting methodological conception of
historical materialism (Kalecki [10] ,p. 236 ff.).
10. Furthermore, the views of Lange on this matter were subject to evolu-
tion (see Lange [28]).
11. In this work the author shows how this bilingualism can be avoided by
the reconstruction of the conceptual apparatus of historical materialism
in adaptive terms. It demonstrates that the possibility of overcoming the
more basic opposition praxism-nomologism is not excluded. So far,
nothing that I know of has been done concerning this problem.

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- [32] The Concept of Revolution. Praxis 1-2 (1969).
Markus, M. [33] Women and Work: Emancipation at a Dead End. In The
Humanisation of Socialism: Writings of the Budapest School. London:
Allison & Busby, 1976.
- and HegedUs, A. [34] Tendencies of Marxist Sociology in Socialist Coun-
tries. In The Humanisation of Socialism: The Writings of the Budapest
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fiir Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie VII/7 (1976).
[36] Adaption and Revolution. In P. Buczkowski (Ed.), The Theory of
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Humanities, Vol. 6.
[37] The Theory of Socio-Economic Formations as an Adaptive Theory.
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Revolutionary World, Vol. 14. Amsterdam: Gruner, 1975.
Petrovi~, G. [38] Marxism versus Stalinism. Praxis 1 (1967).
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szawa 1979.
Schaff, A. [40] Marksizm a jednostka ludzka [Marxism and the Human in-
dividual]. Warszawa 1965.
 On Marxist social philosophy 275

Stojanovic, S. [41] Prospects of Socialist Revolution in the Present Time.

Praxis 1-2 (1969).
- [42] Against the Entropy of Revolution. In E. D'Angelo, D.H. DeGrood
and D. Riepe (Eds.), Contemporary East European Philosophy, Vol.
5. Bridgeport: Spartakus Books, 1971.
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Leninism] , translation from the Russian. Warszawa 1973.
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Science et ethique
ANNE M. FAGOT
Universite de Paris

Plan

1. Humeurs de 1a periode 1965-1980, ou l'on distingue schemati-

que quatre temps
1.1. 1965-68: une science prospere, une ethique honteuse
1.2. 1968-73: tumultueuse contestation anti-science
1.3. 1973-77: 1a contestation institutionnalisee
1.4. 1977-80: l'ethique prospere, 1es scientifiques ont perdu de
leur 'arrogance dogmatique'

2. Prob1emes moraux poses par 1es applications techniques de 1a

science
2.1. pouvoirs accrus, cas de conscience nouveaux
2.2. 'on n'arrete pas Ie progres' ...
2.3. intrinsequement bon, intrinsequement pervers?
2.4. mauvais usages: sans equivoque
2.5. ambiguite des bons usages
2.6. modes technocratiques vs. modes democratiques de deci-
sion
2.7. methodo1ogie du choix rationne1
2.8. incertitudes

3. Prob1emes moraux poses par 1a recherche scientifique

3.1. repartition des credits de recherche: un prob1eme de justice
distributive

Contemporary philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 3, pp. 277-349.

©1982, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.
278 A.M. Fagot

3.2. la liberte de la recherche n'implique pas Ie droit de nuire Ii

autrui
3.3. l'experimentation humaine: respect de la personne, 'prix'
de la verite
3.4. un code de deontologie de la recherche?
3.5. la controverse autour des manipulations genetiques (faut-il
interdire? ... )
3.6. applicabilite des schemas rationnels de decision (calcul des
risques et benefices)
3.7. vouloir Ie vrai, i.e. vouloir la mort?
3.8. empirisme rationnel: les avatars de l'axiome d'utilite

4. Problemes de fondements
4.1. 'universaux biologiques'
4.2. l'ethique scientifique d'E. Wilson
4.3. naturalisme vs. existentialisme
4.4. la science met-elle nos valeurs en peril?
4.5. l'ethique de 1a connaissance de J. Monod: Ie vrai comme
fondement de toutes les valeurs
4.6. absence d'un critere absolu du vrai

5. Pour une philosophie du jugement

5.1. une part d 'abitraire a negocier
5.2. approche negative
5.3. connaissance objective et rationalite, dans la solution des
problemes moraux
5.4. decision et normativite, dans la solution des problemes
scientifiques
5.5. peanuts
 Science et ethique 279

1. Humeurs de Ja periode 1965-80, ou ron distingue schematique-

ment quatre temps
'Si la culture des sciences est nuisible aux
qualites guerrieres, elle l'est encore plus
aux qualites morales' (1.1. Rousseau, 1750).

1.1 Vers 1965 l'institution scientifique est prospere. Depuis la

seconde guerre mondiale. les budgets de la recherche ont constam-
ment augmente, particulierement ceux de la physique, et de la
physique fondamentale, dont l'importance pour Ie bien-etre des
peuples ne semble faire, depuis Ie rapport Bush (USA, 1945), de
doute pour personne. Vous avez dit: l'ethique? Vous etes un
idealiste attarde: cette denree n'a plus cours. Les analyses positi-
viste, behavioriste, fonctionaliste, psychanalytique, ou hegeliano-
marxiste ont erode la distinction entre Ie fait et Ie droit, relativise
ou rendu suspecte la motivation morale. Le spoutnik (1957) a
lance l'enseignement scientifique, les humanites se meurent. On
ne trouve plus guere de cours de morale que dans quelques facultes
d'education, ou de religion. Encore Ie courant religieux de l'apres-
guerre (Barth, Berdiaev, Buber, Maritain) s'est-il essouffle. Conse-
quence lointaine du scientisme? Les philosophes ont opere un
prudent repli vers l'exercice linguistique ou l'etude des systemes,
la logique du raisonnement moral ou la metaethique.

1.2 Nait la revolution culture lie chinoise (ete 1966), suivie des
grandes flambees etudiantes de 1968-9, et du premier pas d'un
homme sur la lune (1969). La recherche pure (aristoscience: Pass-
more, 1978) est mise en accusation. Elle n'est pas dissociable de
ses retombees technologiques, dont les usages nefastes (defoliants
et gaz au Vietnam), ou l'injuste distribution (medecine curative de
luxe pour les classes riches, plutot que large prevention des maux
qui affectent les pauvres), ne peuvent laisser les chercheurs indif-
ferents. On denonce la collusion de la science et du pouvoir: qui
decide des programmes de recherche? qui paye? Le mathemati-
cien A. Grothendieck, medaille Field, demissionne de l'Institut
des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques (1969, Paris) pour protester
contre Ie financement partiel de l'Institut par des credits mili-
taires; il se consacre au mouvement Survivre, qui se propose de
lutter pour la survie de l'espece humaine, et des autres especes
280 A.M. Fagot

vivantes, menacees par Ie desequilibre ecologique dont la societe

industrielle s'est rendue responsable. Isaac Asimov prevoit que,
pour survivre aux pollutions, atomiques et autres, creees par sa
folie demiurgique, l'humanite devra fonder une colonie sur la lune
ou ailleurs, une arche de Noe (1973). Les scientifiques et inge-
nieurs de Boston (USA) malmenent Ie scientific establishment, en
particulier la solennelle Association Americaine pour l' Avance-
ment des sciences (qu'ils surnomment AAAs); dans leur bulletin
Science for the People ils appellent a une action collective pour
imposer une reorientation radicale de l'activite scientifique, afin
qu'au lieu de servir les interets de l'imperialisme capitaliste, elle
passe 'au service du peuple'. La British Society for Social Respon-
sibility in Science (fondee en 1969) rassemble des informations
sur les pressions politiques, sociales et economiques, qui affectent
les choix scientifiques, et s'efforce de 'creer un public informe'
qui puisse peser sur ces choix. La revolte contre toutes les formes
du pouvoir scientifique fait fortune (Illich, Szasz); l'Organisation
Mondiale de la Sante encourage les 'medecines paralleles' (1974).
Le mouvement de contestation prend une ampleur mondiale.
La science n 'est pas neutre: vacille la croyance heritee du 1ge siec1e
en la possibilite de disciplines positives, etablissant des verites
universelles et objectivement confirmables, assurant Ie mieux-etre
des hommes par les progres techniques qu'elles inspirent. La science
ne vaut pas mieux que les religions qu'elle a remplacees. En son
nom les etats technocratiques jouent avec Ie destin des peuples.
Luttez contre l'arrogance et Ie dogmatisme de ceux qui pretendent
savoir mieux que vous ce qui vous est bon: don't leave it to the
experts. Denoncee l'ideologie scientifique (Habermas, 1968;
Rose & Rose, 1976), subculture liee aux 'valeurs' d'une civilisa-
tion occidentale en voie de pourrissement, se dessine une contre-
culture (Roszak, 1969) qui remonte aux soucres du sentiments, de
la subjectivite individuelle, des mysticismes orientaux.
Ce n'est pas la premiere fois dans I'histoire qu'un romantisme
leve la banniere anti-science et prone Ie retour a 1a nature. Que
l'entreprise scientifique est faillible, qu'elle ne manufacture pas
de verites absolues, ce n'est pas non plus une decouverte: cin-
quante ans plus tot, A. Einstein etablissait l'imperfection de la
mecanique newtonienne, P. Duhem ecrivait qu'une hypothese
physique ne peut jamais etre defmitivement verifiee, ou fa1sifiee.
 Science et ethique 281

Quant aux preoccupations touchant l'usage desastreux que l'huma-

nite peut faire de certaines connaissances, elles ont ete exprimees
avec force autour de 1950 par de grands savants et prix Nobel
(A. Einstein, B. Russell, N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg ... ).
L'originalite de la crise des annees 1968-72 est moins de lancer
des idees neuves, que de faire eclater ces idees dans un large public,
en particulier dans Ie monde nouveau des 'manceuvres de la scien-
ce'. Dans l'euphorie de l'expansion economique et de l'explo-
sion demographique, les laboratoires jusqu'en 1968-9 ont large-
ment embauche une main d'ceuvre qui, avec l'industrialisation de
la recherche et Ie travail en equipe, se trouve souvent confinee
dans des travaux parcellaires et routiniers, sans comprehension
theorique des probh~mes abordes, ni vue d'ensemble sur les fin a-
lites du travail accompli. 'Beaucoup font de la recherche comme
d'autres balayent les trottoirs, pour avoir de quoi manger', con-
state un jeune chercheur desabuse (CNRS, Paris; in Jaubert &
Levy-Leblond, 1973). Ces 'proletaires intellectuels' voient fonc-
tionner une institution scientifique soumise a la loi du rendement
sans obligation de productivite: course aux publications, course
aux contrats, paternalisme mandarinal. 'Si les scientifiques deci-
daient d'avoir la moindre ethique, on en finirait avec c;a', soupire
un travailleur de Woods Hole (Science for the People, nov. 1971).
La recherche semble plutot menee par Ie desir d'obtenir de nou-
veaux credits que par l'amour de la verite.
Dans les annees 1920-30, seule l'extreme-<iroite, reprenant les
idees d'O. Spengler sur Ie declin de l'Occident, avait revendique
une vue radicalement relativiste de la verite scientifique. Cette
fois au contraire, non seulement l'extreme-gauche estime que Ie
devouement politique vaut bien la competence professionnelle
comme critere de selection aux postes universitaires, mais la gauche
liberale penche a admettre que les criteres scientifiques du vrai ne
sont pas plus objectifs que les criteres religieux. La droite n'est
pas en reste: temoin la controverse des manuels (USA, 1969-73),
au cours de laquelle de puissants groupes de pression obtinrent
que les hypotheses (ex. theorie darwinienne de l'evolution) ne
soient pas present6es comme des certitudes dans les textes peda-
gogiques (cf. Nelkin, 1976). La revendication d'un controle de-
mocratique sur Ie travail scientifique est, en fait, un trait mar-
quant de la periode. La generation precedente, traumatisee par
282 A.M. Fagot

1es usages militaires de l'energie atomique, avait insiste sur la

responsabilite individuelle du savant comme citoyen. Cette genera-
tion-ci, inquh~te des dommages qu'une machine de recherche puis-
sante, et gaspilleuse de fonds publics, menace de fair subir a l'en-
vironnement et a la societe civile, prend conscience des responsabi-
lites de la collectivite a definir une politique de l'acquisition et de
1a distribution du savoir. C'est la, me semb1e-t-il, Ie fond de la re-
vendication ethique qui sous-tend, plus ou moins consciemment,
1a contestation anti-science des annees 1968-72.

1.3 L'embargo petrolier de 1973 souligne la recession plus qu'il

ne la cree. L'entreprise scientifique souffre les vicissitudes de l'eco-
nomie mondiale: ses budgets progressent moins que l'inflation, les
laboratoires debauchent. Les conclusions ma1thusiennes du Club
de Rome paraissent se verifier (cf. Meadows, 1972).
La contestation des annees precedentes est recuperee par l'auto-
rite institutionnelle. L'art et la maniere varient d'un pays a l'autre:
marchandage erige en systeme, via des commissions aupres du Pre-
sident ou du Congres americains (ex. Office of Technology assess-
ment, 1972); reg1ementation par decret ministerie1, en France (ex.
Charte des droits et des devoirs du malade, 1974); large consulta-
tion publique, en Suede (sur Ie choix d'une politique energetique).
Les gouvernements sollicitent des rapports de synthese (rapport
Rasmussen, sur la securite des centrales nucleaires, USA, 1975;
rapport Nora & Minc, sur l'informatisation de la societe, France,
1978).
Colloques et seminaires fleurissent: 'peril du pouvoir scienti-
fique et technique' (ONU, Stockholm, 1972); 'science et societe'
(DGRST, St Paul de Vence, 1972); 'science et ethique' (sympo-
sium Copernic, Washington D.C., 1973); 'peut-on re-diriger 1a
science?' (CNAM, Paris, 1975); 'science and society' (University
of New South Wales, Australie, 1977) ...
De nombreuses universites ouvrent des programmes d'etudes:
'Science in a social context' (University of Leeds, Grande-Bre-
tagne) , 'Science, technology and society' (Cornell University,
Ithaca, N.Y.). Les ecoles d'ingenieurs, il est vrai, suivent peu ce
mouvement, qui se distingue par de remarquables publications
periodiques: Newsletter on Science, Technology and Human Val-
ues (commence en 1971 so us Ie titre 'Newsletter of the Program
 Science et ethique 283

on Public Conceptions of Science', Harvard University, Cambridge,

Mass.). Le Hastings Center, fonde en 1969 pour etudier des ques-
tions de morale appliquee aux sciences de la vie, publie un rapport
bi-mensuel; de 1974 Ii 1978 un groupe pluridisciplinaire de ce
Centre reflechit sur 'the foundations of ethics and its relationship
to science' (travaux publies: 4 vols, Engelhardt & Callahan, eds.).
La biologie eclipse la physique. 11 faut dire que, dans ces annees,
les percees de la recherche biologique depassent tout ce que les
specialistes eux-memes avaient prevu. Vingt ans apres l'elucidation
de la structure de l' ADN (Watson & Crick, 1953), douze ans apres
Ie dechiffrement du code genetique (1961), l'invention du bistouri
enzymatique (Smith & Nathan, 1972-3; faisant suite Ii la decou-
verte des enzymes de restriction par Aber, 1965) ouvre l'ere du
bricolage des genes. Certes, il y a encore loin de la manipulation
des genomes bacteriens Ii celle du genome humain. Mais les auteurs
memes de ces experiences s'inquietent. En 1974 Paul Berg et
Stanley Cohen proposent Ii leurs collegues un moratoire. La con-
ference d'Asilomar (fev. 1975) discute des risques, et des moyens
de les controler. L'histoire de la DNA-controversy a souvent ete
contee, la bibliotheque du M.I.T. en conserve les archives exem-
plaires. D'autres controverses attirent l'attention du public sur les
disciplines biomedicales: reanimation et defmition de la mort
(affaire Karen Quinlan, 1975~), transplantation d'organes, con-
traception et avortement, fertilisation in vitro (naissance du 'bebe-
eprouvette' Louise Brown, 1978, G.B.).
Un colloque reuni par l'UNESCO (Varna, 1975) souligne les
carences de la reflexion morale et deontologique face aux pro-
blemes poses, en particulier, par Ie developpement de la biologie
moleculaire, et appelle les philosophes Ii engager Ie dialogue avec
les hommes de science pour que dans une recherche commune
s'elabore une ethique appropriee a l'acquisition, l'usage et l'en-
seignement des connaissances sur Ie vivant.
La bioethique a bientot ses instituts, ses symposiums, ses publi-
cations, principalement en Amerique du Nord (ex. Kennedy Cen-
ter for Bioethics, Washington D.C., fonde en 1972; Centre de Bio-
ethique de l'Institut de Recherches Cliniques de Montreal, ouvert
en 1976). L'Europe occidentale suit, avec peut-etre moins d'en-
thousiasme, ou ... des ressources financieres plus mod estes (ex.
colloque organise par Ie recteur Mallet Ii la Sorbonne: 'biologie et
284 A.M. Fagot

devenir de l'homme', 1974; Dahlem Workshop of Biology and

Morals, Berlin, 1977). Un simple coup d'reil sur la bibliographie
suggere l'enorme quantite de travail fournie dans ce domaine en
quelques annees.
Les sciences humaines sont entrainees dans Ie mouvement. Une
enquete internationale est lancee sous l'egide de l'UNESCO (1973)
pour repertorier les codes d'ethique existant en anthropologie,
economie, sciences politiques, psychiatrie, psychologie, sociologie
(Ii l'epoque, il en existe peu d'explicites).
Dans les pays anglo-saxons l'habitude se prend de favoriser
institutionnellement la ret1exion ethique, ou Ie contr6le ethique
des entreprises scientifiques (creation de postes universitaires
doubles: philosophie-medecine, philosophie-droit; obligation de
fa ire examiner tout projet de recherche par une commission qui
juge de sa conformite a l'ethique).
L'experimentation sur des sujets humains avait ete codifiee
par Ie tribunal de Nuremberg (1947), et par l' Association Medicale
Mondiale (declaration d'Helsinki, 1964). La decouverte aux Etats-
Unis d'affaires evoquant plus ou moins les experiences medicales
nazies (ex. etude conduite par Ie U.S. Public Health Service sur
l'evolution naturelle de la syphilis non traitee chez des noirs males,
1932-72) fait rebondir Ie probleme, et provoque une large prise de
conscience des implications morales de la recherche clinique.

1.4 L'ethique est a la mode, annonce Ie New York Times Ii la

fin de notre periode. On embauche des philosophes. Une ret1exion
sur les fondements de la morale se dessine dans un cadre pluridisci-
plinaire: Ie systeme a interiorise sa subversion. En 1977 la Chine
en terre sa revolution culturelle. L'humeur est au travail. Dans la
plupart des pays developpes, les budgets de la recherche ont re-
trouve une croissance moderee. Les chercheurs paraissent gueris
de leur crise masochiste, qui laisse pourtant derriere elle une sorte
d'humilite sceptique. 11 est devenu banal d'admettre que l'objecti-
vite scientifique est un leurre, que les explications scientifiques
sont provisoires et relatives Ii des conventions linguistique, que la
liberte du savant se negocie dans un marchandage avec les bail-
leurs de fonds, et en tenant compte des interets exprimes de la
collectivite. Inversement l'anxiete diffuse de la collectivite Ii pro-
pos des developpements exuberants de la recherche s'est muee sur
 Science et ethique 285

des points precis en la volonte de promouvoir une politique con-

tractuelle, assortie d'une estimation des risques et benefices: les
projets de recherche sont soumis a evaluation en fonction de cri-
teres relatifs a un choix de societe.
On peut se demander si l'effacement de la morale devant la
science, sign ale au debut de la periode, n'a pas fait place a une
sorte d'alienation de la science a la morale. Mais a cote de grandes
entreprises de repenser Ie contrat social (Rawls, 1971 ; Hare, 1973;
Nozick, 1974), d'illustres tentatives pour faire du choix de chercher
Ie vrai l'option ethique fondamentale (Monod, 1970), ou pour
reduire les instincts moraux a des imperatifs biologiques (Wilson,
1978), montrent que, chez les biologistes a tout Ie moins, Ie sci en-
tisme n'est pas mort.

2. Problemes moraux poses par les applications techniques de la

science
'Dans la mesure ou les hommes vivent sous
la conduite de la Raison, ils sont toujours
necessairement d'accord entre eux' (B. de
Spinoza, 1677).

2.1 La recherche agro-alimentaire, la recherche bio-mecticale,

l'informatique - pour mentionner trois secteurs 'de pointe' - ont
fait pendant notre decennie des percees dont il est tout de suite
apparu que les consequences pour l'existence des hommes sont
considerables. QUi accroit son pouvoir accroit ses cas de con-
science. Pouvoir de sauver des vies, pouvoir de transformer les
conditions de la vie: leur diversification a fait appraitre des situa-
tions non prevues par les codes d'ethique traditionnels, ou revele
des incoherences latentes de ces codes.
L'informatisation permet aux societes modernes de fonctionner
avec une quantite de travail productif decroissante. 'Dans un uni-
vers ou se dissoudra la valeur travail, Ie travail rt!gressera-t-il en
tant que valeur?' A mesure que les conflits sociaux se deplacent
du secteur industriel vers les secteurs cuiturels, Ie stockage du sa-
voir dans des 'banques de donnees', Ie remplacement de la langue
ecrite par une langue modulaire, bouleversent les modes d'acces a
la culture, et rendent plus aleatoire l'evolution de la societe: 'Plus
va l'histoire, plus les gens la font, et moins ils savent queUe histoire
286 A.M. Fagot

ils fa~onnent'. Si l'avenir depend moins de la prospective que 'de la

qualite du projet collectif et de la nature des regulations sur les-
queUes il s'appuie', comment la collectivite doit-elle gerer cette
liberte? (cf. Nora & Minc, 1978).
Les techniques de reanimation permettent de maintenir en sur-
vie des malades comateux: jusqu'ou la reanimation doit-elle etre
poursuivie? Le pape Pie XII avait fixe en 1957 la doctrine de
l'eglise catholique: 'la raison naturelle et la morale chretienne'
n'obligent, disait-il, qu'a l'emploi des 'moyens ordinaires', l'arret
de la ventilation artificielle (admissible) n'est pas l'euthanasie
(inadmissible) ... Des affaires celebres montrent que la 'raison na-
turelle' ne juge pas pareillement chez tout Ie monde du moment
auquel il est opportun de 'debrancher la machine' (Karen Quin-
lan; Brother Fox; orders not to resuscitate sur la pancarte de cer-
tains malades, a l'hopital de Harvard). On sait pro longer la vie de
nouveau-nes porteurs de graves malformations neurologiques
(myelomeningocele, hydrocephalie); ne devrait-on pas les laisser
mourir, plutot que de leur offrir, au prix de prouesses chirurgicaies,
une existence diminuee?
La transplantation d'organes (cceur, foie, moelle ... ) devient
routine pour les chirurgiens: encore faut-il recolter des organes
fonctionnels. Cela conduit a une redefinition de la mort (coma
irreversible, ou brain death: Harvard ad hoc committee, 1968).
Que dire du prelevement sur Ie vivant: peut-on obliger une per-
sonne a une donation d'organe? (proces McFall, Pittsburgh, 1978);
peut-on utiliser des fcetus humains avortes comme fermes d'or-
ganes? (H.C.R. 1978,5).
Un symposium se tient en 1971 pour traiter de l'usage des con-
naissances acquises en genetique. Conseiller ou contraindre? Peut-
on a la fois tenter d'eliminer une tare genetique (ex. les USA ont
entrepris l'eradication, par voie de conseil genetique, de l'idiotie
amaurotique chez les juifs askhenazes) et eviter de culpabiliser,
voire de penaliser, les individus tares (est-il admissible de steriliser
les arrieres mentaux)?
L'avortement pour anomalie chromosomique (detectee apres
amniocentese) est generalement accepte: l'avortement pour sexe
indesirable Ie sera-t-il? Tout ce qui est possible est-il permissible?
Encore n'avait-on jusqu'ici que Ie pouvoir de' selectionner les
genes existants (entre l'avortement des fcetus femelles, et l'exposi-
 Science, et ethique 287

tion des nouveau-nes de sexe feminin - pratiquee en Europe il y

a trois siecles -, la difference est faible). Certains exprimaient Ie
souci que l'amelioration du niveau de vie et de la qualite des
soins medicaux opere en fait une contre-selection, une degradation
du genome (Monod, 1970, ch. 9); d'autres faisaient campagne
pour que du sperme de prix Nobel soit consacre a l'insemination
artificielle de femmes intelligentes (Shockley, 1980). Mais voici
que devient realisable ce qu'il y a dix ans les meilleurs esprits
tenaient pour science-fiction: Ie bricolage des genes (premiere
manipulation genetique sur l'homme, 1980: M. Cline greffe a
deux thalassemiques des cellules-souches erythropoietiques, dont
I'ADN a ete modifie par genie genetique). Au pouvoir de modifier
Ie genome humain, ne doit-on pas poser des limites?

2.2 On peut penser avec morosite que tout ce qui est rendu
possible par Ie progres scientifique devient un jour ou l'autre,
sinon pratique licite, du moins pratique courante, de sorte que Ie
moraliste a tout au plus Ie loisir de stigmatiser la folie humaine, en
rappelant ce qu'on devrait faire, et qu'on ne fait pas.
La condamnation rep6tee, par l'eglise catholique, des methodes
'artificielles' de contraception, n'a guere empeche les femmes de
prendre la pilule. Inversement, la legalisation de l'avortement, in-
tervenue dans plusieurs pays (ex. decision de la Cour Supreme des
Etats-Unis dans Ie cas Roe v. Wade, 1973; loi Veil en France,
1975), a augmente Ie confort des manreuvres abortives plus que
leur nombre. On peut penser que les efforts humains moralisa-
teurs (autorisations, interdictions) ne sont couronnes de succes
que s'ils vont dans Ie sens de certaines tendances naturelles ou
conjoncturelles.
On n 'arrete pas Ie progres, disent les bonnes gens. Imaginons
qu'un groupe social veuille favoriser les naissances feminines.
Jadis il eut autorise Ie meurtre des nouveau-nes de sexe masculin.
Aujourd'hui, il peut autoriser Ie diagnostic prenatal, et l'avorte-
ment des fretus males. La seconde methode est plus sophistiquee
que la premiere. II n'est pas evident qu'elle soit moralement
meilleure (un Iheurtre est-il moins meurtrier avant qu'apres la
naissance?), ni que son cout socio-economique soit moindre (neuf
mois de grossesse inutile, c'est onereux; l'appareil medical neces-
saire pour que soit disponible l'avortement selectif, c'est onereux
288 A.M. Fagot

aussi). On commence a entrevoir la possibilite de moyens a la fois

meilleurs, et moins collteux (regime alimentaire preconceptionnel).
11 ne suffit pas qu'un moyen soit juge moralement meilleur pour
qu'il soit adopte (la contraception chimique n'a pas fait dispa-
raitre l'avortement). La substitution, a des moyens rudimentaires,
de moyens plus sophistiques, se fait peut-etre plus irresistiblement
que celle, a des moyens moralement douteux, de moyens moins
reprochables.
11 n'en resulte pas que toute technique disponible soit force-
ment exploitee de toutes les manieres (cf. Stich, 1978). Beaucoup
de nos contemporains possMent assez de drogues dans leur ar-
moire a pharmacie, et assez d'information, pour se suicider scienti-
fiquement: cela n'entraine pas une epidemie de suicides. Si meme
un imperatif technologique nous poussait (nous: espece humaine,
apprentis sorciers) a realiser tout ce que nous concevons comme
techniquement realisable, i1 entrerait en conflit avec un imperatif
economique (l'exploration spatiale lancee lors de l'ere Kennedy
fut ensuite freinee pas son collt, et la recession), et un imperatif
ethique ou politique (limitation des essais nucleaires par des ac-
cords internationaux, non-utilisation de l'arme nucleaire lors de
la guerre du Vietnam ... ).

2.3 Notre epoque a constate Ie caractere irresistiblement explo-

sif du developpement scientifico-technologique (le volume de l'ac-
tivite scientifique double regulierement tous les dix a quinze ans,
pres de 90% des decouvertes faites depuis Galilee sont dues a des
hommes actuellement vivants: Derek J. de Solla Price, 1961).
Elle a conteste l'idee (heritee du 1ge siecle) que ce progres soit
per se benefique. Elle en a observe, ou prevu, les revers: collt
energetique exorbitant, epuisement des res sources naturelles, pol-
lution par les dechets.
Ralte a 1a croissance! (croissance zero: club de Rome). Les
mouvements ecologistes tentent meme de provoquer, par une
prise de conscience collective, un renversement de la tendance.
Emues par des affaires comme celle de la thalidomide l , ou de la
dioxine 2 , les populations s'inquietent d'une deterioration sour-
noise de l'environnement, se sentent victimes d'une expansion
technologique incontr6lee. Les mouvements. de consommateurs
hesitent entre organiser l'auto-dMense des usagers (information,
 Science et ethique 289

boycott) et reclamer l'intervention protectrice de l'etat. Les gou-

vernements se lancent dans une phase de reglementations et d'in-
terdictions. En quelques annees sont proscrits, avec plus ou moins
de vigueur: DDT et autres pesticides organochlores, aerosols Ii
l'ozone, edulcorants (saccharine, cyclamates), ignifugeants (ami-
ante, PBB3), colorants artificiels ... A la suite de la pollution du
golfe de Minamata par Ie methylmercure, Ie Japon promulgue
(1973) une loi reglementant la fabrication et Ie transport des
produits chimiques; il est precede dans cette voie par la Suisse,
suivi par les Etats-Unis (TOSCA, 1976) et la France (1977). L'ac-
tion legislative est particulh~rement importante aux Etats-Unis,
ou des centaines de mesures reglementaires sont votees touchant
la preservation de l'environnement (National Environmental Poli-
cy Act, 1969), la purete de l'air et des eaux, la securite du travail
et de la conduite automobile, l'innovation technologique (Tech-
nology Assessment Act, 1972). La charge de la preuve est renver-
see: au lieu que les innovations techniques soient presumees in-
nocentes jusqu'li preuve du contraire, on exige la preuve que les
nouveaux produits sont sans danger avant leur mise sur Ie marche.
La pollution des mers (organophosphores, metaux, hydrocarbures),
des rivieres (chlorures dans Ie Rhin) , des lacs (eutrophisation)
provo que des rencontres internationales et la signature de quel-
ques proto coles d'accord (Barcelone, 1975; Athenes-Venise, 1977).
Des voix s'elevent pour precher un retour a la nature. II est
temps de mettre fin, dit-on, Ii la guerre de colonisation de l'espece
humaine contre les autres especes naturelles (Chargaff, 1976,
Science, 192), de reagir contre l'expropriation de l'individu par
les media, les robots menagers, les institutions medicale ou sco-
laire. Ivan Illich denonce la transformation de la douleur et de la
mort en problemes techniques (Nemesis medicale, 1976). Des
mala des exigent Ie droit de mourir, au lieu de subir des traite-
ments qu'ils jugent attentatoires Ii leur dignite. Certains etats
accordent ce droit Ii leurs cit oyens (California right to die bill,
1976).
II est, bien sur, aussi nai:f de tenir Ie progres technique pour
intrinsequement pervers, que de Ie croire intrinsequement bon.
Nulle epoque n'a, de fait, mieux apprecie Ie caractere ambigu de
ce progreso Prenons l'exemple du DDT. En permettant I'eradica-
tion de grandes maladies epidemiques (typhus, malaria) Ie DDT a
290 A.M. Fagot

sauve des millions de vies humaines, avant que l'on ne s'inquiete

des dommages causes par sa presence dans la chaine alimentaire.
Sauver des populations n'est d'ailleurs un bien que si elles ne sont
pas condamnees a la misere physiologique de la malnutrition.
Quant a la toxicite du DDT, elle se discute parce que Ie DDT
inhibe la conversion bacterienne du mercure in organique (non
toxique) en mercure organique (toxique) ... etc ... ,
Quant au retour a la nature, il n'est pas sur qu'il soit Ie demier
mot de la sagesse. On deplore que la folie humaine soit respon-
sable du stockage de dechets radioactifs, de la decimation des
forets par l'industrie du papier, des accidents de la route et de
l'usine. On oublie que la nature nous donna les maladies infecti-
euses et les virus cancerigenes, les tremblements de terre, la seche-
resse au Sahel, la mort des enfants et des femmes en couches ...
S'incliner devant l'ordre de l'univers, ce peut etre la regIe morale
ultime (stoicisme, spinozisme). Accepter l'inevitable (fiat evange-
lique, ou tout est bien d'Oedipe-Sophocle) a toujours ete pour
certains une attitude plus digne que la revolte, dans la mesure OU
elle met l'individu en harmonie avec Ie tout. Mais il y a loin, de
la mort par hemorragie accidentelle d'un enfant pour qui ses
parents repoussent comme 'artificielle' une transfusion sanguine, Ii
la mort d'un vieillard qui, apres avoir lutte contre un cancer avec
l'aide de toutes les therapeutiques disponibles, refuse les quelques
heures de survie diminuee que lui donnerait Ii l'hopitalla ventila-
tion assistee.

Si Ie progres technologique n'est, en soi, ni bon, ni pervers, son

acceleration comporte-t-elle un phenomene pervers (impossibilite
de la retroaction)? On a dit (Stich, 1979) que depuis la seconde
guerre mondiale, l'accroissement quantitatif du pouvoir techno-
logique a soumoisement entraine un changement qualitatif des
problemes poses Ii I'humanite. Jadis un individu ou un groupe
qui cherchait Ii nuire etait limite par la nature et les moyens
techniques. Aujourd'hui, on ales moyens techniques d'un mal
illimite: cataclysme nucleaire, desastre genetique (l'invention de
la poudre Ii canon dut susciter des declarations semblables).
Une entreprise de destruction requiert aussi des moyens hu-
mains. La defoliation des forets de l' Asie du 'sud-est n'est pas la
premiere entreprise de deboisement systematique dans l'histoire.
 Science et ethique 291

Le genocide nazi se fit, apres tout, avec des moyens technologiques

simples: c'est l'organisation humaine qui rendait I'entreprise re-
doutablement efficace. Quand on craint que Ie possibilite de ma-
nipu1er 1es genes ne conduise a un brave new world (Huxley, 1932;
actualise par Vance Packard, 1977), on ne doit pas oublier que ce-
1a requerrait une prise de pouvoir politique (P.B. Medawar, NYRB,
27 oct. 77). L'eventualite d'une utilisation 'irresponsab1e' de l'arme
atomique par des groupes marginaux effraie: mais ce sont 1es chefs
des grands etats 'civilises' qui ont Ie pouvoir d'aneantir Ie plus
surement la civilisation dans un conflit nuc1eaire.
En 1974 Ie physicien Theodore B. Taylor mene aux USA une
vive campagne visant a informer l'opinion que, 1es connaissances
techniques utiles a la construction d'une bombe A etant a present
disponib1es dans 1a litterature 'ouverte', la fabrication artisan ale
de bombes atomiques est a la portee d'a peu pres n'importe qui.
II n'entend pas predire qu'une catastrophe atomique se produira
necessairement (il s'en est produit, de militaires et de civiles4 ), ni
regretter que Ie Ministere de la Defense n'ait pas impose un em-
bargo plus strict sur certaines informations: en fait, les efforts
pour garder Ie secret de manipulations dangereuses sont illusoires
(et ruineux). On n 'arrete pas la diffusion des connaissances. II
faut donc (idee kantienne) chercher dans la publicite un frein
aux usages abusifs. Une drogue interdite peut faire plus de ra-
vages qu'une drogue accessible a un public exactement averti de
ses effets.

2.4 Si nous admettons la neutralite (ou l'ambigulte) des moyens

de plus en plus sophistiques que la science met a notre disposition,
nous nous interrogeons sur les fins auxquelles ces moyens sont
employes. Les bons usages posent au moraliste des questions plus
complexes que les mauvais.
Amnesty International (1980) avertit les medecins des tenta-
tives de certains gouvernements pour utiliser la competence des
hommes de l'art a des taches que condamne leur deontologie pro-
fessionnelle: injection de poisons ou toxiques pour donner Ia
mort (lrak, USA: en 1979, quatre etats americains adoptent l'in-
jection lethale -penthotal, curare - en remplacement de la chaise
electrique), amputation de voleurs (mains et pieds: Pakistan),
supervision de tortures 'scientifiques' (Chili, Bresil), administra-
292 A.M. Fagot

tion forcee de neuroleptiques a des individus sains (URSS, Rouma-

nie). Des 1973-4 les campagnes des mathematiciens en faveur de
Chikhanovitch et Plioutch ont attire l'attention sur l'usage de l'in-
ternement psychiatrique comme moyen de pression politique.
La conscience universelle reprouve assez unanimement ces pra-
tiques pour que la controverse porte habituellement sur la realite
des faits allegues, plus que sur leur condamnation. La declaration
de Tokyo de l' Association Medicale Mondiale (1975) pose ferme-
ment que les medecins ne peuvent en aucune circonstance partici-
per a des actes de torture. 11 est vrai qu'il existe actuellement une
divergence entre Ie CIOMS (qui ne considere pas comme torture
une sanction legitime telle que la peine de mort) et l' AMM (plus
stricte dans l'affirmation de l'independance professionnelle a
l'egard des pouvoirs politiques). Mais, de toute falton, un mede-
cin ne peut ignorer que Ie serment d'Hippocrate lui interdit de
contribuer a un homicide, et qu'il s'est engage a 'ne voir que
I'homme dans celui qui souffre' (priere de Maimonide).
L'existence d'un code de deontologie rend explicite pour les
medecins la transgression. 11 n'existe pas toujours un code d'e-
thique particulier. La commission de deontologie du 2le congres
international de psychologie (Paris, 1976) deplora l'application de
tortures psychologiques (ex. privation sensorielle en Irlande, 1971).
L'usage (et l'abus) de la psychologie par les militaires a d'ailleurs
fait l'objet d'etudes attentives (P. Watson, 1978). Dans plusieurs
pays Ie developpement de la telematique a suscite des interven-
tions tres vives pour que soient protegees la liberte et la vie privee
des cit oyens contre une centralisation abusive des informations,
instrument convoite des pouvoirs (cf. Rapport ... 1978-80). Ces
positions sont prises au nom des droits de l'homme, enonces dans
la Declaration Universelle (ONU, 1948), ou les Constitutions des
etats. L'unanirr..ite se fait plus facilement sur ce qu'on doit es-
sayer d'empecher, que sur ce qu'il faut promouvoir.

2.5 II est rare qu'une technique soit explicitement appliquee

pour Ie mal des gens (torture entrainant la folie ou la mort).
Encore ces applications, quand elles sont avouees, sont-elles
justifiees par la poursuite d'un bien plus grand (ex. l'ordre public).
On peut, avec Platon, croire que les entreprises humaines visent
toujours quelque bien.
Au nom de la science beaucoup de mal s'est fait, pour Ie bien
 Science et ethique 293

des gens: par application prematuree de connaissances insuffi-

santes, par exces local d'efficacite sans vision globale, par imposi-
tion autoritaire du 'progres' a des populations non preparees a Ie
recevoir.
Une demi-science est e1le pire que l'ignorance? Cependant on
n'agit jamais qu'avec des certitudes partielles. Au cours de notre
periode, plusieurs affairs ont montre Ie danger de la mise sur Ie
marche de produits dont la valeur ou l'innocuite n'avait pas ete
prouvee (thalidomide, laetrile, depo-provera ... ). 11 vaut mieux,
a-t-on dit, s'abstenir d'agir, plutot que d'agir sans savoir au juste
ce qu'on fait. Mais un medecin sait-il au juste ce qu'il fait lorsqu'il
prescrit, par exemple, un medicament psychotrope? La decouverte
de la chlorpromazine (1952) mit la paix dans les hOpitaux psychia-
triques et rendit a beaucoup de 'schizophrenes' l'opportunite
d'une vie 'normale'. Des annees plus tard on prit conscience des
dyskinesies tardives dues aux neuroleptiques; certains malades
refuserent de prendre ces drogues, la loi leur confera parfois ex-
plicitement Ie droit a ce refus (USA, 1980). Autre application
hasardeuse d 'une science insuffisante: la psychochirurgie souleva
me fiance et colere (d. campagne menee aux USA par Peter Breg-
gin, 1971), jusqu'a ce qu'une commission du Congres americain
remette un rapport favorable aux psychochirurgiens (1974). En
devenant efficace, la medecine est aussi devenue dangereuse. Elle
a du apprendre a mesurer les risques.
On ne' peut pas eliminer tous les risques. La prise de conscience
brutale, dans les annees 1968-70, des dangers considerables que les
technologies nouvelles font peser sur l'environnement, et sur l'es-
pece meme, donna lieu a une avalanche de decisions technocra-
tiques (ex. reglementations emises par la FDA), mais aussi a une
contestation publique, hi OU la democratie fonctionna (actions du
maire Alfred E. Vellucci a Cambridge, Ma., de Robert Moses a
New York; de Ralph Nader). On exigeait la suppression des
risques, on decouvrit qu'il y a des risques a prendre, on apprit
l'art de fa ire des choix rationnels. Le cas de l'energie est exem-
plaire. Le nucleaire fait peur; on essaie de calculer les risques in-
herents a l'exploitation des diverses sources d'energie; on decouvre
que les autres energies ont ete, dans l'ensemble, beaucoup plus
couteuses pour la sante humaine que Ie nucleaire (ex. en jours-
homme perdus par megawatt-annee; Herbert Inhaber, Ottawa,
294 A.M. Fagot

1978). Ces calculs revelent un changement considerable dans les

mentalites. L'explosion d'une mine de charbon, la silicose des mi-
neurs, etaient jadis plus ou moins considerees comme des acci-
dents naturels. L'irradiation des travailleurs d'une centrale nu-
cieaire, la pollution atomique, sont aujourd'hui traitees comme
des risques a contrOier. Nos societes, dans leur fonctionnement
reel, sont aussi loin de la legerete avec laquelle Ie premier capita-
lisme exploita la main-d 'ceuvre et l'environnement, que des dis-
cours moralisateurs sur la valeur absolue de la vie humaine. Savoir
qu'une amelioration de la qualite de la vie (ex. transport auto-
mobile) se paye, non seulement d'une depense energetique (epui-
sement des ressources petrolieres), mais aussi d'une certaine quan-
tite de vie (accidents de la mine, de l'usine, de la route); prendre
conscience qu'on choisit Ie niveau acceptable du cout, et que ce
faisant on attribue a la vie humaine une valeur finie, comme a
toute autre ressource; s'apercevoir que cette evaluation est peu
coherente, lorsqu'on depense des milliards pour sauver quelques
journees de vie humaine (therapeutiques de pointe, dans les mala-
dies terminales) et refuse de faire un effort financier bien moindre
pour en sauver beaucoup plus (prevention des accidents, ou de la
malnutrition): tout cela est, pour Ie moraliste, sujet d'espoir plus
que d'aigreur. Pour sortir du dilemme entre l'empirisme sophis-
tique (Ie bien, c'est ce qui est; laissons faire la nature; que Ie plus
fort gagne) , et l'idealisme malheureux (revolte contre un etat de
fait, au nom de valeurs absolues), l'ethique avait urgemment be-
soin d'un bain de realisme.
Les proces pour negligence professionnelle (malpractice), aux-
quels les medecins (entre autres) se sont trouves en butte, mon-
trent meme un peu plus que cela. L'homme de l'art est Ie deten-
teur de la connaissance. On attend de lui des resultats a la mesure
de connaissances qui progressent. On Ie sanctionne pour ses
echecs. 11 revendique Ie droit a l'erreur. Mais il aurait du savoir?
Il dit qu'il n'a pas I'obligation de resultat, car toute action com-
porte des risques. Mais il aurait du prevoir les risques et en in-
former Ie patient? Il juge que l'etat du patient eut ete aggrave
par la conscience du risque. Le patient reciame Ie droit de prendre
lui-meme les risques qui Ie concernent. Le patient devient agent.
Le paternalisme decisionnel ne se fissure pas que sur Ie front
medical. Les consommateurs veulent fixer eux-memes les normes
 Science et ethique 295

de securite des produits qu'on leur vend. Les habitants du village

de Fessenheim demandent la publication du plan d'evacuation de
1a plaine du Rhin en cas d'accident survenu a la centrale nucleaire
(plan Orsec-Rad, tenu secret par I'administration). Le recent projet
de revision (1980) du code de de ontologie de l' American Medical
Association va dans un sens beaucoup moins paternaliste que Ie
code existant. Deja on parle de faire elaborer les codes d'ethique
professionnels dans une negociation entre les professionnels et les
representants de la collectivite (HCR, 1980, 3). Quand il devient
clair que la science ne livre pas 1a meilleure solution absolue (et
la science de 1a decision rationnelle pas plus que les autres), la
responsabilite de choisir ce qui parait Ie meilleur se dissocie de la
responsabilite de dessiner les options possibles. La science eclaire
Ie choix, elle ne decide pas: c'est ce que conclut un colloque
'science et decision' (CNRS-MIT, 1979).
Ce qui parait Ie meilleur aux uns, ne I'est pas pour les autres.
Quand aux USA Ie droit est accorde aux malades men tau x de re-
fuser Ie traitement prescrit, les psychiatres s'insurgent: on ruine
leur metier. Un psychiatre prive du pouvoir de coercition est un
cordonnier prive de mains. Va-t-on raisonner avec un malade
mental, lui expliquer Ie bien-fonde d'une decision therapeutique?
Et s'il juge que I'absorption de medicaments diminue sa liberte,
doit-on Ie laisser menacer Ie calme et la liberte de son entourage?
On agit pour un bien: il peut en resulter des desastres. En aug-
mentant l'efficacite de nos moyens de faire Ie bien, la technologie
scientifique peut aggraver Ie desequilibre naturel des biens et des
maux. Le jeune medecin d'un pays riche, parti avec tout devoue-
ment dans un pays pauvre pour sauver des vies, cons tate qu'il
ferait mieux, dans I'immediat, de desobeir au serment d'Hippo-
crate et de se mettre a creuser des puits, plutot que d'augmenter,
en vaccinant meres et nouveau-nes, Ie nombre des malnutris. Une
etude de l'UNESCO (Moraze, 1979) montre comment Ie progres
scientifique accentue l'inegalite entre les peuples (drainage des
cerveaux et des matieres premieres vers les regions riches et les
grands groupes linguistiques, qui controlent l'essentiel des techno-
logies civiles et militaires).
A. Sauvy (1976) note que les techniques antimortelles (celles
qui ont permis de prolonger I'esperance de vie: adduction d'eau
potable, drainage des eaux usees, vaccination de masse, etc .... )
296 A.M. Fagot

ont ete en general plus faciles et moins couteuses amettre en reuvre

que les techniques antinatales (celles qui permettent la regulation
du nombre des naissances), et que les techniques de developpe-
ment economique (meilleure productivite agricole et industrielle,
formation de techniciens et de cadres), parce que ces dernieres
necessitent une evolution culturelle, qui ne peut Hre que lente,
alors que les premieres peuvent Hre imposees dans Ie cadre d'une
assistance technique ne requerant que Ie consentement passif des
populations. L'application zelee des premieres a induit une surpo-
pulation catastrophique du globe. La science au service d'une fer-
veur humanitaire a courte vue peut faire autant de mal que l'igno-
rance imprevoyante. Ii faut donc prevoir a long terme, et maxi-
miser Ie bien du plus grand nombre. Mais qui possede la vision
globale d'un developpement harmonieux du monde? L'Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies? A supposer qu'elle ait les moyens de syn-
theses meilleures, el1e n'a guere Ie pouvoir de les faire prevaloir.
De meme pour les conferences internationales d'experts. Quant
aux detenteurs de pouvoirs effectifs, ils font prevaloir des visions
partielles, et conflictuelles.
Un peu de science ecarte de dieu, beaucoup de science y ramene.
L'application d'une connaissance pontuelle ne fait de bien que si
elle est eciairee par une comprehension globale des probIemes.
Mais on n'a pas de science totale. Et quand meme on tenterait
une totalisation du savoir, elle ne serait pas a la disposition d'un
decideur unique.

2.6 Imaginons cependant qu'il existe un gouvernement mondial

compose d'hommes tres sages, ayant a leur service les meilleurs
conseillers, experts dans to utes les disciplines scientifiques. Con-
jecturons que ces sages disposent du pouvoir de faire executer par-
tout ce qu'ils decretent. Supposons enfin qu'ils sachent Iegiferer
pour Ie bien de l'humanite, soit qu'ils aient connaissance de l'ordre
et du dessein qui president a l'univers ('Dieu serait pour nous fa
mesure de toutes choses', disent les legislateurs de Platon: Lois,
IV, 7lb), soit qu'ils s'accordent sur un projet de societe ('grace a
la science qui nous permet de maitriser notre nature, nous allons
ou nous voulons aller', dit M. Bessis dans une adresse redigee pour
Ie Mouvement Universel de la Responsabilite Scientifique, 1980).
Ces hommes tres sages auraient, par hypothese, deux sortes de
 Science et ethique 297

choix a faire: choix des fins a atteindre, choix des moyens de les
atteindre. Le choix des fins ne requerrait pas de conseiI scientifi-
que, iI beneficierait au plus indirectement de l'information fournie
par les experts, dans la mesure ou iI sortirait de celle-ci une vision
du monde d'ou l'on pourrait extrapoler des tendances (iI parait
difficiIe de decider de ce qui doit are, sans tenir compte de ce qui
peut etre, ou de ce qui vient a etre). Le choix des moyens, au con-
traire, serait fait aussi scientifiquement que possible, apres etude,
par les professionnels, des meilleures solutions techniques, et du
meilleur rapport efficacite/ cout.
Les peuples seraient-ils heureux sous ce meilleur des gouverne-
ments possibles?
Admettons que la sante soit un objectif prioritaire. Presumons
qu'il est scientifiquement prouve que la fluoration de l'eau potable
previent les caries dentaires, et ne presente aucun inconvenient.
Nos sages imposent-iIs la fluoration systematique de l'eau? II se
trouve des gens pour protester que, meme si la fluoration est bene-
fique, ils sont assez grands pour Ie comprendre, et absorber eux-
memes leurs comprimes de fluor; qu'iIs n'ont pas Ie gout d'etre
des enfants assistes, qu'on ne fera pas leur bien malgre eux. Encore
peut-on, quand un consensus existe sur les objectifs a atteindre,
esperer, que dans to us les cas ou la politique d'autorite rencontre
des resistances, une politique d'information respectueuse des
libertes donne presque les memes resultats. S'il est certain que Ie
port de la ceinture de securite reduit significativement la gravite
des accidents de la circulation, resultat que tout Ie monde s'ac-
corde a juger souhaitable, on peut rendre ce port obligatoire (I'in-
fraction etant assortie de sanctions); on peut aussi, par de larges
campagnes d'information, expliquer, statistiques a l'appui, l'avan-
tage vital du port de la ceinture. La seconde politique est plus
couteuse, en temps et en vies humaines: Ie prix social de la liberte
individuelle se me sure a ce cout. II n'est pas impensable que nos
sages croient souhaitable de traiter leurs concitoyens comme des
etres rationnels, et non comme des termites. Apres tout, on ob-
tient souvent plus des enfants par la persuasion, que par la con-
trainte.
Mais qu'advient-il de nos sages, si leurs objectifs sont contes-
tes? Tolerer la deviance (la promotion d'autres hierarchies de va-
leurs), c'est tolerer Ie mal. Reduire la deviance implique l'emploi
298 A.M. Fagot

de methodes d'education (ou de reeducation) coercitives, voire la

suppression des deviants: l'auteur de l'univers s'etant garde de
rendre transparents ses desseins, nulle science absolue du bien ne
peut etre ici communiquee. Les hommes s'accordent a penser
que Ie bonheur est Ie souverain bien, disait Aristote; mais leurs
conceptions du bonheur different (Ethique a Nicomaque, I).
Que l'on propose aux terriens d'unir leurs efforts pour conquerir
la galaxie, et il s'en trouvera pour prUerer l'elevation du niveau de
vie aux grandes actions. Que l'on donne priorite au developpement
economique, certains s'indigneront que l'on cultive moins les arts
de l'esprit que ceux du ventre. Nos sages deviendront des tyrans,
ou ils renonceront a decider du bonheur des autres.
Possibilites technologiques nouvelles, vieux problemes ethico-
politiques: notre epoque ne les a pas mieux resolus que les prece-
dentes. On y a tout ensemble constitute moult commissions de
sages, et vivement conteste les modes technocratiques de decision.
11 est concevable que la diversite des options soit elle-meme un
bien, que Ie pire mal soit l'uniformisation qui reduit la creativite
naturelle de l'espece. On a beaucoup entendu dans les annees re-
centes l'eloge de la pluralite, la diversitC, la difference (ex. A.
Jacquard, 1978). Les modes democratiques de decision qui per-
mettent la gestion des differences sont aujourd'hui, pour l'essen-
tiel, ceux qui furent elabores au 18e siecle. 11 n'est pas certain
qu'ils soient appropries a des choix peu reversibles, et engageant
l'avenir a long terme: nous ne pouvons d'ailleurs pas interroger
nos descendants - les principaux interesses - sur l'opportunite
de creer des poubelles nucleaires ou des populations d'individus
genetiquement identiques. Par contre, dans 1es cas de conscience
ponctuels qui ont surgi a l'occasion de progres technologiques
(fertilisation in vitro, manipulation du cerveau par des methodes
pharmacologiques ou chirurgicales, informatisation de la gestion
... ), Ie mode democratique semble fonctionner tres bien, en depit
des divergences ideologiques (cf. Denham et aI., 1979; Beauchamp
& Childress, 1979). L'experience du Hastings Center est, a cet
egard, exemplaire: Engelhardt et Callahan (1980) rap portent qu'en
pratique, dans les commissions de bioethique, l'accord se realise
en general facilement sur des questions concretes, meme si les
interlocuteurs donnent a leurs jugements moraux des fondements
tres differents (maximisation de l'utilite, universalisabilite de la
 Science et ethique 299

regIe, intuition naturelle du bien, tradition religieuse, sens histo-

rique ... ). Cette constatation nSconfortante ne saurait faire oublier
la precarite des principes allegues: 'vestiges de systemes philo so-
phiques culturellement morts', dit A. McIntyre (1979). Notre
temps a echoue dans sa recherche d'un critere rationnel permet-
tant d'arbitrer entre des ethiques differentes, autant qu'il a man-
que d'un consensus touchant lesfins ultimes de l'espece humaine.

2.7 Mais en de multiples commissions, assembIees et comites, il

a perfectionne un outil d'aide a la decision. La gestion de risques
technologiques croissants ne rend peut-etre pas plus sage, mais
elle incite aux ruses de la prevoyance, d'autant que la rarete des
ressources ne permet pas de multiplier les tentatives (cette rationa-
lite-ci est humaine - la nature gaspille): identification des se-
quences possibles d'evenements (scenarios, arbres), estimation de
la gravite des accidents eventuels et de leur probabilite de sur-
venue, calcul de la valeur escomptee des diverses solutions pos-
sibles, rejet des solutions comportant des risques inacceptables
(Ie niveau acceptable du risque etant defini en rapport avec celui
des risques presentement acceptes), agregation des preferences
lorsqu'il faut accorder plusieurs partis. Cette methodologie du
choix rationnel naquit il y a deux siecies (ex. D. Bernoulli, 1760;
Condorcet, 1785); notre temps l'a perfectionnee a un point
(Clark & Van Hom, 1976) qui laisserait croire a une fac;on scien-
tifique de trancher, s'il ne fallait parfois constater l'incommensura-
billte d'analyses divergentes. Mais I'accord pratique observe a l'is-
sue d'un deb at entre interlocuteurs raisonnables n'est-il pas dii a
I'acceptation implicite par la plupart des decideurs, nonobstant
leurs inclinations ethiques conscientes, d'une morale utilltariste
sous-jacente a la theorie de la decision rationnelle? C'est une
question delicate. Un compte-rendu des travaux de la commis-
sion suedoise de l'energie (Elster, 1978) insiste sur Ie fait que les
consequences immediates et perceptibles sur Ie milieu de la con-
struction de barrages mobilise contre l'energie hydro elect rique
nombre d'ecologistes et de politiciens, qui negligent les conse-
quences beaucoup plus graves et irreversibles - mais lointaines -
d'autres choix energetiques (enrichissement en C02 de l'atmos-
phere: petrole; accumulation de dechets radioactifs: energie nu-
cieaire). Entre l'interet de la generation presente et celui des gene-
300 A.M. Fagot

rations futures, Ia the6rie de Ia decision ne se prononce pas: non

qu'elle ne donne pas de principe de choix (ex. principe bernouI-
lien); c'est I'auteur du choix qu'elle ne designe pas. Chacun choisit
toujours Ie bien Ie plus grand, disait deja Platon, mais il faut ap-
prendre a mesurer pour dejouer Ies erreurs de perspective (Prota-
goras, 355). Or, il n'y a pas toujours de mesure objective. Quand
on dispose, pour traiter une maladie, d'un rem Me efficace, peu
coilteux et sans danger, Ie medecin, Ie patient, et la collectivite
qui couvre Ie risque, tombent d'accord sur la prescription. II n'en
est pas de meme si I'efficacite est incertaine, Ie coilt exorbitant,
les effets secondaires redoutables: la fa~on de me surer depend
alors du sujet qui mesure. Le degre d'accord entre les parties est
lie au degre d'objectivite auquel on peut arriver dans l'estimation
des probabilites et desirabilites; en l'absence d'etalons absolus,
l'information des decideurs, et leur aptitude a adopter une per-
spective totalisante, sont les facteurs cruciaux. Pour que les deci-
deurs soient informes, il faut que les resultats scientifiques perti-
nents soient a leur portee, ce qui renvoie a des problemes educatifs
bien connus. Quand elles demandent aux individus d'universaliser
la maxime de leur action (Kant), ou de viser Ie plus grand bonheur
du plus grand nombre (Mill), les morales traditionnelles poussent a
depasser Ie chacun choisit pour soi. Rien cependant ne permet
d'affirmer que dans une situation concrete, des sujets rationnels
bien informes doivent avoir les memes preferences positives; on
con~oit mieux qu'its se rejoignent dans leurs aversions. La posi-
tion utilitariste minimale, c'est la politique du moindre mal, qui
a Ie merite, si elle reunit un consensus, de ne pas Ie figer en bonne
conscience.

2.8 En somme, la gestion des pouvoirs issus du progres scienti-

fique a pose au cours de cette decennie des problemes pratiques
plus spectaculaires que difficiles a resoudre; mais elle a aiguise
l'incertitude theorique, donnant des angoisses de fin du monde a
ceux qui doutent que la sagesse humaine puisse relayer celle de la
nature, et une demiurgique ivresse a ceux qui voient l'homme au
bord de prendre en mains rationnellement son destin planetaire.
Des applications de la science les inquietudes se sont portees vers
Ie travail scientifique lui-meme, avec une intensite emotionnelle
comparable, Ie sentiment puissant qu'il y a des choses qu'on ne
 Science et ethique 301

doit pas faire, et peut d'intuitions sur ce qui doit etre fait positi-
vement: une institution scientifique qui se croyait forte a ete se-
couee par les exigences d'une morale aux bases apparemment fra-
giles.

3. Problemes moraux poses par la recherche scientifique

'We are fallible, and prone to error; but we
can learn from our mistakes' (K. Popper,
1961).
3.1. La liberte de la recherche a recemment ete l'objet d'apres
discussions. Reconaissons d'abord que des contraintes economi-
ques pesent sur la science. Le bailleur de fonds a normalement un
controle sur I'utilisation des ressources qu'il accorde. Avec la pos-
sibilite, pour un individu isole, de faire des decouvertes majeures
a ses frais, s'est envolee l'independance superbe du decouvreur
dans sa tour d'ivoire. La plus grande partie de la recherche scienti-
fique se fait aujourd'hui sur fonds publics, aussi bien dans les pays
neo-liberaux que dans les pays socialistes; lorsqu'elle se fait sur
fonds prives, c'est plus souvent pour des entreprises qui y cherchent
un investissement rentable, qu'aux frais de mecenes eciaires. Tant
que regna l'abondance, on se satisfit d'une lutte quasi-darwinienne
pour l'obtention des credits de recherche. Lorsqu'il fallut admi-
nistrer la rarete, on chercha les axes d'une selection plus ration-
nelle des projets. 11 est normal que les gouvernements s'efforcent
d'avoir une politique de la recherche, normal aussi que divers
groupes de pression ou partis contestent les priorites etablies, et
veuillent re-diriger la science (colloque CNAM, 1975). On craint
que la bureaucratie ne sterilise Ie travail. L'exemple des pays de
l'est montre qu'en fait, dans les secteurs de pointe 011 l'argent ne
manque pas, une science florissante est compatible avec un certain
dirigisme. Et Ie chercheur ne saurait confondre Ie droit de s'in-
teresser a un sujet, avec Ie droit de depenser les ressources de la
collectivite.
De d6licats problemes de justice distributive se posent, des qu'il
s'agit de penser les conditions d'une politique rationnelle de la
recherche. Pour appliquer aux sciences un calcul des couts et
avantages, on veut evaluer la productivite des divers secteurs de
302 A.M. Fagot

l'activite scientifique (science indicators), et juger de leur contribu-

tion probable au mieux-etre social. Des erreurs historiques (A.
Comte, C. Babbage) montrent combien ces estimations sont ha-
sardeuses. Seraient-elles pertinentes, que les choix de priorites
resteraient discutables. 'L'archeologie ne sert a rien', dit-on; prio-
rite est donnee a la recherche medicale (ex. recherche sur Ie can-
cer). En depit de gros efforts financiers, la recherche sur Ie can-
cer pietine; des voix s'elevent pour deplorer que pendant ce temps,
l'archeologie se meure: on affirme l'utilite de la recherche archeo-
logique et de la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel (cf. Rapport
Soustelle sur la recherche franvaise en archeologie et anthropolo-
gie, 1975). Bien des scientifiques tendent a revendiquer, c~ntre la
perspective utilitariste, les droits d'une recherche desinteressee,
tout en laissant entendre que les decouvertes les plus importantes
pour l'humanite viennent de la recherche fondamentale. Par
chance, les societes tendent a admettre a la fois que la recherche
pure, comme l'art, est un luxe qu'il faut savoir se payer; et qu'elle
est - sait-on jamais? - la plus utile. Cette incoherence se reflete
dans les statuts juridiques. A cote de contrats signes pour l'etude
de projets precis, la recherche vit d'un saupoudrage de subventions
qui ne sont assorties d'aucune obligation explicite. Et la comme
ailleurs, il parait aussi irrationnel de vouloir tout rationaliser que
de ne pas tenter une rationalisation.
La liberte de la recherche, dit un juriste (Newsletter 20, 1977),
est analogue aux autres libertes publiques: ainsi, la liberte de la
presse. Le droit pour un citoyen de lancer un journal n'implique
pas Ie devoir, pour la societe, de subventionner tous les journaux;
i1 n'implique pas non plus Ie droit de nuire a autrui.

3.2 Claude Bernard eut des demeIes avec les societes protec-
trices d'animaux; les travaux de Pasteur souleverent une telle emo-
tion que Ie Conseil municipal de Paris forma une commission
chargee d'examiner la securite des experiences de vaccination
antirabique. 'Nous ne sommes plus au temps de Galilee, nous
laisserons la terre tourner', aurait dit alors un conseiller municipal
parisien.
Les premieres manipulations genetiques causerent des frayeurs
du meme genre (Harvard, ete 1976). Des bruits de mysterieux
risques epidemiques se repandirent dans la population. Les auto-
 Science et ethique 303

rites prirent des mesures limitant la recherche jusqu'a plus ample

informe. Les scientifiques revendiquerent la competence de juger
leur pro pre travail, et crierent au retour de l'Inquisition. Un Scien-
tific Freedom and Responsibility Committee fut cree par l' AAAs
pour proteger les gens de la profession contre tous empietements
sur leurs libertes, la National Academy of Science reaffirma solen-
nellement la liberte de recherche et d'expression.
Les ingerences de la societe dans Ie travail scientifique ne pro-
cedent pas toujours de l'obscurantisme. II n'est pas necessaire de
remonter a la condamnation par Ie tribunal de Nuremberg (1947)
des experiences conduites par les medecins nazis. Notre decennie a
ete riche en evenements montrant que l'ethique de la recherche
n'est pas seulement 1'affaire privee des savants. La manipulation
du virus variolique entraina en 1978 la mort d'une employee dans
un laboratoire britannique: lorsqu'une recherche est dangereuse
pour l'homme ou son milieu, la collectivite a Ie droit d'exiger une
estimation exacte des risques potentiels, et la preuve que les avan-
tages escomptes valent que ces risques soient courus. Ce calcul
reste dans Ie cadre d'une morale utilitaire, sauf peut-etre en ce
qui concerne 1a fixation du niveau de risque admissible. D'autres
situations paraissent faire intervenir des regles morales absolues:
certaines limites ne sauraient etre transgressees, quels que soient
les benefices que la connaissance en tirerait; la declaration d'Hel-
sinki (1964) et l'amendement de Tokyo (1975) fondent sur Ie
respect de 1a personne humaine l'ethique de l'experimentation
sur l'homme.
II est instructif de regarder comment la reflexion ethique susci-
tee par 1a recherche scientifique a oscille ainsi entre imperatifs
hypothetiques et imperatif categorique.

3.3 Deux sociologues desabuses ecrivent que, si les chercheurs

en sciences sociales viennent a se preoccuper des droits des sujets
sur qui ils experimentent, c'est parce que les populations de co-
bayes traditionnels (etudiants, minorites raciales, prisonniers)
ayant commence de resister a 1'exploitation, i1 faut negocier Ie
droit de chercher avec des groupes sociaux mieux avertis, et plus
puissants (Social Policy, May-June 1978).
Certes, ils ne faut pas se faire trop d'illusions sur les motivations
morales des chercheurs. 11 peut bien leur arriver, comme a nous
304 A.M. Fagot

tous, de se plier a la regle ostensiblement par crainte de sanctions,

et de l'esquiver quand la discretion des circonstances parait as-
surer l'impunite. On exposa des enfants arrieres au virus de l'hepa-
tite virale (Willowbrook State Hospital, N.Y.); on transplanta des
tissus cancereux a l'insu des receveurs (Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital); il est de notoriete publique que les firmes pharmaceu-
tiques profitent des failles de la legislation dans certains pays pour
y experimenter des medicaments nouveaux. Mais on ne crie pas ces
choses-la sur les toits. Quand fut decouverte (1972) l'experience
menee sur une population de noirs syphilitiques a Tuskegee, la
presse fit un scandale, et l'experience, qui durait depuis quarante
ans, fut arretee immediatement. Personne ne soutint publiquement
que l'interet de la science justifiat de laisser evoluer sans traite-
ment, 'pour voir', une maladie pour laquelle on disposait d'une
therapeutique efficace (penicillin e) (HCR, 1978,6).
Respecter, en soi et en autrui, la personne humaine: pour Kant
(comme d'ailleurs pour St Thomas) cette obligation est absolue et
sans exception. En decoule Ie principe selon lequel nulle expe-
rience ne peut etre entre prise sur un etre humain sans qu'iI y ait
donne son libre consentement, apres avoir ete pleinement informe
(Helsinki, 1964).
Les scientifiques n'ont pas toujours admis ce principe avec
grace. lIs ont argue de necessites methodologiques. Les strategies
en double insu sont jugees indispensables, en pharmacologie, pour
garantir l'objectivite des donnees. On a dit que les resultats sont
biaises si l'on n'experimente que sur des volontaires. Les cher-
cheurs en sciences sociales ont parfois erige Ie mensonge en habitu-
de, induisant systematiquement en erreur leurs sujets d'experience,
manipulant leurs emotions, s'infiltrant sous de fausses identites
dans diverses institutions pour recueillir des renseignements (War-
wick, 1975). 'Logique' de ces conduites: la fin justifie les moyens,
tout est bon qui permet a la connaissance de progresser. C'est la
logique des journalistes du Watergate, aussi bien que des expe-
riences de psychologie sociale de Stanley Milgram (1974).
Un certain malaise a souvent accompagne ces attitudes dans les
milieux scientifiques. On a propose de psychanalyser les presuppo-
ses des chercheurs affectionnant les methodes de recherche per-
verses. La divulgation de la vie privee des gens - meme pour de
'bons' motifs (travaux de Masters et Johnson), l'infliction de souf-
 Science et hhique 305

frances physiques ou morales - me me si Ie savoir obtenu beneficie

a l'humanite, parurent peu excusables. Salvador Luria (1976) juge
que Ie droit de savoir a pour limite Ie devoir d'Ure innocent du
malheur des autres. Si un seul etre humain doit souffrir de nos re-
cherches, dit-il, arretons-Ies: 'that truth may not be worth such
price'.
Mais Ie respect de la personne humaine n'a pas ete laisse a la
bonne (ou mauvaise) volonte des chercheurs. Le trait dominant de
la periode est un effort considerable de reglementation, particu-
lierement aux Etats-Unis (National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research; cf.
HCR, 1980, 2). On ne s'est pas contente de minimiser Ie mal
cause aux individus (utilitarisme c1assique), on a voulu garantir a
chaque individu Ie statut de personne libre et raisonnabie, experi-
mentateur et sujet etant places dans la situation initiaie d'egalite
dont parle Ie nouveau contrat social (ex. Rawls, 1971). Juristes et
concepteurs de plans d'experiences ont deploye une extraordinaire
ingeniosite (ruse de l'intelligence!) pour rendre techniquement
compatibles l'imperatif moral et les exigences de l'objectivite
scientifique (ex. Rutstein, 1969; Lindley, 1975).
Dans une experimentation therapeutique, si l'interet vital des
patients exc1ut l'administration d'un placebo a la moitie d'entre
eux (ex. etude des effets de l'adenine arabinoside dans l'encepha-
lite herpetique), aux statisticiens a trouver comment on peut faire
une inference valide a partir des resultats observes. Comment con-
cHier l'obligation d'obtenir Ie consentement informe des sujets,
avec la necessite de leurrer pour decouvrir Ie vrai? Les sujets de-
vront avoir donne un consentement prealable a I'experience, en
etant in formes de la possibilite d'une tromperie; si l'ignorance des
inconvenients que comporte la participation a l'experience est
indispensable, ils pourront en outre designer un representant
charge de decider en leur nom, apres information complete, s'ils
peuvent accepter de participer (proxy consent; HCR, 1978,5).
Le caract ere categorique du principe pose n'exclut pas un cer-
tain flou aux limites de son application. Comment obtenir Ie con-
sentement informe d'un enfant, d'un malade ou handicape mental,
d'un etre ineduque? Ces frontieres ont ete explorees. La tendance
est a exclure tout paternalisme et favoriser l'autonomie person-
nelle: au-dessus de 7 ans Ie consentement de l'enfant lui-meme est
306 A.M. Fagot

sollicite, au-dessous de 7 ans 1a fa mille donne, non un consente-

ment, mais une permission, apn!s avoir verifie que les risques en-
courus ne sont pas significativement superieurs a ceux que l'en-
fant courrait de toute fa~on dans sa vie quotidienne. 11 reste des
zones d'incertitude: Ie respect de 1a personne humaine s'etend-il
au fa!tus, a l'embryon humain? L'embryon, dit-on, n'a pas d'auto-
nomie personnelle: mais Ie patient comateux, l'arriere mental,
n'en ont pas davantage. On pratique sur des chimpanzes (a qui l'on
reconnait de l'intelligence) des interventions agressives que l'on
jugerait inacceptable de pratiquer sur des enfants atteints d'un
deficit cerebral: pourquoi?
'La verite ne vaut pas ce prix', dit-on. Faible prix de la verite,
qui ne vaut pas meme, aux yeux de certains, la vie d'un chien. 11
est remarquable que nos societes tolerent des marges plus grandes
de souffrance et de mort pour l'extraction du petro Ie et du char-
bon que pour la recherche du vrai. On envoie les gens se faire tuer
pour la defense d'un territoire, ou d'une opinion, non pour celle
de 1a verite scientifique. On pense sans doute que la verite peut
se defendre seule.

3.4 On ne croit meme plus que la passion du vrai soit une pas-
sion noble, on y voit plutot une passion cannibale. La vieille con-
fiance dans Ie desin teressement des savants a fait place a la me-
fiance: la science donne du pouvoir, Ie pouvoir est corrupteur.
'Are researchers trustworthy?' (New Scientist, 1976,171). Finie
l'immunite morale dont jouissaient les chercheurs. Les profits
issus de la vente de resultats scientifiques sont examines avec
soup~on (cf. vente de cultures cellulaires a des laboratoires phar-
maceutiques par Hayflick, 1976-7). Les chercheurs eux-memes
concedent que leurs hypotheses explicatives sont liees a des
modes (paradigmes) ou a des biais culturels, qu'il est aise de don-
ner aux faits un 'coup de pouce' afm qu'ils entrent dans Ie cadre
d'une theorie. Des affaires de fraude scientifique re~oivent un
echo retentissant (affaire Summerlin, 1974: maquillage de souris
pour faire croire a des greffes de peau reussies; affaire Cyril Burt,
decouverte en 1976-9: il avait 'fabrique' les resultats concernant
Ie QI desjumeaux homozygotes; cf. La Recherche, 1980, 113).
Henri Poincare (1910) jugeait impensable qu'un parlement ren-
dit un arret competent au sujet du travail scientifique: 'On doit
 Science et ethique 307

s'en rapporter a sa conscience; toute intervention h~gale serait im-

portune et un peu ridicule'. Aujourd'hui on parle de tribunal
scientifique pour trancher les controverses, on veut mettre par
ecrit un code de la recherche qui serait a l'activite scientifique ce
que Ie serment d'Hippocrate est a l'activite medicale (Cournand &
Zuckerman, 1970; Merton, 1973; Popper, 1975; Co urn and &
Meyer, 1976), on se demande si les journaux professionnels ne
devraient pas refuser de publier des resultats moralement contesta-
bles.
Cette ingerence de l'ethique dans Ie travail scientifique res-
semble a l'arbitraire d'une censure, sans la reference transcendante
dont jouissaient les tribunaux de l'Inquisition. EIle parait bien in-
utile: s'il est un domaine ou sevit une rigoureuse selection dar-
winienne, c'est celui des idees scientifiques. Le respect de la
deontologie professionneIle est moins une question de morale
que d'avantage bien compris: Ie chercheur qui fabrique des re-
sultats est t6t ou tard elimine de la competition. II est ici mala-
droit de n'etre pas vertueux. Vouloir prescrire Ie respect de la
verite, c'est se conduire comme si l'on avait peur que la verite ne
s'impose pas: mais la verite, dans Ie domaine scientifique, n'est-
eIle pas ce qui s'impose en fin de compte, ce qui resiste a tous les
assauts critiques? Un darwinien ne saurait craindre que l'espece
la plus apte ne survive pas, puisque l'espece prouve son aptitude
en survivant.
Cette reflexion suppose toutefois la con fiance que l'instinct du
vrai ne mene pas l'espece humaine a des catastrophes (que la na-
ture intellectuelle est bonne). La volonte de soumettre la quete du
savoir a des normes ethiques 'plus hautes' pro cede parfois moins,
sans doute, de l'horreur du faux que de l'anxiete du vrai. L'utili-
sation de donnees pseudo-scientifiques sur Ie quotient inteIlec-
tuel a recemment alimente cette quereIle: si la science prouve
l'inferiorite genetique d'une race, a-t-on dit, alors la science est
nuisible; toute recherche menant a des decouvertes qui choquent
Ie sens moral doit etre interdite. Henri Poincare (1910, encore lui)
se serait contente de dire que d'enonces a l'indicatiJ ('il existe des
differences de QI' ... ), on ne tirera jamais une proposition a l'im-
peratiJ ('il faut traiter d'inJerieurs ceux qui ont un QI different'
... ), i.e. on ne tirera jamais de la science une proposition 'qui con-
frrme ou qui contredise la morale'. D'autres l'ont redit: 'nous ne
308 A.M. Fagot

sommes pas obliges de croire a l'uniformite biologique pour pou-

voir affirmer la liberte et la dignite humaines' (E. Wilson, 1978,
ch. 2); 'loin de menacer la justice, la decouverte du vrai lui donne
un fondement realiste' (B. Davis, 1979). II se trouve que la 'preuve'
de l'hereditabilite a 80% de I'intelligence fut ruinee par la decou-
verte du caract ere imaginaire des observations de C. Burt (cf. p.
ex. Medawar, NYRB, 3 feb. 1977). Mais l'idee que des constata-
tions scientifiques peuvent avoir des consequences perverses est a
examiner de plus pres.

3.5 'Are there ethical limits to scientific discoveries?' se deman-

decent en 1975 des scientifiques, theologiens, historiens et philo-
sophes, reunis a Washington D.C., parallelement a un symposium
'Copernic'. D. Callahan fit remarquer que, dans la tradition occi-
dentale, la connaissance est un bien en soi: iI vaut mieux savoir
qu'ignorer; aujourd'hui cependant, on en vient a se demander si
un accroissement de connaissance n'est pas une chose mauvaise,
ou, au plus, neutre.
L'idee qu'il y a des choses qu'il vaudrait mieux ne pas savoir,
ou qu'iI est sacrilege de decouvrir, reminiscente des mythes de
Promethee et de Faust, aussi bien que du livre de la Genese, res-
surgit autour de 1975 a propos de la recherche genetique avec une
charge emotionnelle intense, meme chez des savants eminents.
La controverse autour des manipulations de l'ADN, abondam-
ment relatee (voir p. ex. Jackson & Stich, 1979), ne sera evoquee
ici que pour souligner l'intrication etroite de deux types d'argu-
ments: (1) la possibilite de consequences catastrophiques doit
faire interdire ces recherches, (2) penetrer Ie secret de la vie,
c'est mal. Dans Ie premier cas, on fait mine d'admettre, pour la
subvertir, une analyse rationnel1e des risques et benefices de
l'entreprise qui, dans Ie second cas, est jugee au nom d'une morale
'plus haute' (ou d'une peur irrationnelle).

3.6 La supputation des couts et avantages d'une recherche don-

nee peut etre iIlegitime, soit parce que les enjeux sont impossibles
a estimer, soit parce que la presence d'une valeur infinie precipite
Ie calcul dans une situation analogue a celle du pari pascalien. Es-
quissons un debat schematique entre adversaires et partisans de
1'entreprise.
 Science et ethique 309

Nul ne peut concevoir toutes les consequences possibles d'une

investigation ... - mais c'est Ie sort de toutes les entreprises hu-
maines. Parmi les consequences que l'on imagine, certaines sont
desastreuses, Ii court ou Ii long terme (une epidemie resistant Ii
tous les antibiotiques; une perturbation irreversible du genome
humain) ... - mais d'autres sont favorables (bact erie productrice
d'insuline humaine; correction de tares genetiques). La simple
possibilite d'une seule consequence deastreuse doit faire prohiber
la recherche ... - s'il fallait prohiber toutes les activites poten-
tiellement dangereuses, on ne laisserait personne conduire une
automobile. On choisit de conduire sa voiture: un danger est ad-
missible dans la mesure OU l'on a la liberte de s'y soustraire; les
chercheurs exposent les gens Ii des risques qu'ils n'ont pas accep-
tes ... - les gens ne choisissent pas non plus de travailler Ii la mine
ou d'aller Ii la guerre. 11 est vital de produire ou de se defendre,
non d'acquerir des connaissances ... - 'tous les hommes, par na-
ture, desirent savoir' (Aristote). La valeur intrinseque de la con-
naissance (Ie plaisir intellectuel qu'elle donne) ne saurait entrer
dans un calcul ... - parlons donc de sa valeur instrumentale; il
est temps, au lieu d'evoquer Ie spectre de terribles consequences,
d'evaluer la gravite, et la probabilite, de ces consequences. Une
estimation precise est impossible, il n'y a pas de me sure objective
... - demandons aux experts leur estimation subjective. Qui sont
les experts? ... - 'ceux que les experts reconnaissent comme ex-
perts' (Stich, 1979). Les experts ne sont pas d'accord entre eux ...
- 'quand on a plusieurs theories donnant des evaluations tres
differentes d'un risque, on doit agir comme si la probabilite du
risque etait au moins aussi elevee que ce que prevoit la pire theo-
rie' (Fl{>llesdal, 1978). Dans la pire theorie, les consequences ima-
ginables sont injiniment graves, en sorte que, meme si leur proba-
bilite d'occurrence est jugee infime, on n'a pas Ie droit de prendre
Ie risque ... - les risques mortelssont les plus graves; jamais l' espece
humaine ne s'est comportee comme s'ils l'etaient infiniment; du
reste, des risques mortels comparables existent dans l'hypothese
OU la recherche n'est pas entreprise. Admettons que les risques
soient finis; les probabilites sont inassignables, puisqu'on ignore
ce qu'on va trouver (par exemple, on ignore tout Ii fait la probabi-
lite qu'un organisme pathogene pour l'homme naisse d'une recom-
binaison genetique) ... - on ne l'ignore tout Ii fait que si l'on mani-
310 A.M. Fagot

pule au hasard; de toute fayon, pour que la pathogenicite se mani-

feste, encore faudrait-il que l'organisme s'echappe du laboratoire,
et soit capable de survivre au dehors; la probabilite d'une telle se-
quence d'evenements etant au plus egale a celle de l'evenement Ie
plus probable de la sequence, i1 suffit de rendre tres petite la pro-
babilite sur laquelle on a Ie meilleur contrale, pour fixer une limite
superieure a la probabilite de la catastrophe (en surveillant etroite-
ment la securite des laboratoires; c'est d'ailleurs ce qui fut fait; cf.
P. Berg et a1., 1974, Science, 185).
Cinq annees d'un debat souvent serre ont abouti a la relaxe des
restrictions que l'on avait provisoirement imposees a la recherche
genetique. Dne surveillance locale, ponctuelle, parait suffisante.
Dans un article intitule 'la carriere morale de l'ingenierie gene-
tique' D. Callahan (HCR, 1979, 2) fait Ie point: les adversaires de
l'entreprise n'ont pas reussi a produire des arguments convaincants.
L'enthousiasme pour les resultats obtenus a balaye les premieres
inquietudes. Au demeurant, est-il sense de vouloir limiter l'expan-
sion de recherches auxquelles l'industrie s'interesse, et dont la
technique s'est simplifiee au point qU'elles sont desormais a la
portee du premier biologiste venu?
Les arguments des adversaires de l'entreprise consistaient sur-
tout dans Ie refus d'argumenter, i.e. la mefiance a l'egard d'une
discussion rationnelle des risques et benefices. Leur voix s'est
perdue, mais on n'a pas prouve qu'ils avaient tort. Pour saisir l'en-
jeu ethique de la bataille, on se retournera de l'objet vers Ie sujet.
'Nous devons nous interdire l'acces aux connaissances que nous
n'avons pas la capacite morale d'absorber', disent sous des formes
differentes Nirenberg, Ramsey, Kass, ou encore Sinsheimer: 'it
may be that the highest wisdom is to recognize that we are not
wise enough to know what we do not want to know' (in: Cohen,
1977); et aussi: 'dans l'incertitude, il faut s'abstenir de perturber
la nature'. Tandis que les autres, en affinant leur analyse des
dangers courus et de leurs probabilites respectives, prenaient une
confiance croissante dans la possibilite de contrbler rationnelle-
ment les risques, ceux-ci imaginaient deja les apprentis-sorciers
debordes par les consequences de leurs actes, soit qu'ils aient
perdu tout contrOle sur Ie phenomene, soit qu'ils facilitent a une
autorite malefique l'exercice d'un contrOle absolu. Dne entreprise
cognitive est perilleuse si elle risque de faire perdre au sujet son
autonomie de sujet.
 Science et ethique 311

3.7 'II vaut mieux pour toi ignorer ton destin que de Ie savoir',
dit Promethee a 10 (Eschyle, Promethee enchaine). 'Le jour ou tu
en mangeras, tu mourras', dit dieu; 'Ie jour ou vous en mangerez,
vos yeux s'ouvriront et vous serez comme des dieux, qui connais-
sent Ie bien et Ie mal', dit Ie serpent (Livre de la Genese).
Resumons. On peut vouloir restreindre la liberte de chercher Ie
vrai pour quatre sortes de raisons: si un usage mauvais doit etre
fait des resultats obtenus (ex. recherche militaire, cf. 1), si la rarete
des ressources oblige a sacrifier certains secteurs de recherche (ex.
priorite a la medecine sur l'archCologie, cf. 2.0), si les methodes
d'obtention du savoir sont immorales ou illegales (ex. vivisection
humaine, cf. 2.1, 2), enfin si la connaissance acquise est destruc-
trice pour celui qui l'acquiert. Les trois premiers cas ont ete envi-
sages. Le dernier cas recouvre deux attitudes pratiques: non-divul-
gation, ou non-accession.
L'interdiction de reveler une information (classified research; il
y a des informations que nous ne communiquons pas meme a nos
amis, ou a nos allies), quand elle ne s'explique pas par Ie desir de
se proteger soi-meme (contre les usages nocifs que l'autre en ferait),
se justifie par Ie desir de proteger ['autre d'une revelation qui lui
ferait du mal. Ainsi va Ie paternalisme medical, alleguant que la
communication au patient d'un pronostic mortel suffit a Ie tuer:
Ie patient rend vraie la prediction. Ainsi souP90nne-t-on les intel-
lectuels de pervertir la jeunesse, en ebranlant (avec quelque sad is-
me) ses prejuges, a coup de doctrines psychanalytiques ou autres.
On oublie que Ie mal vient plutot de ce que des conjectures sont
presentees ou entendues comme des certitudes (effet Pygmalion).
L'idee que l'autre n'est pas capable, ou pas digne, de savoir ce qu'
on sait soi-meme ('cette verite n'est pas pour les enfants', - 'les
femmes', - 'Ie peuple'), est difficilement compatible avec une
ethique du respect de la personne humaine. Tant de connaissances
sont inaccessibles en fait a tant de gens (faute d'une formation
qui leur en donnerait l'intelligence), qu'il parait disgnicieux d'ag-
graver cette inegalite par un deni du droit de savoir. En realite,
faciliter a la fois Ie libre acces a l'information, et la dispensation
de moyens educatifs (permettant au moins de comprendre quand
et comment il faut recourir aux experts), est pour une societe un
choix ethique. La publicite de la connaissance scientifique (Ie fait
312 A.M. Fagot

qu'un resultat, pour etre scientifiquement consacre, doive avoir

ete publie, i.e. offert a la contestation) suggere que les savoirs
dont on protege les faibles sont moins des savoirs que des instru-
ments d 'exploitation.
Qui accroit sa connaissance, accroit sa douleur. L'ictee qu'il y
a des decouvertes insupportables, voire fatales, non seulement
pour certains etres, mais pour l'espece humaine entiere, rend
compte en partie du halo emotionnel qui entoura les discussions
sur Ie genie genetique. Derriere certains arguments d'apparence
scientifique (ex. on n'a pas Ie droit de franchir la barriere 'natu-
relle' entre ADN eucaryote et procaryote: Sinsheimer), se pro-
filait la conviction qu'il y a des frontieres intellectuelles qu'il
est sacrilege de vouloir transgresser. 'Le genie genetique prepare
la mort de l'espece humaine', declare J. Attali (Le nouvel Ob-
servateur, 1 oct. 1979). En remplayant Ie naturel (Ie gene defec-
tueux) par la pro these artificielle (Ie gene manipule), elle trans-
forme l'individu en marchandise normalisee: 'Ie naturel et l'ar-
tificiel sont alors de moins en moins discernables'.
On pourrait croire qu'il y a deja bien assez de necessites na-
turelles devant lesquelles il faut s'incliner (ex. Ie vieillissement),
pour qu'on ne s'abstienne pas de toute recherche Ii ou Ie destin
parait modifiable (ex. correction de tares genetiques responsa-
bles d'un vieillissement premature). De quoi a-t-on peur: de la
col ere divine (comme l'enfant qui tremble en penetrant dans Ie
cabinet ou son pere lui a interdit d'entrer)? d'une vengeance de
la nature (on craint de fabriquer des monstres ... mais la nature
en produit bien toute seule)? On trouve, je crois, immoral de
violer la nature parce qu'on attribue i l'intelligence une arti-
ficieuse perversite: en devoilant par des manipulations la fragili-
te des frontieres entre Ie normal et Ie pathologique par exemple,
ne rend-elle pas precaire la distinction entre conduites bonnes et
mauvaises? C'est d'une subversion du sujet moral qu'il est ques-
tion. A l'epoque de Darwin on s'etait scandalise que l'espece
humaine puisse n'etre qu'une espece animale, cette fois on fan-
tasme sans doute vaguement l'apparition, dans une eprouvette,
d'une espece surhumaine, meprisant nos valeurs. II s'agit de la
manipulation de la volonte, et du malaise de l'homme qui se
veut esprit devant sa condition organique. 'Vouloir Ie vrai, ce
pourrait etre, secretement, vouloir la mort', dit Nietzsche (Le
 Science et ethique 313

gai savoir, 344). Voir dans Ia curiosite scientifique un element

suicidaire, soit que Ie monde reel ignore Ie souci du vrai, soit
que l'intelligence derange l'ordre des choses, cela revient a se-
parer l'homme de la nature (a croire au pecht originel). La na-
ture sait mieux, ou choisit mieux, qu'une espece humaine de-
chue, rouee, artifieuse et peu fiable. Sous Ie couvert d'une con-
fiance dans la nature s'exprime ici une defiance dans fa nature
humaine. 11 faut avouer que cette intuition est au cceur des mo-
rales repressives. La conscience, dit encore Nietzsche, est dange-
reuse pour l'organisme: 'c'est une grande chance qu'elle soit
bien tyrannisee' (ibid., 11).

3.8 Il en va de l'ethique comme du jardinage: ceux-Ia pre-

ferent les jardins a la fran~aise, ceux-ci les jardins a l'anglaise.
La vieille maxime morale 'suivre La nature' (stolciens, epicu-
riens) est compatible avec l'hypothese que loin d'etre deviant,
l'homme est un etre naturel, dont les tatonnements ne sont pas
transgresseurs de barrieres sacrees, mais inventeurs de chemins.
Un acte libre n'est, apres tout, ni plus ni moins naturel qu'une
mutation genetique; la libre recherche est, a !'instar de la crea-
tivite artistique, un aspect de la demiurgie humaine spontanee.
Telle me parait etre la philo sophie de ceux qui acceptent la
discussion rationnelle des risques et benefices, pour tirer Ie
meilleur de chaque entreprise en rectifiant localement, ou
mieux en prevenant, ses tendances facheuses. Us font preuve
d'un empirisme moral semi-normatif, a mi-chemin entre la
methodologie de la decision et l'absolutisme ethique. Temoin
les avatars de l'axiome d'utilite, a me sure que se developpait la
controverse sur la recherche genetique.
On n'hesite pas a renoncer a des investigations qui, meme po-
tentiellement benefiques pour un tres grand nombre, compor-
tent des risques graves pour certains: la regIe du moindre mal
prevaut quand les nuisances ou catastrophes possibles ont une
probabilite forte, comme si l'obligation d'eviter de nuire, ou de
minimiser la sou/france, etait plus importante, ou plus imme-
diate, que celle de /aire Ie bien, ou de promouvoir un mieux-
are (Stich, 1978). Non que l'on tienne alors pour nuls les avan-
tages escomptes, ou pour injini Ie prix d'une vie humaine (on a
vu que cela n'est pas realiste); on suivrait plutot un 'harm-
314 A.M. Fagot

weighted principle' (Stich, ibid.), c'est-a-dire une variante du

principe d'utilite dans laquelle les consequences defavorables
seraient alourdies (ex. il est plus mal d'abreger d'un an l'espe-
rance de vie qu'il n'est bon de l'augmenter d'un an). Mais quand
Ies consequences redoutees sont tres eloignees dans Ie temps, ou
tres peu probables, l'obligation de chercher ajaire Ie bien passe
devant celle d'essayer de ne pas nuire, comme si la negligence a
chercher Ie vrai (et, avec Ie vrai, les benefices du savoir), consti-
tuait un peche par omission (Callahan, 1979); il faut que l'espe-
rance mathematique d'une catastrophe surpasse enormement
celle de decouvertes avantageuses pour qu'on se resolve a limiter
la liberte de connaitre (Cohen, 1977). Le gout du risque et Ia
confiance en la nature l'emportent Iorsque I'incertitude est
grande.
Ces ttitonnements ethiques sont-ils tenables? En l'absence de
consensus sur des normes absolues (ou de dictature qui en im-
pose), l'utilitarisme decisionnel tend a fournir aux deliberations
humaines une sorte de 'plus grand denominateur commun',
semi-scientifique (mesure et calcul), semi-normatif (choix de la
'meilleure' solution, i.e. celle qui a la plus grande esperance
mathematique). Mais l'accord sur des principes de procedure,
permettant de regler au 'coup par coup' des questions parti-
culieres (ex. faut-il interdire Ie clonage humain?), risque d'obli-
terer plus que de rMuire les desaccords ou incertitudes touchant
les visees de la recherche scientifique, et plus generalement, Ies
fins que Ia liberte humaine devrait se proposer. Ne peut-on
faire un pas de plus, et chercher dans des harmonies nature lies Ie
fondement de nos harmonisations partielles? Certes, Ia 'science
des mCEurs' reussit au debut de ce siecle a demolir plus de pre-
juges moraux qu'elle ne sut degager de regIe generale des con-
duites; d'aucune science humaine on n'espere aujourd'hui une
proposition normative. Quand notre epoque interroge la nature,
c'est Ii la nature biologique qu'elle s'adresse.
 Science et ethique 315

4. Problemes de fondements
'L'humanite ne constituant, au fond, que Ie
principal degre de l'animalite, les plus
hautes notions de la sociologie, et meme de
la morale, trouvent necessairement en bio-
logie leur premiere ebauche, pour les esprits
vraiment philosophiques qui savent les y
saisir' (A. Comte, 1852).
4.1 Can science provide the foundations for ethics? Le petit
colloque de Washington (Gingerich ed., 1975) entendit D. Cal-
lahan souhaiter Ie retour d'une philosophie de la nature qui,
repla<;ant l'homme dans l'ensemble de l'univers, et discemant
dans l'univers un ordre, decouvre dans cet ordre une sorte de
principe general de l'ethique. Si la theorie darwinienne est cor-
recte pour l'essentiel, l'espece humaine est Ie produit d'une
longue selection, et elle est la premiere espece a pouvoir influ-
encer deliberement la selection. Dans quel sens? Les especes
semblent avoir toujours lutte pour survivre: pour faire de la
survie une valeur, (pour continuer de procn~er, proteger l'en-
vironnement, etc.), il faut admettre que l'homme contribue a
la perfection de l'univers; quant a prendre en mains la direction
de l'evolution ... 'as long as we have no clear consensus on
what is good, it would seem prudent not to intervene' conc1ut
B. Davis.
L'ideal medieval d'une comprehension a la fois scientifique et
te16010gique de l'univers n'est pas si facile a ft!aliser aujourd'hui.
A defaut d'une synthese globale, on a espere tirer de la biologie
quelques universaux d'une ethique scientifique. A. Berleant
(1977) juge que des faits normatifs emergent de certaines re-
gions du savoir. Les universaux biologiques toument autour du
maintien de l'homeostasie: d'abord il faut survivre (sinon, on ne
pose meme pas de questions ethiques); ensuite il faut s'adapter
('adaptation is the central moral concept'), et si la vie sociale
impose largement Ie style de cette adaptation, les conditions
premieres sont ·celles du bien et du mal biologiques (preserva-
tion de la sante, du patrimoine genetique ... ). La psychologie
et l'anthropologie completent Ie tableau, en dessinant les con-
ditions de l'epanouissement individuel (Fromm, Maslow, Rogers,
Skinner) et celles de !'insertion dans la collectivite (Murdock,
316 A.M. Fagot

Kroeber, Kluckhohn, Harris), entre lesquelles naturellement on

observe une convergence.
Tout en trouvant contradictoire de fonder des universaux
moraux sur une science evolutionniste, constatons que la sante
a sans doute ete la norme la plus populaire d'une epoque qui a
consacre a la recherche medicale d'importants budgets, et
compte parmi ses imperatifs urgents Ie jogging ou l'absorption
de nourritures naturelles. Certes, ces attitudes sont fondees sur
des notions scientifiques: on peut calculer Ie coca de la mala die
pour la collectivite; il est etabli que la sedentarite, une alimenta-
tion trop riche, etc., sont des facteurs de risque des maladies
cardiovasculaires. Mais l'imperatif scientifique est hypothetique:
si tu veux diminuer tes chances de develop per un cancer bron-
chopulmonaire, alors abstiens-toi de fumer. Les sciences bio-
medicales ne prouvent pas que Ie gain de quelques annees d'espe-
rance de vie vaut que l'on sacrifie Ie plaisir du tabagisme et de la
bonne chere. Dans la mesure ou elles presupposent que tout etre
humain choisira une longue vie de sobriete, s'il est eclaire sur les
risques d'une consommation debauchee, elles adoptent impli-
citement des representations culturelles dans lesquelles Ie puri-
tanisme s'accorde assez bien avec Ie calcul economique. On sai-
sit ici sur Ie fait ce que Engelhardt et Callahan (vol. I, 1976)
appellent l'importation reciproque de concepts entre science et
ethique, les sciences biomedicales absorb ant des jugements de
valeur repandus dans la colle ctivite, et les valeurs collectives
etant dependantes de connaissances factuelles que la science
contribue a etablir. 11 est possible que dans cet echange se con-
struisent des valeurs universelles; mais il y a la meme rupture,
entre la sante totale (notre saintete moderne: holistic health,
cf. Guttmacher, H.C.R., 1979, 2) et la normalite statistique
definie par les biologistes, qu'entre l'homme du juste milieu
d'Aristote, et l'homme moyen de Quetelet. La conference
reunie en 1978 par l'OMS et l'UNICEF a Alma Ata reaffrrma
'avec force que la sante, qUi est un etat de complet bien-etre
physique, mental et social, et ne consiste pas seulement en
l'absence de mala die et d'infirmite, est un droit fondamental
de l'etre humain' (art. 1). Si les objectifs poses par les organisa-
tions internationales constituent des normes progressistes, alors
1a sante ainsi definie est une valeur pour l'humanite, c'est-a-dire
 Science et ethique 317

justement pas un etat de fait observable ou caracterisable scienti-

fiquement.
Pourtant il est difficile de dissocier Ie jugement objecti! sur la
maladie d'un jugement de valeur (la maladie est un mal), et Ie bien-
etre ne peut etre pose comme valeur que si l'on en sait expliciter
les conditions objectives de realisation. 'Both evaluation and ex-
planation are done by the same reasoning creatures', dit Engel-
hardt qui, faisant Ie bilan de quatre annees de reflexions inter-
diciplinaires sur 'les fondements de l'ethique et son rapport avec
la science', conclut que les deux entreprises: d'expliquer ce qUi est,
de dessiner ce qUi doit etre, doivent avoir des racines communes
(Engelhardt and Callahan, vol. 4, 1980). Cela ne revient pas seule-
ment a dire que science et ethique, comme disciplines de la raison,
part agent la meme exigence de coherence rationnelle (non-contra-
diction, effort de systematisation): cet aspect est souligne par H.
Margeneau (1979), qui suggere un parraltelisme methodologique
entre les processus de validation, par confrontation avec l'expe-
rience, des axiomes scientifiques et des commandements moraux.
Le groupe de Hastings va plus loin, en appelant a la double prise de
conscience qu'une ethique rationnelle se fonde sur des donnees
scientifiques, et qu'inversement de nombreux concepts scientifi-
ques ont deja une dimension normative.

4.2 II y a une nature humaine, dont l'ethique doit tenir compte.

Lancee par E. Wilson (1975, 1978) avec un sens quasi-publicitaire
de l'effet, cette proclamation contraste avec celles que l'on enten-
dit au cours des decennies precMentes. II n 'y a pas de nature hu-
maine, affmnait l'existentialisme sartrien; l'homme est Ie produit
des situations, disait Ie marxisme, l'homme se choisit face aux si-
tuations, resumait Sartre. Apres avoir fait de l'espece humaine une
espece culturelle, radicalement differente des autres especes ani-
males, voici que l'on revoit en elle une espece anima Ie comme les
autres, dont l'evolution sociale resulte de l'adaptation genetique
des populations aux contraintes ecologiques, dans les limites im-
posees par l'inertie du genome (1975, ch. 3). La sociobiologie a
suscite d'apres controverses qu'il n'est pas question de resumer ici
(voir p. ex. La Recherche, 1977, 75). On examinera seulement Ie
programma d'une ethique scientifique.
Les etres humains sont guides par un instinct ronde lui-meme
318 A.M. Fagot

sur des genes (1978, ch. 2). Pour expliquer les reactions affectives
qui sont a la racine des jugements ethiques, il faut demonter la
machinerie neurologique dont elles procedent, dans les structures
profondes de l'encephale (zones limbique et hypothalamique).
Pour comprendre la finalite de ces attitudes programmees dans
notre systeme nerveux central, il faut reconstituer l'histoire evo-
lutive qui eclaire la signification adaptative de la selection des
genes responsables du developpement de ces structures cerebrales.
Une ethique scientifique existera lorsque la neurophysiologie, et
la sociobiologie evolutionniste, auront conjointement montre
comment (par quels circuits) et pourquoi (pour repondre a quelles
exigences du milieu) Ie cerveau humain fonctionne comme il Ie
fait (p. ex. embraye, dans certaines situations, sur une conduite
aItruiste). Par la-meme seront balayes les fantasmes des philo-
sophes de l'ethique, qui cherchent pour l'individu des raisons
d'exister, sans voir que notre espece est une experience de l'evo-
lution parmi d'autres (1978, ch. 2), et l'organisme individuel la
forme ephemere d'une des configurations genetiques possibles
de l'espece - 'un phenomene superficiel', eftt dit Schopenhauer
(1844, suppl. XLI). Le message de ce nouveau materialisme scien-
tifique est austere, voire melancolique (1975, ch. 27): la connais-
sance totale de la nature humaine est, ultimement, deshumani-
sante ... mais elle est inevitable. 'Le destin de l'homme est de sa-
voir' (1978, ch. 9), la survie est a ce prix.
Nous nous rendons malheureux si nous ten tons de lutter contre
nos dispositions innees (1978, ch. 4). La connaissance de ces dis-
positions sera liberatrice, dans la me sure ou elle ouvrira la voie du
seul progres moral veritable: celui qui resulte de l'action des struc-
tures sociales sur la selection de nos genes, voire de la modifica-
tion directe de certains genes (sur la manipulation eventuelle des
genes, Wilson est toutefois discret). Cette connaissance n'en est
aujourd'hui qu'a ses premiers balbutiements, ne permettant que
de denoncer quelques illusions: d'abord, l'illusion de l'autonomie
personnelle et du libre-arbitre.
Comme jadis A. Comte, E. Wilson se garde de tout reduction-
nisme: il reconnait que l'ordre social presente des proprietes
emergentes par rapport a l'ordre biologique (1975, ch. 2); mais il
laisse cannibaliser la psychologie, et toute science .du developpe-
ment animal individuel, par la biologie cellulaire (et moleculaire:
 Science et ethique 319

biochimie des neurotransmetteurs) d'un cote, la sociologie de

l'autre (entendue comme etude neo-darwinienne des populations
animales). Nul acte d'un organisme n'est pose pour lui-meme (pour
Ie plaisir, la beaute, l'interet); toute conduite individuelIe (qu'elle
soit apparemment egoiste, comme l'homosexualite, ou apparem-
ment altruiste, comme Ie sacrifice de soi) est toujours utilitaire. Le
ca1cul d'utilite n'est pas Ie fait de l'individu, mais celui de ses genes,
qui optimisent leur chance de se reproduire (ainsi les homosexuels
conferent un avantage a la selection des genes de leur parente, cad.
indirectement des leurs propres). 'Les genes tiennent la culture en
laisse ... La morale n'a aucune autre fonction demontrable que
celIe d'assurer la permanence du materiel genetique humain' (1978,
ch.7).
Autre illusion: celIe d'une morale rationnelIe. Citant avec a pro-
pos l'aphorisme d'Abba Eban (1967) - 'les hommes ne recourent
Ii la raison qu 'en.dernier ressort', Wilson insiste sur Ie caractere
essentiellement emotionnel de nos motivations morales (I'oracle
limbique parle en termes de peur/agressivite, arnour/haine, expan-
sion joyeuse/retrait de tristesse; 1975, ch. 1). L'impossibilite de
degager un code moral coherent et universel est liee au pluralisme
inne de ces affects, vestiges d'adaptations a des situations evolu-
tives d'ages differents. Les mammiferes en particulier, dont la sur-
vie a requis un haut degre de cooperation sociale, sont intimement
tirailles entre des fidelites irreconciliables (narcissisme du moi, de
la famille, de la tribu, - l'egoisme du groupe imposant l'altruisme
reciproque de ses membres: ambivalence mammalienne). Dans la
description faite par L. Kohlberg (1971) des stades du developpe-
ment moral de l'enfant humain, Wilson semble voir une recapitula-
tion ontogenetique de l'evolution phylogenetique, ou les forma-
tions cuiturelles (educatives) realisent des compromis d'amplitude
croissante entre l'egolsme et l'altruisme. C'est la qu'une science
des fondements biologiques de la morale serait utile, en permet-
tant de demeler parmi les valeurs celles qui gardent aujourd'hui
une signification adaptative (['injustice ne paie pas; if est dans ton
interet de cooperer: imperatif mammalien), et celles qui sont peri-
mees (certaines reactions agressives pourraient etre des restes ar-
chaiques de conduites adaptees au milieu ou vivaient nos ancetres
chasseurs des eres glaciaires). Cette science donnerait a l'espece hu-
320 A.M. Fagot

maine les moyens d'agir sur sa propre evolution, soit en achevant

de rendre obsoletes certaines tendances innees, ce qui entrainerait
leur disparition (nous pouvons dessiner nos densites de population
et nos systemes sociaux de fa~on arendre inadaptees la plupart des
conduites d'agression; 1975, ch. 11), soit en selectionnant delibere-
ment les traits auxquels nos societes attribuent une valeur (esprit
de cooperation, creativite ... ; 1975, ch. 27).
Au 'grand probleme humain, subordonner l'egolsme a l'altruis-
me' (Catechisme Positiviste, 4e entretien, 1852), A. Comte propo-
sa it une solution positive, sous la forme d'un systeme politico-
religieux destine a construire Ie Grand-Etre. Wilson insiste sur la
necessite, avant de ba:tir des utopies, de s'assurer qu'elles sont
biologiquement praticables, et croit que la science nous montrera
que Ie nombre des trajectoires possibles est, en realite, restreint.
Au demeurant la 'societe planifiee', dans son zele a se debarrasser
de phenotypes indesirables, risquerait de faire disparaitre du meme
coup des phenotypes interessants qui leur seraient genetiquement
lies (1975, ch. 27). Aussi, en attendant qu'une science bio-sociolo-
gique achevee nous permette de prendre des decisions judicieuses,
Wilson penche pour un conservatisme circonspect, proposant que
l'on choisisse comme valeur primordiale la preservation du lot glo-
bal des genes humains (1978, ch. 9). Quant aux generations fu-
tures, pour lesquelles on entrevoit la possibilite prometheenne de
modifier la nature humaine, elles trouveront dans la connaissance
biologique les conditions d'un choix realiste. Y trouveront-elles la
norme d'un choix optimal? L'evolution a des buts, non un but. La
theorie neo-darwinienne est peut-etre 'Ie meilleur my the que nous
ayons jamais eu', mais elle n'a pas, en tant que source de moralite,
l'attrait emotionnel des mythes religieux: elle ne dit pas ou aller.
Notre cerveau affectif est programme pour conserver des valeurs,
non pour en creer: silence de !'instinct. 'lIn 'y a pas de signe dans
Ie monde, disait Sartre (1946), l'homme est condamne a inventer
l'homme'. Curieusement, apres avoir rejete comme illusoire l'in-
dividualisme existentiel, Wilson est accu16 a une sorte d'existen-
tialisme des populations, ou de l'espece: l'ethique scientiJique,
c'est Ie choix d'un systeme de valeurs (d'une constellation gene-
tique, - d'une essence humaine), sur 1a base d'une connaissance
objective des determinismes historico-chimiques a travers lesquels
la nature humaine s'est constituee jusqu'ici, aiguillonne peut-etre
 Science et ethique 321

par la conscience des incoherences qui dans cette nature sont la

cicatrice des hasards de l'evolution, rna is sans concept rationnel ou
a priori de ce que la nature humaine devrait etre.

4.3 D'aucuns ont reproche a l'auteur de la sociobiologie cette

abstention normative. Laissons-nous guider par nos emotions, dit
R. McShea (1978), puisqu'elles sont Ie seul principe regulateur, et
l'indice sur des valeurs ultimes. Mais si nos emotions sont dispa-
rates? - E1les s'unifient so us l'influence de nos cognitions. L'idee
que Ie developpement moral est organiquement determine, mais
que l'intellect (la societe) finit par modeler !'instinct en lui impo-
sant de trouver des satisfactions de plus en plus complexes et dif-
ferees, se trouve deja chez Freud et nombre de ses contemporains
(Dewey, Baldwin). E1le est reprise par les psychologues de l'ecole
piagetienne, qui voient dans l'apprentissage un processus de regu-
lation reciproque 'entre l'assimilation des choses par l'esprit et
l'accommodation de l'esprit aux choses' (Piaget, 1964): ici, entre
les sentiments moraux evaluateurs et les situations qui les suscitent.
L'homme qui, au lieu d'agir sous Ie coup de l'emotion immediate,
prend une conscience plus large de la situation, et laisse les emo-
tions se reorganiser, agit comme on doit agir, cad. de fa90n plus
humaine, parce qu'inspiree par un sentiment plus complexe, ne
d'une vue plus comprehensive des choses (McShea, 1978). La ma-
turation morale de l'enfant, depuis l'obeissance pour eviter la puni-
tion, jusqu'a l'acceptation d'un systeme de regles instituant Ie
bien commun, est reglee par sa maturation cognitive, et ce que l'on
doit faire, c'est ce que fait l'individu parvenu au stade de develop-
pement ou la societe tend a conduire la plupart de ses membres
(Kohlberg, 1969).
Que la norme morale soit a trouver dans la pratique de l'indivi-
du evolue, plutot que dans une theorie du bien, Aristote d'ailleurs
Ie suggerait deja, et les explorateurs recents de la 'nature morale'
de l'homme ont consciemment retrouve l'inspiration du natura-
lisme aristotelicien (cf. Stent, 1978). Stegmiiller (1977) voudrait
que Ie 'sujet' des theories morales ne fUt pas un sujet abstrait
(comme chez Kant ou Rawls), mais un sujet informe et mur,
ayant soumis ses motivations a l'epreuve d'une therapie cognitive.
L'ethique a sans doute beaucoup a ganger d'une etude objective
des itineraires de la normalite et de l'epanouissement biopsychique,
322 A.M. Fagot

ou des procedures d'harmonisation sociale. Sans aller jusqu'a dire

que les regles morales sont construites, comme les hypotheses
scientifiques, par extrapolation ou imagination rationnelIe, a partir
de l'examen des aspirations de personnes mures et bien informees
(Walter, 1974), il est tentant de chercher a percevoir Ie sens dans
lequel l'evolution nous entraine, et d'y lire, sinon un destin ou une
prescription, du moins - comme l'esperait Kant (1795) - Ie signe
que la nature est complice de nos fins morales. Nonobstant la con-
viction personnelle de Wilson (qui voit les societes humaines de-
river vers l'uniformite de la termitiere), les recherches sus-men-
tionnees tendent a vehiculer l'impression que Ie processus evolutif
tend a creer les conditions de l'epanouissement des potentialites
individuelles (Simpson, 1966). Le danger, si l'on y voit une mo-
rale, est qu'elle justifie tout (I'm OK, you're OK ... , tout ce qui
est pleinement humain est bon),
A cet optimisme laxiste, on peut preferer l'ambivalence d'E.
Wilson qui, lorsqu'il ne se regufie pas dans la securit6 provocante
du determinisme genetique (nous avons he programmes ... ), bas-
cule vers une liberte nue et sans excuse (aucun gourou ne peut
nous dire quoi faire ... ). La nature ne fournit, a ses yeux, que des
normes perimees (nos predispositions sont des survivances d'adap-
tations archa'iques), ou des normes negatives (certaines conduites
sont biologiquement impraticables; ainsi l'echec des systemes es-
clavagistes suggerait que Ie genome humain est rebelle a l'escla-
vage; 1978, ch. 4). D'ou Ie triple 'dilemme' (1978): en mesurant
les contraintes qui pesent sur nos evaluations morales, la science
nous accule a choisir les valeurs que nous voulons conserver; elle
donne les 'bases objectives' de ce choix (elle montre les trajec-
toires impossibles) , elle ne fournit aucun principe de choix entre
les trajectoires possibles; elle nous permet d'agir sur la nature par
laqueUe nous sommes agis.
On a releve chez Wilson l'idee mythique (et romantique) que les
traits moraux sont so us la dependance des genes; on a souligne
l'influence determinante du milieu socio-culturel (Science for the
People, nov.-dec. 1975; Lewontin, The Sciences, mars-avril 1976).
L'argument est ambigu. Pour reprendre un trait de K. Popper
(1962, I, 5): on peut essayer de changer un etat de fait (par exem-
pIe, un privilege de race ou de sexe), on peut resister aux tenta-
tives faites pour Ie changer, on peut decider de laisser aIler et
 Science et ethique 323

s'abstenir de toute intervention. Mais ces decisions n'ont de sens

que si l'etat de fait est modifiable. Accuse-t-onWilson de laisser
entendre que les traits moraux ne sont pas modifiables, ou de
s'etre trompe dans son hypothese sur la fayon de les modifier?
Croit-on que 1a causalite socio-economique se manipule mieux
que 1a causalite organique? (on sait pourtant que la prescription
de drogues anxiolytiques est plus facile que l'amenagement de con-
ditions de vie moins stressantes!). Avec les progres de la biologie,
Ie bricolage des genes pourrait devenir plus aise que celui des
structures sociales. Wilson croit meme qu'une connaissance exacte
des mecanismes qui ont conduit a un etat de fait nous libere: si
nous savions qu'il suffit de changer un gene (ou une disposition
juridique) pour eradiquer un prejuge sexuel ou racial, nous pour-
rions effectivement entreprendre de nous en liberer. Deciderions-
nous de Ie faire, de nous opposer a ceux qui voudraient Ie faire, de
nous abstenir? Quel role la science jouerait-elle dans cette deci-
sion? Le point obscur me parait etre a l'origine du dilemme
signale: si la connaissance positive est 'source d'emancipation',
comme l'auteur Ie repete, elle doit bien etre aussi source de mo-
ralite, non par ses contenus (I'observation de la nature, encore
une fois, ne montre pas ce qu'i! laut laire), mais par son projet
(la recherche scientifique n'est pas neutre, puisque Wilson la met
en competition avec les religions). Or 1a sociobiologie, si elle se
presente comme une science militante, n'elucide guere Ie role de
l'aventure scientifique dans 'l'epopee de l'evolution'.
Bien des hommes de science souhaitent rester en retrait de tels
developpements. 'Aux problemes qui articulent Ie biologique et
Ie social, les biologistes n'ont, en tant que tels, pas de reponse a
proposer. lis ne peuvent que constater les conditions de possibili-
te des evolutions dont ils se bornent a reperer les termes' (Gros,
Jacob, Royer, 1979, 5). D'autres ont pousse plus loin que Wilson
Ie questionnement d'une 'philosophie naturelle de la biologie
moderne'.

a meme de donner des buts de vie a

'la science est-elle
I'homme, apres avoir prouve qu'elle peut en enlever et en
detruire?' (Nietzsche, 1886).
4.4 La biologie evolutionniste confrrme-t-elle [,absence de toute
324 A.M. Fagot

raison profonde de vivre? E. Wilson (1975, ch. 27) cite A. Camus

(1942): 'Dans un univers soudain prive d'i/lusions et de lumieres,
l'homme se sent un etranger. Cet exil est sans recours puisqu'il est
prive des souvenirs d'une patrie perdue ou de l'espoir d'une terre
promise'. 'Cela est malheureusement vrai', conc1ut Wilson, qui se
console par la pensee qu'il faudra encore plusieurs generations
pour que les mythologies religieuses cedent la place a une phylo-
genie positive, qui nous donne de nous-memes une explication
'totale et mecaniste'. Monod juge, lui aussi, que la science 'ruine
toutes les ontogenies' sur lesquelles reposent les valeurs tradition-
nelles, qu'elle implique 'l'exigence d'une revision totale des fon-
dements de l'ethique': 'l'homme sait enfin qu'il est seul dans l'im-
mensite indifferente de I'Univers d'ou il a emerge par hasard. Non
plus que son destin, son devoir n 'est ecrit nulle part. A lui de choi-
sir ... '. Au meme livre de Camus il emprunte (en exergue) sa re-
ponse quasi-stolcienne: 'aveugle qUi desire voir et qui sait que la
nuit n 'a pas de fin, it est toujours en marche ... Lui aussi juge que
tout est bien. Ces univers desormais sans maitre ne lui paraU ni
sterile ni futile .. .' (Le my the de Sisype).
La science met nos valeurs en peril: vieille querelle? De la cos-
mologie galileenne on crut deja qu'elle allait ruiner l'ordre moral
.. , Par un raisonnement analogue a celui de Duhem (1905), qui 'de-
nie a la theorie physique toute portee meta physique' , les creation-
nistes (cf. Nelkin, 1976) n'eurent pas de peine a faire observer,
vers la fin des annees 1960, que Ie dogmatisme est etranger au veri-
table esprit scientifique, que Ie systeme des hypotheses neo-dar-
winiennes a ete construit pour rendre compte d'un certain nombre
de faits, qu'une construction n'est pas une verite objective, qu'i}
existe au moins un autre systeme d'hypotheses (creationniste)
qui permet de representer et pre dire aussi bien les memes donnees
de l'experience, que les preferences pour l'une ou l'autre theorie
doivent etre respectees au nom du pluralisme democratique et de
la liberte de penser. Monod prend l'entreprise scientifique moins
legerement. Le choix entre deux theories compatibles en gros
avec les faits n'est pas a ses yeux question de gout, mais ques-
tion d'objectivite. La confrontation avec l'experience selectionne
les idees pertinentes, finit par eliminer les hypotheses qui cad rent
mal avec la realite. L'hypothese de l'evolution a supplante celIe de
la creation: ce n'est pas une affaire de mode intellectuelle, c'est
 Science et ethique 325

qu'en observant Ie monde des vivants on s'est aper~u que les

choses ont dll se passer ainsi, et non pas autrement. Certes, l'expli-
cation neo-darwinienne n'est encore qu'approximativement vraie,
on en rectifie les erreurs a mesure qu'on analyse de nouvelles don-
nees ... Le point est que, pour qu'il y ait des idees moins fausses
que d'autres, on doit supposer une realite objective qui les depar-
tage. Le postulat d'objectivite fonde l'entreprise de connaissance.
Deux conceptions de la verite scientifique s'opposent ici, dont
il est bien possible que l'une, au moins, ne soit pas compatible
avec n'importe quelle ethique. Derealiser la science pour assurer
son inocuite metaphysique: c'est l'attitude d'un positivisme con-
ventionaliste, heritier peut-etre du polytheisme. Le discours
scientifique n'a pas de pron!ondeur (pas de portee ontologique),
soit parce que l'observation n'atteint que des phenomenes (des
apparences - il n'y a pas d'experience de la realite veritable),
soit parce que l'observateur ne dispose pas de criteres de choix
entre descriptions differentes du reel: on peut tout dire, une
theorie s'accorde toujours avec les faits, puisque l'observation
des faits est tout impregnee de theorie. A l'extreme on tend au
relativisme: toutes les idees se valent, tout Ie monde a raison (po-
sition imprenable, voire perverse - elle rend derisoire la critique).
Par la-meme toutes les morales sont bonnes; du moins, ce n'est
pas la science qui peut les departager. Le relativisme est l'allie
naturel des religions: si les hommes sont depourvus d'un sens du
vrai, peut-etre vaut-il mieux qu'ils subissent la regIe de quelque
dieu-pere, plutot que de s'installer dans une lutte fratricide, ran-
~on de la tolerance pour les idees. En effet, si nul ne peut etre
convaincu d'erreur, certains doivent etre persuades qu'ils ont
tort (il est particulierement savoureux de mettre en minorite
ceux qui croient qu'il existe des verites objectives). La science
n 'est pas neutre: chaque chercheur travaille a faire triompher son
point de vue, l'hypothese qui triomphe a un moment donne est
celIe dont les defenseurs ont Ie mieux su demolir leurs rivaux, ou
trouve les meilleurs appuis financiers, politiques, et autres.
La conscience morale (s'il existe une conscience morale) ne
peut que s'offusquer d'un tel etat de choses: au minimum elle
exigera que s'applique la regIe democratique de decision plutOt
que celle de l'absolutisme mandarinal. Si la verite scientifique
s'elabore dans une competition entre les chercheurs (au niveau
326 A.M. Fagot

de ce que Popper appelle monde 2), il est concevable que l'on

cherche a moraliser cette competition, par exemple en garantissant
a tous les chercheurs les memes credits, les memes facilites de pu-
blication, etc. (en substituant, a une science capitaliste, une scien-
ce socialiste ... ).
Mais decide-t-on du vrai a la majorite des suffrages, mieux que
par soumission a une autorite? Monod croit a la selection, non des
chercheurs, mais des idees (monde 3 de Popper): les idees vraies
sont celles qui resistent a la confrontation de notre logique (les
schemas d'experience acquis par l'espece) avec la rea lite objective
(I'experience actuelle). Est vrai ce qui correspond aux faits: la
connaissance objective (scientifique) seule peut etre vraie, i1 n'y
a pas d'autre source de connaissance. Les ontogenies mythiques
(judeo-christianisme) ou philosophiques (Hegel) par lesquelles
l'homme s'est represente l'histoire de sa destinee etaient a la fois
explicatives et normatives (elles fondaient les valeurs sur une na-
ture: elles parlaient, par exemple, de droits naturels). Elles n'e-
taient pas vraies (pas objectives). La science atteint a l'objectivite
au prix de l'abstention de toute normativite: en ce sens 'la science
attente aux valeurs', en manifestant qu'un jugement de valeur
n'est jamais fonde sur un jugement de realite, que Ie seul fonde-
ment des valeurs est la volonte humaine de les promouvoir (quand
bien meme nous croirions que dieu existe, cela ne nous dispense-
rait pas d'avoir a decider si les commandements divins sont justes
et acceptables, eut dit Popper - 1961, § 13 -, que Monod a lu).
Alors, la science est neutre? - non. Quand on croit la verite ac-
cessible si l'on decide de se donner la peine de la chercher, on de-
finit une attitude de vie: une ethique, voire une politique. La
science n'est pas neutre par rapport aux valeurs, non parce que la
morale peut se fonder sur la science, mais au contraire parce que
celui (individu ou societe) qui s'engage dans la recherche scienti-
fique a fait un choix d'ordre ethique, et par la-meme, a deja
choisi une morale. L'ethique de la connaissance est cette ascese
de l'esprit qui consiste a s'imposer de n'accepter pour vraie qu'une
connaissance objective. Elle implique la solitude morale de l'hom-
me dans un univers 'sourd a sa musique, indifferent a ses espoirs
comme a ses souffrances ou a ses crimes' (1970, ch. 9). Une
science solidement realiste appellerait, en somme, une ethique
d'inspiration existentialiste: ce que nous devons faire n'est ecrit
 Science et ethique 327

nulle part au ciel ni sur la terre, nous creons nos valeurs.

4.5 La proposition de Monod enveloppe trois theses emboltees:

Ie vrai est une valeur, c'est la valeur fandamentale (la 'mesure'
des autres valeurs), un groupe humain qui decide de mettre ses
institutions au service de cette valeur edifie un socialisme authen-
tique.
- Premiere these, peu contestable: Ie choix de chercher Ie vrai est
un choix ethique (Ie pastulat d'abjectivite etablit une narme de
cannaissance). L'idee est ancienne - Descartes disait qu'on peut
refuser de se rendre a l'evidence du vrai et/ou du bien (Le. refu-
ser Dieu; cf. lettre a Mesland, 9 fey. 1645). Monod souligne avec
raison que la science modeme ne s'est pas developpee par ha-
sard au sein d 'une culture judeo-chretienne: nos societes occi-
dentales ont pris Ie partie d'accepter Ie monde comme il est, de
faire avec, de collaborer a l'reuvre du createur (dire aui, jouer
Ie jeu: principe de realite) plutot que de s'evader dans Ie fan-
tasme ou Ie nirvana. Cet engagement existentiel, pris de fa~on
a peine consciente, demeurerait sous-jacent a notre civilisation
scientifico-technique.
- Deuxieme these: ayant ruine les anciens systemes de valeurs,
l'ethique de la connaissance est seule susceptible de donner un
ideal a l'homme, et de Ie reconcilier avec lui-meme en recon-
naissant a la fois sa nature socio-biologique (objet d'etude
scientifique) et sa liberte (creatrice de 'transcendance'). Monod
pense-t-il que de l'honnetete intellectuelle decoulent les autres
vertus, et la discipline des passions? La proposition aurait un
relent spinoziste, si l'auteur de l'Ethique ne precisait que c'est
la connaissance de l'Etre sauverainement parfait, qui rend par-
fait. Faut-il entendre que Monod transpose: Deus sive natura ...
L'idee resterait ambigue: suffit-il d'etre savant pour etre bon?
- La troisieme these generalise la seconde en l'etendant a la vie
collective: une societe qui prend pour base de ses institutions
sociales et politiques, et pour 'mesure' de leur authenticite,
l'axiome selon lequel il faut promouvoir la connaissance vraie,
sera une societe juste et respectueuse de la personne humaine.
Cela laisse perplexe. Vne communaute humaine est-elle demo-
cratique a proportion que la recherche, et la circulation de l'in-
328 A.M. Fagot

formation, y sont assurees? L'education scientifique et techni-

que rend-dIe les gens meilleurs? La presence des savants em-
peche-t-eUe les camps de concentration? Suffit-il de reconnaitre
qu'il n'y a pas de lois objectives de l'histoire universeUe, pour
echapper au totalitarisme? II n'est pas ridicule de dire qu'une
societe qui restreint la liberte de savoir n'est pas une societe
democratique (critere negatif). Le malaise qu'on eprouve a
suivre l'auteur jusqu'au bout de sa these vient, je crois, de ce
qu'a entendre que la science dispose du seul critere de verite,
on se sent menace d 'un autre absolutisme.

4.6 On se plait a reconnaitre, avec Monod, que la prudence

scientifique exige Ie respect du fait: il y a la, en meme temps
qu'une humilite devant Ie monde (les faits sont ce qu'its sont,
non ce que nous souhaitons qu'ils soient; nos conjectures ou ex-
trapolations sont ultimement soumises au verdict de l'experience),
l'expression d'une certaine mefiance (ne croire que ce que l'on
peut constater: l'ame, les soucoupes volantes, les phenomenes
psy, ne sont pas des objets scientifiques). Choisir de respecter les
faits, c'est sans nul doute un choix ethique - une ethique even-
tueUement utilitaire, car les idees vraies ont un haut 'pouvoir de
performance' (eUes reussissent), selon Monod lui-meme. L'impor-
tant est de reconnaitre que l'ancrage du discours dans une objec-
tivite (garantie par des precautions methodologiques multiples:
techniques d'observation, definition de marges d'erreur, critique
des resultats ... ) fait qu'on ne peut pas raconter n'importe quai. A
cet egard la pratique scientifique peut etre comprise comme une
'therapie morale' (Crombie, 1975), non pas au sens ou la recti-
tude exigee du chercheur serait une vertu, mais au sens ou l'into-
lerance pour les idees fausses facilite la tolerance pour les gens:
s'ils se trompent, l'erreur est jugee par l'experience (iI est inutile
d'employer la force pour imposer Ie vrai); s'ils expriment une
preference axiologique, eUe ne peut etre erronee, puisqu'elle ne
releve pas du criterium experimental.
Aussit6t note qu'il est sain de tenir a un certain realisme scien-
tifique, on en voit cependant les limites: ceilleres d'un positivisme
au ras des faits (Rolando devient cachectique: on lui fait une bat-
terie de blood tests, et iI explose - 'vous aves des yeux pour ne
pas voir que je suis en train de mourir de chagrin?' O. Sacks,
 Science et ethique 329

1973-{), illusion d'objectivite (quels faits, etablis par qui? l'inter-

ference de l'observateur avec l'objet observe, la dependance de la
perception a l'egard du savoir acquis, la formulation des donnees
en termes subtilement normatifs, rendent necessaire une critique
du 'postulat d'objectivite'), difficultes theoriques de la notion de
'confirmation' d'une hypothese par les faits (Monod semble faire
sienne la position verificationniste naIve). En maintenant une
transcendance du vrai, Oll la sanction des faitsjoue Ie role dujuge-
ment de Dieu, Monod se montre l'heritier du monotheisme (on
pourrait en dire autant de Wilson).
'II ne peut pas y avoir de critere general du vrai': apres avoir
rappele Ie resultat de Tarski, Popper (1961) insiste sur Ie fait que
nous approchons du vrai negativement (en decelant nos erreurs).
La theorie neo-darwinienne de l'evolution n'est pas vraie, elle est
moins fausse que les theories qui 1'0nt precedee (elle correspond
mieux a la realite). L'axiome de Monod: oil faut chercher Ie vrai',
assorti du bemol popperien: 'on peut prouver qu'on s'est trompe,
on ne peut jamais etre sur qu'on est dans Ie vrai', garde son impact
ethique. Le chercheur s'engage, en quetant Ie vrai, a exercer sa
vigilance critique, a douter. Le benefice du doute, c'est la tole-
rance. Vne societe qui s'organise de fa~on a rendre libre toute
critique (la 'societe ouverte' de Popper) institue des conditions
necessaires a un pluralisme democratique. Pour croire que ces
conditions sont suffisantes, il faut, soit supposer peu ou prou dans
la nature une sagesse spontanee (laissez s'installer la liberte de con-
tester, Ie reste - la democratie - vous sera donne par surcroit),
so it presumer que Ie culte de la connaissance vraie com me 'valeur
transcendante' implique un respect absolu pour 'l'homme, crea-
teur et depositaire de cette transcendance' (Monod, 1970, ch. 9).
Dans l'un ou l'autre cas, pour retomber sur une situation conforme
aux aspirations morales communes, on injecte un precepte kan-
tien: imperatif categorique, ou principe regulateur d'une finalite
de Ia nature.
Mais veut-on d'une societe vouee au progres de la science? Que
la civilisation occidentale a opte, en pratique, pour la connaissance
objective, et qu'elle a virtuellement balaye les autres civilisations,
on Ie constate avec Monod. Que Ie 'malaise des societes modemes'
soit dll au mensonge ideologique par Iequel elles se dissimulent que
l'homme est la mesure de toutes choses, on en est moins sur: il
330 A.M. Fagot

peut aussi bien tenir a la conscience qu'il n'y a pas de mesure abso-
lue des valeurs. Quant a l'orgueilleuse et austere ethique de la con-
naissance, on doute qu'elle guerisse ce mal. Lorsqu'on a Ie choix
de ses valeurs, pourquoi tenir a l'ascese de dire ce qui est, pourquoi
pas la distance de l'ironie, l'imaginaire, Ie contre-factuel? On dira
que l'ascese de la recherche est payante: elle est facteur de deve-
loppement. Voila bien l'ambiguite. On sollicite l'enthousiasme
pour la recherche desinteressee; on compte que ceux qui, faute
d'etre mus par la curiosite du vrai, preferent une autre ethique a
titre personnel, acceptent que la collectivite sacrifie tout au pro-
gres scientifique, parce que Ie progres scientifique, c'est Ie progres
tout court. Preche-t-on '!'ideal transcendant du vrai', ou un modele
technologique de developpement? Les deux ne coincident pas: la
decouverte d'un meson ou d'un pion de plus peut n'importer
guere au developpement collectif. S'il faut choisir une valeur fon-
damentale, Ie vrai ne s'impose pas (Platon choisit Ie Bien). Traiter
l'art et la poesie comme des epiphenomenes, au regard de l'activite
'serieuse' qu'est la recherche scientifique, c'est une bevue de sa-
vant: une danse, une phrase musicale, peuvent apaiser l'angoisse
existentielle mieux que la connaissance exacte de nos origines
phylogenetiques. Monod dirait sans doute qu'il ne meprise point
Ie discours poetique, a condition qu'il ne se donne pas pour un
discours vrai. Mais il y a quelque imperialisme latent dans Ie refus
d'un pluralisme des valeurs. Platon rejetait les artistes de la cite.
La science experimentale aurait, au surplus, Ie monopole de la
verite? 11 faut reconnaitre que cette proposition a, chez Monod,
une portee surtout negative: il s'agit d'exc1ure du domaine de la
connaissance ce qui ne peut etre scientifiquement valide. Cepen-
dant, une fois adrnis avec Popper (1959) que Ie non-scientifique
n'est pas Ie non-verifiable, mais l'infalsifiable; une fois reconnu
avec Lakatos (1974) que meme la falsifiabilite ne suffit pas a
distinguer les hypotheses scientifiques, puisque les grandes theo-
ries resistent aux 'anomalies' rencontrees dans les faits (these
de Duhem-Quine: une seule experience n'est jamais cruciale, la
refutation n'est pas plus decisive que la confirmation. Quand
l'experience est en desaccord avec la theorie, 'Ie bon sens est juge'
... , dit Duhem, 1914, II, 6, 10); la question du critere de demarca-
tion entre science et non-science reste ouverte. On peut preferer
qu'elle Ie soit, plutot que d'en rester a l'image d'une institution
 Science et ethique 331

scientifique qui delivre des labels de verite, comme jadis l'Eglise

administrait les sacrements. Le probleme de la demarcation n'est
pas pour autant un pseudo-probleme, Lakatos (1974) reconnaH
qu'il a 'de graves implications ethiques et politiques': on reagit
differemment a des propos tenus sur 'race et intelligence', par
exemple, selon qu'on les tient pour scientifiques ou non-scienti-
fiques. II existe des criteres de non-scientificite: on peut critiquer
la methode par laquelle un resultat a ete etabli (ex. echantillon in-
suffisant: statistique non significative), contester la fayon dont Ie
result at est interprete (ex. explication finaliste: chercher une ex-
plication causale), recuser les concepts sur lesquels une recherche
se fonde (I'intelligence': ce que mesure un certain test?). Mais nous
n'avons pas plus de critere absolu de scientificite que nous n'avons
de critere absolu de moralite. 'Dans la methode experimentale
comme partout, Ie seul criterium reel est la raison', disait Claude
Bernard (1865, I).

5. Pour une philosophie dujugement

'L'arbitraire creant Ie necessaire .. .' (P. Va-
lery,1894).

5.1 Science et ethique ne sont pas, en somme, dans des situa-

tions tres differentes. Le projet d'ethique scientifique de Wilson
delimite une part de scientificite possible dans la recherche ethique,
l'ethique de la connaissance de Monod identifie dans l'entreprise
scientifique une part de decision normative. Les deux reflexions
sont complementaires.
Chercher a fonder l'ethique sur la science, c'est vouloir limiter
l'arbitraire des normes, de charger 1a responsabilite humaine du
choix des valeurs (sans pour autant en charger dieu). Notre epoque
tend a enraciner les systemes de valeurs dans des determinismes
biologiques (en d'autres temps on les rapporta a des determi-
nismes economiques - Marx, ou psychologiques - Freud ... ). Il
s'agit de toute fayon de montrer que l'homme (espece ou individu)
ne saurait choisir de faire n'importe quoi, que ses preferences
axiologiques sont donnees dans une nature, qu'on ne peut les
modifier sans manipuler leurs determinations reelles, que toute
manipulation n'est pas possible. Wilson ne nie pas qu'il y ait finale-
332 A.M. Fagot

ment une liberte, voire une creativite morale radicale, mais il s'at-
tache a lui definir des conditions d'exercice qu'il croit realistes.
Dans cette perspective, la science exerce sur l'ethique une sorte
de regulation negative: el1e ne prescrit rien (elle n'indique pas Ie
bon choix), elle dit ce qui est impossible (utopique), ou de quel
prix on doit payer Ie possible (e1le donne des elements pour juger
que certains choix sont pires que d'autres).
Montrer que l'entreprise scientifique se Jonde sur un choix
hhique, c'est reveler la part d'arbitraire ineliminable qu'il y a
dans la determination du vrai, - sorte de talon d'Achille de la
science. Le tort de Monod est sans doute de vouloir se debarras-
ser de cet arbitraire d'entree de jeu et d'un coup, par une sorte
de pari existentiel en faveur de la connaissance objective. Or, la
decision de ce qui est scientifiquement acceptable est prise de
nouveau chaque fois qu'est etabli un resultat scientifique, elle
engage chaque fois la responsabilite des chercheurs: il n'y a ni
norme absolue, ni autorite decisive, les normes de la scientificite
se creent, par retouches et corrections successives, en meme
temps que la science se fait.

5.2 Popper resume la situation (1961, § 10-14). II n'y a pas de

critere absolu du vrai (ex. il n'existe pas de theorie physique vraie).
II y a encore moins de critere du bien absolu (ex. il n'existe pas de
systeme fiscal juste). Faut-il, constatant la pluralite des normes,
admettre que toutes les verites se valent et que tout Ie monde a
raison (theorie kuhnienne de la science, relativisme moral)? Pop-
per juge plus sense de croire que nul n 'a jamais entierement rai-
son, mais que nous sommes parfaitement capables de reconnaitre
des erreurs, ou des injustices (de voir qu'il existe des theories phy-
siques moins erronees que d'autres, et des systemes fiscaux moins
injustes que d'autres). Equivalent la"ique de la theologie negative,
la philosophie de Popper maintient l'exigence de la Verite, ou du
Bien, a travers Ie principe de la libre critique (pluraliste: il n'existe
pas de norme de critique non criticable), et l'idee que Ie corpus
des resultats scientifiques, comme Ie corpus des regles ethiques,
sont des ensembles objectiJs, appartenant au domaine public
(world 3), relativement independants de la subjectivite individu-
elle, et indefinirnent perfectibles a travers les tatonnements de
l'imagination creatrice soumise au contr6le critique.
 Science et ethique 333

De ce point de vue, la decision d'adopter la meilleure politique,

dans une situation donnee, est Ii bien des egards (et plus meme que
ne Ie dit Popper) analogue Ii la decision d'adopter la meilleure hy-
pothese disponible, pour expliquer des donnees de fait, si ce n'est
que dans Ie premier cas, parmi les politiques compatibles avec la
situation, on choisit la plus conforme aux objectifs que 1'on veut
atteindre et aux normes (standards) que 1'on a resolu d'adopter,
tandis que dans Ie second cas, parmi les hypotheses respectant les
normes (standards) scientifiques que 1'on accepte, on choisit celIe
qui correspond Ie mieux aux faits. Autrement dit: parmi toutes
les lignes de conduite qu'invente notre libre imagination, certaines
sont exclues parce qu'impraticables (impossibles, dit E. Wilson), et
c'est parmi les lignes de conduite objectivement possibles que nous
selectionnons celle qui nous parait moralement meilleure. Parmi
les hypotheses concevables pour 1'explication d'un phenomene,
certaines sont negligees parce qu'elles ne sont pas jugees scienti-
fiquement de centes, et ce sont les hypotheses satisfaisant aux cri-
teres de scientificite qui sont confrontees a l'experience. L'elec-
tion est Ii deux tours: au premier on elimine, au second on choisit.
Le premier tour (regulation negative) reste souvent implicite,
voire inconscient; Ie second tranche: c'est pourquoi on dit que la
norme juge la conduite, et Ie fait juge !'idee. Le juge n'est pas im-
muable: notre experience se diversifie, nous tatonnons pour ame-
Horer nos normes. 'Nous creons la norme que nous decidons
d'adopter, nous ne creons pas Ie fait', dit Popper (ibid. § 12).
Si nous savons co"iger nos e"eurs (remplacer une conjecture
inexacte par une plus exacte, une tentative mediocre par une
moins mauvaise), nous ne savons pas pour autant predire les con-
sequences lointaines des reorganisations ainsi introduites dans nos
theories (la modification des pratiques cree une modification des
normes, dont la portee peut n'etre appreciee que longtemps apres;
ex. Ie passage de one fais pas aux autres ce que tu ne voudrais pas
que ron te fit' Ii 'fais aux autres ce qu'i/s veulent qu'on leur fasse'
s'opererait Ii force d'avoir Ii faire face aux revendications, mecon-
tentements, exigences des autres ... proletariat, minorites ethni-
ques, sexe oppose, etc.). Approximativement campee notre stra-
tegie serait, Ii defaut de pouvoir trouver Ie Vrai, de commettre
Ie moins d'erreurs possibles (minimiser la discordance entre nos
conjectures et l'experience) et, Ii defaut de pouvoir trouver Ie
334 A.M. Fagot

Bien, de commettre Ie moins de mal possible (minimiser la discor-

dance entre nos conduites et nos normes). Encore cette descrip-
tion ne rend . elle pas compte des aspects innovateurs de nos stra-
tegies de recherche scientifique ou ethique. Mais surtout elle pa-
rait supposer que nous avons des criteres infaillibles du faux, ou
du mal. Minimiserle malheur(misery) est, aux yeux de Popper, un
principe d'action moins naif que Ie principe utilitariste c1assique,
et sans doute generalement applicable au domaine public (poli-
tique), tan dis qu'au domaine prive pourrait s'appliquer Ie principe
de maximiser Ie bonheur. Mais faire d'un tel principe un critere
absolu de moralite menerait a des consequences absurdes (ibid.
§ 3, 13), d'autant que, si nous savons reconnaitre Ie malheur
quand nous Ie rencontrons, nous n'en avons pas de caracterisation
univoque . 'Je ne crois pas ..... qu'il existe ... un principe general
supreme de la moralite', repete Popper (1968). N'avoir de critere
absolu, ni de 1a sante, ni de 1a maladie, n'empeche pas de dia-
gnostiquer l'etat pathologique et d'identifier des strategies thera-
peutiques correctes . De meme pour l'ethique et la science: c'est
en resolvant les problemes qui se posent que nous nous formons,
par retouches successives, nos criteres de jugement (la perspective
de Popper est a la perspective philosophique classique ce qu'en
mathematiques Ie constructivisme est au platonisme).

5.3 La solution des problemes ethiques inclut-elle une demarche

scientifique? A la question: 'Y a-t-il incompatibilite entre norma-
tif et scientijique?', B. de Finetti (1958) repondait avec quelque
impatience: 'Sans doute on ne peut jamais prescrire quoi que ce
soit au nom de la science, car, comme l'a bien exprime Poincare
... , on ne peut pas tirer de consequences a l'imperatif de ses veri-
tes qui sont a l'indicatif.. Mais, des que la tache est que/que peu
compliquee, on peut bien accepter sans dedain de considerer
comme un probleme scientifique la formulation de prescriptions
systematiques adaptees an'importe que/ but.'
La tradition philosophique issue des /umieres affranchit l'e-
thique de toute sujetion a la science. La meme raison s'exprime
en tout homme, savant ou ignorant; elle pose ce qui doit etre,
nonobstant ce qui est (nous n'agissons peut-etre jamais d'une
fa~on pleinement morale, mais nous savons discerner ce que serait
un acte moral); la loi qu'elle prescrit, identique pour tous les
 Science et ethique 335

hommes, est immuable (une decouverte scientifique n'est pas

susceptible de la faire changer). La seule exigence qui puisse passer
pour scientifique, a l'interieur de l'ethique, est celle de coherence:
Ie sujet rationnel (sujet abstrait: moi transcendental de Kant, eva-
luateur impartial de Moore) ne peut pas vouloir agir selon des
maximes incompatibles (ce qU'exclut categoriquement !'imperatif
categorique, c'est la contradiction de soi a soil.
Dans la Phenomen%gie de l'esprit (V, B, c), Hegel represente
la conscience vertueuse luttant contre Ie cours du monde, comme
Don Quichotte contre les moulins a vent, clamant que les choses
ne vont pas comme elles devraient alIer; elle succombe sous les
coups de l'adversaire, dont la victoire au demeurant s'avere deri-
soire, car il n'a detruit que la fiction qu'il existe un bien universel
abstrait: Ie bien reel est celui qui existe deja.
M. Leavenworth (1973) constate qu'en reaction contre la vague
reductionniste qui succeda aux lumieres, vehicuIant !'idee que ce
qui doit etre est identique ace qui est (hegelianisme, evolutionnis-
me), nos contemporains ont retrouve Ia theorie abstraite du con-
trat comme fondement de 1a justice sociale (Rawls, 1971), et
insiste sur l'autonomie de la fonction d'evaluation (nous creons
nos valeurs), en laissant au second plan les determinations objec-
tives qui pesent sur les attitudes morales. Or il n'est plus possible
d'ignorer la masse des donnees que la science porte a notre con-
naissance: Ie moment est venu, pense Leavenworth, de reintegrer
dans l'ethique Ie sujet moral concret, sans perdre pour autant, ni
l'autonomie, ni l'exigence de coherence (on verra plus loin que
meme Ie sujet concret n'est pas suppose pouvoir exprimer des
preferences non-transitives, ni donner une estimation incoherente
de probabilites).
La perspective popperienne peut servir de point de depart.
Popper croit au progres, au sens ou les acquisitions constituees
par la reconnaissance d'erreurs sont definitives, et font en elles-
memes un debut de solution au probleme pose. Ainsi les amelio-
rations se fixent, independamment des pratiques subjectives (mon-
de 2) qui peuvent etre en retard sur les acquis objectifs (monde 3).
Afin de ne pas prejuger du sens de l'histoire, on peut dire change-
ment pour progreso Voyons comment un progres (changement)
moral peut etre induit par un progres (changement) dans la con-
naissance scientifique. La decouverte de la responsabilite des
336 A.M. Fagot

prostaglandines dans les douleurs menstruelles (et consequem-

ment, de l'action curative de certains medicaments antiinflamma-
toires) reduit au silence les jugements moraux (blames ou exhorta-
tions sto'iciennes) prodigues aux femmes souffrant de ces douleurs,
jugements volontiers portes sous Ie couvert d'un pseudo-diagnostic
psychiatrique (manifestation 'hysterique'). L'exemple est petit,
mais il suggere comment l'acquisition d'une connaissance objective
(la solution partielle du probleme de l'etiologie des douleurs men-
struelles) peut, par Ie biais de l'education et de l'information, mo-
difier Ie pratique morale, et a travers elle provoquer une reorgani-
sation des normes traditionnelles de jugement. La science n'est pas
seule responsable de changements de ce genre: une reforme juri-
dique (loi sur Ie divorce, l'avortement, l'egalite des droits entre
sexes, races ... ) a des effets comparables ('moralisation' des pra-
tiques, puis des normes de conduite), meme si elle peut en meme
temps etre consideree comme Ie resultat d'une evolution qu'elle
contribue a consolider. Si I'on admet que des prob!emes ethiques
se posent et se resolvent tout ensemble dans Ie cours de l'existence
individuelle ou collective, l'import specifique de la science peut
etre vu sous Ie double aspect du contenu et de la methode de solu-
tion.
11 n'est guere douteux que l'evolution de la connaissance objec-
tive est susceptible de remettre en question certaines valeurs.
Ainsi la psychanalyse a contribue a deprecier des vertus apparem-
ment liees a l'autonomie personnelle (maitrise de soi, volonte) en
les interpretant en termes de surmoi, censure, etc.; inversement Ie
modele du fonctionnement normal et de la sante psychique qui
se degage des travaux de Freud a inspire des normes morales
nouvelles. Monod va jusqu'a dire que la science est sacrilege. Si
l'on entend par la que la theorie de l'evolution, par exemple,
ruine l'hypothese d'un dieu createur, on reste sceptique: on tient
avec Duhem, contre Monod ou Wilson, que la science est neutre a
l'egard des religions, qu'elle n'a pas sur elles d'impact direct. Mais
!'impact indirect est considerable. Que la connaissance des faits
d'evolution ait force les religions a modifier leur disc ours sur la
creation pour Ie rendre compatible avec les donnees de la science,
on ne saurait Ie nier: les religions judeo-chretiennes ont montre
une belle capacite d'adaptation (en meme temps que de resistance)
aux acquis scientifiques. Les ethiques d'inspiration non religieuse
 Science et tthique 337

offrent vraisemblablement moins de resistance. Que des sociolo-

gues mettent en evidence un lien entre la delinquance juvenile et
certaines conditions urbaines de vie, et les juges d'enfants adoptent
des attitudes moins repressives. Poincare (1910) donne la formule
populaire de l'objection hegelienne, craignant que la science en ex-
pliquant ne justifie (donc excuse) tout, et revele Ie caractere illu-
so ire du jugement moral: 'ce qu'on appelait crime ou chatiment
s'appellerait maladie ou prophylaxie' ... En effet, dans une periode
de recession comme celle des annees 1970, la conscience morale
spontanee s'est ecriee: 'il faut reduire Ie chomage, lutter contre la
deterioration du niveau de vie!'; dans Ie meme temps les econo-
mistes, a l'est comme a 1'0uest, expliquent que la recession et Ie
sous-emploi sont Ie resultat de nombreuses causes et n'etaient
guere evitables, qu'une politique realiste doit tenir compte des
contraintes objectives, que la marge de liberte est restreinte, qu'
une reduction du nombre des chomeurs se paye d'autres maux,
etc. 'Qui veut, peut', disent certains: 'si 1'0n veut vraiment pro-
mouvoir une plus grande justice sociale, meme dans un contexte
de crise, il suffit d'en prendre les moyens; affirmer que c'est im-
possible, c'est reveler qu'on pre/ere conserver la situation presente
(soit par peur d'une situation pire, soit parce qu'on profite soi-
meme de cette situation - de toute favon, il s'agit d 'un jugement
de valeur). 'In/ormez-vous, reprenons ensemble les donnees, exa-
minons les dossiers' disent les autres, 'une analyse detaillee de la
situation montre ce qu'il est possible de faire'. Ceux-ci croient que
l'etude objective des phenomenes entraine la convergence des
opinions, d'ou la strategie: 'discutons d'abord, choisissons ensuite'.
Ceux-Ia, acceptant l'irreductibilite des points de vue, recourent
plus tot a une methode d'agregation des preferences. La theorie
de la decision montre queUe part de rationalite chaque processus
peut comporter (les memes schemas sont transposables au cas de
la deliberation individuelle).
Identification des conduites possibles et de leurs resultats,
compte tenu du cours que peuvent prendre les choses; estimation
de la probabilite des divers etats de choses, appreciation de l'utilite
des divers resultats, calcul de l'esperance (expectation) liee a
chaque conduite, choix de la conduite qui maximise l'esperance:
c'est un fait que sous certaines conditions, cette methode realise
la convergence d'opinions d'abord eloignees (cf. procedure baye-
338 A.M. Fagot

sienne). Ses limites viennent du caractere conjectural de nos con-

naissances (p. ex. estimation partiellement subjective des probabi-
lites: a priori, toute opinion coherente est admissible), mais sur-
tout de l'absence d'une norme absolue permettant de trancher
entre normativites differentes. Quand l'un accepte un traitement
mutilant qui lui 'sauve la vie', et l'autre prefere la mort a une
existence de handicape, personne ne peut dire lequel a raison: il
n'y a pas de perspective absolue, l'homme n'est pas dieu. II n'y a
pas de solution scientifique a ce genre d'impasse (l'ordinateur ne
peut pas decider): on est renvoye au cas suivant.
De la dictature au vote democratique, il existe une variete de
methodes d'agregation des preferences (on suppose que toutes
les preferences individuelles sont coherentes, i.e. transitives):
aucune n'est parfaite, les methodes infailliblement decisoires
n'etant pas equitables, les methodes equitables comportant des
risques de n'ctre pas decisoires (paradoxe de Condorcet-Arrow).
S'il existait une technique a la fois infaillible et equitable d'agre-
gation des preferences, on pourrait envisager de tout trancher par
Ie vote: mais en l'absence de technique parfaite, un residu de me-
contentement est ineliminable, donc une critique ou contesta-
tion du bien-fonde des decisions prises. En regime democratique
on reduit les oscillations du systeme en laissant !'information
circuler librement entre les votants, et des debats publics s'insti-
tuer, afin que des convergences aient chance de se degager: ce qui
renvoie au cas precedent.

5.4 La solution des problemes scientifiques inclut-elle un ele-

ment ethique? Des lors que l'on admet Ie caractere conjectural de
tout savoir humain objectif, il y a dans la strategie du jeu contre
la nature par laquelle ce savoir progresse une part d'arbitraire a
negocier.
II ne s'agit pas de redire ici: 'la science n'est pas neutre', ni de
denoncer son infeodation a une ethique, que ce soit l'ethique de
Ia connaissance des societes technologiques, l'ethique capitaliste
ou socialiste des fmanciers de la recherche, ou l'ethique person-
nelle du chercheur. Certes, Ie choix d'investir son energie dans la
recherche implique l'adoption d'une tournure d'esprit 'positive'
(mais aussi 'speculative'!); toutefois la sagesse austere de Monod
- Ie choix de ne croire que ce qui est scientifiquement etabli -
 Science et ethique 339

peut fort bien se limiter pour un chercheur au domaine etroit de

sa specialite. Le choix d'etudier certaines questions est sans doute
motive par les inten~ts de l'epoque; cependant Ie fait qu'un travail
soit utile (ex. recherche sur la nutrition humaine orientee vers la
prevention des carences alimentaires) n'implique pas que ses re-
sultats soient meprisables du point de vue theorique, et les tenta-
tives historiques d'emprise theologique ou politique (affaires Ga-
lilee, Lyssenko ... ) donneraient plutat confiance dans Ie dynamisme
critique, et anti-ideologique, de l'esprit scientifique. Enfin les pre-
juges individuels biaisent certainement beaucoup d'observations
et de tentatives d'interpretation, mais la methode scientifique
permet precisement de contraler les resultats, et de questionner
les biais. Si Ie lien entre science et ethique etait externe, il reste-
rait plus ou moins accidentel.
Comme toute activite humaine, l'activite de recherche scienti-
fique comporte des decisions qui engagent la responsabilite du
chercheur, exigeant l'exercice de son jugement, et declarant des
preferences axiologiques: cette these fut soutenue dans les an-
nees 1950 par Churchman, Braithwaite, Rudner ... Ce dernier
affirme que des jugements de valeur sont essentiellement impli-
ques dans les procedures scientifiques: 'scientists as scientists do
make value judgments' (Rudner, 1953). En effet, aucune hypo-
these n'est definitivement verifiable, ou falsifiable. Au plus on a
la quasi-certitude qu'une hypothese est fausse quand on dispose
d'une hypothese meilleure (plus simple et/ou rendant mieux
compte des faits, etc.). On admet qu'une hypothese est vraie (on
l'enseigne) si e11e n'a jamais, ou a peu pres, rencontre de contre-
exemple. Dans Ie cours d'une investigation, une hypothese est
retenue (ou ecartee) lorsque l'evidence en sa faveur (ou defaveur)
est jugee suffisamment forte pour que la probabilite et la gravite
d'une erreur apparaissent negligeables. Une probabilite ponderee
par une gravite est une esperance mathematique; autrement dit,
on n'adopte pas crument l'hypothese 1a plus probable, on adopte
celle qui a la plus forte expectation.
Cette these a ete contestee. B. de Finetti (1951) souligne 1a
difference entre juger que telle hypothese est la plus probable,
en l'etat actuel des connaissances (conclusion de l'expert), et de-
cider d'agir comme si cette hypothese etait vraie (tache politique).
Jeffrey (1956) conteste que dans la recherche pure on tienne ja-
340 A.M. Fagot

mais compte d'un cout de l'erreur. II reconnaH que les tests aux-
quels on soumet un vaccin sont plus ou moins exigeants selon qu'il
est destine a des enfants humains ou a des singes: Ie cout d'une er-
reur est alors presque aussi bien defini que dans Ie controle indus-
triel de qualite (exemples de Rudner). Mais la recherche fonda-
mentale ignorerait ces considerations: une 'loi' ayant des applica-
tions multiples, dont la plupart ne sont pas prevues au moment ou
elle est formulee, Ie cout de l'erreur tMorique serait d'aileurs im-
possible a evaluer.
II est classique de considerer que, dans les regions de la science
pure, emettre une conjecture fausse n'a pas, en soi, de consequen-
ces defavorables: on a tout Ie temps devant soi, il n'est pas grave
d'errer. Dans ces conditions l'esperance mathematique d'une hypo-
these se ramene simplement a sa probabilite d'etre vraie. La liberte
speculative serait d'autant plus grande que la recherche est plus
desinteressee et eloignee des applications. Ainsi lorsque R. Thorn
(1972) propose des modeles geometrico-algebriques de la gastrula-
tion et de la neurulation chez les amphibiens ou les oiseaux, il
souligne la 'part considerable d'arbitraire' dans son interpretation
de la morphogenese. II a neanmoins choisi ces modeles: HIes juge
plus proches de la verite (moins probablement errones) que
d'autres qu'il cite et discute (comme les modeles biochimiques).
II a, d'autre part, choisi de publier ses resultats: dans la decision
de publier entre toujours Ie calcul d'esperance d'une politique de
prudence. Une idee scientifique, pour etre validee, doit etre pu-
bliquement exposee a la discussion critique; l'auteur y court Ie
risque de stimuler Ie progres de la connaissance, mais aussi d'etre
discredite. La qualite de sa prestation marque d'ailleurs celle du
debat. II peut imposer un style nouveau, ou se conformer servile-
ment aux standards en vigueur (au plan-type des communications
dans les journaux scientifiques). II peut apporter des theses ori-
ginales, au risque qu'elles soient trouvees inexactes, ou des theses
exactes, au risque qu'elles soient trouvees sans interet. De toute
fa<;on, 1a publication implique Ie choix d'un niveau de dignite
scientifique, d'un type d'exigence et de rigueur, qui par ses even-
tuels aspects innovateurs peut faire jurisprudence, qui peut aussi
rejoindre dans l'oubli d'autres tentatives vetilleuses ou sottes. Si
Popper a raison lorsqu'il dit qu'une bonne conjecture scientifique
est moins une conjecture dont on peut aisement etablir qu'elle a
 Science et ethique 341

une forte probabilite d'etre vraie (seules les conjectures triviales

sont dans ce cas), qu'une conjecture dont il est instructif d'eta-
blir qu'elle est fausse, alors toutes les conjectures fausses n 'ont pas
la meme valeur, et 1a decision d'explorer une hypothese suppose
de la part du chercheur, en meme temps qu'une estimation de sa
plausabilite, un jugement implicite sur ce que vaut cette hypothese.
Le fait est plus patent encore dans les regions de la science ou
des applications sont previsibles, etfou celles ou les donnees font
l'objet d'une analyse statistique. Quand on cherche si l'hypertri-
glyceridemie augmente Ie risque d'atheroscierose, ou dans quelle
mesure Ie tabagisme de la femme enceinte est toxique pour Ie fre-
tus, il paraitrait irresponsable de negliger la gravite d'une erreur
eventuelle. On ad met generalement que Ie risque de rejeter une
hypothese vraie (erreur de type I) est plus grave que celui d'ac-
cepter une hypothese fausse (erreur de type II). Certes, la deci-
sion de lancer une action preventive de l'atherosclerose est dis-
tincte de l'inference statistique par laquelle on conclut que l'hy-
pertriglyceridemie en est, ou n'en est pas, une cause probable.
Mais l'interpretation statistique d'un resuItat objectif n'est pas
dissociable d'une politique de prudence. En statistique orthodoxe,
meme si les resuItats sont livres 'bruts' (ex. 'dans l'echantillon de
population etudie, l'hypertriglyceridemie muItiplie par 1,2 la
probabilite d'un infarctus du myocarde chez l'aduIte de cin-
quante ans'), Braithwaite note (1953, ch. 7) qu'il y a un ca1cul
hedoniste implicite dans Ie fait de donner la frequence observee
comme estimation de la probabilite (on sait qu'a la longue c'est
I'estimation la plus avantageuse). En statistique neo-bayesienne
Ie critere bernoullien prevoit explicitement qu'on doit choisir
l'hypothese qui a 1a plus grande esperance: les considerations
d'utilite varient selon Ie contexte, mais un bayesien jugerait a
la fois irrealiste de croire qu'elles n'entrent pas en ligne de compte,
et irrationnel de les negiiger. Est-il immoral d'etre irrationnel?
Trouver s'il est parfois immoral d'etre rationnel jusqu'au bout,
c'est affaire de jugement. Une philosophie comprehensive du
jugement et de la rationalite, qui reprenne Ie projet kantien en
y incorporant des considerations d'incertitude, est encore a
faire: notre temps en a engrange beaucoup d'elements en deve-
loppant une theorie de la decision.
La these selon laquelle les chercheurs comme tels portent des
342 A.M. Fagot

jugements de valeur a ete contestee d'un autre point de vue.

H. Verhoog (1980, II, c, 3) tient pour regrettable l'expression 'la
science comme telle', parce que l'entreprise de connaissance ne
saurait etre coupee de son telos, ni la communaute scientifique de
la communaute humaine dont elle est un sous-systeme. Aussi Ie
chercheur ne serait pas seulement responsable du choix de normes
methodologiques (criteres internes de qualite, permettant l'evalua-
tion des procedures, des paradigmes explicatifs, etc.); i1 participe-
rait encore a l'elaboration d'un humanisme, ou se reconcilieraient
l'ideal 'aristote1icien' et l'ideal 'baconien' de la science (II, c, 5), Ie
premier invitant au developpement individuel harmonieux (accep-
ter l'idee regula trice d'une verite absolue cherchee, non possedee,
tient la personne sur Ie juste chemin qui exclut tour a tour dogma-
tisme et relativisme), Ie second invitant au developpement social
harmonieux (la science doit contribuer a sou lager les maux de
l'humanite: la rationalite instrumentale se soumet a la regulation
d'une justice, ou rationalite universelle). L'auteur insiste pour
que cette prise de conscience des sources d'inspiration philoso-
phiques de la science ne soit pas consideree comme Ie travail des
philosophes ou epistemologues professionels, mais redevienne la
tache de tout chercheur qui pense par lui-meme.
Beaucoup de personnes privees ont, a notre epoque, reconquis
Ie gout de l'autonomie intellectuelle, avec l'intuition que, si des
revolutions sont a faire, elles ne sont pas pour demain-les-autres,
mais pour chacun-aujourd 'hui comme specimen humain, et contri-
buteur a une humanite qui se cherche. Mais s'il parait bon de
maintenir Ie soud d'un projet global unifiant, la prudence con-
seille qu'on ne croie point l'avoir cerne, qu'on ne se dissimule
point l'absence de perspective totalisante susceptible de faire
l'unanimite, ni la fragilite des choix reposant sur des volontes
individuelles diverses.

5.5 Dans un album des Peanuts (cite dans HCR, 1980, 3), Lucy
interroge: 'Quels sont les plus nombreux dans Ie monde, les bons
ou les mechants?'. 'Comment savoir?', observe Charlie Brown, 'qui
reconnaitra les bons des mechants?'. - 'Moi', dit Lucy.
Au-dela d'une contestation des normes re<;ues, Ie trait domi-
nant de la decennie fut peut-etre l'apprentissage, a travers les
tatonnements d'une rationalite lucide sur ses limites, de la deci-
 Science et ethique 343

sion touchant les valeurs. L'angoisse qui, dans l'existentialisme de

l'apres-guerre, accompagnait 1a conscience du caractere arbitraire
des choix humains ultimes, fut ici temperee par Ie sentiment
quelquefois retrouve d'une complicite amoureuse avec la nature.

NOTES

1. La thalidomide, lancee Ii la fm des annees cinquante par la firme alle-

mande Chemie Griinenthal, sans experimentation animale prealable,
presentee comme un sedatif benin, en vente libre (sans ordonnance)
dans plusieurs pays, s'avera un des plus remarquables teratogenes connus.
2. Vietnam, Niagara Falls (N.Y.), Seveso. La dioxine provoque des aberra-
tions chromosomiques.
3. Le PBB (cousin du PCB: chlorure de vinyle) provoqua une tragedie dans
l'etat du Michigan. Incorpore par erreur Ii la nourriture pour animaux,
il entra dans la chaine alimentaire (bovins, porcs, volailles) en 1973. Le
ministere americain de la sante n'intervint que trois ans plus tard. Le PBB
est probablement cancerigene.
4. L'atoll de Bikini, pollue en 1954 par les essais de la bombe H americaine,
repeupIe en 1963, dut etre reevacue en 1978. L'accident de Three Mile
Island (1979) a montre combien precaire est la securite des centrales
nucIeaires. Au moins trois satellites americains porteurs de materiaux
nucIeaires etaient retombes (en 64, 68, 70) avant que Ie satellite russe
Cosmos 954 contenant un generateur nucleaire ne s'ecrase au Canada
(78). Les organisations revolutionnaires cIandestines sont loin d'avoir
jusqu'ici realise de tels exploits.

REFERENCES

Comme on l'aura constate, rna documentation recouvre une decennie elargie,

approximativement la periode 1965-80. Ne sont donnees ci-apres que les re-
ferences aux travaux contemporains explicitement mentionnes dans Ie texte.
Pour l'histoire des evenements scientifiques et de leur retentissement so-
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York), Nature (London), La Recherche (Paris),Zeitschrift filr Naturforschung
(Tiibingen), Scientia (Bologna, Milano), The New York Review of Books
(abr. NYRB, New York), etc.
Toumant autour des problemes ethiques et/ou politiques poses par Ie
developpement de la science, plusieurs periodiques ont etc! crees durant la
periode:
344 A.M. Fagot

Science Policy News (Science of Science Foundation), 1969-71; cont. Science

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The Hastings Center Report, 1970- . Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life
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Science, Medicine and Man, 1973-4; cont. Ethics in Science and Medicine,
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Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F. (1979). Principles of biomedical ethics.

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Bronowski, J. (1964). Science and human values. Harmondsworth: Penguin

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Abbreviations used by some contributors

MC = mental cause theory

A = agency theory

H = henneneutictheory

PS = practical syllogism

D = principle of determinism

PAP = principle of alternative possibilities

C = conditional (statement, analysis)

S = supplementation thesis

LC = linguistic condition
BI = basic intuition
AP = authoritative positivist (consideration)
Index of names

Abelson, R. 17,24,25,28,29,30, Bachelard, G. 232

37 Bachtin, M.M. 237
Aber, J.W. 283 Bacon, F. 342
Achilles, 332 Baczko, B. 259
Achinstein, P. 16 Baldwin, E. 321
Adorno, Th.W. 220,221 Barry, B. 167
Aischylos, 311 Barth, K. 279
Alchourr6n, C.E. 127n., 129,130, Barthes, R. 230
132n., 134n. Bartuschat, W. 193,202
Almasi, M. 255,258 Bayes, T.337,338,341
Alston, W.16, 18, 28n. Beauchamp, T.L. 298
Althusser, L. 220, 228 Beck, L.W. 187
Anscombe, G.E.M. 15,45,83,95 Becker, L.C. 179
Apel, K.-O. 17,29,214,215,221 Beckermann, A. 33, 37
Aqvist, L. BIn. Bell, K.R. 179n.
Aristotle, 1, 14,74,78,102,130, Benn, S.1. 166,167
253,298,309,316,321,342 Bennett, J. 38
Armstrong, D.M. 67 Bentham,J.117, 134, 140-142,
Arrow, K.J. 179, 338 146,159-161
Asimov, Isaac, 280 Berdiaev, N. 279
Attali, J. 312 Berg, P. 283,310
Audi, R. 36n. Berger, P. 13,225
Aune,B.16,26,93-96 Bergson, H. 224
Austin,J.L. 36n., 82, 85-87, 89, Berleant, A. 315
90,93,94,108,108n., 109, Bernard, C. 302,331
117,140-142,146 Bernoulli, D. 299, 300, 341
Ayer, A. 74 Bernstein, RJ. 221n.
Ayers, M. 86-90, 92 Bessis, M. 296
Blackstone, W.T. 177
Blankenburg, W. 226n.
Babbage, C. 302 Bloch, E. 154, 262
354 Index a/names

Blumenfeld, D. 75,76 Cildress, J.F. 298

Blumer, H. 226n. Clark,B.167
Bobbio,N.127n., 142 Clark, E.M. 299
Bohatec, J. 187 Cline, M. 287
Bohr, N. 281 Cohen, C. 310, 314
Bourdieu, P. 236 Cohen, R.S. 187
Boyce-Gibson, A. 73 Cohen, S. 283
Bradley, M.C. 84 Collingwood, R.G. 167
Braithwaite, R.B. 339, 341 Compte, A. 302, 315, 318, 320
Bramhall, D.F. 75, 85, 93, 96, Condorcet, MJ. 299,338
101 Cornides, Th. 134n.
Brand, G. 230n. Cournand, A. 307
Brandt, R. 29, 36n. Crombie, A.C. 328
Braybrooke, D. 163 Cunoc, 262n.
Breggin, P. 293
Brock, D.W. 159
Broekman, J.M. 228 Dallmayr, F.R. 220n"
Bronaugh, R.N. 97 Daniels, N. 167, 172
Brown, L. 283 Danielson, P. 179
Brzozowski, S. 247n. Danley, J.R. 179
Buber, M. 279 Danto, A. 2, 16,32,66
Buczkowski, P. 245n. Darwin, Ch. 281, 301, 307, 312,
Bukarin, N.J. 262n. 315
Bulygin, E. 5, 127n., 130, 132n., Davidson, D. 2,3,15,16,18,26,
134n., 135n. 28-37,45,46,48-52,58-62,
Burt, C. 306,308 62n.,63,64,65,67,68,69,83,
Bush, G.P. 279 87,89,90,95
Davis, B. 308,315
Davis, L. 46
Cailahan,D. 283,298,308,310, 314, Denham, MJ. 298
315,316,317 Dennett, D. 28n., 67-69
Camus, A. 324 Descartes, R. 1,3,4,50,59,60,
Candlish, S. 77 221,327
Capella,J.R.127n. Dewey, J. 321
Care, N. 17 Dicey,A.v.112,112n.
Castaneda, H.N. 132 Dilthey, W. 62n.
Chargaff, E. 289 Dray, W. 15, 17,24,29,33,50
Chisholm, R. 17,20,31,80, Dubislaw, W. 128
92-94 Duhem,P.280,324,330,336
Churchland, P. 33, 36n. Durkheim, E. 225
Churchman, C.W. 339 Dusing, K. 207,208
Cicourel, A. 226, 226n. Dworkin, R.M. 116, 166n., 117n.,
 Index of names 355

118, 123n., 127, 144-149, 154, Gadamer, H.-G. 11, 62n., 221,
159,166,167,175-177 222n.
Galilei, G. 288, 302, 339
Garfmkel, H. 226, 226n., 235
Eban, A. 319 Gean, W.D. 27-29,30,32,33
Ebbinghaus,J.187 GeWen, A. 222n., 225
Einstein, A. 280,281 Gewirth, A. 177
Elias, N. 229n. Gibbard, A. 179
Elster, J. 299 Gingerich, 0.315
Engelhardt, H.T., Jr. 283,298, Gintis, H. 167
316,317 Glover, J. 77, 81
Engels, F. 244,252,253,262 Goffman, E. 237
Epicur,313 Golding, M. 135n.
Erikson, E.H. 237 Goldman, A.H. 177
Goldman, A.1. 16,18,21,31,32,
46,95
Fagot, A.M. 5,8,9 Goldmann, L. 220
Faust, 308 Gotesky, R. 167
Feinberg,J. 36n., 154-159, 167n. Gould, C.C. 154
Feyerabend, P. 230 Gouldner, A.W. 226
Fichte,J.G.188 Gramsci, A. 228, 251,262
Finetti, B. de, 334, 339 Grathoff, R. 222n., 226, 227,
Finnis, J .M. 117n., 123n., 142 229n., 235
Fitzgerald, R. 154 Green, T.H. 167
Flaubert, G. 223 Gregor,M.187
Flew, A.G.N. 79 Grice, G.R. 172
Fodor, J. 16, 28n. Gros, G. 323
Foley, R. 102 Grothendieck, A. 279
Fcpllesdal, D. 309 Gupta, R.K. 201
Forschner,M.206 Gurwitsch, A. 224
Foucault, M. 230,236 Guttmacher, A.F. 316
Fox, B. 286
Frankel, C. 167
Frankfurt, H.-G. 74-77,80, Haag, K. 127n.
96-102 Habermas, J. 9, 221,230,236,280
Freud, S. 28n., 321,331,336 Hacker, P.M.S. 116n., 117n., 137n.
Frings, M. 222 Hagerstrom, A.A.T. 187
Fromm, E. 315 Hammerich, K. 229n.
Fuller, L. 109n., 123n. Hanson, W.H. 134n.
Fullinwider, R.K. 167 Hare, R.M. 132n., 135,285
Harre, R. 38
Harris, Z.S. 316
356 Index afnames

Hart, H.L.A. 36n., 107n., 117, Inhaber, H. 293

117n., 123n., 135-137, 137n., Inwagen, P. van, 76
138-140, 140n., 141-146, 10,311
149,159,160,165,175 Iribadjakov, N. 268
Hastings, J.W. 317
Haworth, L.L. 163
Hayflich, L. 306 Jackson, D.A. 308
Hedenius, I. 136, 148 Jacob, F. 323
Hegedus, A. 258, 259, 260 Jacquard, A. 298
Hegel, G.W.F. 8, 167,188,212, James, G.C. 157
213,223,236,326,335,337 James, W. 74
Hegeler,A.187 Jaubert, A. 281
Heidegger, M. 3,4,11,220, 220n., Jay,M.221n.
222, 222n., 224, 228, 229, 233 Jeffrey, R. 99, 102,339
Heisenberg, W. 281 Joas, H. 228n.
Held, V. 179 Johnson, C.E. 304
Heller, A. 154,228, 228n., 233, Jones, H.E. 203
236,256,259 Jcprgensen, J. 128
Hempel, C.G. 29, 32, 51
Henrich, D. 187
Henry, M. 223 Kalecki, M. 264, 264n.
Hill, T.,Jr.155 Kalinowski, G. 130
Hindess, B. 232 Kant, I. 3, 6,166,167,187-196,
Hippocrates, 292, 295, 307 230,291,300,304,321,322,
Hobbes,T. 74, 75,85,96,177 335
Hochfeld, J. 264 Kass, L. 310
Hollis, M. 38 Kaufmann, A.S. 154
Holmes, R.L. 179 Kaul, N. 179n.
Holmgren, M. 163n. Kautsky, K.H. 262n.
Hook, S. 154 Kearns, T.R. 160
Horkheimer, M. 220 Kelsen, H. 113,114,115,116,
Hume, D. 3,17,21,45,49,50,52, 117n., 118, 134, 135, 135n.,
74,78,96 136,143
Husser!, E. 3,6,219-221, 221n., Kennedy, J.F. 288
222,224-228, 228n., 229-232, Kenny, A.J.P. 15,45,74,77,78,
234,236 81,82,83,84,87,90,92
Huxley, A. 291 Kern, I. 221
Hyppolite, J. 220 Kiefer, T. 117n.
Kierkegaard, S. 220
Kim,J.24,29,36n.
Illich, I. 280,289 Kisker, P.K. 226n.
Ilting, K.-H. 214 Klein, M. 229n.

Kluckhohn, C. 316
Kmita, J. 263n.
Kohlberg, L. 319, 321
Kolakowski, L. 228,251,252,253,
256,259,260, 260n., 271
Kosik, K. 228, 233, 251,254,255
Kowalik, T. 262n., 266
Kozyr-Kowalski, S. 264
Kristeva, J. 237
Kroeber, A.L. 316
Kuhn, H. 222n.
Kuhn,T.230,236,332
Kurylov, A.K. 270
Ladosz, J. 264
Lakatos, I. 330,331
Landesman, C. 17
Landgrebe, L. 222n., 236
Lange, O. 262, 263, 263n., 264,
264n., 265, 265n., 266,271
Laslett, P. 108n.
Lazlo, E. 167
Leavenworth, M. 335
Lefevbre, H. 233
Lehrer, K. 92, 93, 94, 95
Leibniz, C.W. 206
Leithausser, Th. 234,236
Lenin, V.I. 246,247,248,253
Levinas, E. 222
Levison, A. 29
Levi-Strauss, C. 222
Levy-Leblond, J .-M. 281
Lewin, A.Y. 28n.
Lewis, C.I. 132
Lewontin, R.C. 322
Lindley, D.V. 305
Locke,J.l77
L6with, K. 154
Luckmann,Th.13,225,226
Lukacs, C. 14,220,228, 228n.,
229,234,247, 247n., 248, 249,
251,260,261,262
Index of names 357
Luria, S. 305
Lyons, D. 123n., 154, 155, 160,
161-166, 166n., 179
Lyssenko, T.D. 339
MacCallum, C. 179n.
MacCormick,N.157, 160, 177
Mackie, J.L. 167, 177, 179
Macpherson, T. 154
Maimonide, J. 292
Makinson, D. 134n.
Malcolm, N. 17,50,53
Mallet, S. 283
Malthus, R. 282
Marcuse, H. 220
Margeneau,H.317
Maritain, J. 279
Markovic,M. 254,255,256
Markus, C. 228
Markus, M. 258, 259, 260
Marshall, C. 112n., 160
Martin,R.5,6,17,23,33,153,
160,177,178
Marx,K.1,6, 7,10,12-14,154,
219-221,223-225,227-230,
232-236,237, 237n., 238, 243,
243n., 244-248,250-255,
258-262,264-272,331
Maslow, A. 315
Masters, J.C. 304
Mathes, J. 226n.
Mayo, B. 80, 157
McCloskey, H.J. 154
McFall, J.A. 286
McIntyre, A. 299
McShea, R. 321
Mead, C.H. 225, 226,237
Meadows, D.L. 282
Medawar, P.B. 291,308
Melden, A.I. 15, 17,24,26,30,34,
45,49,174
358 Index a/names

Merleau-Ponty, M. 220, 221,222, Nirenberg, J.S. 310

222n., 223, 226, 227,237, Nora, S. 282,286
237n. Nordenfelt, L. 16,23,37,38, 38n.
Merton, R.K. 307 Nowak, L. 5, 10, 243n., 245n.
Mesland, D. 327 Nowell-Smith, P.H. 86
Metraux, A. 239 Nozick, R. 154,166,167,175,
Meyer,M.307 176,178,179,285
Michelman, F.1. 167
Milgram, S. 304
Mill, J.S. 102,160-165,300 Oberdieck, H. 113n.
Milne, A.1.M. 167 Oedipus, 290
Mine, A. 282,286 Ofstad, H. 73
Mokre,J.127n. O'Neill, J. 237n., 238
Molesworth, C. 75 O'Neill, O. 179
Monod,J.285,287,324,
326-332,336,338
Moodie, G.C. 112n. Paci,E.227
Moore, G.E. 85,335 Packard, V. 291
Morawski, S. 260n. Parsons, T. 225
Moraze, C. 295 Passmore, J. 279
Moritz, M. 131 Pasteur, L. 302
Moses, R. 293 Pato(!ka, J. 228
Munitz, M.K. 117n. Paton, H.J. 187, 198
Murdoch,J.315 PaZanin, A. 228,236
Murphy,J.G.167,202,204 Pazner, E.A. 180
Pears, D.F. 16,33,52,86,90,91,
92
Nader, R. 293 Peters, R.S. 15, 17, 24, 45
Narveson, J. 159 Petrovic, G. 228,258
Nathan, N.M.L. 283 Piaget, J. 321
Natanson,M. 222n., 225, 226 Piccone, P. 227
Neely, W. 101 Pichler, J. 175n., 178n.
Nelkin, D. 281,324 P~to,100,101,132,292,296,
Nelson, W.N.157, 167 300,334
Nesbitt, W. 77 Plessner, H. 222n.
Newell, A. 28n. Poincare, H. 306, 307, 334, 337
Newton, I. 280 Popper, K. 11,301,307,322,326,
Nickel, J .W. 153, 160, 177,178, 329,330,332-335,340
179n. Porn,l. 29, 37,38
Nielsen, K. 154, 172, 175n. Prezetacznik, F. 154
Nietzsche, F. 232,312,313,323 Prometheus, 308, 311
Nino, C.S. 136 Psathas, G. 220n., 226, 226n.
 Index of names 359

Putnam, H, 67,68 Rudner, R. 339, 340

Pygmalion, 311 Russell, B. 281
Rutstein, D.D. 305
Ryan, C.C. 179
Quetelet, A. 316 Ryle, G. 1,3,4,15,26,29,45
Quichotte, Don 335
Quine, W.v.O. 62n., 330
Quinlan, K. 283, 286 Sacks, o. 328
Sartre, J.P. 220,223,224,227,
317,320
Rainko, S. 269 Sauvy, A. 295
Ramsey, J.T. 310 Scanlon, T.M. 163,179
Rankin,N.80 Schaff, A. 228,269-271
Rasmussen, L.L. 282 Schopenhauer, A. 318
Rawls, J. 6, 154, 159, 166-175, Schedler, G. 154
175n~176,178,179,285, Scheffler, S. 179
305,321,335 Scheler, M. 221n., 222, 222n.,
Raz, J. 5, 116n., 117n., 136, 137n., 224
138n., 141, 146 Schiller, M. 160
Reboul, o. 211,212 Schmidt, A. 220
Regan, D.H. 177 Schmucker,J.187
Regan, T. 157 Schreiber, R. 130
Reich, K. 187 Schreiner,H.127n.
Reichenbach, H. 132, 132n. SchUtz, A. 224-227,229,231,
Reisinger, L. 134n. 232,234-236
Richards, D.A.J. 177 Schutze, F. 226n.
Ricoeur,P.222,238 Secord, P. 38
Roche, M. 226 Sellars, W. 16,26,29,30
R6dig,J.130 Shaffer, J. 36n.
Roe,A.287 Shalgi, M. 198, 199,202
Rogers, A.R. 315 Shenoy, P. 175n.
Rolando, C. 328 Sheptulin, A. 267
Rollin, B.E. 196,197 Sherwood, M. 28n.
Rose,H.280 Shiner, R.A. 172
Rose, S. 280 Shockley, A.A. 287
Ross, A. 127n., 128, 130, 136, Sichel, B.A. 154
142,143,148 Silber, J.R. 195,196,202,212,
Rossv~r, V. 5,6 213
Roszak, T. 280 Simon, H. 28n.
Rousseau, J.1. 166,230,279 Simpson, D.D. 117n., 323
Rovatti, A. 227, 228 Sinsheimer, H. 310, 312
Royer,P.323 Sisson, J. 175n.
360 Index of names

Sisyphos,324 St. Thomas, 304

Skinner, Q. 17,23,315 Thomson, J.J. 179
Smith, A. 283 Tiles, J .E. 4, 9, 10 1
Snare, F. 172 Tiles, M. 103
Socrates, 204 Tolman, R.C. 28n.
de Solla Price, J. 288 Tonelli, G. 187
Sophokles, 290 Tordai, Z. 260
Spengler, O. 281 Toulmin, S. 17
Spiegelberg, H. 167 Tran Duc Thao, 220
Sp~oza,B.l,3,4,14,285,290 Tran</>y, K.E. 154
Springborg, P. 154 Tuomela, R. 2, 3, 16, 18, 19,22,
Sprondel, W. 222n., 226,227,235 24,26-28, 28n., 29-35, 36n.,
Srubar, I. 236 37,38, 38n., 67,87
Stalin,J.249,250,251,252,253, Turner, M. 28n., 46
254,256,262,266,268 Turner, R. 237
Stegmiiller, W. 29,321
Stent, G.S. 321
Stich, S.P. 288,290,308,309, Vadja, M. 228, 228n.
313,314 Valery, P. 331
Stojanovic, S. 258 Van Horn, A.J. 299
Stoutland,F.2,3,17-20,23,29, Vellucci, A.E. 293
31-33,49,55,60,63,65,83 Verhoog, H. 342
Strasser, S. 223,237 Vilmos, S. 256,259
Strauss, A. 237 Volosinov, V.N. 237
Stroup, T. 89
Summerlin, S. 306
Supek, R. 251 Wade, T. 287
Szabo, I. 154 Wagner, H. 127n.
Szasz, T. 280 Waldenfels, B. 5,6, 14, 220n.,
228,237,238
Walker, O.S. 99
Tadic, L. 154 Walter, E. 322
Tammelo,1.127n. Ward, K. 209-212
Tarski, A. 130,329 Warga, E. 264
Taylor, C. 2, 15, 17,30,37,38,56 Wasserstrom, R. 155
Taylor, D. 33 Watson, G. 99-101
Taylor, R. 17,20,26,31,33,34 Watson, P. 292
Taylor, Theodore, B. 291 Weber, M. 224,226,229,232,
Thalberg, I. 16,20,21,29,36,86, 237
87 We~berger, O. 127n., 129, 130, 134n.
Theunissen, M. 222n., 237n. Wellbank, J.H. 167
Thorn, R.340 Wellman, C. 179n.

White, M. 79-81,97
Wiatr, J. 265
Wiggins, D. 84
Williame, R. 226,227
Williams, C.J.F. 89
Williams, G. 108n.
Williams, T.C.189-193, 198-202
Winch,P.15,45
Wilson, E.O. 285,308,317-320,
322-324,329,331,332,336
Wittgenstein, L. 1,3,4, 15, 17,
45,46,60,62n.,229,230
Wolff, R.P. 167
Wolheim, R. 108n.
Wood, A.W. 209-211
Woodfield, A. 31
Index of names 361
Wolff, R.P. 200, 201, 204-206,
214,215
Wright, G.H. von, 2,3,4,17,
22-25,29-31,33,35,38,
45,46,50, 52-57,58n.,
59-62, 62n., 63, 65,
66-69,128-132
Yolton, J. 77
Young,R.89,97,157
Yovel, Y. 207,208,209
Zaner, R.M. 225
Zecchi, s. 220n.
Zuckerman, AJ. 307
Index of subjects
Ability, 5, 11,67, 73 ff.
voluntary, 93, 96 f.
vs possibility, 93,96 f.
Action-explanations, 2 ff., 15 ff.
because-of-, 36n., 48 f.
causal, 15, 21
causal theory of, 47 f.
conclusive teleological, 23 f.
intentional, 47,53 f.
intentional-teleological,36,
36n., 37 f., 38n.
means-end purposive, 25
nomological, 15
reason, 36n.
reason·terminating, 25
teleological, 16, 18 f., 21 , 23 ff.,
36 f.
Actions
agency theory of, 16 f., 20 f.,
23, 35 f.
anthropology of, 4, 12
behavior in, 19 f.
complex, 12 f.
consequences of, 55
deli berate, 16
determined, 4
descriptions of, 14
explanation of, 2 ff., 15 ff.
external determinants of, 58n.
free, 4,12 f.
freedom of, 98
generic means -, 27
goal-theory of, 17
habitual, 16
hermeneu tic theory of, 16 f.,
21 ff.
individual constitution of, 5
intention in, 18,20 f.
intention of, 18,21
intentionality of, 3, 28n., 46,
54
internal determinants of, 58n.
language of, 267
meaning of, 6
mental cause theory of, 16 ff.,
26 ff.
moral vs immoral, 198 f.
nature of human, 15
Neo-Wittgensteinian theory of,
17
nomological theory of, 36n.
non-causal theory of, 17, 24 ff.
non-intentional, 16
oblique theory of, 33, 51 f.
origin of, 6
philosophy of, 1 f., 45
purposive-causal theory of, 16, 26,
30 f., 33 ff., 36n., 37
rationalization of, 28
sci en tific, 8 f.
 Index of subjects 363

simple, 12 mental,3
simple intentional, 16 natural,234
social,237 non-intentional, 3
social constitution of,S Autonomy, 190 ff., 200 ff., 204 ff.
social philosophy of, 6
theory of, i, 11 f., 15
volition theory of, 34 Behavior
Acts ascriptions of, 61 f.
basic,66 in actions, 19
non·basic, 65 f. intentional, 2,46 ff.
Actualism, 88,97 intentionality of, 22, 58 f.
Adjudication mere,46 f., 53 f., 57 ff.
constitutional, 157 non-intentionalisticalIy under-
moral,119 stood,23
theory of, 116 f. understanding, 21
Agency Behaviorism, 60
moral,200 existential, 1
rational, 200 Benefits
Alienation, 260, 270 undeniable, 157 f.
of life, 223 Bioethics, 283,298
ontological, 223 Biology, 283, 315, 323
Alltag, 229 ff., 229n. evolutionary, 323
vs History, 233 socio-, 317, 321, 323, 327
Analysis Biosociology, 320
conditional, 85 ff. Budapest school, 259
Anthropological school, 259
Anthropology, 2, 222
Argument Capacities
evaluative, 124 emotional, 97
incompatibilist, 85 Causality, 19 f., 32 f., 47 ff.
justificatory, 161 agent, 37
logical connection, 27,30,49 f., cybernetic, 35
56 f., 59 f., 63 will as, 201
moral, 119, 119n., 123 f. Causation, 43 ff.
nomological,36n. agent, 36 f.
The Chisholm-Lehrer, 92 ff. final,35
Attitudes Humean, 45, 49 f., 52
actualist, 97 nomic, 45,49 f.
conative, 36 f., 86 oblique theory of, 63 ff.
conative pro-, 92 ordinary, 36
doxastic, 36 f. purposive, 31, 35 f., 36n.
global character of, 59 f. purposive event-, 35
justifying, 58 f. singular, 32
364 Index a/subjects

Cause moral,208
event-, 36n. revolu tionary, 246, 248
final,37 Contract theory, 166 ff.
Humean, 17,21 Critical Theory vide Frankfurt
mental, 2 f., 16 School
non-Humean, 35
purposively, 35
Cause theory Deduction, 197
mental, 2,16 ff., 26 ff. Descriptions
Chains of events, 49 ff.
wayward causal, 19,35 vs criticism, 238
Choice Determinism, 73 f., 76,78,81 ff.
methodology of rational, 299 metaphysical, 90
Circle Development
hermeneutic, 62n. ergodic, 263
Claims, 154 ff. harmonius - of the world, 296
have, 155 scientific - technological, 288
justifiable, 157 Dispositions
make, 155 to behave, 60
valid, 154 ff. Doxa
Cognition the despised, 231
theory of, 253 Dualism
Communication, 214 f. mind and body, 3 f.
and interaction, 236 ff.
- situation, 7 ff.
Compatibilism, 74 ff., 102 Ego
Concepts transcendental, 220
dispositive, 145 Element
Conclusiveness counterfactual, 65
logical, 23 f. Empiricism, 2, 231
Conditionals Environmen t
causal, 87,90,96 deterioration of, 288
genuine, 91 preservation of, 289
material, 89 f. Epicurianism, 313
pseudo, 86, 89 ff. Epistemology,2 f., 46, 60
real,92 Epoche, 227 f.
subordinate, 91 Equality
true, 91 principle of, 270 f.
Congruence Equilibrium
between intentionality and mere method of reflective, 172, 174
behavior, 64 ff. Equivalence
Consciousness logical,90
false, 7,247 Equivocation, 95
 Index of subjects 365

Ethics, 2, 279, 281,292,294,321, Goods

324 highest, 206 ff.
bio-, 283, 298 primary, 168, 173
evo1u tionary, 316
foundation of, 282,324,331
general principle of, 315 Hermeneutics, 11 ff., 62n., 221 f.
meta-, 279 non-causal, 2
of knowledge, 326 f., 330 f. Hexeis, 102
of science, 303 History, 254
of scientific activity, 8 f. hermeneutic theory of, 11 f.
rational, 317 laws of, 10 f., 13, 246 ff.
scientific, 315,317 f., 320, 331 meaning of, 268
utilitarian, 328 of socialism, 256
m' science, 331 f., 336, 338 philosophy of, 10 f., 13,209,
Ethnomethodology, 226,235 224
Evaluation scientific theory of, 244
principle of, 189 vs common sense world, 233
Evolutionism, 335 Holism, 1
Evil Human rights
problem of, 211 f. declaration of, 292
Execution
principle of, 189
Existentialism, 317,320,343 Idealism
non-Marxian, 253
objective, 252
Factors transcendental, 232
initiating, 86 vs materialism, 252
Formula Ideology
universal, 191 f. criticism of, 238
Frankfurt School, 62 n., 220 f., legal positivism as, 142 f.
221n. scientific, 280
Freedom, 77,201 f., 204, 212, 214 Idioms
negative view of, 78 ff. causal,27
of action, 98 Imperative
of will, 6, 33, 98 authoritative, 134
positive view of, 81 categorical, 6,188 ff.
to act, 87, 98 social,7
Functionalism, 68 ff. Inclination
conceptual 26 f., 30, 67 f. dispositional,38
token, 68 Incompatibilism, 74 ff.
Indeterminism
physical, 83
Game, 8 Indexicality, 235
366 Index of subjects

Indifference Language
liberty of, 74,77 ff., 96 of actions, 267
Individualism, 237 of macrostructures, 267
Intentionality, 3,19,22,31,37, theory of, 11
46 ff. Laws
higher-order, 6 philosophy of, 107
multilevel, 6 f. physical, 33, 64
object-directed,3 practical, 109, 109n.
of behavior, 22 predictive theory of, 140
two-level, 6 f. psychological, 32 f.
Intentions, 2 f., 7, 12, 28n., 35 science of, 135
determinants of, 58n. social, 244, 248
in actions, 18,20 ff., 35 sociological,255
of actions, 18,21 teleological, 197, 199
social, 120 f. theoretical, 109
Interaction want-action, 36n.
and communication, 236 ff. universal, 190, 193 f., 196,201
Interest Laws
basic, 158 causal, 32, 50 ff., 61 ff.
principle, 154 ff. covering, 32 f., 50 ff., 61 f., 64,
specific, 157 68
- theories, 154 ff. deterministic, 61
Interpretation ideology of, 116
theory of, 11 legal, 109
Intuition logical, 128
basic, III ff. makers vs appliers, 122
moral, 109, 190 ff.
natural, 73, 80, 84,191 f., 197
Justice nature of, 5,107 ff.
principles of, 168 f. of history, 10 f., 13, 246 ff.
theory of, 6 Lebenswelt, 225, 228, 230, 230n.,
Justification, 146 f. 231,236 f.
of rights, 153 ff. ontology of, 231 f.
subject of, 172 und AI/tag, 229 ff., 229n.
vs explanation, 63, 65 Lekton
norm-, 132n.
Leninism, 246 ff.
Knowledge Liberty, 332
ethics of, 326 f., 330 f. equal basic, 174 f.
intrinsic vs instrumental value of indifference, 74, 77 ff., 96
of,309 ofscience,301 ff.
of spontaneity, 74, 76 ff., 96,
101
 Index of subjects 367

Life Metaphysics,2 f., 46, 60

real process of, 232 of the individual, 223
- welt, vide Lebenswelt Methodology
Linguistic condition (LC), 110 ff. Marxian, 243n.
Locomotions, 28n. of rational choice, 299
Logic Mind
atheoretical,131n. object-dependence of, 4
deontic, 127 ff. Mind and Body
of normative propositions, - dualism, 3
128 ff. philosophy of, 2
of norms, 128 ff. Monism
Lukacsism, 248 anomolous,52
Moral, 323 f.
biological foundations of, 319
Macrostructures - universals, 315 f.
language of, 267 Morality vs expedience, 161 f.
Man Motivation
as social animal, 219 - system, 100
essence of, 255
existence of, 255
Marxism, 1,10,13 f., 154,219 ff., Nature
243 ff., 317 confidence in, 213
Mask philosophy of, 315
character, 236 return to, 289 f.
Materialism system of, 192
historical, 245n., 246 f., 249, Necessity, 197
251,254,259 ff. historical, 254 f., 261
identity, 52, 67· logical, 57,84,92
neopraxistic, 252 Needs
scientific, 318 theory of, 154
token, 52, 68 Negligence, 78
traditional,252 Neodarwinism, 319 f., 324 f., 329
vs idealism, 252 Norms, 127 ff.
Meaning legal,133
historical, 11, 14 -lekton, 132n.
of action, 8, 12 logic of, 128 ff.
of attitude terms, 68 moral,158
of history, 268 Rechtssatz vs. Rechts-, 13 ff.
Mechanisms Noumenon
mental,83 homo, 199 f., 202, 206
Messianism
social, 244,260 ff.
Metaethics, 279 Objectivism, 231
368 Index a/subjects

ethical, 206 of Equal Basic Liberties, 174

in science, 227 of equality, 270 f.
Ontology of evaluation, 189
of lifeworld vide Lebenswelt of execution, 189
social, 260 Privileges
Order legal, 157
dynamic, 133 Progress, 335
legal, 133 ambiguous character of, 289 f.
moral, 335
of science, 329
Phenomenology, 219 ff. possibility of historical, 209
dialogical,237 scientific, 287 f., 295,300,330
Philosophy technical, 280, 289
analytic,1 f.,45 f.,62n.,67, technological, 290, 298
108 Prohairesis, 102
natural, 323 Propositions
of action, 1 ff., 45 ff. logic of normative, 128 ff.
of history, 10 f., 13, 204, 224 normative, 127 ff.
oflanguage, 2, 219 Psychology, 28n., 70, 103, 226n.
of law, 107 nomological reason -,33
of mind and body, 2 stimulus-response, 15
social, 2, 219 ff., 243 ff. - used as torture, 292
Physics, 283
Pollution, 289
atomic -, 294 Rationality, 197,210
Positivism, 280,325,328 Realism
- fight, 221 legal, 136
legal, 123, 127, 140, 140n., Reality
142 ff. manyfold vs excellent, 232
Possibility,S, 11,28,67,73 ff. Reanimation, 286
principle of alternative -ies, 73 Reasons
Praxism, 251,261 executive, 122
neo-, 251 ff. practical, 212
Predicates Recognition
purely legal, 109 rule of, 137n., 137 ff.
semi-legal, 110 Reductionism, 96, 141
Principles Reference
Difference, 173 explicit, 65
distributional, 163 implicit, 65
general - of ethics, 315 Relevance
interest, 156 f. and the typical, 235 ff.
legal, 156 Research
moral, 156, 190 classified -, 311
 Index of subjects 369

Responsibility,S, 11, 36n., 73 ff., modern, 327

120,200 mor~ problems of,S
Rights normative code of, 307
basic, 159, 168 objectivism in, 227
basic moral, 153, 157,160,163, oflaw, 135
167,169,173 f., 177 f. Science
constitutional, 153, 160 utilitarian vs pure, 302
declaration of, 292 utility of, 302, 313 f.
human, 153, 163 vs ethics, 331,336,338
justification of, 153 ff. vs moral, 285
legal, 156 ff. Scientism, 279, 285
manifesto, 156 Sentences
moral, 156 ff. deontic, 127 ff.
natural, 159, 170 elliptic, 133
Rights genuine vs spurious legal, 136
political, 174 iso, 135
principle of human, 6 ought-, 135, 139
specific, 157 Socialism, 246, 250, 257 f., 265,
subsidiary, 171 270
Rules, 161 history of, 256
kg~,112,136,146 Society
linguistic, 7 basic structure of, 168 ff.
mor~, 156 Sociobiology, 317,321,323,327
of recognition, 137n., 137 ff. Sociology
valid,138 bio-, 320
Rulings reflexive, 226
authoritative, 118 ff. wild,239
Solipsism
/Jasein-, 222
Science transcendent~, 220, 224, 231
and ethics, 282 Spinozism, 290
and society, 282 Spontaneity, 78
aristo-, 279 liberty of, 74, 76 ff., 96,101
ethical control of, 284 Stage
ethical limits to, 308 deliberative vs executive, 119 ff.
ethics of, 303 f. pure executive, 121 f.
experimental, 330 Stalinism, 249 ff., 262,266
factual vs normative, 135 Stance
Science design, 69
ide~s of, 342 intentional, 69
- indicators, 302 physic~, 69
insufficient, 293 Statements
legal, 134 f. can-,80
370 Index of subjects

conditional, 96 Understanding
deontic, 141 behavior, 21, 57 f.
dispositional, 95 Universality
external vs internal, 136 ff. moral, 197,213
legal, 109 ff., 127 ff. Universalizing, 236
practical, 141 Universe
States order of -,290,315
separateness of, 117 Utilitarianism, 159 ff., 3 13 f.
Statism, 258 classical, 305,334
Stoicism, 290,313 rule, 161
Structuralism, 220, 236
Structures
universal, 232 Values
Subjectivism, 195 action-guiding moral,S
Syllogisms Volition
practical, 23 f., 27 f., 34, 56 ff., second-order, 98 ff.
58n., 59, 61 f., 165
Systems
legal, 114 Wantings, 34 f., 96 ff.
motivation, 100 extrinsic, 34, 38
valuational, 100 intrinsic, 34, 38
Wanton, 100
Will, 199,207
Technicism, 231 adequacy of, 83
Technology as causality, 201
scientific -,295 free, 98, 203
Teleology, 6, 13 freedom of, 6, 33,98
in history, 11 moral, 200 ff.
- theory, 2 rational, 190. 199 ff.
Thesis self-legislating, 203
The supplementation, 88 ff. weakness of, 101 f.
Translation Wille vs Willkiir, 203 f., 212
indeterminacy of radical, 62n. World
Truth, 323 f., 342 common sense, vise Alltagswelt
scientific, 281 life-, vide Lebenswelt
scientific criterions of, 281
Trying, 34, 55,66,86 f.
Turing machine programs, 67